US Foreign Policy in the Middle East
From Crises to Change

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us FOREIGN p Ol Icy IN th E mIddl E East
For my wife Amira and my son Ridan
Us foreign policy in the Middle East from crisis to change

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ASHGATE
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International crisis has long been a crucible for the development of US policies. Among the Middle Eastern crises that have erupted into American public awareness since World War II are the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, the Iran crisis (1951–53), Suez (1956), Lebanon (1958), the June or six-day War (1967), the War of Attrition (1969–70), the October or yom kippur War and the oil embargo (1973–74), the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), the first Iraq War (1990–91), 9/11 (2001), and the second Iraq War (2003–present). These crises commonly expose deficiencies in the pre-crisis US policy toward the region and resulted in changes to that policy.

Following each of these crises, the US grappled with the fundamental problem of how to create a stable post-crisis order that would both serve its own interests and uproot the sources of the crisis. These junctures constituted dramatic moments of turmoil that rendered the pre-crisis order obsolete and forced policy to change.

The Middle East in general has remained a main centre of concern for the US because of the West’s dependency of the region’s oil resources. The aim of this book is to understand change and to explain the vicissitudes in US foreign policy toward the Middle East. When does change take place? What factors or variables cause a state to ditch its previous policy and to embark upon a new course? What type of crises affects change? What is the role of ideas in shaping new policies?

The period after World War II saw an intensive and extensive expansion of US military and diplomatic involvement in the Middle East. The United States was historically disconnected from the abuses of colonial policy in the area (Dobson and Marsh 2001; Quandt 1970). Many a rab conservative leaders therefore welcomed US involvement at the regional level. Yet US foreign policy toward the Middle East since World War II has been neither coherent nor consistent, especially during the first phase (1945–73) (see Table 1.1), given the discrepancy between various American interests and the complexity of realizing these interests. This inconsistency was highlighted by the crises, whose eruption magnified the uncertainty surrounding the realization of US interests and required a great deal of creativity by American experts on the Middle East (Terry 2005).

In general, US policy in the Middle East cannot be analyzed on a purely rational basis. This theory presumes that policymakers possess full information about the event under consideration and they always choose the policy option that maximizes their utilities. It also explicitly assumes that foreign policy is always in flux and that policymakers persistently re-examine their policies and do not hesitate to ditch a policy that does not maximize their utilities, or that they are always ready to adopt a new policy line that could bring about better results.
## Table 1.1 American foreign policy in the Middle East: crises, interests and ideas

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<th>US interests in the region</th>
<th>Ideas/Problem-Solving theories</th>
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<td><strong>I. 1945–73</strong></td>
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<td>a rab-Israeli War, 1948</td>
<td>1. Free access to the oil resources and supporting the oil majors. 2. Supporting and protecting Israel. 3. Blocking Soviet penetration. 4. Protecting traditional pro-Western regimes.</td>
<td>1. Realism, containment policy and domino theory. 2. Orientalism. 3. Limiting arms exports to the area in order to prevent arms race. 4. Keeping the US aloof of the a rab-Israeli peace process.</td>
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<td>Iranian crisis, 1951–53</td>
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<td>The Oil Embargo of 1973–74</td>
<td>1. Supporting and protecting Israel. 2. Blocking Soviet penetration. 3. Steady supply of oil at a reasonable price. 4. Recycling petrodollars into the US market.</td>
<td>1. Gradually promoting peace between Israel and its major a rab foes. 2. Orientalism. 3. Increasing arms sales to the region as a means of recycling petrodollars. 4. Increasing the dependence of the a rab oil exporting countries on US protection and arms sales. 5. Realism, containment policy and domino theory.</td>
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<td><strong>III. 1979–2001</strong></td>
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States unfortunately do not operate in this manner in the domain of foreign affairs, as states do not re-examine their policies every day.

Based on the writings of scholars who have examined the impact of ideas on state behaviour ( Adler and Haas 1992; Goldstein 1995; Goldstein and Keohane 1993a; Haas 1992; Keohane 2000), this book argues that reality in the Middle East is not causally independent of the minds of policymakers. Crises create uncertainty and spur policymakers to come out with new ideas as solutions that may deliver better results. The US foreign policy toward the Middle East from World War II to the second Iraq War has experienced the challenge of responding to major crises in the region, shaping long-term policy that directed different administrations, aimed at stabilizing the Middle East. The argument of this book is that each one of the major crises menaced US interests and highlighted the shortcomings in existing policies, thus undermining existing policies’ validity in the eyes of top American policymakers. This uncertainty stimulated the consolidation of a new set of ideas among these policymakers, marking a departure from previous beliefs and aiming to address the roots of the recent crisis and to construct a new reality that would better serve US interests. In this sense each set of ideas became embedded within formal US institutions, influencing the way American policymakers contemplated and comprehended foreign policy, assessed problems, and formulated strategies toward the region. Such embedded ideas, in turn, regulated American relations with the Middle East—a political region in which power and interests shape outcomes by the virtue of the ideas that channel them. In short, the eruption of a major crisis reset the prevailing mindset and allowed the emergence of another mindset. Each set of ideas endured till the eruption of the next major crisis. In

### Table 1.1 continued

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<td>T he t errorist attacks of 11 S eptember, 2001</td>
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<td>V. 2003–present</td>
<td>1. A chieving stability within Iraq and establishing a strong pro-American federal regime in Baghdad. 2. B locking Iran from developing its nuclear capability. 3. S teady supply of oil at a reasonable price.</td>
<td>1. R educing US dependence on oil in general and Middle Eastern oil in particular. 2. R approchement with Iran? Or else using force against Iran?</td>
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1. Reducing US dependence on oil in general and Middle Eastern oil in particular. 2. Rapprochement with Iran? Or else using force against Iran?
other words, US foreign policy in the Middle East shows a remarkable continuity between major crises.

Finally, ideas have a double function. First, ideas shape long-term strategies, thus guide US foreign policy. Second, ideas create understanding with regional forces about the desired order, resulting in the consolidation of a hegemonic or more precisely semi-hegemonic order in the Gramscian sense. This point is explained in more detail in the next chapter.

Shared ideas are not, however, consolidated in an ontological vacuum. Indeed collective ideas obviously guide foreign policy. Yet such ideas have a constitutive power in the context of other fundamental forces that facilitate such guidance. Power facilitates change and makes its occurrence probable, while it is the power of shared ideas that bring about change and make it practical. Metaphorically, we may think of the forces of gravity and friction as ones that not only constrain our movements, but also facilitate it. Yet the direction of our movement is guided by our mind—ideas. The question that remained unanswered is what affects change in shared ideas, and why certain crises alter shared ideas or policy lines, while other crises do not.

From the list of crises mentioned above, it is possible to discern four major ones that constituted turning points in US foreign policy in the Middle East: the oil embargo of 1973–74, the Iranian revolution, the events of 9/11, and the second Iraq War. Each one of these crises had a profound impact on US economy, society, or polity and raised a merican public awareness about US policy toward the region (see Table 1.1).

Phase one, between 1945 and 1973, marks the first epoch of shaping and defining US policy interests in, and consolidating a merican understanding of, the political culture of the Middle East. Regional crises that influenced forged and then altered US middle Eastern policy were the Iranian crisis of 1951–53, the suez crisis of 1956, the Lebanon crisis of 1958, the six-day War, and the War of Attrition. These crises had limited domestic impact within the US. They brought about a learning process but did not result in redefinition of US interests or rethinking the efficacy of its current policy. For instance, the Iranian crisis of 1951–53 and the suez crisis gave rise to the desire to isolate nationalist leaders. These two crises nonetheless marked neither a watershed in the American comprehension of the politics of the region nor a redefinition of American interests in the area.

Phase two, between 1974 and 1979, started with the Arab oil embargo of 1973–74, the sharp rise in oil prices, high inflation, and economic recession. The embargo, nationalization of oil resources, and the accumulation of petrodollars in the hands of few sparsely populated oil monarchies added more complexity to the US policy and required a re-examination of the current policy.

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1 It is also possible to claim that the 1948 Israeli War of Independence had raised major public awareness of the Jewish constituency within the US, but not a merican public awareness of the middle East in general.
t he Islamic revolution in Iran and the captivity of a merican diplomats as hostages marked the onset of phase three (1979–2001). t he revolution cost the us its control of Iran and showed the rise of anti-a mericanism among muslim societies, and also brought about another sharp rise in oil prices. t his event undermined the state-centric approach that ignored a rab/muslim societies and discredited the ideas of orientalism that called for Western cooperation with authoritarian traditional regimes, with minor embroilments in domestic affairs. t he crisis stimulated a new thinking, especially about a merican cooperation with corrupt, authoritarian middle Eastern regimes that left the lower classes alienated (s adowski 1993).

The terrorist attacks of 11 s eptember, 2001, marked the advent of the fourth phase. t hese events undermined the feeling of security within the us and raised once again questions about us cooperation with authoritarian regimes and the lack of democratization in the region. t hese events brought about a major reassessment of US foreign policy and redefinition of US interests in the region (Miller and s tefanova 2007, 18; pauly 2005, 41).

And finally, the sectarian war in Iraq that followed the US invasion in 2003 has caused a rethinking of the US’s democratization policy in the area and marks the onset of a new phase. a t this stage it is still too early to assess new directions in us foreign policy toward the middle East, but it is possible to assert predict with some certainty that future a merican administrations may refrain from promoting democratization processes in the a rab world through military or even peaceful means (pillar 2001, 14; pauly and I ansford 2005, 31). f uture administrations may also seek to diminish us dependency on middle Eastern oil supplies in the face of the environmental damage caused by the use of fossil fuel, while some may consider that the costs of US involvement in the region outweigh the benefits.

Over the past few decades, major crises have impelled a reassessment of us foreign policy toward the middle East and spurred the rise of new ideas on how to cope with the post-crisis reality. While each major crisis undermined the credibility of the set of ideas that underpinned pre-existing policy, the crisis allowed the incumbent president to contemplate new ideas that would reshape us policy or construct new institutions aimed at maintaining political stability in the region.

In general, us foreign policy toward the middle East has oscillated between two positions that are not mutually exclusive. The first is a global approach: the us presumes that overall stable relationships between states would result in stability within each pro-West middle Eastern state and consequently regional stability. t he us pursued a state-centric policy, with minor interference in the internal affairs of the middle Eastern states. t he us adopted this policy until 1979. u ntil 1974, the us sought to maintain regional stability by limiting arms sales (hoping that this would mitigate the arms race between the middle Eastern states), blocking s oviet penetration into the area, and focusing merely on serving a merican interests. b etween 1974 and 1979, the us hoped to realize regional stability through a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the aftermath of the oil embargo of 1973, Western dependence on middle Eastern oil increased
(Gilbar 1997a, 33), while the oil monarchies were the main pillars of the American-led order in the region. The Arab oil exporting countries and Iran had nationalized the oil companies throughout the 1970s and became responsible for downstream as well as upstream processes of oil supply ( Sampson 1975). These regimes had also accumulated great sums of petrodollars. Consequently, the United States needed to create a common understanding with these regimes about a reasonable price of oil and to put in place institutions and policies that would recycle petrodollars into the US market.

The second position began immediately after the Iranian revolution and called for deepening US intervention in the internal affairs of the regional states, while the aggregation of stability in each of these states would result in a regional overall stability. By pursuing this policy, the US aimed to assuage or even restructure what is perceived by many American policymakers as irrational trends typical to the Arab-Islamic culture in its anti-modern and anti-Western behaviour. The Iranian Revolution severely challenged the American perception regarding the everlasting passivity of Arab societies and their deference to traditional leaders. In response, the US sought to construct new institutions that would address the problems of alienated societies in order to preempt the spread of the Islamic revolution throughout the Arab world. During this time, the US constructed capitalist institutions that would raise the average living standards of the lower classes, yet stopped short of advocating democracy. The US also needed to keep Iran from exporting the revolution into neighbouring Arab countries. This new reality required new thinking. The solutions were not obvious to US policymakers.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001, deepened US interference in the internal affairs of the Middle Eastern states. For the first time, the US began aggressively promoting the democratization of Islamic polities. His process was predicated on abandoning ideas regarding the incompatibility of Islamic values with democracy, and further underpinned by the conviction that ordinary Muslims, who live in free societies would be reluctant to join terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda or perceive the US as a foe.

In short, during the last three and a half decades, US foreign policy toward the Middle East has shifted from advocating authoritarianism, to embracing capitalism, and finally, to promoting democratization. These shifts have been administered after new ideas emerged to supersede old ones, thus justifying new thrusts in the policy approach.

Two genres of theoretical approaches offer explanation for American foreign policy in the region: ‘structural’ and ‘cultural’. Within the structural approach, we encounter two major theories: neo-realism/ hegemonic stability and interdependence.

The classical conception of international relations is that under the conditions of anarchy in the international system, crises erupt and wars occur because there is no supranational organization that is able to regulate relations between sovereign states. Foreign policy is conducted in an arena of power politics, where there is no reliable mechanism for coordinating relations and regulating disputes. Under these conditions, power is the most efficacious instrument in conducting foreign policy,
where in the words of Thucydides ‘the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.’ (Thucydides 1998, Book V, verse 89). In this regard, the hegemonic stability theory examines the international distribution of power that acts as a determinant for a state’s role (Lake 1995; Keohane 1996). Being the most powerful state in the world since World War II, the US has become a hegemon in both the West and Middle East, whose role has concentrated on providing international public goods, including a steady supply of oil. In fulfilment of this purpose, the US has had to participate in the regional balance of power throughout the Middle East in order to keep regional or state aspirations from controlling the oil fields, for example, as Egypt under Nasser (Pan-Arabism) or Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Furthermore, historically, military power was an efficacious instrument for generating wealth, while wealth was always subordinated to power. In the Middle East, controlling the regional oil fields, directly or indirectly, has been a source of power.

The theory of interdependence, while not dismissing the classical axioms of power politics, nonetheless, urges attention to a set of new forces in international politics that engendered interdependency between states. In our present era there are many states, especially in the Middle East region, that are impoverished but command tremendous military power, while others are wealthy, yet militarily weak. The fact that some states are militarily weak does not render them less influential or an easy prey to the more powerful ones. In the US, the economy has become sensitive to fluctuations in world commodity and financial markets, and vulnerable to energy crises. For many years economists were confident that national governments can control inflation and unemployment by relying on fiscal and monetary tools. The oil crises in 1973–74, for instance, had proved that small states could exploit their power within an issue area (the oil market) and inflict tremendous costs on the hegemon, while national remedies are unlikely to succeed without coordination of policies with other nations. The theory of interdependence examines asymmetrical distribution of power within an issue area (Keohane and Nye 1989). The seminal analysis made by Keohane and Nye shows how small states, despite their overall power inferiority relative to a superpower, can influence outcome in a specific issue area and even create issue linkage, thus influencing international politics in areas that are beyond their control. In these circumstances, military power does not seem to reap benefits commensurate with its costs, nor a useful tool to deal with world economic crises.

By contrast, the cultural approach looks at the Arab-Islamic culture as an ontological, fixed structure that controls the lives of Arab-Muslims. So called ‘orientalist’ scholars insist that the US should work in unity with these cultural forces—that is to say, they prescribe cooperation with traditional authoritarian regimes in the Middle East (Kedourie 1994; for a critique of this approach see Hudson 1995; Hudson 1996; Anderson 1995).

This book argues that neither approach captures the dynamics of US foreign policy in the Middle East, since both are unable to explain long-term transformation from what Gramsci calls one historical block into another. The
realist theory refers to power as the most significant variable influencing outcome in international relations. yet power does not determine ideas, nor shape the way states think of each other, nor automatically lead to a conflict between states. the interdependence theory describes the way states react to power relations within an issue area, yet without taking into account how the process of interaction reshapes the identity of the involved actors. the theory cannot explain, for instance, how culture shaped the interaction between the us and its middle Eastern counterparts or how interactions shape what a lexander Wendt calls the common identity of these actors (Wendt 1999). i likewise, the hegemonic stability theory examines the distribution of power that ascribes an international role to the hegemon—an influence which, in turn, is translated into state policy (Lake 1995; Gilpin and Gilpin 2001). In this view, the hegemon ensures international public goods and punishes recalcitrant actors, but the theory assumes that the hegemon stops short of attempting to influence their identity.

the cultural orientalist approach, by contrast, assumes that the hegemon takes the identity of the arab states as exogenously given, rather than one that is (at least partially) shaped by the hegemon itself. furthermore, both the structural as well as the cultural approaches do not provide for a learning process on the part of the hegemon, especially after the eruption of a crisis. a t an early stage of a crisis, the sources of the crisis are analyzed and new ideas emerge—ideas that channel the hegemon toward its mission of forging the identity of middle Eastern countries. It is my argument, therefore, that none of these approaches examines the arrangements through which ideas are filtered out under the given international, material constraints, and which are then incorporated into state institutions.

alternatively, scholars from psychology and social constructivism have paid tremendous attention to the impact of ideas on policymaking. scholars of psychology in international relations have focused on the dynamics of consolidating the worldview of an individual policymaker or analyzed the ideas that she holds. yet given this focus on analyzing decision-making at the level of the individual or the micro-political level, these scholars were unable to explain how shared ideas or consensus guides foreign policy, regardless of the worldview of a key policymaker—that is, how shared ideas guide the foreign policy of several consecutive administrations. c onstructivist scholars, nonetheless, have illuminated the constitutive power of shared ideas in constructing reality while avoiding cause-and-effect analysis. Yet these scholars face difficulties in explaining change, given the fact that shared ideas are not often changed by policymakers. c onstructivists have demonstrated how shared ideas construct reality, but they failed to explain how and when shared ideas themselves are constructed or reshaped by reality. In short, constructivists cannot use ideas as a source of continuity as well as change, because this may raise the problem of tautology.

the claim of this book is that policy is an outcome of politics wherein a group of policymakers contemplate a set of ideas in order to achieve certain goals, but when these ideas lose credibility as a result of external events, a new order emerges (Ikenberry 1992; Gourevitch 1986, 18; t erry 2005; d oyle and Ikenberry 1997).
Ideas for solving a political crisis and forging long-term policy are plentiful, but if an idea is to prevail as an actual policy, it must obtain endorsement from those who have political power. Furthermore, theoretical prescriptions of how to deal with the Middle East can tell us a lot about policy alternatives, but unless a crisis undermines existing policies and allow the rise of new alternatives, and unless new ideas gain the endorsement and conviction of those who have power, these prescriptions will not tell us enough about how the choices actually been made between the various alternatives. The argument of this book is that the breaking out of a major crisis highlights the deficiencies in the old set of ideas and allows for the emergence of a new set that ultimately can, and will, help policymakers construct a new reality; thus, once a set of ideas turns into inter-subjectivity, this set obtains a constitutive effect.

A crisis forces a state’s reaction and unleashes events that could be given varying interpretations. It raises the uncertainty level and stimulates the demand for new interpretations and institutionalization.

In short, policymakers are influenced by their worldviews during the process of interpreting and redefining the world around them. During times of tranquillity, policymakers’ perception of social reality is always coloured by the prevailing ideas or inter-subjectivity, yet once these ideas cease to serve national interests, a shared meaning emerges and directs the policymakers’ endeavours to in shape and manage the new reality, and this shared meaning prevails until new conditions dictate otherwise.

The next chapter lays down the theoretical assumptions of this book and reviews various theories that endeavour to explain US foreign policy, in general, and toward the Middle East, in particular. Chapters 3–7 deal with the impact of each of the major crises on US foreign policy in the Middle East and how each of them had undermined preexisting ideas and policies and led to the forging of new ones.
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chapter 2
Ideas matter

Foreign policy decisions rarely emerge from abstract analysis
(Kissinger 1979, 353).

Continuity of policy follows success, while innovation follows failure
(Reiter 1994, 490).

The occurrence of a major crisis constitutes a rare historical point in time, in which states, and especially superpowers, possess the ability to create and maintain a new order in international politics. These moments come after dramatic events, such as wars, revolutions, economic depressions or, in short, major crises that may lead to change in the international system (Ikenberry 2001; Gilpin 1981; Vasquez and Mansbach 1983, 257; Vasquez 1985; Katzenstein 1989). These events may render the old belief system underpinning the existing order obsolete, as it ceases to constitute a problem-solving tool or to serve the interests of a powerful state (Cox 1993). In other words, a major crisis exposes policy problems for which a prevailing set of ideas provides little guidance. This impels policymakers to search for new ideas that could help them envision new policy solutions, especially if they believe that there is evidence that the new ones will work better than the old ones.

In the history of nations, these historical junctures especially took place immediately after major wars, as the winning state envisioned the construction of a new post-war world order based on its definition of its interests and on its normative understanding of the way international relations should be conducted (Ikenberry 1992; Ikenberry and Upchan 1990, 285; Ruggie 1982, 385; Clark 1989, 8).

Under these circumstances, a powerful state seeks to establish new organizing rules and regulations that constitute an extension of its own values, norms and organizing principles. A major war, for instance, provides a powerful state with an opportunity to reshape international relations, based on its normative understanding of the way world order should look like. Due to the crisis, leaders of powerful states find themselves in an advantageous position to apply new rules and principles that will guide present as well as future governments.

Ikenberry, for example, examines the consolidation of an international order following a major war, as the nascent hegemon utilizes this rare moment to establish a new world order (Ikenberry 2001, 4). Ikenberry discerns three options for the newly hegemonic state: domination, abandonment, or transformation. In his view, the invective for the new hegemon to construct a new order depends on two independent variables: the power disparity after the major war, and the
types of states. Ikenberry claims that a democratic hegemon tends to establish binding institutions and would forfeit short term gains for longer terms ones, while the weaker states in this system have incentive to establish regulations that would reduce the risks of domination or abandonment. Ikenberry claims that a hegemonic democratic state endeavours to institutionalize a postwar order that restrains power and reassures weaker rivals, rather than simply relying on balance of power strategies. Yet, Ikenberry’s analysis focuses only on the way major wars cause to the consolidation of a new world order, while other non-war major crises could also bring about change. and his argument is problematic when it comes to third World countries, because the democratic hegemon should decide whether the culture of these nations is compatible with what seems to the hegemon ‘benevolent’ institutions. In this case, the hegemon may opt for domination.

Likewise, Robert Cox claims that after World War II, the US established in Western Europe a hegemonic order based on three components: consent, institutions and power (Cox 1996, 136). Cox also analyses transformation from what Gramsci calls one historical bloc into another. Cox uses three variables: social forces, forms of state and world order to explain transformation. For example, a change in the organization of production causes to the rise of a new class, which in turn transforms the form of state into a democratic-capitalist state and even a colonizing one. The problem with Cox’s argument, however, is that in his view a world hegemonic and non-hegemonic orders are mutually exclusive. His book argues that there could be international orders that are partially or semi hegemonic. For example, in the Middle East, order was based on understanding between the US and the local traditional regimes, but without the consent of the subaltern classes. Moreover, change could take place under the same constellations and configurations of social forces, world order and forms of states. For example, the 1973–74 oil crisis brought about change in US foreign policy and in order in the Middle East, simply because the Arab oil exporting countries were suddenly able to use their oil power to express their dissatisfaction with US peace process policy.

The focus of this book is on the way in which the eruption of each of the major regional crises in the Middle East shows the obsolescence of each succeeding set of ideas that had hitherto guided US foreign policy toward the region. In some of these crises, the eruption signalled the disenchantment of regional actors with US foreign policy, and these actors demanded a change in the course of this policy. Each crisis changed the distribution of gains and compelled the US to rethink its foreign policy and to incorporate new ideas that would replace beliefs that had hitherto guided its policy. Following a major crisis, the US undertook measures that would, it believed, prevent a loss of influence, a substantial plunge in its economic gains or a sharp upsurge in its costs. The new policy was guided by a shared set of ideas that were consolidated in the aftermath of the crisis. The US endeavoured to transform its unfavourable post-crisis power position into a more durable order that would preserve the allegiance of its allies and maintain regional stability. In short, power makes change possible; ideas make it feasible.
There are six central arguments of this book. First, a major crisis renders the existing order obsolete and sends signals to the hegemon about the disenchantment of regional powers with this order. Second, regional powers are able to inflict costs on the hegemon and undermine an existing order, but regional powers cannot create a new regional order by themselves, regardless of the hegemon’s position.

Third, the hegemon contemplates new ideas that envision the creation of new broad policy patterns that not merely serve as a mechanism of political control by the hegemon, but also lock regional allies in a favourable set of post-crisis arrangements that assuage their fears of domination or overreaction by the hegemon. This set of arrangements operates like the pillars that underpin a Gramscian hegemonic order, in which the hegemon does not merely rely on its coercive power in the creation and maintenance of a new order, but also creates an order that wins the consent of regional states. Domination through consent is important because an order that is predicated merely on the power disparity between the hegemon and the regional states is not durable or stable over time. Regional states can use their asymmetrical power position within an issue area, opposing the overall asymmetrical power distribution that favours the hegemon in order to reverse what seems to them as an unfavourable order.

Fourth, in the Middle East, there are three parties to an order: the hegemon, the local regimes and the local people. Unless each one of these three parties is satisfied with the existing order, the order could not be called fully hegemonic in the Gramscian sense. In other words, while there could exist an international consensus about an order that results in the rise of a semi-hegemonic order, given the lack of democracy or legitimate regimes, that order does not point to the existence of a regional, durable hegemonic order. The institutionalization of arrangements of an order both at the international as well as the domestic levels intends to limit the recourse to power by the hegemon as well as by regional states (see Halabi 2004; Ozkececi-Taner 2005, 253).

Fifth, in order to stabilize the new order, the hegemon creates international or regional institutions, or encourages regional states to create domestic institutions, and to abide by the institutions’ rules, in order to guide behaviour in an orderly and predictable manner.

Sixth, given the plethora of states in a region and the existence of contradictory interests, the hegemon may pursue policies that are in discrepancy with each other; for example, after 1974, the US decided to seek a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict and at the same time conducted an all-out sale of weapons to the region.

My goal in this book is not to demonstrate that only ideas matter or that ideas outshine all other factors, especially the balance of power, in explaining foreign policy change. My goal, first, is to demonstrate that reality is not independent of cognition and that ideas have power in constructing social reality. Second, I intend to examine the deficiencies of both the orientalist and post-orientalist theories that purportedly explain US foreign policy but that have thus far failed to account for change in this policy. My third goal is to expose the deficiencies in the rational
choice theory that reduces social behaviour to materialist structures, where these structures could not be reduced to group cognition.

**Crisis, New Ideas, and Change**

Policy is based on convention and inter-subjectivity, wherein a set of powerful ideas shared by a group of actors sustains an existing order. If these prevailing ideas lose their credibility, a new order emerges. The major question is what could shake the credibility of a convention. In general, the breakout of a major crisis highlights the deficiencies in the old set of ideas and allows for the emergence of a new set that ultimately will help policymakers construct a new reality; in this sense, ideas have a constitutive effect. Furthermore, a crisis stimulates new discursive practices that delegitimize existing practices and prevailing ideas. The new practices lead the actor(s) to forge a new reality that would, through shared meanings, ascribe a new identity to the agents, thereby affecting the way they define their interests (Adler 1997; Ruggie 1998). Ideas channel policymakers in shaping, manipulating, and steering the realities which they face. In this regard, Peter Haas argues that ‘control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power,’ and that ‘the diffusion of new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of behaviour and prove to be an important determinant of international policy coordination’ (Haas 1992, 2).

Throughout the past five decades, US foreign policy toward the Middle East was predicated on its understanding of the nature of the region’s culture. Applying these ideas aimed to facilitate self-interests—namely, a steady supply of oil and the recycling of petrodollars back into US hands. When US interests changed dramatically after September 2001, the US redefined its interests and priorities in a new order and sought new ideas that would keep the Middle East stable. By establishing a link between repressive regimes in the region and anti-Western terrorism, this new idea provided the basis for the US to reshape the region after its own democratic image.

Under certain given material constraints, cultural perceptions influence the way actors set their foreign policy and construct new institutions—paradigms that regulate relations in the short term, as well as in the long run. Hence, interactions between nations do not take place in an ideational void; they are always planned and channelled by ideas and always over material conditions as well. Therefore, understanding change should take both the ontological, material structure and the ideational consensus into account. In other words, interactions between states take place under the constraints of the material structure, while guided by ideas embedded within institutions. Further, the shaping of reality or identity of actors is not unplanned; this process cannot be based only on an incremental, spontaneous accumulation of actions and via the forging of a collective identity. The repetition of interactions indicates that they are shaped by other structures that regulate them.
Additionally, the identity that the actors attribute to each other determines the framework of the interactions and the direction of change. Even actors who seldom interacted, such as the US and Saudi Arabia before World War II, are motivated by narratives concerning each other, even in their first encounter. In short, interactions are directed by mutual perceptions and constrained by material conditions. Interactions are a function of inter-subjectivity and the distribution of capabilities (overall power distribution as well as within an issue area). An examination of US foreign policy in the Middle East in the wake of the 1973 oil embargo, for instance, should take into account the distribution of world oil reserves, the accumulated conceptions in the West about the Arab/Islamic world, the sparse populations of the Arab oil-exporting countries and the US’s overall economic and military capabilities.

The eruption of a major crisis raises the uncertainty level and stimulates the demand for new interpretations and institutions. It also propels a state’s reaction and unleashes events that could be given varying interpretations. Under conditions of uncertainty, the impact of ideas put forward by individuals (especially experts) on policy choice increases (Goldstein and Keohane 1993b, 10). A crisis may unravel prevailing shared understandings and even the definition of state interests (Widmaier 2003, 63). In other words, a major crisis constitutes a turning point—a place where uncertainty stimulates the demand for new ideas and creates its own supply. The rise of a new set of shared meanings does not necessarily indicate the disappearance of the previous one in its entirety; rather, the modification of some prevailing ideas would deal more effectively with the roots of the crisis. The Iranian Revolution of 1979, for instance, did not bring about the demise of the orientalist set of ideas, but forced major modifications and gave rise to the school of neo-orientalism. In fact, major crises in the region encouraged American scholars to build useful theories for the US to protect its interests. These are problem-solving theories that seek to guide policymakers in their assessment of the events in the region.

At least in 1979 and 2001, US policymakers treated the causes of these crises as in part the result of the existing consensus, which was seen as part of the shortcomings in US policy that fuelled the crisis. This point suggests that policymakers who were locked into a set of ideas ultimately faced difficulties bringing in new ideas during times of tranquillity, let alone engaging in a process of learning by doing as long as stability is maintained. Thus, each of the crises begot a new set of ideas that not only addressed problems in the Arab world, but also questioned assumptions among US policymakers—leaders whose concepts were no less responsible for the crisis. Following a major crisis, new ways of discourse take effect through the construction of new institutions. The manner in which the outdated set of ideas is perceived to have caused the crisis creates a new scale of social meanings according to which pre- and post-crisis ideas are accepted or rejected. The new set of assumptions created by the triumphant ideas then restructures existing conditions and readjusts them for the sake of realizing American interests.
moreover, a major crisis stimulates change as it spurs a political debate about the deficiencies of the existing set of ideas and policies and how to cope with the new challenges in the long run (Legro 2005, 14). These dramatic shocks show the obsolescence of existing ideas and beliefs, and give rise to new ideas that prevail until the occurrence of the next crisis.

Not every crisis stimulates the rise of new ideas; in the context of US involvement in the Middle East, only those crises that had profound domestic impact within the US instigated change. These crises include the oil embargo of 1973–4, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the events of 9/11, and the second Iraq War. The oil embargo, for instance, caused a shortage in oil supply across the Western world and an abrupt hike in oil prices and inflation. Other crises in the Middle East, such as the Suez crisis, the Six Days War or the first Iraq War of 1991 had less domestic repercussion; therefore these events had less effect on existing policies or long-term US foreign policy as a whole. In short, ideational logic is useful in explaining the remarkable consistency in US foreign policy in the Middle East, despite the occurrence of crises, such as the Six-Day War in 1967, the split within the Arab world over the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Camp David peace accord or the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

moreover, a crisis creates new goals for states. Under the new circumstances created by the crisis, ideas help policymakers in defining their goals. Ideas also influence foreign policy, as they constitute causal beliefs that provide clarity about, augment policymakers’ understanding of, or reduce the uncertainty over the goals to be achieved and the relationship between ends and means. Furthermore, policymakers often cope with situations that have several potential alternative ways of reaching a given equilibrium or a certain goal. In this sense, ideas have constitutive power in shaping strategies as well as international order. During periods of tranquility, ideas influence foreign policy as they are embedded in political institutions. But such ideas mark continuity rather than change. It is more interesting though to examine the power of ideas as causal beliefs that propel change in foreign policy. Thus, instead of focusing on continuity in international politics or resemblance in foreign policy between states, this book examines change and the causes that affect change in a state’s foreign policy during periods of transition.

The focus of this book is not on crisis management but on the assumption that a major crisis creates a new reality and policymakers need to continue dealing with the post-crisis reality in order to preclude the reoccurrence of such crisis or to prevent its spread (Reiter 1994, 494). For example, following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Kennedy administration needed to develop new ideas, such as détente policy, in order to prevent a similar crisis from recurring; this is different from contemplating new ideas of how to manage the crisis and to bring it to a peaceful end. Another example is the economic crisis in the early 1970s of high inflation coupled with sluggish economic growth and high unemployment. Stagflation put pressure on the fixed exchange rates system and led to the collapse of the Keynesian theory as the guiding paradigm for international monetary relations.
a new set of ideas, namely monetarism, replaced Keynesianism after policymakers were convinced that monetarism provided a more coherent explanation of the stagflation phenomenon (McNamara 1998, Chapter 2). Similarly, the Carter and the Reagan administrations had to develop new ideas about long-term strategies designated to prevent the spread of the Iranian fundamentalist Islamic revolution into neighbouring rab countries, either from the outside in or from the bottom up. In short, once a crisis ends, states do not go back to ‘business as usual’.

Collective ideas fundamentally shape foreign policy even during periods of tranquillity. Substitution of existing ideas does not take place very often. Transformation in foreign policy occurs when an external shock exposes a deficiency in the existing policy and thus renders obsolete the ideas that underpin that policy, thereby setting the stage for the rise of a new updated set of ideas.

The eruption of a major crisis changes reality and presents policymakers with situations that are unfamiliar. These policymakers come to the conclusion that their ideational structure is ill-suited to deal with the novel situation. They search for new ideas to guide a new strategy. Novel situations arise from the interaction of external and internal developments that mark social, political or economic discontinuity, such as the oil embargo, the Iranian revolution, and the 9/11 events, which had major domestic ramifications within the United States. Finally, policymakers are influenced by their worldviews during the process of interpreting and redefining the world around them. The perceived social reality is always coloured by prevailing ideas or assumptions. In addition, a shared meaning directs the policymakers’ endeavours in shaping and managing reality, and this shared meaning prevails until new conditions dictate otherwise.

**Positivism, Post-positivism and the Construction of Reality**

The major disputes between positivist and post-positivist theorists concern the following issues: whether policymakers possess full knowledge about the situation under consideration, whether national interests are exogenously given or endogenous to the state, whether all policy options available to policymakers are brought to their attention, and whether policymakers, as rational actors, always choose the policy alternative that will maximize their utilities (Campbell 2002, 26; Kurki 2006, 189). Positivist theories have focused on how the pursuit of self-interest affects politics and policy making under the constraints of structural variables. This has been true for realist, neorealist, neo-marxist, neoliberal institutionalist and rational choice theories (Smith 1996, 14). Positivist scholars, who pursue an empiricist methodology, underestimate the power of ideas in shaping reality. That is, how can abstract variables such as theories, conceptual models, norms, world views or principled beliefs, rather than self-interest or other observable variables, affect policymaking. These scholars have explored the impact of variables such as the balance of power, international institutions, organization of production, class structure, and domestic politics on foreign policy. These theories assume that the
preferences of actors are pre-given and examine the means used to realize these goals (Hollis and Smith 1990, 50–52).

The long-lasting debate between idealist and materialist approaches focuses on the question of which variables have more power in influencing policymaking. While positivist theories have praised the virtues of causal analysis, idealist theories have highlighted the constitutive power of ideas. These two approaches assume that either ideas or material interests affect policy, but not both. Materialist approaches assume that ideas are neither observable nor measurable; therefore their influence is minimal. The idealist theories contend that shaping reality is mediated through the human mind; therefore it is only through consensus that we can understand the behaviour of political units, where ‘ideas “constitute” the meaning that of material forces’ (Kurki 2006, 198). Finally, materialist approaches assume that stable outcomes are a result of tangible ontological constraints, while idealist approaches contend that they are a result of shared understandings about the appropriate actions for a particular situation.

According to positivist approaches, material structures are the only medium that is responsible for the reproduction of practices, where the agent possesses full knowledge of the situation s/he is coping with and chooses the option that maximizes his or her utilities (Mearsheimer 1995). These approaches assume that actors’ interests are exogenous to social practices, while states enter social relations with their interests already given. In other words, previous social interactions, identities and ideas, which result from these interactions, are by no means determinants of interests and means (Wendt 1992). Rational choice theory understands social arenas as opportunistic realms in which actors, including states, interact for the sake of maximizing pre-defined interests. Yet if the processing of collective cognition into actions is uniform, or if reactions to similar external events is fixed and always involves rational cost-benefit calculation, then mediating structures of knowledge could simply be a redundant explaining factor. This paradigm, in short, ignores, first, that states are inherently social actors, influenced by their previous interactions and that these previous interactions (read major crises) shape common identity and cognition (Wendt 1999, 17). Second, the rational choice theory ignores the fact that states are corporate actors that are composed of classes, various institutions and organizations, rather than unitary, individualist and hierarchical actors. This approach also fails to explain how states define their preferences and shape the means by which they realize these preferences. Finally, it is important to understand the sources of actors’ beliefs and the way beliefs guide policymakers, given the complexity and uncertainty of the international system. In short, rational belief formation is constrained by the uncertainty and complexity of the international system.

This book is more open to the possibility of interplay between ideas and interests (see Goldstein 1995; Williams 2004; Wendt 1999). The occurrence of a major international crisis marks a unique and opaque period in interstate relations, in which uncertainty is high and policymakers lack full knowledge about the situation they are coping with (Goldstein and Keohane 1993b, 3–4). When a
crisis creates policy problems for which the prevailing set of ideas provides little guidance, policymakers search for a new ideational set that helps them envision new policy solutions, especially if they believe that there is evidence that the new one will bring about better results.

Ideas, as collective knowledge, drive social action. Ideas ‘define the limits of what is cognitively possible and impossible for individuals’ (Adler 1997, 325). Thus, when coping with a new reality, policymakers deliberately act on the basis of their understanding of that reality and their judgment about the best way of shaping the new environment in order to prevent the eruption of a similar crisis in the future. Actors interpret the social world around them and through that interpretation and understanding they react. In the post-crisis period, there is a demand for new ideas that would guide policymakers in shaping long-term reality, while periods of tranquillity are shaped by prevailing collective interpretations and knowledge structures. All in all, these cognitive structures are constrained by what is considered real or unreal; thus, the knowledge structures are constrained by the material structures that exist out there.

Furthermore, knowledge structure is a cognitive framework within which ideas are organized for storage and retrieval. At the individual level, the structure determines what information will be stored or retrieved from memory, and it facilitates problem solving. If a policymaker attempts to construct a cause-and-effect relationship, then the structure of knowledge is recalled to present an explanation for the phenomenon in question. Knowledge structures are, to a large extent, static ones, which tend to discourage the acceptance of discrepant information by both the organization and the policymaker. Similarly, through knowledge structure, organizations tend to develop collective interpretations of history, which acquire the status of truth within the organization and can be very resistant to revision. For both individuals and organizations, often only a major crisis or policy failure can overcome this reification of reality and form a new knowledge structures.

Institutionalist theories that explain continuity focus on institutional rules or routines. These theories claim that rules prescribe behaviour and result in regularized patterns of interaction, while actions that are inconsistent with those rules are likely to be dismissed. In this sense, to understand regularized patterns of interaction affected by rules, one needs to examine the actions and outcomes that the rules allow, require or forbid and the mechanisms that exist to enforce those rules (Krasner 1982; North 1990; Ozkececi-Tanner 2005; Keohane 1982). Institutional rules, the argument continues, are written or tacitly understood in a form comprehensible to actors. Thus, in order to understand continuity, one needs to explain behaviour in institutions—combining the so-called grammar of institutions with a theory of action, just as to understand a text one requires knowledge of grammar of a language and the subject matter (Crawford and Ostrom 1995, 583). Focusing on rules, however, shifts the analysis away from shared understandings and knowledge structures that influence behaviour. For instance, us reluctance to engage in the peace process before 1974, or its opposition to the
promotion of democratization in the middle East before the events of 9/11 could not be explained by referring to institutional rules.

First, following a major crisis, policymakers must decide whether the crisis showed the existing dominant ideational orthodoxy as adequate or not. Thus, a crisis does not automatically cause to the collapse of an existing cognitive structure; but a major crisis can cause policymakers to realize that the existing ideational orthodoxy is outdated, thus making it an inadequate problem-solving tool (Legro 2005, 16). In other words, a crisis could undermine the adequacy and credibility of existing ideas in the mind of policymakers. A crisis could also generate consequences for policymakers and society as a whole that deviate from their collective expectations. Where these consequences are unwelcome, this incompatibility between expectations and consequences makes the need for change more likely. Second, policymakers must contemplate new ideas that would substitute the existing set of ideas. In other words, the interaction between ideas and consequences of a crisis is central to the process of transformation in which an existing set of ideas is displaced by a new set.

As mentioned before, positivism asserts that actors behave instrumentally to achieve pre-defined interests. Yet even if actor’s preferences are given, the actor has some beliefs about which strategies are most appropriate to achieve these interests. For example, to assume that a steady supply of oil and the security of Israel are the two major American interests in the middle East tells us very little about the beliefs of American policymakers of how to achieve these apparently incompatible goals. Certainly the beliefs of how to realize these two goals that prevailed among these policymakers before the oil embargo in 1973–74 are different from the beliefs that existed after the crisis.

Moreover, rational belief formation is constrained by a lack of information that increases uncertainty. The complexity of the problem and the multiplicity of incompatible interests make assessment of probabilities a very difficult task. Complexity turns ideas into an indispensable factor, which actors have to use to navigate into an unknown and uncertain future. Under these circumstances, actors need a problem-solving theory to guide their behaviour. Such a theory could be one that was developed by academic scholars or by a group of policy advisors. Yet theories or ideas are not tested every morning by policymakers. Once theories are put into practice and provide satisfactory results, policymakers see no need to shop around for new ideas. In short, the complexity of the problems policymakers face in international relations creates a demand for new ideas that are supplied by the academy and/or foreign policy specialists. The occurrence of a major crisis is a perfect point in time for the emergence and implementation of new theories.

Furthermore, the fact that states are actors that are managed by humans has led some scholars to focus on the first image—the characters, world views and background of the individual decision-maker. While individual attitude is an important element that connects collective ideas with foreign policy, it is an inadequate explanation given that the ideas continue to prevail even after the departure of one administration and the advent of a new one. Attitudes themselves
Ideas Matter

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derive from and express the structure of knowledge. By the same token, these structures are not mere subjective reflections of objective conditions. Furthermore, change in an individual’s cognition is an insufficient condition for change in the knowledge structure for the simple reason that in the absence of a major crisis, reality has not changed in the eyes of policymakers and there is no real empirical justification for replacing existing ideas.

Alexander George, relying on the writings of Nathan Leites, examines the impact of ‘operational codes’ on decision-making. Operational codes are ‘a set of general beliefs about fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics as these bear in turn on the problem of action’ (George 1989, 483). George contends that ‘the foreign policy of a nation addresses itself not to the external world … but rather to “the image of the external world,” that is in the minds of those who make foreign policy’ (George 1989, 483). In other words, this image is mediated by the decision-maker’s subjective perceptions. George asserts that operational codes affect decision-making through the decision-maker’s belief system. Operational codes serve ‘as a prism that influence the actor’s perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations’ (George 1989, 484). Yet given the fact that these operational codes are personal general beliefs or attitudes, what is the relationship between these personal beliefs and collective beliefs or strategies that have guided foreign policy during eras of tranquillity. How could we explain the consistency in US foreign policy towards the Middle East across several consecutive administrations? How could we explain the fact that change in US foreign policy did not stem from change in personal beliefs but from the eruption of a crisis, when policymakers came to realize that they needed to create a long-term response to the new conditions resulted from the crisis? Indeed, policymakers need to simplify the complexity of the world around them in order to be able to cope with world events by filtering out information through their personal operational codes. Yet the fact that American presidents have often had little knowledge about the Middle East makes them highly dependent on existing structures of knowledge that provide orientations to action.

Cultural theory provides a different explanation for continuity in foreign policy without reference to the personality of the decision-maker (Thompson et al. 1990). This theory claims that actors do not respond directly to the external world but respond to them through mediating orientations embedded in the local culture (Wildavsky 1987, 5; Eckstein 1997, 24). According to Eckstein, “‘Orientation to action’ are general dispositions of actors to act in certain ways in sets of situations. Such general dispositions pattern actions. If actors do not have them, or if orientations are ill formed or inconsistent, actions will be erratic: patternless, anomic’ (Eckstein 1988, 790). Orientations, in this view, are not personal attitudes but they are general dispositions. The problem with this explanation is that, first, these orientations or dispositions could exist collectively without the group of decision-makers being aware of their existence or conscious of their impact on the process of decision-making. Second, the theory assumes that orientations stem from the domestic culture, which is a very broad concept that includes institutions,
institutional structures, civil society organizations, state-society relations, etc. This could risk tautology, where general dispositions could explain continuity as well as change in a state’s foreign policy. It is possible that American policymakers perceive the Arab/muslim culture through general dispositions that are embedded in their own culture—muslim culture as an antithesis of their Western modernity-preaching. This explanation, however, cannot provide a reliable guidance of how the structures of knowledge change over time, despite the absence of change in the local culture. In fact the premises of the political culture approach lead to the expectation of continuity and it is ill-suited to deal with change.

Furthermore, if structures of knowledge are not inherent in actors’ personal cognition (not simply subjective reflections of external reality) but are instead exogenous to them, then something that is also external must shape and reshape them. Structures of knowledge are human-made structures with cognitive and normative dimensions that provide meaning to material structures. Under these structures of knowledge, continuity is the mode, and so these structures are resistant to abrupt change. Foreign policy dispositions are forged through collective cognition and consensus that is hard to change; yet the patterns of such structures of knowledge vary from one state to another and from one period to another. In this sense, foreign policymaking involves a process of seeking coherence in dispositions. Exceptionally, a major crisis is able to induce changes. The notion of continuity, which is inherent in the operation of institutions, opens the door to external events to account for change. Unfortunately, change takes place because policymakers only learn things the hard way, following the occurrence of a major crisis (Scott 1970, 86).

In short, policymakers are spurred by theories, and once they realize that a theory ceases to facilitate their goals, they start looking for a new one. The main argument, therefore, is that US policy has always been guided by a theory. It is a theory that has constituted for these policymakers a grand strategy. Once us policymakers have defined their interests, they need a strategy that will help realize these interests with minimum costs.

Learning, Institutions and Change in Foreign Policy

Jack Levy defines learning ‘as a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience’ (Levy 1994, 281). Learning is also an analytical process, wherein policymakers interpret world events through their understanding of these events. Levy nonetheless rules out the possibility that learning is equal with change in foreign policy. According to Levy, “simple” learning new information leads to a change in means but not in ends, and in “complex learning” a recognition of conflicts among values leads to a modification of goals as well as means’ (Levy 1994, 284). In the process of learning, policymakers become actively involved in the search for information
they think is essential for a proper understanding of world events and the adequate response to these events. Policymakers, however, seldom reconsider their basic strategic assumptions and orientation and they do so only reluctantly after the eruption of a severe crisis that keeps them from achieving their basic goals.

According to Levy, however, there are strategies to increase the capacity for learning by inserting organizational reform to enhance the quality of information search and analysis, to improve organizational memory, to incorporate new decision rules or analytic techniques, to utilize technical expertise or academic specialists, to expand the use of computers, or to develop new language capabilities (Levy 1994, 287). In other words, Levy contends that these technical improvements could improve organizational learning, thus causing an incremental change, even during times of tranquillity. But Levy ignores the influence of structural factors and other external constraints, including material and knowledge structures that favour continuity. Policymakers seldom re-examine fundamental interests and strategies that seem to work, especially during peaceful periods. Finally, Levy overstates the capacity of organizations to learn; organizations do not learn in the same sense that individuals do.

Organizations learn through individuals who run those organizations by incorporating individually learned lessons drawn from experience into organizational routines (Allison and Zelikow 1999, chapter 2). The process of change takes place first at the individual and then at the organizational levels (Kim 1993, 43). Organizational change through learning occurs if individuals’ inferences from experience become embedded in the institutional knowledge structure. Thus organizational learning involves a process in which external stimulus, such as a crisis, instigates individual learning, which leads to a change in the set of institutional routines. In the absence of a conflict or policy failure, lessons could be incorporated into organizational routines, only if these lessons are consistent with the institutional knowledge structure.

Given the enduring routine operation of organizations, once a major crisis transpires, organizations become the first victims for reform. The power of organizations lies in their organizational capacity in employing routines or structural constraints that resist change. Yet once major policy failure occurs, organizations become a conduit for the incorporation of new ideas that are consolidated through a learning process. Hence, change to organizational policymaking requires imposing a new set of guiding principles that will dispose the system to respond to new contingencies better than before. Thus organizations link between new ways of thinking and action. Furthermore, institutions provide both a location and legitimacy for new ideas and the process of new policymaking. State action is the product of individuals acting on the basis of both collective and personal cognition, and of organizations acting within the larger framework of the state. Decision theories from both of these fields are necessary to provide a complete understanding of the learning process. Thus, change in foreign policy is unlikely to occur in the absence of a major crisis or policy failure; but once a major crisis
transpires, it often reshapes the behaviour of organizations in a way that leads to long-term policy change.

Other scholars have examined learning within an epistemic community. These scholars highlight the importance of both the conceptual framework through which technical experts develop their ideas and the political processes through which these experts seek to affect the views of political leaders under circumstances of uncertainty (Haas 1989; Adler and Haas 1992). An epistemic community creates awareness about an existing problem and ways to address that problem, while policymakers in general and the bureaucracy in particular are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of the problem and unable to define state interests. An epistemic community is a knowledge-based committee of experts, who understand the cause and effect relationship of complex problems, and help states identify interests, frame collective debate and propose solutions. In other words, epistemic community deals mainly with existing problems, where there is a political void and lack of political solutions. His void or unawareness allows the community to forge a consensus around solutions that bring about change by addressing the roots of the problem. In the context of the Middle East, nonetheless, new ideas that were consolidated into policies were provided by experts from within the administration itself. Following each crisis, policymakers discussed the shortcomings in the existing policies and decided whether existing ideas are adequate to maintain long-term stability in the Middle East under the new reality created by the current crisis. If not, then these same policymakers searched for new ideas. Thus, when it comes to sensitive issues in foreign relations, an administration seldom seeks the advice of external experts, let alone foreigners.

**Theories of Orientalism and Post-Orientalism**

Orientalist scholars of Middle Eastern studies contend that they observe a given cultural ontology in the Middle East that seems to them totally different from their own. These scholars interpreted and simplified this ‘structural’ cultural ontology to American policymakers, who adopted this set of ideas and found it a useful tool to guide policies. In addition, these scholars advised policymakers to use their theories as a vantage point to explore ways of constructing new institutions that would, ultimately, help the US to extract maximum gains from the reality it faced. The orientalist argument regarding the stationary nature of Islam is embodied in the following passage of Bernard Lewis, who asserts that Islamic culture is ‘dominated by a set of relatively enduring and unchanging political processes and meanings, to be understood through the texts of Islam itself and the language it generated.’ (Lewis 1992, 116). In this sense, once these texts are ‘loaded’ into the mind of Muslims they are fixed and operate as a routine.

The orientalist theory highlighted the dual nature of traditional Arab societies in general and the Gulf Bedouin societies in particular. Internally, the monarchic regimes in the Arab world, including the shah’s regime of Iran, enjoy legitimacy
based on simple obedience to a ruler. Externally, these monarchs depend on the windfall from oil and for that reason they are ready to cooperate with the West. The emphasis of orientalist scholars is on the social structure of Muslim societies and the religious legitimacy of rulers. These scholars assert that according to Islamic prescription, ‘the duty to obey the ruler, who was the Prophet’s apostolic successor was a religious duty’ (Kedourie 1994, 7). Orientalists see traditional monarchies as the lesser of two evils, because the alternative could be anti-Western nationalist leaders. Accordingly, the US could gradually gain ‘traditional monarchies’ compliance by promising help against external adversaries. Since World War II, US policy towards the region revolved around cultivating ties with traditional pro-Western regimes and protecting their reigns, with total neglect of the needs of the masses. These ideas of orientalism are illustrated in the following telegram by the US ambassador to Iran: ‘We definitely do not believe we should urge in any manner devolution local government powers to local elected assemblies. Elections in this country do not now and cannot be expected in foreseeable future to produce responsible representatives of people’ (Wailes, 10 May, 1961).

Furthermore, although orientalist scholars borrow their methodological analysis from positivist theories, in the sense of observing the world as they find it, these scholars see the Arab/Islamic culture as unique one that cannot be compared to other cultures. Orientalists who have examined religious fundamentalism claim that although fundamentalist movements share certain aspects that make it possible to conduct a research on these movements based on a rational actor paradigm, Islamic fundamentalism is a unique field that could not be approached with the comparative tools of social science. In this view, there are substantial differences that distinguish Islamic fundamentalism from other fundamentalist movements. These include transnational Islamic solidarity, the lack of separation between state and mosque, the strong collectivist structure of Islamic society, the religious legitimacy of leaders, and the dominance of Islamic faith over secular factors. Hence, the argument continues, any attempt to make cross-cultural comparisons looking for common themes will leave out fundamental cultural differences, making this research superficial and distorting our understanding of the essence of Islamic movements. In the words of Gabriel ben-dor: ‘It makes more sense to speak of fundamentalism in Middle Eastern Islam, as this is a unit that has far more cultural and political coherence … t here is a danger that people will say that Islamic fundamentalism is just like any other … t his seems to me somewhat dangerous, as sociology phenomena differ greatly from one another.’ (Ben-dor 1997, 250). The question then, is, if Islamic fundamentalism is a unique phenomenon; what could indicate to these scholars that their analysis is wrong? Finally, if the Middle Eastern culture is stationary, while US policymakers merely react to this cultural ontology, how could we understand change in US policy? There could be two answers: either that the Middle Eastern culture is in persistent flux, which refutes a basic axiom of the orientalist school, or that following a
major crisis, US policymakers found out that they were misled by this school and sought to refine their policy.

The post-orientalist approach refers to orientalism as a discourse that guides the American foreign policy in the Middle East (Said 1978; Said et al. 1998). This school asserts that reality in the Middle East is nothing other than a text, while policymakers are born into that discourse and cannot think outside of it. These scholars emphasize orientalism as a discourse of domination that is a product of the western inclination to control others through ‘scientific tools.’ Orientalism seeks to simplify the Arab/Islamic culture in order to construct these societies in a certain way that makes it easier for the West to deal with and to subjugate them. Orientalism, in this view, is a practical discourse for controlling irrational people; it encompasses Western ideas from different disciplines such as history, literature, philology, politics, sociology and (recently) development that together tell policymakers how to deal with the Middle East. Orientalist scholars in this sense are far from being detached from the reality they observe but instead are actively engaged in its construction.

This school nonetheless does not deal with transformation and seems unable to explain how change might occur. In fact, as long as US policymakers are locked within this discourse, the school leaves no hope that change might take place. Furthermore, the post-orientalist school asserts that the discourse of orientalism guides policymakers in the Middle East, while it is unclear how this discourse is related to power and interests of the West in the region. Post-orientalists fail to demonstrate whether orientalist discourse serves power and Western interests or in fact, it is the other way around. If Western interests in the Middle East are not immutable over time or have changed in the past few decades, then there should be resilience in the orientalist discourse that should be able to account for change. The discourse of orientalism has been depicted by these scholars as omnipresent and omnipotent set of theories, ideas, statements and metaphors that have piled up over time, but without a clear insight or scrutiny of how these ideas are organized or related to each other or to previous ideas; it is even less clear when, how and under what conditions this discourse is going to be replaced.

Finally, while post-orientalists showed us how we came here through deconstruction, they have not told us where can we go from here, and they did not highlight the Orientals’ resistance. How can Middle Eastern people emancipate themselves by themselves and why have they not done so? To claim merely that reality has been constructed by ideas and power implies indirectly the passivity of Orientals who have not managed to shape their reality, let alone resist Western construction. To put it differently, post-orientalists have highlighted the Middle East as an entity that has been constructed and by doing this they indirectly illustrated Middle Eastern peoples as impotent, passive, and inferior beings, who are unable to create or alter their own reality. Furthermore, post-orientalist scholars have a negative opinion about the construction of reality and see it as a zero-sum-game (Obeidat 1998; Bed al-Jabri 1999; Sayyid 1997). In their view, the West constructs Middle Eastern ‘reality’ out of hostility or other malicious intentions,
aiming at subordinating the Orient, exploiting its resources and perpetuating its social and political structure. Yet how could post-orientalists explain the fact that the West promotes a free-market economy and democratization in the Middle East? This policy would free the private sector and encourage the emergence of new social structures; it might lead to higher economic growth and even to political reforms.
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us involvement in the middle East began immediately after the first World War, when the major oil companies Exxon and mobile became partners of the Iraqi Oil Company. In 1927, Gulf started to operate in Kuwait, while Standard Oil of California (SoCal) won the first concession to explore oil resources in Saudi Arabia in 1933 (Sampson 1975, 88–90). SoCal soon invited Texaco to join in. SoCal and Texaco started to export oil from Saudi Arabia in 1938 and immediately invited Exxon and mobile to become partners in the newly established Saudi oil company Aramco. After World War II, the US placed a premium on its interests in the region due to the region’s gigantic oil reserves, its strategic location south of the Soviet Union, the importance of the Suez Canal as a passage to the Far East, and the strategic location of British military bases in the Suez Canal zone that could be used to launch a counterattack against the Soviet Union.

The Middle Eastern countries jointly possess 64 percent of the world’s oil reserves. The most important among these countries is Saudi Arabia, which alone controls 27 percent of the world’s oil supplies. After the turn of the 20th century, fossil fuel became the main source of world energy. Following the war, the economic boom in the US and the reconstruction of Europe increased the dependency of the West upon Middle Eastern oil.

The US believed that it could not fight a protracted war without Middle Eastern oil. It needed access to oil in friendly countries that could and were ready to increase their production within a short period. The US also understood that controlling these resources was a source of power through which it could claim world leadership. Therefore, the US aspired to develop security arrangements in the region that would be in harmony with its own economic and security needs. The problem was that in wartime, the requirement for oil could increase dramatically, whereas the supply of oil correlated with the degree of political tension.

With the eruption of the Cold War, access to the oil resources of the Middle East was, from an American point of view, the heart of the struggle against the Soviet Union. American policy in the Middle East in the early 1950s had as its objective containing the expansion of Soviet power, largely by constructing a barrier of regional military pacts buttressed by military aid. The Baghdad Pact of 1955 was central for the security of the Middle East.
During the late 1940s, the Middle East was producing about 1.5 million barrels a day (mbd); by comparison, the US produced 5 mbd during the same period. But there were two major differences: the marginal cost of oil barrel production in the Middle East was almost one-tenth that of the US; and American oil fields were over-exploited and declining in production (oskins 1951, 231). The US wanted to conserve its own oil resources during peacetime. These factors increased America’s desire to keep the traditional royal regimes in the oil exporting countries within the US orbit. The fact that the oil resources were regarded as the property of these regimes, who bestowed concessions on the oil majors, prompted the US to perceive these regimes as indispensable for the realization of its interests. His dependence on these regimes, however, had complicated the means that were essential to realize these interests. Given these interests, the US needed to explore new ideas of how to achieve them under the constraints of the global balance of power and the local politics of the Middle East.

The creation of Israel left the US in a difficult situation. Extending support to Israel might worsen US relations with the Arab world, while reluctance to support it would alienate an important political force, the American Jewish constituency, whose electoral power had been significant for Truman’s winning the presidency. The US needed to tread a fine line between Israel and the Arab world.

Certainly, the US wanted to demonstrate that its approach toward third World countries was different from that of the former colonizing European great powers. It had to be very careful not to be seen as the heir of British or French imperialism in the region. It was, at least during this first postwar decade, reluctant to adopt ideas and policies that were developed and used by the former colonizers. The US expressed such progressive ideas toward the third World as self determination, economic prosperity and the political freedom of individual Arab states (Baram 1978, 56). In the late 1940s, the US advocated the idea that the gains from oil exports should be distributed evenly between the hosting country and the oil majors (McGhee 1975, 48), and it was willing to embrace nationalist leaders such as Muhammad Mossadeg in Iran and a bed el-Nasser in Egypt (Gasiorowski 2006, 51). Yet this policy fell short of endorsing the nationalization of natural resources by these leaders. But these ideas were soon compromised and even abandoned when the US became drawn into the Cold War, after the USSR developed nuclear capability (Uniholm 1980).

In short, in the late 1940s, America pursued three broad objectives in the Middle East in a descending order: access to oil, containment of the Soviet Union and security for Israel. These interests remained relatively constant from 1948 through 1989, when the US collapsed and the Cold War ended. But the US foreign

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1 As explained below, some scholars contend that during the 1950s, the US perceived Israel as a strategic liability; this contention should not contravene the assumption that the US was ready to defend Israel if its existence were threatened. It is difficult to prove this assumption, though, because at no time between 1948 and 1973 was Israel’s existence under imminent threat.
policy in the Middle East during the first three decades (1945–74) of its major involvement in the area was bewildered and erratic. The new superpower had a clear definition of its interests in the region but was unable to distinguish between means and ends. For instance, protecting the regimes in the oil exporting countries became an end in and of itself. Controlling the oil resources became crucial for ensuring the steady supply of oil. Isolating nationalist forces that were thought to imperil Western interests in the region became an end in and of itself.

**Arabists in the State Department**

Events in early 1950s—the outbreak of the Korean War, the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the assassination of king Abdullah of Jordan by a Palestinian nationalist in 1951, the coup d’état by the Free Officers in Egypt in 1952—overwhelmed the US’s ability to deal with all of these problems through military means alone and exposed its lack of experience in coping with crises. Faced with these challenges, the Truman administration contemplated the idea that maintaining long-term stability in the Middle East required economic development. Consequently, in November 1951 Truman established a regional economic office in Beirut, whose function was to coordinate all regional economic activities.

In early 1952, president Truman appointed a pro-Arab banker, Edwin Locke, to head the regional office. Locke belonged to a group of pro-Arab American diplomats who believed that the combination of American finance and expertise with the cheap labour force in Middle Eastern countries could constitute a fertile ground for sustainable economic growth, thereby reinvigorating long-term domestic political stability (Kingston 2007, 30). In addition to Locke’s mission, since World War II, the Point Four office had worked on projects of economic development in the Middle East. The two offices lacked a common vision about the appropriate development strategy (Locke 1967). The Point Four office emphasized long-term economic development achieved through investment in human capital through technical assistance in such areas as education, agriculture and industry.

His strategy stressed the centrality of the state in the process, involving local government through investment in education and training. Locke, on the other hand, thought the Point Four approach was too sluggish and insufficient to solve short-term economic problems in the Arab world. It would take too long for an Arab society to reap the benefits of these projects. In Locke’s words:

> the state department is not really very well equipped to handle an operational program, and it’s not psychologically very well disposed either in that direction. And so I had my hands full trying to get this economic and technical aid program going, both in individual [Arab] countries and yet with some consideration for the aspects of the [Middle East] region as a whole … I also made a particular point of getting out among the people, including extensive visits to the [Palestinian] refugee camps. The result was that I was sending back quite different information
to the State Department than its own Foreign Service officers. It was particularly embarrassing, because it meant, in effect, that many of their policies were wrong, because they were based on false premises (Locke 1967).

Locke requested US funding and involvement in planning and constructing whole projects such as dams and transportation projects. He recommended the creation of a $100-million development fund for the underdeveloped Arab world and he advised the president to provide unconditional capital assistance to states such as Jordan, Syria and Egypt in building up their infrastructure. Locke even suggested the provision of aid to Arab countries that did not have friendly relations with the US, such as Syria.

The State Department strongly objected to providing large-scale aid, whatever its short-term benefits, without political and policy reforms, although the State Department emphasized the short-term political goals of the aid, in contrast to the long-term Point Four approach. The Point Four office wanted to link American aid to Syria with the settlement of Palestinian refugees in that country, while the State Department wanted to link it to improving Syria’s relations with the US. In the words of a mbassador George McGhee, a career diplomat, who promoted development in Africa and the Middle East and negotiated a military alliance and a petroleum contract with Saudi Arabia:

We hoped that by pointing out the advantages of accepting capital to develop their countries (particularly the building of dams and the irrigating of land) the Arab states would see the advantages of using the refugees as resources and would welcome them. Israel could take some back; the Arabs could keep some. We wanted to remove the political aura which surrounded the problem (McGhee 1975).

By the end of 1952 these ideas of economic development had failed. The US failed to bring about resettlement the Palestinian refugees in Arab neighbouring countries or their restitution in Israel. The Point Four program’s long-term plan of investing in human capital had also failed. Locke’s plan proved to be unattainable and his mission came to an end in late 1952. As the Cold War deepened, the Eisenhower administration ditched Locke’s ideas of economic development and began consolidating new policies that were based mainly on security considerations.

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2 The various American administrations throughout the 1950s pressed Israel to absorb a limited number of Palestinian refugees; this policy was compatible with Point Four’s call for resettling the refugees in Arab countries.
Crises in the Middle East: The US and the Iranian Crisis, 1951–1953

t he location of Iran on the fault line between East and West made it a centre of struggle between the two superpowers. t he us perceived Iran as a gateway that the s oviet s could use for further expansion into the middle East and for access to the warm water port facilities in persian Gulf. t he us was determined to force the soviets to withdraw the troops it had stationed in northern Iran during World War II. t he us made successful efforts in 1945–46 through the united Nations to safeguard the integrity and independence of Iran, resulting in the withdrawal of these troops.

f urthermore, Iran had rich oil resources. d uring the early 1950s, Iran supplied around 6 percent of world oil demand and more than 20 percent of western European oil imports. Iran exported refined oil from the refining plant in Abadan. t hese resources were exploited by the a nglo Iranian Oil c ompany (a IOc ), later b ritish petroleum (bp ). t he 1949 oil contract between Iran and b ritain gave Iran only a pittance of the profits from its oil exports. In the words of the American diplomat George mcGhee: ‘a nglo-Iranian was run by William f rasier, a s cotch accountant who didn’t understand the modern world. His failure to understand the political forces in Iran helped create a very difficult problem for them … We warned them that we were offering fifty-fifty. They could perhaps have had a settlement at fifty-fifty, but they wouldn’t offer it’ (McGhee 1975).

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[McGhee] had a very unreal attitude. He was very anti-British. He didn’t trust the b ritish at all. h e had an unreal attitude towards the importance of Iranian oil. h e thought we would offer any price to keep Iran in the western community. We made it very clear we wanted Iran to stay in the western community, but then we couldn’t upset the world oil industry. As a result the Iranian oil fields were closed down for three years, during which they didn’t ship any oil (McGhee 1975).
The Eisenhower administration saw the world through the lens of the cold War and it feared that severe economic conditions in Iran would drive the whole country directly into the Soviet sphere of influence.

Furthermore, during the early 1950s, the US started to develop the belief that the mosque was a strong agency that encouraged anti-West sentiments. The US also linked Islam and Iranian nationalism: ‘the ambitious mullahs … spread [their word] through the mosques and gave nationalism a religious sanction’ (Bayne 1951, 582). The US believed that the mullahs had links to the underground terrorist organization of fadaiyan Islam, whose members assassinated several key allies of the shah, including Ali Razmara, the Iranian prime minister and former chief of staff, in March 1951 (Bullard 1953, 461). These organizations, the argument continued, utilized anti-Western or anti-Franjis xenophobia in order to counter Western influence within the country. In the US’s view, the alliance between Mussadeq, the mullahs (leaders of the National Front), and the Tudeh party aimed at weakening the shah and at cutting off Western influence within Iran in favour of the US.4 The US felt that the shah and the Iranian army were its most reliable and indispensable allies.

US support for Mussadeq started dwindling and the Eisenhower administration finally joined the British-led conspiracy to remove him from office, which the US had previously opposed. In contrast to its previous announcements, the United States turned its back on supporting democratization, and threw its support behind an autocrat whose throne depended on the military. The Eisenhower administration did not regard Mussadeq as an out-and-out communist, but he stepped on the West’s toes in two vital issues: nationalizing the AIOC and trimming the power of the shah. The State Department endorsed the majors’ embargo by announcing that ‘they [the oil majors] would not, in the face of unilateral action by Iran against the British company, be willing to undertake operations in that country’ (quoted in Sampson 1975, 121). Given the economic consequences of the embargo, Iran (the State Department believed) was ripe for a communist takeover. Thus, both the State Department and the CIA (respectively led by the Dulles brothers) saw eye to eye on the situation in Iran: the Mussadeq government must be toppled and replaced by a pro-Western one.

In 1953, Mussadeq took control over the army. In August, the shah tried to dismiss him, but when he failed, fled the country. Kermit Roosevelt, the mastermind of CIA operations in Tehran, who had been plotting Mussadeq’s overthrow for months, organized street demonstrations led by paid agents and conspired with

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3 The leader of the clergy within the Majlis was a Yatollah Khashani who scorned the modernization plans of the shah and Razmara. Khashani justified the act of assassinating Razmara and depicted the latter as an enemy of Islam, who opposed the Oil Nationalization law of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

4 The US thought that the activities of the mullahs were financed by the Soviet Union. The US also perceived the Tudeh party, with its 15,000 active members, as the most powerful pillar of the anti-West alliance.
generals loyal to the shah to turn military units against the prime minister and to fight his troops (Yapp 185; Sampson 1975, 127). After three days of massive demonstrations following the shah’s departure, Mussadeq lost credibility and was toppled. Once the shah returned to Iran he declared, ‘I regained my throne thanks to God, the Iranian people and the CIA’. The event taught the CIA that it should not accept the rise of nationalist leaders as a reflection of the will of the masses and that covert operations could be used to fight these leaders and restore the rule of traditional pro-West leaders.

**The US and the Suez Crisis of 1956**

t he dispute between britain and Egypt over the status of the British military bases in the Suez Canal zone evolved into a bitter conflict in the late 1940s. The US was caught in the middle. It needed to find a solution that would reconcile Nasser’s nationalism with the security interest of maintaining these bases, which could be used for launching attacks against the soviet union. t he t ruman administration decided to continue supporting the presence of British military bases in the middle East. t he pentagon, while focusing on military affairs, acknowledged the invaluable status of the bases. f or the pentagon, security concerns took higher priority than such ideals as self-determination or territorial integrity (k uniholm 1980, 10).

t o Egyptians, however, these bases were the last vestige of the protracted British imperialist exploitation of their country’s resources. The British military presence thus fuelled anti-Western nationalism. t he s tate d epartment was alarmed by the surge of nationalism both in Egypt and Iran, especially after the Iranian crisis of 1951–53 and the revolution by the Free Officers in Egypt, who ousted k ing f arouk in 1952. t he s tate d epartment feared that nationalism in Egypt could turn a rab public opinion against us interests in the area, especially given the a merican support of the nascent Jewish state. t he s tate d epartment perceived anti-Western nationalism in the t hird World and communism as two sides of the same coin. b ritish imperialism could turn the whole region against the West and towards the uss R. In short, the s tate d epartment demanded that britain should come to terms with the government of Egypt.

c ontingency war plans prepared by the pentagon after World War II, however, ascribed immense importance to the b ritish bases as a launching point of air offence against military targets in the southern Soviet Union. The Pentagon’s position of supporting britain had prevailed over the position of the s tate d epartment (t hornhill 2004, s angmuah 1990).

c hanges in the global balance of power in 1954 somewhat reduced the strategic significance of the bases in the Suez Canal Zone and strengthened the
State Department’s position. These new conditions included technological improvements—the development of long-range bombers—and a shift in the American strategic focus from Egypt to more reliable partners such as Turkey and Pakistan (Yesilbursa 2001). Thus, as the strategic significance of the Canal Zone diminished, the US sought to appease the nationalist aspirations of Nasser by offering him financial aid. But when US efforts to sway Nasser and bring him into the Western fold failed, the US started to see him as a threat to its national interests in the Middle East. The US concluded that Nasser could not have it both ways: he could not cooperate with the Soviet Union and at the same time expect to enjoy financial help from the United States.

The American government made it clear to Egypt that it would provide the latter with arms only for cash or upon a conclusion of a British-Egyptian agreement, which would extend the deployment of British troops in the canal Zone and allow the use of these bases for US military missions. His position did not change even after that the strategic value of the bases diminished in 1954. Egypt could accept neither condition; first, it lacked hard currency reserves, and second, the Egyptian nationalist government could not accept a new form of colonialism that would that would either extend or replace that of Britain. Having been disappointed by the Americans and facing a sharp security threat from Israel, Egypt looked to the Soviet Union as a potential arms supplier. Egypt concluded a Czech arms deal in 1955, and this led to a dramatic change in US position.

The assistant secretary of state George Allen visited Egypt in 1955 to offer Egypt a new arms sale, hoping that such an offer would dissuade Egypt from cultivating diplomatic relations with the Soviets. During this visit, the Egyptian government-controlled newspaper Al-Ahram printed a story claiming that the Soviet Union had agreed to help Egypt to build the high dam—a project that would allow Egypt to boost its agricultural production and meet its burgeoning demand for food. The US, joined by the World Bank, replied with a counteroffer, hoping that such a gesture would keep the Soviet out of the Middle East. When the US revealed that the Soviet offer was faked by the Egyptian media or government, it withdrew its offer in June of 1956.

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5 As the US and Egypt marched toward some kind of modus vivendi, Israel feared that cooperation between the two would result in the withdrawal of British troops from the canal Zone. Israeli defense minister Penhas Avnon initiated what became known later as the Avnon affair. In 1954 the minister ordered the Israeli military intelligence to carry out bombings in Egypt against British and American targets, under the guise of Palestinian terrorism. The aim was to create anti-Egyptian outrage in order to keep Britain from withdrawing from the canal.

6 An agreement between Britain and Egypt was reached in 1954. The agreement stated that British forces should be evacuated from the Suez canal Zone within 20 months, but it permitted Britain to return its troops in case of a Soviet invasion of Turkey or any other state in the Middle East. British forces departed the country in July 1956.
Nasser reacted by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company in July with the encouragement of the Soviet Union. The government of Anthony Eden remained committed to the traditional British policy that ‘failure to keep the canal international would inevitably lead to the loss one by one of our interests and assets in the Middle East’ (quoted in Feis 1960, 599). As a result the British government decided to use force to restore its control over the canal. The US conveyed to the British and the French that it would not tolerate domination of the canal by a single country and advocated the international operation of the canal. It did not rule out the use of force, but only as a last resort (Feis 1960, 600). The problem was how to persuade Nasser to agree to such measures, even by increasing Egypt’s revenues. The Soviet Union backed Nasser’s nationalization of the canal, and warned that an attempt to use force against Egypt to compel it to agree to the British program would escalate tension beyond Egypt’s borders.

The so-called first Suez Conference, for which 18 states gathered in August 1956 in London, approved a declaratory proposal to be presented to Nasser, which called for keeping the canal under international management (Aldrich 1967, 542). This declaration did not include any threat of punishment to Nasser in case of his refusal to comply. In fact, the Eisenhower administration opted for a diplomatic solution of the problem. Given the American position and Soviet backing, Nasser thought it safe to reject the Eighteen Nations Plan. Nasser also expressed Egypt’s commitment to the 1888 Covenant of keeping the canal open and allowing free passage through it, without discrimination (Aldrich 1967, 542). If this is the case, Britain sought to test Nasser’s true intentions, by revealing that Nasser would in fact take hostile actions against some users. The US, however, was not ready to endorse British colonial aspirations. It did not accept Britain’s claim that yielding to Nasser would allow him to inspire revolution in other pro-Western Middle East countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq. A triumphal Egypt, the British claimed, would become a spearhead for the Soviet Union, allowing it to realize its aspirations of controlling the Middle East.

In the meantime, a new actor entered the scene: Israel. Hostility between Israel and Egypt raised the spectre of war between the two countries. What, then, would become of the Suez Canal? According to the US ambassador to Britain at the time, Winthrop Aldrich, the British Government claimed that it learned about Israel’s mobilization of its forces only on 28 October, 1956, one day before it attacked Egypt (Aldrich 1967, 545). He believed that Britain did not coordinate the attack with Israel. His position was, at best, naïve. It seems clear that Britain, France and Israel wanted to attack Egypt in order to unseat Nasser; Britain and France merely needed a pretext, which Israel provided. In a secret meeting on 24 October, the three countries agreed that Israel would attack Egypt, upon which Britain and France would call on Israel and Egypt to end hostilities and withdraw their forces from the canal zone (Yapp 1996, 408). If either side refused—and it was likely.

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7 Concession of the Suez Canal Company to Britain was supposed to continue till 1968.
that Nasser would reject such an ultimatum—the British and French forces would interfere to separate the two parties and temporarily occupy the canal in order to safeguard the safe passage through it. By occupying the canal, the British expected that Nasser would be discredited and would fall from power.

The United States had previously urged Israel not to take any action that might disturb the status quo in the Sinai peninsula. Once Israel attacked Egypt, the US pressed, in an unusual and swift move, for a resolution from the Security Council that unequivocally called for stopping the fighting. The US demanded the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from Egyptian soil without delay. The resolution was endorsed by the majority of the Security Council members, including the US and the Soviet Union, but was vetoed by both Britain and France.

In early November, Israeli forces marched through the Sinai peninsula, while the British and French forces attacked Egypt’s air force. The US remained committed to its position and submitted a second resolution to the Security Council, similar to the one it submitted in October. The Security Council condemned the Israeli attack on Egypt and called for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the canal, including the British and French forces. The British and the French rejected the resolution, claiming that they would withdraw their forces only after safeguarding free passage through the canal. Following these events, the Soviet Union declared that it is ‘fully determined to crush the aggressors [against Egypt] by the use of force and to restore peace in the East’ (quoted in Feis 1960, 610). The US threatened to use its monetary power by dumping British pounds sterling, creating chaos in the British financial system. Faced with economic threats from the US and military threats from the Soviet Union, the Eden cabinet decided to withdraw the British forces from Egypt. Eisenhower also insisted on the withdrawal of Israeli troops.

The Eisenhower administration saw the Sinai War as provocation against Egypt, something that would play into the hands of the Soviet Union and nationalist Arab forces. Therefore, the US decided to use its economic and political power to compel the foreign forces to withdraw from the Egyptian soil. On 20 February, 1957, Eisenhower declared that the US would support imposing UN sanctions on Israel unless the latter withdrew from the Gaza strip and other occupied territories. Following this stunning announcement, Israel instantaneously pulled out its troops (Little 1993, 563). In return, Eisenhower acknowledged Israel’s right for safe passage through the Straits of Iran.

The results of the Suez Crisis and the US’s strong policy of opposing British and French colonial practices, as well as its call for a halt to the Israeli incursion into Egypt, were a turning point in the relationship between the US and Egypt. The US proved that it could be honest and impartial in its approach to settling disputes in the Middle East. Eisenhower reinstituted food aid to Egypt in the hope of establishing a positive relationship with Nasser, although his administration disliked Nasser’s pan-Arab ideology and anti-American propaganda.

President Kennedy promoted economic cooperation with Egypt, while keeping distance from the Nasser regime. As a very poor and populous country, Egypt...
was starving for foreign exchange and food supplies and the US was ready to provide limited assistance in that regard. The Kennedy administration understood that improving living standards in Egypt would guarantee political tranquillity, while poverty and miserable economic conditions might cause Egypt to fall victim to the ‘Soviet predator’ (Badeau 1965, 282). The US and Egypt signed a cultural agreement in 1962 and an investment guarantee agreement in 1963. The US was motivated by the idea ‘that if we don’t help Nasser he’ll become even more mortgaged to Moscow’ (Komer, 28 May, 1962).

The Kennedy administration undertook these confidence-building measures in order to ease tensions in the Middle East, fuelled by the arms race between Israel and its Arab neighbours, Nasser’s role in promoting Pan Arabism, Nasser’s involvement in the war in Yemen, and US military support of Israel. Before Ben-Gurion’s visit to the US in May 1961, Kennedy sent letters to Arab leaders confirming his administration’s commitment to an even-handed policy and the ‘desire of the new US administration to deal with Near East problems in as fair and friendly manner as possible’ (Wailes, 10 May, 1961).

The administration was rebuked by American friends in the Arab world including Iran, which scorned Nasser: ‘the Saudis and the Jordanian chargé found it impossible to understand why the US, which purported to be their friend, was helping the man [Nasser] who was seeking to destroy their governments’ (Rockwell, 23 May, 1962). Kennedy refused to succumb to these pressures:

- To break openly with Nasser now over Yemen would: (a) increase the danger of an Arab-Israeli explosion; (b) destroy our ability to get anywhere on a rab refugee or Arab-Israeli arms control issues; (c) nullify our influence with the key a rab state just when the Jordan Waters issue is heating up, and (d) cause the US to turn more to the Soviets, as it did when it alleged we reneged on the s oviet d am (Jernegan, 11 December, 1963).

Kennedy’s assassination proved a watershed in the evolution of US policy in the Middle East. The Johnson administration explicitly embraced Israel and stopped providing loans or aid to Egypt. The following memorandum by a member of the

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8 US ambassador to Egypt, Frederick Reinhardt, reported on his farewell on 6 May, 1961 that ‘Nasser had stressed US economic development and appeared surprised by US complaints about Egyptian press coverage. Reinhardt offered these comments: “I regret to report that despite growing US economic assistance and cultural exchange which has characterized my fourteen months in Cairo, lack of mutual confidence between US and US has, if anything, become more apparent ... that the fact derives to a large extent from Nasser’s determination to maintain and enhance if possible his status as a neutralist leader and to attack the US as necessary to this end. Current Nasser-tito-Sukarno initiatives for a new conference of non-aligned states (including Latin America) indicate that this policy can be expected to prevail for foreseeable future with all that this implies for US-US relations”’ (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/5–661).
National security council pointed out ‘that a rabs sense a change in our [middle East] policy. t hough largely the product of circumstance, it comes out as lb J being pro-Israeli and reversing the three years of skilful kennedy handling of the Arabs’ (Komer, 14 February, 1964). Ironically, this change came at a time when Nasser was showing explicit and courageous signs of moderation, despite Israel’s provocation of diverting the Jordan River in 1964:

despite the usual bluster about Israel—“from yemen to palestine”—Nasser in fact says quite clearly that to fight now over the Jordan waters would be folly. a s he puts it, “t he palestine of 1948 can never be repeated”. Why overbid when we know we can’t win … We Egyptians will not go in for this doubletalk. And the matter is one for the top political leaders, not the military, to decide. So let’s have an a rab summit … h ere Nasser says his line will be: “We will not overbid. I am not ashamed to say that I cannot fight if I feel I cannot really. If I cannot fight and then go out and fight, I will only lead you to a disaster. Shall I bring my country to disaster? s hall I gamble with my country? Impossible.” While Nasser is obviously trying to prevent other a rabs from branding ua R a coward, the line he’s chosen shows he’s the one major Arab leader who may make sense (Komer, 30 December, 1963).

a s mentioned above, by cultivating cooperative relations with Nasser, the u s had alienated some of its a rab friends. On the eve of the June 1967 War, h arold s aunders visited Saudi Arabia and Jordan and was urged by these states to take a firm position against Nasser: ‘k ing h ussein told me that the breach between a rab moderates and Nasser is complete … Wasfi Tell, former PM … told me bluntly, “It’s time for you to choose sides.” h e believes that radicalism is on the wane and that Nasser will have to adopt more moderate policies or be replaced’ (Saunders, 16 May, 1967). Thus the u s was distancing itself from Nasser at a time when Nasserism and pan-a rab was waning (Saunders, 24 June, 1966).

The Crises and New Ideas

h ow did the crises in Iran and Egypt affect the thinking of a merican policymakers, and what ideas emerged in their aftermath? t he us management of the crises in Iran and Egypt reveals a policy inconsistency throughout the 1950s. Early on, the us feared that nationalist leaders might harm a merican interests and tried to accommodate and co-opt these leaders. b ut once this strategy failed, the us turned against these leaders, trying to topple or at least isolate them. t his failure was mainly due to the US’s tendency to confuse means with ends, identifying a steady supply of oil with control over oil resources and access to the suez c anal with control over the canal itself. This desire for control stemmed from US’s mistrust of nationalist leaders.
Consolidation and Learning by Doing

With regard to Iran, in particular, the US started to perceive the traditional regimes as indispensable partners. This policy line is revealed in the following top secret memorandum by the chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara:

AAS indicated by the proposed memorandum the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that any regime which would replace that of the Shah at this time, whether communist or non-communist, would be less Western-oriented and would therefore, represent a net loss to US interests in the Middle East. This assessment is based upon the absence of any constructive pro-Western alternative regime, as recognized in NSC 6010. It would, therefore, appear to be in the best interest of the United States at present to support the Shah’s government by all appropriate means ( Lemnitzer, 26 January, 1961).

A nother top secret memorandum submitted by various intelligence agencies concluded that the regime of the Shah was stable and the US should persist support him: ‘While a political upheaval could take place in Iran at any time, on the whole, we believe the odds are against such a development in the next year or so … the nature of Iranian politics and the character of the Shah make it unlikely that this change will be evolutionary’ (NIE, 28 February, 1961).

The US was even against a regime that would include some heirs of Mussadeq: ‘The admission of Mosadeqist leaders to the government, while the most promising of the suggested reforms, would mean a reduction of the Shah’s powers, an eventual reduction of the role of the military, and a danger of cutting the moderate Mosadeqists off from their followings. The Shah would regard such a suggestion as proof positive that the United States had turned against him’ (Morgan, 27 March, 1961). Morgan identified as Mussadeqists a group that ‘consists of the great majority of those urban elements who are caught between a traditional culture which they have rejected and a Western tradition which they cannot wholly accept. They are prone to xenophobia, to demagoguery, and to searching for scapegoats, and are personally frustrated and unhappy’.

In the case of Egypt, while there was no available alternative to Nasser during the 1950s and 1960s, US policy oscillated between isolating his regime and imposing sanctions on Egypt, on one hand, and co-opting him and providing Egypt with food aid and loans, on the other, while the US always kept itself distant from Nasser.

As a result of these two crises, the US developed the following set of ideas during the 1950s. First, nationalist leaders were dangerous to US interests, because of three reasons: they might conspire with the Soviut Union, they might nationalize foreign properties, and they might turn against traditional pro-West

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9 The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the National Security Agency.
leaders. Therefore the US should seek to ways to isolate these leaders or even to topple them if it could, or to co-opt them. Second, nationalist leaders were not an acceptable substitute for traditional regimes, which proved to be the most reliable partner of the US. Third, the US should pursue an even-handed policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Fourth, the US should restrict arms exports to the region as a way of reducing tension between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Finally, the US realized that the power of the nationalist leaders to turn the Middle East against the US or its regional allies was limited and manageable. These ideas guided both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

**US Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948–1973**

The Truman administration accepted the UN partition plan of Palestine in November 1947 and recognized Israel once it was established in May 1948. The administration feared, however, that supporting Israel might damage relations with the Arab states. The president also faced strong resistance for this policy from the State Department and especially from Loy Henderson—director of the Office of Near East and African Affairs—and the Pentagon (Brands 1991, 174; Benson 1997; 77). Henderson’s assessment was based on his prediction that being surrounded by many Arab nations and given its small population, the Zionist project could not survive, and sooner or later Israel would be eliminated. He also thought that American advocacy for the establishment of a Jewish state would undermine US efforts to prevent further Soviet penetration into the Middle East and would damage its relations with Arab nations.

Facing re-elections in November 1948, Truman hoped to win the Jewish vote by advocating the partition plan (Cohen 1990, 60). He also hoped to balance this decision by promoting negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Truman sought a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the return of a significant number of refugees, withdrawal of Israel from some of the territories it occupied outside the partition plan, and the internationalization of Jerusalem. But Israel utterly rejected these conditions, even at the expense of forfeiting a generous package of US economic aid. Without any moral justification for imposing sanctions on Israel to force it to change its position, especially given of the memory of the Holocaust and pressure from American pro-Israel lobbyists, Truman conceded and implicitly yielded to Israel’s policy that the refugees were

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10 In gratitude for Truman’s role in establishing the state of Israel, the latter renamed a town after him: Kfar Truman.

11 Around 750,000 Palestinians became refugees in 1948. They were scattered mainly in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip.
a rabs and could be resettled and reintegrated in neighbouring a rab countries, especially Jordan.\textsuperscript{12}

In may 1950, the us , b ritain and f rance agreed to regulate the selling of arms to the middle East under the t ripartite d eclaration (l evey 1997, 2).\textsuperscript{13} t hese three major arms exporters hoped to prevent the outbreak of war in the region by rationing the export of arms and by maintaining a balance of power between the belligerent parties of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This system lasted until 1955, when Egypt signed its c zech arms deal (Jabber 1981, 7). t he transfer of weaponry by the s oviet u nion to Egypt undermined the balance of power that had hitherto existed and constituted a historical turning point that marked a sharp acceleration of the arms race in the region. f ollowing this development, f rance and b ritain abandoned the t ripartite d eclaration and became the major arms suppliers of Israel and a rab states, respectively.\textsuperscript{14} t he u s , nonetheless, remained committed to limited arms exports.

t hus, at this stage we start to see the consolidation of two related strands of ideas: rationing arms sales to the middle East, and taking an even-handed policy toward the conflict while seeking a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that would include restitution of some of the palestinian refugees, while resettling the bulk of them in neighbouring a rab countries. d uring this period, the us - Israeli relations were also shaped by the rise in the clout of the Jewish constituency and the nascent Jewish lobby within the us t he pro-Israel lobby promulgated its ideas among members of the c ongress through the \textit{Near East Report}\textsuperscript{15} and it put pressure on c apitol h ill to provide all-out support to Israel, to reduce or eliminate aid to Israel’s Arab neighbours, and to drive a wedge between Washington and Israel’s enemies (Kenen 1981, 76–92, 115; Cohen 1990).\textsuperscript{16} a s the 1950s and 1960s wore on, ideas propagated by the pro-Israel lobby became part of the mindset of

\textsuperscript{12} The Truman administration established its Point Four office to assuage the plight of the palestinian refugees and offered aid to a rab states, who were willing to reintegrate them within their territories.

\textsuperscript{13} the aim of the t ripartite d eclaration was to stop uncontrolled arms-race, and to focus the attention of the states of the middle East blocking s oviet penetration into the middle East. In fact, during the 1950s, the u nited s tates refrained from arms exports to the region, leaving those markets to b ritain (major supplier of arms to the a rab states) and f rance (major supplier of Israel).

\textsuperscript{14} b etween 1955 and1965, Israel purchased around half of total f rench arms exports.

\textsuperscript{15} t his is a bi-weekly report distributed to every member of c ongress.

\textsuperscript{16} Isaiah k enen was the main representative of the Jewish a gency in Washington beginning from 1947. In a pril 1947 he registered as an agent of the a merican s ection of the Jewish a gency for Israel. h e established the a merican Zionism c ommittee for public a ffairs (AZCPA) in 1951. Kenen changed the committee’s name from the AZCPA to the American Israel public a ffairs c ommittee (a Ipac ) in 1959. k enen was in favor of providing aid to a rab states to be used for resettling palestinian refugees. h e also demanded that aid should be divided half-and-half between Israel and the a rab states, claiming that the Jewish immigrants to Israel be treated as refugees.
a merican foreign policy. t he a rabists in the s tate d epartment, such as h enderson, were gradually purged and replaced by pro-Israel diplomats, and c ongress grew more and more as pro-Israel and anti-a rab.

Following the armistice agreements of 1949, and under pressure from Israel’s friends on c apitol h ill, t ruman re-examined the arms embargo and decided to sell a limited quantity of weapons to Israel, while sharing the Pentagon’s fear that more ‘weapons would increase Israel’s offensive capabilities and give incentive to offensive planning’ (quoted in Hahn 2004, 73). The United States continued to impose an embargo on selling advanced arms to Israel throughout the 1950s for fear that such exports would harm us  relations with friendly a rab states and would show up its policy of impartiality as hollow, and it might prompt an arms race between Israel and its neighbours that could lead to military clashes (ben-Zvi 1998, 60). t his a merican policy of limited arms sales to the middle East persisted, with some exceptions, until the y om k ippur War (Levey 2003, 527).

The Eisenhower administration perceived the conflict through the lens of the Cold War. The administration remained convinced that Israel’s dispute with its a rab neighbours should be reconciled in order to prevent it from playing into the hands of the soviet u nion. Eisenhower also persisted with the policy of limiting arms exports to the middle East. Eisenhower employed pressure on Israel to agree to a unilateral Israeli territorial withdrawal from the Negev, to stop retaliatory raids against palestinian f edayeen in Jordan and the Gaza s trip, and to agree to the restitution of a limited number of palestinian refugees. Israel rejected these conditions. Throughout the first half of the 1950s, the US feared that Israel would be a major destabilizing force in the region and a strategic liability; the us  could neither distance itself from Israel nor embrace it. t he us  was concerned that political instability and radicalism in the a rab world was a direct consequence of the palestinian problem, which fed the forces of a rab nationalism. Given these reasons, the Eisenhower administration refused to modify its position on the issue of arms sales to Israel or to ditch the policy of impartiality. In 1959, Eisenhower did, however, agree to give Israel $100 million in technical and financial assistance.

t he Eisenhower administration focused on the national interests of the us , which, in its view, rested with the a rab states; Israel was a strategic liability (spiegel 1985, 87). Eisenhower’s standing as the supreme commander of the allied forces in Europe during World War II and the first commander of NATO

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17 t here were some exceptions to this policy; for example, in 1962, president k ennedy authorized the sale of h awk anti-aircraft missiles to Israel and president Johnson provided arms packages to both Jordan and Israel as a one-time transfer in the mid-1960s. a fter the s ix-d ay War, Johnson wide opened the door for us  arms exports to Israel but continued to limit sales to the a rab states.

18 a ccording to steven spiegel ‘t he tension between the Eisenhower administration and Israeli supporters was so acute that there were rumors (unfounded as it turned out) that the administration would investigate the a merican Zionist c ouncil. t herefore, an independent lobbying group was formed within the auspices of the American Zionist Committee’ (87).
allowed him to withstand pressure from pro-Israel lobbyists. His high popularity made him less dependent on the Jewish vote. In a conversation with AIPAC Eban in March 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles observed that ‘the more the friends of Israel try to exert pressures against the administration, the more difficult it is to convince the Arabs that they do not need to turn to the Soviets. All activities that friends of Israel customarily resort to in whipping up pressure … do not help to create a basis for understanding and cooperation between our two Governments’ (quoted in Ben-Zvi 1998, 55).

Eisenhower was, however, unsuccessful in swaying Israel on the peace process front. Israel adamantly rejected Eisenhower’s conditions and managed to withstand American diplomatic pressure aimed at forcing Israel to come to terms with the Arabs. Israel was no more enthusiastic than the US about a military alliance, fearing that the US would use such an alliance to confine its freedom of action in using its military power for further territorial expansion. Israel’s aloofness partially explains Eisenhower’s failure to extract concessions.

The US strategy of diplomatic pressure was not tied to any American reciprocal policy, such as a commitment to sell American weapons to Israel or provide security guarantees (Ben-Zvi 1998, 20). This policy persisted under President Kennedy and was illustrated in the following memorandum: ‘We have serious doubts as to the advantages either for the US or Israel of a bilateral defence agreement and we question the advisability of a new public statement on the part of the US Government supporting in explicit terms territorial integrity of the Near East states’ (Talbot, 1 May, 1961).

Israel rejected US diplomatic pressure, insisting that it would not jeopardize what it regarded as its core security interests—maintaining a Jewish majority within Israel, and asserting its sovereignty over territories that were not included in the original 1947 UN partition plan, especially the Negev. Because of the emotional power of the Holocaust and the influence of the pro-Israel lobby on Congress, the US’s ability to impose sanctions on Israel was, at best, weak.

Eisenhower understood, however, that as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remained unresolved, efforts to co-opt a rab state into an anti-soviet military alliance was doomed to failure. These apprehensions reached a high point with Israel’s 1956 invasion of the Sinai Peninsula and the tripartite aggression by Israel, Britain and France. Following the 1956 standoff between the US and Israel, the latter finally realized that it could not create facts on the ground and expect the US to follow suit. In the aftermath of the Suez crisis, Israel resorted to its secret weapon, the pro-Israel lobby within the US, to convince Congress of Israel’s security needs, including the need to expand its territories and to use its newly acquired territories as a bargaining card for a lasting peace.

19 After 1960, AIPAC grew up stronger and stronger, while no subsequent president has enjoyed the stature of Eisenhower, and no presidential candidate could dispense with the support of the Jewish vote.
There are two general views of the development of US-Israeli relationships during the mid-to-late 1950s. Some scholars believe that American-Israeli relations were at a low level throughout the 1950s. They argue that the Eisenhower administration continuously perceived Israel as a strategic liability (Little 1989; Hahn 2004; Alteras 1993). In their view, Israel’s acts of aggression, aimed at territorial expansion and manifested by raids into neighboring countries, as well as the so-called ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy towards unarmed Palestinian infiltrators (Morris 1993), resulted in the rise of radical regimes in some Arab states. Furthermore, the American-Israeli relations that were cultivated under Truman threw some Arab states into the hands of the Soviets and complicated the recruitment of Arab allies at a time when the US’s Cold War strategy centered on the British Suez Canal bases. Thus, the US was dependent on Arab cooperation in its struggle against communism.

According to this viewpoint, American-Israeli relations started to warm up in 1961 with the new Democratic president, John Kennedy. In a tight election, Kennedy had received widespread financial and political support from Jewish voters. Support for Israel was a natural response to the strong ties that had evolved between the Democratic party and the pro-Israel lobby. Kennedy also appointed two Jews, Arthur Goldberg and Abraham Ribicoff, who were staunch supporters of Israel, to his cabinet (Kenen 1981, 155; Rubenberg 1986, chapter 4; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007). Kennedy was more open to Israeli leaders and took a more friendly approach toward Israel than Eisenhower. He did not, however, ditch the idea of impartiality or limited arms exports.

From a different viewpoint, Ben-Zvi argues that the dramatic events of 1957 and 1958 in Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon drew the US and Israel closer together. The two countries concurred on the need to support friendly Arab/Muslim regimes in the Middle East (Ben-Zvi 1998, 67). When pro-Egyptian Jordanian officers attempted to topple King Hussein in April 1957, Eisenhower quickly sent in US marines to save the young king’s shaky throne. This move was compatible with Israel’s policy of safeguarding its vulnerable eastern borders with the West Bank. Four months after the Jordanian crisis, Baathist officers in Syria seized power and pressed for close cooperation with Egypt and the Soviet Union. The likelihood of close ties between Damascus and Moscow created fears in Tel Aviv that Syria would turn communist. Eisenhower again dispatched marines to the Mediterranean in order to deter Syria from taking any act of aggression. The US convinced Israel that any pre-emptive military action on its part would backfire, causing more instability in friendly Arab states, such as Jordan and Iraq. Israel’s compliance with the US’s helped to rehabilitate the two countries’ relations following the standoff during the Suez crisis (Ben-Zvi 1998; Little 1993, 565).

Furthermore, according to Ben-Zvi, the formation of the united Arab Republic (UA R) between Syria and Egypt in February 1958, the Lebanese crisis in May, and the Iraqi revolution in July that toppled the pro-Western royal regime and put an end to the Baghdad Pact, created a sense that the Middle East was sliding out of control, and the US feared for the stability of the jewel in the crown—Saudi
a rabia. When the pro-Western government of Camille Chamoun came under pressure from Muslims who wanted Lebanon to join the US, Chamoun appealed to the US. Eisenhower sent 14,000 marines into Beirut and persuaded Chamoun to resign in favour of a moderate, Fuad Chehab, easing Christian-Muslim tensions. Britain sent 2,000 troops into Jordan in the face of another attempt to topple the throne of Hussein in July.\textsuperscript{20} The US perceived Egypt a destabilizing power in the Middle East as it was setting the pace of arms race since 1955, when it first began to acquire Soviet arms. As the deal accentuated Israel’s security dilemma, the US expressed concerns about Israel’s ability to meet a sudden air attack, given its narrow ten-mile waist.

Ben-Zvi argues that American-Israeli friendship culminated in Kennedy’s decision in 1962 to sell Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Israel. ‘In approaching Israel, president Kennedy pursued a posture that was closely and inextricably patterned on at least some of the premises and tenets that had begun to surface during the years 1957–1960’ (Ben-Zvi 1998, 3). Given Israel’s growing clout in the region, the argument continues, especially after its swift victory in 1956, the US was impressed with Israel’s military capability, his argument continues. Furthermore, given Israel’s western culture and type of regime as the only democratic country in the whole Middle East, it was perceived as a reliable ally. Thus, according to Ben-Zvi, in the second half of the 1950s and in the context of the cold War, the US started to perceive Israel a strategic asset that was able to deter pro-Soviet Arab states.

In fact, the truth lies between these two positions. The crises of the late 1950s caused a major change in America’s evaluation of Israel’s role in the Middle East. But Kennedy embraced a policy package from Eisenhower that included impartiality and limited arms exports.

Even after fostering cooperation with Israel, Eisenhower had firmly turned down Israel’s request for military hardware or security guarantees, even in the face of deepening Soviet involvement in Syria and Egypt, events that provoked a feeling of insecurity among Israel’s top policymakers. This policy persisted under Kennedy, who also insisted on even-handed policy; promoting friendship with Israel should not mean burgeoning animosity toward Egypt. Kennedy, by and large, kept the policy of impartiality, but he gave it a new form. While Eisenhower tended to raise the stick at both parties in conflict, Kennedy preferred the carrot. Yet both sets of policies were guided by the same set of ideas: impartiality and a limited arms race.

If America’s pro-Israeli foreign policy was a function of external forces, à la Ben-Zvi, why did the US fail to twist Israel’s arm to further its own interests throughout the 1960s? Even when the US provided Israel with sophisticated conventional weapons, it failed to sway Israel on the core issue that hallmark US policy toward Israel during the 1960s: the Dimona nuclear reactor. In a letter

\textsuperscript{20} Israel hoped that the crisis in Jordan would topple the throne of King Hussein, a thing that would provide Israel with a pretext to occupy the West Bank.
to President Kennedy, Dean Rusk raised his concern that ‘Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would have grave repercussions in the middle East, not the least of which might be the probable stationing of soviet nuclear weapons on the soil of Israel’s embittered Arab neighbors’ (Rusk, 30 January, 1961). The US perceived the Dimona reactor as a stimulus to the arms race and an obstacle to a lasting peace. The Eisenhower policy continued to govern the new administration.

With regard to the arms imbalance feared by the Israelis, we continue to believe that steps which would in effect make the United States the arsenal for Israel would heighten tension in the area and would probably lead to a corresponding step-up of Soviet arms to the UAR. Such an intensified arms race with its concomitant economic burdens would be highly detrimental to the countries of the area and dangerous (Talbot, 1 May, 1961).

Although Kennedy cultivated a more friendly relationship with Israel, the issues that concerned the Eisenhower administration remained a major concern for Kennedy too. These issues included Israel’s nuclear reactor project at Dimona, the Palestinian refugees and Israel’s raids into neighbouring countries. Indeed, Kennedy approved the sale of limited sophisticated arms to Israel and provided implicit guarantees that the US would protect Israel in case of a war. Kennedy hoped that by providing these guarantees and conventional weapons, he would be able to dissuade the Jewish state from developing a nuclear bomb. But like Eisenhower, he failed. On the refugee issue, Kennedy suggested that Israel would absorb 100,000 Palestinian refugees in return for the provision of the Hawk missiles. In the end, Israel refused to accept any refugees, blocked US plans of monitoring the Dimona reactor, persisted with its raids, but still managed to get the Hawk missiles. This series of failures is a proof of the power of the pro-Israel lobby in the US that reinforced Israel’s resistance to US pressure.

Given this failure, added to Eisenhower’s, the Kennedy administration decided to remain aloof from the peace process. The Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs wrote to Secretary of State Dean Rusk:

> Ambassador Harman’s memorandum is noteworthy in that it speaks favorably of the present tranquility in the Near East and eschews “frontal and public” approaches to an Arab-Israel settlement. In this connection, it is of interest that Ben-Gurion has publicly stated that an Arab-Israel settlement cannot be imposed... We are pleased that the Israelis share our view concerning the many “positive aspects” characterizing the present climate of the Near East. As noted in previous exchanges between us, we agree with the Israeli view that a “frontal and public attack” on major outstanding issues would be likely to boomerang but we would

21 Talbot refers to a 27 February 1961 memorandum by the US ambassador to Israel, Avraham Harman, entitled: ‘Some Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Situation’ (Department of State, Central Files, 684a.86b/5-161).
Ironically this memorandum gives the impression that the tail was wagging the dog. It was the position of the Israeli government not to come to terms with its rab neighbours and the US simply concurred with it. Yet, while the tranquillity of the early 1960s might justify such a position, it should have changed after the June War—but it did not. This raises a significant question: why was a superpower unable to twist the arm of a nascent, vulnerable, developing country?

The answer lies in a fundamental shift in the American position. Regardless of whether Israel was perceived as a strategic asset or liability, one thing was clear: the security of Israel became a prominent end for US during the 1960s. The need to support Israel had shifted from a mere moral solidarity of the US with the Jewish people in the late 1940s into a national commitment to Israel’s security in the early 1960s. That does not mean, however, that the US truly perceived Israel as a strategic asset. This commitment was a result of pressures employed on the executive branch by Israel’s friends in the Congress, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and pro-Israel diplomats within the administration, along with the political developments of the late 1950s.

The willingness of the Kennedy administration to provide Israel with missiles was a reaction to two developments: Israel’s nuclear program and the arms race begun by Egypt. Ambassador Ogden Reid urged United States consideration of ballistic missiles for Israel and more specific assurances of our willingness to help in case of invasion, as moves that will contribute to stability in the Middle East’ (Reid, 31 January, 1961). This policy was also illustrated in the following memorandum by a member of the National Security Council staff:

Both state and defense seem to favor selling hawks to Israel as soon as US starts actually getting the various types of missiles US has contracted to give. Before doing so, however, we ought to make an effort to sell mutual (though tacit) arms limitations instead. This would involve an approach to Nasser, probably at highest level, saying “before we give hawks to Israel to restore balance upset by your missile purchases from Sovs, we’d like to see if both of you wouldn’t consider cheaper and safer self-denial route” (Koerner, 22 June, 1962).

The inauguration of Lyndon Johnson as president in November 1963 marked the end of the Eisenhower/Kennedy policy of impartiality. The friendly relationship between Johnson and Israel went back to the 1950s. Johnson had always declared himself as a friend of Israel and had defended her in both houses of Congress. In January 1957, he urged President Eisenhower to oppose the UN resolution to impose sanctions on Israel (Kenen 1981, 135). In 1959, as the Senate majority leader, Johnson called for Israel to be made eligible for a multimillion-dollar military assistance credit under the mutual security program. As president, he also...
appointed a Jewish staunch supporter of Israel, Arthur Goldberg, as the new US ambassador to the UN (Little 1993; Kenen 1981, 228; Rubenberg 1986, 94).

The tension in the Middle East in the aftermath of 1967 calls for a re-examination of whether Israel was indeed a strategic asset for the US. Scholars who advocate the idea argue that Israel promoted US interests in the area by blocking Soviet penetration and its own ‘body.’ It maintained regional stability through military deterrence and it ensured the survival of pro-American Arab regimes by deterring pro-Soviet Arab nations from attacking them. But was this in fact true? Had Israel managed to deter its Arab neighbours and consequently maintain regional stability while it was occupying Arab lands? In fact Israel’s policy of territorial expansion in 1967 invited Soviet penetration of the Middle East and a Arab attacks against it. And last but not least, the pro-Arab regimes were in effect under persistent threat by other more radical Arab regimes because the former were taking a conciliatory approach toward Israel.

Under the Johnson administration, the pro-Israel lobby’s ideas were merged with the existing policy of isolating nationalist leaders. These two ideas continued to guide US policy in the Middle East until the eruption of the oil crisis in 1973, which dictated a new response.

Johnson was, however, restrained by his Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Pentagon and the CIA, all of whom warned that supplying major quantities of arms to Israel would ignite a regional arms race that could jeopardize US interests in the region by increasing Arab nations’ dependence on the USSR. Johnson agreed and continued to oppose Israel’s aspiration to join the nuclear club, in the belief that Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons would accelerate the arms spiral. Johnson was ready to provide Israel with a limited amount of weapons in order to dissuade it from developing its nuclear capability. Johnson also understood that unconditional support for Israel would poison US relations with friendly Arab states.

Johnson, in short, tried to find a balance between the ideas propagated by AIPAC, which called for a unconditional support for Israel, and the set of ideas that guided US foreign policy toward the Middle East since the early 1950s. In the end, Israel was playing a cat-and-mouse game with the US. Israel was ready to delay the development of its nuclear reactor until it received the arms it requested, and then it resumed its plans as usual. It remains unclear why the US did not insist on monitoring the Dimona nuclear reactor in return for supplying Israel with weapons during the 1960s.

Keeping Israel from becoming a nuclear power was the chief goal that guided US-Israel relationship throughout the 1960s. Like Eisenhower and Kennedy, Johnson hoped that by providing Israel with sophisticated conventional weapons, he could dissuade it from building a nuclear bomb. Johnson, however, contrary to

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22 The pro-Israel team surrounding Johnson included also the National Security Advisor Walter Rostow, his brother Eugene as Under Secretary of State and Clark Clifford, among others.
his announcement, decided to increase conventional arms exports to Israel and to embrace Israel as a strategic asset. This shift in US policy was undertaken even though Johnson was unable to force Israel to end its nuclear weapons project, which was underway at the onset of his incumbency. As for the peace process, the Johnson administration thought that by staying out of a Arab-Israeli peace talks, the US could demonstrate its impartiality: ‘The United States attempts to conduct its relations with states of the area on a strictly bilateral basis and to avoid being drawn into disputes either in an inter-Arab or an Arab-state-Israeli context, except where vital United States interests are affected’ (Dinsmore, 6 April, 1964). This policy was based on an intelligence estimate that ‘any losses to our [American] position throughout the area occasioned by Nasser’s Arab nationalist drive would be essentially peripheral … and that our basic interests in the Near East would be maintained’ (Moore, 10 September, 1964). In other words, Arab nationalists were mere paper tigers, and the US could manage to serve its own interests in the region, regardless of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Immediately after the end of the six-day War, the State Department was astonished by Israel’s plan to keep the territories it had just occupied. When Rusk discussed peace settlement with the Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban, ‘Rusk reminded Eban that Israel had always denied having any territorial ambitions. “We have changed our minds,” Eban retorted’ (quoted in Little 1989, 578). In fact, Israel had never changed its mind. The 1948 War was the first manifestation of Israel desire for territorial expansion followed by the 1956 Sinai War. After 1967, Israel had it all: it had occupied new territories, it had acquired nuclear weapons and it had the strongest presidential supporter to date in the White House.

In the aftermath of the six-day War of 1967, Johnson believed that immediate withdrawal to the 4 June boundaries would not resolve the conflict in the Middle East. In his view, withdrawal should be linked to a comprehensive settlement. During this period, as Israel rejected any withdrawal and Arabs refused to recognize the Jewish state, the US’s peace efforts in the Middle East were reduced simply to stopping the fighting, rather than restoring the status quo ante bellum. The US sought calm rather than a long-lasting peaceful settlement of the conflict.

This American position raises several questions, however. What incentive did the defeated and humiliated Arab states have to agree to a ceasefire while their land was under occupation? And why did the US make such a sharp departure from the Eisenhower doctrine, which had established the US as the protector of Western interests in the middle East, and from the policy of impartiality toward the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Indeed, at no time between 1948 and 1967 were the Arab states ready to start direct negotiations with Israel, let alone to recognize it as a sovereign state. At no time during this same period was Israel willing to make painful concessions, such as the restoration of Palestinian refugees or withdrawal from territories located outside the 1947 partition plan, which might have induced a Arab states to come to terms with the Jewish state. Israel’s stance was strengthened by its spectacular victory during the six-day War and the backup that it received from the Johnson
administration. US efforts to stop the fighting were not accompanied by Israeli withdrawal from the newly occupied territories. These efforts were therefore doomed to fail and brought about the opposite result—further escalation.

The participation of Soviet pilots and missile crews in the military operations of Egypt during the War of Attrition, 1969–70, embodied this escalation. Soviet participation was designated to undercut the Israeli air force’s superiority over Egypt and to shift the balance of power in favour of its client.

Johnson’s policy is questionable in light of Nasser’s inclination to come to terms with Israel. In December 1967 Nasser sent a secret letter to president Johnson in which he expressed not only his readiness to resume diplomatic relations with the US, but, more importantly, his willingness to ‘accept non-belligerency with Israel with all that implies. If Israel will pay just and adequate compensation to Palestinian refugees, Nasser will exchange Ambassadors with Israel’ (Birdsall, 10 December, 1967). In response to Nasser’s letter, Johnson wrote: ‘I am pleased to note President Nasser’s readiness to accept a state of non-belligerency with Israel’ (Johnson, 30 December, 1967). Johnson emphasized the need for Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab land. Johnson declared, though, that the US should throw its weight behind the UN initiative conducted by Ambassador Jarring, a position that Israel also advocated. That was not the kind of response that Nasser expected.

Egypt in the meantime, retained the option of recourse to force, unless the diplomatic track would bring about a satisfactory withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai peninsula. Israel, by and large, made use of public Arab rhetoric, in particular their explicit intentions of seeking the total destruction of the Zionist state, and bolstered this with anti-Semitic elements: Arabs were seeking Israel’s destruction, because it was a specifically Jewish state. Israel highlighted this public rhetoric while ignoring the secret talks, as a pretext for not making territorial concessions. It went on to build settlements in the occupied territories in order to establish ‘facts on the ground’ that would prevent any future withdrawal by a left-wing Israeli government.

The US’s failure to compel Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied during the six-day War elevated tensions in the region to new heights. His encouraged the Soviets to send more military advisors to Egypt, Syria and Iraq and set the stage for two more wars: the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War.

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23 In fact, Arabs accepted the existence of Israel de facto after a series of ceasefire agreements in 1949, but they could not recognize it de jure, given the solidarity of a rab public opinion with the plight of the Palestinian people, who were deported from their homes in May 1948.

24 Israeli leftwing parties viewed the occupied territories as a bargaining card to be given back in return for peace. It was the Labor party that started to build limited settlements in the occupied territories. Center-right parties, including Likud, which came to power in 1977, perceived the territories as part of the Jewish biblical lands to be used for building Jewish settlements.
War. Moreover, the US also failed to sway Israel on the issue of settlement in the occupied territories, a policy that Israel initiated immediately after the six-day War, while the US consistently argued that the settlements constitute a major obstacle to peace.

Once Israel had realized all of its goals, it was less able to convince Washington to go on providing conventional arms, especially after Johnson decided that the special relationships between the two countries were not reciprocal: while the US was generously supporting Israel economically and politically, Israel gave almost nothing in return. The question was what Johnson would do in the context of an election year, while his country was embroiled in a controversial war in Vietnam.

Johnson summarized his views on the arms race immediately after the six-day War:

This last conflict has demonstrated the danger of the Middle Eastern arms race of the last 12 years. Here the responsibility must rest not only on those in the area—but upon the larger states outside the area. We believe that scarce resources could be used much better for technical and economic development. We have always opposed this arms race, and our own military shipments to the area have consequently been severely limited ... the nations of the region have had only fragile and violated truce lines for 20 years. What they now need are recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security against terror, destruction, and war (Johnson, 19 June, 1967).

As to the occupied territories, Johnson reproached Israel that it ‘should [not] permit [its] military success to blind it to the fact that its neighbors have rights and its neighbors have interests of their own’ (Johnson, 19 June, 1967). Yet he also declared in the same speech that withdrawal was not a prescription for peace but would bring the parties back to square one, at the point when hostilities began. In other words, Johnson accepted the Israeli formula of land in return for peace, a formula that was also accepted by 365 members of Congress (Kenen, 1981, 207). In fact, Johnson, at this stage, had very little leverage to influence Israel on the issue of withdrawal, while the latter could always use its connection on the Capitol Hill through AIPAC to mitigate pressure by the president.

One week before Johnson left office, he declared: ‘There must be a settlement of the armed hostility that exists in that [middle East] region of the world today. It is a threat not only to Israel and to all the Arab states, but it is a threat to every one of us and to the entire world as well’ (Johnson, 14 January, 1969). Johnson became convinced that a peaceful solution should be based on withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories in return for full recognition of its existence.

Following the 1967 war, each side of the conflict provided differing interpretations of United Nations Resolution 242 of November 1967 in congruence with its own interests. Was Israel to return all, or only part, of the territory it had occupied during the war? Israel felt more secure within its newly expanded borders, which gave it a strategic buffer zone. It saw the Golan Heights, the West
Bank and the Sinai Peninsula as an invaluable strategic asset. Nasser’s Egypt left the door open for a settlement that would allow Egypt to regain its occupied territory. The more nationalist Arabs, fronted by Syria and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLQ), adopted a more radical posture, calling for an end to Israel’s sovereignty and the creation of a Palestinian state on the whole territory of Palestine. Under these circumstances, the US under both the Johnson and the Nixon administrations perceived any attempted negotiations would be doomed to failure. Luckily for the US, the protracted conflict did not constitute a source of harm for American interests in the region till 1974, and thus the US did not feel any urgency to reinvigorate the peace process.

The US position of staying aloof from the peace process was influenced by two considerations. First, the US thought that the Arab states would not dare start a war in the near future as long as the balance of power was not tilted in their favour. Second, given the power of the pro-Israel lobby, the president could not compel Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. This prompted the US to re-examine its position on arms sales to Israel: empowering Israel would help the latter maintaining stability through deterrence. In fact, Syria rejected direct peace negotiations and refused to recognize Israel’s legitimacy or existence; this led the US to believe that Israel should continue to retain the occupied territories. In the aftermath of the Six-Day War, the Soviet Union decided to restore shattered Arab pride by providing Egypt and Syria with all-out military, political and diplomatic support in their campaign to regain their lost territories. Moscow’s main purpose was to shift the balance of power in favour of the Arab states, to establish its political sphere of influence in the Arab world and to embarrass the US in the eyes of Arabs by highlighting the US’s anti-Arab policy. To the US, the USSR’s massive arms deliveries to Egypt and deployment of several thousand military men to Syria and Egypt crossed the line and was seen as a sign that the Soviets had in mind a larger plan of expanding their influence into other states in the Middle East. The competition between the US and the Soviet Union become the focal point of the US foreign policy in the region.

Following the Six-Day War, US analysts assessed the USSR’s arms supply to Egypt and Syria at almost $4 billion. Israel had been cut off from its own arms supply by the imposition of a French arms embargo. The US could not stand idly by. For the US, any indication of Israeli weakness would encourage a counterattack and further escalation. Although the US wanted to persist with the policy of limited arms exports, events had dictated otherwise. The US felt obliged to increase arms exports to Israel in order to allow it to meet its military challenges and to prevent what the US thought would be further Soviet penetration of the Middle East.25

25 In 1967 Israel asked the US for 27 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, to be delivered in 1969. These were in addition to the 48 Skyhawks that were scheduled for delivery in 1968. It also asked for 50 F-4 Phantom jets to be delivered in 1969–70.
furthermore, king hussein of Jordan was pressing the us for some arms deliveries to meet the equipment needs for his defeated army. Hussein threatened that if the us turned down his request, he would turn to the soviets (k omer, 23 September, 1965). The US understood Hussein’s vulnerable position within the arab world and within his own kingdom. He was threatened by his inclination to reach a settlement with Israel, his association with the us, and his resistance to attractive soviet arms offers. The us needed to walk a thin line between its two allies, who also happened to be each other’s enemies. The US wished to meet King Hussein’s needs, but without endangering Israel’s security, thus avoiding further substantial us arms commitments. Given this pressure, both the state and defence Department felt that the US should find a diplomatic solution to the problem. In a memorandum to Johnson, secretary of state dean Rusk declared:

In accordance with your instructions I had lunch today with secretary mcNamara, Walt Rostow, clark clifford, and luke battle to review the Israeli arms request which will be before you in the course of the visit of prime minister Eshkol. It is our conclusion after a lengthy discussion that the security of Israel cannot be assured by military hardware alone but must involve an arrangement for peaceful existence with the arab states. In addition, soviet penetration of the area cannot be limited by the provision of military hardware alone but necessitates that Israel finds some means of establishing a basis for peace beginning as soon as possible with a step of encouragement to the moderate a rabs in their contest with extremist arab states … we are prepared to see that Israel receives weapons needed to defend itself, but must avoid arms shipments not warranted by the actual threat (Rusk, 5 January, 1968).

If Israel was not ready for peace talks that would lead to stripping it of the occupied territories, the us was not ready to enter peace talks that would reveal its inability to force Israel to withdrawal. In fact, the us perceived the policy of impartiality to be congruent with remaining aloof of the peace process. Its attempts to bring peace to the region were confined to supporting either the Jarring mission under the aegis of the u N or an international convention sponsored by the t wo powers (us and uss R) or f our powers (us, uss R, britain and france) t he us believed that peace depended on the parties themselves. In the words of a mbassador Goldberg the ‘political influence of USG will be exerted in support of efforts of UN Rep to achieve fair and equitable and dignified solution so that all in the area can live in peace, security and tranquillity’ (Day, 7 December, 1967). The US admitted that it ‘has no blueprint for settlement. We continue to believe that … secure, just and

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26 the policy of impartiality and remaining aloof of the peace process illustrated in the following memorandum: ‘t he u nited s tates attempts to conduct its relations with states of the area on a strictly bilateral basis and to avoid being drawn into disputes either in an inter-arab or an arab state-Israeli context, except where vital u nited s tates interests are affected’(Dinsmore, 6 April, 1964).
lasting peace must rest upon agreements between the parties (day, 7 December, 1967).

But in fact, the policy of impartiality was in contradiction to the US provision of arms to Israel. The US needed to forfeit one or the other. The lack of active involvement in the peace process escalated tensions, while increasing arms exports kept Israel strong but contradicted impartiality. His contradiction prompted Johnson’s Special Assistant Walt Rostow to write to the president that ‘we are on the way to losing the Middle East rapidly. In a matter of months there will be a military confrontation in which the Soviet Union will be prepared not only to arm the Arabs, but directly to engage’ (Rostow, 29 December, 1967). Rostow warned that Israel’s occupation of Arab land would trigger more aggression and that a departure from the policy of limited arms sales would be unwise.

Why, then, did the US persist with all-out support for Israel in response to the Soviet policy of bolstering its Arab allies? Why did the US not try to resolve the conflict by compelling Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab lands back to the 4 June, 1967 borders in return for both demilitarizing these areas and a recognition of Israel’s right to exist as a sovereign state, in light of Nasser’s letter? Even though this would not have been an ideal solution, the alternative was further escalation of the conflict that would propel the USSR to support the radicals on the Arab side. In short, the Johnson administration departed from the Eisenhower and Kennedy’s impartiality position and backed the Israeli side against those who called for a more even-handed approach to the conflict (Campbell 1970, 64). Johnson embraced the idea of limited arms exports, but was compelled to increase such exports to Israel and Jordan in light of new circumstances as they unfolded.

There could be several reasons why the Johnson administration departed from the impartiality policy. First, in light of the Vietnam War, it felt that it should bolster its regional allies rather than weakening them, because the US might be unable to rescue them if their security position deteriorated. Second, even if the US would intervene military to save Israel in case of a war, it would only worsen its relations with its Arab allies. Thus, it would be better to supply Israel with American weapons than to defend it with American soldiers. Third, the US interests in the region were safe due to the fact that Arab oil was in the hands of five American and two British oil companies, while the Arab oil exporting countries were still unable to use oil as a weapon against the US. Fourth, the pro-Israel lobby managed to convince the administration to support Israel, while propagating the idea that the only menace to US interests could be an invasion by the Soviets or one of its proxies against one of the Arab oil sheikdoms. In this sense, Israel was perceived as a strategic asset that could deter such an invasion. But even if Johnson thought that Israel was indeed a strategic asset, he remained convinced that the occupation undermined stability in the region.

When Nixon came to power, the tension between Israel and its Arab neighbours was at its highest: first, there was the War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt along the Suez Canal, with direct Soviet involvement, while Israel was conducting deep air raids into Egyptian territories. Second, the PLO was sending Palestinian
feidayeen to attack Israeli targets from Jordan and Lebanon and Israel retaliated with counterattacks. Third, Israel and Syria continued their fight over the Golan Heights.

Given this context, several ideas dominated US foreign policy toward the region. First, the US perceived the security of Israel as a national commitment. Based on this conception, the US could not allow its ally to suffer a defeat. Second, the US wanted to block the Soviets from expanding their influence into friendly Arab states. Third, the US persisted in rationing the sales of weapons to the Middle East, while preserving Israel’s qualitative edge in the regional balance of power. Fourth, the US should remain aloof from the Arab-Israeli peace process, because if the US failed to force Israel’s withdrawal, that would reveal political US weakness and its bias toward Israel.

The policy of the Nixon administration in the Middle East marks continuity with its predecessor. The Nixon administration perceived Israel as the most effective blocker to the Soviet penetration of the Middle East. In the words of Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird, ‘for one hard reason the Israelis are currently the strongest buffer against Soviet expansion in the entire region’ (Laird, 17 February, 1970). The new administration failed to diagnose the cause of Soviet penetration: Israel’s occupation of Arab lands. Instead it decided to deal with the symptom, not the disease, and felt obliged to support Israel. The US could not allow its ally to lose the War of Attrition, especially after Vietnam. Once again, the US was reacting to outside events rather than initiating a new long-term policy that might bring about better results.

In 1970, the US’s Middle East policy was paralyzed by disputes within the administration over the root of the problem and the inability to find an immediate solution. From the State Department’s point of view, ‘the root of our difficulties was the Arab-Israeli conflict over territory’ (Kissinger 1979, 558). President Nixon concurred with this explanation, but understood that a solution was not going to be found around the corner. Kissinger ‘had grave doubts about these assumptions and the course that they seemed to suggest’ (Kissinger 1979, 558). In Kissinger’s view, the occupation was only part of the problem, while Israeli withdrawal was not a panacea for resolving unrest in the area. Furthermore, in his view, a peace deal that would be brokered by the two superpowers would consolidate the position of the Soviets in the Middle East.27 Thus, Kissinger discouraged the two power and four power talks that were promoted by the State Department, a policy that centred on Israeli withdrawal from the territories it occupied during the June War (Rubenberg 1986, 146). Kissinger suggested focusing on reciprocal measures to achieve ceasefire and on Arab commitments to Israeli withdrawal. Kissinger, in other words, asserted that the US should not conform to Soviet demands to put pressure on Israel. Kissinger thought that time was working to the US’s advantage.

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27 This policy line was also advocated by Israel, which rejected the two power talks because they could result in the imposition of a settlement. Israel contended that it preferred direct negotiations.
and advocated a policy of procrastination that would weaken the Soviet position in the Arab world and demonstrate to Arab leaders such as Nasser that the key to a solution was only to be found in Washington.

Having understood that peace settlement in the Middle East was not within striking distance, Nixon gave the State Department the task of dealing with the Arab-Israeli peace process. In Kissinger’s words, ‘Nixon had no real belief that the State Department diplomatic plan would work, but also he had little stomach for overruling Rogers’ (Kissinger 1979, 577). In fact, Kissinger had the same feeling about the Rogers plan that outlined negotiations of peace settlement, sponsored by the two superpowers and based on Resolution 242. On 16 June, 1970, Kissinger warned Nixon against the State Department’s plan, which, in his view, would leave Israel with more vulnerable frontiers and would stimulate another cycle of the arms race. In the end, Israel announced in September its refusal to participate in the two or four power talks and the whole project collapsed. What the State Department managed to achieve was a cease-fire agreement between the belligerent parties in July.

**Arms Sales to Iran**

t he policy of limited arms exports also applied to Iran. Eisenhower rejected repeated requests by the shah for more arms. Although both Kennedy and Johnson were less able to gauge the military needs of Iran, each was willing to export slightly more weapons to Iran in order to avoid losing Iran to the communist bloc. The Kennedy administration concluded that the shah overemphasized his country’s needs for sophisticated weaponry, while his army lacked the needed trained military personnel to operate these weapons. The Kennedy administration also urged the shah to pursue political reforms that would be strong enough to satisfy the needs of the masses, but not too strong to topple the regime. Under these pressures, in 1961 the shah introduced the White Revolution that included, among other things, land reforms, women’s suffrage and privatization of state-owned enterprises. Yet, as we will see in Chapter 5, these reforms were too little and alienated powerful political centres of power, sowing the seeds for the mass revolution of 1979. In the early 1960s, the US expressed understanding of the shah’s repression of dissident groups, which were perceived as reactionary forces that threw sand in the engine of modernization.

In a letter to the shah, Johnson remained committed to limited arms exports:

> Because of Iran’s exposed position, we have always taken quite seriously your military concerns. However, after another thorough look, we have concluded that the basic factors that led our military experts to agree on the current five-Year Military Plan have not changed significantly … While we can understand your quite natural worry about potential developments in the Arab world, we
simply do not yet foresee much likelihood of a substantial a rab threat to Iran (Johnson, 19 march, 1964).

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the shah’s regime seemed to enjoy political stability. The military was strong enough to crush any local subversive movement, and the military was loyal to the shah. It also seemed that the White Revolution had weakened the landowners and clergy and had increased the popularity of the regime among the landless peasants in the countryside.

Under these circumstances, president Nixon visited the shah in May 1972. Nixon expressed his admiration for Iran’s impressive record in the development of a strong economy and the successful implementation of the White Revolution (Nixon 1972). His visit constituted a turning point in US policy toward Iran; the US created an unrestricted commitment to turn Iran into the major US political ally in the Persian Gulf. Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger perceived the shah’s aspiration to convert Iran into the most powerful state in the Gulf as compatible with the Nixon Doctrine. They agreed to provide Iran with sophisticated conventional weapons and to increase the number of American advisors and technicians working in Iran. The US induced Iran to protect American interests in that region, a role that the shah was eager to play.

The idea of arms transfer to Iran was not a turning point in the US foreign policy of limited arms exports to the region, but it intertwined with the overall global Cold War struggle. In the early 1970s, the US was losing the war in Vietnam, and both American public opinion and Congress were against undertaking similar adventures elsewhere. Britain had completed its withdrawal from the Middle East in 1971 and left behind a political vacuum. The Soviet Union was empowering Iraq to become a hegemonic power in the area. Finally, the Persian Gulf was the major supplier of oil to the West. Under these circumstances, the US was in an acute need of a regional, powerful ally that would protect American interests, and Iran willingly and enthusiastically filled that role (Kissinger 1979, 1261; Sick 1985, 14–15).

This policy of placing the US’s vital interests in the hands of the shah increased the US’s dependency on him, while the US became associated with his regime. As hatred for the shah’s regime soared among the clergy, the bazaries, and the working class, these groups also identified the US with the ‘Westoxication’ of Iranian society.

The policy of relying on regional powers to maintain stability in the Gulf continued unabated under the Ford and the Carter administrations, although this policy required some compromise in the area of human rights by the latter. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who visited Iran in May 1977, assured the shah that the US would fill all existing arms transfer contracts and even offered the shah airborne Warning and Control Systems (a Wacs).
Assessing US Foreign Policy Between 1945 and 1973

In the late 1940s, the United States was a nascent superpower that had little understanding of the domestic political culture within the Arab states, the link between a rab-Islamic culture and domestic political stability, inter-Arab rivalry, or the ramifications of the Arab-Israeli conflict on regional stability. Faced with the reality on the ground, and especially the Cold War, emerging Arab nationalism, the Iranian crisis and the Suez crisis, the US was desperate to find a formula that could maintain stability in the Middle East.

In order to assess US policy in the Middle East during this period, we have to understand the way in which the US defined its interests and the means it employed for achieving them. Many scholars fall into the trap of lumping means and ends, but the two should be clearly distinguished. We also need to distinguish between vital ends and merely important ends. It is important to emphasize that neither the American interests in the region nor the means employed were externally determined but were defined by American policymakers themselves. The ideas that guided these policymakers had a tremendous impact on their preferences. Understanding means and ends and the distinction between them gives us a clear picture about the set of ideas that guided US foreign policy during this critical era.

Before World War II, British vital interests in the Middle East, included a free passage through the Suez Canal and access to oil resources, including the Abadan refinery in Iran. In order to secure these interests, the British defined the control or ownership of these facilities as a vital interest too. Thus Britain enmeshed ends with means. The same confusion between means and ends applied to oil resources; disputes over ownership triggered the Iranian crisis of 1951–53. This confusion of ends and means was also typical of US Middle Eastern foreign policy. This tendency jeopardized the realization of vital Western interests in the Middle East.

The US policy of economic assistance, such as the Point Four plan, was innovative. But these policies, conducted at the sub-state level, were short-lived, inconspicuous and secondary even in the eyes of American policymakers themselves. The more conspicuous US policy in the Middle East was state-centred. The US perceived pro-American regimes as the most reliable, indispensable and irreplaceable partners, providing concessions to the oil majors to explore, extract and export oil. The US has defined the steady supply of oil as a vital interest.

The US, nonetheless, defined the means of achieving this interest as vital too, to an extent that the means became an end by itself. The means included cooperating with authoritarian, traditional regimes, such as that of the shah or the Saudi dynasty and controlling the oil resources by the oil majors. As a result of the Cold War, blocking Soviet penetration into the region became an end by itself. The US expressed hostility toward states in the region that developed a pro-Soviet orientation and these were denied US aid or loans from the World Bank. The steady supply of oil and support for traditional, pro-American regimes were two sides of the same coin.
While the containment of the Soviet Union was compatible with both the steady supply of oil and the security of Israel, these two latter interests were by no means compatible under the conditions that evolved following the 1948 Palestinian Nakba. The conflict between these two vital interests culminated in the 1973–74 oil crisis as we will see in the next chapter. The US delayed exploring a policy that would match its support for the Jewish state with ensuring a steady supply of oil.

To what extent was the US flexible in accommodating its policy in the Middle East to the region’s political and social developments, so long as these developments did not impede the steady supply of oil from the area? The answer is ‘not very.’ By lumping means—i.e., allying itself with authoritarian regimes—with ends, the US became less resilient in realizing its sole vital interest, the steady supply of oil. While the middle East has experienced profound social changes as a result of its contacts with the West, the US has remained locked into the same mindset it held since the early 1950s—believing that a rab-muslim culture is immutable and essentialist.

Since the onset of the American involvement in the middle East, the region has experienced a sharp rise in living standards, rapid urbanization, the rise of a middle class, and even secularization (Halpern 1963, 51). Yet the US has continued to view the middle East societies through the lenses of orientalist ideas, as a static, traditional and backwater culture that should be ruled through authoritarian traditional regimes. Hence the shock to the US when in 1979, Iranians enthusiastically rushed to establish a fundamentalist anti-American regime.

Similarly, the US viewed the progressive forces of nationalism as inimical to its interests. Nationalists, primarily urban rab intellectuals, expressed an outburst of frustrated feelings, encouraging mass demonstrations and demanding the nationalization of foreign properties and political modernization. They vowed to modernize a rab societies through social modernization and industrialization and were staunch advocates of socialist ideologies. The US perceived these forces through the lens of anti-communism, failing to perceive the difference between socialism and communism. It feared that a rab nationalist governments would conspire with the Soviet Union against the US. Its reflexive anti-communism made it incapable of seeing these forces as modernizing or constructive. Its perception of a rab culture as static and traditional made it fail to see how new patterns could be forged in the a rab world. The US endeavoured to isolate these forces, but it underestimated their power.

The US also failed to distinguish between religious nationalism and secular nationalism in the middle East. From a US perspective the nationalists could vary in their political colour from Islamists to socialists, but they all had the same overall objective: to create an a rab/Islamic empire whether through the secular ideology of pan-a rabism or through the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism. In either scenario, the US believed that the outcome would not serve US interests in the region. President Nasser of Egypt was depicted in the US ‘as a tinpot dictator, a middle Eastern Hitler, a breaker of treaties, an oppressor of minorities and a
saboteur of international commerce’ (Nolte and Polk 1958, 652). Similarly, after 1979 this same terminology was also used to depict Khomeini. From an American point of view, the only way to deal with leaders such as Nasser, Khomeini or Mossadeq was through containment, a euphemism for force. The main question that remained unanswered is whether the aspirations of the secular nationalists or the Islamists were, in fact, contradictory to the vital US interest: the steady supply of Middle Eastern oil. Its opposition to these forces—another instance of confusing ends with means—was self-defeating, as it only strengthened them while allowing them to depict the US as the scapegoat for all the ills of their societies.²⁸

Conclusion

The crises that erupted in the 1950s and 1960s, the Iranian crisis, the Suez crisis and the Six-Day War were limited in time and place. They had little repercussion on political or economic systems in the West and in the US in particular. As a result, these crises did not stimulate a major modification in US thinking of how to approach the Middle East. The major idea that prevailed in US foreign policy was the need to stabilize the Middle East by limiting arms sales to all the states in the region. Despite the fact that the US initially sympathized with the cause of nationalist leaders such as Mossadeq and Nasser in the early 1950s, the crises in Iran of 1951–53 and Egypt of 1956 consolidated the idea that the US should oppose nationalism in the Middle East, in general because nationalist regimes might ally with the Soviets, nationalize foreign-owned undertakings and turn against the so-called ‘local traditional’ forces that allied themselves with the West.

With regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the pressure of American pro-Israel public opinion and ideas propagated by the pro-Israel lobby on Congress and the White House compelled the US to remain aloof from the Arab-Israeli peace process. Only the eruption of the oil crisis in 1973 would stimulate new thinking about the need to find a solution to the conflict.

²⁸ American policymakers believe that this policy of hatred of America and depicting it as a scapegoat, has culminated in the events of 9/11. See Chapter 6.
Chapter 4
The Oil Embargo Crisis in 1973–1974

Introduction: Defining the Problem

On the eve of the October War (also called the yom kippur War) of 1973, US policy toward the Middle East was based on several ideas. Arms exports to the region should be limited. Iran should be empowered with advanced American weapons so that it would be able to play the role of a regional policeman. The US should stay out of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Finally, the US should do all in its power to limit the influence of the Soviet Union in the area. With the eruption of the oil crisis, some of these ideas would rapidly become obsolete.

As never before in the course of the Cold War, the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973–74 shook the foundations of the Western alliance. For the first time, members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) managed to exploit their power as major oil suppliers (Levy 1974; Quandt 1981; Safran 1985; Sampson 1975).

The crisis took the Western world by surprise. For many years, it had been accustomed to inexpensive oil and it was unprepared for a sharp rise in oil prices. During the embargo, the price of an oil barrel nearly quadrupled within three months to almost $12. In the words of Henry Kissinger, ‘the oil price shock caused a deadly combination of severe recession and high inflation which, in the United States, reached 14 percent a year at its height. The energy crisis was even more disastrous for the non-oil producing nations of the developing world’ (Kissinger 1999, 664).

Furthermore, the transfer of capital from developed countries to oil-producing countries created a trade deficit for the former of $40 billion at current prices. ‘Much of the world’s wealth had suddenly shifted to an obscure corner of the world’ (Sampson 1975, 343). In the same vein, Walter Levy warned the West that ‘the supply of oil from individual producing countries or a group of them to individual consuming countries or a group of them might ... at a time unknown, again be curtailed or completely cut off for a variety of economic, political, strategic or other reasons’ (Levy 1974, 691).

Since the end of World War II, the political and economic importance of the Middle East has stemmed mainly from its oil resources, accounting for around 68 percent of the world’s total oil reserves. During the 1970s, the oil-producing nations nationalized these oil resources. Subsequently, foreign oil companies lost control not only over oil production but also over the price of oil (Gilbar 1997b, 27–8).
members of the worldwide Organization of petroleum Exporting countries (OpEc) then took full charge of deciding the quantity of production and, to some extent, the price of oil.

Following the dramatic events in the world oil market in 1973–74 and the subsequent phenomenon of stagflation (unemployment and inflation) in some developed economies, the 1970s witnessed a debate over the durability of a merican hegemony in world politics, together with speculation over the repercussions of its decline on world economic stability (k eohane 1984; k eohane and Nye 1989). us hegemony was shaken by the simple fact that asymmetrical distribution of power within an issue area, rather than the overall distribution of power, determined the outcome of the embargo (k eohane and Nye 1989). Despite the overall power inferiority of the Gulf states in relation to the us, Oap Ec managed to create a linkage between political events in the region and the oil market. It penalized the us for its support for Israel during the yom k ippur War by imposing an embargo against the us, thus cutting back its essential supply of oil (s keet 1988, 100).

Thus, many of the oil-consuming nations in the West were at the mercy of Oap Ec in general and the volatile political situation in the middle East in particular. As president c arter aptly put it, ‘Our national strength is dangerously dependent on a thin line of oil tankers stretching halfway around the earth, originating in the middle East and around the persian Gulf, one of the most unstable regions in the world’ (quoted in Stobaugh and Yergin 1979, 570). Under these conditions, ‘Both the Nixon and f ord a dministrations had no higher priority than to bring about the reduction of oil prices by breaking the power of OPEC’ (Kissinger 1999, 668).

The crisis created several major problems that required long-term solutions. How could consuming countries preempt the imposition of oil embargos in the future? How could petrodollars be recycled back to the West? How could oil be lowered and kept at a reasonable level? Finally, how could the oil suppliers be induced to meet the world demand for oil? With regard to the final problem, the us feared that Oap Ec members would export oil at a level that met their own needs for foreign exchange, not the West’s need for oil.

Broadly speaking, three non-market forces affect oil prices: the political climate and major conflicts in the region; the level of cooperation among the producing countries as a cartel; and internal political stability within each oil-exporting country. These forces complicate the challenge of the us in its dealings with the Middle East and raise difficult questions. How should the US construct the political and economic environment in the middle East in order to prevent the Gulf states from operating as a cartel? Should the us endeavour to construct the domestic political reality in the middle Eastern states based on its perception of a rab/Islamic culture as inimical to Western interests? In other words, should the us shape reality in the Gulf states for the sake of maintaining long-term stability by supporting pro-West regimes, given the constraints of an alien culture?

During the oil embargo, the developed countries lacked a consensus about the causes of the crisis and the means of coping with it. The crisis not only shook the Western world like no other event during the c old War, but it also created a
crack within the Western camp. Western European countries feared that a military solution, or even diplomatic pressure on OpEc countries, could threaten their own position and trigger severe reaction from the oil producers. As a short-term solution, the US threatened the use of force to take control of the oil fields in the Persian Gulf (Kissinger 1975). This possibility caused strong objections from Western European countries and augmented their fears about the US’s ability and wisdom to restore stability to the oil market (Kissinger 1999, 667).

The US needed its European allies’ cooperation in three areas related to the oil market: conservation in oil consumption, financial solidarity, and policy coordination vis-à-vis the oil producers. The US could have used its military power in order to maintain a steady supply of oil from the Gulf area (A_delman 1995; Tucker 1975), but it rightly understood that this strategy would merely add fuel to the fire. It would not ease the fears of America’s Western European allies, and occupying a piece of the holy Muslim land in the Arab peninsula would unify the whole Islamic world against America. Furthermore, Western European countries feared that breaking the power of OpEc through military means would not eradicate the source of the problem: the occupation of an Arab land by Israel. Given Western Europe’s resistance to American military and diplomatic pressure against OpEc, the US felt that it should seek more creative solutions.

Following the crisis, the US contemplated several ways of ensuring a long-term steady supply of oil from the Middle East and stable oil prices. Its first step was to create the so-called International Energy Agency, composed of major developed countries. Coordinating energy policy among these countries would restore the balance of power between the developed oil consuming countries and OpEc members. The creation of a unified front would bolster the developed countries’ negotiating position, and regulating their consumption of oil could decrease oil prices. Second, the US sought to drive a wedge between developing countries, in order to isolate oil producers from non-oil producers and to increase international pressure on oil producers from all sides. Third, as a long-term solution, the US sought a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that had triggered the whole oil shock in the first place. After all, the October War was the pretext for imposing the embargo.

Fourth, the US contemplated increasing arms sales to the Middle East. It was under heavy pressure to find ways to recycle petrodollars back into the West without causing a major financial crisis. The oil-exporting countries had accumulated an enormous number of dollars, giving them financial power that could be used against Western banks. Increasing arms sales would kill two birds with one stone: arms sales would recycle petrodollars, especially into the US market, and increasing the arms race between oil-producing states would cripple their ability to operate as a cartel. Finally, the US encouraged the Soviet Union to export oil to the West in return for importing foodstuffs from the West.

Trying to create solidarity and policy coordination among industrialized countries proved to be a futile attempt. As a result, the US concentrated on the
third and fourth solutions. This chapter focuses mainly how this decision played out in US foreign policy in the Middle East.

The main task of the United States was to persuade the Gulf states to meet the world’s demand for oil, despite their natural propensity to produce oil at a level below their full capacity. It also had to persuade the Gulf states to recycle the petrodollars despite the low propensity of their societies to consume. At the time, Gulf states societies still maintained an austere lifestyle, befitting a Muslim culture. As a CIA report stated, since the Gulf monarchies had a ‘low absorptive capacity’, they had ‘little financial incentive to boost output’ (CIA 1979, 6).

The CIA report cited several reasons for the general inclination of these countries to produce below their full capacity. First, the report states that these are sparsely populated countries that ‘do not need increased income’ (CIA 1979, 46). As the former Saudi Oil minister Yamani put it, ‘the Saudis could live happily by reducing their production from over ten million b/d (barrels a day) to as little as six million b/d if such a reduction [is] required to support a unified OPEC pricing policy’ (Levy 1981, 1084). Second, these countries also feared that high income would be followed by a rapid increase in expenditures that would stimulate inflation. Third, OPEC countries expected that a future rise in price would bring in higher revenues than investment in the financial market. Fourth, Saudi Arabia ‘prefers production profiles that stretch reserve depletion over longer periods’ (CIA 1979, 6). Additionally, the CIA feared that restricting production below capacity would spill over into restricting investment in the exploration of new oil fields. The report states that ‘OPEC countries with the largest oil reserves relative to production have already taken steps that have lowered current oil production and limited investment in the expansion of productive capacity. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi have imposed restrictions that have kept output below capacity’ (CIA 1979, 43). ‘Keeping production below existing capacity … also serves as a disincentive to invest not only in new capacity but even in maintenance of existing capacity. Kuwait, for example, which has had substantial excess capacity for years, has let capacity erode’ (CIA 1979, 43). Under these circumstances the CIA report predicted that

energy demand in OECD countries exceeds available supply at any rate of economic growth above 2 percent per year if OPEC countries produce at their preferred levels. The size of the notional gap in 1979–82 would average 2.0–4.0 million b/d if OECD countries try to achieve 3 percent growth, and 3.0–5.0 million b/d if they try for 3.5 percent economic growth … Losing the notional gap entails cutting economic growth, increasing energy conservation, or both of these, so as to balance supply and demand (CIA 1979, 11).

Moreover, the United States’ understanding of Arab and Islamic culture saw it as profoundly alien, based on a rab tribalism and the concept of jihad, or holy war. In Western eyes, while tribalism enforced an austere lifestyle on the Arabs, jihad impels Muslims to wage a holy war against non-Muslims or ‘infidels’. The US
The Oil Embargo Crisis in 1973–1974

should therefore be careful not to disrupt the lifestyle of a rabs while simultaneously encouraging Western consumerist culture (Barber 1995, 3–22; Edourie 1994, 6–7). This suggests that the United States does not trust the rationality of Muslims in general, viewing them instead as ‘traditional collectivities’. It mattered, therefore, who held the helm of state. As Henry Kissinger said in an interview given in January 1975, ‘if you bring about the overthrow of the existing system in Saudi Arabia and a Qaddafi takes over, or if you break Iran’s image of being capable of resisting outside pressures, you’re going to open up political trends which could defeat your economic objective’ (quoted in Kissinger 1999, 674). In short, the US needed to envision new strategies that would restore stability, but without throwing baby out with the bathwater. It needed to achieve a steady supply of oil at a reasonable, stable price and to recycle petrodollars while not making the oil monarchies look like Western puppets in the eyes of their own people, or modernizing Muslim societies through consumerist culture.

Thus, the readiness of a traditional, Islamic monarchy such as Saudi Arabia to comply with the needs of the West requires explanation. After the end of the oil crisis, surprisingly, Saudi Arabia began to play a swing role in which it adjusted its supply in order to meet world demand and, additionally, to prevent a major global economic recession (Erb 1982, 114). The swing role has made Saudi Arabia something of a stabilizer. With its enormous production capacity, Saudi Arabia has a strong influence on oil prices. During normal times, it produces around 8 million barrels a day (mbd). It has the capacity to increase production to 12 mbd within two months and even double it within a year.

Essentially, given the culture, the sparse population, and the by-products of a rentier state (such as the ‘Dutch Disease’, denoting heavy reliance on one commodity, a thing that keeps the currency overvalued), Saudi Arabia should have an interest in reducing its excessive reliance on the export of oil for the sake of diversifying its exports. Through varied ways, the United States has convinced the Saudi regime to play a role that impinges on world economic prosperity. In the words of the Saudi oil minister Ali Naimi, ‘the goal of Saudi Arabia is a stable oil market in terms of supply and demand and a moderate oil price that is acceptable to oil consumers, generates good income for oil producers and the industry in general and does no harm to world economic growth’ (The New York Times, 21 June, 2000). This policy requires an explanation.

Contemplating Solutions

The US needed to reshape the Middle East to protect its own interests. The stakes for the West, in general, were too high to ignore economic and social developments in the region and leave them to regional dynamics. Yet there was a dichotomy between the various institutions which the US sought to build and the interests it sought to protect. On the one hand, constructing institutions for the recycling of petrodollars and a steady supply of oil depended on maintaining stability within
the Arab states. Overall stability in the region was the sum total of stability within each one of these states and calmness on the Israeli-Arab front. On the other hand, stable and confident oil exporting countries seeking to maximize their wealth could refuse to supply the required quantity of oil to the world market at a reasonable price.

Unlike the seven major oil companies, OpEc is not a cartel of private conglomerates; its members are sovereign states that have their own political considerations in relation to their domestic conditions and geostrategic location (Skeet 1988, chapter 3). These considerations have been exploited by the US in order to prevent OpEc from operating as a cartel. In contrast, should OpEc members choose to settle their disputes and manage to cooperate as a cartel, they could set the price above the market level.

How, without disrupting traditional Muslim lifestyles, could the US maintain a balance between recycling petrodollars and tempting the Gulf states to meet the world demand for oil at a reasonable price? Traditional austerity favoured political stability but failed to recycle petrodollars. An abrupt rise in consumerism, on the other hand, could bring social changes that might trigger political turmoil. Despite all these problems, OpEc members have often competed amongst themselves over who could produce more oil, each time creating a glut in the market that caused the price of oil to sink. How and why could such behaviour transpire? Are market forces alone responsible for such competition?

Recycling Petrodollars

The sharp rise in oil prices created its own by-product problem: the accumulation of vast sums of petrodollars in the hands of the oil producers, who could use these resources as a weapon against Western financial centres. Furthermore, the increase in US imports from the OPEC throughout the mid-1970s, combined with the sharp rise in oil prices after the oil embargo, expanded the American trade deficit with these countries.

Since the early 1970s, United States dependency on oil imported from OPEC (primarily OPEC) countries has increased enormously. The proportion of US oil imported from OPEC rose from 2 percent in 1970 to 20 percent in 1977 (Gilbar 1997a, 33). By the late 1970s, OPEC countries supplied about 50 percent of US oil imports. Given this dependency and the impact of oil prices on consumer behaviour, it became clear that any political turmoil in the Middle East could cause major fluctuations in the price of oil and (possibly even more damaging) could retard economic growth in many oil importing countries. The United States imported $16.5 billion worth of oil in 1977 from a rab oil exporting nations. Henry Kissinger succinctly summarizes the problem of the accumulation of petrodollars by the oil producers as follows:

Exploding oil prices were producing growing surpluses for the producers amounting to $75 billion a year or nearly $235 billion in 1997 dollars. These
The Oil Embargo Crisis in 1973–1974

represented a vulnerability for the industrialized world because the investments of the cartel tended to be short-term while the banks recycled them in the form of long-term loans. Thus the oil producers had the capacity, by means of massive withdrawals, to threaten the banking system even in the normal course of doing business. And if the producers shifted their funds according to a political strategy, their financial resources could turn into a formidable political weapon (Kissinger 1999, 684).

One way to reduce the trade deficit and to recycle petrodollars back into the United States was through increased arms sales to oil producing countries (see table 4.1). Given the region’s sparse population, an arms race among the Gulf states was the best strategy for closing the trade deficit. Between 1976 and 1986, Saudi Arabia’s allocation for defence was estimated as high as $150 billion (loney 1987, 201). In 1990 alone, Saudi Arabia imported $7.8 billion worth of arms, with an additional purchase of $8.5 billion in 1992, $5.2 billion in 1994 and $9.6 billion in 1996 (Gause 1997a, 13; safaran 1985, chapter 17; us arms control and disarmament agency 1997, 96).

On 1 July 1976, president Gerald Ford declared that

I have signed into law h.R. 13680, the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. This measure authorizes appropriations to carry out security assistance and other programs in the fiscal years 1976 and 1977 and makes extensive changes in the methods, organization, and procedures through which those programs are carried out ... most of the unacceptable features of the earlier bill have either been dropped from h.R. 13680 or have been modified into an acceptable form. I am pleased to note, for example, that this bill does not attempt to impose an arbitrary and unwieldy annual ceiling on the aggregate value of Government and commercial arms sales ... (Ford, 1 July, 1976).

Ford’s new policy, intended to increase arms transfers to the Middle East in particular, continued unfettered under the Carter administration. President Carter expressed concerns about the exported amount of weapons:

... the virtually unrestrained spread of conventional weaponry threatens stability in every region of the world. Total arms sales in recent years have risen to over $20 billion, and the United States accounts for more than one-half of this amount ... I have concluded that the United States will henceforth view arms transfers as an exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national security interests (Carter, 19 May, 1977).

But in practice, Carter’s administration was no different from either the Ford or the Reagan administrations. In the words of Carter again: ‘We will continue to
utilize arms transfers to promote our security and the security of our close friends’ (carter, 19 may, 1977). In apr 1978, the carter administration sold 75 f-16s and 15 f-15s to israel, 50 f-5s to egypt, and 60 f-15s to saudi arabia, and us arms transfer to iran continued unabated under carter (Vance, 28 apr, 1978).

this indiscriminate sale of weapons and the arms race it spurred created a sense of insecurity, rather than greater security, giving rise to an atmosphere of distrust among middle eastern states. this sense of insecurity and lack of trust hampered attempts to coordinate oil prices or to allocate supply quotas among opec members. the security dilemma among the gulf states reinforced the US’s leverage with the Gulf monarchies by enhancing their dependency on US protection facilities and the supply of sophisticated weaponry. in early march 1977 carter told reporters that:

> When cy Vance visited all the middle eastern countries early this month, there was one unanimous statement made by every head of state, and that was that we are spending too much of our money on weapons. Now, it’s hard for one of those countries, for instance—I’m singling out that part of the world—unilaterally to stop buying weapons. but every one of them unilaterally said they would like to stop. and I think that this puts a responsibility back on our country, the major

### Table 4.1 Trend indicator value of arms imports to the top Middle Eastern largest importers, 1977–2006 (million dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>saudi arabia</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>2,194</td>
<td>1,715</td>
<td>38,791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>iraq</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>1,839</td>
<td>1,211</td>
<td>2,176</td>
<td>2,641</td>
<td>3,203</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>36,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>turkey</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>31,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>egypt</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>2,475</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>28,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>iran</td>
<td>6,233</td>
<td>3,489</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>25,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>libya</td>
<td>2,948</td>
<td>4,191</td>
<td>4,115</td>
<td>3,101</td>
<td>3,245</td>
<td>2,761</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>24,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>syria</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>2,114</td>
<td>2,024</td>
<td>1,399</td>
<td>2,042</td>
<td>2,444</td>
<td>22,039</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>israel</td>
<td>1,105</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>1,609</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>21,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>libya</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>1,632</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>1,423</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>16,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>uae</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>15,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>world total</td>
<td>1,5194</td>
<td>15,699</td>
<td>13,165</td>
<td>13,022</td>
<td>14,701</td>
<td>16,152</td>
<td>12,672</td>
<td>260,266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

arms supplier of the world, to try to induce Iran and Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Syria and Israel and Jordan to cut down on the quantity of arms they buy (Carter, 4 March, 1977).

In reality, cuts to US arms exports did not materialize.

Viewed in this context, the major challenge for the United States after the oil embargo was how to create a long-term neutral or positive balance of trade with the Middle East. Regardless of the balance of power, the balance of trade depended on factors not under direct American control. In order to recycle petrodollars back into the West in general, but into the US market in particular, the US sought to increase the sale of weapons, for several reasons: the US had a comparative advantage over its Western allies in the arms industry; the market for weapons was independent of the limited market for consumer goods in Gulf societies; and the sale of weaponry would increase the Gulf states’ dependence on the security provided by the US. This policy was not, however, without risk. Arms races in the Gulf area could increase tension between states and raise the likelihood of war, as the Iran-Iraq War of 1980, and first Gulf War of 1990–91 proved.

Saudi Arabia has been one of the world’s largest importers of arms since the mid-1970s (Table 4.1). In 1986 and 1996, the region as a whole purchased 36.2 and 38.1 percent of world arms imports. By comparison, East Asia imported 11.3 and 22 percent in the same years, while South America imported 1.9 and 2.7 percent (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1997, 2). In 1996 alone, the United States exported $23.5 billion worth of arms, followed by Britain, which sold $6.1 billion out of a total $42.7 billion world arms trade. Thus the United States accounted for 55 percent of world arms sales. The arms race and the consequent sharp increase in security issues in the Gulf area, part of the strategy of recycling petrodollars, surprisingly contributed to the goal of maintaining long-term stability in the oil market.

The contradiction between these two goals was not overlooked by US policymakers. They calculated that arm sales to the region could stabilize the oil market as well, because increasing the dependency of the Gulf monarchies on US security services would give the US leverage to preempt any future oil embargo.

Table 4.2 shows military expenditures of some of the oil-rich countries in select years. In terms of comparison, these ratios stood well above the average that existed in developed countries. For example, defence expenditure in developed countries stood at $469 per capita in 1985 and dropped to $390 in 1992, in constant 1985 prices (UNDP 1995, 183).

On an average, the Middle East region multiplied its real military expenditure 56 times between the years 1952 and 1983. The increase in Central America, the Far East and Africa was 7.5, 10.2, and 29.7 times respectively during the same period. In 1952, the spending of the Arab countries was around $886 million, whereas in 1983 it stood at around $50 billion. Saudi Arabia imported not only military hardware from the US but also support services such as repair and overhaul, construction services and personnel training. For example, in September

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**Table 4.1:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>1996</th>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
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**Table 4.2:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military Expenditure Per Capita</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>$469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>$390</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 4.2  Military expenditures of some oil-rich countries (selected years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military (M$) Expenditure</th>
<th>Armed Forces (K)</th>
<th>MX/GNP %</th>
<th>MX/CGE</th>
<th>MX Per-Capita $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1987 9,436</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990 7,117</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993 4,802</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1984 23,360</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>1,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1986 19,370</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>1,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988 22,330</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>1,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1987 1,575</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990 14,730</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>134.0</td>
<td>6,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993 3,679</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>2,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1987 20,430</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>1,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990 25,780</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>1,624</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993 20,900</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>1,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>1987 1,987</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>1,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990 2,863</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>1,271</td>
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<td>1993 2,154</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>811</td>
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Notes: M$: million dollars; K: thousands; MX: military expenditures; CGE: central government expenditures. Expenditures are calculated in constant 1994 dollar terms.

1995 the Saudis spent $850 million on imported maintenance and training support for F15 aircraft. In July 1997 it spent $300 million on imported maintenance and construction support for previously installed AWacs. With the increase in imports, the overall financial surpluses of the OPEC diminished from $65 billion in 1974 to $5.5 billion in 1978. In the words of Denis Healey, ‘In 1974, many bank economists estimated that by 1980 OPEC’s cumulative reserves would have risen to $500 billion. In fact, they are only $50 billion bigger [six years later] than they were in 1973’ (Healey 1979, 221).

By and large, without an American technical support, the sophisticated weaponry would be of very little use to Gulf countries. While the security dilemma stimulated arms competition and was a major factor in the increase in the military expenditure of the middle Eastern countries, the rationale for these purchases was never unconvincing. With their small armies, the Gulf states would always have to rely on US protection. The burgeoning of arms exports did not really alter
the delicate balance of power in the Gulf. These are status quo countries without expansionist ambitions. True, there are border disputes between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, as well as between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran, but it is very unlikely that a monarchic, oil-exporting Gulf country would start a war against its neighbour to settle a territorial dispute. First, a defeat would put an end to the royal family’s rule. Second, these states have not developed large citizen armies. Instead, they have relied on highly sophisticated weaponry that could not be used to occupy new territories without a strong infantry.

From time to time, the American arms industries and the various US administrations exerted pressure on the US Congress to endorse huge arms sales to these countries. In fact, the United States often decides the defence requirements of these Gulf monarchies. According to one report, for instance, ‘the United States has been helping Saudi Arabia define its military needs for over fifty years’ (Federation of American Scientists 1999). Yet even this process has many complications. Each of the Gulf states has created a compact army that can be managed effectively by the regime. Their military strategy has been to invest enormous amounts of money in sophisticated weaponry while placing less emphasis on building a large national army (Gause 1997b, 64).

The fact that some Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, rely on foreign mercenaries clearly shows that these countries have a deliberate policy of not building a strong army composed of their own people. In the case of the UAE, mercenaries compose an estimated 30 percent of total troops. His reliance on mercenaries highlights the regimes’ mistrust of a citizen army. Yet as one writer observes, ‘The mercenary option is not a realistic answer to the monarchies’ security problems ... [mercenary troops] are expensive in peacetime and unreliable in wartime’ (Gause 1994b, 125).

The Gulf monarchies’ approach to security shows ‘irrational’ behaviour. The purchase of sophisticated weapons has not made these governments self-reliant in security matters. On the contrary, their reliance on sophisticated weapons has raised political tensions in the Gulf and increased the dependency of the Gulf monarchies on a US protection. The US military presence in the Gulf includes 27,500 troops, 300 aircraft, 34 warships and 300 cruise missiles. The US can almost double its forces in the Gulf within a period of one week. The main mission of the American troops is not to protect the oil fields so much as to protect the monarchic regimes that control these fields. Thus, given the massive presence of US forces in the region in general, and in the Gulf in particular, the US would continue to exercise enormous influence in matters relating to the Middle East.

Why are the Gulf states spending such huge sums on security rather than on social welfare or development programs? First, they have aligned themselves with the US, which has a comparative advantage in the arms market over other industrialized countries, which these purchases advance. Second, had the oil monarchies channeled petrodollars into consumerism and welfare measures during the 1970s, it might have caused a collapse of the traditional values of these societies,
which for decades had been accustomed to the austerity prescribed by Islam. It was a legitimate concern. The social consequences of rapid development and mass consumption are already evident in the monarchies. These include urbanization, a large influx of expatriate workers from other countries, a rapid infrastructure boom and mass inflow of foreign goods. This has ‘led to a weakening of established social and political values, accompanied by disappointment and resentment’ (Stobaugh and Yergin 1979, 565). Yet, the Gulf monarchies have so far been able to slow the pace of social changes and to preserve much of their traditions, the erosion of which may ultimately threaten the legitimacy of the regimes.

Third, there is the problem of fluctuation in oil revenues (see Table 4.3). The Gulf governments can adjust military expenditure against their income from oil very easily; they can increase military purchases when oil revenues are high and vice versa. But they cannot do the same with regard to living standards or social welfare expenditures. Saudi Arabia, for instance, cannot cut welfare benefits simply because its oil revenues have declined. If it were to do so, it would automatically trigger social resentment and even invite calls for intervention by social groups in the management of the oil industry and revenue allocations—a policy that the regime strongly wants to keep out of public scrutiny. The monarchical regimes have kept the oil sector under the tight control of the royal families. Since the main aim of the Gulf regimes is to stay in power, they do not want fluctuations in oil revenues to become a source of instability. Rather, they seek to use these revenues as a means to ensure the people’s loyalty. They have kept living standards, wages and the employment levels unaffected by the fluctuations in oil revenues in order to regulate and even slow down the rapid social changes that could possibly erode traditions in a period of economic boom.

The oil industry requires few workers and has very few spin-off effects on industrial sectors. This gives the kingdoms a high degree of autonomy, since their economic power does not rest on a strong productive middle class but on the weakness of this class compared to the regimes. Instead of building an industrial base that could bolster an independent working class, the monarchies have sought

Table 4.3 Oil export revenues for selected years (billion dollars)

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<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.846</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>104.2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
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to create their own support bases among the people through distributive policies and by providing employment in the public sector. An industrial community would likely seek to limit oil exports and devalue the local currency in order to make its commodities more competitive in the world market. Instead, a heavy reliance on oil has kept the currency overvalued (Dutch disease) and rendered the local production of other commodities unprofitable.

Peace Process

Another theme that emerged from the oil crisis in 1974 was the need to resolve the conflict between Israel and its belligerent Arab neighbours, or at least some of them. After all, the territorial conflict triggered the oil embargo, and its persistence would always carry the potential to spark off anti-West nationalism throughout the Arab world. Before the oil crisis, the United States had little incentive to broker peace negotiations. It feared that if such negotiations failed, that failure would, as Kissinger put it, ‘inflame even the moderate Arabs’ against the US. After the oil crisis, such a failure was not an option for America. President Ford explicitly articulated this US position to President Sadat in their meeting on 1 June, 1975: ‘I want to tell you [Sadat] that as far as we are concerned, stagnation [in the Middle East peace process] is unacceptable’ (Kissinger 1999, 435). The US felt compelled to deliver Israeli acquiescence to a long-term peace settlement of the conflict, based on the formula of peace in return for returning Arab lands.

Before the October War, Egypt and Jordan were ready to make some form of accommodation with Israel that would ensure the Israeli withdrawal from the lands it occupied during the six-day War in return for a declaration of non-belligerency and the recognition of Israel by these Arab states, and the right of each state in the region to a secure existence. It was unclear whether Israel was ready to strike a peace deal between 1967 and 1973. Israel may have exploited the reluctance of these Arab states to engage in a face-to-face peace process that would usher in a deal—including open and recognized secure borders—as a pretext for rejecting their proposal. What is certain is that the US did not attempt to pressure Israel to change its posture until 1973. The ambiguity in the speech given by President Johnson on 19 June 1967 illustrates the position of the US between 1967 and 1973.

There are some who have urged, as a single, simple solution, an immediate return to the situation [between Israel and its Arab neighbors] as it was on 4 June [1967]. Our distinguished and able ambassador, Mr. Arthur Goldberg, has already said, this is not a prescription for peace, but for renewed hostilities… The main responsibility for the peace of the region depends upon its own peoples and its own leaders of that region. What will be truly decisive in the Middle East will be what is said and what is done by those who live in the Middle East (Johnson, 19 June 1967).
Given this ambiguity and the US support of Israel, some Arab states, including Egypt, cut their diplomatic relations with the US in the aftermath of the June War and the US was left without senior diplomats in some key Arab states, which had expected active US involvement in the settlement.

This policy of calculated aloofness toward the conflict in the Middle East continued under the Nixon administration. As Kissinger describes it, ‘he [Nixon] calculated that almost any active policy [in the Middle East] would fail; in addition, it would almost certainly incur the wrath of Israel’s supporters. So he found it useful to get the White House as much out of the direct line of fire as possible’ (Kissinger 1979, 348). His position was not shared by the State Department, which argued that the US should be actively involved in promoting peace. All parties, it argued, believed that the US had the key to settlement but the State Department could not pursue such a course with success without the president’s active involvement.

In short, on the eve of the Yom Kippur War, the US had neither a plan of how to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, nor the will to pursue that course. Following the oil crisis, its post-1967 policy—limiting arms sales to the Middle East, staying politely aloof from the conflict, and keeping a low profile in the peace process—were rendered obsolete by the oil crisis. Thus, it was the oil crisis, rather than the Yom Kippur War itself, that caused to a change in the set of ideas that guided US foreign policy after 1974.

Having finally determined to pursue a peace settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the US needed to decide which diplomatic course was the most promising. As Syria was not interested in a partial settlement, the only other remaining options were the Jordanian (the West Bank) or the Egyptian (the Sinai peninsula) options, or both (Kissinger 1999, chapter 12). The Jordanian option was put on hold for several reasons. First and foremost, Israel would be ready to make compromises on the Sinai peninsula, but it would be harder to press Israel to do the same in the West Bank. Second, Jordan was one of the weaker Arab states, and King Hussein’s regime was even weaker domestically, given the large constituency of Palestinian refugees living within the kingdom. The Hashemite regime might not be able to withstand pressures from within as well as from without. Finally, unlike the Sinai peninsula, the West Bank was densely populated area where Jordan and the PLO competed for the hearts and minds of the people. Given these problems, the US decided to press ahead with the Egyptian option and leave Jordan for a better time in the future.

Kissinger succinctly summarized the new thinking among members of the Ford administration in a memo to Ford in October 1974:

> We have an abiding interest to support Israel’s security; but our interests in the area go beyond any one country … Our strategy of segmenting the issues which divide Israel and its neighbors into negotiating units which are politically manageable … is based on the belief that a progressive series of limited agreements could create new situations which in turn will make further agreements possible (quoted in Kissinger 1999, 382).
a t this stage the ideas that guided the us were as follows: achieving long-term settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict through a series of limited agreements; lifting the limits on arms sale to middle Eastern countries; and supplying Israel with the arms it needed to maintain its qualitative military edge over its arab adversaries. The only obstacle to this type of thinking was Israel’s unwillingness to keep pace with the american or Egyptian march toward a peace settlement.\footnote{ford wanted to reach ‘an interim settlement in a quick period of time—within two or three weeks’ (Kissinger 1999, 442).}

during his meeting with ford on 1 June 1975 sadat expressed his enthusiastic desire for peace in these words: ‘I want to push the peace process. I want to move in the direction of agreement’ (quoted in Kissinger 1999, 437).

the Israeli prime minister, yitzhak Rabin, however, wanted guarantees against a sudden Egyptian attack on Israel. Rabin was ready for a partial withdrawal from the Suez Canal that would also transfer the oil fields in the Peninsula to Egypt, but he demanded that UN forces would separate the Egyptian and Israeli armies and that the radar station overlooking the suez canal continued to be operated by a merican personnel (kissinger 1999, 436). under these constraints, the us decided to move forward with a series of limited agreements. Israel and Egypt signed the interim Sinai II Accord in September 1975. It guaranteed Israel’s withdrawal to the Gidi passes about 50 kilometres east of the suez canal and allowed Egypt to access the oil fields in Abu Rudeis in return for declaration of formal non-belligerency by Egypt, the stationing of UN forces and maintenance of the radar station. this agreement set the stage for the full Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed at Camp David in 1978 that guaranteed Israel’s full withdrawal from the sinai peninsula.

Conclusion

t he oil embargo marked a sharp and unprecedented hike in oil prices and the accumulation of massive amounts of petrodollars in the hands of few oil sheikhdoms. To make matters more complicated, the oil exporting countries nationalized the oil resources and eroded the power of the major oil companies. Under these circumstances, the united states was compelled to contemplate a new long-term solution to these problems. subsequent us policy favoured coordinating oil policy among Western oil importing countries, seeking peace process between Israel and its arab neighbours, increasing the amount of arms exported to the middle East as a means of recycling petrodollars, supporting authoritarian regimes in the region, and limiting the Soviet sphere of influence there. The US perceived the regimes in the middle East as the greatest potential source of threat to its national interests in the region, rather than terrorist groups or muslim societies. therefore the us pursued a state-centred approach that aimed at taming these regimes and ensuring their cooperation.
It was the oil embargo, not the Cold War or the October War that compelled the US to initiate a peace process in the Middle East, culminating in the Camp David accord in 1978. It seems unlikely that the US would have committed itself to laborious peace process that extended over three administrations (Nixon, Ford and Carter) without having an eye on stabilizing the oil market in the long run.
On the eve of the Iranian revolution in January 1979, the US’s Middle East foreign policy was guided by a number of assumptions. First, it believed that Muslims always obey their leaders and do not question, let alone criticize, their policy; therefore notions of popular democracy or the idea of representation are alien to Muslim societies. Second, the US should not intervene in the internal affairs of the Muslim states in the Middle East, including issues of human rights or democratization. Third, the amount of the weapons to be sold to the Middle Eastern states should correlate with their purchasing power, not their security needs. Fourth, exporting weapons to the region is the easiest and fastest way of recycling petrodollars. Fifth, the US should seek a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict through a series of limited agreements. Sixth, the US should supply Iran with weapons and train its troops in order to allow Iran to play the role of regional policeman, safeguarding Western interests in the Persian Gulf and sparing the US from any direct military intervention in the region.

Up until the revolution, the US had pursued a state-centred approach. The US adopted a ‘global’ policy that focused on maintaining stability between states through the regional balance of power, and protecting the territorial integrity of weak American allies, such as Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. By the same token, the US deliberately avoided any embroilment in the internal affairs of these states—assuming that Muslim societies favour a traditional authoritarian regime over a modern democratic one. The revolution, nonetheless, had shifted US attention to the internal affairs of these states, while not abandoning the state-centred approach. The revolution compelled the US to explore strategies of maintaining intra-state stability. In the aftermath of the revolution, the US assumed that order in the Middle East was contingent on global regional stability and the sum total of stability within each state, with the exception of some poor, peripheral states, such as Yemen or Sudan.

Following the revolution, Iran turned from a relatively stable American ally into a radical anti-American Islamic republic. The revolution brought to power a theocratic-nationalist regime that rejected both Western modernism and communism. It preached the expansion of Islamic revolution into other Arab states through mass upheavals, overthrowing both pro-Western, reactionary and traditional and pro-Soviet secular, socialist Arab regimes. The revolution
undermined the power parity between the US and the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf, as the US lost Iran and the Soviet Union continued to sponsor Iraq. Finally, the revolution marked the end of the Nixon doctrine that persisted under Carter, who emphasized that he did not intend to link human rights to arms exports to Iran. At the domestic US level, the revolution brought a US animosity toward Iran to a new height, when a mob of Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1980 and took the American diplomats as hostages for a period of 444 days. The hostage crisis precipitated one of the longest crises in the US history and caused to the ousting of President Carter from the White House (Houghton 2001, 5).

Aside from the hostage crisis, the events in Iran and the Iran-Iraq war led to another round of crude oil price increases in 1979 and 1980. The Iranian revolution resulted in the loss of 2.5 million barrels per day (mbd) of oil production during the first half of 1979. At one point production came to standstill. Iran was weakened by the revolution, while Iraq seized this moment of weakness and invaded Iran in September 1980 in order to expand its coastal strip at Shatt El-Arab. By November the combined production of both countries was only 1 mbd, or 6.5 mbd less than a year before. Consequently, worldwide crude oil production in late 1980 was 10 percent lower than in late 1978. The combination of the Iranian revolution and the Iraq-Iran War caused the price of crude oil barrel to almost triple from $14 in 1978 to $41 in 1981 at current prices. These events brought about a major hike in inflation in the US. These events in Iran, especially the hostage crisis, were responsible for the defeat of Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential elections.

The good news was that Iran did not join the USSR’s camp. But the US feared that Iran could be vulnerable to Soviet intervention, especially during the autumn of 1980 (Brzezinski 1983, 451), as the Soviet Union perceived Iran as easy prey after the departure of the US. Moreover, Iraq, a potential power balancer to Iran, had cut off its diplomatic relations with the US after the Six-Day War in 1967, and the foreign policy of its Baath-socialist regime was pro-Soviet. In short, the loss of Iran created a political vacuum in the Persian Gulf. The US had relied on Iran for the balance of power in the area; now Iran had become an enemy that itself needed to be balanced. This situation compelled the US to come up with new ideas of how to fill this political vacuum and how to stop the revolution from spreading outside Iran’s borders.

The United States began to realize that the most serious threat to its interests came from within the states of the region, more specifically from the Muslim society, which so far had been ignored by the US, rather than from outside powers such as the Soviet Union or from the local regimes themselves.

The eruption of an Islamic fundamentalist revolution, furthermore, had posed an unprecedented threat to Western interests in the Middle East, especially to the steady supply of oil. The revolution also undermined some of the concepts that had guided US foreign policy toward the region. In contrast to the 1974 oil embargo, which was externally triggered by the Arab-Israeli war, this time the threat erupted unexpectedly from within: an alienated Muslim society had risen against its own
leader and now perceived Western culture as an antithesis of what it stood for. Because the US had hitherto avoided embroiling itself in the internal affairs of middle Eastern states, the whole political culture of these states remained an enigma for American policymakers. In the words of Gary Sick: ‘despite a century of sustained contact, Iran remained terra incognita for almost all Americans … it is not an exaggeration to say that America approached Iran from a position of almost unrelieved ignorance’ (Sick 1985, 5). Until 1979, the United States was guided by the idea that it should focus on the regimes themselves and ignore the masses and their needs.

One main lesson that the US drew from the Iranian revolution was to refrain from a policy of putting all its cards on one option or one man. It had believed that ‘the Shah was Iran and Iran was the Shah’ (Sick 1985, 31). The US equated its relations with Iran as relations with the Shah himself; without any attempt to listen to the complaints of the opposition. In the words of one writer: ‘most of Carter’s chief advisers agreed too quickly that the Shah should concentrate only on liberalizing his regime so as to ease the demonstrations against him. None of the major advisers initially offered a critical look at this consensus’ (Moens 1991, 212). Despite the disagreement within the Carter administration between the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, on the one hand, and the National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, on the other, on the best way to handle the Iranian crisis on the eve of the revolution, both agreed that the US should continue to support the Shah. Vance thought that the Shah could retain stability through limited political and economic reforms, while Brzezinski thought that the Shah could achieve the same goal through crackdown on the subversives. These policies were coherent with the idea that the Muslim world was not amenable to absorb democracy.

After 1979, the US began to assess the Shah’s mistakes in his domestic policy. A shift to a free-market economy would, policymakers thought, acculturate Muslim societies to capitalist norms of rational, secular, individualist behaviour. The idea behind this policy was that poverty is associated with fundamentalism, while affluence leads to modernization and acceptance of the Western way of life. By raising the living standards of the lower classes, the US aimed to weaken Islamic norms that stress austerity, collectivism and sheer obedience to political leaders and to emphasize the incorporation of values like individualism, rationalism and consumerism. Finally, following the Iranian revolution there were major concerns among US policymakers about an anti-American uprising throughout the Islamic world, especially after the attack on the Great mosque in Mecca in 1979, and the attack against US embassy in Islamabad.

The Cold War and the Loss of Iran

Until its revolution, Iran cultivated close and warm relationships with the United States and was a major pillar in the struggle against communism. Under the restrictions imposed by the US Congress and public opinion after the Vietnam
War of the late 1960s, the US government became reluctant to undertake new military adventures abroad or to play a role of regional balancer. Instead, it worked with allies such as Iran to fill regional power vacuums. President Nixon gave Iran, which sat on the fault line between communism and capitalism, a major role. Based on the Nixon Doctrine, the US would not assume direct involvement in preserving security in the third World but instead would encourage regional powers to assume a primary role in assuring security in their neighbourhood, a role that the Shah of Iran was eager to fill in the Persian Gulf. The US would merely furnish its allies with arms, training and intelligence.

Between 1972 and 1979, the Nixon Doctrine was compatible with the Shah’s aspiration of making Iran the major power in the Gulf and protector of Western interests in that area. His policy is summarized in two words that Nixon said to the Shah of Iran in their meeting in May 1972 in Tehran: ‘Protect me’ (quoted in S ick 1985, 14). He us provided the Shah with massive military hardware, against the will of the Department of Defence, in addition to training the Iranian military in order to establish Iran’s military capacity.

The role of Iran as a pro-American policeman in the Persian Gulf was important for several reasons. First, after 1967, Iraq cut its diplomatic relations with the US and joined the camp of the Soviet Union. Thus, before the 1979 revolution, the two superpowers had maintained parity in the balance of power in the Persian Gulf through their respective clients, Iran and Iraq. Second, following the Vietnam War, the Congress was not ready to commit American troops to obscure regions in the Third World, while Iran of the Shah was ready to fill the role of a balancer against the pro-Soviet Iraq. Third, the US thought that Iran could deter Iraq from expanding into the oil-rich Arabian peninsula, while such an Iraqi move could be used by the Soviet Union to cut off the West from the Gulf states’ oil supplies.

After the revolution, the US had to come up with new ways of protecting its oil-rich allies and securing its access to oil. It had two options: to lure Iraq into the American camp; or to build up its power base in the Gulf in order to contain both Iran and Iraq. These two are not mutually exclusive alternatives; in fact the US pursued them both.

To make things more complicated, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 raised a American fears that Iran would be the next target of Soviet expansion and that the US would interpret the animosity between the US and Iran as a sign that the US would not protect Iran in case of a Soviet attack. President Carter asserted that the invasion of Afghanistan posed ‘a threat to Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf, a region vital to the security of the entire Western Alliance.’ According to President Carter, ‘NATO’s members and our other friends and allies must also be prepared … to contribute according to their capabilities to cooperative security efforts in other parts of the world [the Persian Gulf]’ (Carter, 25 June, 1980).

Thus, in addition to the pressure put on the Nat O members to assume shared responsibilities outside the Nat O area, the US increased its Navy and marine presence in the Persian Gulf. The US also approved developing a small rapid intervention force capable of quick deployment for the purpose of helping US allies
face any subversive domestic attack, similar to the Iranian revolution. These ideas were summarized in a memorandum, entitled ‘Persian Gulf Security Framework’, submitted to President Carter on 3 June 1980, by his national security advisor, Z. Brzezinski (Brzezinski 1983, 450). Carter also increased America’s Middle East naval force by two ships. In short, the Carter doctrine of 1980 formally committed the United States to blocking any hostile power from dominating the Persian Gulf.

The Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led the United States to take a direct role in the Persian Gulf.¹

The substantial debate over US efforts to secure its interests in the Persian Gulf was tested again in the autumn of 1980. First, US intelligence agencies provided information about a pending Soviet invasion of Iran. While the US could deal with the loss of Iran to the mullahs, it was not ready to lose it to the Soviet Union. The US made it clear to the Soviets that it would be ready to intervene in order to defend Iran against such an invasion. Second, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980 northeast of the Saudi oil fields compelled Saudi Arabia to ask the US for protection. The Saudis feared that an attack by Iraq against Iran launched from Saudi soil would prompt Iran to retaliate in the oil fields region (Brzezinski 1983, 452). The US came to the conclusion that the loss of the Persian Gulf was no less severe than the loss of Europe. It would even be ready to use nuclear weapon to protect the region against Soviet invasion (Brzezinski 1983, 452).

Why, then, if it was prepared to resist a potential invasion of Iran by the USSR, was the US apparently indifferent to the attack on Iran by Iraq, a Soviet client? The US did not resist the Iraqi attack of Iran and maintained neutrality during the early stages of the war (Jentleson 1994, 36). Some even argue though that the US gave Iraq the green light to attack Iran, on the assumption that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. As Gary Sick put it ‘After the hostages were taken in Tehran [in November 1979], there was a very strong view, especially from Brzezinski, that in effect Iran should be punished from all sides. He made public statements to the effect that he would not mind an Iraqi move against Iran’ (Hitchens 1991, 92). After the presidential elections of 1980, Brzezinski recommended providing military aid to Iraq if the Iranians were not forthcoming on the hostage crisis (Brzezinski 1983, 506). The US even provided Saddam with intelligence information about the movements of the Iranian troops, especially in areas where Iraq seemed to be vulnerable.

During the early 1980s, the US started to realize that the Islamic revolution, instead of merely toppling the shah, was potentially spreading to other Muslim societies. Iran was aggressively promoting the revolution by undermining traditional pro-Western regimes in the Arab peninsula. In September 1981, Iranian pilgrims disrupted the Mecca pilgrimage; later, in December, Iran encouraged the Shi’ites in Bahrain to initiate a coup against the Sunni regime. Iran also operated in other states in the area, such as Kuwait and Northern Yemen. Under these

¹ The Reagan administration took further measures to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to international shipping. For this task, the US deployed additional forces in the Gulf in late 1983 (see National Security Decision Directive (Nsdd ) 114, 6 November, 1983).
circumstances, the US needed not only to bolster its allies from within to prevent the eruption of similar internal mass revolutions, but also to stem Iran’s attempts to export the revolution from without. It was during this period that the US initiated contacts with Saddam Hussein’s regime in order to keep Iran at bay.

The US perceived a victory of Iran over Iraq as a disaster to its interests in the Persian Gulf. The leitmotif of US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf during the early 1980s was therefore to counterbalance Iran by striking a tacit alliance with Iraq and to oppose the Soviet Union by fortifying the American military presence in the Persian Gulf. But the US still endeavored to maintain a balance of power between Iraq and Iran so that neither would be able to claim a regional hegemony that might undermine US interests in the Persian Gulf.

In early 1982, the United States provided civilian and military aid to Iraq in the hopes of countering the spread of the Iranian-backed Islamic revolution. The Reagan administration took Iraq off the list of terrorist states. On 26 November, 1984, Tariq Aziz, the foreign minister of Iraq visited Washington and the two countries agreed to resume their diplomatic relations. On 26 April 1985, the US nominated David Newton as its first ambassador to Iraq since the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries; hitherto Newton had been charge d’affaires at the US Embassy in Baghdad. There were nonetheless policymakers within the administration who raised concerns during the 1980s about close cooperation with Saddam’s regime, but their caveats were rejected. The main policy thrust was to stop Iran from exporting the Islamic revolution and to block Soviet expansion into the Gulf area. As Assistant Secretary of Defence Noel Koch put it, ‘no one had any doubts about his [Saddam’s] continued involvement with terrorism … the real reason [for taking Iraq off the terrorism list] was to help them [Iraqis] succeed in the war against Iran’ (quoted in Jentleson 1994, 33).

After taking Iraq off the list of terrorist states, the US was able to export to Iraq products that could be used for both civilian and military purposes, such as trucks and helicopters, in addition to other weapons, delivered to Iraq through third-party states in the Middle East. In 1983 and 1984 Iraq was granted a credit of almost $1 billion from the US government to purchase US foodstuffs, in addition to $500 million from the Export-Import Bank (Jentleson 1994, 44). In 1986, William Colby, a former director of the CIA, stated that ‘it is in the interest of the United States, the Western world and even the Soviet Union that Iraq successfully withstands the Iranian assault … the United States [had] better make direct efforts to strengthen Iraq against Iran.’ (quoted in Sheikholeslami 1993, 107). In October 1989, President Bush signed National Security Directive 26, which was to ‘propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behaviour and to increase our influence with Iraq’ (quoted in Jentleson 1994, 15).

Finally, after the signature of the Camp David accord, the US installed Egypt as a substitute for Iran of the shah, as a second pillar of US Middle East policy along with Saudi Arabia. This new policy committed the United States to provide an aid package to Egypt, the bulk of it oriented toward modernizing and reinforcing the Egyptian army.
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Dual Containment

t he end of the cold War transformed the global role of the united states. t he sudden disappearance of the soviet union in early 1990s compelled the bush administration to reassess the us policy of intervention abroad. yet while the ramifications of the revolution continued to resonate during the 1990s, there was no radical discontinuity with the past in the us foreign policy toward the middle East. What is notable is the degree of continuity in the way the US defined its interests in the region during and after the cold War.

The dual containment policy was initiated by the carter administration in 1979. during the 1980s, the Reagan and bush administrations had been pursuing a policy of engaging Iraq through diplomacy and economic aid. t he Iraqi invasion of kuwait in 1990 came as a surprise and put an end to any future cooperation between the US and Saddam’s regime. With this invasion, Saddam’s Iraq went on the American blacklist of regimes that dared to challenge the US, such as Castro’s cuba and North korea. t he us had never come to terms, at least in its modern history, with regimes that challenged it in the past.

through Operation Desert Storm, the us made clear its commitment to the security of Gulf oil monarchies. While these monarchies provided only a small proportion of total us oil imports, they remained central to the wider us economic objectives in the middle East. t he us has maintained military installations in each of its allies’ territory, seeing the presence of its forces as central to keeping the dual containment of Iran and Iraq and to securing the free flow of oil.

The main pillars of the american policy in the middle East between 1991 and 2001 were, first, the doctrine of dual containment of Iran and Iraq, a policy that was reintroduced in 1993, and, second, the Israeli-arab peace process.

Operation Desert Storm created an unusual environment; both Iran and Iraq emerged as us enemies while neither had a global patron, a state of affairs that allowed the us to isolate them both politically, economically and militarily (lake 1994, 45). martin Indyk, the special assistant to the president for Near East and south asian affairs at the National security council, asserted that ‘the united states would no longer play the game of balancing Iran against Iraq. t he strength of the united states and its friends in the region—Egypt, Israel, saudi arabia, turkey and the Gcc —would allow Washington to counter both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes. We will not need to depend on one to counter the other’ (quoted in Gause 1994a, 57). In an interview with c NN on 13 april 1995, president clinton reiterated that Iran was a menace but that the us remained reluctant to cooperate with Saddam given his previous challenge of the US in the area. In Clinton’s words: ‘Every country that we speak with, every world leader I talk to in the region [middle East] and beyond still believes that Iran is the biggest cause of instability and the biggest potential threat to the future.’

The rationale for dual containment was the direct result of three events. first, the end of the cold War left some states in the middle East without a patron. second was the political outcome of Operation Desert Storm; although the us
succeeded in liberating Kuwait, Iraq under Saddam could no longer be co-opted by the US, while Iraq was perceived as undermining the sovereignty of the pro-West Arab oil exporting countries. Third, the US perceived Iran as a country that had cultivated ties with subversive elements such as Hezbollah and Hamas that sought to sabotage the Arab-Israeli peace process begun in Oslo (Indyk 1994, 1). Conventional wisdom held that the solution was to pit the region’s most powerful states, Iraq and Iran, against one another. That way, neither could become too dominant or able to jeopardize the supply of oil to the West. But by choosing to isolate both states the US committed itself to an ambitious, protracted program that required a direct intervention and an expansion of US military presence in the Gulf. The number of American troops based in the region was maintained at around 20,000 throughout the 1990s. In addition, the US sought to bolster the power of its allied monarchies in the Arab peninsula. Saudi Arabia, for instance, acquired arms worth $36 billion between 1990 and 1994 (Gause 1997a, 13). The Clinton administration continued to support the peace process and the dual containment policy. It perceived that the success of the former depended on the latter: creating a suitable environment for making progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process was a by-product of isolating extremist states such as Iran and Iraq. Pacifying moderate Arab foes of Israel would demonstrate that adopting an anti-American posture was both costly and worthless. This policy remained the hallmark of the Clinton administration until he left office in January 2001.

In the words of Clinton’s Secretary of Defence, William Cohen, ‘I think as long as he [Saddam Hussein] remains in office as the head of that [Iraqi] state, it’s unlikely that we could have anything but the current policy in place, with very little prospects for relief’ (Cohen 1998).

The Rise of Neo-Orientalism

US policy towards the Middle East on the eve of the Iranian revolution stemmed from the orientalist ideas that prevailed in the US before the revolution. Elie Kedouri summarizes succinctly the Orientalist manifesto: ‘the notion of a state as a specific territorial entity which is endowed with sovereignty, the notion of popular sovereignty as the foundation of governmental legitimacy, the idea of representation, of elections, of popular suffrage ... —all of these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition’ (Kedourie 1994, 5–6). Neo-orientalism emerged in the aftermath of the revolution, which disrupted oil exports from Iran for more than four months and brought into power an Islamic fundamentalist and anti-American regime. His school attempted to resolve the anomaly in the orientalist approach, which failed to explain how a Muslim society could rebel against its leader. Muslims had been supposed to owe allegiance to their rulers indefinitely, without questioning their policies (Sadowski 1993). Neo-orientalists argued that the establishment of a fundamentalist regime was an inevitable process under the specific conditions of the Shah’s rule. Furthermore,
they believed that it was the only possible outcome of the revolution, for the masses intended initially to build a regime compatible with Islamic values.

During the 1980s and 1990s the US believed that the anti-West sentiment in Muslim countries was at its peak (Lewis 1990; Indyk 1992; Pipes 1986; Salla 1997). Former Vice president Dan Quayle associated Islamic fundamentalism with Nazism and communism (Esposito 1992, 168). Michael Walzer attributed the outbreak of violence in Palestine, the Philippines and Iran to a common denominator: Islam. In his view, Islam explicitly endorsed violence against non-Muslims (The New Republic, 8 December 1979).

This set of ideas furnished American policymakers with a theoretical tool that could explain major trends in the Middle East. The theoretical tool also constituted a problem-solving theory that guided American policymakers in dealing with the Middle East, where orientalists prescribed a state-centred approach and all-out support for tradition regimes. The neo-orientalist school endeavoured to rectify some of the loopholes in the orientalist school and suggested how to pre-empt revolution from reoccurring in other Middle Eastern countries. His theory simplified Middle Eastern reality for American policymakers, while the US grand policy towards the Middle East was forged under the assumption of these problem solving theories.

The neo-orientalist school of thought generalizes from one case—the Iranian Revolution—in order to address the drawbacks of the conventional orientalist school, without really challenging its fundamental assumptions regarding the lack of compatibility between Islam and democracy and the perpetual antagonism between Islamic culture and its Western counterpart. In other words, ‘within the essentialist school both orientalists and neo-orientalists share the conviction that Islam is incompatible with democracy. Both agree that since there is no separation between religion and state, a secular democratic state cannot emerge in a Muslim country’ (Halabi 1999, 384). Based on this conviction, the US refrained from supporting democratization in the Middle East.

The only point of disagreement between the two schools of thought is the relative strength of an Arab society vis-à-vis its own ruler. Thus, neo-orientalism aims to supplement and restore the orientalist school rather than refute or discard it altogether. The neo-orientalist school shifts the focus from the ruling regime to the people. It claims that mere allegiance to the ruler is not enough; instead, policymakers need to identify the roots of the problem and construct the ‘right’ institutions to address them. Neo-orientalists concur that Islamic culture is unsuitable for democracy, but also that the passivity of Muslim society is not guaranteed under all circumstances.

Neo-orientalists argue that throughout the history of Islam, society has always been strong and the regime always weak, because the regime has had a very shaky grassroots support and faces traditional communities bound together by blood relations (assabiya, tribalism) (Salami 1987; Ibi 1991). Muslim societies have maintained an austere, religious, traditional lifestyle, their argument continues, that seems right and moral to many Muslims, who dissociate themselves from
the corrupt, immoral behaviour of the ruling elite, which adopts an extravagant lifestyle and squanders public money (h alabi 1999, 385). By prescribing ‘ideals that are impossible to fulfil, Islam ensures that Muslims will view any form of government, sooner or later, as illegitimate. Sincere Muslims tend to withdraw support from their rulers’ (Sadowski 1993, 18). Thus, neo-orientalists perceive Muslim societies and Muslim state regimes as two domains that are independent of each other, with minimum interaction. The lack of constant interaction is due to the weakness of civil society in Islamic states, where solidarity is formed on the basis of blood ties or consensus among believers (t ibi 1991; s harabi 1988). 

This school asserts that there is an inherent defect in Islamic culture, in which society endeavours to maintain a rigid implementation of essentialist religious laws or Shari’a. In this view, Muslims are fundamentalists and anti-Western by nature; if they were given the opportunity to vote, they would elect only an Islamic fundamentalist regime. In other words, if a Muslim country is given a chance to decide freely its own destiny, radical Islamists would gain ascendancy and like to topple pro-West regimes, as occurred in Iran in 1979 or in the Algerian elections in 1991. Because these ideas prevailed among many US academics and policymakers, the US refrained from promoting democratization processes in the Middle East and opted to cooperate with authoritarian, traditional regimes.

The Accommodationist School

The accommodationist school became popular during the 1980s and 1990s. (Anderson 1995; Anderson and Martinez 1998; Esposito 1991; Hudson 1991). This school concurs with the neo-orientalist approach about the unpreparedness of a rab/muslim societies for democratization, but some advocates of this school attribute the lack of democratization to non-cultural factors, such as oil exports and the rise of the rentier state, while other advocates of the school assume that economic modernization should precede political modernization.

These advocates stress the economic backwardness in the Arab states and accuse Arab regimes of adopting inappropriate economic policies, clearly reflected in the uneven distribution of wealth and the unwise allocation of resources (Richards 1993; Sadowski 1991; Waterbury 1983). These scholars assume that poverty provokes the lower classes to support an Islamic movement, whereas market-oriented reforms would succeed in raising living standards and narrow the disparity between the haves and have-nots and thereby erode the support base of the Islamists (tessler 1997). These accommodationists are motivated by pragmatic concerns about long-term stability in the region. They do not want to see a repetition of the Iranian revolution in countries like Saudi Arabia or Egypt (Gerges 1999, 33).

The accommodationists justify the reluctance of the US to promote democracy, yet they refuse to see the Middle East as a backwater. In fact, some even argue that the pace of change in the region is faster than in the West.
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(murphy 1999, 73; Walker 1980, 42). Nonetheless, the us should monitor the middle Eastern situation closely in order to maintain control over unfolding events. a ccommodationists particularly recommend the promotion of economic reforms, while the introduction of democracy should be kept on hold. John Waterbury, a leading expert on the political economy of the region, claims that

the middle East ... may be characterized by a type of exceptional politics that will make the transition to greater accountability and democracy relatively difficult. I do not believe, however, that this exceptionalism extends to the economic sphere. t hus I view the problems facing the region mainly as one of the rate of change (Waterbury 1998, 160).

a fter the revolution, us policymakers agreed with accommodationists on the need for promulgating economic reforms while freezing democratization. Edward d jerejian, former us ambassador to s yria and Israel and former a ssistant s ecretary of s tate for Near East a ffairs, claimed that there was no competition between the West and Islam. In his view, the US recognized ‘Islam as one of the world’s great faiths’ (Djerejian 1996, 19). Yet when it came to democracy, he suspected that Islamic movements would use democracy in order to come to power, only to later dismantle elections and outlaw competing political parties. In his words: ‘we suspect those who use the democratic process to come to power only would destroy that very process in order to retain power ... we do not support one person, one vote, one time.’ James Baker, former US Secretary of State, contends that ‘we neglect at our peril the reality that the middle East region today sits right in the middle of an “arc of crisis” stretching across a frica and a sia from a lgeria to pakistan. t his region contains a combustible mix of mass poverty, dictatorial governments, simmering animosities, and radical Islamic fundamentalism—a movement that is of broad and intense and ominously anti-Western appeal’ (Baker 1998 [m ay/June], 14). In his view, the combination of these elements with large conventional arsenals and ambitions to acquire weapons of mass destruction makes these societies a real threat to the world. In his view, cooperation and peace would mitigate this reality: ‘it is precisely this “spirit of madrid” that the u nited s tates should seek to rekindle. It is the spirit of cooperation, not confrontation. It is a spirit of realism, not radicalism.’

f ormer a merican a ssistant s ecretary of s tate for Near East a ffairs, a mbassador Robert pelletreau stated one viewpoint: ‘t here are some experts who take a positive attitude toward political Islam, and argue that Islamists should be allowed to participate: if they fail, they have then participated and failed, and if they succeed, they have then succeeded in a democratic context’ (Khan 1996, 4). b ut in his assessment, this was too benign a position for any us foreign policymaker to take. a mong other consequences, there could be an immediate effect on neighbouring Islamists or on other issues of immediate importance, such as the peace process. t herefore he recommended ‘a more restrictive posture than suggested’ by some academicians (Khan 1996, 4).
these positions were shared by mainstream American orientalist as well as accommodationist intellectuals. At the time of the 1991 Gulf War, such shapers of public opinion, such as Bernard Lewis, warned the Bush administration against promoting democracy in the Middle East. Fouad Ajami (of Lebanese descent) stated a realist position of what America should seek: order rather than justice. In 1990, Ajami asserted that ‘The US is in the Gulf to defend order ... We’re not there to impose our rules. The injection of questions of democracy into the debate is completely inappropriate’ (quoted in Blecher 2003). President Bush stated that ‘the war [Operation Desert Storm] wasn’t fought about democracy in Kuwait.’ Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Bush and later Secretary of State under Bush Jr., told a press briefing in 1992:

saddam hussein is a terrible person, he is a threat to his own people. I think his people would be better off with a different leader, but there is this sort of romantic notion that if saddam hussein got hit by a bus tomorrow, some Jeffersonian democrat is waiting in the wings to hold popular elections. You’re going to get—guess what—probably another saddam hussein (quoted in Liu, 20 November, 2003).

During Operation Desert Storm, Saudi Arabia had come to an understanding with the Bush administration that after the war, the US would concentrate on settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet the idea of using the momentum of the war to establish democracy in Iraq and Kuwait had few, if any, advocates within the administration. The Bush administration preferred to maintain the status quo of authoritarian Arab regimes and to return to business as usual, in which the political stability to be achieved through settling the Arab-Israeli conflict, which took higher priority than promoting democracy (Indyk 2002, 76).

In the same vein, President Clinton asserted that ‘Our vision of the future of the Middle East is a simple one. We want to see the establishment of a prosperous region in which all nations and peoples can live in freedom and security ... more and more regional governments are recognizing that dialogue and reconciliation—and the trade and development that accompany and reinforce peace—are the best means of ensuring a better future for their nations’ (Nader 1995, 16). Anthony Lake, national security advisor at the Clinton administration went one step further by admitting past American mistakes: ‘In previous administrations ... the United States built up Iran under the shah as a supposed regional pillar of stability. Then it backed Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in its war with revolutionary Iran. Both approaches proved disastrous. In the shah’s case, the US strategy for regional stability collapsed when he was overthrown’ (Lake 1994, 48). Secretary of State during Clinton’s second term, Madeleine Albright, explained the US reluctance to promote democratization by claiming: ‘We have been afraid to push too hard

2 the US seized on its regional dominance to convene the Middle East peace conference in Madrid in October 1991.
for democracy, especially in a rab countries. We worry, perhaps with reason, that if radical Islamists obtain power through an election, there would be no more elections … and instability might be created’ (quoted in Yetiv 2006, 400).

martin Indyk perceived peacemaking and democratization in the middle East as mutually exclusive. Indyk favoured peacemaking rather than democratization because of the opportunity of wrapping up a comprehensive peace deal while yitzhak Rabin was in power (Indyk 2002, 76), a peace deal would seriously undermine the ability of extremist leaders like Saddam Hussein to use the conflict as a pretext to destabilize the region. In Indyk’s view, the peace process might also create a peaceful environment to proceed with democratization. On the other hand, aggressively promoting democratization in the middle East would, the argument continues, disrupt the peace process and harm us interests in the region: ‘t he united states should … focus its energies on peacemaking, while containing the radical opponents of peace (Iraq, Iran, and l ibya) and leaving friendly a rab regimes to deal with their internal problems as they say fit’ (Indyk 2002, 76). t hus, moderate a rab regimes would help the us maintain stability in the middle East through isolating ‘rogue states’ and proceeding in the peace process; freezing democratization was the quid pro quo. f or example, the us could use s audi air bases to enforce the no-fly zone over Iraq and to launch military strikes when needed to contain s addam in return for supporting the Gulf monarchies militarily and refraining from criticizing their human rights record. In this sense, the crisis of Operation Desert Storm brought about no new ideas in us foreign policy toward the middle East.

t here were some positive notes, however. s ome a mericans at this stage allowed that muslims share some general values with the West, but these fell short of democracy. a d epartment of s tate fact sheet announced that ‘most a mericans and most muslims share fundamental values such as peace, justice, economic security, and good governance’ (Quoted in pipes and s tillman 2002, 49–59). In 2000, president c linton declared that ‘a merica is made stronger by the core values of Islam—commitment to family, compassion for the disadvantaged, and respect for difference’ (Pipes and Stillman 2002, 53).

In short, many accommodationists contended that socioeconomic conditions were responsible for the Iranian Revolution. t hey believed that the main cause for the revolution was uneven development; a small segment enjoyed the fruits of oil wealth while most of society remained extremely poor (parsa 1989; s ick 1985, 4). f urthermore, the income from oil was distributed according to social status and region: it benefited only the rich in Tehran and the central Persian-speaking area (a brahamian 1982). t he wide gap between the rich and the poor was conspicuous in big cities; it came as no surprise therefore that the revolution was initiated by urban inhabitants (Zubaida 1989, 65).

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3 Indyk was a s pecial a ssistant to president c linton and s enior d irector for the Near East and s outh a sia on the staff of the National s ecurity c ouncil from 1993–95 and us ambassador to Israel between 2000–2001.
the loss of Iran rendered the orientalist ideas obsolete, and led to the adoption of accommodationist and neo-orientalist ideas to guide US policy in the Middle East. Accommodationists concurred with neo-orientalists that the Middle East was not ripe for democratic processes, certainly not ones that are imposed from afar by the US. Yet the accommodationists went one step further. The loss of Iran made accommodationist scholars realize that the best way to stabilize Muslim nations was through a combination of economic liberalization, which could bring prosperity to the lower classes, and authoritarian rule. Empowered with these ideas, and determined to preempt the spread of the Islamic revolution to other countries in the region, the US sought to implement free market reforms throughout the 1980s and 1990s in such states as Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco, even against the will of the political elite.

**Promoting Capitalism in the Arab World**

Ever since the mid-1980s, the US had promoted capitalism in four Arab states (Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco) through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These economic reforms changed the very domestic characteristics of these states. Capitalism was accompanied by a shift from an inward-looking, state-dominated development and import-substituting industrialization policy to an outward looking and market-oriented development, and from a corporatist, inclusionary society into a private-dominated and exclusionary political arrangement. The corporatist ideology underlying socialism in these Arab states had aimed at shaping the nation as an organic entity with an internal division of labour and without any place for class struggle or competition among opposed groups. The shift to capitalism modified the social contract that had existed in these states. The structural adjustment program, advanced by the IMF with the endorsement of the US and under pressure behind the scenes by US officials, resulted in the rise of the private sector, the bourgeoisie and an unorganized proletariat class. The state has come to depend more on the extraction of taxes from the private sector to finance a redistribution of wealth from the haves to the have-nots and to subsidize basic goods.

From the early 1960s till the mid-1980s, Arab states, especially the socialist states such as Egypt, Syria and Algeria, stressed a just distribution of wealth, saturation and corporatism. A socialist approach allowed the government to control the individualism typical of a capitalist economy, to preempt class conflict and to deal more effectively with the unemployed. The government’s neglect of the need to maximize wealth through efficient management of the economy led to a deep debt crisis during the 1980s. In this period, an increasing number of states in the West began to see the reconciliation of limited-capital mobility, price control and full employment as impossible. They also feared that the deepening of poverty could trigger a revolution, whose fundamentalist outcome was almost inevitable.
since the mid-1980s, the US has sought to construct a new politico-economic atmosphere within the Arab world from the bottom up, made in the image of a Western capitalist society.

Between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco embarked upon a protracted and sluggish process of economic reforms under the auspices of international financial institutions (IFIs)—the IMF and the World Bank. The reforms aimed at stabilizing these states’ financial and foreign exchange markets, slashing subsidies, reducing budget deficits, privatizing state-owned enterprises, and opening up of trade, thus helping to integrate each nation’s economy into the world economy. These processes were direct results of the political pressure IFIs exerted on these states, and the support of the US and other members of the Western nations’ Paris Club. Agreements concluded between these states and the IMF called for stabilizing and restructuring the economy and emphasized the mechanism of the free market economy.

Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia were the first countries in the Middle East to experience this new policy in effect. Egypt had earlier rejected the free market reforms introduced by the IMF in 1986. Remembering the bread Riots of January 1977—an event that nearly toppled the regime of President Anwar Sadat—Mubarak’s regime was not ready to slash subsidies for basic goods. The US, or, more precisely, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), was unhappy with Egypt’s refusal to overhaul its economy. As Egypt refused to comply with the IMF, the US decided in March 1986 to delay the disbursement of $265 million in aid until Egypt introduced free market economic reforms. The US demanded that Egypt reach an agreement on reforms with the IMF that would include cutting subsidies, reducing the public deficit, liberalizing interest and exchange rates, privatizing state-owned companies and encouraging the private sector.

In the same year, Egypt responded by introducing reforms that failed to satisfy the US. In the words of one USAID officer: ‘The reforms are fine, but they are only nibbling at the edges of the problem’ (Butter 1986a, 13). Several weeks later, the US agreed to disburse $150 million of aid while making it clear that any additional aid would depend on the government’s progress in economic reforms, particularly in cutting subsidies (Butter 1986b, 17). The Reagan administration also rejected Egypt’s request to provide relief for its foreign debt, which reached a level of almost 150 percent of its gross domestic production. The US made it clear that relief could not be provided through a bilateral agreement. Instead, it should be achieved through a multilateral debt-rescheduling agreement arranged and coordinated by the IMF, on condition that Egypt would comply with the IMF’s structural adjustment program (Pasha and Samatar 1996).

The Clinton administration persisted with the policy of economic reforms begun under the previous two administrations. It was worried that the Algerian economic crisis of the late 1980s and the political crisis of 1991 would repeat themselves in Egypt, as the Egyptian economy had many structural similarities to Algeria’s.
When Egypt started to implement the IMF structural adjustment plan in 1992, nonetheless, violence escalated. The Mubarak regime confronted stiff opposition from Islamist groups (Gama’a Islamiyya, Islamic Jihad, among others), assassinating public figures and garnering support among the impoverished masses for the purpose of toppling the regime. Under these circumstances, the Clinton administration supported Mubarak’s policy of ruthlessly suppressing these groups and it overlooked violations of human rights.

Vice President Al Gore led the Clinton administration’s initiative to prompt Mubarak to reform, deregulate and privatize the Egyptian economy. The Clinton administration believed that economic reforms and a market-oriented economy would enable the regime to meet the economic needs of the poor and achieve stability in the long run. But even under such a high-level initiative, the pace of the reforms would have to be compatible with the slow pace of adaptation of the Egyptian people in order to avoid major changes that could trigger mass demonstrations, which could take unpredictable and undesirable directions.

In short, during the 1990s, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, experienced the process of stabilizing and restructuring their economies under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank. The US believed that a rational allocation of resources would result in higher economic growth, while more wealth would also trickle down to the working class. Viewed from this perspective, a rise in the living standards of the masses would dissuade them from joining radical Islamist movements (Oth 1998; Tessler 1997). New ideas would provide a new identity for the masses in these Muslim societies, the argument continues, to overcome their enmity against Western culture. The construction of this new identity would be achieved, from a US perspective, through a convergence of free market economies and openness to trade, with far-reaching repercussions for society’s structure, social solidarity and state-society relations.

Conclusion

Many studies that have examined international order attributed the characteristics of the order to the type of regime in the hegemonic state. Given the democratic character of the US, we should expect an order that mutes the importance of power. Yet, when it comes to the Middle East, the democratic characteristics of the US were neutralized, and the US sought domination of oil exporting countries, such as Iran, through the authoritarian regimes. US perception of the type of culture convinced American policymakers that a hegemonic order in the Gramscian sense that would guarantee the consent of the masses through democratic processes is unattainable. Before and even after the revolution that US was convinced that far reaching democratic processes were futile and counterproductive. The revolution in this sense marks the desire of the Iranian people to escape US domination. By the same token, the animosity toward the US is by no means an expression of a clash of civilizations between Islam and Christianity.
The 1979 Iranian revolution marked a watershed in US foreign policy in the Middle East as some new ideas emerged and old ones vanished. The US embraced neo-orientalist ideas that assume that Muslim societies are religious and traditional by nature, and that a Muslim leader who deviates from the principles of Islam and imposes rapid modernization process would face the same fate of the Shah of Iran. The US also embraced some accommodationist ideas that prescribed the need to seek to raise living standards of the masses in the Middle East through structural adjustment economic programs. At the regional level, the US embraced the dual containment policy in the Gulf region in order to isolate ‘rogue states’ and to create a suitable framework for proceeding toward a complete peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict through a series of limited agreements. During this period, the US continued to reject democratization as incompatible with the Arab-Islamic culture.
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On the eve of 11 September, 2001 the US policy toward the Middle East was guided by a set of ideas that included the following assumptions:

1. The US should cooperate with authoritarian regimes in the region.
2. Arab-Islamic culture was inhospitable to democracy.
3. Pro-American Arab states should be encouraged to adopt market-oriented economies.
4. Iran and Iraq were rogue states that should be contained.¹
5. The US should promote peace between Israel and every one of its Arab belligerent neighbors (including rogue states) that is willing to sign a peace treaty with the Jewish state.

In other words, American policies aimed at fostering political reforms in the Arab world generally took a back seat to supporting stability and cooperation of pro-West Arab regimes. The US had followed a policy that aimed to protect traditional, authoritarian regimes in exchange for a steady supply of oil.

The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York City, the Pentagon headquarters in Washington DC, and Pennsylvania that killed more than 3,000 people, mostly Americans, caused swift and dramatic changes to US foreign policy toward the Middle East (The American Working Group 2002). Following these attacks, the US placed a premium on fighting terrorist groups and states that harbor terrorism, while every other interest became subordinated to this drive, including the steady supply of oil from the Middle East.

Before 9/11, the US assumed that market-oriented economies would raise the living standards of the lower classes and dissuade ordinary Arabs from supporting anti-West fundamentalist regimes. This policy was based on the premise that only impoverished people who live in miserable conditions would support an anti-Western cause. Americans were astonished to learn that most of the perpetrators of the attack carried Saudi nationality, while the two leaders of Al-Qaeda were one Saudi (Bin Laden) and one Egyptian (Ayman al-Zawahiry)—two pro-American states. The perpetrators of the attack were mostly highly educated Saudis from

¹ As explained below, some leading neo-conservatives had doubts about the effectiveness of the dual containment policy of Iran and Iraq and called for the replacement of Saddam’s regime through the use of force.
affluent families, a fact that undermined the assumed relationship between poverty and anti-Westernism.

Americans were puzzled: did the perpetrators of 9/11 commit the attacks because of the friendly relations of the US with their mother states or in spite of them? Furthermore, if the US under the Bush administration was determined to uproot terrorism, how should it treat these friendly regimes? The US felt as though it had been stabbed in the back by these ‘friends’—that while the US was overlooking the authoritarian rule of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and providing them with security and foreign aid respectively, members of both nations were plotting to attack America.

Thus, following 9/11, Arab states, including pro-Western Arab states, were depicted as dangerous to the Western world. These states were asked to clean their house by uprooting terrorism and creating an adequate rule of law that respected human rights, in order to make lives safer inside Western nations. With this attitude in mind, the US began to adopt a hard-line position not only against its foes but also toward its allies, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Dumke 2006, 88). In the words of Martin Indyk, ‘The United States backed their [Saudi Arabia’s and Egypt’s] regimes and they begat al-Qaeda’ (Indyk 2002, 86). Furthermore, there was a major change in the US’s democratization policy vis-à-vis the Islamic countries in general and the Middle Eastern region in particular. In the wake of the attack, the need to fortify internal security within the US was added as another major American objective in the region, because the US linked the attack of 9/11 with anti-Westernism in the Middle East.

Hence, in the aftermath of 9/11, the US could not reduce its interests in the region merely to a steady supply of oil, sacrificing good governance and transparency on the way. American policymakers suddenly became disillusioned about the link between US domestic security and stable democracies in the Muslim world. They started to realize that economic and political marginalization in the Middle East creates a fertile ground for anti-Western terrorist groups to recruit young Muslim men into their organizations.

According to a report by the United States Institute for Peace USIP, a ‘prime factor in the rise of extremism ... is the failure of many governments in the Muslim world to address the overwhelming challenges of development arising from rapid social, demographic, and economic changes over the last century’ (USIP 2002, 2). The report quotes scholars who argue that the West should start promoting democracy and stop supporting oppressive regimes.

In the face of burgeoning animosity toward the Middle East, neo-conservatives such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Robert Zoellick and Condoleezza Rice became too powerful, vocal and assertive within the Bush administration, and the whole administration gravitated toward attacking Iraq, regardless of 9/11. These neo-conservatives advocated a unilateral policy that would give the US the maximum freedom of action. They were staunch supporters of using an American power against regimes that the US categorizes as ‘rogue states’ that are accused of having links with terrorist groups or of seeking to develop weapons of mass
destruction (Wmd). The US has since launched a military attack against two Muslim-majority countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, and imposed sanctions on Syria, in addition to the sanctions that had been imposed on Iran and Libya. In the case of pro-Western states, the US sought to persuade their regimes that democratization would reshape domestic politics and would have a direct effect on the daily life of ordinary people, dissuading them from joining terrorist organizations.

In short, under the ‘Ground Zero’ level of trust between the US and the Arab states, the US pursued its policy in the Middle East in two incompatible strands: on one hand, it initiated an unwavering war against terrorist groups; and on the other, it criticized the absence of democratization processes and disrespect of human rights in the region. Fighting terrorism had caused the popularity of ‘rogue states’ in the eyes of Arabs to skyrocket, while criticizing the human rights record of friendly Arab states reduced their popularity in the eyes of their own people to a new nadir. Furthermore, the second policy strand created a ‘Catch-22’ for pro-Western regimes: promoting democracy would put an end to their rule, while maintaining the status quo of authoritarian rule and pro-Western policy would make them an easy target for attacks by subversive Islamic groups and bring sharp criticism from the US itself.

US Foreign Policy Toward its Arab Allies After 9/11

Before 9/11, US relations with the Gulf oil monarchies were conducted according to the formula of a Arab oil in return for American security guarantees. The US had for many years simplified these states’ foreign policy by providing them with guarantees against any foreign attack. These monarchies pursued a pro-American foreign policy, rejected communism and kept the Soviet Union at bay; they supported the peace process or at least did not object to it after the mid-1970s, while the US took responsibility for their foreign security and solved their security dilemmas with their neighbours. In return, the monarchies merely pledged to provide a steady supply of oil at a reasonable price. The Clinton administration, moreover, had tolerated Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the Taliban, hoping (in the words of Martin Indyk) ‘that the United States would use Saudi influence to get the Taliban to expel Osama bin Laden’ (Indyk 2002, 79).

In the aftermath of 9/11, Saudi Arabia, in particular, came under fierce attack from the Bush administration, Congress, the media and other non-governmental bodies. The US viewed Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the Taliban as a threat to its own security. Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia announced his peace plan in 2002. The plan called for full recognition of Israel by all Arab states in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June, 1967, boundaries. The plan was adopted at the Arab summit in Beirut the same year. Haaretz (30 March, 2007), ‘Arab states unanimously approve Saudi peace initiative’.

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organizations, portraying the kingdom as hostile to the US, but also financing some Islamic groups that condemned the West. These agencies developed a negative view of Saudi Arabia, because 15 out of 19 terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks were Saudi Arabians. The Congress, in particular, repeatedly put pressure on the Bush administration to impose tough measures on Saudi Arabia. Hence, following 9/11, the harmonious interdependent relations between the US and Saudi Arabia in particular came to an end.

In addition, the policy of Congress toward the Middle East has long been influenced by the pro-Israeli Jewish lobby, AIPAC, which has tirelessly sought to block efforts to bolster US-Saudi relations. AIPAC feared that close ties between the US and Saudi Arabia could allow the latter to use its oil power to convince the US to coerce Israel to withdraw from a land it had occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem. AIPAC seized the opportunity after 9/11 to limit the US’s sale of weapons to the Arab world in general and to reduce previous administrations’ pressure on Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab land (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 45).

In the aftermath of 9/11, Congress began to question not only Saudi Arabia’s reliability as an ally but whether it had encouraged extremist Islamic militants through the propagation of Wahhabism, which (in the American view) gave rise to anti-Americanism and extremism. Congress attacked the kingdom’s educational system as contributing to extremism and hatred against Christians and Jews. The kingdom disseminated textbooks that called for the killing of Jews, Congress argued.

On 19 December, 2005 Congress passed Resolution 275 (H. Con. Res. 275) that ‘urges the government of Saudi Arabia to reform its education curriculum in a manner that promotes tolerance and peaceful coexistence, develops civil society, and encourages functionality in the global economy’ (US Congress 2005b). The resolution called for a stop to Saudi support for institutions that fund or encourage terrorism and for full Saudi cooperation in the investigation of terrorist attacks (Dumke 2006, 89). In 2005 the House stated that it ‘prohibits funds under this Act from being used to assist Saudi Arabia unless the President certifies to the committees on Appropriations that Saudi Arabia is cooperating with anti-terrorism efforts and that the proposed assistance will help such effort’ (US Congress 2005a).

Congressional testimony by American officials in November 2002 revealed the constraints facing US efforts to combat Saudi financial support for terrorism. Carl W. Ford Jr., an assistant secretary of state, told the Senate Intelligence Committee that ‘the Saudi banking system is not totally transparent, and Riyadh has not maintained strict oversight’ on non-governmental organizations operating abroad’ (quoted in Gerth and Miller, 1 December, 2002).

In light of 9/11 and under pressure from Congress, the Bush administration started to harden its position toward its traditional allies. Initially the administration...
hoped to focus on Afghanistan and Iraq, but it suddenly was under pressure to provide some attention to the way its allies had indirectly supported terrorism. The administration began to raise unprecedented allegations against these allies, questioning their commitment to the peace process and criticizing the lack of transparency in their domestic decision-making processes and the allocation of resources to Islamic education and Islamic organizations that support terrorism. Furthermore, the administration even started to question the US policy of oil in return for protection, given that the cost of protecting the oil monarchies through a unilateral defence strategy seemed too high (the US imported only 10 percent of its oil from the Gulf region during the 2000s) (Ebel, 31 October, 2005). Its commitment to the kingdoms’ security made the US the primary target of Islamic extremist groups. Given the repeated terrorist attacks against US military bases in the Gulf area, the US military presence in the region had negative political consequences for the stability of the oil monarchies; even they started to see the US military presence as a liability, part of the problem rather than the solution.

The 9/11 attacks demonstrated, furthermore, that support for corrupt, authoritarian, yet pro-West regimes, such as the Saudi dynasty jeopardized American domestic security. President Bush declared that

> it jeopardizes our national security to be dependent on sources of energy from countries that don’t care for America, what we stand for, what we love. It’s also a matter of economic security, to be dependent on energy from volatile regions of the world. Our economy becomes subject to price shocks or shortages or disruptions, or one time in our history, cartels. (Bush, 6 February, 2003).

The truth of the matter is that Egypt’s Mubarak regime fought Islamist opposition groups with an iron hand, killing more than 1,000 Islamist activists in 1992–1997. The regime blocked democratization and suppressed legitimate opposition groups, which became highly critical of the US—the main external ally of the regime. Thus the Mubarak regime deflected criticism from itself, while the US became a scapegoat blamed by the opposition for all the ills of the Egyptian people and the Middle East in general. Consensus grew between the opposition groups from the left (secular Nasserists or advocates of pan-Arabism) and the right (Islamists—the Muslim Brotherhood, Jama’a Isalmiyya, among others) that the US’s imperialist role in the Middle East aimed at keeping the Middle East dependent on the West

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4. Canada is the number one supplier of oil to the US. Three of the top four oil suppliers to the US (Canada, Mexico and Venezuela) are in the western hemisphere and together provide more than 48 percent of total US petroleum imports, while Saudi Arabia provides 8 percent.

5. In November 1995, a car bomb exploded outside a US facility in Riyadh for training Saudi soldiers; it killed five Americans. In June 1996, a truck bomb in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 19 US Air Force soldiers, and wounded 372. Both operations were carried out by Saudis.
and underdeveloped politically and economically. The US, in turn, felt that the attacks of 9/11 were a culmination of this hatred accumulated over many years with the knowledge and sometimes even the encouragement of these pro-American regimes (Indyk 2002, 82). Hence, fighting Islamic terrorism should not be conducted through military means only, but through winning the hearts and minds of ordinary Muslims via education and halting what Americans regarded as an unfair incitement against the US.

But in fact, the US was only paying the price for supporting authoritarian, corrupt regimes in the Arab world and the US was just as responsible for the lack of democratization in these states as the local regimes themselves. If Americans ask themselves ‘why do Arabs/Muslims in the Middle East hate us?’ the answer is that the US decided to cooperate with corrupt, authoritarian regimes, because it feared that democratic processes would bring to power Islamist groups (Telhami 2002, 37). Effectively, the US felt that it needed to choose between corrupt regimes and anti-West fundamentalism, and it naturally opted for the former (Waterbury 2003, 58). Even more importantly, US foreign policy has operated under a double standard with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The US supported Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, overlooked Israel’s policy of violating the international law by annexing a Arab land, refrained from condemning the Israeli policy of repressing the Palestinian intifada, and turned a blind eye to Israel’s policy of deporting Palestinians and building illegal settlements on occupied Arab lands. Winning the hearts and minds of Arabs/Muslims could be achieved through a change in policy toward Jerusalem rather than by a detour through Cairo and Riyadh.

Suddenly, however, the US interests in the Middle East were not compatible with those of either the Saudi or the Mubarak regime. The US began to show a strong interest in Saudi domestic affairs, which it saw as being related to a merican domestic security. Hitherto, Saudi Arabia had been extremely jealous of its autonomy in internal affairs, and ‘Americans did not view domestic arrangements of Saudi Arabia as particularly relevant to their daily lives. 9/11 changed that, if not forever, then at least for some time to come’ (Chanin and Gause 2003, 117). Since 2001, the Bush administration has supported a significant expansion of broadcasting to Arab audiences and has expanded assistance programs that improve public education systems, increase exchanges, and promote democracy in Muslim countries.

In fact, the US sought to overhaul the whole domestic political, educational and tax system within Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies. Furthermore, the US raised unprecedented concerns about religious freedom for non-Muslims and freedom for women (Karl, 10 October, 2005). The US also raised concerns that Saudi Arabia is the only country in the region that does not have a parliament, let alone an elected parliament. By focusing on social and political reforms on the part of its allies, the Bush administration thought it could reduce the incentive for Arabs to join anti-merican terrorist movements. As the president said,
many middle Eastern governments now understand that military dictatorship and theocratic rule are a straight, smooth highway to nowhere. but some governments still cling to the old habits of central control. here are governments that still fear and repress independent thought and creativity and private enterprise, the human qualities that make for strong and successful societies. Even when these nations have vast natural resources, they do not respect or develop their greatest resources, the talent and energy of men and women working and living in freedom. Instead of dwelling on past wrongs and blaming others, governments in the middle East need to confront real problems and serve the true interests of their nations. the good and capable people of the middle East all deserve responsible leadership (bush, 6 November, 2003).

Two years later the president repeated his demands: ‘We’re encouraging our friends in the middle East, including Egypt and saudi arabia, to take the path of reform, to strengthen their own societies in the fight against terror by respecting the rights and choices of their own people’ (Bush, 11 November, 2005).

t he us - saudi relations became a hot issue in the 2004 presidential race. t he democratic nominee John kerry announced in may 2004 that ‘If we are serious about energy independence, then we can finally be serious about confronting the role of Saudi Arabia in financing and providing ideological support of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups’ (quoted in Dumke 2006, 92).

This new American involvement in the Saudi Arabia’s internal affairs was clearly articulated by a merican participants in a conference on us - saudi relations held at bellagio, Italy, in June 2003:

The core of this new American focus is ‘Wahhabism,’ the official interpretation of Islam in saudi arabia, its organizational relationship to the state, and its intellectual relationship to the jihadist anti-a mericanism preached by Osama bin Laden. While acknowledging the distinctions between ‘Wahhabism’ and ‘bin Ladenism,’ a number of [American] participants [in the conference] expressed concern that the narrowness of the ‘Wahhabi’ interpretation of Islam could provide a basis (not the basis) for an overt rejection of the West in general and of the united states in particular. t here is concern that saudi efforts to propagate the ‘Wahhabi’ interpretation of Islam, both at home and abroad, have become a breeding ground for anti-a mericanism and, in extreme cases, sympathy toward and recruitment by al-Qaeda (c hanin and Gause 2003, 118).

t he us expressed concerns that saudi arabia had been using its oil wealth to compete with Shia’a Iran to promulgate its Wahhabi Sunni version of Islam (c hanin and Gause 2003, 52). t he us raised fears that endemic poverty and corrupt and weak political institutions in many Islamic countries had created fertile ground for Islamist movements, funded by saudi arabia, to recruit potential suicide bombers. t he us raised allegations that the education system in many Islamic countries allows traditional families to send their children to religious
schools, or madrassahs, that brainwash the pupils, raise them to hate the ‘infidel Westerners’ and instil in their minds anti-Western ideas, such as a religious duty to kill Westerners and especially Americans. The madrassahs and even the Arabic news networks, such as al-Jazeera, the US government’s argument continues, depict the US as anti-Muslim.

Moreover, the influential 9/11 Commission Report states that the Islamic religious tax of zakat has been used to fund Wahhabi education and as foreign aid to various Islamic movements. The commission asserted that ‘closely tied to zakat is the dedication of the [Saudi] government to propagating [worldwide] the Islamic faith, particularly the Wahhabi sect that flourishes in Saudi Arabia’ (the 9/11 commission 2004, 372). The commission unequivocally asserted that Saudi Arabia ‘was a place where al-Qaeda raised money directly from individuals and through charities,’ and that ‘charities with significant Saudi government sponsorship’ had transferred funding to al-Qaeda. The commission concluded that substantial sums of the zakat money was used to finance various Islamic charities of every kind around the world, including terrorist movements, and the Saudi ministry of Islamic affairs has used the zakat to spread the Wahhabi beliefs outside Saudi Arabia (Prados and Blanchard 2005, 2; Greenberg et al. 2002, 1). The commission stated explicitly that: ‘some Wahhabi-funded organizations have been exploited by extremists to further their goal of violent jihad against non-Muslims’ (373).

The commission contended that the lack of income-tax institutions in Saudi Arabia and in other oil monarchies in the Gulf cripples the ability of these governments to monitor the zakat expenditures. It recommended that the US should induce Saudi Arabia to seek economic and political reforms, including a modern tax system and more freedom, especially for women. It also recommended that the US should encourage Saudi Arabia to modify its educational system in order to propagate more intercultural tolerance and respect, as well as a commitment to fight Islamic extremists (375). Finally, the commission recommended that tracking terrorist financing ‘must remain front and centre in US counterterrorism efforts’ (the 9/11 commission 2004, 382).

With regard to the educational system in Pakistan the commission recommended that ‘the United States should support Pakistan’s government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education’ (369).

In January 2007 the Bush administration announced that ‘the administration has made significant progress in implementing 37 of the 39 recommendations of the 9/11 commission that relate to and were adopted by the executive branch and has consistently urged Congress to adopt the two recommendations that relate to its functions’ (Bush, 9 January, 2007).

Saudi Arabia faced also vigorous criticism from members of the influential Council of Foreign Relations, which stated that ‘there is a grudging awareness that, at the extremes, the [Saudi education] system produces terrorists. One former high-level government official described Imam Mohammed bin Saud Islamic
University in Riyadh as “a factory for terrorism” (Bronson and Coleman, 7 May, 2005).

While acknowledging the flaws in the Saudi financial system that allowed the transfer of funds to terrorist organizations, president Bush praised the efforts of ‘Saudi Arabia [that] is working hard to shut down the facilitators and financial supporters of terrorism. The government has captured or killed many first-tier leaders of the al-Qaeda organization in Saudi Arabia, including one last week’ (Washington Post, 12 July, 2004). Furthermore, the Bush administration opposed Congress’s request to restrict aid to Pakistan by requiring the government of Pakistan to report on its efforts to combat the Taliban in areas along the borders with Afghanistan. On the US-Saudi front, King Abdullah and President Bush announced a ‘Strategic Dialogue’ initiative in April 2005, which intended to strengthen bilateral ties between the two nations by establishing a framework for addressing security, financial, economic and cultural issues. The administration also opposed Congress’s demand for a reporting requirement on the United States-Saudi Arabia Strategic Dialogue that would require the disclosure of sensitive negotiations or discussions with a foreign government (Bush, 9 January, 2007).

Thus, while the Defence Department had dealt with the ‘rogue states’ through the use of power, the State Department has maintained a conciliatory approach toward traditional American allies in the Middle East. In early December 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell outlined the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)—a policy that viewed democratization as a sluggish, incremental process that should be encouraged by the US through the promotion of economic development, education, and the funding of civil society organizations (Ottaway 2003, 7). MEPI, in fact, saw the American commitment to democratization in the Middle East as a final stage in the development package. These efforts also aimed at influencing Arab public opinion on the United States (Weisman 2003). As outlined by the Carnegie Endowment’s report, ‘There is nothing in MEPI to frighten incumbent regimes and make them fear that the Bush administration is out to overthrow them. The United States was not planning “to abandon long time allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia because of their lack of democracy” but would offer “positive reinforcement for emerging reform trends”, explained an administration official’ (Ottaway 2003, 7).

Even with these reservations, the Saudi regime was irritated by American attempts to intervene in the internal affairs of the kingdom. The called-for changes would, in its view, have devastating consequences for domestic political stability. The Saudis thought that American values of religious freedom and gender equality are incompatible with Islamic values. Moreover, promoting these values might topple the Saudi regime, thus throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Saudi Arabia also interpreted the war on terrorism as a war against Islam and particularly against its Wahhabi regime. The US policy of detention of many Arabs without charges and the racial profiling that targeted Arabs by the US customs agencies outraged many citizens around the Arab world and irritated their governments.
to a large extent, the relations of interdependence between the US and Saudi Arabia have been preserved. Saudi Arabia has provided justification for its cooperation with the US on the common threats it shares with Washington from al-Qaeda. As for Americans, the preservation of the strong ties with the Saudis finds justification in the need to pressure the government to reform the political system and make it more democratic. From an American perspective, solid ties with the Saudis would allow US officials to induce the Saudi monarchy to bring about more political reforms to the kingdom, while preserving the throne of the Saud dynasty. It would also allow the US to have a presence in the kingdom and control closely internal developments there.

As a result of this pressure by the US, the Saudi government took three initiatives. First, it cooperated with the US Department of Treasury and the G7 within the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), established by the G7 in 1989 to examine terrorist financing. The aim of FATF has been the development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Saudi Arabia felt the brunt of al-Qaeda following a series of deadly attacks on foreigners’ residential compounds in Riyadh in May 2003 and on oil facilities in the kingdom. Following these attacks, Saudi Arabia understood that it is not immune to such attacks and should be an active participant in the war on terror. It therefore launched a massive crackdown on Islamic militants. It also enacted several decrees and created new institutions designed to tighten control over the flow of funds across the kingdom’s borders, with increasing governmental monitoring of charitable donations.

Second, in 2002, King Abdullah initiated a peace plan to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, a move that set Saudi Arabia as a leading player in the Arab world. The plan aimed to create peace and stability and to guarantee a just and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Saudi initiative stated that the acceptance by Israel of this comprehensive peace initiative meant that Arabs could establish normal relations with Israel. The central idea of the proposal was for the Arab states collectively to normalize relations with Israel within its pre-June 1967 borders in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Third, in 2005, in a miniscule step toward democracy, Saudi Arabia held its first municipal elections. Only Saudi males could cast their vote.

Dual Containment or Attacking Iraq?

The US aimed to contain the spread of the Iranian-backed Islamic revolution and to weaken and consequently topple the regime of Saddam Hussein through full-scale economic sanctions. The original assumption of dual containment was that the US should restrict military build-ups in Iran and Iraq, military build-ups, which had had been pitted against each other by the superpowers during the Cold
War. But this policy could not constitute a long-term solution to the security and political stability of the Persian Gulf.

On the eve of the 9/11 attacks, there were three different views of how to deal with Iraq. The first, advocated by neo-orientalist scholars such as Martin Indyk and Daniel Pipes, praised the dual containment policy. In testimony presented to the United States Senate in March 1995, Pipes claimed that

> the American public simply does not have the will to prosecute military campaigns aimed at extirpating the regimes in Tehran and Baghdad, no matter how foul these are ... This leaves containment. Containment implies laying down clear markers, standing vigilant while avoiding military confrontation, and hoping that internal problems will eventually cause the regimes in Iran and Iraq to fall—a reasonable expectation ... Widespread misery suggests that containment has a good chance of success (Pipes, 2 March, 1995).

The second view called for tightening the containment of Iraq in order to weaken Saddam’s regime, yet easing the economic sanctions on the Iraqi people in order to prevent a humanitarian disaster (see Brzezinski et al. 1997, Gause 1999). Brzezinski and his colleagues also proposed to engage with Iran in order to reinforce the Iranian moderates and to dissuade Iran from proceeding with its nuclear weapons program. In their view, the US ‘should explore the notion of using carrots in addition to sticks in getting Iran to shift course’ (Brzezinski et al. 1997, 28). This potential policy was torpedoed by the Republican Congress, which demanded that the Clinton administration increase pressure on the Islamic regime.

While these two groups had a different opinion regarding the treatment of Iran, both shared the idea that the US should focus on the peace process and refrain from a showdown with Iraq.

The third view was advocated by neo-conservatives, who asserted that the dual containment pursued by the Clinton administration was too risky, depending on an unreliable network of alliances. The neo-conservatives claimed that dual containment required a prolonged US military presence in the Persian Gulf region, protecting weak oil sheikdoms. Neo-conservatives such as Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Zoellick, who soon would become members of the Bush administration, sent a letter to President Clinton in January 1998 claiming that ‘the policy of “containment” of Saddam Hussein has been steadily eroding over the past several months.’ They urged Clinton ‘to turn your Administration’s attention to implementing a strategy for removing Saddam’s regime from power. This will require a full complement of diplomatic, political and military efforts’ (Kristol et al., 27 January, 1998). They claimed that dual containment was costly and risked allying Iran and Iraq together and drawing the US into a regional conflict against these two powerful regional states. They concurred about the

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6 The letter was also signed by other members of the project of the New American Century.
need to continue isolating Iran but had a different opinion about Iraq. These neo-conservatives started to criticize the effectiveness of the dual containment strategy long before the 9/11 attacks.

Their ideas were also shared by Condoleezza Rice, who would become national security advisor in the Bush administration. In her view,

a history marches toward markets and democracy, some states have been left by the side of the road. Iraq is the prototype. Saddam Hussein’s regime is isolated, his conventional military power has been severely weakened, his people live in poverty and terror, and he has no useful place in international politics. He is therefore determined to develop WMD. Nothing will change until Saddam is gone, so the United States must mobilize whatever resources it can, including support from his opposition, to remove him (Rice, 2000, 60).

The motive to eliminate Saddam’s regime, Rice thought, should be the promotion of democracy and the need to keep him from developing WMD. Other neo-conservatives even argued that a peace deal on the issue of Jerusalem could be achieved through Baghdad; in this way, toppling Saddam would allow the US to reassert its power and proceed with the peace process (Doran 2003, 22).

Following the swift victory in Afghanistan in late 2001, the US found itself at a crucial moment of decision in the Middle East. How would it define the next phase of the campaign against terror: by going after its allies, its foes or both? The neo-conservatives started to depict Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein as allies sitting in the same boat, even if not coordinated, united in their desire to oust the US from the Middle East. This view was put forward by two prominent members of the project for the New American Century only two weeks after the 9/11 attacks: ‘Neither Osama bin Laden nor Saddam care much about America’s role in Europe or East Asia. They want us out of their region’ (Schmitt and Donnelly 2001). The answer of the US to the 9/11 attacks, in their view, should be to reassert its role as the region’s predominant power, by both defeating America’s bitter enemies and by establishing democratic regimes that would share the same American values of freedom. To achieve the former goal, their argument continues, ‘Osama bin Laden and his organization should be a prime target of this [US war] campaign … But the larger campaign also must go after Saddam Hussein.’ In their view, ‘adopting a defensive posture risks attacks with unacceptable consequences. The only reasonable course when faced with such foes is to preempt and to strike first.’

What is striking is how, with such a limited understanding of the political complexities of the Middle East, these prominent neo-conservatives had developed such strong beliefs about the need to eliminate the regime of Saddam Hussein. Their simplistic view was that America’s opponents in the region formed a monolithic group, united in their resistance to the US. Some even believed that Bin Laden’s and Saddam’s policies were coordinated. The neo-conservatives sought very little advice from experts on the Middle East, nor did they give much attention to
alternative ideas or policy options of how to respond to the 9/11 attacks or how to deal with the Middle East in the aftermath of the attacks. Still worse, they did not have intelligence evidence that Saddam possessed WMD.

In short, the second Gulf War was not a direct US response to the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 attacks merely made it easier for the neo-conservatives to convince the president and Congress to wage the same war that they had earlier failed to convince the Clinton administration to undertake in 1998. The attacks of 11 September created an environment that allowed the Bush administration to capitalize on the hostility toward the Middle East voiced by American public opinion and Congress in order to pass a resolution to invade Iraq in March 2003.

In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush announced a tough policy towards what he called the ‘axis of evil’ or ‘rogue states’—countries like Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea together with their terrorist associates. The US was worried that these states might carry out terrorist attacks not only through conventional weapons or other means, such as blowing up passenger airplanes, but also through WMD. President Bush implied that the US might take strong actions against such countries or actors.

Further linking the issue of US security to democratization in the region, President Bush left no doubt about his faith in democracy being a universal answer to terrorism:

In Iraq, we are helping the long suffering people of that country to build a decent and democratic society at the center of the Middle East. Together we are transforming a place of torture chambers and mass graves into a nation of laws and free institutions. This undertaking is difficult and costly—yet worthy of our country, and critical to our security (Bush, September 8, 2003).

The Bush administration struggled hard to find a justification for launching an attack on Iraq, presenting intelligence reports about Iraq’s WMD and links with al-Qaeda (see Gellman, December 12, 2002) while its real aim was to remove Saddam Hussein from power. But if Saddam’s regime constituted a real threat to US interests (that is, the security of Israel and of the oil-exporting countries), the US would not have waited ten years to launch such an attack.

The father of the dual containment policy, Martin Indyk, continued nonetheless to oppose an attack against Saddam without the backing of US allies in the region, namely Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In his view, the US should first insist on a long-term strategy of economic and political reforms within these and other pro-American Arab states, reforms that would improve living standards and reinforce civil society. The alternative, in his view, was that these regimes would fall sometime in the future, igniting an Islamic revolution similar to the one that took

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7 It is worth mentioning that the commission investigating the 9/11 attacks found no evidence of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda in attacks against the United States.
place in Iran. Second, the US should seek a long-term solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

By and large, the US has done the opposite: it attacked Iraq despite stiff opposition from Cairo and Riyadh, and it elevated the animosity among a rab/muslim public opinion to a new height. Political reforms in Egypt and Saudi Arabia could be described as either cosmetic or too little too late, while on the peace front, the US has opposed a peace deal between Syria and Israel. It isolated Yasser Arafat, the president of the Palestinian Authority, and accused him of harbouring terrorism, and it failed to make any tangible progress between the governments of Ehud Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas (A bu mazen).

Hence, with regard to Iraq the US faced a ‘Catch-22’. On one hand, the dual containment of Iraq and Iran and imposing sanctions on Iraq to weaken Saddam Hussein enraged Arab public opinion and shored up animosity against the US and its pro-American Arab regimes. The Arab public perceived this policy as responsible for the impoverishment of the Iraqi people and the death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children. This rage was directed against pro-American Arab regimes, which deflected it against the US and Israel. Furthermore, the attempt to deny Iran influence in regional politics was unrealistic. On the other hand, fighting Iraq would be perceived by the Arab public as a crusade against all Muslims, wherever they were.

Finally, pushing Iran to the limits, coupled with the oppression of the Shi’ites in neighbouring countries such as Iraq, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, could bring about exactly the regional instability that the US was trying to avoid. Shi’ites form the majority of the population in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich eastern provinces. The steady supply of oil therefore depends on a pacified Shi’ite population in that region.

Promoting Democratization in the Arab/Muslim World

t he US government was more concerned about its domestic security, and Congress in particular started to perceive the American traditional allies as a more of a liability than an asset. Having associated terrorism with the oppressed rather than the poor, American policymakers sought to address the roots of the problem. The Bush administration came to the conclusion that promoting political liberalism through offensive means or peacefully via persuasion was the only long term guarantee of domestic security. While Muslims would get freedom and even prosperity, Americans would get security. President Bush endeavoured nonetheless not to define the war on terror as a clash of civilizations. He disagreed with those who argued that Western values of democracy were incompatible with Islamic values. By insisting that the US was not at war with Islam and that Muslim societies were amenable to developing democracy, Bush sought to isolate religious Islamist fundamentalists who illustrated the conflict as a clash between opposing civilizations.

With this in mind, the Bush administration embraced a neo-conservative policy or internationalism against ‘rogue states’, namely the use of all means
including military power for the establishment of democracy in these states. It took a neo-isolationist approach toward its traditional allies, promoting democracy in these states through peaceful means such as diplomatic pressure and through international organizations. Democratization in Saudi Arabia, for instance, could ease the political pressures that drove some Saudis to extremist groups.

Even though the Bush administration relied heavily on military means to fight terrorism, the promotion of democracy was given equal importance. After its victory over both the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Baath regime in Iraq, the US encouraged free elections in both countries. The elections were held despite the fact that there was not much public debate within the US over whether these traditional, multi-ethnic Islamic nations would be able to cope with a democratic form of government in view of their demographic and ethnic complexities.

Gradually, however, the American media as well as the academia began advocating democratization in the Muslim world. In a blunt, direct attack against the existing authoritarian Arab regimes, Stephen P. Cohen, a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, declared that:

Regimes such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia or the Palestinian Authority have a legitimate fear of democracy—they fear that free elections would be exploited by Islamist extremists who are basically undemocratic. But these Arab leaders have to understand that if we root out these extremists—who’ve been produced by their own bad governance—we are not doing it so these regimes can keep their countries free of democracy for everyone else. We want to make the world safe for democracy, and they want to make the Arab world safe from democracy (quoted in Friedman 2001).

As a direct critique of neo-orientalists, Thomas Friedman, for instance, asserts that ‘someone argue that if you have elections in these [Muslim] countries you will end up with “one man, one vote, one time”—in other words, the Islamists would win and never cede power back. I disagree. I think you would have one man, one vote, one time—for one term. Because sooner or later even the Islamists would have to deliver or be ousted’ (Friedman 2002).

In the case of Afghanistan, for instance, some scholars argued that the US and its allies ‘should strengthen the coalition around the [exiled Pakistani] king by enticing southern Pashtuns to join’ (Roy 2001). It should be remembered that the Pashtuns constituted the great majority of the Taliban followers, yet they resented being forced by the Taliban into the army while their economic conditions deteriorated. Despite these complex tribal and ethnic dynamics, the US went ahead with its plan to create democracy in Afghanistan. In fact, domestic security, or more precisely the vulnerability of Western societies to terrorist attacks, was what impelled US policymakers to explore ways of solving their domestic security problem via democratization. The issues at stake are no longer academic debates—issues such as whether Muslim culture fits modernity, or the merits of promoting democracy in the Middle East versus securing a steady supply of oil. The Bush administration...
saw democratization as a sort of problem-solving model for the domestic security interests of the US and the whole Western world.

The problem of Afghanistan, like that of many other underdeveloped countries, is that it has failed in its attempt to establish a central government that maintains close links with the periphery. It lacks basic infrastructure such as railroads and communication systems that connect the countryside with the centre. Highlighting these difficulties, former US Ambassador to Pakistan Thomas Simons recommends that

We will have much of the responsibility for giving post-Taliban institutions traction and staying power. Political negotiations on Afghanistan have always been extremely intricate. Those now underway can be more successful if we understand that there is space in Afghanistan politics between universalist Islam and the ethnic groupings that are so often painted as that unhappy country’s only options (Simons 2001).

The ambassador suggested creating ‘new institutions with national reach—government ministries that can build roads and schools and provide health care—not to enforce centralization but to ensure a viable Afghan government.’ Yet neither Oliver Roy nor Simons has endorsed democratization. Having succeeded in conducting free elections in Afghanistan and establishing a pro-American regime under the rule of Hamid Karzai, the US aimed for the same outcome in Iraq: to remove an anti-American regime from power and to establish a friendly democratic government. Furthermore, the initial success in Afghanistan convinced President Bush that America’s ability to install a democracy in Iraq would constitute an example for other Arab states.

In early October 2001, President Bush declared that ‘We ... should learn a lesson from the previous engagement in the Afghan area, that we should not just simply leave after a military objective has been achieved’ (quoted in Lewis 2001). In other words, the US should be involved in a multilateral process of nation building that lays the foundations for democracy and a free market economy. In fact, President Bush acknowledged that nation building is crucial to Afghanistan’s future as well as for Western security—that is to say, other developed countries should have an interest in the process, because terrorism has become a global problem that threatens the security of all democratic countries. In September 2003, President Bush announced that

The Middle East will either become a place of progress and peace, or it will be an exporter of violence and terror that takes more lives in America and in other free nations. The triumph of democracy and tolerance in Iraq, in Afghanistan and beyond would be a grave setback for international terrorism. The terrorists thrive on the support of tyrants and the resentments of oppressed peoples. When tyrants fall, and resentment gives way to hope, men and women in every culture
reject the ideologies of terror, and turn to the pursuits of peace. Everywhere that freedom takes hold, terror will retreat (Bush, 8 September, 2003).

In short, the Bush administration’s new message—that terrorism is connected to the absence of democracy—has convinced many a rab that the United States has rejected the long-standing view that its interests in the region are confined to oil and best-protected by stable, friendly, traditional regimes, and that it intends to promote regime changes throughout the region.

The Peace Process

t he peace process between Israel and its neighbours became an integral part of the war against terror, and the US approached the peace process with the same ideas that guided it in its campaign against terror. Its approach was twofold: on one hand, a relentless military campaign to destroy terrorist organizations and isolation of rogue states that support terrorist groups, and on the other, extending an olive branch in encouraging democratization, freedom and peace to states that fight terrorism. But in no area were these two strands more contradictory and inconsistent than in the case of the Palestinian Authority. On the one hand, George Bush was the first American president to affirm the need for a Palestinian state. This policy was compatible with the second strand of promoting democratization. The US concluded that self-determination for the Palestinians and the establishment of a Palestinian sovereign state would bring freedom to the Palestinians that could result in a lasting peace in the holy land. But in the short run, the US aligned with the Israeli policy of fighting terrorism and isolating Yasser Arafat, who Israeli PM Ariel Sharon depicted as a terrorist long before Sharon came to power in March 2001.

When 9/11 transpired, the second Intifada was nearly a year old. Following its eruption, the US created the Mitchell Committee to investigate the causes of the violence. The Mitchell Report recommended, among other things, that the Palestinian authority should stop all terrorist violence against Israel and should condemn and declare terrorism as an unacceptable means of conducting relations with Israel. In return, the Israeli government should freeze all settlement activities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In the aftermath of 9/11, however, the US focused on uprooting terrorism, which it defined as violent acts carried out by paramilitary organizations for political causes, regardless of the political motives of the terrorist organizations. The Bush administration therefore lined up with the position of Ariel Sharon. Bush refused to meet with Arafat and embraced Sharon as a partner in the war against terror. In November 2001, 88 senators signed a letter to the president asking him to stop criticizing Israel’s tactics in its fight against terrorism, including the assassination of Palestinian leaders involved in terrorist acts. In their view, Israel was merely defending itself. Instead the senators asked the president to provide full diplomatic support to Israel in its fight against Palestinian terrorism. In March 2002, Vice
president dick cheney visited Israel, where he met with sharon, but refused to meet a rafat, who was under siege inside his headquarters in Ramallah. cheney demanded that a rafat renounce the use of violence as a precondition before the us would resume relations with his palestinian authority. the inconsistency between fighting terrorism and promoting democratization loomed large in the Palestinian Authority’s response to the challenge. ‘either with us or with the terrorists’ took away any possible middle ground. if the palestinians chose to reject terrorism, then they would have to end the Intifada. But to do so without first reaching a comprehensive peace deal with Israel, one that would guarantee the establishment of a palestinian state on all the palestinian territories that were occupied during the 1967 six-day war, would allow Israel to further solidify its rule in these areas. in other words, Israel would be less willing to compromise within a climate of political tranquillity.

for the bush administration, nevertheless, the struggle in the holy land had become part of the global fight against terror. although the administration condemned the palestinian authority for terrorist acts, the president set a landmark with his announcement in June 2002 on the need for a palestinian state as a long term solution to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. on the other hand, while the demand for self-determination for the palestinians was compatible with the us policy of promoting democracy, the administration’s focus remained on fighting terrorism. president bush asserted that what deprived the palestinians of their political freedom were their own terrorist activities, not the Israeli occupation. stopping these activities was a precondition for a palestinian state. in his view, the palestinian authority should therefore seek a leadership that supported peace before resuming the peace negotiations.

but this policy of the us raised more questions than answers. while the us advocated self-determination and democratization for the palestinians, it excluded a rafat and hamas leaders as unacceptable. moreover, how could the us ask the palestinians to remain quiescent while Israel continued its settlement policy unabated?

following 9/11, the us treated each country that harboured terrorism as a terrorist state that should be punished like any other terrorist organization. the list of terrorist states included, as usual, Iran, syria, Iraq and libya. these states, from the Bush administration’s point of view, should be excluded from the peace negotiations and should be subject to military actions. as in the case of saudi arabia, congress took a far more radical stance in condemning the palestinian authority and in supporting Israel and its use of military means to destroy palestinian militant groups (zunes 2002, 53).

the peace process took on a new dimension after 9/11. before the crisis, the us would have welcomed any rab state that wished to come to terms with Israel, recognize the Jewish state and opt for peaceful coexistence with it. after 9/11, however, the US created a clear dichotomy between states that supported America’s endeavours in the fight against terrorism and rogue states that sponsored terrorism. the latter, from an american view, were not eligible to enter into the peace process
and should be isolated. Thus, the posture of each Arab state on fighting terrorism was a precondition for starting peace negotiations. The peace process therefore ceased to be an end by itself or a means for stabilizing the Middle East; instead, it became a prize to be granted to those willing to fight terrorism.

Under these new circumstances, the Palestinian Authority under Arafat and Syria’s Baath regime were regarded as pariah states.\(^8\) The latter has been accused of being the sponsor of Hezbollah and Hamas.\(^9\) The Israeli government of Ariel Sharon tirelessly presented evidence that suicide bomber operations and other terrorist actions were paid for by the Arafat regime. Sharon depicted Arafat in the American media as Israel’s Bin Laden. The State Department declared one organization under Arafat’s control—the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades—to be a terrorist entity. Sharon’s government proceeded with dismantling the terror network in the West Bank and Gaza Strip while indefinitely postponing the peace process with the Palestinian Authority and Syria.

The Bush administration made it clear to the Arab world that there would be no exceptions and that Arab political entities had to choose between peace and terror. But the Bush administration became so immersed in the Iraqi civil war that it had little energy and time to proceed with the peace process even after Arafat’s death and the ascent of Mahmoud Abbas to the leadership of the Palestinian Authority.

**Conclusion**

Throughout the 1970s, Western policy concerning the Middle Eastern region ignored the needs of the Arab/muslim peoples. The masses were seen as being in patriarchal associations with an internal, informal social hierarchy, obeying their leaders without questioning their competence or qualifications. Following the Iranian Revolution, however, American scholars developed a new set of ideas that were translated into a foreign policy which aimed at restructuring societies in the Arab world and developing a new identity for these societies through free markets and free trade. These scholars argued that the United States should address social and economic problems at the societal level. Following the events of September 11, 2001, however, another set of ideas emerged within the Bush administration, aimed at promoting democratization, not for its own sake but to promote US security. His policy change, which was by no means value free, would have far-

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8 Syria has been blamed for sponsoring the leaders of the Islamist Hamas movement and for using terrorist tactics to destabilize Lebanon, including the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri in February 2005.

9 Hezbollah is a Shi’ite Lebanese organization that has been blamed for kidnapping several Israeli soldiers and for launching missiles on northern Israel that culminated in the Second Lebanese War in July 2006. Hamas is a Sunni-Palestinian organization that vows that liberation of all parts of Palestine that were occupied during the (Nukba) May 1948 and the June 1967 wars.
reaching political repercussions not only for the Arab-Islamic world but also for the West. This was in sharp contrast to the response to the oil embargo or the Iranian Revolution, in which ideas originated not from within the administration but from the scholarly community. In the aftermath of 9/11 the urgent need to provide a long-term solution to U.S. domestic security prompted the administration to expand its policy beyond merely destroying al-Qaeda.

Over these decades, each new crisis stimulated a new set of ideas and required new allies to implement them. During the 1970s, America’s sole allies were the traditional regimes in the Arab world, whereas during the 1980s the U.S. worked with the IMF and the World Bank in promoting free market economies and free trade, even against the will of some Arab regimes. Following 9/11 the U.S. adopted internationalism and sought to work with international governmental and nongovernmental organizations in order to build a robust civil society in the Arab-Islamic world, thus laying the infrastructure for an infant democracy.

In short, conceptions about the Arab world were refuted abruptly by the occurrence of a crisis, and not as a result of a gradual, incremental rise of new ideas. Each crisis therefore caught American policymakers unprepared to deal with the roots of the problem. Furthermore, since the interests at stake were so high, the need to find a reliable solution to the crisis received top priority on the agenda of the key policymakers during all three crises—those of 1974, 1979 and 2001—covered in this book.
On the eve of the American invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Bush administration was convinced that the Arab world was ready for secular democracy. These democratic processes would, it believed, favour domestic security in the US. It saw the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as unreliable partners. It continued to see Islamic parties as anti-American; if they were to win in elections, it would be ‘one vote, one time.’ Furthermore, after 9/11, the administration continued to hold the neoconservative idea of using US military power to unilaterally promote democratization in the Middle East. The administration was also convinced that attacking Iraq—a ‘rogue state’ that in the eyes of many Americans was dominated by one of the most vicious regimes in the world—would allow the US to kill two birds with one stone: toppling Saddam’s regime and constructing a robust democratic regime in Iraq. The public and the Republican party were in consensus with the administration. The democratic party could either join the bandwagon or remain on the sidelines. The bulk of democratic representatives on Capitol Hill decided to support the war. Finally, the US assigned a higher priority to the war against global terrorism over the Arab-Israeli peace process, boycotting and marginalizing states such as Syria that were alleged to harbour terrorism.

Some of these ideas were contradictory, for example, fighting terrorism while spreading democracy and freedom as the key to a safer and more peaceful world. The Bush administration apparently thought that these ideas are compatible. The war on terror legitimized US military intervention in the internal affairs of other states, while this intervention was to allow the promotion of democracy. The administration ignored the fact that fighting terrorism involved repression and interference with democratic process in the name of fighting terrorism. Nor could the US see the problem of simultaneously advocating secular democracy while isolating Islamic parties and preventing them from coming to power. The third contradiction set fighting terrorism against freezing the peace process with countries that the US categorizes as a rogue states, ignoring the fact that the persistence of the conflict and occupation of Arab land breed violence.
The second Iraq War has been a shocking experience for the US. Since 2003, the war has dominated the headlines and the agenda of the White House, the Pentagon, and the Department of State. After five years of fighting, more than 150,000 Iraqis and 4,000 American soldiers have been killed. Two million Iraqis have fled to neighboring countries. Up till mid-2008, the US has spent around $646 billion on the war, a sum that may reach $2.7 trillion by the time the conflict comes to an end. The process of transition to Iraqi or to Shi’ite majority rule has resulted in insurgency, making it very difficult for the US to establish a secure environment for the reconstruction of Iraq. Finally, the popularity of President Bush is at its lowest rate, standing at 30 percent approval. Many Americans think that not only was the war waged on false motives, but the main objective of the war, promoting democracy in Iraq, is out of reach.

The US’s motives for the Iraq invasion can be categorized as long-term and short-term. The short-term interests include stripping Saddam’s regime of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), toppling the regime, and cutting the links, if there were any, between Saddam’s regime and al-Qaeda (Russett 2005, 396). The long-term interests include the construction of democracy in Iraq and restoring Iraq’s role as a major exporter of oil (Yetiv 2006, 397–98). In 2003, the US was convinced that establishing democracy in Iraq would be followed by restoring Iraq’s role as a major, reliable exporter of oil and a counterbalance to Iran. This chapter does not deal with the contested issues: whether the invasion of Iraq was legal or not; whether the US had clear evidence that Saddam had ties with al-Qaeda or whether its intelligence agencies fabricated such reports in order to justify the invasion; whether the US really believed that Iraq possessed WMD or whether the US used this argument as a pretext to invade Iraq (Dobbins 2007, 62).

Sadly enough, the US singled out Iraq as a target to promote democracy in the Middle East, not because Iraq was ready to absorb democracy more than any other state in the region, but because Iraq was the only country, where the US could justify its unilateral policy of using its military might to promote democracy in the Middle East. In other words, promoting democracy was not used a means to justify the invasion after that the US failed to find the ‘smoking gun,’ WMD. On the contrary, promoting democracy was a primary US objective in the first place, given the consensus that people who live under democracy are less prone to join terrorist organizations. The administration named the invasion of Iraq ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom.’ In a speech a few days before the invasion, Bush declared: ‘we would undertake a solemn obligation to help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbors …We will support the Iraqi people’s aspirations for a representative government that upholds human rights’ (Bush, 16 March, 2003). One day after the invasion, he repeated the US objective of fighting terrorism and promoting democracy as two sides of the same coin: ‘I have … determined that the use of armed force against Iraq is consistent with the United States and other

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1 At the beginning of the conflict in 2003, the Bush administration gave Congress a cost estimate of $60 billion to $100 billion for the entirety of the war.
countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations … united states objectives also support a transition to democracy in Iraq, as contemplated by the Iraq liberation act of 1998 (Public Law 105–338)’ (Bush, 21 March, 2003).

This chapter deals mainly with the geopolitical repercussions of ‘democratizing’ Iraq on the power politics between the us, Iran and Saudi Arabia. It examines how the after-effects of the invasion, especially the sectarian civil war, have affected the idea of promoting democratization in the Arab/Islamic world. Finally, where could the us go from here? What new ideas could and should the us adopt in order realize its long term interests of stabilizing the middle East?

As chapter 6 noted, the neoconservative Bush administration lamented the US’s reluctance to promote democracy in the Arab world during the previous six decades. In the words of the secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice: ‘for sixty years, my country, the united states, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the middle East, and we achieved neither. Now we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspiration of all people’ (Rice, 20 June, 2005). The Bush administration urged friendly Arab regimes, such as Egypt, to show the benefits of democracy to other states in the region by adopting democratic processes. The question is whether the invasion of Iraq gave an impetus to a peaceful self-promotion of democracy in the Arab world, or whether it has in fact impeded the process by consolidating sectarian solidarity and the violation of human rights under the cloak of the war on terror.

Following the swift American victory in Afghanistan and the creation of the friendly democratic regime of Hamid Karzai in 2002, the Bush administration thought that the model of Afghanistan could be duplicated in Iraq. Iraq, the administration thought, was more affluent, given its oil resources, had a larger secular middle class, and a stronger civil society. Thus, even if Afghanistan barely passed the exam of democracy, Iraq should succeed, perhaps even with distinction. The administration thought that the Iraqis would greet US soldiers with joy and gratitude for the US help in toppling Saddam’s regime (Cantori and Norton 2005, 99). It seems that the US did not learn from the Israeli experience in Lebanon in 1982. Like Lebanon, Iraq is a land of sectarian division, ethnic cleavages, and contending foreign policy orientations.

With hindsight, the US not only has so far failed to achieve its objectives in Iraq, but it has actually damaged the only noble idea that gave impetus to its invasion in the first place: bringing democracy to the Middle East. Unfortunately, after several years of promoting democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, many Americans believe that the Middle East is not amenable to developing democracy (a jami et al. 2007; Sullivan 2006, 33; Mishra 2008, 166). Rather than establishing a democracy coupled with a viable market-oriented economy, the invasion has brought Iraq into chaos that is manifested in a civil war between Sunni and Shi’ite, escalation in the war between the Kurds and Turkey, unprecedented animosity toward the US in the Arab world in general and Iraq in particular, and further intervention of Iran in the internal affairs of Iraq (a bootalebi 2007; Fearon 2007, 414; Fearon
2007). These events lead to the conclusion that Iraq may be heading toward schism into two or even three states. Ironically, the invasion may have also strengthened al-Qaeda by allowing it to establish a stronghold in Iraq and to recruit into its rows new a rab s unni volunteers from neighbouring a rab countries (byman et al. 2005, 2; diamond 2006, 151; dobbins 2007, 70).

The Myopic Neoconservative Vision

American policymakers apparently thought that once if s addam were overthrown, progressive liberal movements would flourish in Iraq, ushering it towards a vivid democracy. These hopes have gradually evaporated. In its rush to stabilize the middle East through democratic processes, the bush administration miscalculated when it assume that the transition to democracy in Iraq would be quick and smooth. This miscalculation results from its conviction that the main obstacle to democracy in the country was the dictatorial regime of s addam. Thus, removing s addam was to be a panacea for solving many local and regional problems. In fact, the bush administration mistakenly thought that all a rab states are equally ready for democracy; Iraq was ‘lucky’ to be the first because the US could justify the invasion on the basis of Iraq’s alleged possession of WMD. According to Bush’s vision, Iraq would constitute a democratic prototype that could be emulated by other muslim nations in the region. In the end, this long-term process would gradually convert the middle East into a more peaceful and stable region. In the words of l arry d iamond, advisor to us proconsul paul bremer: ‘Iraq is now better positioned than any of its a rab neighbours to become a democracy in the next few years. That achievement, however tentative and imperfect, would ignite mounting aspirations for democratization from Iran to Morocco’ (quoted in Cantori and Norton 2005, 100).

The problem with implanting democracy in Iraq was that civil society had been thwarted for decades, and political parties had to be rebuilt from the ground up. In the meantime, tribalism or using Ibn Khaldun’s terminology, assabiyya, is the most potent element of political solidarity in Iraq (alamè 1987; u mari 1992). The Shi’ite community’s commitment to democracy is contingent on its control of the political system. Instead of making Iraq a model of an a rab democracy, in the eyes of many a rabs, Iraq has become a new a lgeria, a country that conducted free elections, sank into a brutal civil war during the 1990s, and reached stability only through an iron grip on power by the military. The bush administration was over-simplistic not only in its expectations about the ease of steering Iraq’s transformation, but even in terms of the challenge of maintaining security, as indicated by the rampant looting and anarchy in Iraq following the invasion.

Furthermore, the administration assumed that transforming Iraq into democracy would make it less threatening to its neighbours. While in theory, democratic states do not fight each other, in practice democratic and non-democratic are locked in strife like cats and dogs. The bush administration also believed that a democratic
Iraq would terminate its relations with al-Qaeda and would join the fight against Islamic terrorism. In reality, the Iraq war led to increased recruitment by al-Qaeda and expanded the war on terror from a fghanistan into Iraq. many spontaneously joined al-Qaeda in the hopes of helping the sunni a rab insurgency against the Shi’ites. Finally, the administration hoped that the war would put an end to the failed policy of dual containment, allowing the us to concentrate on Iran. In reality, the us is totally preoccupied with stabilizing Iraq and has been distracted from Iran’s nuclear enterprise.

moreover, all of the us objectives, the administration miscalculated, would be achieved through a Blitzkrieg that would cost the a merican tax payer less than $100 billion and would result in the creation of a secular, democratic regime headed by pro-a merican secular Iraqis. b ecause international law does not justify humanitarian intervention or regime change, the bush administration resorted to the pretext that Iraq possessed Wmd, and that it could pass these lethal weapons on to al-Qaeda.

The US, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Future of Iraq

Several players who play a significant role in shaping the future of Iraq: the US, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Iraqis themselves (including the Sunni, Shi’ite, and kurd factions). On one hand, the us has sought to establish a secular, pro-western democratic regime. On the other hand, Iran and saudi a rabia compete in empowering the Shi’ites and Sunnis respectively, and the Iraqis are locked in a sectarian civil war over who will control the state after many decades of sunni dominance. Ironically, both the us and Iran concur that democracy is the most suitable governing type for stabilizing Iraq, yet these two countries are motivated by different perceptions. The Bush administration’s enthusiastic promotion of democracy across the a rab world emanates from the normative perception that democracies do not fight each other, that democracy is a stable form of government, and that it is a bulwark against religious terrorism. In Bush’s words: ‘It should be clear that the advance of democracy leads to peace, because governments that respect the rights of their people also respect the rights of their neighbours’ (Russett 2005, 396). Given the merits of democracy, the Bush administration was confident that in the end, a secular, democratic Iraq would emerge as a pro-Western peace-loving country. a s the occupying power, the us could directly forge the new Iraq as a secular, democratic, pro-Western regime.

the overarching priority for Iran, however, is to encourage democratization in Iraq in order to bring the Shi’ites, who constitute the majority of Iraq’s population, to power, thus building Iraq as a friendly state ruled by the mullahs. In this way, Iran hopes to prevent Iraq from reemerging as a strong military rival ruled by a secular sunni regime. t o this end, Iran seeks to diminish the power of the sunnis and to construct Iraq either as a loose federal structure with three strong provincial governments (Takeyh 2008, 18), or as a federal state in which the Shi’ites are
Iran hopes that by exhorting Iraqis to embrace democracy the Shi’ites would gain the upper hand. A Shi’ite Iraq would be neither an enemy of Iran nor a close ally of the ‘infidel’ America.

Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has endeavoured to empower the Sunnis, hoping to restore their dominance under an authoritarian regime friendlier to Saudi Arabia than the notorious Baath. During its seven-decade monopoly of power, the Sunni minority proved its capacity for dismissing and sidelining the Shi’ites, while Iraq constituted a bulwark against the expansion of the Iranian revolution. The American pledge to establish a democratic Iraq altered the balance of power between these two communities. The Shi’ites, confident of their numerical majority, viewed the democratic process as a promising springboard to the inter-sectarian transfer of power. In the face of their brutal repression by Saddam, the Shi’ite community managed to preserve its inner solidarity and traditional structure. Despite the forced secularization that the Iraqi society underwent after the end of the monarchy in 1958, the Shi’ite community remained on the sidelines of the modernization processes. Like Iran on the eve of the 1979 revolution, the mosque remained the most influential social institution for organizing both Sunni and Shi’ite political life. Thus, the US has to grapple with religious parties that do not share its preferences for a secular Iraqi regime.

Yet the main struggle is between the US and Iran that has spilled over the boundaries and into the future of Iraq. Iran seeks to fuel the insurgency, in general, as a means of keeping the US preoccupied with Iraq’s internal affairs, thereby distracting the US from attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities (Chalef et al. 2008, 36). While Iran fuels the insurgency, its intention is not to compel an American withdrawal but keep the US mired in Iraq for the time being. So far, Iran has succeeded in that mission. The worst-case scenario for Iran is for the US to withdraw without leaving behind a stable Iraqi government that would allow the Sunnis, with the help of Saudi Arabia, to regain the upper hand, while the US would be free to turn its attention to Iran. Iran’s best scenario is the establishment of an axis that would include a Shi’ite Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, in which Tehran is the predominant power (Samii 2008, 49). In congressional testimony before the House and Senate in September 2007, General David Petraeus, the commander of multinational forces in Iraq, stated that, ‘it is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of Iranian Republican Guard Corps Qods Force, seeks to turn the Shi’ite militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.’ In the same vein, US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker contended that: ‘Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi state’ (both quoted in Kyl, 2 October, 2007).

Since 1979, Iran has endeavoured to reduce the US power and presence in the Persian Gulf and for that end is even ready to cooperate with Sunni states in the region such as Saudi Arabia. Iran has so far faced an uphill battle in trying to convince the Saudis that the departure of US troops from the kingdom would...
reduce tension in the area or that it would ease the pressure employed by al-Qaeda on the Saudi royal family. As Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared, ‘We are prepared with the help of our regional friends and neighbours such as Saudi Arabia and others to fill the vacuum in the interest of the region’ (Takeyh 2008, 26). If the US decides to diminish its dependence on oil and to seek other sources of energy, the US will reduce its military presence in the Persian Gulf to a level of maintaining a balance of power in the region. In this case, the US will refrain from intervening in the internal security affairs of the Gulf states but will merely endeavour to prevent one country from becoming too dominant. It is simply still too early to imagine the Persian Gulf without a US military presence.

Thus, the US and Iran, in particular, have turned Iraq into a battleground, while each wants to shape Iraq in its own image, at time when there are forces in the US, including members of the Iraq Study Group, that call for engaging Iran to play a more positive role in this process in order to achieve regional stability (Baker et al. 2006, 7). These forces proclaim that in order to stem the flow of arms to Iraq and to influence the Shi’ite parties and their militia, the US should increase its engagement with Iran (Eland et al. 2005, 8).

So far, the democratic enterprise in Iraq has been impeded by a combination of the sectarian insurgency and a merican clumsiness and sluggishness of handling domestic security. The Sunni insurgency, in particular, has been a natural response to the rise of the Shi’ite at Sunni expense. This insurgency ignited a counter-resistance leading to a sectarian civil war. The merican failure to provide security to Iraqis has compelled each sect to develop its own militia. This process is manifested in the failure of the US to bring daily life in Iraq back to normal. The US had dismantled the Iraqi army, while its own army has been unable to provide security.

The Sunni states of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, and Jordan are extremely anxious about the emergence of a ‘Shi’ite Crescent,’ especially while Iran is on the verge of possessing nuclear weapon (Cole et al. 2005; Eland et al. 2005, 18). The Sunni Arab states would like to see Iraq unified under a Sunni regime as a bulwark against Iran. King Abdullah of Jordan warned: ‘If Iraq goes to the Islamic Republic, then we have opened ourselves to a whole set of new problems that will not be limited to our borders’ (quoted in Takeyh 2008, 20).

Saudi Arabia rejected the war from the onset, worried about the post-conflict rise of the Shi’ite majority and the cross-border infiltration of refugees and al-Qaeda activists. Furthermore, there is intense domestic pressure within Saudi Arabia on King Abdullah to intervene in Iraq by providing the Sunni insurgents (many of them former Baathists) with arms in order to stop the Iranian-backed Shi’ite militias from massacring Iraqi Sunnis. Major Saudi tribal leaders, who have historical and communal ties with their counterparts in Iraq, express solidarity with them and call for action against Iran for the future identity of Iraq. ‘Saudi Arabia is going to end up with no identity in Iraq, and I think that instability and the multiple civil wars in Iraq may in fact be coming to resemble the Thirty Years’ War in Central Europe, a struggle within Islam with the possibility of igniting a wider struggle.'
throughout the fifth of the human race that adheres to the Muslim faith’ (Cole et al. 2005, 1). Another warning came from a Saudi government security adviser, Nawaf Obaid, who wrote that ‘remaining on the sidelines would be unacceptable to Saudi Arabia. To turn a blind eye to the massacre of Iraqi Sunnis would be to abandon the principles upon which the kingdom was founded. It would undermine Saudi Arabia’s credibility in the Sunni world and would be a capitulation to Iran’s militarist actions in the region’ (Obaid, 29 November, 2006). So far, the Saudi government has refrained from providing the insurgents with weapons, fearing that they might be used against US soldiers, but the US complains that about 45 percent of all foreign militants targeting US troops and Iraqi civilians and security forces are from Saudi Arabia. Fighters from the kingdom are believed to have carried out the majority of suicide bombings in Iraq (Parker, 15 July, 2007).

In the coming few years, the post-Saddam Iraq will decide its new foreign policy orientation. The rising Shi’ite parties will likely find common ground with Iran. But if Iraq does not aspire to expand its territory, it could also develop friendly relations with its own Sunni neighbours. The main question is how US–Iraq relations will evolve following the departure of US troops from Iraq. If the era of Saddam teaches us one thing, it is that common ideology (Baathism) or common sectarian identity (Sunnism), could not promise alliances between states. Thus, Iraq could play a constructive role, bridging between Iran and Sunni Arab states, but it could also ally itself with one of these states against the other. Relations with the US could be more complicated, especially if Iraq develops into a Shi’ite theocracy.

Secular Democracy

The civil war in Iraq created a highly charged political climate by sharpening the differences between the US’s vision and local ones, especially the vision of the Sunnis. The latter have heightened the level of insecurity within Iraq in order to obstruct future democratic reforms—the complete opposite of what was intended by the neoconservatives. US officials presumed that Iraq could be treated as clay that the US could mould to its own design. The main question remains: does the US seek to democratize Iraq or to secularize it through democracy? The US embraced the ideals of religious freedom to be exported to Iraq and incorporated in the new constitution (Mayer 2007, 154). In US view, Islamists convert Islam into an anti-Western political ideology as Islamists reinstate Islamic laws that restrict religious freedom and depict Western societies as a collective of infidels. The US has introduced, nonetheless, the ideals of religious freedom as universal and neutral principles that could serve as the foundations of the new democratic order. Yet the main geopolitical consideration behind these ideals is to prevent Islamic religious parties from coming to power—constituting an anti-American alliance.

2 The Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al-Faisal, resigned after firing Obaid, who wrote the article for the Washington Post without consulting him.
In other words, the US has had a broad blueprint of engineering a secular post-Saddam order by reverting to the universal ideal of religious freedom and secular democracy as a vehicle for marginalizing Islamist parties. The US has empowered political entities that conform to its own idea of what constitutes a political movement or party, rather than organizations that are rooted in local solidarity.

The draft of the interim constitution, which took effect in March 2004, included assurances for the Sunni minority that the role of Islam would be limited, hoping thus to convince the Iraqi Sunnis that they will not live under a Shi’ite theocracy. During the US-run occupation, which ended 28 June, 2004, key Shi’ite leaders sought to have Islam designated as the only source of legislation in the interim constitution. However, Paul Bremer, the administrator of the US Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), blocked the move, agreeing only that Islam would be considered a source — but not a primary one, let alone the source. At the time, prominent Shi’ite leaders agreed to forego a public battle with Bremer and pursue the issue during the drafting of the permanent constitution in 2005.

The US deliberately insisted on exempting itself from adjusting to Iraqi local traditions and attitudes. While ignoring actual patterns that pointed toward escalating ethnic conflict, US officials acted as if universal principles would suffice as a foundation for Iraqi democracy. Rather than grasping Iraq through its vertical ethnic-based structure, the US highlighted Iraq’s class-based horizontal divide, thinking that the US could appeal to the broad middle class through principles that cut across sectarian lines. Yet, given the lack of security with the rise in insurgency, the bulk of the middle class has fled into neighboring Arab countries, leaving the political arena to sectarian forces.

Despite its rhetoric about being committed to establishing democracy in Iraq, the US never completely supported free and open elections after toppling Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime. This marks the contradiction and clumsiness in the US democratization policy in Iraq. Despite the US’s determination to promote democratization in the Middle East, it has not freed itself from the orientalist ideas that if Muslims would be given the chance to vote, they will elect a fundamentalist leader, who would emerge as anti-Western; the elections would be ‘one vote, one time.’

Under the plan put forth by Paul Bremer, national elections were to be preceded by a series of caucuses that would have chosen candidates. These preparations were designed to ensure that the majority of candidates were not opposed to US interests in Iraq. This idea was quickly defeated by strong opposition by the loose coalition of Shi’ite religious organizations led by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Ironically, Iraq’s most prominent religious leader, Ayatollah al-Sistani, emerged as the strongest advocate of democracy. Al-Sistani sent messages through emissaries to Bremer that made it clear that he would accept nothing less than immediate elections without preconditions. Al-Sistani’s insistence that national elections not be delayed and that they be based on one person, one vote paved the way for the January 2005 polling.

Al-Sistani issued a religious decree stating that it was a religious duty upon all Iraqis to vote in the January 2005 National Assembly elections. With the
end of the US occupation, al-sistani continues to gain political prominence and support, suggesting that the democratic political structure of Iraq will bear little resemblance to the plans of the Bush administration, which obviously found the prominence of religious leaders an unfortunate surprise. With the end of the de jure occupation, the constitutional framework formed by Paul Bremer was discarded by the acting Prime Minister Iyad al-Ilawi. Obviously, the US effort to marginalize religious elements was futile.

The Shi’ite sect has its own inner rifts, given friction among various Shi’ite factions. Al-Sistani, representing senior clergy, did not explicitly endorse a divorce between mosque and politics, but pressed for democratic elections as a means of stabilizing public affairs and solidifying the centrality of the Shi’ite community in Iraqi politics (Wong, 6 February, 2005). His moderation has been challenged by the young nationalist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Al-Sadr has not hesitated to confront the al-Maliki government or US forces, and has called for the establishment of an Islamic state like Iran’s.

By toppling Saddam’s regime, the US effectively passed control of Iraq over to the Shi’ite majority and to influential Shi’ite clergy, many of whom have close ties with the Iranian regime. In light of the rise of nationalist Shi’ism and tightening its grip in Iraq, US interventions in the constitution-drafting process aimed to rule out Islamic provisions that in the US’s view stood in the way of Iraq embracing a secular democratic model. But in drafting the new constitution in 2005, senior Shi’ite clerics, confident in their popular mandate from the election, advocated for Islam to be acknowledged as the sole source of the constitution. They insisted that the Americans stay aloof from the formation of the new constitution in its final form. Thus, the 2005 constitution contains several provisions that affirm Iraq’s Islamic identity. It was agreed that Islam is “a primary source of legislation” in the new Iraqi constitution, with the proviso that no legislation be permitted that conflicted with the “universal principles” of the religion (Filkins, 21 August, 2005) and that potentially allows for the application of Islamic Sharia (Knickmeyer, 21 August, 2005). Islam has been officially established as the state religion in one of the first articles.3 The Kurds criticized the language in the draft that in their view would subject Iraqis to extreme interpretations of Islamic law.
certainly the bush administration hoped for a constitution that would lead to the creation of a secular government and that ensures religious freedom. In response to the new constitution bush put his hope in democracy:

[I]’s going to be the spread of democracy, itself, that shows folks the importance of separation of church and state. and that is why the constitution written in Iraq is an important constitution, because it separates church for the first time in a modern day constitution in Iraq ... part of our strategy in order to keep the peace is to encourage the spread of democracy ... the enemy knows that a democracy, as it spreads ... will encourage the separation of church and state (bush, 11 January, 2006).

It seems that Bush got it backward. While the Shi’ite clergy perceived democracy as an instrumental process that would perpetuate their rule, bush thought that democracy would decrease the religiosity of Iraqi politics. bush hoped that us-led democracy initiative would augment the role of pro-Western voices in a rab societies and push Islamist groups to the margins of political life. the clergy saw the us democracy initiative as serving us strategic interests rather as a genuine desire to empower a rab citizens to freely elect their own representatives. bush ignored the fact that democracy is more than mere a process. Its success depends upon factors external to the formal democratic process. One of the most serious obstacles to democracy remains the inability of the Iraqi government in delivering results which satisfy their community’s needs for tangible improvements in security, public service, and employment. the values of freedom, in the absence of these services, remain epiphenomenal. thus, while bush proclaims that democracy would mitigate sectarianism and weaken the insurgency, a sectarian war begets insecurity and renders democracy irrelevant.

For many Arabs, the US’s mission of spreading democracy is a mere cloak for neo-imperialism; they see the us as an occupier, not a liberator. In this view, by aggressively endeavouring to marginalize Islamic Sharia’a laws and parties, the US has had recourse to undemocratic manipulation. In the US’s view, the world had witnessed in Iran the impact of Shi’ite Islamism triumphant, which resulted in an Islamization program that had crushed religious freedom and encouraged religious discrimination, persecution, and anti-Westernism. Only defective elements, the argument continues, such as the weakness of civil society or lack of education, would result in the rise of Islamic religious parties. assuming that these defects existed, the us perceived its role as compensating for these defects by towing the Iraqi political system to a secure shore. the middle East as a whole, though, had experienced a rise in Islam. as understood by many muslims, rather than Islamists only, Islamic Sharia’a offers a depository of principles that provide assurances against setting society adrift towards the superficial and temporary Western ‘good life’ that in their view is a euphemism of a corrupt and immoral life.

As of May 2006, Shi’ite leaders were already using their political and military ascendancy to enforce their version of Islam—as were sunni militants in areas
under their control. In January 2007, the US National Intelligence Council reported in its National Intelligence Estimate that the prospects for stabilizing Iraq were remote, citing factors like the growing polarization within Iraqi society and the burgeoning in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. The estimate found sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, observing that sectarian divisions were hardening and were driving extensive population displacements, which were draining Iraq of its professional and entrepreneurial classes (NIE 2007).

Given that Iraq is deeply divided along sectarian/ethnic lines, the US can do one of two things. It can either support one side and hope that that side wins, or it can try to be neutral by supporting all sides. On the one hand, the US does not like the idea of a Shi’ite hegemony; on the other, it has expressed its commitment to the democratization of Iraq. Given this complexity, US policy remained vague. The US has opted for supporting all sides, giving more hope to the Sunnis and Kurds. By doing this, the US ignores that the Shi’ite constitute 65 percent of the Iraqi population, who can use their majority to perpetuate their domination of the Iraqi parliament.

At the regional level, the political elites in countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia have taken small steps towards reform in a controlled fashion in order to assuage a merican pressure for more political openness, but with an eye on ensuring that the current regime remains in control. The problem here is that this makes it increasingly likely that any reform will be restricted to non-substantive liberalization rather than embracing true change that could alter the current balance of power between the ruling party and the opposition parties. As a pretext for ignoring major democratic reforms, these regimes point out to the examples of Algeria and Palestine. The victory of the Islamic Salvation Party in Algeria in 1991 and of Hamas in Palestine in 2005 led to civil war in Algeria and between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine. These precedents seem to suggest that a rapid (read: reckless) promotion of reform in societies that lack a tradition of political pluralism increases the likelihood of anti-Western Islamic parties gaining power (Tessler et al. 2006, 33).

It seems that the US is once again holding two opposing policies. The war on terror and the promotion of democracy have different and contradictory effects on the democratization process in the Middle East. States friendly to the US find additional support for their efforts to consolidate their positions vis-à-vis Islamist movements. The war on terror has been invoked by these regimes to justify clampdowns on opposition movements and the restriction of liberalization (Telhami et al. 2006, 2). Put it clearly, the war on terror fortifies the police state in the Middle East, forcing democratization to take the back seat.
The Future of Democracy in the Middle East

the issue of democratizing Iraq has been surrounded with bewilderment and frustration over what the allies should do next. As former British prime minister, Tony Blair put it, ‘What should our response be? However difficult it is, stay the course, stand up for those people who want democracy, stand up for those people who are fighting sectarianism, stand up for a different vision of the Middle East based on democracy, liberty, the rule of law’ (BBC, 3 August, 2006).

During the last few years, many Americans started to rethink of the 9/11 attacks and to question whether they were a single, isolated extraordinary event that does not point to a general trend, and in fact the US has not been under a constant terror threat, contrary to the way the global war on terror has been illustrated by the Bush administration. This is of course due to the fact that there has been no terrorist attack since 9/11. Many Americans, including President Barack Obama, believe that the Bush administration overreacted to the 9/11 events and that the second Iraq War never should have been waged (Obama 2007, 2). In this view, the US experience in Iraq should serve as a warning against using military force, while establishing that democracy is not an effective antidote to the problem of terrorism.

The new consensus on the eve of the 2008 presidential elections was that the mere threat of terrorism does not allow the US to exercise a policy of unilateral internationalism—using its military power to promote political freedom. Given that many Americans believe that the US adventure in Iraq is a failed policy, many question three aspects of the Bush doctrine: first whether the US is under a constant threat of terror; second, whether the use of force is an effective, let alone legitimate, instrument to promote democracy in the Third World; and third, whether a rab/Islamic culture is congruent with the principles of democracy. Faced with the difficulty of state-building in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration has been forced by reality to work more closely with allies and to set aside the doctrine of regime change by military intervention (Gordon 2006, 82).

For some scholars, the failure of the US in Iraq signals the beginning of the end of the US era and the advent of an American neo-isolationism (Haass 2006, 5). Other scholars have reverted to orientalist ideas. Trying to generalize from the Iraqi experience, their argument is that a rab nations are not ready for democracy, ‘because their populations are often sharply divided along tribal, ethnic, or religious lines. Where more than one tribal, ethnic, or religious group inhabits a sovereign state in appreciable numbers, democracy has proved difficult to establish’ (Mandelbaum 2007, 127). Mandelbaum also argues that there is a

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4 Haass attributes the end of the US era to structural as well as self-made factors, including the tying down of a huge portion of the US military by the Iraq War, the rise of Hamas, the failure of traditional Arab regimes to counter the appeal of radical Islamism, and finally globalization, in which the spread of new media such as al-Jazeera politicized the Arab world and raised anti-American emotions to new heights.
clash of civilization between the muslim world and the christian world, in which ‘rab muslims saw themselves as engaged in an epic battle for global supremacy against the Christian West’. Given this battle, ‘liberty and free elections have less favourable reputations in the Arab Middle East than elsewhere’ (127). In this view, the clash of civilizations is due to the fact that muslims perceive christians as infidels who seek the Westoxication of Muslim societies by implanting Western values within these societies.

Moreover, policymakers in both Washington and London receive assessments from diplomats and officers on the ground, who claim that the democratic enterprise may not succeed. William Patey, Britain’s former ambassador in Baghdad, warned the British government that ‘the prospect of a low intensity civil war and a de facto division of Iraq is probably more likely at this stage than a successful and substantial transition to a stable democracy’ (BBC, 3 August, 2006). In the same vein, Major General Benjamin Mixon, commander of Task Force Lightning raises doubts about the consolidation of democracy in Iraq. In his view the US should endeavour to leave ‘an effective government behind that can provide services to its people, and security. It needs to be an effective and functioning government that is really a partner with the United States and the rest of the world in this fight against the terrorists’. Similarly, Brigadier General John ‘Mick’ Bednarek, part of Task Force Lightning in Diyala province, contends that ‘democratic institutions are not necessarily the way ahead in the long-term future [of Iraq] ... because of our insistence on democratic elections in Iraq, we have a Shia dominated government in Baghdad ... it’s going to ... take a long time for the Iraqi side of their identity here, as opposed to the Shia side of their identity to become dominant’ (both quoted in Ware and Evans, 22 August, 2007).

Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, contends that the US’s ‘mistake would be to count on the emergence of democracy to pacify the region ... the US government must continue to work with many nondemocratic governments. Democracy is not the answer to terrorism, either’ (Haass 2006, 9). Or as Haass put it elsewhere, ‘democracy is of little use when dealing with highly mobilized ideological or religious extremists. A more relevant focus might be reforms that promote education, economic liberalism and open markets and encourage a rab and muslim authorities to speak out in ways that delegitimize terror and shame its supporters’ (Haass, 8 January, 2007). In Haass’s view, the fact that both Hamas and Hezbollah performed well in elections and have continued to carry out violent attacks in the name of Islam ‘reinforces the point that democratic reform does not guarantee quiet’. Haass puts his faith in economic reforms, where nations that can offer political and economic opportunities for their young people are less prone to radicalism.

The administration, or more precisely the State Department, has remained committed to the propagation of democracy as the best answer to terrorism in the long run. In the words of Secretary Rice:
In the Middle East, the absence of freedom, the absence of democracy, leads to a kind of freedom gap, and something will fill it. When there is an authoritarian regime that does not permit the development of healthy politics, politics will develop, but it will develop in radical mosques and in madrassas. And that is what we have seen in much of the Middle East (Rice, 19 June, 2008).

The problem with this analysis is that in Rice’s view, Islamic movements and institutions such as the madrassas continue to breed terrorism and Islamic terrorism is the only facet of terrorism that exists in the Middle East. This type of analysis, although repudiates orientalist prescriptions against democratization, it is originated in these same cluster of ideas.

**Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terrorism: The Road Not Taken**

After 9/11, US policy locked onto two unproven ideas: democracy is the long term answer to terrorism, and Saddam’s Iraq was a terrorist state. History shows, though, that the US has not been ready to seek reconciliation with regimes that dared to challenge it in the past, including North Korea, Cuba, Iran, and Iraq. The US has persistently imposed sanctions on these regimes and cut off diplomatic and trade relations with them, punishing an entire nation for the ‘misbehaviour’ of its regime. This indicates that the US would not seek rapprochement with Iraq as long as Saddam was in power, even if Saddam would have proved that his regime did not possess WMD and had no relations with al-Qaeda. Removing Saddam from power became an end by itself. Promoting democratization in the Arab world, although it was central to the US fight against global terrorism and a major objective of the invasion, was an attachment to the primary mission of toppling Saddam’s regime.

The US pursued democratization without a thorough examination of whether Iraq was ready for a democracy imposed from without, and regardless of the weakness of civil society in Iraq. It paid no attention to Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic fabric, nor to the animosity between the Sunni minority and the Shi’ite majority after many years of Saddam’s Sunni regime of Saddam.

Certainly Iraq was not the best candidate to be a pilot model of secular Arab democracy, to be emulated by other Arab states. Moreover, imposing democracy from above through military power is not the best way to encourage democratization in the Arab world. There are plenty of Arab states that have a homogenous and relatively strong civil society in which the US could promote democratization through peaceful means. These countries include Tunisia, Egypt, Kuwait and Qatar. A second wave of democratization could include countries that are less homogenous, such as Morocco, UAE, and Jordan. In fact, Lebanon, the only Arab country that is considered to be democratic, should be the first candidate for promoting democratization in the Middle East. The US could put an end to the ethnic democracy of Lebanon, in which the highest political positions in the
country are allocated based on ethnicity (the president so far must be a maronite Christian, while the prime minister must be a Sunni Muslim). This undemocratic system perpetuates Lebanon’s sectarian enmity. The US could provide incentives to the Lebanese parliament to terminate its obsolete undemocratic constitution and create a new one in which the president, as well as parliament, would be elected directly by the people, in which every Lebanese citizen could be a candidate, regardless of his or her ethnic or sectarian affiliation.

Conclusion

It seems that Bush’s team locked onto the idea of attacking Iraq and removing Saddam from power. His idea prevailed among prominent members of his team even before 9/11. The president was surrounded by a homogenous group of policymakers such as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz who were not ready to listen to alternative policy lines that contradicted their own. These policymakers seized on the ‘golden’ opportunity that opened in the aftermath of 9/11, when the majority of the American people were convinced that Saddam had ties with al-Qaeda, and that he possessed WMD.

It is very difficult to extrapolate at this stage whether the idea of promoting democracy in the Middle East is still alive or it has been abandoned altogether following the failure to build a robust democracy in Iraq. His failure, nonetheless, is not an indication that the fate of democratization in other Arab countries would be the same as Iraq’s. Given the differences between Iraq and other Arab states, the US cannot and should not generalize from the Iraqi case about the compatibility of democracy and the Arab-Islamic culture. Abandoning the idea of promoting democratization in the Arab world would bring US-Arab relations back to square one, in which authoritarianism leaves civil society weak. This weakness creates a political void that is filled with Islamist movements that preach the use of violence against the West.

Finally, a quote from the Iraq Study Group Report:

The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine (Baker et al. 2006, 7).
When the United States, the most powerful state in the world, changes its understanding of foreign policy, it also constitutes international politics. Ideas held by other less powerful states do not have such a constitutive effect. Yet states and even superpowers do not often revise their foreign policy beliefs. In this book, I have attempted to show under what conditions U.S. policymakers modify the way they think of U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East and when these new ideas have a constitutive effect. In order to understand change in foreign policy, we have to pay attention to three major variables: the distribution of power (including overall power as well as power within an issue area); shared ideas; and crises. While the distribution of overall power and power within an issue area are given, at least in the short run, we have to focus on the eruption of a major crisis and its impact on shared ideas as the main factor that affects change in foreign policy. A major crisis stimulates change in thinking; power makes change possible; and ideas make change feasible.

Furthermore, shared ideas or inter-subjectivity explain not only change but continuity. One of the difficulties of bringing about change during peaceful times is that individual dissenters face a collective ideational structure that defeats efforts to challenge the prevailing mindset. The mission of change becomes even more difficult, especially when ideas are infused in institutions (Haney 1997, 16). In this sense, during peaceful times, advocates of change face an uphill battle convincing key policymakers to embrace new ideas that may lead to change.

So far, the research on the impact of ideas on change has remained underdeveloped, due to the fact that ideas are an unobservable variable and it is impossible to quantify their effect. Yet the fact that we cannot empirically measure the impact of ideas does not mean that ideas are powerless. Ideas not only shape strategies that are put in place to realize given interests; they also define interests. To put it differently, ideas are not derivatives of interests or the distribution of power, but ideas are a factor, and that factor shapes and is reshaped by reality. In other words, a full explanation of foreign policy change would remain incomplete if we ignore the combination of profound factors such as the distribution of power and ideas. The argument of this book is that ideas determine the direction of change; power is a medium that carries out change, while a major crisis ripens the conditions necessary for change in the mind of policymakers and allow them to overcome resistance from their colleagues, who cling to the pre-crisis mindset. A major crisis creates a crack in the old consensus and allows a consolidation of a new set of ideas. The collapse of the old set and the consolidation of a new set are two sides of the same coin. The occurrence of the former is a precondition for
the emergence of the latter, while states could not run their foreign policy in the absence of grand ideas that orient their policy. There could, of course, be a time lag between the collapse of existing ideas and the rise of new ones due to the sudden eruption of a crisis.

Thus, major crises constitute a watershed in the history of nations. The eruption of a crisis creates a battle between states over the notions of the new order and a debate within the ruling administration over the appropriate set of ideas that should guide the new policy. This battle sets in motion the need for change. Whether a crisis could ripen the conditions for change depends on the extent to which it threatens or harms the realization of interests. In international relations, a crisis erupts because foreign forces are dissatisfied with the status quo. The consolidation of new ideas must take into account the needs, power, and consent of these foreign forces. This does not mean that the hegemon consults with these forces in shaping its new mindset, but the US has to take their reaction into account.

In the context of the Middle East, some regional actors used their power advantage within an issue area, such as oil supply or terror, in order to undermine an existing order. The crisis ‘succeeds’ in altering the mindset of American policymakers only when it has a profound domestic effect. Thus the distribution of power within an issue area could not point to the direction of change, but it marks the dissatisfaction of regional powers, while an overall distribution of power cannot dictate continuity.

The eruption of a crisis in the Middle East marks the US’s failure to establish a Gramscian hegemonic order that, according to Robert Cox, should be predicated on three pillars: ideas, institutions, and power. The US ignored the needs of the local forces and their consent. Yet we also need to remember that some of these local forces have different attitudes and often contradictory ones. Indeed, the US endeavoured to gain the consent of those forces that seemed to American policymakers as the most powerful actors—the local traditional authoritarian regimes. But an order that is underpinned by these three Gramscian pillars is an ideal one that is difficult to realize, because gaining the consent of the subordinated classes is not always possible. We also tend to confuse satisfaction with consent. Until 1979, the US merely sought to gain the support of traditional regimes, while ignoring the needs of the masses. After the Iranian revolution, however, the US endeavoured to create an order that would meet the needs of the masses and make them satisfied, but would not necessarily guarantee their consent. The US created a delicate order that was predicated on a market-oriented mechanism that would satisfy economic needs, yet one that would not undermine the legitimacy of pro-American traditional regimes.

Unlike the order that the US constructed in Europe after World War II that was based on partnership and agreed-upon institutions that would guarantee transparency and mutual gains, in the Middle East the US established a semi-hegemonic order that was based on domination through proxy regimes.
US Democratization Policy in the Middle East

during the 1970s and 1980s, many scholars of Middle East politics maintained that Middle East societies are somehow naturally impervious to democratic processes, most often citing the incompatibility between Islamic culture and democratic values of pluralism, freedom of speech, and freedom of association. These authors saw culture as the crux of the problem, whether it was an inherent natural tendency toward various forms of tribalism and social conformity, the acceptance of the Islamic religious canon as the finite truth and the only source of legislation, or the Islamic emphasis on sheer obedience to traditional rulers. Yet regardless of whether these causes are intrinsic to Middle East societies or innate in the mind of American policymakers, the assumed uniqueness of the Middle East worked for the benefit of US interests in the region. The US found it easier to deal with traditional authoritarian regimes, where the US needed only to convince the supreme ruler who held all authority with little or no opposition. In other words, regardless of whether the US perceived the Islamic culture as it is without attempting to affect its structure, or whether the way the US comprehended that culture oriented its foreign policy, pro-Western authoritarian regimes in the Middle East developed a dependency on the US and facilitated its interests in the region. The quid pro quo was protection against external invasion. Consequently, the US perceived these regimes as the best facilitators of its interests. If the pro-American regimes in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, had been genuinely democratic, they would have been highly unlikely to permit American troops on their soil, especially since the US has pursued an anti-Arab policy toward the Palestinians and the Iraqis during the 1990s.

Thus, even if the US believed that the political culture of the Middle East was ready to absorbing democracy, the US had an interest in embracing authoritarian regimes, however dictatorial. Some American policymakers even point to some instances in which a American pressure for political reforms proved to be counterproductive. The Department of State’s heavy-handed pressure on the shah of Iran for political reforms weakened the regime and set the stage for the Iranian revolution. In this sense, the revolution did not undermine the policy of cooperating with dictators; on the contrary, the disastrous consequences of the revolution—cutting US diplomatic relations with Iran—dictated that US policymakers would see supporting pro-West authoritarian regimes as indispensable.

The question that remained unanswered is whether US pressure would help or hinder the process of democratization in the Middle East. The US has lost any moral standing in the eyes of many Arabs, including a Arab intellectuals, following its invasion of Iraq and its support for the Israeli repression of Palestinians’ aspiration to establish an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza. Furthermore, the perception that the US is dictating the agenda and delimiting the sovereignty of the Iraqi government has, for many Arabs, discredited the process of implementing a liberal, pluralist political system there. If the US wants to establish a true democracy in Iraq, it should allow the Iraqis choose the government they like; yet if the US
wishes to preserve its influence inside Iraq by preventing pro-Iranian movements from coming to power, that may infringe on Iraq’s democratization process. In this sense, US involvement in the Middle East may make it more difficult for grassroots movements to exert bottom-up pressure for reform. With the power of the state reinforced by the crackdown on opposition movements in the name of fighting terrorism, the implementation of measures of political reform will depend more on the good will of political elites than on grassroots pressure.

The Bush administration envisages not so much a pluralist democracy as a controlled democratic process, which is confined to expanding political participation that would guarantee the election of a secular government. Bush has noted that democracy does not come overnight and has emphasized the need for an incremental and gradualist approach to participation, which will no doubt reassure US vested interests in the region. Top-down political reform is a process with which Middle Eastern regimes feel much more comfortable, than the idea of instantaneous democratization. Gradual or cosmetic reforms allow them to control the degree of change and to ensure their holding on to power. The US has implicitly concurred with this process.

The challenge for US policymakers at this stage is to walk on a thin line of engaging with mainstream, non-violent Islamic opposition movements, without damaging its relationships with the incumbent regimes. As the most organized grassroots opposition groups in most a rab states, the Islamic movements cannot be excluded from the democratic reforms without casting doubt on the whole democratization process. The question is: could these Islamic movements be integrated into a democratic framework without jeopardizing the democratic character of the framework itself and without damaging its relations with these same groups that the US indirectly helped to come to power? Unless this enigma is addressed, the tensions between democratic pluralism and the US reform program will remain unresolved.

In sum, Islamic opposition groups in the a rab world are almost uniformly doubtful of the US democracy enterprise. These groups understand that a genuine democracy could serve them as a springboard to reach power. Yet in their view, the US is interested in a democratic process that perpetuates the power of secular, pro-West regimes. To the extent that they view democratization as a mere process rather than an end in itself, they fear that it is designed to weaken popular movements that oppose US policy in the region.

The US might accept in Iraq, for example, a secular regime led by a secular Shi’ite prime minister that excluded nationalist or religious movements. The broader emphasis on economic liberalization, as well as political liberalism, aims to energize stagnant economies, raise the quality of life, and diminish terrorist activities. The American desire to reform a rab monarchies after 11 September, 2001 and the US’s war on terror is motivated by security concerns. This again raises question about the genuine intention of the US to construct a true democracy in the Arab world. In the name of the fight against terror, Arab governments have
seized on the current circumstances to tighten, rather than loosen, their domestic political controls.

Ironically, the US possesses enough power to block democratization via cooperating with and supporting authoritarian regimes, yet when it comes to promoting democratization, the US is vulnerable. The ‘helping hand’ from the US may have limited positive results. It could even undermine the liberal reform efforts and provide unintended support for radical Islamist and nationalist movements, because the proposed reforms aim to support the power of pro-American secular regimes. In short, pursuing democracy without addressing some other issues could be counterproductive, producing highly radical populist regimes hostile to the United States.

Moreover, US efforts to block peace talks between Israel and Syria ensure a state of continued instability in Lebanon, continued Syrian alliance with Iran, and a continued stalemate in US-Syrian relations.

This struggle is about ideas and power in the context of independent states, and it is fought with modern means of political mobilization, as well as military power. In fact US power is used to serve liberal ideas of democratization, hoping that the process would engender a more stable order in the Middle East. This crisis is as much about the future identity of the Middle Eastern states as it is about a clash within the Islamic world: which party will dominate the states, the secular authoritarian, or the popular Islamist? This crisis of control overlaps with the regional struggle of dominance, because Iran supports Islamist groups in Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq that seem to oppose the US policy, while the secular regimes in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt perceive the religious movements as a threat to domestic stability.

With the realization that the main threat to America’s security was no longer posed by the so-called ‘rogue states’ but by terrorist movements, the linkage between security and democracy was radically reformulated. US policymakers came to the conclusion that it was no coincidence that the perpetrators of 9/11 originated in countries with little, if any, participation in the political affairs of the nation. Policy planners also came to believe that America’s role in supporting illiberal regimes in the region was to blame.

If the US wishes to establish a hegemonic order in the Middle East, it could achieve that only through democratization processes. The US, nonetheless, should be very careful about how and where to promote the process. First, the US should single out Middle Eastern states that either have a homogenous society, such as Tunisia or Egypt, or have a strong civil society, such as Lebanon. Second, the US should promote the process through diplomatic means and economic incentives only. The US could score a swift victory on the democratization front by convincing the Lebanese political elite to dismantle the Lebanese covenant that distributes power based on ethnicity, and instead to create a sheer democracy, where every Lebanese is eligible for any political position.
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