Strategic US Foreign Assistance
The Battle Between Human Rights and National Security

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and
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STRATEGIC US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
To our parents
Strategic US Foreign Assistance
The Battle Between Human Rights and National Security

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# Contents

*List of Figures* vii  
*List of Tables* ix  
*Preface* xi  
*Acknowledgements* xiii  
*List of Abbreviations* xv  

## Introduction
Strategic US Foreign Assistance 1

## PART I  HUMAN RIGHTS AND US FOREIGN POLICY: THEORIES, MEASUREMENT, AND MODELS
1  The Road to Hell is Paved with Good Intentions 9  
2  The Evolution and Motivation of the US Foreign Assistance Program 37  
3  Measuring Human Rights and Foreign Assistance 65  
4  Examining the Empirical Evidence 87  

## PART II  HUMAN RIGHTS AND US FOREIGN POLICY: CASE STUDIES
5  The Trade-offs of Plan Colombia: Drug Trafficking versus Human Rights 113  
6  US Foreign Assistance to Turkey: The Cold War to the War on Terror 139  
7  US Foreign Assistance to Pakistan: Friend or Foe? 161  
8  Foreign Aid and Human Rights: Strategic Priorities or Global Responsibility? 183  

*Bibliography* 191  
*Index of Names* 207  
*Subject Index* 211
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List of Figures

Figure 2.1  Total US foreign assistance to Egypt and Israel 45
Figure 2.2  Security rights in Egypt 49
Figure 2.3  Security rights in Israel 53
Figure 2.4  Total US foreign assistance: 1950–2005 58
Figure 3.1  US foreign assistance and security rights: Historical dollars 82
Figure 3.2  US foreign assistance and security rights: Aid/GDP 83
Figure 3.3  US foreign assistance and subsistence rights: Historical dollars 84
Figure 3.4  US foreign assistance and subsistence rights: Aid/GDP 84
Figure 4.1  Predicted values of wealth and democracy 95
Figure 4.2  Predicted values of political variables 96
Figure 4.3  Predicted values of economic and military aid 102
Figure 4.4  The effect of one unit change in military aid on security rights, conditioned upon democracy 106
Figure 4.5  The effect of one unit change in economic aid on security rights, conditioned upon wealth 109
Figure 5.1  Total US foreign assistance: Regions in Latin America 116
Figure 5.2  Distribution of foreign assistance: Latin America 119
Figure 5.3  Distribution of foreign assistance as a percentage of GDP: Latin America 119
Figure 5.4  Total US foreign assistance: Colombia 130
Figure 5.5  Security rights in Colombia 131
Figure 6.1  Economic and military assistance to Western Europe: By era 142
Figure 6.2  Total US foreign assistance: Select countries in Western Europe 143
Figure 6.3  Economic and military assistance to the Middle East and North Africa 145
Figure 6.4  Total US foreign assistance: Select countries in the Middle East/ North Africa 146
Figure 6.5  Total US foreign assistance: Select countries in Eurasia 148
Figure 6.6  US foreign assistance to Turkey: 1976–2005 149
Figure 6.7  Security rights in Turkey 151
Figure 7.1  US foreign assistance to Pakistan and India: 1950–2005 163
Figure 7.2  Total US foreign assistance by region 164
Figure 7.3  Total US foreign assistance during the Vietnam War 165
Figure 7.4  Security rights in Pakistan 168
Figure 7.5  Economic and military assistance to Pakistan 171
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List of Tables

Table 1.1 The categories and goals of US foreign assistance 25
Table 2.1 The European Recovery Program 38
Table 3.1 Mean values of security rights and subsistence rights 73
Table 3.2 Mean values of foreign assistance (millions) 79
Table 3.3 Bivariate relationships: US foreign assistance and human rights (aid as a percentage of GDP) 81
Table 4.1 Security rights model 94
Table 4.2 Subsistence rights model 98
Table 4.3 Substantive results of aid on security and subsistence rights 101
Table 4.4 Interaction analysis: US foreign aid and democracy 105
Table 4.5 Interaction analysis: Foreign aid, democracy, and security rights 106
Table 4.6 Interaction analysis: US foreign aid and wealth 108
Table 4.7 Interaction analysis: Foreign aid, wealth, and security rights 108
Table 5.1 Multivariate analyses: Latin America security rights and foreign aid (aid as a percentage of GDP) 120
Table 5.2 Plan Colombia: By the numbers 126
Table 5.3 Security rights violations in Colombia: Kidnappings, disappearances, and politically motivated killings 133
Table 5.4 Displaced persons in Colombia 133
Table 6.1 US foreign assistance and security rights (aid as a percentage of GDP) 144
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Preface

It has been said that it is not enough to preach the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights; one must also actively promote them. This belief is the essence of this book. In terms of espousing the importance of global human rights, the United States talks the talk. Both the executive and legislative branches, throughout the years, have preached the importance of bettering the human condition in other countries, in particular through the spreading of democratic ideals. The United States fails, however, to walk the walk. Although improving human rights is often a rhetorical goal of US foreign aid, in reality, the allocation of aid does little to improve those conditions and in fact, can be counterproductive. The irony here, of course, is that Congress has legislated an explicit link between foreign assistance and human rights conditions. As the discussion in this book demonstrates, however, this legislation is rendered toothless by waivers in the name of national security. Obviously, security is the primary interest of every state: nothing will change that and nothing should. But, the stated goals and motivation for aid must come in line with reality, and alternate means for promoting human rights abroad must be found, lest the United States continues to lose credibility in the international community as a leader in human rights.

It was these issues and concerns that drove us to write this book. We strive to explain and demonstrate the true motivations for US foreign assistance, the consequences of the allocation of aid, and the responsibility of the United States to ensure that the outcome matches the motivation. This manuscript utilizes two approaches in addressing these questions. An empirical analysis employing pooled cross-section time series analysis provides for a comprehensive examination of the relationship between foreign assistance and human rights conditions, and case studies provide for a deeper investigation of specific foreign assistance relationships between the United States and Colombia, Turkey, and Pakistan. Ultimately, we have sought to empirically and qualitatively examine whether US foreign assistance actually does more harm than good.
Acknowledgements

We have many people to thank for their assistance and encouragement as we embarked upon this process. The idea of this book came from elements of Rhonda’s dissertation and thus we are indebted to the guidance of David Leblang (University of Colorado) and Steven C. Poe. Steve’s willingness to answer any and every question was invaluable. He will be missed. We would also like to thank Julie Harrelson-Stephens (Stephen F. Austin State University) and Johanna Dunaway (Louisiana State University) for their expertise on human rights and methods respectively. We were greatly helped by Elizabeth’s research assistants, Vanessa Martin at CSUSM and Thalia El Chammah, a visiting intern at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at UCSD. We appreciate their hard work and dedication. We would also like to thank Kirstin Howgate, Margaret Younger, Nikki Dines, Carolyn Court, and Emily Jarvis at Ashgate for their patience, guidance, and assistance as we worked on the manuscript. Finally, we are grateful to our families, friends, and colleagues who put up with us during the writing of this book. We are indebted for their endless support and encouragement throughout this process.
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List of Abbreviations

AUC United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
DOS US Department of State
ELN National Liberation Army (Colombia)
ESF Economic Support Funds
FAA Foreign Assistance Act
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FMF Foreign Military Financing
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
IMET International Military Education and Training
IRFA International Religious Freedom Act (US)
MCA Millennium Challenge Account
MFN Most-Favored Nation Status
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONDCP US Office of National Drug Control Policy
PKK Kurdistan Workers Party
PPP Pakistan’s People Party
PQLI Physical Quality of Life
PTS Political Terror Scale
TVPA Trafficking Victims Protection Act
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNESCO United Nations Development Program
USAID US Agency for International Development
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
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Introduction

Strategic US Foreign Assistance

Throughout the ages moralists have expressed horror at the way princes and sovereign states behave toward each other. Behavior which would be considered immoral by any standard can obviously be detected in all realms of life; but nowhere does the contradiction between professed ethical principles and actual behavior appear so patent and universal as in the conduct of foreign relations (Wolfers 1949, 175).

The following question was posed over 40 years ago regarding the US foreign assistance program, “why is aid so confidently proposed by policymakers and so readily supported, or at any rate tolerated, by the public?” (Banfield 1963, 2–3). The same question is relevant today, particularly given the recent US foreign aid package to Colombia, the overwhelming amount of US aid to countries in the Middle East, and the linkage between foreign aid and the war on terror. We suggest that there are two possible answers. The first, and most obvious answer is that there is a self or donor interest motivation. Needless to say, national security concerns dominate the motivation for the allocation and distribution of US foreign assistance. These national security concerns, to name just a few, come in the form of supporting and attracting allies, protecting oil interests, fighting communism, and now fighting terrorism. Foreign aid is also designed to promote democratization and human rights, an objective seemingly based on recipient interests. However, there is an inconsistency between policies based on the self-interest of the donor and policies based on human needs in the recipient state which may lead to disturbing consequences. One such consequence is the danger that self-interest may be pursued in the name of foreign aid, regardless of the impact on the recipient nation (Ruttan 1989, 1996).

This leads to our second answer, perhaps politicians and the public have no true understanding of the actual consequences to human rights of such action. The expectation is that aid designed for such lofty ideals as democracy and human rights would surely fulfill that objective. However, foreign policy objectives and decisions are made with the state’s interests in mind, that is, at the aggregate level, while human rights concerns focus on individuals within the states. Thus, it is easy, perhaps, for policy makers to ignore the realities at the individual level when formulating policy objectives that serve the state. We argue that regardless of the original intent of aid, understanding the consequences of the allocation and distribution of foreign aid is imperative given the hegemonic role of the United States in the international system. We suggest that the United States, or any other donor, has some responsibility to ensure that their gain is not at the expense of the recipient’s pain, particularly in the area of human rights. In other words, the United States must first do no harm to human rights when it comes to pursuing foreign policy objectives through the allocation
and distribution of foreign assistance. The consequence of such action can have a deleterious impact on national security. While human rights were once considered a low politics issue, today they are an integral element of national security. Thus, the real or perceived abuses of human rights at the hands of the United States only lead to a further derogation of the US image abroad, the consequences of which may lead to some form of retaliation or perhaps even increased terrorist activity. In this book, we investigate the battle between these two motivations of foreign assistance: the need to defend national security interests at home and abroad on the one hand and the desire to advance human rights practices on the other, all the while understanding that no state has the responsibility to put other states’ interests before its own. In doing so, we are particularly concerned about the effects of foreign aid decisions on human rights conditions in recipient states.

What is the legacy of the US foreign assistance program where human rights are concerned? Has the program actually improved human rights in recipient states? Or, as some critics charge, has the foreign aid program done more harm than good, at least to the human condition, in the pursuit of national security objectives like the war on communism and the war on terror? We address these questions from three different perspectives: the US motivation in allocating foreign aid, the consequences of US foreign aid on human rights conditions in recipient states, and ultimately the ethical responsibility of the United States regarding the consequences of such aid. Of course, this leads to a further question, that is, what is ethical when it comes to foreign policy in general and the US foreign assistance program specifically? While this discussion is provided in Chapter 1, a brief explanation is warranted here. One of the dilemmas in foreign policy is while individuals formulate policies, it is the state that is of primary interest. This leads to the debate of whether or not states can act morally, or whether morality is a characteristic or trait reserved for individuals. Rather than attempting to solve this philosophical dilemma, we argue that foreign policies can be ethical, that is, that the motivation or intent and the consequence are in alignment. If a state articulates a motive for a particular policy, such as promotion of human rights, and that policy ultimately hinders the realization of human rights, it can be considered unethical.

In considering the relationship between US foreign aid and human rights, one of the first concerns is the causal relationship between the two. Specifically, do human rights conditions influence US foreign aid allocation or do US foreign aid allocations influence human rights? The majority of the published research on the relationship between human rights and foreign policy examines human rights conditions in potential recipient states as a determinant in foreign policy decisions, particularly the allocation of US foreign aid. The most prevalent model in the motivational or

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1 Ruttan (1989, 414) makes a similar argument regarding foreign assistance in that it is the duty of the donor “to demonstrate that this assistance does no harm to the recipient.” In addition, Vasquez (2005) utilizes the concept of “first do no harm” in applying ethical behavior to war and interventions.

2 This line of research on conditionality appears primarily in academic journals. See Schoultz 1980; Stohl et al 1984; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Carleton and Stohl 1987; McCormick and Mitchell 1988, 1989; Hofrenning 1990; Poe 1990, 1991, 1992; Poe and
conditionality literature suggests a two-stage framework of US foreign assistance allocation (Cingranelli and Pasquerillo 1985). In the first stage, the gatekeeping stage, models include both recipient and non-recipient states to ascertain if human rights are a determining factor in the allocation of foreign aid. In the second stage, only recipient states are examined to ascertain the determinants in the level of aid. Examining Latin American countries, Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) found that human rights records were not a concern in distributing economic aid, however, once past the gatekeeping stage, states with better human rights records received greater levels of aid. As for military aid, states with poor human rights records were often eliminated at the gatekeeping stage. Once past this stage, human rights did not play a role in the level of aid.

Subsequent research has built upon this model with conflicting results (Carleton and Stohl 1987; McCormick and Mitchell 1988). Most of the disagreement occurs during the second stage when the level of aid is considered. Poe (1992) examines only economic aid and finds that during the Carter and Reagan administrations, human rights conditions affected US foreign aid allocation. Poe and Meernik (1995) find that once the decision to give aid was made, human rights records were not a consideration regarding the level of aid, while Meernik, Krueger and Poe (1998) find that, in fact, those countries with the worst human rights records received more aid. More recently Apodaca and Stohl (1999) found that human rights considerations depended upon the administration and the type of aid. Their ultimate conclusion is that human rights matter for economic aid, but not military aid and further, that human rights were not the only and not the primary consideration. Ultimately, the research on conditionality presents some conflicting results and it is clear that the United States allocates and distributes foreign assistance to countries that engage in gross human rights violations.3 Given this fact, what are the consequences or effect?

Nascent literature moves beyond elements of conditionality and seeks to examine the consequences of the allocation and distribution of US foreign assistance and subsequent human rights practices (Regan 1995; Meyer 1996, 1998; Smith et al 1999; Richards et al 2001).4 Our research addresses this deficiency in the understanding of the consequences of US foreign policy making and provides a complete assessment of the nature of US foreign assistance, ultimately demonstrating the disconnect between the rhetoric of foreign aid and human rights and the reality of human rights conditions in recipient states. We initially examine, in a historical and qualitative

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3 In spite of legislative restrictions on the allocation and distribution of economic and military aid to countries with gross human rights violations, both have loopholes that allow disbursement to such countries under special circumstances. The Harkin Amendment (1982) to the Foreign Assistance Act (1961) addresses economic aid, while Section 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act (1961) outlines the human rights restrictions for military aid. A full accounting of the history of the US foreign assistance program is provided in Chapter 2.

4 In addition, there is a burgeoning literature that examines total Official Development Assistance from a variety of donor countries, not just the United States. See Alesina and Dollar 2000; Zanger 2000, 2007; Barratt 2004; Neumayer 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d; Berthelemy 2006.
manner, the motivation for the allocation and distribution of foreign assistance, specifically the way the United States situates the goal of promoting human rights in light of national security concerns. This necessitates a discussion of the debate between realpolitik and liberal approaches to foreign policy. Our second theme, the consequences of foreign aid, centers on a liberal view of the positive impact of economic penetration contrasted against a more disparaging assessment that is found in the critical literature within international relations. Here we offer a quantitative analysis and case studies to illustrate the impact of foreign aid on recipient states. Our last theme, and our concluding argument, is that regardless of the motivation and the impact, the consequences of such action must be known and taken into account. In other words, we argue that the United States cannot justify the ends with the means in this case. The consequences of such action will eventually erode national security as victims of US foreign policy, however good the intentions, will eventually seek alternative means of justice. We pose an important and timely question in light of today’s international political climate and provide evidence that suggests that while the US bilateral foreign assistance program fulfills many foreign policy objectives, its record in improving human rights has been far less successful.

**Chapter Outlines**

The first chapter discusses the dilemmas in pursuing a human rights policy as part of US foreign policy. Here we define what is meant by human rights, both from a universal or international perspective, as well as what the United States means when it refers to human rights. We transition, then, to a discussion of the evolution of human rights in the context of American foreign policy and the dilemmas the state encounters in pursuit of such a policy. We close this chapter with our arguments advocating an ethical approach to the allocation and distribution of US foreign assistance.

In Chapter 2, we examine, in a historical fashion, the motivations of the US foreign assistance program. Here we discuss the economic, political, and social goals that the United States sought to accomplish, first in the rebuilding of Europe after World War II and then in the various developing regions around the world. This chapter will trace US aims through the anti-communism of the Cold War to the twenty-first century global battle against terrorism. In doing so, we highlight specific cases of aid to Egypt and Israel as part of the Middle East Peace Process.

Chapter 3 focuses on the concepts of human rights and US foreign assistance. We provide a discussion of the dilemmas of measuring human rights, that is, adequately capturing the concept of both security rights and subsistence rights in a quantitative measure. This section also outlines the derivation of both variables concluding with descriptive statistics for both types of rights. The elements of economic and military aid are outlined in Chapter 3 as well. Here we define and describe the various programs that constitute the US foreign assistance program. In a similar fashion as the human rights section, we provide summary statistics of both economic and military aid, closing with an analysis of the correlation between human rights and foreign aid.

Chapter 4 provides the empirical model regarding the relationship between foreign assistance and human rights including a discussion of the control variables
that have been established as important factors in the determinants of human rights. This chapter also explains the methodology employed in the study. Briefly, this study examines not only the influence of foreign aid on the level of human rights but whether the effect of foreign aid is moderated by levels of democracy and wealth. In both instances, we are interested in the relationship over time (1976–2003) and across most nations. As such, pooled cross-sectional time series analysis is the most appropriate design. Finally, the results of the empirical analysis are discussed.

Chapter 5 presents a case study on Plan Colombia. This chapter examines the US decision to grant military aid to Colombia and the subsequent impact the program has on human rights in Colombia. Proponents of the plan suggest that the only way to improve human rights and democracy in Colombia, not to mention the US domestic drug problem, is to provide the Colombian government with the necessary firepower to curb the activities of the drug cartels. Opponents of the plan argue that the influx of any additional military firepower will only serve to increase the level of human rights violations and do very little to help democratization efforts. Despite an extremely poor human rights record, the US government approved Plan Colombia and over its existence has ear-marked billions in aid to the Latin America country. Ultimately, we examine the consequences of such action and come to some conclusions regarding the responsibility the United States has for the human rights conditions in Colombia.

In Chapter 6, we analyze the relationship between the United States and Turkey. US foreign assistance to Turkey has long been tied to stabilizing the region with respect to Turkey’s relationship with Greece and the island of Cyprus, and, after 11 September, to cooperation in the war on terrorism. Foreign aid to Turkey is meant to promote and strengthen democracy in a country bordering a mostly non-democratic region, the Middle East. Given Turkey’s relatively poor human rights record, the stabilization of the region and war on terrorism must qualify as a circumstance that allows the executive branch the ability to override human rights legislation. This chapter examines the US-Turkey relationship in light of our foreign assistance program, with an eye to the Turkish government’s desire to become a member of the EU. Specifically, we seek to understand how the aid impacts human rights and whether foreign assistance to Turkey improves the quality of life of its citizens.

The fragile relationship between Pakistan and India and their respective relationship to the United States is explored in Chapter 7. Throughout the Cold War, the two nations had varying degrees of relations with the United States, and despite questionable to atrocious human rights (and anti-democratic principles in Pakistan), both countries now receive substantial aid from the US. India receives its aid as a stabilizing factor in the region, and a growing global power, while Pakistan receives aid as an ally in the war on terror. This chapter addresses the reasons behind US assistance to Pakistan (with an eye to the impact of the relationship between India and Pakistan) that clearly have little to do with the improvement of human rights, and the consequences of that policy.

Our last chapter considers the extent of the damage to the US in pursuing a policy rhetorically designed for the improvement of human rights that actually proves to be counterproductive in that area. The implications for US foreign policy are explored
given the empirical and case study results. The combined results suggest that foreign assistance is not the optimal means to attempt to alter, that is improve, a regime’s behavior regarding human rights. Suggestions that foreign aid has the potential to do otherwise are not supported by any empirical results in this study. Thus, this research comes to the general conclusion that the US foreign aid program has perpetuated and contributed to poor human rights conditions in recipient states and should not be used, rhetorically or in practice, as a tool to improve human rights. In addressing national security concerns, the United States will undoubtedly continue to utilize foreign assistance for security purposes, but it should pursue alternative paths for human rights. While the allocation of foreign assistance may serve a valuable national security tool, it often does so at the expense of citizens elsewhere.

This study reflects a major dilemma regarding US foreign policy—when and how should the United States address human rights around the globe and what is its responsibility? On the surface, allocating foreign assistance on the basis of ethical convictions suggests that the United States is interested in improving the human condition around the globe. However, national security interests often taint even this motive. At the present time, we have to conclude that the US foreign assistance program has little to do with a moral imperative to improve human rights and is simply another blunt instrument aimed at shoring up US national security. In spite of political rhetoric and even sincere intentions on the part of policymakers regarding foreign assistance policy, it appears that the US foreign assistance program has failed to live up to its human rights objectives. Can this paradigm change? We offer a few solutions in order for the US foreign assistance program to transform with the demands of the twenty-first century.
PART I
Human Rights and US Foreign Policy:
Theories, Measurement, and Models
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Chapter 1

The Road to Hell is Paved with Good Intentions

No ethics in the world can dodge the fact that in numerous instances the attainment of “good” ends is bound to the fact that one must be willing to pay the price of using morally dubious or at least dangerous means—and facing the possibility or even probability of evil ramifications. From no ethic in the world can it be concluded when and to what extent the ethically good purpose “justifies” the ethically dangerous means and ramifications (Weber 1919, 121).

The foreign assistance program has been hailed as an essential element in US foreign policy since the end of World War II. While the stated objectives of the program have evolved and changed over the decades, one of the constant themes has been the improvement of the lives of others around the world, including increasing the respect for human rights. Even before World War II, US presidents expressed a will to use American foreign policy to shape political conditions around the world. Woodrow Wilson wanted to make the “world safe for democracy” by ending colonialism and supporting self-determination as elements of his Fourteen Points. Franklin D. Roosevelt looked “forward to a world founded upon four freedoms” which included the freedom of expression and religion as well as the freedom from want and fear. Ultimately, Roosevelt (1941) stated that “[f]reedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who struggle to gain those rights or keep them.” This support would soon manifest itself in the form of, among other things, foreign aid.

After World War II, these efforts at improving the human condition continued as US leaders began to recognize the linkage between poor living conditions and the appeal of socialism, particularly in the war-ravaged countries of Europe. Thus began the inextricable link between national security concerns and human rights conditions. Perhaps no better early example of this linkage exists than the Truman Doctrine, which initiated the policy of containment that dominated the Cold War era. In a speech before a Joint Session of Congress on 12 March 1947, President Harry S. Truman remarked,

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. I believe that it
must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic stability and orderly political process.

The Truman Doctrine, along with the Marshall Plan, was the genesis of a massive political, economic, and social philosophy aimed at combating communism. It also launched a foreign aid program to Greece and Turkey that continues through to today.

This focus on human rights was consistent with the desire to support and promote democratization and economic development in countries with governments friendly to the United States, first in the war against communism and now the war on terror. In fact, we often hear in the rhetoric from US leaders that the pursuit of democracy and improved human rights goes hand in hand with security concerns. Speaking to the UN General Assembly three years after 11 September, President George W. Bush (2004) remarked, “I’ve outlined a broad agenda to advance human dignity, and enhance the security of all of us. The defeat of terror, the protection of human rights, the spread of prosperity, the advance of democracy—these causes, these ideals, call us to great work in the world.” While seemingly in harmony, the pursuit of national security and human rights are often pitted against one another in practice. On one hand, the United States has embarked on a mission, some might argue a crusade, to spread democracy and subsequently human rights around the globe. On the other hand, these objectives are often compromised in times of national security. Of course, most policy decisions are not black or white, that is, the choice usually is not one extreme or the other, realpolitik or utopian. Rather, multiple goals and objectives portend a blend of these two extremes found in the relations between states, ultimately suggesting that the road to hell (human rights hell) is indeed often paved with good (and sometimes bad) intentions.

This foreign policy dilemma is exemplified in congressional debates regarding the allocation of foreign assistance to countries with poor human rights records. In the 1970s and 1980s, legislators argued whether the United States should consider a state’s human rights practices when allocating economic and military aid. As a result, Congress passed several amendments to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) designed to link the allocation and distribution of foreign aid to human rights practices in recipient states.\(^1\) In the late 1990s, the debate resurfaced during congressional discussions regarding granting Colombia a substantial foreign aid package in order to combat the drug trade.\(^2\) Supporters in Congress of the plan point to the domestic drug problem as the primary reason for the need of foreign assistance; however, they often resort to human rights and democracy rhetoric for support.

We have the obligation to at least assist them with some additional fire power with which to fight the druggies who have been using our dollars to buy weapons to fight the people there who are trying to preserve their democracy…Narco-guerillas, funded by the illicit drug

\(^1\) A full explication of the history of congressional action regarding foreign assistance is offered in Chapter 2.

\(^2\) An in-depth discussion of Plan Colombia is offered in Chapter 5.
trade, now threaten the oldest democracy in Latin America. The Colombian government has the political will, but not the resources to combat this threat. Failing to provide US “Supplemental” aid will further weaken Colombia’s democratic institutions, jeopardize its fragile economy and undermine its ability to negotiate peace (Souder 2000).

Congressmen Mark Souder’s (R-IN) urging was accompanied by that of Congressman Cass Ballenger (R-NC) who described a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) attack on a village and argued that this “attack should present us with the more clear evidence that any further delay…will result in more violence, more attacks, and could threaten the very existence of the Colombian government” (Ballenger 2000a). The congressman offered an even more dramatic plea for passage of the Colombian aid package imploring that,

In Shakespeare’s play Julius Caesar, the soothsayer warned Caesar to “beware of the Ides of March.” Caesar did not listen and Caesar perished. Today, on this Ides of March, I bring my colleagues fair warning. If we do not pass the Colombia aid package, our friends in Colombia could suffer the same fate as Caesar and our own children could be next (Ballenger 2000b).

Lastly, Madeline Albright, US Secretary of State under President Bill Clinton, urged that the Colombian aid package and Colombian President Andres Pastrana “merits our support for his plan to fight drug trafficking, achieve peace, promote prosperity and improve governance throughout his country” (CNN 2000). The implication of such rhetoric implies a link between foreign aid and improved human rights.

Opponents of Plan Colombia in Congress argue that supply-side attacks in the war on drugs are and have been fruitless, and funding should be provided for domestic drug treatment programs (Ramstad 2000). More important to our research, opponents point to the potentially deleterious impact of foreign assistance, and in this case military assistance in particular, on human rights. When it comes to foreign aid, policymakers express a desire that such aid will actually promote human rights and democracy. In the least, they argue that foreign aid should not be employed as a tool for state abuse. In 2000, the late Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN) lamented that,

We have just voted, with essentially no strings attached, to be involved in a military operation in Colombia with the money going for a military operation, to a military that does not lift a finger while these paramilitary death squads go in and massacre innocent people. I say to Senators, Democrats and Republicans, this is no longer Colombia’s business. This is our business because we now have provided the money for just such a military, which is complicit, not only in human rights violations…but in the murder of innocent people, including small children.3

Likewise, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) urged that “[w]e at least need to see a concerted effort by the Colombian Army to thwart the paramilitary groups, who are responsible for most of the atrocities against civilians, and a willingness by the Colombian Armed Forces to turn over to the civilian courts their own members who

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3 It is worth noting here that this military aid is actually classified as economic aid. A full explication of the categories of aid is provided in Chapter 3.
Strategic US Foreign Assistance

violate human rights” (Garcia 2000). This concern for the current human rights conditions in Colombia and the impact that any US foreign aid would have on these conditions did not delay or deter the program from making its way through the US Congress. In addition, this rhetoric highlights one of our objectives, that is, to ascertain whether the US foreign aid program is in line with its human rights objectives, a requisite for an ethical foreign policy, we would argue, in regards to human rights.

This concern regarding the impact of foreign aid on human rights is repeated in congressional debates regarding other threatened peoples around the world. For example, in comments regarding the plight of the Kurds in Turkey, Congressman Bob Filner (D-CA) argued that it “is imperative that we affirm a human rights linkage with any foreign aid given by the United States and oppose the furnishing of lethal equipment to those who would use it for repressive purposes” (Filner 1997). In one last example, Senator Wellstone again expressed concern regarding US security aid, this time to Uzbekistan in support of the US war on terror given the country’s poor human rights record. He argued that “we must ensure that anti-terrorism efforts are conducted in a manner that protects religious freedom and other human rights, and we must carefully monitor our cooperation with Uzbekistan to ensure that protection” (Wellstone 2001). Time and time again, congressional members go on the record linking foreign aid to human rights, cautioning fellow members of allocating aid to countries with poor human rights records. However, time and time again, the executive branch of the United States, through loopholes in the legislation, continues to allocate foreign assistance to these very violators. One of the questions we ask is, what are the consequences?

The Foreign Assistance Dilemma: The Battle Between Human Rights and National Security

The foreign aid consequence regarding human rights, illustrated in the collective concerns of US politicians, is the focus of this research. However, we recognize (and agree) that the national security needs of the United States are generally as, if not more, important to these same policymakers. There is no expectation or requirement that states must put the security needs of citizens of other states above their own. The tension between human rights concerns and national security interests is exemplified in statements from US policymakers and the institutions they represent, including a recent White Paper on foreign assistance from the US Agency for International Development (USAID 2004). Here, several operational goals of US foreign assistance address the desire to transform fragile and underdeveloped states as well as provide humanitarian assistance. At the same time, the fulfillment of another operational goal, that of “supporting US strategic interests,” especially in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, may naturally clash with the others, setting up potential, and perhaps inevitable, conflicts of interest. Thus, there is often an inherent contradiction in the motivation for and the consequences of aid which manifests itself in the dilemma between foreign policies based on self-interest and policies based on human needs. This inconsistency of US human rights
The Road to Hell is Paved with Good Intentions

Policy over the last six decades demonstrates that the promotion of human rights, the concerns for economic and social development in poorer nations, and ultimately peace within these regions, are often sacrificed for national security concerns leaving foreign assistance to be intrinsically strategic in nature rather than humanitarian.

While it is of no great revelation that foreign aid has a strategic element, the consequences of the allocation and distribution of foreign aid where actual citizens are concerned seldom goes beyond any anecdotal evidence. We contend that the consequences of US foreign assistance must be understood and taken into account by US policymakers in order to maintain (if not recover) American credibility in the international arena, particularly in the realm of international human rights. Thus we also ask, is it possible to implement a foreign policy based on both intentions and consequences, in other words an ethical foreign policy? Ultimately, we suggest that the US foreign assistance program should first do no harm, and if it does, the United States should acknowledge the ramifications of its bilateral foreign aid program and initiate steps to overcome it. In sum, we address the following major questions:

- How do we explain the motivation to allocate and distribute foreign assistance?
- What are the consequences of the allocation and distribution of foreign assistance?
- What is the responsibility of the United States to ensure that the consequences match the motivations?

The remainder of the chapter is divided into two major sections. The first section provides the rationale for and the evolution of a human rights policy in the United States. The second section focuses on the theoretical arguments related to the motivation for aid, the consequences of aid, and lastly the responsibility the United States has to build the bridge between the motivation and consequences of its foreign aid program.

In Pursuit of a Human Rights Policy

Beyond the political and economic destruction, the aftermath of World War II also left many nations destroyed socially. The human rights atrocities associated with the war led to a post-war emphasis on human rights, with the United States leading in the insistence that Nazi leaders be punished for their crimes against humanity. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed and adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, with additional covenants regarding economic, political, and social rights following in 1976. The implementation of human rights policy either domestically or internationally, however, was another matter. In fact, a focus on human rights as an integral part of US foreign policy was slow to evolve (Shestack 1989). US leadership in the formulation of a human rights regime, but its reluctance to “submit to the jurisdiction of international bodies that enforce or monitor human rights commitments” is tied to foreign policy (Orentlicher 1992, 341). This reluctance was justified by concerns that US laws would be superseded by international law, the loss of US sovereignty, or damage to national security. The
most recent example is the refusal on the part of the United States to submit to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Fearful that the far-reaching jurisdiction of the ICC will eventually lead to the prosecution of American soldiers as well as infringe upon the sovereignty of the state, the United States finds itself as one of the most vocal opponents of the ICC.4 The combination of these factors hinders not only America’s own commitment to human rights but also goes a long way in undermining US efforts to promote human rights in other countries.

Although the US Senate did not ratify many of these international documents, policymakers nonetheless became interested in improving living conditions in the less developed countries and began a commitment, at least rhetorically, to improvement of a whole host of human rights. These efforts are evident in congressional legislation passed tying foreign assistance to human rights practices, as well as passing legislation to fund programs under the direction of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). After the Vietnam War and the realpolitik policies of the Nixon Administration, Jimmy Carter sought to further and more deeply link human rights policy with the US foreign aid program. While congressional members had addressed the human rights component of aid with the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 and later amendments, President Carter made human rights a cornerstone of his foreign policy agenda. Specifically, he attempted, with little success, to make adherence to accepted human rights practices a key factor in granting foreign assistance to a recipient nation. In the 1970s and continuing into Reagan’s tenure, congressional legislators argued about whether the United States should consider a state’s human rights practices when allocating economic and military aid. Ultimately, Congress passed the 1982 Harken Amendment mandating that no assistance will be granted to “the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”5

However, caveats in the amendment allowed for exceptions or loopholes when national security interests were at stake. As a result, the United States granted (and continues to grant) extensive amounts of foreign aid to countries with poor human rights records in the name of national security. During the Cold War, recipients were client-states that fit the mold of “anything but communist.” Today, recipient states are allies in the “decisive ideological struggle of the twenty-first century” in a scenario that is best described as “anything but terrorists.”6 Although questions

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4 Ironically, the failure of the United States to ratify the Rome Statutes implementing the ICC places it in the category of “rogue states” along with Libya, China, Algeria, Yemen, and Qatar (Bosco 1998; Tepperman 2000). In addition, the United States has passed several pieces of legislation curbing foreign assistance to countries that do sign the ICC. The APSA and Nethercutt amendments address military and economic aid specifically and reduce such aid to countries unless they sign Article 98 of the ICC which is a bilateral agreement where countries agree not to pursue any prosecution of US citizens in the ICC.

5 A complete overview of the foreign aid program and the actions of the different presidential administrations is provided in Chapter 2.

6 The phrase “decisive ideological struggle” is often invoked by President George W. Bush in describing the war on terror. Jentleson (2004) refers to certain regimes as ABC democrats, that is “anything but communist,” to describe authoritarian governments friendly to the United States during the Cold War.
about the recipient country’s human rights records have been central to the debate concerning aid allocation in the post-Cold War environment, the security concerns regarding certain regimes are just as important. For example, the human rights debate was pronounced during the discussions regarding Plan Colombia. However, security concerns were also at play. In this case, over $1 billion was appropriated in 2000 to ostensibly “assist Colombia in vital counter-drug efforts aimed at keeping illegal drugs off US shores and to help Colombia promote peace, prosperity, and a stronger democracy” (US ONDCP 2005). In this one statement, we see the inherent battle within the US foreign assistance program: donor interest in the area of national security and ethical considerations in the form of democratization and humanitarianism in recipient states.

More recently we saw this duality in US efforts to use Turkey as a gateway into Iraq in 2003. Although Turkey refused to allow 62,000 US troops access to the country to open a northern front against Iraq, the Bush Administration requested $1 billion in grants for Turkey. Proclaiming recipient needs (the damage to the Turkish economy by the war in Iraq), the money gained the United States some leverage in Turkey, whose leaders supported the war effort despite a great deal of anti-war public opinion. In today’s political climate, human rights are often at the forefront of foreign policy. The war in Iraq, treatment of combatants in Guantanamo Bay, as well as the allocation of foreign aid to gross human rights violators like Pakistan have refocused the world’s attention on the claims made by the United States that they are the champions of democracy and human rights; rhetoric that has little evidence in the eyes of many.

**Dilemmas in human rights policy**

The tension between realpolitik or donor-interest and recipient interest regarding foreign assistance presents the United States with a real quandary when it comes to formulating a cogent human rights policy. In fact, linking foreign assistance to human rights presents several problems or dilemmas in foreign policy decision-making. These problems include the definition of human rights, the question of whether policymakers and the public care about human rights in terms of foreign policy objectives, and lastly the constraints associated with pursuing a human rights policy at all.

**Problem 1: What are human rights? Whose definition matters?** While it is not the purpose of this research to debate the origins and specific nature of human rights, it is important to understand how countries view human rights, particularly in light of their foreign policies. There are at least three areas of concern within the human rights and American foreign policy literature regarding the nature of human rights pertinent to our research. The first issue lies within the actual definition of human rights itself. There is a certain level of agreement when considering human rights in general. For example, Cranston (1973, 7) suggests that human rights are something that pertains to all men at all times, in that “they are rights which belong to a man simply because he is a man.” Donnelly (1989, 12) concurs, stating that “[H]uman rights are a special class of rights, the rights that one has simply because one is a
human being.” Similarly, Vincent (1986, 13) contends that “human rights are the rights that everyone has, and everyone equally, by virtue of their very humanity. They are grounded in an appeal to our human nature.” Lastly, Hedley Bull defines human rights as those that are attached “to human beings as such, rather than to this or that class or human beings. They are thought to be enjoyed by all human beings, to be enjoyed by human beings only and to be enjoyed by them equally” (Bull 1979, 6).

Yet, disagreement emerges when one is asked for specificity. There are a plethora of terms used to describe a whole host of different types or subsets of rights including security rights, political and civil rights, subsistence rights, basic human needs, first-generation rights, second-generation rights, and third-generation rights. There is little consensus, however, that all of these types of rights actually constitutes a human right and whether they all are even considered universal rights. For example, Cranston (1964, 40) posits that the traditional rights to life, liberty, and property are “universal, paramount, categorical rights.” However, he continues stating that economic and social rights are emphatically not universal and in fact “belong to a different logical category” (Cranston 1964, 54). Donnelly (1989) disagrees and suggests that civil and political rights on the one hand and economic and social rights on the other are interdependent, that is, they are realized together and cannot easily be separated into categories of human rights and non-human rights. In fact, quantitative studies have indicated that the different types of rights, including security rights and basic human needs, are actually realized together and are in fact complimentary (Milner, Leblang and Poe 1999).

The differences in countries’ human rights priorities emerged as states attempted to clarify exactly what constitutes human rights. These differences have had an impact on the formulation of foreign policy, specifically how states develop a foreign policy based on poverty versus a policy based on gross human rights violations. This is even more difficult when what is considered a gross human rights violation in the West may be considered a cultural practice elsewhere. For example, certain non-western religious and cultural practices such as female genital mutilation rituals in Africa and “honor killings” in Islamic culture are deemed human rights violations in the west. In what are commonly referred to as second and third generation rights, many non-western countries place an emphasis on subsistence and quality of life issues as well as collective and group rights while individual rights and liberties are emphasized in the West.

This leads to the second area of concern regarding the nature of human rights, the one between cultural relativism and universalism, specifically do universal rights exist? The passage of the UN Charter as well as the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) suggests that there is an internationally or universally accepted minimal standard of human rights. This assumption is based, in part, on the wording of the preamble of the UN Charter which calls for the organization to “achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and

7 An “honor killing” refers to the murder of women in Islamic states for the crimes of adultery and other sexual offenses. See position paper by the Muslim Women’s League at http://www.mwlusa.org/pub_hk.shtml.
The Road to Hell is Paved with Good Intentions

encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion” (UN Charter, Article 1, paragraph
3). In addition, the assumption is supported by the fact that this charter has been
signed by nearly every country of the world.

However, the UDHR does not carry much, if any, legal weight. The consensus
regarding the UDHR, and its sister covenants, only binds the states of the international
community together in a political and moral way. One of the major points of contention
from the perspective of developing states is that the UDHR reflects western views,
marginalizing and even omitting non-western views on human rights, thereby
precluding any ability to claim universality.8 Beyond the perception that concepts of
universality in the UDHR reflect an ethno-centric western view, developing states
are also leery of the motives of those states that developed the UDHR and led in the
establishment and development of the human rights regime. Like many other issue
areas, developing states believe that attempts at establishing a universal code of
human rights is yet another avenue for developed states to dominate the rest of the
international community. Perhaps most importantly for the debate on universalism
and cultural relativism is the contention that individual rights are emphasized at
the expense of social, economic, and cultural rights as well as group and collective
rights. It is these types of rights that are more sought out by developing countries
(Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway 2007). This critique leads to another debate
within the human rights literature, that is, the types of rights that are addressed in
foreign policy decisions.

When the United States refers to human rights in the context of foreign policy,
what rights are they referring to? We can find references to human rights laced in the
rhetoric of US presidents and statesmen throughout history. The very first reference
is found in the Declaration of Independence, where Thomas Jefferson penned that
“We hold these truths to be self-evident—that all men are created equal; that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” In delivering his Fourteen Points Address to
the US Congress, President Woodrow Wilson declared that “An evident principle…is
the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal
terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.” And
John F. Kennedy commented that “[I]n giving rights to others which belong to them,
we give rights to ourselves.” One of the best sources, however, for how the United
States actually defines human rights is found in a speech by Cyrus Vance, Secretary
of State during the Carter Administration, on Law Day before the University of
Georgia’s Law School, 30 April 1977.9 Vance states,

Our human rights policy must be understood in order to be effective…Our concern for
human rights is built upon ancient values. It looks with hope to a world in which liberty
is not just a great cause, but the common condition. In the past, it may have seemed
sufficient to put our name to international documents that spoke loftily of human rights.

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8 It should be noted that most of today’s developing countries were not a party to the
drafting of the UDHR as most were colonies at the time.

9 This speech is important since Carter’s presidency ushered in a new era in US human
rights policy.
That is not enough. We will go to work, alongside other people and governments, to protect and enhance the dignity of the individual.

Let me define what we mean by “human rights”. First, there is the right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of the person. Such violations include torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; and arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. And they include denial of fair public trial, and invasion of the home.

Second, there is the right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care, and education. We recognize that the fulfillment of this right will depend, in part, upon the state of a nation’s economic development. But we also know that this right can be violated by a Government’s action or inaction which divert resources to an elite at the expense of the needy, or through indifference to the plight of the poor.

Third, there is the right to enjoy civil and political liberties: freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly; freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of movement both within and outside one’s own country; freedom to take part in government.

Our policy is to promote all these rights. They are all recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a basic document which the United States helped to fashion and which the United Nations approved in 1948. There may be disagreement on the priorities these rights deserve. I believe that, with work, all of these rights can become complementary and mutually reinforcing (Vance 1977).

Interpreting these remarks, one might conclude that the United States places an emphasis, at least rhetorically and theoretically, on security rights, political and civil rights, as well as what are called subsistence rights or basic human needs.10

However, the priority in American foreign policy, particularly diplomatic efforts, has traditionally focused on the first two.11 This is demonstrated by the fact that the United States has signaled, through the ratification of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (1976), that the types of rights they deem as universal include civil and political rights and those rights referred to as security rights. The origins of these rights as they apply to citizens within states, at least in the western context, can be traced to the Virginia Bill of Rights (1776) that was incorporated into the United States Constitution in 1791 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789 (Baehr 1994). In these documents, individual rights and liberties are laid out, primarily derived from the writings of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau and include the right to life, liberty, and property as well as the right not to be tortured and falsely imprisoned by one’s government. These particular rights have evolved into what are referred to as political, civil and security rights or first

10 For a complete discussion regarding the concept of basic human rights see Shue (1980).

11 The United States does engage in a variety of programs aimed at improving subsistence rights, however, in foreign policy diplomacy which includes debates and negotiations regarding human rights, the emphasis is on civil and political rights, as well as security rights. It should be noted that there are far greater numbers of economic development programs than military ones. Thus, while security and political rights dominate in the realm of diplomacy, addressing the level of subsistence rights, or basic human needs, have been a staple of the US foreign assistance program. In addition, we address subsistence rights in our models presented in Chapter 4.
generation rights. It is these types of rights that statesmen tend to focus their foreign policy objectives on, particularly as the United States attempts to alter or change another state’s behavior. In addition, the violations of these types of rights also tend to be the focus of the media and NGOs; for example, Amnesty International’s initial focus was on torture. In the international arena, these types of human rights have been codified in a variety of treaties and resolutions. The protection of first generation rights are found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951), and The Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1975) among others. These documents attempt to promote the civil and political rights, as well as the physical integrity rights (that is, the right to life, the right not to be tortured, and so on), of citizens throughout the world.

On the other hand, the United States has failed to support many other major international human rights documents, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976). This signals to the international community that the United States does not want to be held accountable or responsible for the provision or realization of these types of rights. The United States is in the minority, however, as the international community has also recognized the need to go beyond these first generation rights and address additional types of basic rights. These are codified in such documents as the Helsinki Agreement (1975), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1976), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), and the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development (1986). In what are generally referred to second-generation rights, these documents seek to address the economic, social, and cultural rights of the citizens in the world. These types of rights are seemingly more difficult to realize as they require fundamental structural changes within a society.

It has long been argued that the United States should take social and economic rights more seriously (Shue 1980; Donnelly 1989; Howard 1983; Shestack 1989; Forsythe 1990). According to Forsythe (1990, 453), the United States focuses on political and civil liberties and security rights to the exclusion of the basic needs for survival, pointing out that the,

human rights movement in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America demand rights that go beyond the American tradition. They demand entitlements to adequate food, clothing, shelter, health care, and education. To argue that these demands on public authorities are not as essential to human dignity and welfare as demands for civil and political rights is to fail to understand and relate to less affluent, less individualistic societies.

Likewise, Shestack (1989, 27) argues that the United States “must also, at long last, cope with the neglected aspects of human rights that will, in the years ahead, undoubtedly cause ferment...These rights involve concepts of distributive justice that we have been reluctant to accept.” In the twenty-first century, the international community, as well as the United States, is finding that other entities are providing
for social services, creating allegiances to organizations that may not be in the best interest of the United States. For example, Palestinians in the West Bank or Gaza more often turn to Hamas for support which has “largely supplanted the crumbling and feeble institutions of the Palestinian authority. A poor Palestinian…might send a child to a Hamas school on a Hamas bus, use a low-cost Hamas medical clinic, play soccer at a Hamas sports club and perhaps rely on a ration of Hamas rice” (Kifner 2006). Thus, addressing these types of human rights is as important as addressing security rights violations.

**Problem 2: Do US policymakers and the American public care about international human rights and should they?** As the examples in the introduction of this chapter demonstrate, rhetoric from policy makers suggests that human rights concerns are often used in the formation of foreign policy, particularly the allocation of foreign assistance. In fact, “idealistic ends—peace, freedom, order, justice, harmony—are the staples of political rhetoric. But the engine that has driven foreign policy since the end of World War II has been interests” (Shestack 1989, 19). However, the confrontation between national security concerns and the exportation of the ideals of American democracy pose both moralistic and practical dilemmas in the realm of international relations and American foreign policy. While we recognize that the purposes of foreign aid are multifaceted, and national security is the primary goal of all states, in the end does the United States truly attempt to influence human rights conditions through foreign policy decisions? In other words, how important are human rights in US foreign policy? According to the US State Department (2007), they are very important as human rights are considered a cornerstone of American foreign policy;

> The protection of fundamental human rights was a foundation stone in the establishment of the United States over 200 years ago. Since then, a central goal of US foreign policy has been the promotion of respect for human rights, as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United States understands that the existence of human rights helps secure the peace, deter aggression, promote the rule of law, combat crime and corruption, strengthen democracies, and prevent humanitarian crises.

Indeed, policies ranging from the Truman Doctrine to the Peace Corps, from the Alliance for Progress to the more recent Plan Colombia, are all positioned within the human rights rhetoric and claim US support for human rights. More specifically, several foreign aid program explicitly target democratization and human rights efforts, particularly those programs focusing on the republics of the former Soviet Union.

Beyond rhetorical arguments, there are a number of practical arguments in support of a human rights policy. First and foremost is the fact that human rights are a global issue confronted by all states and international institutions. Second, there is an inherent link between the realization of human rights, peace, and security. It is apparent that human rights conditions around the world are connected to US

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12 For a complete discussion on the role of Hamas and social services, see Levitt (2006). It should be noted that Hamas was victorious in parliamentary elections in January 2006.
security at home. As Schultz (2001) contends, human rights are “in our own best interests.” Tied to the security argument is the idea that human rights are valued by liberal democracies and “our support of human rights would thus help build a coalition of liberal states, further peace, confound our adversaries, and reinforce our claim to world leadership based on elements other than military might” (Shestack 1989, 21). A third argument in favoring of pursuing a human rights policy is that it will facilitate the development of a just world order based on shared norms. Finally, pursuing a human rights element as part of US foreign policy would be a reflection of those values that are important to the American public (Shestack 1989).

Ultimately, the American public does consider human rights to be an important facet of American foreign policy. Holsti (1996) contends that the American public’s interest in human rights was sharpened due to the Vietnam War. He writes that a;

combination of the civil rights movement at home, revelations of gross human rights abuses by some American allies—including the South Vietnamese regime on whose behalf the United States was expending vast treasure and lives—and reactions to the stark realpolitik foreign policies of the Nixon-Kissinger period combined to rekindle interest in human rights foreign policy goals that had rarely played more than a secondary role during the height of the Cold War (Holsti 1996, 1).

Polling data lends support to this assertion and to the idea that this interest has not waned. A February 2005 Gallup poll indicates that an overwhelming majority of Americans (86 percent) believe that promoting human rights should be a priority in US foreign policy, albeit not the most important (particularly when ranked against other objectives such as the war on terrorism and restoring trust in government). This has remained consistent since the end of the Vietnam War. According to World Public Opinion (2007), “[I]n every quadrennial survey since 1974, more than 80 percent have said this goal (promoting human rights) is important, and the percentage saying it is very important climbed to 47 percent in 2002 from 39 percent in 1998 and 34 percent in 1994.” Perhaps naively, citizens expect that US action, and perhaps even intervention, in other states will serve the greater good in that a “large majority of American believe that the US has a positive impact on other countries when it comes to democratic values and human rights” and a “strong majority supports the idea that US foreign aid can and should be used to help promote new democracies and thus human rights” (World Public Opinion 2007, 2–4).

In essence, the American public has a concern for people around the world and believes that the United States should take this into account when formulating foreign policy. This is especially true when citizens hear reports of abusive regimes and the denial of basic freedoms. Polls have consistently found that US citizens generally agree that in situations where atrocities are occurring, that some form of intervention should take place. According to a National Opinion Research Center poll in 2004, 75 percent of Americans favored the following arguments: “If a country seriously violates

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13 In Our Own Best Interests (2001) is the title of a book by William Schutlz, executive director of Amnesty International, US.

14 This Gallup poll is referenced in the World Public Opinion’s article on “Human Rights: Promoting International Human Rights” (2007).
human rights, the United Nations should intervene.” Additional polls support the idea that states should no longer hide behind the veil of sovereignty as a justification for the violation of human rights and the impediment to international intervention.15 The actions that the US government implements in the name of human rights, therefore, should have positive results on human rights in the minds of US citizens.

Thus, from a public opinion perspective, the American public demands a foreign policy based on their own self-image of “an exceptional people who stand for freedom around the world” (Forsythe 1995, 111). This sentiment of American moral “exceptionalism” and the demand and will of the American people is the basis of many arguments for United States involvement in promoting human rights around the world (Schifter 1992, Forsythe 1995; Ruttan 1996). In fact, Eberstadt (1988, 1) suggests that Americans have traditionally been concerned about the well-being of others around the world since the beginning of the nation and that this concern is “guided by a political creed that emphasized the universal and indivisible dignity of man.” From the rhetoric of policy makers to the opinion of the American public, it seems that human rights is and should be a policy objective of the United States. As we will see, however, implementation of such a policy is difficult at best.

Problem 3: What are some constraints or difficulties in pursuing a human rights policy? There are several possible foreign policy constraints when it comes to formulating human rights policy. One such constraint is the fact that governments critical of human rights practices believe they must maintain a friendly and working relationship with the abusive regime (Luard 1992; Baehr and Castermans-Holleman 2004). Vincent (1989) argues that it is not enough to have a relationship; diplomats need to maintain good ones. He articulates that if the purpose of “diplomacy is communication among states, then it may be argued that a concern with human rights obstructs the fulfillment of that function…The professional diplomat, sensitive to cultural differences, is disinclined to allows political questions like that of human rights to upset the professionalism of his or her communication” (Vincent 1989, 55). The assertion is that increased criticism of a regime may cause resentment leading to a difficult and contentious diplomatic relationship. For example, shortly after the US State Department issued its 2000 annual report on human rights, the Chinese Foreign Minister accused the United States of a double standard when it comes to human rights contributing to an already difficult diplomatic relationship.16 In addition, Turkey has been a major recipient of US foreign aid since the late 1940s in spite of its poor human rights record. Subsequent abuses of human rights in Turkey have raised concerns, leading to public condemnation and the withholding of some military aid, but foreign assistance has not been suspended. For example, in 1994, Turkish authorities arrested Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) members of Parliament and banned DEP.

15 A Program on Policy Attitudes (PIPA) 1999 poll found that 62 percent agreed to intervention due to genocide; a 1999 Newsweek poll found that 68 percent agreed that sovereignty was not a license to kill as many of its people as a state wanted, without the consequences of intervention (World Public Opinion 2007).

16 See the news article at http://www.itn.co.uk/news/20010227/world/08china.shtml for details.
Congressional outrage lead to the withholding of a percentage of the aid until proof was obtained the US military equipment was not being used against civilians (CRS, 1996). Any harsher criticism, much less any punitive action, jeopardizes a very strategic relationship, a concern we turn to next. In short, diplomats’ attitudes are to “let human rights remain in the periphery. Taken in a foreign minister’s baggage on a world tour, they might…spoil the whole trip” (Vincent 1989, 58).

Second, strategic concerns may also serve as a foreign policy constraint on human rights policy. During the Cold War, foreign aid was often used as a policy tool to maintain political and economic control of less developed nations. In an attempt to keep them loyal allies against the Soviet Union, the United States gave considerable military and economic aid to Nicaragua, Iran, and South Vietnam—before anti-US governments dominated those states. In addition, governments are hesitant to criticize repressive regimes that control precious resources such as oil, as evidenced by the US relationship with the harsh regime in Saudi Arabia. Hesitation is also demonstrated in cases where sensitive negotiations are at stake, such as Carter’s unwillingness to link the improvement of human rights in the Soviet Union with progress on the SALT II Treaty. In more recent years, the United States has altered its criticism of the Russian government regarding the human rights conditions in Chechnya. Prior to 11 September 2001, the United States called on Russia to end their human rights abuses in the province. Afterwards, however, the United States has been far more sympathetic to the Russians as they battle the terrorist element in the region. As another example, recent attempts to criticize the Turkish government for its role in the Armenian genocide had the potential for serious repercussion at a time when Turkish support for US efforts in Iraq was most critical. For all of these reasons, it seems that the United States has traditionally turned a blind eye to human rights conditions in Turkey.\(^1\) Then there is Pakistan whose human rights practices are deplorable and whose people have been regularly under a military regime. Its strategic value, however, overrides these concerns as the United States attempts to juggle two nuclear powers in a very volatile region.\(^2\)

A third foreign policy constraint is the concept of sovereignty, one of the most heralded rules of diplomatic relations. Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, state sovereignty and territorial integrity have served to allow states to control domestic conditions free of international intervention. The emergence of human rights concerns in the latter half of the twentieth century has been slow to penetrate this enduring tenet of international relations. Despite the fact that “increasing pressures of regional and international organizations on human rights issues challenge state sovereignty more and more, states still treat certain issues such as internal displacement as internal matters and discount such coercions” (Celik 2005, 970). For example, the Turkish government has long considered its policies towards the Kurds and the internally displaced as a purely domestic matter. While they still have much room for improvement, pressure from the Council of Europe and conditions required for EU membership have lead to some improvements in the situation (Celik 2005). The ongoing, and basically unchecked, genocide conditions in the Sudan also illustrate

\(^{17}\) The specific human rights concerns in the case of Turkey are addressed in Chapter 6.  
\(^{18}\) A case study of Pakistan is provided in Chapter 7.
the difficulty in overcoming the sovereignty barrier to addressing human rights as part of a states’ foreign policy. Ultimately, Baehr and Castermans-Holleman (2004, 45) suggest that “a human rights policy often implies that a government deals with matters that other governments consider as part and parcel of their domestic affairs. This leads to a tension between traditional sovereignty and what the offending government sees as interference in another state’s affairs.”

Lastly, criticizing a state’s human rights practices simply may not be a very effective tool in human rights diplomacy. In fact, increased governmental criticism may actually alienate the repressive government, which only serves to decrease the influence of the United States. This result came to fruition in the case of Carter’s human rights policy in Latin America where states simply refused US foreign aid rather than be labelled a human rights violator. Government leaders maintain that such criticism constitutes a waste of energy and resources that could be utilized elsewhere. For example, once the US had made the strategic calculation that the end of the Cold War reduced the importance of Turkey (as NATO’s southern flank), in April 1990, George H.W. Bush insulted Turkey by condemning the Armenian genocide during World War I. This statement, as well as additional US actions, diminished (at least temporarily) the close ties between the US and Turkey. In fact, as a result, Turkey hesitated in providing assistance to the US in its attempts to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Thus, pushing a strong human rights policy often conflicts with a state’s national security interests. Additionally, in today’s war on terror, the United States risks criticism and credibility issues in terms of its own human rights practices.

A Theoretical Understanding of a Human Rights Policy

Given the interest of politicians and the stated objectives of the US government when it comes to human rights, and the importance of basic human needs and the desire to alleviate security rights abuse on a normative level, the question arises: does the US foreign assistance program attempt to address them? In what we call the human rights policy conundrum, the United States finds itself in a precarious position in that it promotes human rights on one hand and must carry out the duties of the hegemon on the other. Adding to the conundrum is that human rights are generally construed as an issue dealt with at the individual level and the United States operates at the state and systemic level. As such, we turn to the theoretical, as well as practical, reasons for allocating aid, that is, we first address the motivation for foreign assistance and then we turn our attention to the consequences of aid.

Motivation—Why aid?

We know from the literature that the motivation for allocating and distributing foreign assistance is rooted in several factors. In one of the earliest studies on

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19 It should be noted that Bush did not refer to it is a genocide, but as a massacre of one and half million members of the Armenian nation.
foreign assistance, Morgenthau (1962) argues that there are actually six purposes for the allocation of United States foreign aid: to provide subsistence to recipients, or what Mosley (1987) refers to as compassion; for economic development; to serve humanitarian purposes; for military purposes; to bolster American prestige around the world; and to serve as a bribe in diplomacy.\textsuperscript{20} Table 1.1 illustrates that twenty-first century foreign assistance, while containing some different specifics, still maintains the principles identified by Morgenthau 40 years earlier. The top half of the table shows the main categories of US foreign assistance, and the rest of the table highlights the specific goals of the assistance in support of the “three pillars” of US national security: global development, defense, and diplomacy. As we will see in the case studies, these three pillars or general aims of foreign assistance are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

### Table 1.1: The categories and goals of US foreign assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Aid</th>
<th>Goals of US Foreign Assistance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Development Aid</td>
<td>Promoting Economic Growth and Reducing Poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Assistance Supporting Political and Security Goals</td>
<td>Combating the Global HIV/AIDS Pandemic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Aid</td>
<td>Supporting Peace in the Middle East</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multilateral Economic Contributions</td>
<td>Fostering Democratization and Stability in Countries in Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid</td>
<td>Facilitating Democratization and Free Markets in Central Europe/Former Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suppressing International Narcotics Production and Trafficking</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alleviating Famine and Mitigating Refugee Situations</td>
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</table>


The first three purposes outlined by Morgenthau fit into what Ruttan (1989) calls “ethical considerations” and are consistent with liberal political thought. This position is also consistent with the concept of American “exceptionalism” and a sense of responsibility. Here the idea is to alleviate human suffering and to demonstrate compassion through the allocation and distribution of foreign assistance. Mosley (1987, 12) argues that there are several universal arguments for aid and one of them, distributive aid, fits into this category since it is “based on the value judgment that

\textsuperscript{20} Consistent with diplomatic efforts Mosley (1987, 5) describes a purpose of foreign aid as “a means of winning, and holding, the political and military support of Third World countries and hence creating jobs at home.”
the condition of life available to the poorer people of the Third World today are not acceptable, and should be relieved by transfers of income from those who have more.” In a similar vein, Hattori (2003) claims three ethical justifications for aid, all grounded in the liberal philosophy: a deontological, a utilitarian, and a humanitarian argument for aid. The first refers to an “imperfect obligation” whereby rich states have some duty to relieve suffering in poor ones. The utilitarian argument suggests that aid is a “moral response to the problems that can be solved with technical expertise” (Hattori 2003, 230). In other words, in order to alleviate human suffering and promote development, rich states have a duty to transfer their expertise to poor ones. The humanitarian argument, while self-explanatory, is accompanied by high levels of public support suggesting that average citizens want their governments to respond to poor living conditions around the world. These ethical considerations imply that it is not only possible, but desirable, to utilize foreign assistance as a tool for the betterment of societies. By extension, it is logical to assume that such aid would indeed be beneficial.

On the other hand, Morgenthau’s last three purposes (military, prestige, and diplomacy) correspond to Ruttan’s (1989) “donor self-interest” category and are consistent with the realist or realpolitik perspective on international relations, specifically that aid is justified on the grounds that is will enhance US national security (Cingranelli 1993). Mosley (1987, 12–13) succinctly articulates this donor-interest stating that “bilateral aid by one country can buy political support for that country.” In subsequent chapters, we will see that time and time again the United States utilizes foreign assistance as an integral part of modern-day dollar diplomacy. While this was a particularly prevalent weapon to maintain the Cold War alignment, we are witnessing foreign aid utilized as a tool in the war on terror alignment. While allocating foreign assistance on the basis of ethical considerations suggests a positive relationship between aid and respect for human rights, one does not expect improved respect for human rights from the allocation of foreign assistance on the basis of donor self-interest. It is this latter motivation that leads critics to argue that foreign assistance does more harm than good (Ruttan 1989). In the case of Plan Colombia, allocating aid for the promotion of human rights and judicial reform suggests that the United States is making “ethical considerations.” On the other hand, the “donor self-interest” of US national security and the desire to curb drug trafficking sheds a realist light on Plan Colombia, one that might not necessarily take into account human rights. In the case of Turkey and Pakistan, the national interest, as we will see in later chapters, lies in maintaining allies in the war on terror. It is clear that the security concerns far outweigh the human rights concerns, particularly given the caveats in the various legislative acts pertaining to the allocation of US foreign assistance.21

Consequences—Whither aid?

In this second theoretical section, we turn to the consequences of the distribution of foreign assistance where we find theories of international political economic

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21 The literature on motivation and conditionality was addressed in the Introductory Chapter.
instructive, particularly economic liberalism and the radical perspective. From the critical or radical view, there are several detrimental effects of aid in connection with human rights. One argument focuses on the connection between foreign aid and repression, specifically that security aid serves to increase repression in less developed countries (Clark 1991; Danaher et al. 1987; Gerner 1988; Meyer 1998). Essentially this form of aid lands primarily in the hands of elites in developing countries, the military in particular, who simply perpetuate the status quo. Human rights organizations and activists have long made this argument. Additionally, economic and food aid often ends up in the hands of elites. Beyond the confiscation of food aid by the regime, the centralization of food aid means that individuals in remote and rural locations face several obstacles in order to gain any benefit, namely the time and expense of travel and the opportunity cost associated with leaving their farms.

Similarly, another negative argument regarding foreign assistance focuses on the impact it has on the democratic process. It is argued that international aid perpetuates the anti-democratic tendencies in developing nations (Meyer 1998). The tie between US foreign aid and US investment leads to repression as companies (taking advantage of opportunities provided by foreign aid to the host nation) discourages the formation of many democratic institutions such as labor unions and other workers’ organizations (Zimmerman 1993; Lappe 1980). In the end, it is argued that foreign aid serves to marginalize over 80 percent of the population in these countries, which for all practical purposes, tends to deny people access to the political process and protection from human rights abuses (Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Meyer, 1996, 1998).

The third argument focuses on the negative impact associated with economic aid, specifically the harmful impact on the recipient’s economic infrastructure. Much of this type of criticism concentrates on the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth and development, in other words, on the overall economic health of the state and indirectly, levels of subsistence. The internal development of recipient states is hampered by the restrictions and conditions placed on aid. Dos Santos (1970) contends that these limitations prevent recipient nations from utilizing aid as a substitute for economic surplus necessary for development. More recent research argues that aid provides a “strong disincentive effect on the development of markets and a vibrant private sector” as well as damages any economic prospects by “reinforcing anti-market policies, bloated bureaucracies, and inefficient public enterprises” (Gwin and Nelson 1997, 11). In addition, economic aid is used to introduce antiquated and ill-suited technology to developing states and is used to finance foreign investment in industries that are considered a low priority for development or, even worse, aid is used merely to attract foreign investment that does little to create domestic industries (Dos Santos 1970, Frank 1969). Further, economic aid is often granted in the form of a loan which underdeveloped countries find difficult to repay. It is argued that foreign assistance in the form of these loans inhibits a nation’s propensity to save since any profits are used to repay the initial loan. Aid in the form of technology transfers, critics contend, serves to disrupt the traditional production process leading to increases in unemployment and the “disintegration of stable communities and families” (Clark 1991, 288). Lastly, aid is
often viewed by developing nations as a form of imperialism, in this case, Yankee imperialism (Zimmerman 1993; Meyer 1998), which simply serves to increase the economic gap between the rich and the poor states in the international system (Gwin and Nelson 1997).

In contrast, there are only a few arguments suggesting that aid actually has a positive impact on human rights which reflect the liberal perspective. The basic premise is that foreign aid will serve to elevate the “material living conditions of the world” (Eberstadt 1987, 5) and facilitate economic development. The connection between aid and economic development is not new. Writing in The Observer in 1923, Lord Milner (former British Colonial Secretary, 1919–1921) argued that the colonies needed “economic development—roads, railways, engines, tractors, and in some cases, notably the Sudan, irrigation works. It would increase employment and purchasing power at home (donor-interest) as well as in the countries where the work of development is proceeding (recipient-interest)...Their development is a question of money—and money from outside” (Mosely 1987, 11). Two observations can be made: first, the dilemma or conundrum of foreign aid hasn’t changed in the last 80 years; second, the needs of developing states haven’t changed much either.

Thus, two major arguments touting the positive effects of aid prevail. First, one goal of the US allocation of aid is the opening of future private investment opportunities, opportunities theoretically designed to improve the quality of lives in the host state through things like job creation (Meyer 1998; Mosely 1987). It is through these additional opportunities that the host state will realize economic development, so it is argued. The liberal position posits that foreign assistance helps increase economic development, evidence by high rates of growth in certain countries such as Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan (Spero and Hart 1997). Likewise, Conteh-Morgen (1990) suggests that the influx of economic aid has provided for stability in certain developing countries, citing evidence from El Salvador, Pakistan, and Turkey. In 2003, the US government claimed that 22,000 families have directly benefited from programs designed to shift farm production from coca and opium poppies to alternative crops in Colombia. In addition, a Plan Colombia funded program known as Employment in Action (designed to increase employment levels via infrastructure projects), boasted 1,502 projects are underway (Embassy of Colombia). Second, several studies have demonstrated that aid has benefited developing nations, particularly in the areas of education and health (Zimmerman 1993). Spero and Hart (1997) point out that the quality of life of many countries would have suffered or would have been worse had it not been for distribution of poverty-alleviation and medical aid. Gwin and Nelson (1997) point out, however, that this aid is only helpful in states with a good policy environment.

In examining the previous literature, Meyer (1996, 1998) finds a positive relationship between United States economic aid and civil-political rights in his sample of developing nations. The drawback of this research is that it is limited in the number of countries, 50 less developed countries, and the lack of control variables

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22 Originally quoted in Ian M. Drummond, British Economic Policy and Empire, 1919–1939, (London, Allen, and Unwin 1924, 40). The terms donor-interest and recipient-interest in italics were added by the authors.
found to be important in previous research in the realization of human rights. Smith et al. (1999) could not reproduce Meyer’s results for either US economic aid or direct foreign investment and ultimately argue that the neoliberal position falsely works to negate the need for international regulators and institutions to monitor human rights. On the other hand, Regan (1995) finds that although the variable for economic aid is statistically significant and in the positive direction, substantively the changes in repression due to changes in aid are negligible. He argues that aid is just one;

part of the signal that is sent to the recipients of US assistance and that those searching for mechanisms with which to manipulate human rights practices should focus on the entire range of bilateral interactions…foreign aid can be used to foster economic development, alleviate the suffering from national disasters, promote bilateral cooperation, and reward allies for previous compliant behavior. But the evidence…suggests that aid is not very effective at altering the repressive behavior of recipient states (Regan, 1995, 624).

In a more recent study, Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko (2001, 235) test the relationship between official developmental aid (ODA) and human rights. The results are not statistically significant and they conclude that this “raises serious questions about the practicality of shaping human rights policies in developing countries through aid incentives.” Thus, previous empirical literature is contradictory and inconclusive regarding the benefits of foreign aid in alleviating human rights abuses.

In sum, these competing theories provide very different views on how recipient regimes are affected by the allocation of foreign assistance. The liberal perspective suggests that all forms of international capital, including foreign assistance, are beneficial to all parties, that is, the international economy is a positive sum game whereby all participants can experience improvements in wealth and development, both of which contribute to improvements in human rights conditions. Critics, on the other hand, contend that the flow of international capital and goods, including foreign assistance, is self-serving to the donor regime at the expense of the recipient regime, particularly developing states. Thus, foreign assistance from the United States is viewed merely as an economic and political tool aimed at perpetuating the development and wealth gap between the developed and less developed states. Reliance on international sources of capital, radicals argue, actually inhibits both economic and political growth necessary for the improvements in human rights conditions in recipient states. We are not convinced by either the rhetoric of US policymakers or the intent of US aid programs, particularly those of a military nature, and argue that the motivational imperative of national security relocates human rights to a secondary, and thus, expendable concern. As such, we hypothesize that US foreign assistance will have a deleterious effect on human rights.

Responsibility—Strategic aid

In this last theoretical section, we present our argument that regardless of the competing motivational factors at play, the consequences of foreign assistance decision-making, beyond the national security objective, must be considered in order to guard against the excesses of self-interest and to promote human rights abroad (a stated foreign policy objective). Up to this point, the motivation of aid
and the consequences of aid have been addressed in a separate fashion, when in fact, they should be considered together. When it comes to the consequences, either in the name of national security or more humanitarian pursuits such as democracy and quality of life issues, the United States has an ethical responsibility to ensure that foreign assistance first does no harm. However, the pursuit of an ethical foreign aid policy raises several theoretical and practical questions. First, what is ethics and what is morality? Further, what do ethics mean in terms of politics in general and foreign policy in particular and how is it distinguished from morality? After all, attempting to use a moral or ethical measuring stick is problematic—who’s morality or ethics matter and are these concepts universal? Or is it as Vasquez (2005, 308) has noted, that “the dictates of ethics know no boundaries” and “ethic principles are broad and they do not always tell people of good heart what is the good thing to do, nor do ethical systems always order values, or it they do, they may not order them in the same way.” As we discussed earlier, there is not a universal consensus when it comes to defining human rights, nor is there a universal morality regarding foreign aid. So, starting at a very basic level, the term morals, a derivative of the Latin *mores* or *moriam*, is defined as ways, conduct, or character. The word ethic is from the Greek, *ethos*, and translates to a custom or common practice. It is clear that the two are related and subsequently used interchangeably. Yet there is a difference that is important, particularly as they apply to foreign policy.

One way to distinguish between morals and ethics is to differentiate between attitudes and behavior. We can think of morals as values and beliefs, that is, one’s attitudes about what is good and evil, just and unjust. Conversely, ethics refers to choosing behavior that is right or just rather than engaging in behavior that is evil or unjust (Amstutz 1999). Ethical behavior, therefore, is that behavior that a particular group agrees upon as an acceptable code of conduct for that group. Foreign policy is but one arena where morals and ethics might clash; a tension between the two is found in the workplace and among lawyers to list a just a few situations. Individuals often leave jobs when they cannot reconcile their personal beliefs, values, or morals, with the cut-throat, take-no-prisoner approach to many business transactions. Likewise, lawyers often find themselves defending criminals that commit heinous crimes, ones that violate all of their moral codes; yet an ethical code of conduct demands that they defend their clients with the upmost zeal because they have a moral belief that all those accused deserve representation. Ultimately, an individual engaging in ethical behavior is doing so in line with either their values or morals (Brown 2001). The next step is to connect morality to politics.

In practical terms, we often see and hear about “values voters” in US politics, suggesting that there is a connection between morality and politics. This connotes that those who vote for candidates that reflect their own values do so based on some moral conviction. In this sense there is a marriage domestically between morality and policies that is possible due to shared norms in a particular society or stated differently “domestic society provides a rich and substantive political morality,” however it is often argued that this is absent in the foreign policy arena where “international society provides a limited moral menu” (Amstutz 1999, 6). This limited moral menu leaves individual states, as well as leaders within these states, to determine what action is best for the state, and more importantly, what is best for the citizenry within the state.
This in itself leads to our second question, that is, what responsibility does the state have for the well-being of those outside the state and is it possible for states to have morals? Generally, there are two extremes when it comes to where the state’s responsibility lies: realpolitik or realism on the one hand and a utopian view or liberalism on the other. Thucydides addressed the concept of morality, or justice, in his classical interpretation of the *Melian Dialogue*. He argues that such notions of morality and justice have little place in foreign policy (particularly when the adversaries are not equals), ushering in one of the cornerstones of realism—the primacy of power and national security. Likewise, Machiavelli warned princes about reliance on justice or morals as a ruling paradigm, advocating the use of power instead to preserve their own position and the primacy of the state. Thus for realists, the only allegiance is to the welfare of the state such that the “only morality is that which promotes and protects the territorial security and economic well-being of a state” (Amstutz 1999, 6). US foreign policy makers, particularly during the Cold War, clung to this realpolitik view of foreign policy. This was muted to some extent as a result of the Vietnam War and the attempts by Jimmy Carter to inject his morality and ethical behavior more forcibly into foreign affairs. However, the perception of morality can be just as cloudy as the perception of what constitutes a human right. Therefore, when both concepts are vague, policy decisions often become misguided. Dean Acheson (1965, 227) commented that “what passes for ethical standards for governmental policies in foreign affairs is a collection of moralisms, maxims, and slogans, which neither help nor guide, but only confuse decisions.” For realists, it is not that states pursue immoral polices, merely amoral ones (Amstutz 1999; Harries 2005). As such Hans Morgenthau, generally referred to as the father of modern realism, would argue that it is unethical for states not to pursue policies that lie with their national interests. Similarly, Vincent (1989, 57) argues that “anyone who, acting for a state put first a constituency beyond it, should be censored for neglecting the interests of his or her own community…for all states, domestic obligations outweigh obligations to foreigners—otherwise what is the point of citizenship?” From a diplomats perspective, George Kennan (1985/1986, 206) argued that,

Government is an agent, not a principle. Its primary obligation is to the interest of the national security it represents…its military security, the integrity of its political life and the well-being of its people. These needs have no moral quality. They are unavoidable necessities of national existence and therefore are subject to classification of neither “good” nor “bad”.

So, then when would states be interested in human rights as part of foreign policy? According to Vincent (1989, 57–8), when it “serves the interest of the state” and “when attention to it endangers no other interest of the state.” Embarking on a human rights policy for any other reason, from this perspective inexorably leads to an inconsistent policy which invariably invites criticism of a double standard.

Conversely, communitarians and cosmopolitans represent the more utopian view that see the state as a significant moral actor and the individual as the primary moral actor in foreign affairs respectively (Amstutz 1999). More commonly, liberals within the international relations literature contend that the actions of the individual and the actions of the state can be held to the same standard, implying that the state...
indeed can behave in a moral or ethical manner. Can we articulate or expect a state’s policy to be moral as we would expect in terms of individual behavior? For realists, the answer is no. At the personal level, relationships and community norms act as a barrier or obstacle to unethical behavior. There are inherent societal pressures to conform as well as societal punishment for those who do not. According to realists, such restraints are generally absent at the international level. Neibuhr (1932) argues that the level of selfishness that exists at the individual level is only magnified at the state level leaving the latter to be self-interested, egoistic, and in search for power that has little restraint and certainly destined for conflict. Accordingly, while there is hope for the individual in the form of the “moral ideal of the individual” (Davila 2004, 197), at the international level a universal sense of morality is not in the offing, or is it? In reality, there are a great deal of shared norms in the international arena, particularly in the area of human rights. Leaving the argument of cultural relativism aside, there are agreed upon concepts and a “commitment to such notions as truth and justice as well as agreement about such fundamental norms as the dignity of persons, freedom from torture, impartial application of the law and freedom of conscience” does exist (Amstutz 1999, 10). The difference lies not in the concept of shared norms in general, but the application of these norms, or what Donnelly (2003) refers to as the “substance, interpretation, and form” of human rights. What is agreed upon or considered universal is the general substance of human rights, with societies or culture interpreting the application of such rights. Thus, there are indeed shared norms at the international level; however just as individuals break domestic norms and commit crimes against one another, states violate international norms as well. This does not negate the fact that such norms exist.

Rather than pursue a moral foreign policy that is still fraught with ambiguity and criticism, an ethical foreign policy is advocated. After all, “even states with an avowed commitment to human rights in foreign policy weigh such commitment against competing interests and values” (Turner 2003, 342). As such, we can look to the writings of Reinhold Niebuhr and others for guidance in pursuit of a foreign policy based on ethical realism. He advocates among other things, humility and prudence, an understanding of other states and societies, and perhaps most importantly responsibility, or what Weber calls an ethic of consequence rather than ethic of conviction. The former relates to an idea of understanding the consequences of one’s actions or a teleological approach while the latter focuses on the intentions of one’s actions or a deontological approach.

For Weber, an ethic of conviction refers to an “ethic of ultimate ends, of conscience, of good intentions, of single-minded commitment” (Roth 1984, 494) and an ethic where one’s values are hierarchically ordered and where these values and duties are not in conflict with one another. More importantly, an ethic of conviction is one where the agent is not responsible for the outcome, only that the act is in harmony with the initial value. As Weber (1919, 121) argues,

If an action of good intent leads to bad results, then, in the actor’s eyes, not he but the world, or the stupidity of other men, or God’s will who made them thus, is responsible for the evil...The believer in [an ethic of conviction] feels “responsible” only for seeing to it that the flame of pure intentions is not quenched: for example, the flame of protesting against the injustice of the social order.
Ultimately, the consequences of said action are not a consideration (Starr 1999). Others have referred to this as a deontological based view or what Amstutz (1999, 36) refers to a rule-based action, that is actions that “should be judged by their inherent rightness and validity, not by the goodness or badness of policy outcomes.” The emphasis lies in the intentions, the duties, and the obligation of the decision makers or actors rather than the consequences. As Donnelly (2003, 42) notes, “Right is the moral primitive for deontological theories. We are required to do what is right (follow our duty), period, independent of the effects, for good or bad, produced by our actions.” As a result, if decisions are made void of any moral obligation they are considered immoral, even if the results achieve some desirable outcome. This Kantian based approach or philosophy focuses on a categorical imperative that people be treated as having value in and of themselves and that there exists some universal set of principles. This, of course, is also the source of this approach’s major criticism: the requirement of universal or absolute moralism (Amstutz 1999; Brown 2001).

On the other hand, Weber’s ethic of responsibility (as the opening quote of this chapter indicates) is that no amount of good intentions can obfuscate “evil ramification” of a particular action. Starr (1999, 426) explains that within this paradigm decisions are made with an understanding that conflicts of values are inevitable and in acknowledging this, the ethic of responsibility demands of its adherents that they hold themselves—and allow themselves to be held—accountable, that they acknowledge the ethically creative dimensions of their decisions, and that they attain moral clarity as to the ultimate meaning of their action by allowing the rationalities of the various spheres upon which the impact of action will be felt to speak and to be taken into account.

This vision of an ethic of responsibility is similar to a teleological approach that focuses on consequentialism or what Amstutz (1999, 28) refers to as ends-based action that “assumes that the morality of an action must be ultimately judged by the good results that are realized.” From this perspective, what matters is the outcome of one’s actions. Thus, even if an actor’s intentions were considered amoral, if the outcome achieved positive results then the action itself might be deemed moral. For Donnelly (2003, 42), “the moral imperative is the good. Duty depends on the consequence of our actions. We are morally required to, within the limits of our skills and resources, increase human happiness, virtue, or some other end.” Just as an ethic of conviction or rules-based action has its critics, so does the ethic of responsibility. The primary criticism lies in the inability of decision makers to fully predict outcomes (which we are attempting to overcome with our statistical analysis and case studies) and which ethical standard to use in order to evaluate outcomes (Amstutz 1999, 29–30; Schleffer 1988).

Which is better? Is it better to have good intentions or good outcomes? If the United States intends to improve human rights with foreign assistance and falls short, is it fair to be critical of their conviction? Conversely, should the United States be expected to forego their own objectives to ensure that citizens in other states realize both security and subsistence rights? Clearly, the latter is unreasonable and the former is generally never an isolated objective. In a sense, there is never really a selfless
good deed in the foreign policy arena. The options at the both extremes are simply unrealistic. Weber is critical of both the left and the right and their extremes as is Niebuhr (1952, 5) who warns against the excesses of both as well, commenting that,

our idealists are divided between those who would renounce the responsibilities of power for the sake of preserving the purity of our soul and those who are ready to cover every ambiguity of good and evil in our actions by the frantic insistence that any measure taken in a good cause must be unequivocally virtuous. We take, and must continue to take, morally hazardous actions to preserve our civilization. We must exercise our power. But we ought neither to believe that a nation is capable of perfect disinterestedness in its exercise, nor become complacent about particular degrees of interest and passion which corrupt the justice by which the exercise of power is legitimatized.

Assuming that a definition of ethics can be established and assuming that states can behave in an ethical manner, what does an ethical foreign policy, one based on both conviction and responsibility, in terms of human rights and foreign aid look like?

In terms of conviction, the United States has a long history of moralism, that is to “make one moral value supreme and to apply it indiscriminately without regard to time and place” (Thompson 1978, 988). These moral values attached to the United States include democracy, individualism, capitalism, and human rights. As a consequence, these are the values that the United States projects and promotes abroad, in other words its ethic of conviction. There are moments in US history when the state has opted to be a beacon of democracy and human rights and other times when the United States has been a crusader for these same values. Unfortunately, many of the actions of the United States belie these values. As Niebuhr (1952) noted over 50 years ago, one of the America’s primary values is the primacy of the individual and that this “exultation of the individual” lands the United States in trouble when we support regimes that violate such individual freedom. What is the responsibility of the state to ensure that the values and morals they preach come to fruition? On the one hand it is not useful and in fact it is impractical to promote a policy that does not take into account security interests; however, a total disregard of the consequences of action taken in the name of national security is ethically reprehensible and in practical terms does little to serve the very primary objective that the state pursues—security.

In a recent effort, Lieven and Hulsman (2006) build on the arguments presented by Niebuhr as well as Morgenthau and Kennan that US foreign policy should be based on the philosophy of ethical realism, one that includes elements of morality and realism. The components of such a foreign policy strategy includes “prudence; a concentration on possible results rather than good intentions; a close study of the nature, views, and interests of other states, and a willingness to accommodate them when possible; and a mixture of profound American patriotism with an equally profound awareness of the limits both on American power and on American goodness” (Lieven and Hulsman 2006, xvii). We suggest that a human rights policy conform to this paradigm as well. Of course “what makes human rights policy unique is that the result or objective is not a tangible item that the imposing state enjoys themselves (Baehr and Castermans-Holleman 2004). However, the United States must recognize that promoting human rights are indeed a security interest and ultimately are tangible objectives to pursue.
Subsequently, we suggest an ethical policy regarding foreign assistance and human rights based on the ideals found in ethical realism. First, the related characteristics of prudence and humility suggests that a human rights policy should go beyond what the narrow focus of what the United States considers human rights and look toward understanding and promoting those rights that are important to other countries and the international community at large. This plays into another characteristic of ethical realism, that is, being sensitive to the views and perceptions of other states. Basically, the United States needs to avoid an uber-nationalistic approach to human rights, where the US way and vision of human rights is the only way. Oftentimes, American patriotism is misguided and misinterpreted as cultural imperialism, hence the need for prudence and humility. America’s ability to project, through soft power and the free market is oftentimes more beneficial than the harsh fist of government. Lastly, the United States must understand and focus on the consequences of any action, particularly policies that are tied to human rights. The failure of the United States to join the ICC is a clear example of hubris that endangers its ability to engage in a human rights policy based on ethical realism. Ultimately, an ethical foreign policy in terms of human rights would be one where the United States engages in a behavior that was consistent, not with some universal standard, but with its own values, beliefs, and even rhetoric of which the United States has plenty. In other words, while the concept of human rights evokes a sense of morality, an ethical approach to human rights focuses on whether a state’s behavior is consistent with their rhetoric regarding human rights. After all, “The pulpit from which we speak to the world would be a stronger one if our actions matched our words” (Thompson 1978, 1004).
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Chapter 2

The Evolution and Motivation of the US Foreign Assistance Program

…the Congress finds that fundamental political, economic, and technological changes have resulted in the interdependence of nations. The Congress declares that the individual liberties, economic prosperity, and security of the people of the United States are best sustained and enhanced in a community of nations which respect individual civil and economic rights and freedoms and which work together to use wisely the world’s limited resources in an open and equitable international economic system. Furthermore, the Congress reaffirms the traditional humanitarian ideals of the American people and renews its commitment to assist people in developing countries to eliminate hunger, poverty, illness, and ignorance (Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, P.L. 87–195, §101).

This chapter examines, in a historical fashion, the motivations of the US foreign assistance program. Here we discuss the economic, political, and social goals that the United States sought, and continues to seek, to accomplish. This chapter traces US aims through the rebuilding of Europe after World War II to the anti-communism of the Cold War to the twenty-first century global battle against terrorism. In doing so, we highlight specific cases, such as the Middle East Peace Process, and draw on examples in Latin America. In terms of motivation, the nature of foreign assistance is examined within the context of the major paradigm in international relations: realism. The importance of donor interests in the allocation process of foreign assistance suggests that governments utilize aid programs in a classic realpolitik fashion. Do recipient needs matter? Is the United States truly interested in improving conditions in recipient states, or is national security the sole priority? Are these competing or complimentary interests? We address these questions as we explore the motives behind US foreign aid allocation and distribution.

Post-World War II Reconstruction

The economic, political, and social destruction caused by World War II and the expansionary motives of the USSR left the United States with no other perceived option than to shoulder most of the responsibility of post-war rebuilding. The primary US tool in attempting to achieve the goals of economic, political, and social development was initially a monetary one, and this created the system of foreign aid as we know it today. The rebuilding of Europe was funded first with massive amounts of economic aid and later with American investments. Fledging democracies were bolstered with both economic and military aid and the United States attempted to alleviate poor living conditions with varying forms of humanitarian aid. As
Roosevelt explained to Congress before his death, “we cannot succeed in a peaceful world unless we build an economically healthy world” (quoted in Eberstadt 1988, 22). The main program used by the United States was the Marshall Plan, or the European Recovery Program, which was designed to help European states recover economically and was motivated by both political and humanitarian concerns. The plan was designed to facilitate recovery in the damaged nations of Europe in an effort to prevent communist victories in these nations (especially France and Italy), while encouraging European nations to collaborate on economic policy. In providing the assistance, the United States also sought to expand markets for US exports (Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005, 10). In fact, in 1947 the plan provided $497 million in reconstruction loans while by 1952, the plan had allocated over $13 billion dollars (Brown 1953). Table 2.1 shows the total aid to recipient countries provided under the European Recovery Program.

Table 2.1 The European Recovery Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Aid in Millions of US Historical Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3,189.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,713.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,508.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>1,390.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>1,083.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>706.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>677.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium/Luxembourg</td>
<td>559.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>273.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>255.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>225.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>147.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>107.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Reported in millions of US historical dollars.
Source: United States Information Agency.

At the same time, the Truman Doctrine formulated a national security policy of containment that was then facilitated by the allocation and distribution of military and economic aid to weak nations susceptible to Soviet aggression. In quick fashion, the “Soviet Union’s threat to the West’s position of dominance in the developing world led the United States for the first time to conclude that economic assistance to the South could be a powerful tool in the Cold War” (Spero and Hart 1997, 169). Foreign aid granted to vulnerable countries in Europe, and eventually Latin America and Asia, was a valuable “carrot” to attract client states in the East-West geopolitical struggle. As Allen Dulles explained, “The Marshall Plan…is not a philanthropic enterprise…It is based on our views of the requirements of American security…
It is the only peaceful avenue now open to us which may answer the communist challenge to our way of life and our national security” (Dulles 2005). Thus, from the beginning of the Cold War, financial assistance was tied to national security interests in a classic realpolitik fashion.

Greece and Turkey, in particular, benefited from this new “carrot.” Although Turkey was not one of the largest recipients of Marshall Plan assistance, as demonstrated by Table 2.1, it reaped additional benefits in the form of military assistance from allocations granted by Congress in response to the Truman Doctrine. Greece and Turkey were seen as the front line in the battle against communism, and as a consequence Congress authorized $400 million for the two states. Although the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine mostly succeeded in their purposes in that Europe was revitalized and Turkey held off pressure from the Soviet Union, they lacked a specific concern for human rights in the recipient countries. And it is possible that the success of the Marshall Plan created overly optimistic expectations about foreign aid. As one scholar noted, the Marshall Plan’s “unique marriage of strategic, economic, and humanitarian objectives would later give rise to the notion that foreign aid naturally wedded these distinct, and often contradictory, concerns” (Eberstadt 1988, 24).

The connection of strategic, economic and humanitarian goals was exemplified by Truman’s Four Points Program, laid out in his 1949 Inaugural Address,

First, we will continue to give unfaltering support to the United Nations and related agencies, and we will continue to search for ways to strengthen their authority and increase their effectiveness…Second, we will continue our programs for world economic recovery. This means, first of all, that we must keep our full weight behind the European recovery program. We are confident of the success of this major venture in world recovery.

Third, we will strengthen freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression…If we can make it sufficiently clear, in advance, that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur…In addition, we will provide military advice and equipment to free nations which will cooperate with us in the maintenance of peace and security.

Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people. The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible…Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens (Truman 1949).
This speech and the legislation that followed “marked a major shift in American foreign assistance from almost exclusive emphasis on post-war relief and reconstruction policy to a focus on economic development” (Ruttan 1996, 33).

The focus shifted again, however, as by 1952, the emphasis of US assistance was on security. As a sign of this focus, the 1950s saw the separation of military and development assistance, and a shift in foreign aid patterns (Eberstadt 1988). From 1949 to 1953, military and political aid was one-sixth of US foreign aid, but between 1953 and 1961, the total was more than half (Eberstadt 1988, 31). This shift was unquestionably a response to a serious security issue: when North Korea invaded the South and drew the US into a war, a natural desire to prevent that from happening again occurred. As a consequence, strengthening the defensive capabilities of US allies seemed prudent. The program proved to be highly successful: South Korea was secured from North Korea, Taiwan stood its ground against China, Greece and Turkey held off communist pressures, the Philippines and Thailand contained insurgencies, and the shah of Iran was returned to rule in Iran (Eberstadt 1988, 32).

**Foreign Aid in the Battle Against Communism**

By the early 1960s, “foreign aid was seen as a tool to reduce discontent generated by poverty and the consequent temptations of communism by spurring economic progress in these regions and addressing the social and political tensions created by rapid economic change” (Lancaster and Van Dusen 2005, 10). However, a concern for the human condition began to slowly creep into the foreign assistance calculation. In 1961, in an effort to improve the means by which the United States provided aid, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), which reorganized the foreign assistance programs, separated military and non-military aid, and lead to the creation of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The primary mission of USAID is to support the goals of US foreign assistance: “the twofold purpose of furthering America’s foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world” (USAID 2007). In support of USAID, President Kennedy stated, “I urge those of you who want to do something for the United States, for this cause, to channel their energies behind the new foreign-aid program to help prevent the social injustice and economic chaos upon which subversion and revolt feeds” (Eberstadt 1988, 33). Also in 1961, President Kennedy argued that foreign assistance programs were necessary, “[F]or widespread poverty and chaos lead to a collapse of existing political and social structures which would inevitably invite the advance of totalitarianism into every weak and unstable area. Thus our own security would be endangered and our prosperity imperilled” (USAID 2007). As such, Kennedy began the process of linking domestic conditions in developing states to US security interests and targeted the foreign assistance program as a means of nation-building.1

One of the prominent, if not successful, examples of foreign aid instituted by Kennedy was the Alliance for Progress, designed to promote economic growth and

1 For the text of the Foreign Assistance Act see, www.usaid.gov/..
political reform in Latin American countries. For Kennedy, the program was meant to contain communism (believing that the reduction of poverty would diminish the appeal of communism) and be a model of US values—“it was a program to build alliances and spread the positive vision at the heart of US democracy” (Taffet 2007, 6). If the United States was going to be a moral beacon, it must pursue policies that promote a global good. The program failed, however, to result in economic development or the strengthening of democracy, due in great part to the conflict between humanitarian interests and the security concerns of the Cold War. In other words, although the United States did possess a commitment to nation building, “political considerations proved far more important in developing aid priorities. Rather than committing money to the most worthy humanitarian projects, the United States funnelled its money to explicitly political projects” (Taffet 2007, 5). Latin American leaders wanted the money the United States was offering, but they did not want the strings that were attached. In Brazil, for example, the United States attempted to control President Joao Goulart with restrictive aid loans. This failed to have any effect on the Brazilian leader, thus the United States ceased Alliance for Progress funding. As a result, the military overthrew Goulart in 1964, and created a bloody military dictatorship. The people in the recipient countries were also not prone to follow the desires of the United States. For example, in Chile, a decade of US aid through the Alliance for Progress did little to damage the appeal of Marxist parties in the country, and as a result, much to the chagrin of the United States, the people of Chile elected Salvador Allende president in 1970 (Taffet 2007, 7–8).

**The battle between Congress and realpolitik**

Although initially the FAA contained few restrictions on the provisions of foreign aid and the factors to be taken into account prior to providing assistance, congressional interest in the allocation of foreign aid was piqued during the early 1970s. This came into direct conflict with the realpolitik policies of Nixon and Kissinger. Realpolitik relegated human rights to a secondary position behind national security interests (in this case, the containment of communism), and as such, Nixon and Kissinger resisted linking foreign assistance to human rights (which they considered to be a domestic matter). As a consequence, in 1971, the Senate rejected a foreign assistance bill for the fiscal years 1972 and 1973 marking the first time that Congress vetoed a foreign assistance authorization since the Marshall Plan was enacted. Several reasons have been offered for this action including opposition to the Vietnam War, over-emphasis on short-term military goals, and the idea that economic aid was not helpful in achieving any foreign policy goals (USAID History 2007). Throughout the Nixon presidency, there was little public condemnation of human rights abuses and the United States failed to be a major player in promoting global human rights.

Congress, however, did not sit idly by, and before long, a link between foreign assistance and human rights conditions was firmly established. Through legislation, Congress reasserted itself in the foreign-policy making process and promoted the
belief that US foreign aid should be given to democratic regimes that protect human rights. In 1973, amendments were made to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. As explained by USAID, “Assistance for the poorest sectors of developing nations (‘basic human needs’) became the central thrust of the reform.” In an effort to ensure that the recipient country’s population was helped by the aid, Congress created new categories directed at problems such as agriculture, family planning, and education. The purpose of bilateral development aid “was to concentrate on sharing American technical expertise and commodities to meet development problems, rather than relying on large-scale transfers of money and capital goods, or financing of infrastructure” (USAID History 2007). The structure of the FAA remains roughly the same today. Advocates of the amendments argued that it “would guarantee that American ideals guided foreign policy. Opponents warned that the requirements would tie the president’s hands, or worse, would cut off food and other assistance to needy people living under repressive rule” (Doherty 1992, 3755).

As further illustration of the increasing interest of Congress in human rights, during the Ford Administration Congress passed legislation requiring the Department of State to submit an annual report on human rights practices (sections 116d and 502b of the FAA of 1961, as amended, and section505c of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended). Initially, the report was required only for countries that received US economic assistance (in 1977, numbering 82), but later became required of all UN member states. The reports cover the internationally recognized rights spelled out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 2005 report explained its significance,

The State Department published the first annual country reports on human rights practices in 1977 in accordance with congressional mandate, and they have become an essential element of the United States’ effort to promote respect for human rights worldwide. For nearly three decades, the reports have served as a reference document and a foundation for cooperative action among governments, organizations, and individuals seeking to end abuses and strengthen the capacity of countries to protect the fundamental rights of all.

The worldwide championing of human rights is not an attempt to impose alien values on citizens of other countries or to interfere in their internal affairs. The Universal Declaration calls upon “every individual and every organ of society…to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance…”

These reports were intended to help Congress make decisions on US foreign policy, specifically the allocation of foreign assistance. Theoretically they can be used to deny foreign assistance to countries with poor human rights records. Congress

4 The State Department prepared the first report in 1975, but the 1975 and 1976 reports were initially classified due to Kissinger’s concern that unflattering reports would damage US foreign policy.
5 See http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2006/Mar/08-930887.html.
6 It is important to remember as one reads State Department Country Reports on human rights that often politics play a role in the production of the reports. Many complain that the
The Evolution and Motivation of the US Foreign Assistance Program

passed further legislation in 1976 creating a Coordinator of Human Rights in the Department of State (which later became as Assistant Secretary position). Thus, in sum, “during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, US human rights policy was legislated by Congress, ignored by the executive branch, and hindered by the agency directed to implement the policy (the State Department)” (Apodaca 2006, 49).

The attempt to prioritize human rights: The Carter Administration

In the late 1970s, the new Carter Administration made the promotion of human rights abroad a priority. This marked the first concerted effort at addressing specific human rights violations with foreign assistance policy at the executive level. The view of human rights in the Carter Administration was expressed by many officials, including Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State who testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that, “our foreign assistance programs are an essential tool in promoting a broad category of internationally recognized human rights” (Christopher 1979). Carter himself stated in 1978 that “Human rights is the soul of our foreign policy. And I say this with assurance, because human rights is the soul of our sense of nationhood” (Carter 1978). Carter’s personal commitment to human rights was never in question, and he spoke of his commitment often. For example, in early 1979, Carter said, “Toward regimes that persist in wholesale violations of human rights we will not hesitate to convey our outrage nor will we pretend that our relations are unaffected” (Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984). Thus, Carter tried to define a moral purpose for American foreign policy; a task that proved difficult, to say the least.

Although the Carter Administration initially attempted to apply a single human rights’ standard to all states (ally or enemy), they quickly realized that this was unworkable and adopted a plan to conduct a case-by-case evaluation to determine how to proceed in promoting human rights in specific countries. States behave differently in response to policies, thus “some states responded better to quiet diplomacy, others to public criticism, and yet another set of states responded only to sanctions” (Apodaca 2006, 57–9). In attempting to implement this policy, Carter was criticized for imposing standards in Latin America (because he believed that he could due to their close proximity and economic condition), while ignoring similar reports sugarcoat abuses in allied countries, and since 11 September 2001, critics charge that the reports now tolerate abuses that previously would have been flagged as unacceptable (for example, arbitrary detentions). The first draft of the reports is created by the US Embassies in the countries, and sent to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (formerly the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs).

7 As mentioned above, the Foreign Assistance Act was passed in 1961 and served to separate the allocation of military and non-military aid to recipient states. The 1960s brought the focus of foreign assistance to developing nations with an emphasis on economic, political, and human development. While the program addressed the human condition, it did not speak directly to human rights violations. This original piece of legislation contained little restrictions on how assistance was to be provided, and perhaps more importantly who was eligible for assistance. It was the Carter Administration which first attempted to tie human rights practices to foreign policy.
violations in countries critical to US interests (economic, military, or strategic). For example, during negotiations on SALT II, Carter refused to link progress on arms control with progress on human rights in the Soviet Union. He discussed the issue with the Soviets, but failed to require progress in human rights before proceeding with SALT II. In fact, despite all the rhetoric, the Carter Administration never had anyone declared a “gross violator of human rights” and subsequently reduced their aid (some countries had aid reduced or denied, but did not earn the label). In the first year of Carter’s presidency, aid was only reduced to three countries (Argentina, Uruguay, and Ethiopia), and during his entire term in office, Carter denied security assistance to a total of eight countries (Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay) (Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984). But, none of these states were officially declared gross violators of human rights.

Raising further criticism that Carter’s human rights policy was hypocritical and not applied even-handedly, other countries that violated human rights were granted “extraordinary circumstances” waivers, such as South Korea, Iran, and Zaire. Countries of strategic importance, in clear realpolitik terms, were provided aid despite their human rights records. On the other hand, several Latin American countries simply rejected foreign aid in response to Carter’s human rights policy. In 1977, Guatemala became the fifth Latin American country to decline US military aid because of attempts to link it to human rights (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and El Salvador were the others) (The Capital 1977). Claiming a violation of national sovereignty, these countries chose a policy of disengagement rather than accept any public scolding by the United States regarding their human rights practices. As a consequence, “there was not a significant relationship between human rights performance and US aid during the Carter years” (Apodaca 2006, 57–9).

In the end, the Carter Administration had little success making adherence to accepted human rights practices a key component in granting assistance to a recipient nation. Carter’s vision fell victim to the realities of power politics, infighting among his advisers, and bureaucratic roadblocks. As a consequence, US policy appeared at the least to be hypocritical, and in the eyes of many both ineffective and a threat to national security (Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984). Carter did succeed,

for a period of time [in restoring] the American prestige that had been tarnished by our behavior in Vietnam and our association with dictators. He disengaged the United States from some egregious human rights violators, such as Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. He built human rights support at the United Nations and put repressive governments on the defensive for their human rights abuses...He encouraged human rights dissidents, helped release prisoners, and saved lives. These are no small achievements (Shestack 1989, 23).

Despite these achievements, Carter’s human rights policies possessed some inherent faults, including the fact that unrealistic expectations were raised, and his policy was often incoherent and inconsistent. In addition, human rights violations were overlooked in China and his administration continued to support repressive regimes

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8 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 prevented the US ratification of SALT II, a step the Soviets took in part because they questioned Carter’s resolve.

9 For more on these obstacles, see Apodaca (2006).
because of supposed national security interests (Shestack 1989). Thus, although he succeeded in placing human rights on the international agenda and making it a legitimate subject for policy discussions, the president who cared most about human rights could not overcome the obstacles to their improvement.

US Aid to Egypt and Israel: An Instrument of Peace Making?

The foreign assistance relationship that the United States has with both Israel and Egypt is perhaps the most illustrative example of aid as a foreign policy tool, both in terms of the amount of aid given and motivation behind that granting of assistance. During the 1970s, the allocation of US aid became a tool for peacemaking between the Israelis and the Arabs. Throughout the first three decades of the Cold War, relations between Egypt and the United States fluctuated. After their defeat in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, however, Egypt was looking for a new relationship with the United States, as well as a new regional balance with Israel. When Anwar Sadat made his historic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, the door was open for progress towards peace. The 1979 Camp David Accords created peace between Israel and Egypt, new relationships between the US and Egypt and Israel, and an enormous foreign assistance relationship that lasts to this day as illustrated in Figure 2.1. This breakthrough “ushered in the current era of US financial support for peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors” by providing a total of $7.3

![Figure 2.1](image)

Figure 2.1  Total US foreign assistance to Egypt and Israel
billion to Israel and Egypt “in exchange for a complete cessation of hostilities and Israel’s return of the Sinai Peninsula” (Sharp 2007b, 5). Although relations between Egypt and Israel have been cool since the Camp David Accords, “both parties have maintained the peace, and the United States has continued to underwrite the ‘costs’ of peace by providing high amounts of annual economic and military aid to both parties” (Sharp 2007a, 13).

### Aid to Egypt

One of the “costs” for Egypt was the isolation it suffered at the hands of the other Arabs in retaliation for signing a peace treaty with Israel (the retaliation included the fact that Egypt was expelled from the Arab League, other Arab states withdrew from development projects in Egypt, and financing for Egypt’s defense industry stopped) (Sharp 2007a, 13). The peace between the two neighbors “created new US foreign policy objectives in the Middle East…as the United States envisaged a new role for Egypt, believing that peace with Israel would be the first step in a process that would enable Egypt to lead other Arabs to negotiate peace” (Zimmerman 1993, 82). To gain the support of his people, Sadat sold the Camp David Accords “by stressing the economic benefits of peace and the new relationship with the United States…and the United States openly tied its economic assistance program” to promoting peace in the region (Zimmerman 1993, 82). Since the successful culmination of its peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has received an average of over $2 billion in economic and military aid annually (Sharp 2007a, 27) (See Figure 2.1). The United States provides economic aid (Economic Support Funds—ESF) to Egypt in three ways: direct cash transfer to the government; through the Commodity Import Program that provides currency to the private sector to purchase US agricultural goods; and as funds for USAID programs. The cash transfer allotment is subject to cancellation or delay as it is conditioned on progress on economic reforms and Congress rescinded money in 2007 because certain conditions had not been met (Sharp 2007a, 27). The United States also provides military aid (Foreign Military Financing—FMF) to Egypt in three ways: acquisitions, upgrades to existing equipment, and follow-on support and maintenance contracts. Accordingly,

over the life of Egypt’s FMF program, Egypt has purchased 36 Apache helicopters, 220 F-16 aircraft, 880 M1A1 tanks, and the accompanying training and maintenance to support these systems, among other items. According to the US and Egyptian defense officials, approximately 30 percent of annual FMF aid to Egypt is spent on new weapons systems, as Egypt’s defense modernization plan is designed to gradually replace most of Egypt’s older Soviet weaponry with US equipment (Sharp 2007a, 28).10

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10 Egypt also receives Excess Defense Articles (EDA) annually and Egyptian officers participate in the IMET program. Further, Egypt benefits from provisions that are only available to a select group of countries, such as placing FMF funds into an interest bearing account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
For FY2008, the Administration requested $415 million in ESF aid to Egypt ($133 million of which is a direct cash transfer to help Egypt in the process of economic liberalization) and $1.3 billion in FMF (the same amount received in 2007) (Sharp 2007b, 10–11).

This aid is not granted without controversy, however. For example, in May 2006, the Bush Administration called for the continuation of US aid to Egypt despite the fact that the Egyptian government had undertaken a massive crackdown of pro-democracy activists. The House of Representatives appropriations subcommittee approved the amount, but not without reservations. Representative David Obey (D-Wisconsin), admitted, “When our major aid recipients engage in conduct that flies in the face of our own values, then we ourselves are tarnished” (quoted in Mekay 2006). Administration officials argued, however, that US strategic interests would be harmed if assistance to the Hosni Mubarak regime was to be curtailed. Egypt has supported US interests in the region, including supporting US interventions, opening new markets for US goods, and generally supporting the US pro-Israel policy. In fact, David Welch, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, argued, “Our strategic partnership with Egypt is a cornerstone of US policy in this region. We share a vision of the Middle East that is at peace and free of terror” (quoted in Mekay 2006). Michael Coulter, deputy assistant secretary of state of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, reinforced this view by telling US lawmakers that aid to Egypt is assisting in “creating a defense force that is capable of supporting US security” (quoted in Mekay 2006). Some members of Congress who opposed military aid to Egypt in the past reconsidered their positions in light of the political rise of organizations like Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Congressman Gary Ackerman (D-NY), for example, said, “Egypt must not fail. They are a large secular society that has done much good. Our relationship with them is very important” (quoted in Mekay 2006).

The focus on security has not completely blinded the United States to the human right abuses in Egypt however. In June 2007, President Bush called on Cairo to release Ayman Nur, a political dissident who had been in prison since 2005 for fraud (a charge seen as politically motivated). That same month, the House of Representatives (as alluded to above) passed a bill setting conditions on the payment of $200 million of the $1.3 billion allotment to Egypt for 2008. Marking the first time that the United States restricted Egyptian military funds, the legislation required the Secretary of State to certify that Egypt is taking steps towards improving its human right record, reforming its judicial system, as well as addressing arms smuggling through the Egyptian border with Gaza. Representative Nita Lowey (D-NY) explained the conditions, “This language is a reminder to a good friend that there are some very real and grave concerns in Congress” (quoted in Krieger 2007). Highlighting one of the constraints on promoting human rights discussed in Chapter 1, Egypt responded

11 Both David Welch and Michael Coulter were testifying at a congressional hearing in May 2006.

12 Congress attempted, but failed, to pass an amendment in 2006 that would have cut $100 million in aid to Egypt for 2007 in response to its human rights abuses. Congress also made failed attempts in 2004 and 2005 to reduce US military aid to Egypt.
with disdain over these actions. The call by President Bush to release Ayman Nur was declared “unacceptable interference” by Egypt’s Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit, and the pro-government papers in Egypt were unanimously hostile to the bill passed in the House, with the Al-Jumhuriyah labelling the move as “flagrant interference in Egypt’s internal affairs” and an effort to “undermine the capabilities of the Egyptian armed forces” (Shukri 2007). Egypt viewed the conditions as an infringement on its sovereignty and the wrong method to employ if the United States is truly interested in improving human rights.

Regardless of the rhetoric and certain actions from the legislative and executive branches, Egypt continues to receive large amounts of US aid despite their human rights conditions—which are poor. Through most of the 1970s and 1980s, as well as a period from 1998 to 2000, Egypt received a “3” on the Political Terror Scale (PTS), but received a “2” in 1989, 1991, 1993–1997, and beginning again in 2001 (See Figure 2.2). As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, a “3” on the PTS means that there is extensive (or a recent history of) political imprisonment, political murders may be common, and unlimited detention without due process is accepted. Receiving a “2” means that these abuses are expanded to large numbers, but mostly affecting those who interest themselves in politics. In 2006, the US Department of State cited numerous human rights violations in Egypt:

- limitations in the right of citizens to change their government; a state of emergency, in place almost continuously since 1967; torture and abuse of prisoners and detainees; poor conditions in prisons and detention centers; impunity; arbitrary arrest and detention, including prolonged pre-trial detention; executive branch limits on an independent judiciary; denial of fair public trial and lack of due process; political prisoners and detainees; restrictions on civil liberties—freedoms of speech and press, including internet freedom; assembly and association; some restrictions on religious freedoms; corruption and lack of transparency; some restrictions on NGOs; and discrimination and violence against women, including female genital mutilation (US Department of State, Country Report Egypt 2007).

In addition, Amnesty International reports that in 2006 the Egyptian parliament voted to delay local elections for two years, people continue to be executed despite unfair trials, and the government continued to deny their involvement in the torture and secret detention of people detained as part of the war on terror. Methods of torture against political detainees and criminal suspects include “beatings, electric shocks, prolonged suspension by the wrists and ankles in contorted positions, death threats, and sexual abuse” (Amnesty International Report Egypt 2007). Further, the curtailment of freedom of expression continues to be a serious problem in Egypt. Human Rights Watch reported that a journalist and webmaster was detained in April

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13 The political terror scale is the measure we are using to codify human rights conditions. This scale measures the security rights of citizens only. The codes are based on researchers’ assessments of the Amnesty International reports on human rights conditions. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. As a point of reference, other countries that scored a “2” on the political terror scale in 2003 include Ethiopia, China, Myanmar, North Korea, Somalia, Afghanistan, Uganda, and Burundi. Our PTS data runs through 2003.
2007, explaining, “once again, the Egyptian government is prosecuting a journalist because he has reported on human right abuses in the country. The government should focus its energies on ending the abuses, not silencing those who expose them” (Human Rights Watch 2007a).

The bottom line in the US relationship with Egypt is that despite its poor human rights record, the United States shares numerous security-related issues with Egypt that guide the relationship. Among the important issues between them are the Egyptian relationship with Israel, the security of the Egyptian border with Gaza (in particular the smuggling tunnels in Rafah), nuclear proliferation, and terrorism. As a consequence, “some Egyptian and international human rights activist have charged that US human rights policy toward Egypt is hypocritical, asserting that US policy makers have not adequately championed improved human rights in Egypt due to realpolitik considerations in the region” (Sharp 2007a, 25).

Figure 2.2  Security rights in Egypt

The bottom line in the US relationship with Egypt is that despite its poor human rights record, the United States shares numerous security-related issues with Egypt that guide the relationship. Among the important issues between them are the Egyptian relationship with Israel, the security of the Egyptian border with Gaza (in particular the smuggling tunnels in Rafah), nuclear proliferation, and terrorism. As a consequence, “some Egyptian and international human rights activist have charged that US human rights policy toward Egypt is hypocritical, asserting that US policy makers have not adequately championed improved human rights in Egypt due to realpolitik considerations in the region” (Sharp 2007a, 25).

Aid to Israel

Although Israel was already the largest recipient of US foreign aid, the peace between Egypt and Israel in 1979 also impacted the US relationship with Israel. The US commitment to Israel ebbs (with Eisenhower and George H.W. Bush considered the least pro-Israel presidents) and flows (with Reagan and Clinton considered pro-Israel
presidents), but US aid to the Jewish state has been consistent and considerable since the early 1970s. The relationship between Israel and the United States was initially based on American sympathy and support for the creation of a Jewish state in 1948, but has evolved into a strategic partnership in a region in which the United States must balance competing interests (Mark 2002). The US relationship with Israel has been built around a number of factors, “including strong domestic support for Israel; shared strategic goals in the Middle East (concern over Iran, Syria, Islamic extremism); shared democratic values; and historic ties dating back to US support for the creation of Israel in 1948,” and “US economic and military aid has been a major component in cementing and reinforcing these ties” (Sharp 2006, 1). While there have been disagreements between the states, especially over Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Israeli arms sales to China, Israel has been considered a reliable partner and aid has reflected this belief (Sharp, 2006, 1).

Each presidential administration, with its different influences and leadership, has had its own impetus for the support of Israel. Jimmy Carter, for example, explained his connection to Israel in moralistic and religious terms,

[I] believed very deeply that the Jews who had survived the Holocaust deserved their own nation, and that they had the right to live in peace among their neighbors. I considered this homeland for the Jews to be compatible with the teaching of the Bible, hence ordained by God. These moral and religious beliefs made my commitment to the security of Israel unshakable (Carter 1982, 281).

In 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz explained the US commitment to Israel in both moral and strategic terms,

Our original moral commitment to Israel has never wavered, but over the years Americans have also come to recognize the enormous importance of Israel—as a partner in the pursuit of freedom and democracy, as a people who share our highest ideals, and as a vital ally in an important part of the world. The moral and personal bonds that tie us together have strengthened us both (Shultz 1985).

Thus, although some presidents were decidedly more pro-Israel than others, all US administrations have supported Israel’s role as a strategic partner in the Middle East.

US aid to Israel was limited to economic development assistance until 1962 when the first US military aid (in the form of loans) was granted to Israel.14 The Six Day War was fought in 1967 (resulting in the Israeli capture of the West Bank, Golan Heights, Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula, and Gaza), and in 1968, Congress increased aid to Israel by 450 percent (See Figure 2.1). In 1967, US military aid to Israel was $7 million and in 1968 it had jumped to $25 million (Wenger 1990). In addition, in 1968, the US sold Phantom aircraft to Israel, “establishing the precedent for US support for Israel’s qualitative military edge over its neighbors” (Sharp, 2006, 2). In 1974, the United States began offering military “grants,” in which partial loan repayment was waived. US aid to Israel continued to rise, and in 1976 Israel

14 The first direct arms sale, consisting of hawk missiles, occurred in 1961.
officially became the largest annual recipient of US aid. As part of the Arab-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979, the Carter Administration quadrupled Israel’s military aid to $4 billion (Wenger 1990), and since 1985, nearly $3 billion in grants (both military and economic) have been provided to Israel annually (Sharp, 2006).

In 1996, Israel announced that it would reduce the economic assistance it receives from the United States, and in 1998 a negotiated agreement was reached: “a $600 million reduction in Israel’s $3 billion annual aid package by decreasing the $1.2 billion economic aid to zero over a ten year period while increasing Israel’s $1.8 billion military aid up to $2.4 billion in the same period” (Sharp 2006, 6). Thus, the amount of ESF going to Israel has been decreased yearly by $120 million (beginning in 1999) and the FMF funds have been increased annually by $60 million. This process is set to be completed in 2008 (Sharp 2006, 6). As a consequence of this deal, military assistance to Israel has continued to grow. In 2007, FMF grants to Israel totalled approximately 20 percent of the overall Israeli defense budget, and this will only increase into 2008 (Sharp 2007b, 8). Nearly 75 percent of the FMF funds is used to purchase US defense equipment, which Israel can purchase as reduced rates due to its designation as a “major non-NATO ally” (Sharp 2006, 11–12).

US assistance to Israel has often been adjusted to address emergency situations in the country. For example, in 1985, during a severe economic recession, Congress passed a special economic assistance package of $1.5 billion and all military aid was converted into grants (economic aid had been converted to grants in 1981). In addition to Patriot missiles used to defend against Iraqi scud attacks during Operation Desert Storm, Congress granted Israel $650 million in emergency grants in 1991 to pay for damages and other costs. Further, Congress approved $10 billion in loan guarantees for Israel to help it absorb Jewish immigrants from Russia and other Eastern bloc countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In 2000, the United States provided Israel with an additional $1.2 billion to fund the implementation of the 1998 Wye Agreement calling for the removal of troops and military installations from areas of the West Bank. Lastly, in 2003, Congress granted Israel $9 billion in loan guarantees over three years to assist in economic recovery (from a recession caused by the renewal of Israeli-Palestinian violence), as well as an addition $1 billion in military grants (Sharp 2006, 3–5).

In addition to the staggering amount of aid provided to Israel, the Jewish state also receives benefits that are not generally available to other countries. Since 1977, Israel has been allowed to spend a percentage of its FMF inside Israel instead of

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15 Israel was the largest recipient of US aid from 1976 to 2004, after which it was supplanted by Iraq.

16 The United States designated Israel as a “major non-NATO ally” in 1998, and this allows Israel to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) (outdated equipment) under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act and section 23(a) of the Arms Export Control Act.

17 Loan guarantees allow Israel to borrow money from commercial sources at lower rates than from the US government, and the 2003 loan guarantees came with restrictions. The loan guarantees could only be used within Israel’s pre-1967 borders and it could be reduced by an amount equal to the amount Israel spends on settlements in the occupied territories. In 2003, the loan guarantees were reduced by $289.5 million because of settlement and security barrier construction (Sharp 2006, 9).
being required to spend it on research and development in the United States (this began with special permission granted to Israel for research and development of the Merkava tank inside Israel). No other state has been awarded this benefit. As a consequence, “the proceeds to Israeli defense firms from purchases with US funds have allowed the Israeli defense industry to achieve necessary economies of scale and become highly sophisticated” and many in the United States “believe that a strong domestic Israeli defense industry is crucial to maintaining Israel’s technological edge over its neighbors” (Sharp 2006, 11). Further, all US assistance granted to Israel is delivered within the first 30 days of the fiscal year, whereas other recipients generally receive theirs in staggered installments throughout the year. The money granted to Israel is transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank, and the interest accrued is used by Israel to pay down its debt to the United States. Lastly, the government of Israel directly receives all ESF from the United States rather than the funds being allocated for specific development projects (in contrast, Egypt and Jordan receive a percentage of their ESF as a cash transfer) (Sharp 2007b, 8).

When considering the allotment of aid for Israel in relation to its human rights record, the situation is complicated on two fronts: 1) the distinction between the conditions for Israeli citizens and the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and 2) the security environment for Israel that guides their policies toward the Palestinians. On the first front, if one momentarily removes the Occupied Territories from the equation, human rights in Israel are quite good. Israel is a multiparty parliamentary democracy with free elections, and it has enumerated fundamental rights and an independent judiciary. In its 2006 report on human rights practices, the US Department of State declared, “The government generally respected the rights of its citizens; however there were problems in some areas” (US Department of State 2007). These problems include poor conditions and abuse in detention centers; discrimination against Israeli Arabs (who are citizens of Israel); religious discrimination; discrimination and some violence against women; unequal education for Jewish and Arab students; and, despite the passage of anti-trafficking legislation, trafficking in and the abuse of women and foreign workers continued in some areas (US Department of State 2007). Thus, while problems do exist, Israeli citizens generally enjoy a high level of security rights.

In reality, however, one cannot remove the Occupied Territories from consideration and as a consequence, human rights overall in Israel are very poor. The Political Terror Scale (See Chapter 3) highlights the fact that Israel is considered a serious violator of human rights (see Figure 2.3). While human rights in Israel were considered fairly good in the 1980s, the situation deteriorated in the mid- to late-1990s and continues to do so in the twenty-first century. By 2000, Israel scored a “2” on the Political Terror Scale. As briefly mentioned above and as will be explained further in Chapter 3, classifying a state as a “2” on the political terror scale indicates

18 Palestinians in the occupied territories are not citizens of Israel and do not enjoy the same rights as citizens. In this section, the citations for Department of State all refer to the annual country report on the human rights practices in Israel and the occupied territories available at www.state.gov.
19 Our PTS data ends in 2003.
that murders, disappearances, and torture are common in some segments of society, as well as the incarceration of ideological opponents and arbitrary and capricious punishment of those opponents. Thus, while these atrocities rarely happen to Israeli citizens, the situation in the Occupied Territories is quite different.

According to the Israeli human rights group B’tselem, from 29 September 2000 (the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada) to 30 September 2007, 4,267 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces in both Israel and the Occupied Territories (as additional 41 have been killed by Israeli civilians) (B’tselem 2007). In 2006, the US Department of State confirms, “there were reports of death and injuries to civilians in the conduct of military operations, numerous serious abuses of civilians and detainees, failure to take disciplinary action in cases of abuse, improper application of security internment procedures, [and] temporary detention facilities that were austere and overcrowded” (US Department of State 2007). Amnesty International further highlights the fact that “Israeli soldiers and settlers committed serious human rights abuses, including unlawful killings, against Palestinians, mostly with impunity” and “thousands of Palestinians were arrested by Israeli forces…on suspicion of security offences and hundreds were held in administrative detention” (Amnesty International 2007).\(^{20}\) In addition, in 2006, there was a threefold increase over 2005 in deaths of civilians by Israeli forces.

\(^{20}\) In this section, the citations for Amnesty International all refer to the annual report on Israel and the occupied territories.
Some 650 Palestinians, half unarmed civilians including 120 children, were killed mostly by air and artillery bombardments against densely populated refugee camps and residential areas in Gaza (Amnesty International 2007).21 In addition to an unsafe security environment, the situation in parts of the Occupied Territories is also a humanitarian disaster. According to Amnesty International, in 2006, “humanitarian conditions in the Occupied Territories deteriorated to an unprecedented level, marked by a rise in extreme poverty, food aid dependency, high unemployment, malnutrition and other health problems among the Palestinian population” (Amnesty International 2007). The construction of the separation barrier, checkpoints and blockades (there are more than 500 of them throughout the West Bank), segregated roads, seizure of Palestinian land in the West Bank, and destruction of infrastructure in Gaza all contribute to a deteriorating economic and social condition in the Occupied Territories. Palestinians have been cut off from their farmland, places of work and education, and health facilities, and the passage of goods is also severely restricted (Amnesty International 2007).

On the second front, one cannot assess human rights in Israel without considering the security environment in which Israeli finds itself. Innocent civilians in the Occupied Territories do not live in a bubble, and the significant and real threats against the state of Israel often guide its behavior. The use of suicide attacks, the launching of Qassam rockets from Gaza, and attacks and kidnappings of Israeli soldiers all contribute to a sense of insecurity, and necessitate (in the eyes of the Israeli government and its supporters) a response.

According to the Israeli human rights group B’tselem, from 29 September 2000 (the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada) to 30 September 2007, 1,025 Israelis were killed by Palestinians in both Israel and the Occupied Territories (704 civilians, and 321 security force personnel) (B’tselem 2007). In 2006 specifically, 23 Israelis, including six Israeli Defense Force (IDF) soldiers were killed in terrorist attacks in Israel and the Occupied Territories (US Department of State 2007). Eleven Israelis were killed in one incident in April, claimed by Islamic Jihad.

In addition, the victory of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in early 2006 caused a further erosion of relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). Hamas is an internationally recognized terrorist group, and Israel has no relations with the Hamas government (although relations with PA President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah party continue). Thus, progress in resolving any differences between the two sides has been rendered nearly impossible, and the situation in Gaza deteriorates daily (Hamas expelled Fatah from Gaza in a bloody struggle in June 2007). The situation in Israel is further complicated by conditions along the northern border with Lebanon that resulted in a war with Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon from 12 July to 14 August, 2006. The conflict left more than 1,100 Lebanese dead and more than 4,000 injured. On the Israeli side, Hezbollah rocket attacks killed 39 civilians and injured hundreds more (Human Rights Watch 2007b). Both sides are accused of violating laws of war, but neither the Israeli or Lebanese government have been held accountable.

21 Most Palestinians were killed in Gaza, although there were scores of deaths in the West Bank.
Taken together, these issues provide a serious dilemma for Israel. The common perception is that Israel cannot sit idly by and allow its citizens and military personnel to be the victims of terrorist attacks. Thus, each Palestinian action has an equal (or harsher) reaction. In the bigger picture, Israeli actions to stall the movement of suicide bombers or other terrorists (such as the separation barrier, checkpoints, and segregated roads) may be having the desired effect in Israel (for example, there was a nine month period from April 2006 to January 2007 without a suicide bombing in Israel), but coupled with Palestinian infighting in Gaza, they are having deleterious effects in the Occupied Territories. This in turn creates a dilemma for US policymakers. The United States will continue supporting Israel, but would like to see the response remain proportional. For example, in 2001, Israel responded to a mortar attack from Gaza with a bombardment of Palestinian security positions and took control of a segment of Gaza transferred to Palestinian control as part of the 1993 Oslo Accords. In response, Secretary of State Colin Powell said, “The hostilities last night in Gaza were precipitated by the provocative Palestinian mortar attacks on Israel. The Israeli response was excessive and disproportionate. We call upon both sides to respect the agreements they’ve signed” (quoted in Kirgis 2001). In addition, it is commonly heard from US policymakers that “Israel has the right to defend herself,” and the United States always uses its veto in the United Nations Security Council to protect Israel. For example, in 2006, United States vetoed two resolutions calling for Israel to halt its attacks on Gaza (one in July and one in November). Thus, the United States has been walking a thin line by disapproving of Israel’s actions but not condemning the behavior outright.

In the history of the US foreign aid program, both Egypt and Israel provide striking examples of the priorities of US policy. Questions of human rights may enter the discussion, but aid is little affected by the dialogue. In 2003, loan guarantees to Israel were reduced by $289.5 million because of settlement and security barrier construction, but this was out of $9 billion. Congress placed restrictions on Egyptian aid for 2008, but it only applies to $200 million out of a $1.3 billion allotment. Hence, the rhetoric may exist, but the action does not. Security concerns trump human rights concerns in every instance.

Human Rights and Foreign Aid in the Reagan and Bush Years: Anticommunism to the End of the Cold War

After the human rights focus of the Carter years (albeit unsuccessful), the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George Bush witnessed a heightened sense of the importance of national security as the main factor in granting assistance, and as one author put it, “Life after the Carter Administration turned out to be precarious for human rights” (Shestack 1989, 23). This did not mean, however, that human rights were not a policy issue for the Reagan Administration. Since human rights were still important to the American people and the international community, the administration redefined the concept of human rights to fit the new agenda. As one scholar explains,
Throughout most of its tenure, the administration focused on the use of human rights as a cold-war weapon against Marxist states, showed disdain for internationalism, and supported right-wing repressive governments [including those in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Somalia, South Korea, Turkey, Uruguay, and Zaire] because these governments were regarded as allies against pro-Soviet states or as candidates for Communist takeovers (Shestack 1989, 24).

The initial goal of the Reagan Administration was the Cold War battle with the Soviet Union, and as a consequence, the “us versus them” mentality created a condition where the United States would ally with anyone who was against the Soviet Union. As a consequence, an idealistic concern for human rights was a luxury that could be ill-afforded in the eyes of Reagan Administration officials. Thus, they redefined human rights to exclusively mean anticommunism and the promotion of democracy. In the battle against communism, human rights’ rhetoric actually proved to be quite useful against the Soviets. In 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced that the new US policy of human rights would be the fight against international terrorism, and the administration declared the Soviet Union the ultimate source of international terrorism and thus “the provocateur of human rights abuses” (Apodaca 2006, 83). Once tied together, security, terrorism, and human rights became powerful ideological tools against communism (Apodaca 2006).

In an effort to make the policy more appealing to Congress and the American public, in addition to anticommunism, the administration also couched their goals in terms of the promotion of democracy. Of keen interest was the preservation of democracy in Latin and Central America to the extent that the United States supported authoritarian, right-wing regimes in countries like Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Panama. For example, in 1985 the Reagan Doctrine became a policy of overt rollback in the Third World (although covert rollback had been a part of the Reagan foreign policy since 1981). Reagan proclaimed, “Support for freedom fighters is self-defense” (Reagan 1985). Thus, the Reagan Administration encouraged anticommunist insurrections in Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua, provided assistance for threatened regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala, overthrew the Marxist government in Grenada, and supplied the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan in their fight against Soviet forces.22 By supporting these regimes, “the Reagan White House claimed that the United States was actually directly supporting human rights by providing military and economic assistance to friendly, yet repressive, governments” and “reasoned that a nondemocratic, unpopular, and murderous right-wing government wasredeemable, but a nondemocratic, unpopular, and much less repressive left-wing government had to be overthrown” (Apodaca 2006, 85–6). Thus, foreign aid (primarily military

22 During the Reagan Administration, the Kirkpatrick Doctrine differentiated between totalitarian regimes (pro-Soviet communist states) and authoritarian regimes (pro-Western dictatorships). Jeane Kirkpatrick theorized that states can more easily restore democracy to authoritarian regimes because they do not control the thoughts of their citizens and generally do not undermine community institutions whereas totalitarian regimes do both. In 1986, Reagan appeared to reverse this policy by declaring that his Administration would “oppose tyranny in whatever form, whether of the left or the right.” See Jacoby (1986).
aid, as that was Reagan’s preference) was provided to regimes fighting communism regardless of their human rights record.23

During the period in which the Reagan Administration provided various types of support to abusive regimes, Congress was attempting to tie foreign aid more closely with human rights. Congress passed the Harken Amendment (1982) to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act which mandated that,

No assistance may be provided...to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons or other flagrant denial to the right of life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in the country (italics added by authors) (Claude and Weston 1992, 293).

Similarly, Section 502b of the Foreign Assistance Act dictated that military aid will not be continued or granted to countries that engage in human rights violations. However, just as there is a loophole with economic aid, military assistance may be granted if the president indicates in writing “that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance” (Claude and Weston 1992, 293). As a result of both sets of extenuating circumstances, the United States continues to financially assist, either through economic or military aid, countries that are guilty of gross human rights violations.

As the Cold War came to an end, and the primary position of the battle against communism became a thing of the past, the purpose of foreign aid and the position of human rights in the US agenda had to be re-evaluated. During the administration of George H.W. Bush, human rights suffered a setback in terms of its place in the US foreign policy agenda. While Bush was “neither sympathetic nor antagonistic toward the concept of human rights” he “actively put the United States on a path toward more human rights violations” (Apodaca 2006, 114–15). Generally speaking, Bush supported human rights when it did not cost him anything, which led him to often ignore human rights issues and squander a golden opportunity to redefine the importance of human rights in the post-Cold War world. Instead of promoting the importance of human rights, he supported China, allowed the Kurds and Shi’ites to be abused by Saddam Hussein, ignored ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, and tried to ignore the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, while “actively [reversing] human rights guarantees by, among other actions, restricting freedom of the press in the United States and sacrificing human rights situations to a ‘war on drugs’ crusade” (Apodaca 2006, 134).

Even if human rights policy did not undergo a significant alteration after the demise of the Soviet Union, ideas concerning the allocation of US foreign assistance did. Without a clearly defined enemy (as with communism during the Cold War), Congress (and the American public) was less than eager to support large amounts

23 The Reagan Administration took a more positive approach towards human rights in its second term in response to Congressional and public pressure. Administration officials discovered that human rights concerns often promoted America’s interests. Still, taken as a whole, the Reagan years marked the use of human rights as a Cold War weapon.
Strategic US Foreign Assistance

of foreign aid. As a result, Congress passed the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which significantly reduced security assistance. In addition, the area of the world deemed important became apparent by the passage of the East European Democracy Act and the Freedom Support Act, designed to assist the transition of those countries newly freed from Soviet control (Apodaca 2006). As a consequence, and shown in Figure 2.4, there was a decrease in military aid, but an increase in economic aid in the early 1990s. Thus, the Cold War approach to foreign assistance was gone as an obvious enemy was no longer apparent, and it would take a decade for a solidifying enemy to reappear.

![Figure 2.4 Total US foreign assistance: 1950–2005](image)

The Clinton Presidency: Promise Unfulfilled

The election of Bill Clinton in 1992 was heralded with excitement by those who believe in the worldwide promotion of human rights. In his campaign for president, Clinton emphasized the importance of human rights in American foreign policy. The reality, however, did not live up to the rhetoric. The clearest example of this is the Clinton Administration’s decision to continue granting Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status to China. Human rights in China are poor (freedom of expression is abridged; mass executions occur; there is arbitrary arrest and detention; minorities are robbed of their rights; and there are horrible prison conditions), but it represents a large and lucrative trading market. The economic importance of
China therefore outweighed the human rights concern. As one activist explains the Clinton Administration’s view of human rights,

During the Cold War, the United States was ready to denounce human rights abuses by governments aligned with the Soviet Union; [in the 1990s], it [was] similarly ready to do so against pariah states or the governments of countries that are not considered politically or economically important. That is the new double standard; it is a different double standard from the one that prevailed during the Cold War, but it is just as pernicious in damaging efforts to promote human right internationally (Neier 1996/1997, 96).

Thus, once the controlling nature of the battle against communism was gone, US policymakers simply found other issues, either political or economic, to rank ahead of human rights on the priority scale. In particular, Clinton was more interested in promoting US economic development through trade than with human rights (Apodaca and Stohl 1999).

This ordering of priorities can be seen in many examples during the Clinton years. Instead of condemning Russia for its human rights violations in Chechnya, the United States was intent on supporting ally Boris Yeltsin’s reelection in 1996. As a consequence, the United States continued to provide economic aid to Russia, while Yeltsin was pouring billions of dollars into the war against Chechnya. Although India’s human rights record is poor (See Chapter 7), Clinton’s focus was nuclear weapons. The concern was that to push India to improve its human rights record might cause a backlash in its willingness to cooperate on nuclear policy. Saudi Arabia has notoriously poor human rights, but that country continues to be critical to the United States in many ways, including the control of oil prices and as a buyer of US arms. Colombia’s poor human rights were ignored (and a waiver issued under Section 502b of the Foreign Assistance Act for “extraordinary circumstances”) (See Chapter 5) in favor of attempts to curb drug trafficking to the United States (Neier 1996/1997).

Another example is the US relationship with Indonesia. While Indonesia was suppressing the independence movement of East Timor, it was also buying US weapons and aircraft. Specifically, President Clinton’s decided to sell fighter jets (F-16) to Indonesia in spite of its human rights record. According to a 1996 State Department Report, the Indonesian government,

Continued to commit serious human rights abuses…Reports of extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture of those in custody by security forces increased. Reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions and the use of excessive violence (including deadly force) in dealing with suspected criminals or perceived troublemakers continued. Prison conditions remained harsh, and security forces regularly violated citizens’ right to privacy…The Indonesian people continue to lack the ability to change their government. The Government continued to impose severe limitations on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association (US Department of State, Country Profile Indonesia 1996).

Congress urged the president to withdraw the sale because of Indonesia’s human rights record, and in June 1997, President Suharto cancelled the purchase of the jets himself in the face of criticism from Congress. The State Department “regretted” the decision by the Indonesian president, but vowed it would not hamper further efforts to cooperate on regional issues.
Another particularly illustrative example is the US relationship with Turkey. While Turkey was violating the rights of its Kurdish population (See Chapter 6), it was also playing a critical role isolating Iraq. From 1980 to 1999, the United States shipped $9 billion worth of arms to Turkey, in addition to $6.5 billion in grant and loan military aid to facilitate the purchase of US equipment. At the same time, the State Department Human Rights’ reports were accusing Turkey of significant human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention. Hence, in spite of an extremely poor human rights record, before 1999, Turkey was the third largest recipient of military aid from the United States (Gabelnick 1999). Hence, as a result of extenuating circumstances in the granting of foreign assistance, the United States continues to financially assist, either through economic or military aid, countries that are guilty of human rights violations. Thus, the United States engages in a conscious trade-off in the area of foreign assistance and human rights.

As a consequence of these priorities, as one might expect, human rights were not a factor in deciding which countries would receive economic aid during the Clinton years. These decisions were made based on need, past aid received, and economic interest (Apodaca and Stohl 1999). In terms of foreign aid allocation, with the loss of the Cold War justification, policymakers had to couch their appeals for aid in terms of benefits to US business. After 1994 (and the Republican victory in both houses of Congress), however, Congress cut foreign aid budgets. The allocation of aid was also impacted by the passage of several pieces of legislation late in Clinton’s second term, all resisted by the White House. In 1997, Congress passed the Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act which cut aid to military or police forces that were engaged in gross human rights violations unless the government of the recipient country had taken steps to bring the violators to justice.24 In addition, Congress passed the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) in 1998 to promote religious freedom as a central tenet of US foreign policy and support those persecuted for their religious beliefs worldwide. Specifically, the IRFA seeks “to channel United States security and development assistance to governments other than those found to be engaged in gross violations of the right to freedom of religion.”25 The IRFA contains a list of punitive actions from which the executive branch may choose, but it also contains a waiver (much like the “extraordinary circumstances” waiver in Section 502b of the Foreign Assistance Act explained above). Thus, countries that are vital to US security interests can avoid punishment for violations under this Act. In 2000, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) was passed and seeks to combat trafficking in persons and punish the traffickers. As with the IRFA, the TVPA also contains an executive waiver that allows US foreign assistance to continue to governments that condone trafficking (Apodaca 2006).

Thus, despite Clinton’s rhetoric heralding the importance of human rights, policies during his two terms in office failed to live up to his claims. Instead of making human 

24 In 1998, the Leahy Amendment was expanded to include all security assistance funded through the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.

25 For the text of the IRFA, see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ292.105.
rights promotion a cornerstone of his foreign policy, Clinton was willing to forgo improvements in the human condition for economic and political gains. He exercised waivers for “extraordinary circumstances” to keep aid flowing to some of the most egregious violators of human rights, and undermined US credibility in some circles by rhetorically supporting human rights but actively pursuing self-interest. This trend would only worsen in response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September.

George W. Bush and the New Enemy

The tragic and profoundly altering events of 11 September served as the catalyst for the development of George W. Bush’s worldview and the subsequent foreign policy of his administration. He entered the presidency with no experience in foreign affairs, and while he surrounded himself with experienced and knowledgeable advisers, he himself had a very limited understanding of the way the international environment worked and his foreign policy was haphazard and confused, lacking a clear focus. Following the events of 11 September, he successfully identified an enemy, something that had eluded presidents, including his father, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today, the enemy is “evil,” and it encompasses a wide array of current and potential targets. Fighting terrorism has assumed the primary position in US foreign policy, as combating communism was during the Cold War. His rhetoric has taken the form of “us against them.” As in the Cold War years, the espoused line to other nations is that “you’re either with us or you’re with them.” Bush has reiterated this point many times. For example, on 3 October, 2002, in a speech concerning the need for terrorism insurance, Bush (2002) said, “[The] doctrine that says, either you’re with us or with the enemy, still holds.”

There are significant consequences associated with the designation of an enemy, and in particular if that enemy is defined as evil. The consequences of using such labels lie in the ability to convince the American public (and others including Congress and allies) that a chosen course of action (a policy) is acceptable and proper because it is needed to root out an “evil.” As the definition of evil expands, so does the realm of policy options deemed to be acceptable. As illustration, Bush began by declaring the 11 September terrorist attacks, the terrorists who perpetrated them, and the organization behind them as “evil.” A description most would accept. In turn, this became the basis for the war in Afghanistan. The ruling-Taliban supported and harbored al-Qaeda, thus making them responsible for its actions. Shortly thereafter, Bush expanded the enemy to include the “axis of evil,” Iran, Iraq and North Korea, with his first, and thus far only, military target being Iraq. Thus, the definition was enhanced to include rogue states seeking weapons of mass destruction, ruled by ruthless dictators who might supply such weapons to terrorists. While such an assumption is certainly possible, and casting aside for the moment the fact WMDs were not found in Iraq, many leaders, both friends and foes, as well as many citizens of world, doubted the claims and evidence presented by the United States and Great Britain to suggest such a threat existed. Using the psychologically powerful rhetoric of the fight against “evil,” Bush was successful, however, in convincing a majority of the American people that action against Saddam Hussein would protect the security of the United States.
While the enemy may be “evil,” the target is terrorism, and foreign aid has been identified as a tool to undermine the root causes of the phenomenon. In an effort to combat terrorism, Bush has sought to spread democracy and ease global poverty. The argument is that terrorism is caused by the hopelessness of those who live in poverty (and suffer the corresponding side-effects such as hunger, disease, and illiteracy) with no hope of a better future. And by helping the people in poverty-stricken countries improve their standard of living, they will not be persuaded by the arguments of fundamentalists. With this argument in mind, support for foreign aid has increased in the United States since 11 September, as seen in Figure 2.4, and the Bush Administration began two new foreign aid programs. First, in March 2002, Bush proposed the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which increased development assistance by 50 percent (by 2006) and provides funding, on a competitive basis, to select countries that demonstrate that they are “ruling justly, investing in people, and pursuing sound economic policies.” Second, in his 2003 State of the Union address he called for $15 billion to be spent on combating HIV/AIDS in Africa and the Caribbean over the following five years. While these initiatives are worthy of praise, the irony is that neither of these programs target failed states where terrorism might breed (the MCA requirement that states demonstrate “ruling justly, investing in people, and pursuing sound economic policies” precludes any failed states from qualifying for the program). Regardless, this was a dramatic shift in US foreign policy in terms of foreign assistance. After years of viewing such assistance as a negative aspect of foreign policy, it was now seen as a way to protect US security.

While the use of foreign aid was increasing, the respect for human rights, both abroad and at home, was decreasing. Policies of the Bush Administration have completely and utterly lacked any concern for human rights, and appalling actions have been taken in the name of national security. Civil liberties in the United States have been abridged (in particular with the provisions of the Patriot Act), detainees at Guantanamo Bay are denied basic rights, tactics including torture, rape, and homicide were used (and discovered) at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, and the United States has been accused of torturing suspects abroad (or sending them to others to be tortured) in an attempt to gain information. In addition, to maintain (and reward) allies in the war on terror, economic and military aid flows to governments who are egregious violators of human rights. For example, US relations with Turkey and the continued allocation of aid to this strategic ally is a prime example of the decision to ignore human rights in the name of national security (See Chapter 6). Turkey’s strategic location (especially its border with Iraq) and its own internal fight against terrorism (specifically, its battle against the Kurdistan Workers Party—PKK) has earned it free reign in human rights. Although Turkey’s human rights abuses are a part of the calculation for accession to the European Union, the United States does not link the allocation of assistance to any improvement in this area.

In addition, Pakistan is also viewed as a valuable ally in the war on terror, and thus its human rights abuses are ignored as well (See Chapter 7). For example, in

2005, the Bush Administration authorized the sale of fighter jets (F-16) to Pakistan (this sale was one of many concessions made to Pakistan after 11 September). Former President George H.W. Bush had barred the sale of F-16s to Pakistan in 1990 (over its undeclared nuclear weapons program), but this decision was reversed by George W. Bush to assist in the battle against al-Qaeda. Much like Indonesia under Clinton in 1996, the Bush Administration ignored the human rights situation in the recipient country. In 2005, the Pakistani government was doing little to address issues “such as legal discrimination against mistreatment of women and religious minorities, a rise in sectarian violence, arbitrary detention of political opponents, harassment and intimidation of the media, and lack of due process in the conduct of the ‘war on terror’ in collaboration with the United States” (Human Rights Watch 2005a). Despite its now declared nuclear weapons program, the denial of democracy evidenced by President Musharraf’s military-backed government, and its appalling human rights record, Pakistan continues to receive financial and military assistance from the United States.

Thus, the twenty-first century has seen a dramatic deterioration in the US promotion of human rights. While foreign aid has come back into favor as a foreign policy tool (after a decade of being viewed unfavorably), it is not used as leverage to entice improvement in human rights conditions. In fact, it is given with no strings attached to some of the most egregious violators of human rights worldwide in the name of national security. As one human rights’ scholar put it, “Sadly, US human rights policy was now the calculated victim of George W. Bush’s war against terror. The victimization of US human rights policy was accomplished with little or no opposition from, and at times with the genuine support of, Congress, the American public, and the media” (Apodaca 2006, 189).

Conclusion

This historical narrative demonstrates the ever-present and on-going battle between realpolitik and liberal policies. While we would like to believe that bettering the human condition can be, and is, a priority for governments (and in this case the US government), the reality is, of course, that trade-offs must be made. And when they are made, security will always win. This is how it is, and this is how it should be. The security of a nation’s people and territorial integrity cannot be downgraded in importance in an effort to correct another nation’s human suffering. And this chapter demonstrates that all US leaders have realized this since the inception of the foreign aid program after World War II. Even Jimmy Carter, who honestly and firmly believed in the pursuance of global human rights, could not withstand the realities of foreign policy and as a result, human rights took a backseat to national security.

The recognition that security is the primary goal of all nations does not, however, mean that human rights must be ignored. As shown in this chapter, Congress has attempted to pass legislation that at the very least requires the executive branch to consider the human rights of countries receiving US aid. In an effort to improve human rights, however, such legislation lacks teeth as Congress has always included a “get out of jail free card.” By allowing the executive branch
to waiver the requirements for security reasons, extraordinary or not, they have rendered their ability to prevent the allocation of aid weak and ineffective. Thus, the restrictions enacted by the US legislature have largely been a moot point when the allocation of economic and military assistance is being considered. Chapters 5 through 7 will highlight trends seen in this chapter through a close examination of US aid to Colombia, Turkey, and Pakistan.
Chapter 3

Measuring Human Rights and Foreign Assistance

Statistics is a powerful tool for the defence of human rights. It permits to identify the good performers, name and shame the laggards, stimulate emulation and competition for the adoption of best practise in human rights policies...Even though, as in most social sciences, the quantification of the violations of human rights and the measurement of progress is difficult, it can and should be done (Paolo Garonna, Director of the Statistical Divisions of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2000).

In their 2004 *State of the Child* report, UNICEF reported that infant mortality rates fell between 1960 and 2002 in all of the 156 countries that were able to supply the data in both years. In addition, UNICEF found that eleven countries had lowered their infant mortality rates by 90 percent or more.¹ According to the United Nations, world literacy levels went from 70 percent in 1980 to 80 percent in 2000. On the other hand, the World Bank reports that approximately one billion people live in poverty, that is, one-fifth of the world’s population live on less that $1 dollar per day. This is in spite of the overall world level of poverty decreasing from 29 percent of the global population in 1990 to 18 percent in 2004.² Beyond these aggregate statistics, we regularly see news reports of individual suffering as the recent headline from Haiti illustrates, “Poor Haitians Resort to Eating Dirt.”³ Information regarding human rights statistics peppers the news landscape on a regular basis. In addition, journalists and NGOs regularly report on countries that are experiencing episodes of gross human rights violations. In order for scholars to study human rights, they have to be measured. There is no other way to adequately indicate if human rights are getting better or if conditions are, unfortunately, worsening.

The first two chapters have discussed the nature of human rights and the history of the foreign assistance program respectively. In this chapter, we turn to measuring both of these concepts. We focus first on the dilemmas facing researchers in the field of human rights; specifically the problems of accurately capturing in a measure the concept of human rights. We close this first section with an overview of the measures employed in the study: the Political Terror Scale (PTS) for security rights and the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) for the level of subsistence. Second, we

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² The World Bank’s News and Broadcast web page was accessed on 31 January 2007.

focus on the US foreign assistance program, highlighting the various programs that constitute economic and military aid. Here, we untangle the vast web of programs, some more controversial than others, to highlight the extent and nature of foreign assistance. In this section, we provide an overview of the level of aid allocated and distributed to the various regions, focusing on the regions highlighted in the case studies. The last section of the chapter provides an initial empirical analysis regarding the relationship between human rights and US foreign assistance utilizing bivariate statistical techniques.

**Measuring Human Rights**

Measuring and defining human rights and subsequently human rights violations has been problematic with much disagreement among researchers in the field as to what constitutes first, the definition of human rights, and second, the best measure for a given definition. As for the definition, we argued in Chapter 1 that the United States, at least rhetorically, focuses on a variety of human rights and has initiated foreign assistance programs designed to aid in the realization of these rights. In practice, however, there is a division between the focus on security rights and civil and political rights (so-called first generation rights) on the one hand and social and economic rights (second generation rights) on the other. It could be argued that one reason for this division of rights is for political expediency. Foreign policy decisions regarding the violations of physical integrity rights such as torture and extra-judicial executions seem far more cut and dry than decisions regarding how to alleviate societal and economic problems such as poverty, malnutrition, and illiteracy. Thus, we generally see the United States utilizing its foreign assistance program to more readily address gross violations of security rights rather than attempting to withdraw or suspend foreign assistance based on a state’s inability to alleviate poverty.

In addition, the division of rights seems to be a convenient tool for political science researchers in that “one way to avoid the problems caused by global measures of human rights is to concentrate on a small subset of core rights…which are usually defined as freedom from torture, freedom from imprisonment for the mere expression of beliefs and freedom from political execution” (McNitt 1986, 73). As such, this small subset of rights, security rights, became the focus of academic research in two different areas. The first agenda focused on security rights as an independent variable explaining US foreign policy decisions such as the allocation of aid. However, by the 1980s, researchers embarked on a second agenda and began to examine the conditions within nation-states that explained the variation in security rights conditions; in other words, security rights became the dependent variable. At the same time, a second set of researchers set out to examine the factors that contribute to a citizen’s standard of living, or basic human needs, which turned

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the focus from security rights to subsistence rights. Our research concentrates on both subsets of rights: security rights and a measure of basic human needs or a humane standard of living. These concepts capture the policy objectives outlined by the United States, first in the legislative restrictions regarding foreign assistance which is tied to security rights violations and their USAID programs regarding development which focuses more on subsistence rights.

Once the definition or set of human rights has been established, several additional issues are relevant. Here, we are concerned with questions of reliability and validity. One of the traditional problems in studying human rights in a quantitative fashion has been first the availability and then the reliability of data. In other words, can we expect the same results after repeated observations? The issue of validity involves reconciling the data and actual measurement with the concept or definition of human rights. With these concerns in mind, we now turn to an examination of each of the measures utilized in this study.

**Security rights**

In the case of security rights violations, there seems to be a consensus that this concept at least includes torture, false imprisonment, and extrajudicial disappearances and killings. The sources available with this type of information include Amnesty International Annual Reports, State Department Country Reports, as well as professional media sources. This has lead to the development of two basic types of measurement where security rights violations are concerned: an events-based approach and a standards-based approach. An events-based human rights measure consists of a tabulation of the various categories of abuses over a given period of time. The information regarding the types of abuses is usually collected from newspaper sources. Studies within the field, however, indicate an inherent bias in events-based data measurement techniques (Lopez and Stohl 1992; Stohl et al. 1984; Poe and Tate 1994). Specifically, Lopez and Stohl (1992) argue that events-based data fail to capture the “afterlife effect” of human rights violations. That is, the terror experienced by the victims at time t lingers into the future and this institutionalized abuse cannot be detected by an events-based measurement.

A standards-based data set, on the other hand, establishes a set of human rights criteria for different levels or rankings which are then used to rate a country’s human rights record. One of the initial efforts to codify these types of human rights

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7 For example, the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) data set provides the number of conflictual and cooperative events for a given country each year. Other examples are the data set gathered by Taylor and Jodice (1983) and the PANDA data set (Bond and Bond 1995).

8 Empirical research that employs a standard-based measure for the dependent variable of security rights or personal integrity abuse include Stohl and Carleton (1985), Carleton and
Strategic US Foreign Assistance

abuses was the Comparative Survey of Freedom by Gastil (1973). Beginning in 1978, Freedom House published an annual report, *Freedom in the World*, based upon Gastil’s criteria. In these reports, freedom is defined in terms of political rights “that allow people to participate freely and effectively in choosing their leaders or in voting directly on legislation and those civil liberties that guarantee freedoms such as speech, privacy and a fair trial” (Gastil 1980, 4). Thus two broad categories of rights, based on the UDHR, are considered. Each nation receives a rating based on a set of factors contributing to a citizen’s civil liberties and political rights. The result is a ranking between 1 and 7 for each category of rights. The nations are then divided into three categories: countries with a rating of 1 or 2 or considered “free”, a rating between 3 and 5 refers to a “partly free” country, and a 6 or 7 indicates a country that is “not free”.9

In addition, Gastil (1980) created a scale of political terror which captures “murder, torture, exile, passport restrictions, denial of vocation, ubiquitous presence of police controls, and threats against relatives” (Gastil 1980, 37). This scale provided a set of criteria that captures personal integrity or security rights. This political terror scale has five levels which are outlined below:

Countries on Level A live under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional (though police and prison brutality may occur). Political murders are extremely rare. There is no detention without trial, and laws protect individual and group rights.

On Level B there is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beating are exceptional, and psychiatric institutions are not used to silence political opponents. Political murder is rare, or, if present, characteristic of small terrorist organizations.

On Level C there is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Executions or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted. Incarceration in mental hospitals and the involuntary use of strong drugs may supplement imprisonment.

On Level D the practices of Level C are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life in some societies at this level. In others there is large-scale incarceration of ideological opponents in labor camps or reeducation centers. In still others the terror may stem primarily from the arbitrary and capricious manner in which opponents are punished. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

On Level E the terrors of Level D have been extended to the whole population, and may result from religious, ethnic, or ideological fanaticism. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals. The worst periods of Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia characterize countries on Level E (Gastil 1980, 37).


It is with this political terror scale that Carleton and Stohl (1987) developed a one-dimensional ranking of countries. In their study, three separate measures to capture the concept of human rights are employed. One dependent variable is simply the Freedom House scale mentioned previously. The other two dependent variables are created using the Gastil (1980) five-level scale. The country information utilized came from two different sources: the State Department Country Reports and Amnesty International Annual Reports creating a scale based on each. Their study is important for our purposes for several reasons. First, it established the idea that human rights are a one-dimensional phenomenon. Second, it created a data set that was both cross-national and cross-temporal that allows for inferences to be made about dynamic changes across time. Lastly, their research demonstrated that utilizing different sources of data within the same study provides a more robust and reliable finding. The five-level scale developed by Gastil (1980) has evolved into the Political Terror Scale which is utilized as the primary measure for security rights in this study.

The method of deriving this standard-based measure involves coders reading the Amnesty International and State Department reports, thereby ensuring inter-coder reliability. One problem facing coders is that the two reports do not necessarily cover the same countries. For example, the State Department generally releases reports on more countries than Amnesty International. Citing the high correlation between the two measures, Poe and Tate (1994) substitutes the value coded for Amnesty International for the State Department value for a particular year if the profile information is not available from the State Department. Likewise, the State Department values are substituted in the years where country reports are not provided by Amnesty International. Thus, two measures are actually created: one is based on State Department Reports supplemented by Amnesty International data when necessary and the other based on Amnesty International Reports and supplemented by State Department data when necessary. In a subsequent analysis of the validity of the two measures, Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) report differences in the two, undoubtedly resulting from the respective biases in the reporting from the two different organizations. The Amnesty International based measure is preferred for our study in order to avoid the US bias in the dependent variable, particularly since

10 Cingranelli and Richards (1999a) have demonstrated empirically that security rights are indeed one-dimensional. While subsequent research has primarily utilized the Political Terror Scale (PTS), some recent research has employed the Cingranelli and Richards’s measure. A correlation test was conducted comparing the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) data set with the PTS. The two data sets are highly correlated (Ktau-b = -0.6901; Spearman-.7975; p<.05). The inverse relationship is due to the CIRI ranking based on respect for security rights, while the PTS measure is based on personal integrity abuse. We include the PTS in our analysis in order to compare our results to previous research.

11 We have expanded this idea to include measures for two different types of rights: security and subsistence rights.

12 Mark Gibney, University of North Carolina-Ashville, makes the Political Terror Scale available at http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/images/Colloquium/faculty-staff/gibney.html. The data for security rights violations, as well as many of the control variables utilized in this study were provided in one data set by Steven C. Poe in the summer of 2005.
this research aims at addressing US foreign policy decisions. The variable ranges from “1”, representing the most abusive record, to “5”, representing the greatest degree of the realization of security rights. For the purposes of this study, the ordinal ranking of countries are inverted from the original data set in order for both respect for human rights and subsistence rights to be in the same direction.

Subsistence rights

The focus on subsistence rights turns the researcher’s attention to issues that are considered quality of life concerns. The terms subsistence and basic human needs generally refer to adequate food, clothing, and shelter, the availability of clean water and air, as well as the promise of minimal health care. These types of rights are outlined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and are also a primary objective articulated in the UN Millennium Development Goals. As discussed in Chapter 1, the provisions of these types of rights require a great deal of state engagement and thus are considered more controversial. However, the realization of these rights are as important as security rights in that should a person lack “these basic human needs, the result can be just as painful and deleterious as when a person’s physical security is violated” (Milner and Callaway 2007, 59).

In addressing basic human needs, researchers have relied on demographic data rather than on written reports from states or international institutions that require some level of subjectivity. Initially, the measure employed by researchers studying basic human rights needs has been one of wealth, specifically gross national or gross domestic product. The main reason for its use has been availability. The focus on these measures led researchers to argue that increases in societal wealth would eventually trickle down to the poorest in society. There are a variety of problems, however, with the use of wealth as a measure that adequately captures the concept of basic human needs. In practical terms, it is clear that aggregate economic wealth and growth does not indicate that such wealth is reaching those most in need. In addition, there are plenty of examples where governments fail to intervene on behalf of the needy (Milner and Callaway 2007). In terms of measurement, we are faced with validity issues, that is, whether wealth actually measures or captures the concept of basic human needs. Moon (1991) points out that measures of wealth, given their aggregate nature, do not indicate consumption or income at the individual level. A second concern is that GNP or GDP does not consider the effect of price fluctuations that exist not only between countries, but within countries as well. A third drawback of utilizing aggregate measures of wealth is that they fail to adequately measure how income is distributed within society. Lastly, crucial items necessary for the realization of basic human needs may not be available and this reality is not reflected in measures of wealth (Moon 1991; Milner and Callaway 2007).

As alternates to measures of wealth, additional demographic measures have been considered including indicators of minimum health and nutrition standards, levels

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13 The United Nations and its various agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations, have long addressed many of these subsistence and development goals. The UN Millennium Development Goals calls for significant gains in basic human needs by the year 2015.
of education, adequate water and housing, and necessary sanitation. International organizations and agencies such as the United Nations Development Program, UNESCO, and USAID routinely gather such indicators of basic human needs. In addition, many researchers have created composite indices of these basic needs components (Drewnoski and Scott 1966; McGranahan et al. 1972; United National Economic and Social Council). The most prominent and widely used index was developed by Morris (1979, 1996). This Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) is a composite of infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy and is utilized in this study as the second dependent variable measuring subsistence rights.\(^{14}\) It is designed to capture the ability of a country to meet the subsistence needs of its people. Taken together, infant mortality and life expectancy measure the overall health of a society. While conceptually these two might initially be thought of as measuring the same phenomena, they actually address two different elements within society. Infant mortality rates generally reflect the health conditions within the home while life expectancy at age one reflects health conditions outside the home. Specifically, infant mortality rates are tied to safe water, wellness of the mother, as well as general sanitary conditions within the household. The third component, literacy, is designed to capture the overall development level of a society (Morris 1979; Dixon 1985; Milner and Callaway 2007). The variable potentially ranges from zero, indicating the lowest level of quality of life, to 100, representing the highest level of quality of life.\(^{15}\)

The computation of the PQLI includes a measure for infant mortality per thousand live births (IMR). According to Morris (1996, 3), “improvements in the infant mortality component reflect social improvements inside the home, particularly the well-being of women”. This infant mortality rate uses 250 per 1,000 live births as the worst possible performance with 0 per thousand reflecting the best performance. Each country’s performance is converted using the following formula:

\[
250 - \text{IMR}/2.50.
\]

The measure for life expectancy at age one (LE\(^1\)) assumes that 38 years is the worst performance and 85 years is the best performance. The resulting index for each country is derived from the formula:

\[
14 \text{ Another common index is the Human Development Index which consists of national income (adjusted GDP per capita), life expectancy at birth, and education. Unfortunately, it is only available beginning in 1990 and it mixes both means (income) with ends (health and education). In addition, the inclusion of a measure of income is problematic to our statistical analysis in that it is also used as a determinant of basic human needs.}

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15 \text{ The original computation of the index included the early 1970s, as well as indices for males and females for the years 1950, 1964, and 1970 (Morris 1979). This index was updated to include the years 1960, 1981, 1985, and 1990 (Morris 1996). Milner (1998) collected additional years of data (1980 through 1993) for his study of globalization and the realization of basic human needs. Callaway (2001) further extended the data to cover the years 1976 through 1996. Finally, Cingranelli and Richards have taken the Callaway (2001) and Milner (1998) data sets and compiled a complete data set up through 2005 (Milner and Callaway 2007). David Cingranelli generously provided the updated data set in March 2006.}
\]
However, the data available discloses infant mortality at birth (LE0). Thus, the conversion formula to obtain the measure for life expectancy at age one (LE1) is as follows:

$$LE1 = LE0 - 1 + Q0(1-K0)/1-Q0.$$ 

Where $Q0$ is the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births; $K0$ is the average survival period during the first year. This survival period is assumed to be .03 year; $LE0$ is life expectancy at birth; and $LE0$ is life expectancy at age one. The original raw data on literacy rates was actually given as illiteracy rates. Thus, the data had to be converted simply by subtracting the raw data from 100. After each individual measure is converted to a scale from 0 to 100, the composite index is calculated by simply averaging the sum of the three components. Each component is thus weighted equally.16 While there are certainly critics of the PQLI, and indices in general as a measure of human rights (Bayless and Bayless 1982; Goldstein 1992; Hicks and Streeten 1979; Larson and Wilford 1979), it is currently the best and most valid measure available to adequately reflect basic human needs.17

### Human rights measures: A closer look

The mean values of the variables measuring security rights and subsistence rights are displayed in Table 3.1. The first section of the table reveals the summary statistics for the total sample for the two measures of security rights (3.52) and subsistence rights (71.89). This is followed by summary statistics for long-term OECD states and all other or developing states respectively.18 There is a great discrepancy between the levels of respect for human rights and whether the country is a highly developed or less-developed state. For example, the mean value of security rights in the long-term

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16 The information for the formulas and additional information regarding the derivation of the Physical Quality of Life Index is from Morris (1996).

17 There are several critiques of the PQLI. One is that any index runs the risk of losing valuable information that the individual measure is able to reveal. For example, if one measure in the index is high and the other is low, this information is lost when it is compiled in an index. In addition, there is a question of the appropriateness of weighting each element of the PQLI equally. Morris (1979) argues that in the absence of any theoretical rationale for treating one element with any more importance than other, weighing them equally must be employed.

18 Long-term OECD countries consists of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In our data set, the German Federal Republic is considered Germany from 1976 through 1990. While additional countries have been integrated into the OECD in recent years, the use of long-term membership as a criterion was utilized to maintain consistency within the data. All of these countries became members prior to 1976, the starting year of our data. See Poe (2003). For the purposes of this study, all non-OECD states will be referred to as developing countries.
OECD states approaches the maximum value with a value of 4.6, while the citizenry enjoy a very high quality of life (93.74). However, the mean value of security rights for all other states is approximately 1.3 lower on the scale. In addition, these states lag behind the highly developed states in the quality of life measure by just over 25 points. Table 3.1 also reflects the mean values of security and subsistence rights in different regions.\(^{19}\) Region by region, the mean value of security rights is generally consistent with the mean values for the overall sample of developing countries. The lowest levels occur in the Middle East/North Africa (3.02) and Asia (3.04) regions. It should be noted here that the United States considers Turkey to be in Western Europe, a region that generally has security rights that reflect that of the mean value for long-term OECD countries.\(^{20}\) The mean value of security rights in Turkey is 2.25,

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Table 3.1 Mean values of security rights and subsistence rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Security Rights*</th>
<th>Subsistence Rights**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Sample</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>71.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term OECD</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>93.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing States (non-OECD)</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>68.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>81.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East/North Africa</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>69.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>89.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurasia</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>85.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>69.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>50.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * Political Terror Scale based on Amnesty International Records; ** Physical Quality of Life Index.

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19 These regions are defined by the US government in their allocation of foreign assistance. While the countries that make up Sub-Saharan Africa are self-explanatory, it should be noted that the Caribbean nations are included in the Latin America category. The following countries are included in the Middle East/North Africa category: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. The United States includes the following countries in its Asia category: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The countries that constituted the former Eastern Bloc countries during the Cold War generally comprise the Eastern Europe category. These nations include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Lastly, many of the former republics of the Soviet Union make up the Eurasia category in the United States’ scheme for foreign aid and include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

20 The mean value for security rights in Western Europe is 4.51.
Strategic US Foreign Assistance

74

a level lower than both the European counterparts (East or West) as well as other developing states. In fact, Turkey’s rating is lower than the mean values in the other regions that are considered when discussing the geography of Turkey: Eurasia (3.6) and the Middle East/North Africa (3.02).

In terms of subsistence levels, there is a great deal of discrepancy between the regions ranging from the poor quality of life in Sub-Saharan Africa (50.28) to relatively high levels in Eastern Europe (89.04). The variation in the regions is also striking, where both Eastern Europe and Eurasia, while significantly higher than other regions, still lag behind the mean value of the most developed states in the international system. Countries in Latin America lag behind developed states by approximately 13 points on the Physical Quality of Life Index. However, it should be noted that these three regions just discussed are above the mean value of the total sample. Countries in the Middle East/North Africa, Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa are all below the mean for the total sample with Sub-Saharan Africa well below the mean value of developing states.

In sum, the two dependent variables reflect several principles contained within the various articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Specifically, the measure for security rights captures the “right to life, liberty, and the security of person” (Article 3), the right not to be “subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment” (Article 5), and the right not to be “subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile” (Article 9). The International Covenant of Political and Civil Rights (1976) further articulates those elements that make up security rights. In terms of subsistence, Article 25 of the Declaration states that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services…” In addition, Article 26 indicates that the signatories agree that everyone also has a right to education. Many of these concepts related to subsistence rights are further clarified and expanded in the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976). This right to an adequate standard of living and education is best captured by the Physical Quality of Life Index.

Measuring Foreign Assistance

In what began as a tool for post-World War II reconstruction, foreign aid has long been a multifaceted program with varying strategies and objectives. The brief overview of the history of foreign aid presented in Chapter 2 illustrates that the major recipients of aid followed the contours of US security interests: war-torn Europe in the 1940s, Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, the Middle East in the 1970s, Latin America in the 1980s, transitional economies in the 1990s, and partners in the war on terror in the 2000s. Here, we take a closer look at the components of the US foreign assistance program.

US foreign assistance is broken down into six major categories: development assistance (bilateral), the Economic Support Fund (ESF), humanitarian assistance, aid to the former Soviet bloc (Eastern European states and the republics of the
Measuring Human Rights and Foreign Assistance

former Soviet Union), multilateral assistance, and finally military assistance. These six categories for our purposes are divided into two main categories of foreign assistance: economic aid and military aid. In fact, in reporting foreign assistance, both bilateral and multilateral assistance, humanitarian assistance, aid to the former Soviet bloc, and ESF are categorized as economic aid. All of these programs, save multilateral assistance which falls under the purview of the Department of Treasury, are administered by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). On the other hand, military assistance, which is administered by the Department of Defense, includes among other things the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and peacekeeping operations. A brief overview of each of these types of funding is provided.

Economic assistance

Bilateral economic assistance is a general category of economic aid that includes such programs as the Child Survival and Health Programs (CSH), Development Assistance, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), the FREEDOM Support Fund (FSF), Support for East European Democracy (SEED), the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI), and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). In addition, the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) is also considered a bilateral economic assistance program. All of these programs are pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, which outlines the general purposes and objectives of Congress in regards to foreign assistance, specifically that,

the Congress finds that fundamental political, economic, and technological changes have resulted in the interdependence of nations. The Congress declares that the individual liberties, economic prosperity, and security of the people of the United States are best sustained and enhanced in a community of nations which respect individual civil and economic rights and freedoms and which work together to use wisely the world’s limited resources in an open and equitable international economic system. Furthermore, the Congress reaffirms the traditional humanitarian ideals of the American people and renews its commitment to assist people in developing countries to eliminate hunger, poverty, illness, and ignorance (Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), P.L 87–195, §101).

Thus, Congress developed and continues to fund programs that are meant to address specific types of issues dealing with the human condition. For example, CSH specifically targets health services in recipient states in order to improve the health


22 Data for each of these programs as well as the total amount of economic aid and military aid can be accessed from the online version of the USAID U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations (commonly known as the Greenbook) at http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/.

23 It should be noted that in 1973 the US Congress passed an amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act that required such assistance to specifically target the poorest of the poor in recipient states (CBO 1997).
of the citizenry, particularly that of women and children. One of the objectives of
the program is to improve the health, nutrition, water, and sanitation programs in
recipient states, all of which directly address the physical quality of life issues or
basic human needs outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These
types of rights are captured in the PQLI measure employed in this study.

The Development Assistance program further supports efforts to improve the
quality of life of citizens around the globe. According to USAID, this program is
designed to address five goals: alleviation of poverty, sustainable and equitable
economic growth, respect for civil and economic rights, integration into the open
market economy, and the promotion of good governance (USAID Reference Guide,
4). Again, these objectives are consistent with international norms regarding a whole
host of human rights that are reflected in both security and subsistence rights.

The FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) and the Support for East European
Democracy (SEED) are designed to promote democratization efforts in the former
Soviet Bloc. FSA is specifically for the independent states of the former Soviet Union
and focuses on political and economic reforms as well as social reforms aimed at
health care, drug trafficking, and organized crime.24 There are several restrictions to
FSA including a human rights caveat which states that funding cannot be provided
if a state “is engaged in gross violations of human rights or of international law”
(USAID Reference Guide, 12). Conversely, SEED seeks to address the specific needs
of South Central Europe, particularly the war-torn area of the Former Yugoslavia. As
such, a great deal of focus is placed on the development of political pluralism and
democratization. In addition, like FSA, there is an emphasis on economic reform.

Humanitarian assistance is yet another category under the larger umbrella of
economic aid. Here, the United States contributes to natural disasters such as the
tsunami in Indonesia and famine in Africa with International Disaster and Famine
Assistance (IDFA).25 The Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and the
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) provides humanitarian
assistance for the vulnerable victims of conflict. Perhaps the largest humanitarian
program is the Food for Peace initiative authorized by the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954. Given the abundance (surplus) of food
commodities, the United States uses this surplus to address the issues of world
hunger and malnutrition as well as agricultural and sustainable development. The
efforts of this program should be reflected in improvements in the PQLI.26

24 The law stipulates that this funding is limited to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan.

25 In FY2005, Indonesia, Maldives, and Sri Lanka all received considerable funding for
tsunami assistance (US Overseas Loans and Grants, Country and Regional Notes).

26 The most recent innovation in foreign assistance is the Millennium Challenge
Account initiated in 2003. The funding for the program began in 2004 thus is not included
in our foreign assistance data. Funding for this program cannot include military assistance.
It is aimed primarily at global development and operates under the paradigm of rewards as
“countries will be selected to receive assistance based on their performance in governing
justly, investing in their citizens, and encouraging economic freedom” (US Foreign Assistance
Reference Guide 17).
Lastly, there are several types of foreign aid that the United States government classifies as economic assistance in nature, but in reality have a military purpose. In devising the allocation of foreign assistance, Congress concluded that at times developing countries might need US economic support, not for any specific development program, but for more general purposes such as democratization, peace negotiations, and the promotion of financial stability. Section §531(a) of the FAA (1961) states that “Congress recognizes that, under special economic, political, or security conditions, the national interest of the United States may require economic support for countries in amounts which could not be justified solely [for development purposes].” According to a CBO Report (1997), “ESF explicitly directs economic aid to countries that are deemed to be politically or strategically vital to the security of the United States. The form ESF money takes is often similar to development assistance; however, it may also include cash transfers into a country’s bank account” (CBO 1997, 14). This same report indicated that the overwhelming majority of this type of aid was awarded to Middle Eastern countries with Israel and Egypt receiving 85 percent of the 2.3 billion program in 1997.

Thus, one of the factors complicating the study of the effects of foreign assistance is the reality that economic assistance to certain nations really ends up being military assistance.27 For example, Thorp (1971, 110) points out that “economic assistance which went to Indonesia in the early 1960s was clearly intended for specific economic purposes, but actually released Indonesia’s resources for use in building its military machine.” An additional critic is the Geneva Humanitarian Forum which reports on their website that financing military deals can occur through several different avenues within the foreign aid budget, thereby bypassing the national defense budget. One of these is through “fungible cash transfers through the Economic Support Fund (ESF)” as well as through more traditional means of military aid, including “direct grants or loans through the foreign military financing program (FMFP); grant aid for international military education and training (IMET); peacekeeping operations (PKO); and through counter-narcotics initiatives.” In sum, the ESF allows cash transfers that can then be used to support arms deals and military training. No better example exists than the funding for Plan Colombia and the Andean Counter-Narcotics Initiative.

Beyond the ESF, Narcotics Control is a law enforcement assistance program which the US government classifies as economic aid under the auspices of the US State Department (US Reference guide, 42). Likewise, the Andean Counterdrug Initiative is designed is to reduce the flow of drugs to the United States and prevent political instability in the Andean region. This is yet another program with military or security objectives that falls under the category of economic aid. Thus, a great deal of what most would consider security or military in nature is categorized as economic aid.

27 This is the case with Plan Colombia and the most recent $1B in economic aid to Turkey.
Military assistance

In terms of military assistance, the United States maintains several programs designed to,

- promote the peace of the world and the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by fostering an improved climate of political independence and individual liberty, improving the ability of friendly countries and international organizations to deter or, if necessary, defeat aggression, facilitating arrangements for individual and collective security, assisting friendly countries to maintain internal security, and creating an environment of security and stability in the developing friendly countries essential to their more rapid social, economic, and political progress (FAA §501).

In general, military assistance is money provided to allies and friendly states in order for them to purchase and otherwise acquire US military equipment and training. Some of the specific programs financed by the US government in support of these objectives include the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF), the International Military and Training Program (IMET), and peacekeeping.

The purpose of FMF is to allow the president to “furnish military assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, to any friendly country or international organization, the assisting of which the President finds will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace and which is otherwise eligible to receive such assistance” (FAA §503). Several objectives of note are that the funding is designed to promote professionalism of friendly military forces, particularly for the purposes of dealing with the civilian population as well as to “expose international military forces to democratic ideals and principles of internationally recognized human rights…” (USAID Foreign Assistance Guide 37).

Similar to the FMF, the IMET allows the president to authorize, when he deems it necessary, “military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries” (FAA 1961 (P.L.87–195),§541). Here students are trained in the United States for the purposes of exposing military personnel to “US professional military organizations.” Some of the same objectives apply: learn democratic values, rules of law, human rights, and the improvement of military justice systems. This training is accomplished through the attendance at “military and training facilities in the United States and abroad.” One of the restrictions is that “IMET is normally not used to provide lethal military training or law enforcement training” (Reference Guide page 34). It should be noted that the School of the Americas (SOA) fits into this category. The SOA, now named the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, provides military education to soldiers from countries in the region. It has been heavily criticized as many of the graduates have been accused of engaging in gross human rights violations. The program now highlights that it includes courses on democratization and human rights.28

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28 Nelson-Pallmeyer (2001) refers to the program as the School of Assassins. Several NGOs also highlight the human rights abuses of the program (see School of the Americas Watch at http://www.soaw.org/).
Lastly, the United States provides funding for peacekeeping operations (PKO) that are not funded through the United Nations. This program is designed to allow the president to “furnish assistance to friendly countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in furtherance of the national security interests of the United States” (Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87–195), §551). Beyond the national security component, the rationale for this program is for recipient states to share in peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts in order to reduce the burden placed on the United States in terms of resources and personnel (USAID Reference Guide).

Measuring foreign aid

Our analysis focuses on economic and military aid separately and their respective effect on human rights. The data is taken from U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, otherwise known as the Greenbook, provided annually by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) that was described in the previous section. 29 Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for US economic and military aid. Similar to Table 3.1, this table provides a breakdown of the summary statistics for three measures of foreign aid into the total sample of countries, long-term OECD states, and developing states. The mean value of economic aid in historical dollars for the entire sample is $38.93 million. However, when considering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Historical</th>
<th>2000 US$</th>
<th>Percent of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total sample</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid</td>
<td>38.93</td>
<td>65.37</td>
<td>1.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid</td>
<td>28.24</td>
<td>50.06</td>
<td>.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term OECD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid</td>
<td>8.11</td>
<td>16.54</td>
<td>.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid</td>
<td>34.51</td>
<td>63.43</td>
<td>.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term OECD (without Turkey)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>7.51</td>
<td>.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid</td>
<td>19.57</td>
<td>38.24</td>
<td>.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing States (non-OECD)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid</td>
<td>44.21</td>
<td>73.74</td>
<td>1.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid</td>
<td>27.17</td>
<td>47.48</td>
<td>.21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 The data is available online at http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/. Beginning in July 2005, the data is available in constant or deflated dollars. The use of constant dollars, which takes into account inflation, allows us to compare the allocation of foreign aid over time. Note that in this study, both historical and constant dollars are utilized for both illustrative and comparative purposes. This data for this study was accessed and downloaded in the summer of 2005, thus the years for our study cover 1976 through 2003.
the difference between highly developed and developing countries, there is a large
discrepancy in the values, $8.11 and $44.81 million respectively. A different pattern
emerges for military aid where the mean value for long-term OECD states is actually
higher than developing states. This is a function of including Turkey who receives
a great deal of US foreign assistance, even though it has been a long-term member
of the OECD. When Turkey is removed from the sample, the level of foreign aid to
developing countries far outpaces that of the OECD states.30

However, the raw dollar figures can be misleading. For example, Egypt receives
a disproportionate amount in terms of economic ($1,807 million) and military
($1,653 million) aid compared to the mean values of developing countries in the
sample of $73.74 and $47.48 million respectively.31 While this is an extraordinary
amount of aid allocated to Egypt, the total percentage of economic and military
aid compared to overall GDP comes to 3.9 percent and 2.9 percent respectively.
In 1994, both Guinea-Bissau and Gambia also had an economic to GDP ratio of
approximately 2.7 percent, however, their raw dollar allocation was only $6.49
million and $10.76 million in US dollars respectively. Similarly, in 1990, Belize’s aid
to GDP relationship totaled 2.52 percent, however, the total amount of economic aid
allocated to Belize that year was $11.83 million. On the other hand, small amounts of
US aid can constitute larger percentages of GDP. In 1985, the United States allocated
$53 million to Belize, an amount drastically smaller than the amounts for Egypt;
however, this constituted almost 18 percent of the country’s GDP. In 1978, $112
million in economic aid was allocated to Guyana which equaled 17.9 percent of
their GDP. This larger percentage suggests a greater reliance, or dependency, on the
United States for economic standing. In this vein, it is intuitive to expect that there
is a bigger influence of US dollars on the domestic conditions within the recipient
state. As such, economic and military aid is measured as a percentage of GDP. The
summary statistics of the transformed variables of economic and military aid are also
presented in Table 3.2. There is an obvious difference in the percentage of GDP that
economic and military aid constitutes when comparing developed and developing
states. In addition, economic aid has a much stronger presence in recipient states,
almost nine times as much as military aid.32

**Correlations Between Human Rights and Foreign Assistance**

The bivariate relationships between economic and military aid and human rights
are presented in Table 3.3. The table displays the relationship between both types of
foreign assistance and human rights for the entire sample, long-term OECD states,

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30 Since we are including Turkey as one of our case studies and considering their human
rights records, we removed Turkey out of the OECD category for the purposes of doing the
analysis and include it in the non-OECD category.

31 The data reported is in 2000 US dollars.

32 The range of these variables is quite drastic; for example the largest amount of
historical economic aid is over $4 billion while the maximum value for military aid as a
percentage of GDP in developing states without Egypt and Israel is 25 percent.
and non-OECD states. These three different samples are provided to illustrate the vast differences in the amount of foreign assistance granted to the less developed countries in comparison to industrialized states. When attention is turned to the multivariate analyses in the next chapter, the entire sample will be utilized to ascertain the effect of US foreign aid on human rights. The use of a global sample will allow for the greater generalization with regards to the results.

The first column in Table 3.3 represents the bivariate relationship between both types of aid, the different country samples, and the security rights variable based on Amnesty International Reports. The second column reveals the relationship between foreign aid and subsistence rights, based on the Physical Quality of Life Index. In general, the results indicate that there is an inverse, or negative, relationship between foreign assistance and human rights. In other words, higher levels of aid, relative to GDP, are associated with lower levels of security and subsistence rights. In the first column of correlations between foreign aid and security rights, this phenomenon holds and is more pronounced for high income developed states. While there is little expectation that the United States is granting significant amounts of aid to OECD states for the purposes of addressing human rights concerns, the result is still disconcerting. A graphical representation sheds light on the negative relationship between foreign assistance and security rights. Figure 3.1 depicts the average

Table 3.3  Bivariate relationships: US foreign assistance and human rights (aid as a percentage of GDP)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic aid</th>
<th>Security Rights * (AI)</th>
<th>Subsistence Rights @ (PQLI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All countries</td>
<td>-.32***</td>
<td>-.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term OECD</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
<td>-.39***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>-.09***</td>
<td>-.06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military aid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All countries</td>
<td>-.21***</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term OECD</td>
<td>-.27***</td>
<td>-.36***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>-.03*</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; AI Amnesty International; PQLI Physical Quality of Life Index; * Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient; @ Pearson’s correlation coefficient.

33 The bivariate statistics were conducted using contemporaneous variables for foreign aid as a percentage of GDP and human rights. The purpose of the bivariate analysis is not to establish causality, rather to determine the nature of the relationship between the variables of interest.

34 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is utilized due to the ordinal nature of the measure for security rights.

amount of economic and military aid, in millions of dollars, allocated at each level of personal integrity abuse. As a reminder, a country rated a “1” is considered to have the worst human rights records, while a country rated a “5” is considered to have the best human rights records. The distribution of economic and military aid, as a percentage of GDP, for security rights is presented in Figure 3.2. The gap between economic and military aid is more pronounced when both are measured as a percentage of GDP. Economic aid comprises approximately five times as much GDP than military aid for countries with the worst human rights records. Countries with the worst human rights records receive, on average, more aid from the United States. In spite of congressional legislation aimed at prohibiting such action, the United States continuously allocates and appropriates economic and military aid to countries with poor human rights records.

The bivariate relationship between United States foreign assistance and subsistence rights indicates a similar relationship (see Table 3.3). Both economic and military aid is generally associated with lower levels of subsistence rights. One exception to note is the positive relationship between military assistance and developing states, however, this relationship is not statistically significant. As correlations cannot establish causality, it is unclear from these results whether countries with low levels of subsistence rights attract greater amounts of United States foreign assistance, or whether greater amounts of foreign assistance contribute to lower levels of subsistence rights.

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36 Figures are calculated using foreign aid in 2000 dollars and include the total sample.
Examining the relationship between subsistence rights and economic aid graphically, in millions of dollars, suggests that countries in the range of 40 to 70 on the Physical Quality of Life Index receive more economic aid from the United States (Figure 3.3). However, those suffering the most and presumably those that need economic assistance the most, those experiencing under 30 on the Physical Quality of Life Index, do not receive as much economic aid as the rest of the sample. The average amount of economic aid allocated for countries below 30, such as Gambia, Niger, Sierra Leone, Chad, Ethiopia, and Cambodia, is $34 million dollars compared to the $65 million average for the entire sample. Military aid, as measured in millions of dollars, follows a similar pattern to economic aid, albeit at lower averages across the sample. Countries with less than 50 on the PQLI receive very little military aid. It is the countries in the middle and upper ranges of subsistence that receive the most military aid. The upswing in military aid at the highest levels of subsistence is due to the high quality of life in Israel, Greece, Portugal, and Spain and their relative high levels of military aid.

When economic aid is compared to the GDP (Figure 3.4), it is evident that economic aid comprises a larger percentage of GDP in the countries that have the worst living conditions. So, while in raw dollars it appeared that countries with the worst living conditions were not receiving comparable levels of aid, when compared to GDP these countries appear to have a heavy dependence on US foreign aid. Military aid, however, appears to be a greater percentage of GDP, albeit only slightly, in countries in the middle range of subsistence (60–80 on the PQLI scale), such countries include Turkey, Algeria, Kenya, and most of the Latin American states.
Figure 3.3  US foreign assistance and subsistence rights: Historical dollars

Figure 3.4  US foreign assistance and subsistence rights: Aid/GDP
At this preliminary stage, the results indicate support for the critics’ arguments regarding US foreign aid that there is a negative relationship between foreign assistance and domestic conditions, in this case, human rights conditions. While bivariate statistics are useful to establish relationships between variables, in most cases there are additional influences on the dependent variable that a study seeks to explain. As such, a multivariate analysis is required in order to account for a relationship between foreign assistance and human rights, holding other important factors constant. This is addressed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4

Examining the Empirical Evidence

When it comes to politics, we got no moral Brownie points for good intentions; we will be judged by the results…(Peter Berger 1987).

In this chapter, we turn to a quantitative investigation of the relationship between foreign assistance and human rights conditions in recipient states. We outlined the theoretical arguments in Chapter 1 regarding the expected relationships, but a brief recap is offered here. This perspective is derived not only from theory, but from the policy objectives outlined in the various programs that constitute US foreign aid. The stated intent and rhetoric of the United States, in what can be considered the liberal view, suggests that higher levels of aid are more likely to result in improved human rights conditions, or increases in both the level of security rights and the physical quality of life or subsistence rights. From a theoretical perspective, it is argued that foreign assistance supports democratization efforts which would enhance security rights. In terms of subsistence, foreign aid can help governments meet educational and health goals, build schools and health clinics, trains teachers, nurses, doctors, and other related health workers, provide medical supplies, improve access to food and nutrition through the PL 480 food programs, create new employment opportunities as aid contributes to the building of large infrastructure projects, connect rural and urban areas through road projects, assist in developing food cooperatives, provide vocational training, and assist in developing labor organizations (Zimmerman 1993).

Conversely, arguments are just as plentiful, and perhaps more convincing, that foreign aid contributes to poor human rights conditions, particularly in the case of military aid and repressive governments. This is a concern expressed by opponents in Congress of granting the Colombian aid package as illustrated in Chapter 1. Leaders in such regimes, it is argued, simply use the military assistance to maintain and perpetuate their power, including suppressing the rights of the political opposition. As for economic aid, the restrictions and conditions imposed on many types of aid prevent any assistance from actually improving domestic conditions. For example, antiquated techniques and materials are often introduced into the recipient state which then requires them to seek further aid down the road. This seems to perpetuate the foreign assistance relationship between the United States and the recipient state. In addition, critics suggest that economic aid is used by elites in recipient states to fund their own agendas and the benefit of this aid is not distributed to the masses.
Building a Model of the Determinants of Human Rights

The previous chapter provided an in-depth look at the major variables of interest, that is, foreign assistance and human rights. However, previous research has identified several important determinants of both personal integrity rights and subsistence rights. As a result, they are included in the model as control variables in order to discern the relationship between US foreign assistance and human rights conditions. The following section offers a description of these variables, how the variables are measured and the data gathered for the analysis.

Economic standing

Previous research in the field of human rights indicates that economic standing, or the wealth of a nation, is positively associated with respect for security rights (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995a, 1995b; Poe et al. 1997) and subsistence rights (Moon and Dixon 1985; Spalding 1986; Moon 1991). Collectively, these studies indicate that wealth is a strong predictor in the improvement of the human condition. Moreover, human rights violations and substandard living conditions are expected in relatively poorer countries. Mitchell and McCormack (1988, 478) point out that the countries with the lowest levels of wealth, those “with substantial social and political tensions created by economic scarcity, would be most unstable and thus most apt to use repression in order to maintain control.” As such, it is expected that citizens in wealthier nations experience less abuse from the regime and better living conditions. Following previous research, economic standing is measured by GNP per capita (in 2000 dollars) and is gathered from the World Bank.

Democracy

The level of democracy in a regime is found in previous research to be positively associated with respect for security rights and with subsistence rights (Spalding 1986; Moon and Dixon 1985, 1986; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994, 1996; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Milner 1999). In essence, regimes that are more democratic are less abusive to citizens and are better able to provide for basic human needs. The influence of democracy is twofold: first, the representative nature of democratic regimes tends to inhibit a regime from committing widespread human rights abuses, and second, it causes the state to seek alternative means of conflict (Henderson 1991). Poe and Tate (1994) argue that certain measures of democracy, specifically Freedom House, include a measure of personal integrity that would conflict with the security rights measure. The authors suggest that a tautological problem exists since many measures of democracy contain elements that are necessarily captured in the measure of human rights. Thus, the Polity IV measure of democracy, which focuses on the institutional attributes of democracy rather than actions of the state, is employed in this study. Polity IV measures democracy on a scale of “0”, representing the least democratic, to “10”, representing the most
Examining the Empirical Evidence

democratic. Thus, as the level of democracy increases, respect for both security rights and subsistence rights should increase.¹

**Leftist regime**

A second political variable is regime ideology, specifically the presence of a leftist regime. Kirkpatrick (1979, 44) argues that while right-wing autocracies sometimes evolve into democracies, this likelihood is practically non-existent when considering revolutionary socialism or communist states. She suggests that leftist governments are more repressive and they “create refugees by the million because they claim jurisdiction over the whole life of the society” leading to a negative relationship with respect for security rights. In contrast, Kirkpatrick (1979, 44) suggests that traditional autocratic (right-wing) regimes have systemic differences when compared to socialists states, specifically that “traditional autocrats tolerate social inequalities, brutality, and poverty while revolutionary autocracies create them.” One can infer from the last part of the statement that subsistence rights under a communist revolutionary regime would suffer right along with security rights. However, Moon (1991, 72) argues that socialism provides for a social environment where inequalities are thought to be smaller, specifically that due to a “lower percentage of income deriving from ownership of capital and land, inequality levels are likely to be much lower…It is also evident that socialists states possess a much greater command over social resources, with a considerably greater ability to extract, mobilize, and target the surplus on the problems of basic needs.”

In regards to security rights, Mitchell and McCormick (1988) find limited support for the Kirkpatrick thesis that totalitarian (Marxist states) are more repressive. Poe and Tate (1994) find conflicting results depending on which dependent variable is used. In the model based primarily on State Department reports, the leftist government variable yields a strong, statistically significant coefficient in the anticipated direction. This is in contrast to the model based on Amnesty International Reports, which revealed an extremely weak coefficient with a negative sign.² In their follow-up article, Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) find that leftist countries are less repressive regardless of the source of the dependent variable. The authors suggest that perhaps a longer time span and a larger number of countries might be the cause for the change. In his analysis of subsistence rights, Moon (1991, 74) finds that socialist states “posses a PQLI level more than 17 points higher than would be expected on the bases of GNP alone”. This finding is a qualified one, however, due to the small sample size (11 socialist countries) and the fact that most of these are characterized by relatively high

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¹ The Polity IV project is a data set that codes regime and authority characteristics for all countries on an annual basis for the years 1800–2004. It is gathered under the auspices of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). The principle investigators are Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr. The data are available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/.

² The authors comment that “these results are precisely what one would expect if indeed the State Department’s profiles are biased against leftist governments (or, alternatively if Amnesty International ratings are biased in favor of leftist regimes and movements)” (Poe and Tate 1994, 864).
income levels (Moon 1991, 75). In addition, Cuba proves to be an outlier, primarily due to their relatively high rate of literacy. There are conflicting theories regarding the potential effect of leftist regimes, as well as results, thus leading to a competing hypothesis. As such it is posited with a two-tail test in both models. The variable is coded with a one representing a leftist government and a zero otherwise.  

Military regime

Just as there is an expectation that leftist governments will have an impact on human rights conditions, it is hypothesized that regimes under military rule will abuse both security and subsistence rights (McKinlay and Cohan 1975, 1976; Poe and Tate 1994; Moon 1991). Their method of obtaining power suggests that violence is their primary modus operandi. In addition, they “will face fewer barriers than other leaders if they choose to act repressively” (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Thus, it is hypothesized that the presence of a military regime will result in less respect for security and subsistence rights.

War

Previous research suggests that involvement in international conflict (Stohl 1975, 1976; Rasler 1986; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) and civil wars (Nieburg 1969; Tilly 1978; Skocpol 1979; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Milner 1998) negatively effects the realization of both security and subsistence rights. In times of war, a regime is more apt to abuse citizens in order to maintain power. International wars are apt to create a domestic environment of repression as the regime focuses on events beyond its borders. Maintaining civilian peace and obedience becomes paramount to the war effort; in addition, “preparations for war earmark resources that could alleviate hunger and create jobs, and they make coercion and conscription a way of life much more often that not” (Claude and Weston 1992, 145). Thus, international wars appear to have a dampening effect on both security and subsistence rights.

Civil wars are just as likely, if not more likely, than international wars to produce opportunities for a regime to commit human rights violations. Recent events in Sudan, Nigeria, and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) are a testament to the atrocities a regime is capable of committing. Human rights, in general, suffer in time of conflict. Thus, both international and civil wars are included in the model. Both war variables are coded 0 if there is no current war and

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3 The variable for leftist regime is operationalized as “those governed by a socialist party or coalition that does not allow effective electoral competition with non-socialist opposition” (Poe and Tate 1994, 858).

4 The variable for military regime was provided by Steve Poe. This variable is derived from Mandani (1992) as well as from various years of the Political Handbook of the World and the CIA World Factbook, and the BBC. See Poe, Rost, and Carey (2006).
1 if there is. It is hypothesized that involvement in either case decreases the respect for security and subsistence rights in that particular regime.\(^5\)

**The Cold War**

Although it seems counter-intuitive, it is hypothesized that regimes during the post-Cold War period are more likely to engage in security rights violations. During the Cold War era, the threats and incentives from the United States and the Soviet Union kept the behavior of satellite states in check. The demise of the bi-polar global system characteristic of the Cold War has decreased the involvement and influence of the superpowers in many repressive regimes. The abandonment of this stabilizing influence, as well as the revival of nationalism may work to unleash the repressive nature of many regimes (Milner 1998). As for subsistence rights, the fall of the Iron Curtain has exposed the former communist states to larger and more diversified markets. As a result, increases in the level of trade and investment within these previously closed markets suggest that the quality of life will improve. On the other hand, the economic woes in Russia also indicate that the transition from a command to a market economy is not necessarily a smooth one and that at least in the short run, subsistence rights might suffer. The variable for the Cold War is coded as 0 for the years of the Cold War and 1 for subsequent years. It is hypothesized that the Cold War served to inhibit repressive regimes in terms of security rights, however, the post-Cold War’s influence on subsistence rights is unclear. As a result, it is posited as a two-tail test in the subsistence rights models.

**Population**

Previous research has found that the level of population influences human rights conditions (Henderson 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). It is theorized that large populations increase the pressure on resource allocation. This in turn can lead to increases in opportunities for regimes to repress their citizens due to the increasing scarcity of resources. The population strain on resources also suggests that the regime will have a harder time in providing for basic human needs. Conversely, a larger population might indicate greater outputs available for consumption. The measure for population is logged to account for the disparity in the range of the variable in the present sample. It is hypothesized that population is negatively related to personal integrity rights, while the relationship between population and subsistence rights is posited with a two-tailed test.\(^6\)

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5 One of the dominant data sets on war is the Correlates of War (COW) project. However, the COW data only go through 1997, thus the Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset is the source for both civil and international wars based on the arguments presented by Gleditsch et al. (2002) and the revised list of civil and international wars by Gleditsch (2004). See the expanded war data for the most recent updates at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/expwar.html.

6 Population data is gathered from the World Bank and was provided by Poe, Rost, and Carey (2006).
**British colonial experience**

The colonial experience of a regime has been hypothesized to be an important determinant in the development of the political culture of a nation (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Moon 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Countries that had been territories of Great Britain, it is argued, will have greater respect for the security rights of the individual. This argument is based upon the idea that British influence led to the development of democracy and democratic ideals; in essence “the British role was one of protecting and guiding indigenous development” (Moon 1991, 240). In addition, the British model of colonialism, one of indirect rule, afforded the native population a greater role in governmental participation, ranging from self-government to the establishment of local institutions. As a result, the former colonies were better prepared for independence (Moon 1991).

Does this political training translate into an ability of the former British colonies to provide subsistence rights as well? Moon (1991) investigates the effects of British colonialism on subsistence rights. He argues that along with British political influence, missionaries played a crucial role in the provision of basic human needs, concentrating on education, medical care, medical training, and training the natives in the area of agricultural development. Ultimately, Moon (1991, 244) suggests that the “bulk of the arguments seem to suggest that the British approach would yield a postcolonial political atmosphere more conducive to the spread of citizen welfare.” Moon (1991) finds that the influence of British colonialism results in improvements in subsistence rights compared to other colonial experience. However, this is only true if compared to other colonial experiences (French, Belgian, and Portuguese). In addition, in his bivariate analysis presented, there is a negative correlation between British colonial history and basic human needs. A dummy variable for the history of British colonialism is included in our model. It is hypothesized that this influence will have a positive effect on security rights. Given the ambiguous results regarding the relationship between British colonialism and subsistence rights, it is posited with a two-tail test.\(^7\) We now turn our attention to the analysis of the model.

**Linear Model**

In order to accomplish the task of specifying the model, a pooled cross-sectional time series analysis is employed to test the effects of foreign aid on both security and subsistence rights.\(^8\) This specification accommodates our data that span both

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\(^7\) Data provided by Poe, Rost, and Carey (2006) and is originally from Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) and Poe and Tate (1994). The source of the data is the *CIA World Factbook*.

\(^8\) Our analysis includes two different dependent variables, the Political Terror Scale (PTS) which is an ordinal measure and the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) which is a ration measure. Ordinal data usually calls for an ordered probit model; however, there are several reasons for employing OLS with panel corrected standard errors. First, there is precedence in utilizing an OLS model (Poe and Tate 1994). Second is the ease of explanation with the use of OLS, particularly as it provides a comparison with the subsistence rights model. Third, there is no statistically significant change in the results. An ordered probit
space and time. In the sample, there are approximately 150 countries covering a 28 year time period, 1976 to 2003. Pooled cross-sectional time series are susceptible to heteroskedastic error terms due to the cross-national nature of the data, and auto correlation due to the time series nature of the data (Hicks 1994; Beck and Katz 1995, 1996; Stimson 1985). Since the bias is associated with the error terms, or residuals, and not the coefficients, ordinary OLS is performed to estimate the variable coefficients. Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) suggest the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable to correct for the problem of auto correlation, while the heteroskedasticity inherent in the data is corrected with panel corrected standard errors. However, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable is problematic for several reasons. First, the goal of this research is to test the contemporaneous effect of the independent variables on human rights conditions, not determine whether past human rights conditions influence current human rights conditions. The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the equation inherently includes all the independent variables at t-1, this is in addition to the same variables that are hypothesized to influence human rights at time t. Thus, in effect, the independent variables are being counted twice. Second, the influence of the lagged dependent variable on the results of the regression can oftentimes mask the influence of the remaining independent variables. Achen (2000, x) suggests that “when an autoregressive term is put in ‘as a control’, it often acquires a large, statistically significant coefficient and improves the fit dramatically, while many or all of the remaining substantive coefficients collapse to implausibly small and insignificant values.” Consequently, the two threats to inference in a pooled cross-sectional time series model are corrected by the inclusion of an AR (1) specification to address autocorrelation (Achen 2000) while panel corrected standard errors were utilized to address the heteroscedasticity (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996).9

Security rights model

The results from the pooled cross-sectional time series analysis on the relationship between foreign aid and security rights are presented in Table 4.1. Models A and B represent the economic aid and military aid models respectively for all countries in the sample. Before proceeding to a discussion of the independent variables, a brief comment regarding the model as a whole is warranted. The chi-square statistic indicates that the model as a whole is not significantly different than zero. In addition, the \( R^2 \) statistics of 78 percent indicates that all the models perform well.10

9 A Cook-Weisberg test was conducted for each model in the study and the results indicate that there is indeed the presence of heteroscedasticity in most models. It should be noted that all of the multivariate analyses in this study suffer from similar inherent threats to inference and are thus corrected in the manner just discussed.

10 All subsequent models have similar chi-square and \( R^2 \) results. As a result, no additional comments will be made on these statistics, unless they are drastically different.
Before examining our main variables of interest, we turn to the control variables that are prevalent in models determining security rights abuses. Wealth remains a statistically significant predictor of a regime’s respect for security rights in the models of the total sample (Model A and B). The mean value of economic standing for long-term OECD states is $19,360. This translates into an increase in security rights of over three-quarters of one point (.77) on our five point scale. However, the mean value of economic wealth for non-OECD states is 2.6. This equates to an increase of only .10 on the level of security rights. Stated differently, we can provide predictions for the value of the dependent value by allowing any particular variable to vary while holding all other variables at their mean. In the case of economic standing, the difference between long-standing OECD state and all others, holding all other variables constant, is .78 or three-quarters of one point. This is graphically illustrated in Figure 4.1. Thus, one goal for the United States to pursue in the name of human rights appears to be economic development.

Table 4.1  Security rights model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Effect of US Economic and Military Aid (Percentage of GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid_{t-3}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid_{t-3}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Standing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leftist Government*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
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<td>International War</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post Cold War</td>
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<td>Population</td>
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<td>British Influence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Number of Cases</th>
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<th>2847</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
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<td>.78</td>
</tr>
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<td>Wald X²</td>
<td>1343.23</td>
<td>1421.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability &gt; x²</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Panel Corrected Standard Errors in Parenthesis; * two-tailed test; * p < .05; ** p < .10.

Before examining our main variables of interest, we turn to the control variables that are prevalent in models determining security rights abuses. Wealth remains a statistically significant predictor of a regime’s respect for security rights in the models of the total sample (Model A and B). The mean value of economic standing for long-term OECD states is $19,360. This translates into an increase in security rights of over three-quarters of one point (.77) on our five point scale. However, the mean value of economic wealth for non-OECD states is 2.6. This equates to an increase of only .10 on the level of security rights. Stated differently, we can provide predictions for the value of the dependent value by allowing any particular variable to vary while holding all other variables at their mean. In the case of economic standing, the difference between long-standing OECD state and all others, holding all other variables constant, is .78 or three-quarters of one point. This is graphically illustrated in Figure 4.1. Thus, one goal for the United States to pursue in the name of human rights appears to be economic development.

The political variables all perform well in the model. Democracy has a positive effect on the realization of security rights. Figure 4.1 also provides an illustration of the difference in democracy scores between long-term OECD states and all others. Based on the mean values of democracy in each, the difference between the two
Examining the Empirical Evidence

yields a .4 change in the realization of security rights. When we consider a change from the worst case scenario to the best, that is a change for a value of 0 to a value of 10 for the democracy variable, the change is .62 on the five point scale. As an example, between 1988 and 1995, Poland’s level of democracy changed from the lowest score possible to a value of 9 on the Polity IV rating. Such a change indicates that the level of security rights increases by approximately half a point.

Turning to other political variables, the presence of a military regime is detrimental to the realization of security rights, reducing the level of security rights are by .17 on our five point scale. The coefficient for leftist government is in the positive direction and is statistically significant, lending support to the findings by Moon (1991). Contrary to arguments presented by Kirkpatrick (1979), these results indicate that leftist governments are not more apt to abuse the security rights of its citizens but are in fact less likely to abuse them. In fact, leftist governments have a stronger influence on the realization of security rights than the influence of British colonization. The presence of a leftist regime, all other things being equal, increases the realization of security rights by one-third of a point.

The strongest predictor within the political factors category of the violation of security rights is the presence of civil wars. Countries experiencing such a violent civil conflict, according to the model, should expect a decrease in respect for security rights by almost one full level. One curious result is that involvement in an international conflict is not significant in the model, contrary to previous findings. The addition of the end of the Cold War as a control variable also performs well. Ironically, the Cold War served as a pacifying influence, that is, during the Cold War, regimes were less likely to engage in human rights violations. After the Cold War, nationalism and ethnic conflict has been on the rise and have contributed to human rights atrocities. The predicted values of security rights when considering these dichotomous variables are presented in Figure 4.2. The impact of a civil war clearly affects the realization of security rights, decreasing the level of security rights by 1.29 in the sample.

Figure 4.1 Predicted values of wealth and democracy

11 Examples include the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda.
The remaining control variables are designed to capture social and cultural factors that are theorized to have an influence on the realization of security rights. The variable measuring the level of population is statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction indicating that countries with larger populations experience lower levels of respect for security rights. A history of British influence has a positive effect on the provision of security rights, suggesting that British colonialism provided for the establishment of democratic norms.

The variables of interest, economic and military aid, are statistically significant and the results are supportive of the critics’ view regarding the effect of foreign assistance. The aid variables are lagged at three years for several reasons. Considering the time necessary to transfer foreign aid funds from the United States to a recipient nation and the actual implementation of aid, it is unlikely that aid granted a time \( t \) will have a contemporaneous impact on human rights violations at time \( t \). A more realistic model assumes that there is a lagged effect of foreign aid on security rights. However, there is no sound theoretical argument suggesting a specific time lag over another. Regan’s (1995) model includes a one-year lag, while Meyer (1996, 1998) uses a three-year lag. A three-year lag was chosen for several reasons. First, even one year seems too short a time period to conclude that any effect on security rights would have been realized. The coding of the variable is

\[ 12 \] Previous studies focusing on US foreign aid oftentimes remove Egypt and Israel due to their overwhelming amount of aid. The DFbeta and Cook’s Distance test indicates that Israel is indeed an outlier, even when aid is calculated as a percentage of GDP rather than in raw dollars. Israel was removed from the analysis in the results presented in Table 4.2. From a theoretical perspective, their amount of aid is still rather high relative to other countries. As a result, the presence of Israel in the sample masks the effects of foreign aid on other developing countries. In addition, the United States traditionally has not attempted to alter Israeli behavior in terms of human rights, in spite of its poor human rights record (the mean value of security rights for Israel is 2.89). The statistical significance of the variables remains the same when Israel is retained in the sample. Liberia also presented as an outlier. The analysis was replicated with Liberia removed and the substantive and statistically significant results were not altered. It was kept in the sample since there is no theoretical reason for its removal.
Annual allocation of aid. There is no means of determining whether the aid was actually allocated in the early months of a year or in December. Second, results from a three-year lag will provide a chance for comparison to the Meyer model. Lastly, lagging the aid variables speaks to the issue of causality; specifically we want to establish that economic aid is affecting human rights conditions and not the other way around. There is no reasonable expectation that the level of human rights at time $t$ influenced the allocation and distribution of aid three years prior or at time $t+3$.

According to the results, at a lag of three years, higher levels of aid relative to GDP are associated with lower levels of security rights. The coefficients for economic (Model A) and military aid (Model B) indicate that a one percent increase of aid relative to GDP decreases the respect for security rights by .02 and .06 respectively. The allocation of military aid has a much greater negative influence than economic aid, in fact, three times the effect of economic aid. Fortunately, the mean values of military aid do not reach the levels of economic aid in relation to overall GDP for most countries in the sample. The results conflict with the findings of Meyer (1996, 1998) not only in the expected direction but also in the number of lags. The results also conflict with the study by Regan (1995) which found a negative relationship between levels of economic aid and repression, that is that more aid led to less repression. The results in the present analysis lends support to the conclusions by Smith et al. (1998) that reliance on foreign aid is misplaced and the United States as well as the international community should focus on alternative means of addressing human rights.

Regardless of political rhetoric or the original intent or purpose of foreign assistance, these results indicate that both United States economic and military aid have detrimental effects on security rights of the citizens in recipient states. In the least, foreign aid does nothing to improve these types of rights. Does aid have the same effect on factors contributing to the overall standard of living in recipient states? Is it possible that a regime’s target of human rights violations makes a difference? For example, economic and military aid appears to support the status quo regime and harm the political opposition, that is, the target of security rights violations. Does foreign assistance have a comparable effect on the target of subsistence rights abuses, that is, the average citizen? This next section addresses what effect foreign aid has on the realization of basic human needs.

**Subsistence rights model**

The relationship between foreign assistance and subsistence rights is displayed in Table 4.2. Examining the control variables first, economic standing, that is, the wealth of the citizenry, has a positive effect on subsistence rights. In fact, this is the strongest economic variable in the model indicating that wealth remains a key indicator in providing for the basic needs of citizens as well as improving the level of security rights. Recall that the mean value for wealth in long-term OECD states is $19,360 compared to that of $2,600 in all other countries. In terms of subsistence,

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13 The substantive results, however, were not meaningful in Regan’s analysis leading him to conclude that foreign aid was simply an additional foreign policy tool available to diplomats rather than an effective tool in improving human rights.
this difference equates to over 26 points on the Physical Quality of Life Index. In sub-Saharan Africa, the mean value of wealth only comes to $780 resulting in only a 1.2 increase on the PQLI. The link between economic development and levels of subsistence is clear.

The political variables exhibit some interesting and unexpected results. As expected, democracy has a positive effect on the realization of basic human rights. Full-fledge democracies enjoy a four point increase in the PQLI over countries that score a 0 on the democracy scale. Surprisingly, the involvement of an international or a civil war has no statistically significant bearing on the state’s ability to provide for the basic needs of its citizenry. These results support Milner (1998) who found both international and civil wars to be substantively important for security rights, but not important to the realization of subsistence rights. The Cold War variable does not perform as well in the model for subsistence rights, just missing the .10 level of statistically significance. The end of the East-West ideological struggle has not had a significant influence on the provision of subsistence rights. However, the coefficients are in the opposite direction than in the security rights models suggesting that subsistence rights have improved since the end of the Cold War.

Table 4.2 Subsistence rights model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Effect of US Economic and Military Aid (Percentage of GDP)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent Variable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Aid\textsubscript{t-3}</td>
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</table>

Notes: Panel Corrected Standard Errors in parenthesis; * two-tailed test; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .10$. 


Contrary to the results in the model of security rights, the presence of a leftist government has no statistical significance on subsistence rights. This result suggests that socialist governments are not as competent at providing for the subsistence needs of its citizens as their ideology would have us believe. Thus, while socialist states may not be more apt to abuse the security rights of their citizens, they are not as able to provide for basic human needs. The presence of a military government, however, is important. The results indicate that those nations with a military regime experience a decrease of over one point on the Physical Quality of Life Index. This finding is consistent with the effect of military regimes on security rights. This result suggests that the military regime not only abuses the security rights of the citizens, but also fails in providing basic human needs.

The social and cultural variables also yielded some unexpected results. The size of the population appears to have a significant influence on the state’s ability to provide for basic human needs. The variable capturing the legacy of the British is in the negative direction and is statistically significant. According to the results, states that were colonized by the British have less respect for basic human needs. This finding contradicts the results from the security rights model where a history of British rule led to improved human rights conditions where the personal integrity of the individual was concerned. One plausible explanation rests with the idea that the British were able to install political norms, at least at the elite level, but did little to provide guidance in how to accommodate or ensure the realization of basic human needs for the masses.

Turning to our primary variables of interest, economic aid remains a negative influence on human rights, in this case, subsistence rights. However, contrary to the relationship between military aid and security rights, military aid has a positive effect on subsistence rights, albeit the results are not statistically significant. Given the prior empirical results with regards to security rights, there appears to be two separate effects of US foreign assistance on human rights conditions. First, the results for economic aid suggest that this type of assistance lands in the hands of the leaders of these repressive regimes and the elites continue to abuse a certain segment of the population, primarily the political opposition, and ignore the needs of the populous in general. Second, it appears that military aid is detrimental to security rights as elites in charge use the weapons and materials against the political opposition. How can military aid possibly be beneficial to subsistence rights while at the same time be detrimental to security rights? One plausible explanation is that money originally earmarked for military expenses can be diverted by the recipient regime to welfare and infrastructure expenditures. In this sense, the repressive regime is providing, at least minimally, in terms of basic subsistence, for the vast majority of the population. The regime seems to keep them just happy enough as not to encourage wide-spread revolt and subsequent support for the political opposition.

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14 Similar to the security rights model, Israel presented as an outlier. Retaining Israel in the sample yielded a negative (-.22) and statistically significant result. Additional countries also presented themselves as possible outliers. The analysis was replicated with those countries removed and the substantive and statistically results were not altered. Thus, the countries were kept in the sample since there is no theoretical reason for their removal.
However, further analysis revealed that when military aid was lagged at four and five years, the coefficient was negative and statistically significant. These results suggest that although there might be an initial boost to subsistence as outlined above, military aid has a lingering negative effect in recipient states.

**Substantive results**

While the coefficients for economic and military aid are statistically significant in the models, of more importance are the substantive results. Even when the empirical analysis yields statistically significant results, substantively the results may not equate to any plausible scenario in reality. The conversion of the coefficients from the security and subsistence rights models to meaningful results is displayed in Table 4.3. A sample of different countries with their mean values of economic and military aid, relative to GDP, is provided in the first two columns. The effect on security rights is then calculated and displayed in the middle two columns. The coefficients for economic aid (−.02) and military aid (−.06) are multiplied by the mean values in order to examine the effect of foreign aid on security rights. The last column represents the results from multiplying the mean value of economic aid, relative to GDP, with the coefficient for economic aid (−.19) in the subsistence rights model from Table 4.3.

The countries with the worst security rights records, those with a ranking of “1” average 2.27 and .29 in economic aid to GDP and military aid to GDP respectively over the years in the study. This converts to an effect of −.05 from economic aid and −.02 from military aid on security rights. Economic aid also has a negative effect on subsistence rights, similar to that of the effect of aid on security rights. The distribution of economic aid decreases the level of subsistence rights by close to half a point. Thus, foreign aid not only serves as a negative influence on that segment of the population that poses a threat to the political status quo, but the average citizen suffers as well. It is important to recall that the scale of subsistence rights is from 0 to 100. Thus, while the results are statistically significant, it requires a relatively large amount of foreign aid, relative to GDP, to substantively influence subsistence rights. Nonetheless, the negative influence of economic aid cannot be discounted for several reasons. First, this same foreign aid has a deleterious effect on security rights. Second, movement on the PQLI is fairly slow and incremental. And lastly, it cannot be discounted in light of the political rhetoric that the United States’ goal is the improvement of human rights. These results again provide support for those critical of the US foreign assistance program.

Turning to countries considered as client-states, Country A received a hypothetical annual economic aid to GDP average of 3.26 percent and a military aid to GDP ratio of 1.03 percent. The combined effect of this distribution of aid (−.07 and −.06) is detrimental to security rights on a level that almost equals the presence of a military

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15 At a lag of four years, the coefficient for military aid is −.13 and at t-5 the coefficient is −.16.

16 Since the military aid variable was not statistically significant, it is not included in this part of the analysis.
Examining the Empirical Evidence

101

regime (-.17) and the end of the Cold War (-.16). Several countries in Latin America, such as El Salvador, received comparable amounts of foreign assistance from the United States, particularly during the Cold War years. Country B is representative of states that are considered US allies. In this hypothetical example, aid to GDP ratio averaged 3.37 for economic aid and 5.92 for military aid. The combined effect of US aid for averages of this amount is a decrease in .42 on the security rights scale. In terms of subsistence, the effect of economic aid is a decrease of over .64 points on the PQLI. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan all receive similar levels of average economic aid in terms of GDP as the hypothetical Country B. As for military aid, both Israel and Egypt exceed 5 percent of GDP for many of the years in the study.

Country C represents a humanitarian case. Many African states received a great deal of US economic aid tied to humanitarian relief efforts. The mean values for this hypothetical equate to 2.53 percent and 1.7 percent for economic and military aid as a percentage of GDP respectively, resulting in the combined effect of a decrease of approximately .15 in the level of security rights. This same aid is detrimental to the realization of subsistence rights as well, which is particularly alarming given the relatively low levels of subsistence within the region. Rwanda and Liberia are just two examples of countries that received a great deal of economic aid from the United States. In 1994, economic aid, relative to GDP, was approximately 6 percent with military aid reaching 9 percent of GDP for Rwanda. The next year, Rwanda received over 12 percent of GDP in US economic aid. Over the years in the study, the average level of security rights in Rwanda is 2.62. In the case of Liberia, in 1996 47.19 percent of their GDP came from US economic aid while 10.26 percent came from military aid. In spite of humanitarian aims, the results suggest that these levels of foreign aid do not alleviate the suffering of many Rwandans and Liberians.

Figure 4.3 provides a graphical representation of the predicted values of security rights when we consider the difference between the minimum and maximum values of both economic and military aid. It is clear that military aid has a greater negative impact on security rights than economic aid. The difference between the minimum distribution of economic, that is no aid, to the maximum value of over 47 percent of GDP can result in a decrease in three-quarters of one point on the five point political

Table 4.3 Substantive results of aid on security and subsistence rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mean Values of Aid</th>
<th>Effect on:</th>
<th>Security Rights</th>
<th>Subsistence Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Economic (-.02)</td>
<td>Military (-.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worst Records</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country A (Client)</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country B (Ally)</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country C (Humanitarian)</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
terror scale. As for military aid, the change from zero aid to over 25 percent of GDP decreases the level of security rights by over one and a half points on the scale. The greater the level of aid, the greater the deleterious impact on security rights.

![Figure 4.3 Predicted values of economic and military aid](image)

### Interaction Effects

A further analysis considers the hypothesis that the relationship between human rights and foreign aid is moderated by the level of democracy and wealth within the recipient state. At higher levels of democracy, states are characterized by increased political openness. That is, democratic states tend to have institutions and procedures whereby citizens can effectively participate in competitive elections of their leaders as well as adequately express their preferences regarding policy alternatives. In fact, most definitions of democracy include aspects of regular, peaceful, and competitive elections (Dahl 1971; Sorenson 1993), citizen participation in policy making decisions (Cohen 1971; Dahl 1971; Sorenson 1993), as well as the protection of civil and political liberties which guarantee such citizen participation (Sorenson 1993). Ultimately, Dahl (1971) contends that the keys to democracy are competition and participation. In terms of subsistence, citizens may demand redistributive policies favoring improvements in basic human needs such as health care, sanitation, and education.

Citizens living in states with lower levels of democracy have less opportunity for participation in decisions regarding policy alternatives, particularly redistributive policies. Thus, at lower levels of democracy it is more likely that foreign aid will have a negative effect on human rights as elites within society utilize the benefits from aid to their own advantage. As states become more democratic, however, more citizens are included in this electoral process and the result is an increase in demands for redistributive policies. Given these conditions, liberalism suggests that in more democratic states, citizens are likely to have more say in the distribution of foreign aid dollars, as well as the ability to voice opinions regarding
other economic policies. At higher levels of democracy, due to citizen involvement and institutions based on democratic norms, the influx of foreign aid is more likely to improve human rights conditions.

Critical theories would basically agree that at low levels of democracy, foreign aid is detrimental to human rights conditions. However, as states become more democratic, there is a higher likelihood of political unrest and violence due to increased opportunities for the political opposition to voice their demands. The influx of foreign aid from the United States will only exacerbate the political unrest indicative of fragile democracies. For example, elites within society will use foreign assistance along with other forms of international capital penetration to fund their repressive activities, or at the very least fund their own agendas to the exclusion of the potential political opposition (Randall and Theobald 1985). Thus, introducing foreign aid will only serve as an additional destabilizing factor in the democratization process as elites within the society will use this aid to maintain the status quo and suppress the rights of the masses.

Does the level of economic development matter, that is, will foreign aid affect human rights conditions differently at varying levels of wealth? It seems intuitive that the introduction of foreign assistance to the poorest countries will have a different impact than the introduction of such external economic factors on richer societies. In countries with the lowest levels of economic development, by definition the citizens are living in dire poverty with only immediate goals of subsistence. The introduction of external sources of income in the poorest of the poor countries, one could argue, doesn’t seriously threaten the social position of those elites that do exist. In these poor societies, regimes have very little need to repress its citizens. Generally, the poor are busy being poor (Olson 1963; Gurr 1968). In such situations, providing subsistence in the form of foreign capital to the poorest in society may actually reduce the level of political protest and turmoil (Rothgeb 1991). Thus, while security rights may not improve, there is no expectation that security rights will worsen. As for subsistence rights, the introduction of economic resources, such as economic aid may serve to improve the state’s ability to provide for basic human needs following the liberal argument that external sources of income are diffused throughout society. On the other hand, military aid does not have any economic distributive characteristic as it generally comes in the form of equipment. Receiving such military equipment from an external source, however, allows a regime to redirect money originally earmarked for defense into domestic welfare concerns thereby enhancing levels of subsistence.

As states become wealthier, however, the presence of foreign dollars “creates both anxiety about their social position for some groups and the promise of new opportunities for others” (Rothgeb 1991, 31). Alexis de Tocqueville, in his commentary of the French Revolution, stated, “...those parts of France in which the improvement in the standard of living was most pronounced were the chief centers of the revolutionary movement.” Even Marx argued that improvement in workers’ economic conditions led to social unrest due to their increased inability to satisfy increasing wants. Thus, rather than more murder in the middle (Fein 1995), in this case there is more political unrest in the middle class. The government may resort to repression in order to maintain economic and political control of the state.
Thus, security rights are more likely to be violated as friction between the emerging economic classes and the elites continues. Subsistence rights, on the other hand, may see improvement as the level of wealth increases as more and more foreign dollars are introduced into the recipient state’s economy. At the highest levels of economic wealth, the effect of the introduction of foreign aid on human rights may be negligible. First, at this level of economic development, foreign aid is not likely a factor and an increase in any type of international capital probably does not noticeably alter the level of per capita GDP. In addition, countries at extreme high levels of wealth generally have good human rights records. In fact, wealth is a leading characteristic of states with good human rights records.

**Foreign aid, democracy, and human rights**

Table 4.4 displays the results of the interaction between foreign assistance and democracy and their combined effect on human rights. Only the variables of interest are presented as the results of the remaining control variable do not change from the previous models.  

17 Considering that the analysis between military aid and subsistence rights did not yield statistically significant results, it is omitted from the analysis of a possible interaction with democracy.

18 The correlation between economic aid and the interaction term of economic aid and democracy is .63, while the equivalent correlation for military aid is .70.

19 The statistical significance of the individual coefficients is not as important as the significance of the combined effects of foreign aid and democracy. In an interactive model, the coefficients and standard errors represent a conditional relationship rather than a general one as in most other models. The joint $F$ test provides for the test of statistical significance of the variables of interest, in this case, foreign assistance, democracy, and the interaction term.
Examining the Empirical Evidence

The respective coefficients (\(b_3\)), standard errors (\(SE\)), and t statistics for these different scenarios are presented in Table 4.5. In developing states, the results support the critical argument that the introduction of foreign aid is detrimental to security rights. Furthermore, as countries increase in the level of democracy they are more negatively affected by the presence of economic aid. In other words, at higher levels of democracy, increases in the aid to GDP ratio are more detrimental than aid is to countries at lower levels of democracy. All of the t scores are statistically significant, indicating that all of the slopes differ from zero. At low levels of democracy (a 2 on the Polity IV scale), a one percent increase in aid relative to GDP translates into an additional negative effect of .02 on security rights. From a critical perspective, it is not surprising to find that aid allocated to regimes that have little democratic values would use foreign aid to perpetuate the current regime. At the highest levels of democracy, each one percent increase in aid/GDP translates into an additional negative effect of .10. From the lowest to the highest levels of democracy, the effect is five times greater. This effect is above and beyond the effect of aid and democracy alone. There is support for the notion that foreign intervention in the form of economic aid during the democratization process is detrimental to security rights as elites utilize the aid to suppress the emerging political opposition.

### Table 4.4 Interaction analysis: US foreign aid and democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Security Rights</th>
<th>Subsistence Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model A</td>
<td>Model B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid (_{t-3})</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td>.44*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid x Democracy</td>
<td>-.01*</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid (_{t-3})</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>.06*</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid x Democracy</td>
<td>-.05*</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Joint F Test (\(X^2\)) | 89.70\(^a\) | 115.70\(^a\) | 31.35\(^a\) |
| Number of Cases | 2847  | 2847  | 2895  |
| Wald X2   | 1529.86 | 1397.19 | 1863.37 |
| Probability > \(x^2\) | 0.00  | 0.00  | 0.00  |

Notes: * \(p < .05\); ** \(p < .10\); \(^a\) \(X^2 < .05\).

The respective coefficients (\(b_3\)), standard errors (\(SE\)), and t statistics for these different scenarios are presented in Table 4.5. In developing states, the results support the critical argument that the introduction of foreign aid is detrimental to security rights. Furthermore, as countries increase in the level of democracy they are more negatively affected by the presence of economic aid. In other words, at higher levels of democracy, increases in the aid to GDP ratio are more detrimental than aid is to countries at lower levels of democracy. All of the t scores are statistically significant, indicating that all of the slopes differ from zero. At low levels of democracy (a 2 on the Polity IV scale), a one percent increase in aid relative to GDP translates into an additional negative effect of .02 on security rights. From a critical perspective, it is not surprising to find that aid allocated to regimes that have little democratic values would use foreign aid to perpetuate the current regime. At the highest levels of democracy, each one percent increase in aid/GDP translates into an additional negative effect of .10. From the lowest to the highest levels of democracy, the effect is five times greater. This effect is above and beyond the effect of aid and democracy alone. There is support for the notion that foreign intervention in the form of economic aid during the democratization process is detrimental to security rights as elites utilize the aid to suppress the emerging political opposition.
The result from the interaction of military aid and democracy reveal an even greater effect as illustrated in Figure 4.4. Here, at low levels of democracy, a one percent increase in military aid decreases the level of security rights by .12 of a point. As the level of democracy increases, the introduction of military aid serves to decrease the level of security by a larger and larger margin. It should be noted that at the highest levels of democracy (above an 8 on the Polity IV scale), the relationship is no

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Aid</th>
<th>Level of Democracy</th>
<th>$b_3$</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-2.88*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (4)</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-4.58*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (10)</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-5.15*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Aid</th>
<th>Level of Democracy</th>
<th>$b_3$</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-6.70*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (4)</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-7.59*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (10)</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-7.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: p<.05.

The result from the interaction of military aid and democracy reveal an even greater effect as illustrated in Figure 4.4. Here, at low levels of democracy, a one percent increase in military aid decreases the level of security rights by .12 of a point. As the level of democracy increases, the introduction of military aid serves to decrease the level of security by a larger and larger margin. It should be noted that at the highest levels of democracy (above an 8 on the Polity IV scale), the relationship is no

Figure 4.4 The effect of one unit change in military aid on security rights, conditioned upon democracy
longer statistically significant. Thus, we can conclude that the most vulnerable time to introduce military aid may be during the fragile democratization process.\textsuperscript{20}

Overall, the results indicate that the relationship between foreign aid and human rights differ depending on the level of democracy and is generally supportive of the critical perspective. At the lowest levels of democracy, all types of foreign aid are detrimental to security rights and economic aid is negatively associated with the level of basic human needs. This effect, however, is relatively small compared to the result as the level of democracy increases. These results indicate that as states engage in the democratization process, the effects of foreign aid only serve to disrupt the process, particularly the aspect of democracy that pertains to the realization of security rights.

The interaction of foreign aid and wealth

A second possible interaction exists between foreign assistance and wealth. Table 4.6 presents the three models for the interaction between economic and military aid and wealth and their effect on security rights (Model A and Model B) and subsistence rights (Model C). Again, only the variables of interest are presented as the results for the control variables remained generally the same. All the aid variables remain statistically significant in the interaction models, except for economic aid in Model A. The joint $F$ test indicates the presence of an interaction effect in each model. The substantive results of the interaction of economic aid, wealth, and security rights are presented in Table 4.7 using Model A. The nature of the interaction term is determined with wealth, as measured by per capita GDP, as the moderating variable. The value of the coefficient of the interaction term, $b_{3}$, indicates how the relationship between foreign assistance and security rights varies across different values of wealth. Three different values of wealth were selected and are listed in the first column of Table 4.7. The low value of 1.5 represents the mean value of countries with the worst human rights records. The medium value of 5 represents the value of wealth for the entire sample. The high value of 19 represents the wealthier countries as it is the close to mean value of long-term OECD states.\textsuperscript{21} The respective coefficients, standard errors, and t statistics for these different scenarios are also presented in Table 4.7 in columns two, three and four respectively.

The results suggest that at higher levels of wealth, economic aid has an increasing detrimental effect on security rights. However, the effect dissipates after wealth reaches $6,000 per capita GDP. The t scores are statistically significant up to that point. These results, once again, provide more support for the critics’ perspective. The poorest countries are ill-affected by economic aid in terms of security rights. Elites do appear to perceive a potential threat from the poverty stricken masses and are more likely to suppress political opposition, even in the poorest countries.

\textsuperscript{20} While the model for economic aid, democracy and subsistence rights indicates the presence of an interaction effect, the different slopes in the model were not statistically significant.

\textsuperscript{21} These values are stated in the thousands, thus the lowest value, 1.5, equals $1,500 per person while 19 equals $19,000 per person. The mean values have been rounded to the nearest .5 for ease of explanation and computation.
### Table 4.6 Interaction analysis: US foreign aid and wealth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Security Rights</th>
<th>Subsistence Rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model A</td>
<td>Model B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid (_t-3)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.38*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>.04*</td>
<td>1.92*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid x Wealth</td>
<td>-.03*</td>
<td>.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid (_t-3)</td>
<td>-.06*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>.05*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid x Wealth</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint F Test (X^2)</td>
<td>86.75*</td>
<td>72.58*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>2847</td>
<td>2847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald X2</td>
<td>1416.42</td>
<td>1449.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability &gt; x2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** * \(X^2 < .05\); ** \(p < .05\); *** \(p < .10\).

### Table 4.7 Interaction analysis: Foreign aid, wealth, and security rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of Wealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of Wealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** * \(p < .05\); ** \(p < .10\).
As wealth increases, the extent of political suppression grows, possibly in response to growing unrest among the emerging middle class. The results from the effect of military aid reveal a different effect. Similar to economic aid, the effect of military aid on security rights conditioned by wealth is only significant up to a level of wealth of 7.5 or $7,500, indicating that poor countries are impacted more than wealthy ones in terms of military aid. As Figure 4.5 illustrates, there is a negative effect at low levels of wealth and this negative relationship diminishes as level of wealth increases. It should be noted, however, that there is still a negative effect. The analysis indicates that the level of wealth is not significant in the relationship between foreign aid and subsistence rights. Ultimately, we conclude that the level of wealth does not have the same relevance as the level of democracy as the only scenario that is of substantive importance is that of economic aid, level of wealth, and security rights.

Figure 4.5  The effect of one unit change in economic aid on security rights, conditioned upon wealth

Conclusion

There are several conclusions to draw from the results thus far. First, the appropriation and allocation of economic and military aid to countries with poor human rights records is done through an exception, or loophole, to congressional legislation prohibiting such practice. Administrations often invoke national security concerns or override foreign assistance legislation in the name of humanitarianism. This act is done, then, with an acknowledgement that aid is allocated in spite of poor human rights records. The effect of overlooking the human rights record of a potential recipient state is that countries with poor human rights records receive a great deal of
foreign aid from the United States with negative consequences. Second, the impact of military aid is far more detrimental to human rights conditions than economic aid. Fortunately, from a human rights perspective, the level of military aid, as a percentage of GDP, is on average far less than economic aid. Third, the mean values of economic aid and military aid in the sample are relatively small when considering these allocations as a percentage of GDP. Thus, it seems, wealthier states can absorb foreign aid with less consequences. Poor states, on the other hand, seem to suffer a great deal more. The more dependent a country, in terms of GDP, is on the United States, the more their citizens suffer in terms of security and subsistence rights. Lastly, the introduction of US foreign assistance, particularly military assistance, as states are attempting to democratize may serve as a destabilizing factor, contrary to US intent. All in all, the consequence of the distribution and allocation of US foreign assistance does not match the conviction, at least where human rights objectives are concerned. In Part II we turn to specific cases in order to better understand both the motivations and consequences of US foreign assistance.
PART II
Human Rights and US Foreign Policy:
Case Studies
Chapter 5
The Trade-offs of Plan Colombia:
Drug Trafficking versus Human Rights

US policy toward Colombia supports the Colombian Government’s efforts to defend and strengthen its democratic institutions, promote respect for human rights and the rule of law, intensify counter-narcotics efforts, foster socio-economic development and investment, address immediate humanitarian needs, and end the threats to democracy posed by narcotics trafficking and terrorism…Colombia remains central to our counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism goals and, indeed, is important to achieving every goal we have in the hemisphere (Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform on 17 June 2004).

In 1999, the United States encouraged the Colombian government to develop a plan to combat a multitude of internal problems. The resulting program, known as Plan Colombia, intended to achieve peace and economic prosperity by the end of 2005. The plan focuses on five key areas: combating drug trafficking; justice system reform; democratization and social development; economic growth; and the peace process. Consequently, Congress approved a funding package in 2000, “to assist Colombia in vital counter-drug efforts aimed at keeping illegal drugs off US streets and to help Colombia promote peace, prosperity, and the continued growth of democracy” (McCaffrey 2000). According to the US Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP 2005), the US “aid package was one of the largest and most comprehensive efforts by the US to help an ally in Latin America deal with a national drug emergency.” Further, the ONDCP states that a main component of the program is the protection of human rights. Over $100 million was earmarked for human rights and judicial reform, namely protecting human rights workers, training judges, creating local judiciaries, improving the criminal code, and aiding internally displaced peoples. Despite these claims, the majority of funding in the package was military in nature. In fact, the largest single item of aid, $328 million, was earmarked for helicopters. Amnesty International believes that there are insufficient safeguards to prevent the money from being used, via paramilitary groups, by those committing human rights violations (Amnesty International 2001a).

In attempting to conduct a study on the twin goals of US security at home and the promotion of human rights abroad, an academic would have a difficult time coming up with a better experiment than Plan Colombia. The United States is attempting to

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1 The US government reports a part of Plan Colombia as an economic package, part of the Economic Security Fund, thus masking the military component of the program. See The U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants available at http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/home.html.
accomplish objectives that have traditionally been seen as trade-offs in international relations, that is, high politics versus low politics, within one single foreign assistance program. Can these goals be accomplished simultaneously, are they mutually exclusive, or is there some compromise in between? The quantitative results in the previous chapter suggest that at least where human rights are concerned, foreign assistance does little to improve security rights. The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether the statistical evidence changes when we consider Latin America and whether Plan Colombia might be an exception. If not, what is the United States willing to accept as a trade-off for security at home?

US Interests in Latin America: Does Proximity Make a “Good” Neighbor?

Latin America spans two continents, includes two major languages and one major religion, is the home to a large indigenous population, experienced colonialism by the Spanish and Portuguese, and has been in the shadow of their “good” neighbor from the north: the United States. Although most of the countries in the region have been independent since the nineteenth century, their proximity to the United States has greatly influenced their political and economic development, beginning with the Monroe Doctrine (1823). Directed at European imperialist powers, the United States declared that the region, specifically the newly independent states of the Americas, was part of the US sphere of influence. Given the vast size of Latin America and its resources, subsequent presidents were compelled to clarify US interests. For example, Theodore Roosevelt articulated that the United States would help Caribbean and Central American states economically; thus while the Monroe Doctrine was aimed at repelling potential European influence and intervention, the Roosevelt Corollary was seen as interventionists in nature, helping to establish and further US hegemony in the region. Likewise, the Platt Amendment (1903) addressed US interest in Cuba, providing an avenue to intervene in order to ensure that no other foreign intervention would occur on the island. Consequently, the United States invoked the Platt Amendment, finding occasion to intervene into Cuban domestic politics in 1906, 1912, 1917, and 1920.

The economic interests of the United States, more specifically US corporations, go hand-in-hand with US political interests during this time. US intervention for economic reasons in these “banana republics” stretches back to the turn of the twentieth century and the interests of the United Fruit Company (UFCO). The UFCO owned over 130,000 acres of arable land in Central America by 1913 and looked to the US government to protect its interests in the region (Hook and Spanier 2004). The result was the deployment of the US marines in Nicaragua (1909–1910; 1912–1925) and Honduras (1924–1925) on behalf of UFCO and further interventions in Haiti (1925–1934) and the Dominican Republic (1916–1924) (Hook and Spanier 2004; Jentleson 2007). However, renunciation of such interventionist policies would follow with the Clark Memorandum (1928) under Calvin Coolidge and Franklin

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2 This amendment also provided the United States with the ability to buy and lease land in Cuba. A portion of this lease remains in effect at Guantanamo Bay.
D. Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor Policy.” Nonetheless, these later policies are often cited as a tacit approval of the emergence of dictators that would come to be the norm in many Latin American countries.

Fears that led to foreign assistance to Greece and Turkey to stem communist insurgency in Europe were just as prevalent in Latin America after World War II. Cognizant that socialist leanings fed from the well of poverty and despair, both of which were plentiful in Latin America, the United States kept a keen eye on political developments while ostensibly attempting to bolster economic conditions in the region through organizations like the Alliance for Progress initiated by President Kennedy. The United States was ready to step in either overtly or covertly through the support of dictatorships, or what Jentleson (2007) refers to as “ABC” or “anything but communist” democrats. The first test was in Guatemala in 1954 when the United States, through covert activity of the CIA, assisted in the overthrow of the democratically elected Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Guatemala suffered from inequitable land distribution (much like most Latin American countries) and one of the largest landholders was the UFCO. A redistributive land policy as well as the sliver of a tie to the Eastern Bloc through an arms trade deal with Czechoslovakia brought the Arbenz government into the crosshairs of the United States. In retrospect, evidence indicates that US concerns were less about communist insurgency and more about the bottom line of the UFCO. Nonetheless, this began a string of US supported coups against real or perceived threats to US political and economic interests in the region (Jentleson 2007). Ironically (and unethically), in spite of “their rhetorical calls for democratic rule, US leaders actively supported military rulers throughout Latin America and executed their self appointed ‘international police powers’ to maintain stability in the region” (Hook and Spanier 2004, 101).3 Thus during the Cold War, US political and economic concerns in the region merged with concerns that communist insurgency would derail US economic interests as well as political aspirations for the region.

This fear of communist encroachment in the Western hemisphere was realized with the Cuban Revolution. This reality led to a host of further US interventions in the region, all in the name of promoting democracy. In the Caribbean, the first target was the Dominican Republic where another democratically elected president, Juan Bosch, was ousted in a military coup. Pro-Bosch supports countered with a revolution of their own; however, fearing that the latter movement was communist in nature, President Lyndon Baines Johnson ordered a US military intervention to “restore” order by backing the military regime. The policy of containment was alive and well in even one of the smallest island nations in the Caribbean: Grenada. During the rollback strategy of the Reagan Administration, Grenada found itself a central figure in the East-West ideological struggle when US marines invaded the island in order to send a message to the Soviet Union and Cuba that any attempt to extend their influence in the region would be costly.4 As a consequence, the United

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3 Hook and Spanier (2003) quoted the phrase “international police force” from Roosevelt’s Corollary.

4 This warning shot was in all likelihood directed at Nicaragua, more specifically the Sandinistas led by Daniel Ortega (see Hook and Spanier 2004, 196).
States sent over $48 million to Grenada in economic aid in 1984, followed with over $11 million in 1985. Lastly, there is Haiti, the poorest country in the entire Western Hemisphere and one that had been ruled by the Duvalier family between 1957 and 1996. In examining Haiti’s level of subsistence, the mean value of their PQLI is 49.2, whereas the average for the region is 81.2. When duly elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide fled the island nation to seek exile in the United States in 1991, General Raoul Cedras unleashed a reign of terror in the country resulting in a flood of refugees—all hoping to find their way to the southern shores of the United States. The policy by George H.W. Bush, as well as Bill Clinton, was to refuse asylum for the refugees, a policy that caused much consternation amongst many groups in the United States as well as human rights activists. Figure 5.1 provides a graphical representation of the average annual amount of US foreign assistance to the three regions that comprise Latin America. The graph for the Caribbean shows the spike in the mid-1980s due to the intervention in Grenada and then a slight increase in the mid-1990s as a result of aid to Haiti.

Figure 5.1 also illustrates the vast difference in the average level of aid to Central America, relative to the other two regions, particularly in the 1980s. This is the result of the civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras and the rollback strategy of the Reagan Administration. As discussed in Chapter 2, President Jimmy Carter initiated a new direction in foreign aid assistance and one of the key areas of concern was the continued US support of right-wing dictators in Central America. Thus, when the Sandino Liberation Front (Sandinistas) led a revolution against the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, they found support from United States as well as the
Organization of American States (OAS). Both hoped to see an end to the five-decade rule of the Anastasio Somoza regime. The new government in Nicaragua received over $90 million in foreign aid in return for a promise of democratization; however, the democratic revolutionary movement quickly fell apart and was replaced with a Marxist-Leninist leaning regime. More problematic, however, was the Sandinistas’ aid to similar revolutions in the region, particularly in El Salvador. In response, the El Salvadorian government sent out death squads to squash any socialist insurgency in the country. The killing of three US nuns ended US aid to the country, that is, until the Reagan Administration and the rollback strategy that pumped additional foreign aid to several countries in Central America. The amount of total foreign assistance to the region, as shown in Figure 5.1, is primarily a function of aid to El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Between 1979 and 1993, the years of the civil war in El Salvador, the United States sent over $4.5 billion in foreign aid. Guatemala was allocated and distributed over $839 million between 1985 and 1990 while Honduras received over $1.9 billion between 1982 and 1992. The level of security rights during these time frames were 1.4 in El Salvador, 1.6 in Guatemala, and 2.6 in Honduras. These countries were viewed as the frontline against communist insurgency in the region and received massive levels of aid, in spite of poor human rights conditions.

Comparatively speaking, South America has traditionally received less US foreign assistance on average than the other two regions (see Figure 5.1). More recently, primarily due to Plan Colombia, the level of aid in South America has outpaced the other two regions. This does not mean, however, that the United States has not intervened in the region. The quintessential example is the CIA engineered overthrow of the Allende government in Chile. Evidence suggests that the Marxist leader was already in trouble domestically and unable to cobble together any consolidated base of power. In fact, Allende was successful in polarizing factions within Chilean politics, particularly the military. The Allende seizure of US property in the country was the only pretext the United States government needed. Initially opting to pressure the government financially by stopping all credit, the Nixon Administration signed off on a CIA-backed coup and supported the installation of General Augusto Pinochet as the leader of a four-man junta that would rule the country until the 1990s and more importantly, be a staunch US ally. Chile never received a great deal of US foreign assistance in relative terms; the need was not there since they had a strong right-wing dictator in place and the threat of a Marxist takeover was remote. It should be noted that during Pinochet’s reign, the level of security rights was 2.06; after the end of the Cold War, security rights in Chile rose to 3.8 on average. More recent concerns for the United States involves the socialist leanings of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, immigration issues, as well as drug trafficking. The latter was one of the driving forces in the formulation of Plan Colombia.

An Empirical Investigation

Before proceeding to the overall model of security rights in Latin America, an examination of the level of security rights and foreign aid for the region is warranted. As shown in the previous chapter, the mean value of security rights for all states is
3.52 and 3.31 for developing countries. Developed or industrialized countries mean value is 4.68, indicating that they enjoy almost a 1.3 advantage in the realization of security rights. The mean value for Latin American countries (3.31) is the same for developing countries; however, the mean value of security rights for Colombia during the years of the sample is 1.5. In fact, it has the lowest levels of security rights in the region. As for the level of aid, Latin American countries receive a great deal less in US foreign assistance than the total sample of countries, particularly when it comes to military aid; the mean value of military aid for all developing countries ($51.80 million) is six times as much as in Latin America ($8.15 million). When considering foreign assistance as a percentage of GDP, however, the difference between the two dissipates. Economic aid per GDP to Latin America averages 1.03 in the sample compared to the Middle East’s 1.11 and Eurasia’s 1.26. Only economic aid to sub-Saharan Africa reaches over 2 percent of GDP on average. As for military aid, the mean value for Latin America is .11 which is similar to the amount in Eurasia and sub-Saharan Africa. Only the military aid as a percentage of GDP in the Middle East eclipses 1 percent of GDP on average.

Nowhere is it more evident that the United States regularly overrides legislation based on human rights conditions than in the Latin American case as illustrated in Figure 5.2. Countries with the worst level of security rights, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Haiti to mention a few, receive the bulk of US foreign assistance. A slightly different picture is revealed when considering foreign aid as a percentage of GDP (Figure 5.3), at least in terms of economic aid. However, this percentage for countries ranked as a “4” is inflated due to the high level of economic aid to Grenada in 1984 when economic aid accounted for 56 percent of its GDP. Figure 5.3 also includes the mean values for economic aid at each level of security with Grenada removed. We see a decrease in the level of both economic and military aid, regardless of whether it is accounted for in total dollars or as a percentage of GDP, as human rights conditions improve. Conversely, we see more aid to countries with poor human rights records. The question becomes does poor human rights records attract aid or does foreign aid contribute to poor human rights conditions. We test the latter causal arrow with our multivariate model, replicating our analysis from Chapter 4.

The results from the multivariate analysis are presented in Table 5.1. Examining the control variables first, wealth remains a statistically significant predictor of a regime’s respect for security rights. The mean value of economic wealth for Latin American states is 3.35 which equates to an increase of approximately .24 on the level of security rights (utilizing the total aid model). There are differences in


6 As in the models presented in Chapter 4, the test for overall significance of the model, chi-square, indicates that the probability that these particular models occurred by chance is zero in one hundred. In addition, the R² indicates how much of the dependent variable is explained by the variation of the independent variables, in this case, approximately 85 percent.
Figure 5.2  Distribution of foreign assistance: Latin America

Figure 5.3  Distribution of foreign assistance as a percentage of GDP: Latin America
wealth among the sub-regions: the mean value in the Caribbean is 4.92 or $4,920, in Central America the value is 2.49 or $2,490, while in South America, the mean value is 2.89 or $2,890. While the figure is comparatively low to their North American neighbors, citizens in the Caribbean have a level of wealth that nearly doubles that of citizens in Central America. This equates to a doubling of the effect of wealth on the achievement of security rights. In fact, the mean value of security rights in the Caribbean is 4.0 compared to that in Central America (3.2) and South America (2.9). The support and promotion of economic development, through the private sector, as a means of improving the human condition should be a policy for the United States to pursue.

The political variables all perform well in the model, save the presence of a leftist regime. The strongest predictor among the political variables in the model is the presence of a civil war. Countries experiencing such a violent conflict, according to the model, should expect a decrease in respect for security rights by approximately one full level. Civil wars occurred in Latin America in Guatemala (1978–1984), El Salvador (1979–1992), Nicaragua (1978–1990), Colombia (1984–2003), and Peru (1982–1995). Again, these countries have the worst records in terms of security rights in the region. The end of the Cold War is not a significant factor in the realization of security rights in the region. Democracy, like wealth, remains a

\[ \text{Total Aid}_{t-3} \]
\[ \text{Economic Aid}_{t-3} \]
\[ \text{Military Aid}_{t-3} \]
\[ \text{Economic Standing} \]
\[ \text{Democracy} \]
\[ \text{Military Regime} \]
\[ \text{Leftist Regime} \]
\[ \text{Civil War} \]
\[ \text{Post Cold War} \]
\[ \text{Population} \]
\[ \text{British Influence} \]
\[ \text{Constant} \]

Table 5.1 Multivariate analyses: Latin America security rights and foreign aid (aid as a percentage of GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Model C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Aid (_{t-3})</td>
<td>-.06* (.02)</td>
<td>-.06* (.02)</td>
<td>-.22* (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid (_{t-3})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid (_{t-3})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Standing</td>
<td>.07* (.03)</td>
<td>.08* (.03)</td>
<td>.09* (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>.06* (.02)</td>
<td>.06* (.01)</td>
<td>.07* (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime</td>
<td>-.57* (.12)</td>
<td>-.56* (.18)</td>
<td>-.55* (.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist Regime</td>
<td>.25 (.59)</td>
<td>.25 (.60)</td>
<td>.29 (.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>-1.02* (.16)</td>
<td>-1.02* (.17)</td>
<td>-1.01* (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Cold War</td>
<td>-.06 (.08)</td>
<td>-.05 (.08)</td>
<td>-.05 (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-.49* (.06)</td>
<td>-.49* (.06)</td>
<td>-.49* (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Influence</td>
<td>-.28 (.18)</td>
<td>-.21 (.19)</td>
<td>-.27 (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>10.66* (.90)</td>
<td>10.56* (.91)</td>
<td>10.51* (.89)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Number of Cases | 513 | 513 | 513 |
| R2             | .72 | .71 | .71 |
| Wald X2        | 267.80 | 266.17 | 266.17 |
| Probability > x2 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |

Notes: * p < .05.

The political variables all perform well in the model, save the presence of a leftist regime. The strongest predictor among the political variables in the model is the presence of a civil war. Countries experiencing such a violent conflict, according to the model, should expect a decrease in respect for security rights by approximately one full level. Civil wars occurred in Latin America in Guatemala (1978–1984), El Salvador (1979–1992), Nicaragua (1978–1990), Colombia (1984–2003), and Peru (1982–1995). Again, these countries have the worst records in terms of security rights in the region. The end of the Cold War is not a significant factor in the realization of security rights in the region. Democracy, like wealth, remains a

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7 The variable for international war was removed from the analyses due to a lack of variation. Only two instances were coded in the data, Argentina in 1982 and Chile in 1979.
constant and positive effect on the realization of security rights. Citizens in states that are more democratic experience higher respect of security rights. The mean value of democracy in the region is 5.5 with a range of 0 to 10. Thus, countries moving from the minimum value to the maximum value should see an improvement of at least .60 on the PTS. The coefficient for leftist government is in the positive direction but is not statistically significant in any model. Contrary to the arguments presented by Jeane Kirkpatrick and others, these results indicate that leftist governments are not more apt to abuse the security rights of its citizens. As for the remaining variables, the level of population is statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction indicating that countries with larger populations experience lower levels of respect for security rights. A history of British colonialism does not affect security rights in the region. It fails to reach a level of statistical significance.

The variables of interest are statistically significant and the results are supportive of the critics view regarding the effect of foreign assistance. According to the results, at a lag of three years, higher levels of aid relative to GDP in Latin America are associated with lower levels of security rights. The coefficients for total aid, economic aid, and military aid indicate that a one percent increase of aid relative to GDP decreases the respect for security rights by .06, .06, and .22 respectively. While the coefficients are statistically significant, of more importance are the substantive results. The countries with the worst security rights records in Latin America, those with a ranking of “1”, average 1.23 and .37 in economic aid and military aid to GDP respectively over the years in the study. This converts to an effect of -.07 from economic aid and -.08 from military aid on security rights. It is fortunate in terms of human rights that the level of military aid relative to GDP is not on par with that of economic aid as a percentage of GDP. The maximum values of economic and military aid as a percentage of GDP in the Latin American sample are 18.01 percent and 5.81 percent respectively. At these maximum values, security rights are negatively affected by just over a point in the economic aid model and over one and a quarter point in the military aid model. According to the results, the allocation of military aid has greater negative influence than economic aid, in fact, over four times the effect of economic aid. Fortunately, the mean values of military aid do not reach the levels of economic aid in relation to overall GDP for most countries in the sample.

In sum, regardless of political rhetoric or original intent or purpose of foreign assistance, these results indicate that even after controlling for key variables, both economic and military aid have detrimental effects on security rights in Latin America. We now turn to a specific case in order to further demonstrate the relationship between foreign assistance and human rights in Latin America. In an effort to fully understand the origins and purposes of Plan Colombia, as well as its impact on human rights, we must understand the history of Colombian violence, the internal strife suffered by Colombia, the debate within the United States surrounding the funding, and the apparent results of this funding.
A Cycle of Colombian Violence

The history of Colombia is dominated by violence: Colombians versus Colombians and the government versus its people. A brief look at the evolution of that violence is necessary to understand the purpose of Plan Colombia and the problems inherent in Colombia’s domestic environment. Modern Colombia is one of four states to have been part of Greater Colombia in the early 1800s (including Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador). In 1830, Venezuela and Ecuador gained independence and Colombia became part of the republic of New Granada (later the United States of Colombia). The Republic of Colombia was created under a conservative constitution in 1886, followed in 1889 by a three-year, bloody civil war, ultimately won by the Conservatives (the party favoring centralism and participation of the church in state affairs). Although there has been some infrequent military control, Colombia has demonstrated a commitment to democracy, with civilian government and free elections. Despite this, Colombia has been wracked with violence. The 1930s through 1950s saw violence, martial law, and a coup in Colombia. The tension during this time was dominated by continuing quarrels between the Liberals and Conservatives, the two dominant political parties in Colombia (Crandall 2002, 54). The cycle of violence continued through the 1970s and 1980s as illegal drug sales were growing and cartels were gaining power and influence. Thus, the first century of modern Colombia was punctuated by violence and repression.

After the decades of violence, attempts were made to improve the situation in Colombia, but they had limited effect. A new constitution came into force 5 July, 1991 that included protection of human rights and social benefits such as health care. In 1994, liberal Ernesto Samper Pizano representing the party favoring federalism and the separation of church and state was elected; however, his administration was marred by charges that he accepted campaign financing from the Cali cocaine cartel (he was cleared of these charges in 1996). In 1998, conservative Andrés Pastrana Arango was elected president, and he attempted to work with leftist rebels and right-wing paramilitary leaders in an effort to control the continuing violence. In November of that same year, Pastrana created a distention area, believing that it would serve to advance negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (USIP Library, 1999). The result, however, was that FARC established a parallel government in the region. Fighting continued between the rebel groups and paramilitaries over control of coca-growing regions, and support for Pastrana waned as he was proposing Plan Colombia in 2000. While the plan included significant US aid, Colombia itself was prepared to pay roughly $4 billion, both from its own funds and loans from international institutions. Due to escalating violence, in February 2002, Pastrana was forced to militarily regain control of the rebel region, pushing FARC into the jungle. From this vantage point, however, FARC began conducting a destructive campaign against Colombian infrastructure.

In May 2002, Álvaro Uribe Vélez was elected president and declared a limited state of emergency to conduct a broader campaign against the rebels. The Washington
Office on Latin America claimed that in doing so, Uribe weakened democracy through the unconstitutional use of searches, wiretaps, and seizures sans warrants and the establishment of military zones where rights are suspended (WOLA 2003 Report Card on Plan Colombia). Regardless of criticism not only from the United States but throughout the international community, Uribe has pursued tough security policies. Many in Colombia view him as a savior: violence has dropped since 2002 and the economy is growing at 8 percent a year. As a result, Uribe won a landslide reelection in 2006, with 60 percent of the vote (after pushing for a constitutional change that allowed him to seek a second term) and his approval ratings remained between 70 percent and 80 percent in 2007. This in spite of an embarrassing scandal in which several persons with close ties to his government or him personally were arrested on suspicion of being connected to the paramilitaries (Economist 2007).

Concern over Uribe’s tactics, however, has prompted many countries to express concern over his policies’ effects on democracy and human rights, and “[few] things rile [Uribe] more than having his democratic and human-rights credentials questioned internationally” (Economist 2007). Regardless of his feelings on the matter, in 2007 Democratic leadership in the US House of Representatives opposed ratification of a free trade agreement with Colombia on human rights grounds. Rep. Hilda Solis (D-CA), for example, opposed the trade agreement on the House floor in June 2007 on the basis that the Colombian government has ties to paramilitaries, impunity continued to be a problem, and “each year more trade unionists are killed in Colombia than the rest of the world combined.” She concluded her remarks be declaring, “A US trade policy should promote a democracy based on the protection of fundamental human rights and not a race to the bottom” (Solis 2007). The pattern and amounts of US aid, and the rhetoric in the United States concerning the promotion of human rights in Colombia, will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, but what should be clear at this point is that violence in Colombia has been a problem since the county’s inception and continues to this day.

The Warring Factions

Justification for the focus on the military component of the aid package to Colombia comes from the fact that armed rebel groups and paramilitaries are responsible for a significant amount of the violence (although the government is not without blame, as will be demonstrated later). Thus, to understand the reasoning behind the allocation of funds in Plan Colombia and how that impacts human rights, we must first explain the different rebel and paramilitary groups in Colombia. There are three major groups recognized as central to the problem: the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the paramilitaries.

According to the Pastrana Administration, in its documents for Plan Colombia, the guerilla movement (including FACR and ELN) “has its roots in the traditional rural and political antagonisms of Colombian society fueled in part by the ideological rhetoric of capitalist-communist confrontation. Over time, its fight to extend its
territorial presence and acquisition of political and military power has been financed by extortion and kidnappings, and...informal levies placed on drug-intermediaries” (USIP Library 1999). On the other hand, the “self-defense” groups (paramilitaries) “seek an armed solution to all guerilla activities and increased political recognition for their organization” (USIP Library 1999). FARC is the largest guerilla group, with some 12,000 members, and was formally organized in 1964 as a pro-Moscow group. Today the group dominates the coca-rich southern and eastern parts of Colombia, where the population is limited. In this area, “the nexus between illicit drug production and insurgency defies easy separation, especially since the FARC made a strategic decision to use coca ‘taxes’ and other drug-related revenue to finance its dramatic expansion in the 1990s” (USIP 2004). The ELN, also traced back to 1964 as a traditional revolutionary group, has some 5,000 members and is responsible for attacks on the oil pipelines in Colombia. They extort money from oil companies, MNCs, and other wealthy sectors in society (USIP 2004).

The largest paramilitary group is the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). This type of group was “initially created decades ago by rural landowners and the army to fight guerilla insurgents and to discourage peasants from organizing. They are now illegal, but...they continue to engage with relative impunity in gross human rights violations and drug trafficking” (US Institute of Peace 2004). The group has acquired sophisticated weapons, and it uses support from the military when it suits its needs and acts alone when it does not (Crandall 2002, 88). As part of the crackdown under President Uribe, by 2006, the Colombian government claims that it demobilized more than 30,000 paramilitaries. This claim, and the corresponding effectiveness of the demobilization, remains in question. According to Amnesty International, “despite the supposed demobilization, there was strong evidence that paramilitary groups continued to operate and to commit human rights violations with the acquiescence of or in collusion with the security forces” (Amnesty International 2007). Further, the Organization of American States Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia published a report in August 2006 that “stated that some demobilized paramilitaries had regrouped as criminal gangs, that others had failed to demobilize, and that new paramilitary groups had emerged [and they] continued to commit human rights violations in areas where they had supposedly demobilized” (Amnesty International 2007). Thus, Colombia has a long history of violence and numerous armed groups creating an environment that is less than conducive to the protection of human rights.

Debate in the US and the Purpose for Funding Plan Colombia

By the time Plan Colombia was debated in the US, the “War on Drugs” had been underway for 30 years. US assistance to Colombia to combat drugs began with a bilateral agreement on this type of aid in 1973, but the policy underwent a fundamental shift in the 1980s with the Reagan Administration’s assertive interdiction

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10 In this chapter, citations for Amnesty International refer to the annual report on Colombia, unless otherwise noted.

11 Richard Nixon coined the phrase “War on Drugs” in 1968, although he was primarily referring to a domestic assault on drug use.
policy (Crandall 2002, 25–6). The efforts had achieved very little towards the goal of combating the flow of cocaine into the United States but by 2000, Colombia was the third largest recipient of US foreign aid (Crandall 2002, 143). To enhance these attempts, in January 2000, President Bill Clinton proposed a $1.3 billion aid package aimed at anti-drug activities, with approximately $1.03 billion earmarked for Colombia (with 80 percent for military and police activities and equipment). In addition to the obvious rhetoric concerning the need to diminish the flow of drugs, there was emphasis placed on the need to improve human rights. The plan faced serious scrutiny and revision in its travels through the Congressional approval process, with many of the objections resting on human rights grounds.

In the House Appropriations Committee, amendments were discussed in relation to forcing an improvement in human rights in Colombia and the committee attached an amendment requiring the return of any helicopters used in the abuse of human rights. The full House of Representatives engaged in hours of debate on the floor concerning amendments to add human rights conditions to the package, as well as decrease or rework the military aspect of the package. Significant debate also centered on shifting the focus of US drug policy to domestic drug treatment. In the end, the House approved a package allocating $1.007 billion for Colombia, with 78 percent earmarked for the military and police (Vaicius and Isacson 2000).

The Senate Appropriations Committee made significant changes to the proposed legislation. The committee cut the military portion, replaced the high-tech helicopters with older models, and placed a stronger emphasis on human rights, tripling the aid in this category. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) was instrumental in conditioning the aid on compliance with human rights standards. The conditions in the Senate version, would have mandated that military and police aid be frozen until the US Secretary of State certifies that; 1) Colombia’s president has ordered the military to allow officers credibly accused of committing human rights crimes to be tried in civilian courts; 2) military personnel facing credible accusations of human rights abuses are being suspended while investigations proceed; 3) the Colombian military is cooperating fully with Colombian government investigations and prosecutions of human rights crimes; and 4) the Colombian government is vigorously prosecuting paramilitary leaders, and military personnel who aid and abet them, in civilian courts (Vaicius and Isacson 2000).

The conditions were not to be optional; there was no waiver. The final Senate version reduced the aid to Colombia to $714 million, with a significant reduction coming in the military portion due to the substitution of cheaper helicopters. This version of the aid package contained the tripling of funding for human rights.

The final version of the package coming from the House-Senate Conference Committee included $1.32 billion in overall anti-narcotics funding, with $860 million earmarked for Colombia. This version compromised on helicopters (18 Blackhawks

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12 The plan specified that the European Union would provide humanitarian aid, and it decided to provide $321 million in assistance to Colombia, well below what US and Colombian officials were hoping for. In addition, approximately $200 million of these funds are directed for non-Plan Colombia activities. This minimal amount is one indicator that the plan lacks international support (Crandall 2002, 161).
and 42 Hueys), and allotted $51 million to human rights protections (very close to the Senate version). While the final version contained the Leahy-sponsored human rights conditions, the provision became virtually toothless as the Committee gave the president the right to “waiver” the conditions in the name of national security. Thus, even if the administration is aware of human rights violations, aid can proceed if the president is willing to overlook those abuses in the interest of national security (Vaicius and Isacson 2000). Bill Clinton did just this in August 2000 by waiving the human rights conditions with the justification that it was too soon to make a determination on Colombia’s adherence to the requirements. The waiver underlines the fact that the focus of the aid package was never to be the “soft issues,” including human rights. The purpose of this package, for the administration, was curbing drug production and trafficking. The “soft issues” were “viewed as a necessary element to appease US nongovernmental organizations and congressional Democrats.” Ironically, the “soft issues” became increasingly important in selling the aid package to the international community and the people of Colombia. The promise of substantive democracy, economic growth, and improved human rights goes a long way in countering the criticism of too heavy a focus on military aid (Crandall 2002, 155–7). Table 5.2 demonstrates the breakdown of aid in the final package.

| Total Aid (2000 and 2001): $860.3 plus $330 of already planned aid (in millions) |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Item                            | Amount          | % of Package     |
| Armed Forces:                   | 519.2           | 60.4%            |
| Push into Southern Colombia*    | 416.3           |                  |
| Helicopters                     | 328             |                  |
| Aerial, land and water interdiction activities, logistical and intelligence support, and institutional support | 102.3 | |
| Police:                         | 123.1           | 14.3%            |
| Alternative development         | 68.5            | 8.0%             |
| Human Rights Protection         | 51              | 6.0%             |
| Displaced Persons Assistance    | 37.5            | 4.0%             |
| Law Enforcement (rule of law assistance) | 45       | 5.0%             |
| Judicial Reform                 | 13              | 2.0%             |
| Peace Process Support           | 3               | <1.0%            |

Notes: *The funds for the “Push into Southern Colombia” were designed to fund an offensive by the Colombian Army into Putumayo to create a safer environment for anti-narcotics operations. In other words, the US would fund an attempt by the Colombian Army to remove rebels from an area under their control.

Highlighting the importance of the “soft issues” to Congress, the signing of the final bill by President Clinton on 13 July 2000 did not end the debate over Plan Colombia, the appropriation of the funds, or the effect it would have on human rights. In October 2000, the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources held a hearing on funding to Colombia. One of the topics discussed was that of human rights. Representative Dan Burton (R-Indiana) expressed his concern over the recipients of the aid: “One of the problems we have with Plan Colombia is that we’re giving a disproportionate share of the money to the very people who have been perpetrating [sic] human rights violations.” He was expressing the belief that the aid should be given to the Colombian National Police and not the military (US House of Representatives 2000, 12). At the same hearing, Jess T. Ford, the Associate Director of International Relations and Trade, Government Accounting Office, pointed out to the Subcommittee that both Department of State and Defense officials have stated that they will apply strict human rights standards before approving the distribution of aid outlined in Plan Colombia. As evidence of this application, he explained, “State did not approve training for the second counternarcotics battalion until an individual officer suspected of a violation was removed from the unit, even though the Colombian government had cleared the person of wrongdoing” (US House of Representatives 2000, 33). In addition, according to Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Colombia was also taking the human rights issue seriously. The Colombian legislature passed military reforms that allowed for the dismissal of military personnel credibly suspected of violating human rights or colluding with paramilitaries (US House of Representatives 2000, 43).

Despite the claims made by United States as well as Colombian officials that the human rights situation was improving, that the government of Colombia was taking the problem seriously, and that Plan Colombia would aid in the attempts to further improve the situation, Amnesty International opposed the military components of the plan. In testimony to the House on 12 October, Andrew Miller explained that, “Given what we know about the human rights situation in Colombia…we believe that the increased military funding…will transform what is currently a worrying situation into a human rights and humanitarian catastrophe.” Miller emphasized that there existed a lack of “political will to implement human rights” in Colombia, given that Amnesty International had been making recommendations to the government on ways to improve the human rights record for many years, only to have those recommendations largely ignored. The concern with providing military aid revolved around the evidence of links between the military and the paramilitary organizations. Organizations, including Amnesty International, “extensively and overwhelmingly documented the links.” Thus, “aid itself might be involved in the commission of

13 It should be noted, however, that this only applied to those with less than fifteen years of service.

14 Andrew Miller testified as the Acting Advocacy Director for Latin America and the Caribbean for Amnesty International before the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources on 12 October 2000.
human rights violations or might be supporting military units who operate in the same area as the paramilitary units that work hand in hand” (US House of Representatives 2000, 77–91). Amnesty International recognized that there was a human rights assistance component to Plan Colombia, but told the House subcommittee that it was “inadequate and largely misdirected.” The main complaint was that the aid failed to “address the principal causes of the human rights crisis...including the root causes of impunity and the need to combat illegal paramilitary organizations.” These two aspects are critical, as without progress in these areas, “human rights programs contained in Plan Colombia will be little more than cosmetic” (US House of Representatives 2000, 82).

These concerns were not unheard by policymakers. In October 2003, Adolfo Franco, assistant administrator for USAID’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that USAID was pursuing programs conceived to improve the plan’s effectiveness. The goals addressed by the plan compliment the Bush Administration’s Andean Counterdrug Initiative and its goal to “create incentives for coca-producing farmers to convert their fields to legitimate crops or take up other legal employment.” He further testified that the guerilla and paramilitary groups, funded by the drug trade, “threaten not only Colombia, but also the stability of the Andean region” and “[this] is a direct threat to US security and economic interests” (US International Information Programs 2003).

In FY 2000, Plan Colombia provided USAID with $123.5 million, and in FY 2002 and 2003, the Andean Counterdrug Initiative provided $230.7 million to pursue three main goals: reduce drug crops through alternative development; strengthen democracy and human rights; and aid those displaced by violence. Specifically addressing human rights, USAID believed that “impunity from arrest and prosecution [is] the basic problem that allows those responsible for human rights violations in Colombia to continue committing these crimes.” The shockingly high annual homicide rate of 63 murders per 100,000 inhabitants is attributed less to armed conflict with guerillas than to “drug-related violence, weak governmental institutions, and a pervasive sense of impunity before the law.” As a result, Colombians suffer from “general insecurity [and a] lack of confidence in governmental institutions” leading to an “increasing number of people who resort to extra-official protection.” In an effort to combat these problems, USAID assisted in the establishment of “Justice Houses” to increase access to the judicial system, as well as providing training and technical assistance “to improve the efficiency and transparency of the formal court system.” Further, USAID assisted in protecting human rights workers, labor activists, journalists, mayors and others who are threatened by terrorist groups, as well as creating an Early Warning System to warn state institutions, including the military and police, of “situations that could result in massacres of forced displacements” (US International Information Programs 2003).

In 2005, the US House of Representatives once again debated funding to Colombia.15 Congress now had roughly five years of evidence to determine if Plan

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15 On 28 June 2005, the House debated the inclusion of an amendment to the bill funding Colombia for 2006 that would have reduced the amount by $100 million.
Colombia was successful.\textsuperscript{16} While many members of the House spoke in favor of Plan Colombia and declared it a success,\textsuperscript{17} others spoke in opposition and tied that opposition to human rights. For example, Representative James McGovern (D-MA) introduced an amendment to reduce funding to Colombia by $100 million in 2006 because, “This policy has failed as an antidrug policy. It has failed as a human rights policy and it has failed to have any impact whatsoever in reducing the availability, price or purity of drugs in the streets of America.” He went on to declare,

Colombia is still the most dangerous country in the world to be a trade union leader. It is the second most dangerous place to be a religious pastor or lay leader…Abuses by the Colombian military are on the rise and the armed forces commit crimes with impunity, with no high-level Colombian military officer ever having been successfully prosecuted for human rights crimes (McGovern 2005).

In addition, Representative Mike Honda (D-CA) declared, “We cannot be seen as condoning the ongoing human rights abuses in Colombia. We must be seen the world over as defending human rights. By supporting the McGovern amendment, we would be sending a strong signal to the international community that, yes, the United States does indeed value human rights” (Honda 2005). Finally, Gregory Meeks (D-NY) determined that the United States should stop throwing “good money after bad. Plan Colombia had five or six years to prove itself, and what it has proven is that the plan has caused more harm than good. Eighty percent of US assistance to Colombia goes to the military and police. We need a more balanced policy on Colombia” (Meeks 2005).

Another hearing on Capitol Hill in April 2007 concerning the request by the Uribe government to continue funding for Plan Colombia (or what is referred to as the second phase of Plan Colombia) demonstrates the continued importance of the effects of Plan Colombia on human rights in the recipient state. Again, several members of Congress highlighted the successes of the Uribe Administration’s crackdown focusing on a decrease in certain human rights indicators (discussed below) and on the advances in the overall Colombian economy that is improving the living situation for average Colombian citizens. Dennis J. Hastert (R-IL), for example, emphasized that, “In every single category Colombia is improving. Rates of homicides, kidnappings, and acts of terrorism and displaced persons are all significantly down. On the other hand, school enrollment, gross domestic product, unemployment and poverty rates and beneficiaries of public healthcare have considerably improved” (Hastert 2007). On the other side of the aisle, while recognizing the fact that progress has been made, Eliot L. Engel (D-NY) questioned

\begin{itemize}
\item Our focus is on the effect US assistance has on human rights, but since we acknowledge that Plan Colombia’s main purpose was to curb drug production and trafficking, it is worth mentioning that in the US government reported a 21 percent increase in 2005 and a 9 percent increase (over the previous year) in 2006 in the amount of land cultivated with coca despite record fumigation statistics.

\item Numerous members of the House declared that Plan Colombia was succeeding in reducing human rights abuses and violence overall and curbing the amount of drugs produced.
\end{itemize}
the continued military focus of Plan Colombia, citing the fact that despite the focus of the Colombian government’s proposal for the second phase of Plan Colombia on strengthening democracy and social development, “Plan Colombia is still for the most part a military program.” He concludes that, “While we have seen some progress in Colombia, I have my doubts about our overall impact” (Engel 2007).

Thus, members of Congress continue to rhetorically support the link between US foreign aid and human rights, even as they disagree on the impact of Plan Colombia. As Figure 5.4 indicates, since the inception of Plan Colombia, the US ally in the war on drugs has continued to receive substantial amounts of aid, and as highlighted earlier in this chapter, since 2000, Colombia has received more aid than any other Latin American country. Coupled with the differences of opinion in Congress concerning the progress in human rights in Colombia, this begs the question, how are human rights in Colombia and what effect does US aid have on those rights?

![Figure 5.4 Total US foreign assistance: Colombia](image)

**The Human Rights Situation in Colombia**

Regardless of whether or not the initial purpose of the US contribution to Plan Colombia was the improvement of human rights, the rhetoric has certainly supported the contention that it is an important aspect of the US-Colombian relationship. Given this, what effect has the influx of US foreign assistance had on the security rights
of Colombian citizens? According to Adolfo Franco in 2003, “Plan Colombia is working...USAID continues to work in reforming the justice system and improving respect for human rights, while initiating new programs to strengthen local governance, combat corruption, broaden citizen participation in political decision-making and back initiatives to support the peace process.” While heralding the achievements of the plan thus far, he acknowledged that “Colombia’s multiple interrelated problems are not amenable to a quick fix” (US International Information Programs 2003). To organize our discussion of human rights in Colombia, this analysis will be broken into two time periods: the early years of Plan Colombia (2000–2003) and the effects of the Uribe crackdown (2004–2006).

The early years of Plan Colombia: 2000–2003

Evidence suggests that Adolfo Franco was correct in at least one aspect: US foreign aid has certainly not been a quick fix. While the human rights situation in Colombia was certainly poor prior to the inception of Plan Colombia, the situation actually deteriorated from 2000–2003. As Figure 5.5 indicates, Colombia’s human rights deteriorated in the late 1970s and have never rebounded. Since the late 1980s, Colombia has received a “1” on the political terror index (except in 1995 when it received a “2”). Thus, differentiating between the years prior to Plan Colombia and the years following the dramatic increase in US aid cannot be done through this index (once a country receives a “1” there is nowhere else to go; countries cannot

![Figure 5.5 Security rights in Colombia](image-url)
be rated any lower). Figure 5.5 simply confirms that human rights in Colombia are atrocious while Figure 5.4 confirms that the US began giving them aid in large amounts despite their human rights record in the late 1990s.

Other indicators, however, can paint a more illustrative picture. Amnesty International issues a report of human rights abuses annually and Table 5.3 shows the figures for three key indicators in determining the level of security for Colombian citizens: kidnappings, disappearances, and civilians killed for political motives. Kidnappings and disappearances show a dramatic increase from the late 1990s, while civilians killed for political motives remained high.\footnote{The period ranging from January through December 2003 shows improvement in two out of three of the key indicators (only disappearances increased from 2002 to 2003). This will be discussed later.} In addition, as Table 5.4 illustrates, the US Committee for Refugees reports that Colombia’s displaced persons have steadily risen through the early years of Plan Colombia, and in 2003 it was approximately 2.73 million.\footnote{This number has been consistently on the rise even prior to Plan Colombia, but the evidence indicates that the influx of aid has certainly not improved the situation.} Thus, as the empirical findings suggest, this evidence shows that the influx of aid from the United States under Plan Colombia not only failed to improve human rights, but actually worsened the situation, at least in the short term.\footnote{Recall that although the United States funds Plan Colombia through the Economic Security Fund, the assistance is primarily military in nature.}

As previously stated, in August 2000, President Clinton waived the human rights requirements in the aid package in the name of US national security. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Washington Office on Latin America “deplored” this decision. These organizations published a report detailing the extent of human rights abuses in Colombia, specifically showing that the conditions in the aid package had not been met. The report concluded that the Colombian President had failed to issue an appropriate directive to provide civilian courts jurisdiction over military personnel accused of human rights violations, all armed forces personnel accused of human rights violations had not been suspended, the armed forces were not in compliance with these conditions nor were they cooperating with civilian authorities, and known paramilitaries with outstanding warrants had not been arrested (US House of Representatives 2000, 92–133). In fact, before any US funds specifically from this package had reached Colombia, the anticipation of the aid was enough to worsen the humanitarian situation. In preparation for the US-backed push of Colombian forces into Southern Colombia, FARC provoked a humanitarian crisis by instituting a road block in Putumayo in November 2000. The blockade lasted for nearly six weeks, cutting off food and medical shipments, and prompting the Colombian military to undertake the airlifting of 1,300 tons of supplies (Crandall 2002, 159).

Even with the inception of Plan Colombia, the State Department continued to conclude in its country reports on human rights practices that the human rights record of the Colombian government “remained poor.” In its 2004 report (covering 2003), while claiming “the percentage of total human rights abuses reported attributed
to security forces was low,” the DOS report explains that “some” security forces (including police, prison guards, and military forces) participated in unlawful and extrajudicial killings, disappearances and kidnappings, collaborated with the AUC, mistreated detainees, and conducted arbitrary arrests and detentions. In addition, the report confirmed that impunity remains a core human rights problem, citizens’ privacy rights are “sometimes” infringed upon, journalists are killed or intimidated, human rights activists are harassed, societal discrimination against women and

21 Previous reports use similar (and in some cases identical) language to describe the situation in Colombia. In the 2001 and 2002 reports, identical language is used to summarize the situation: “The Government’s human rights record remained poor; there were continued efforts to improve the legal framework and institutional mechanisms, but implementation lagged, and serious problems remained.”

**Table 5.3**  Security rights violations in Colombia: Kidnappings, disappearances, and politically motivated killings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kidnappings</th>
<th>Disappearances</th>
<th>Killings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3500*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2700</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**: *According to Amnesty International, the figure for 2000 represents victims of politically motivated violence, not necessarily murder. AI cites the remaining numbers as actually instances of political motivated killings.

**Source**: Amnesty International.

**Table 5.4**  Displaced persons in Colombia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of displaced persons by year end</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984–1994</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–1996</td>
<td>875,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,087,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2,730,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source**: US Committee for Refugees.
minorities, child abuse and child prostitution continue, the civilian judiciary is corrupt, inefficient and overburdened, and high-ranking members of the security forces charged with human rights abuses rarely come to trial (US Department of State 2004).22

Despite all this negative news, the DOS report did find some positive developments in 2003, alluded to in Table 5.3. In 2003, murders (not necessarily politically motivated) fell by 20 percent, kidnappings by 39 percent, and there was a decline in newly displaced persons for the first time since 1999. Large-scale massacres by AUC terrorists declined as did the number of union leaders killed (US Department of State 2004). Regardless of these improvements, Colombia continues to rate a “1” on the political terror index through 2005. As you will recall, receiving a “1” on the political terror index indicates the most abusive type of regime where leaders operate with no limits, and murders, disappearances, torture, incarceration of political opponents, and arbitrary and capricious punishment are extended to the entire population (not just those who involve themselves in politics as would be the case with a “2” classification).

The decreases mentioned above are genuine, but the situation in Colombia remains horrific (in other words, an improvement in these indicators should not been seen as evidence that the human rights situation in Colombia is good). In fact, these decreases are at least partially the result of negative occurrences, such as illegal paramilitaries consolidating their control in some regions. In addition, those who commit crimes against humanity and human rights violations continue to do so without punishment and the connection between government security forces and the paramilitaries continues (Human Rights Watch 2004).23 At this point, the fact that the majority of the aid coming to Colombia in Plan Colombia is military in nature becomes illustrative, in spite of the fact that the United States categorizes this as economic aid. Using funds and equipment from Plan Colombia, the government has succeeded in curbing some of the violence committed by the rebel groups and paramilitaries, but at what cost? The following section will discuss the crackdown instituted by President Uribe, and its effects on the human rights situation in Colombia.

The effects of the Uribe crackdown: 2004–2006

The election of Álvaro Uribe Vélez (in May 2002 and his reelection in 2006) and his campaign against the rebels have changed the human rights situation in Colombia, but in the overall picture, not necessarily for the better. Two central features of the crackdown are new legislation and the attempts by the government to demobilize the paramilitary groups. While new legislation in 2003 allows the military to arrest, tap telephones, and conduct searches without warrants, government forces have also increasingly resorted to mass arrests with reports of abuses and arrests based

22 In this chapter, all citations for US Department of State refer to the annual country report on human rights conditions in Colombia, unless otherwise specified.

23 In this chapter, all citations for Human Rights Watch refer to the World Report on Colombia, unless otherwise stated.
on poor or false information. Also in 2003, the government began negotiating the
demobilization of paramilitary groups, and a related, and highly controversial piece
of legislation, is the “Justice and Peace Law” (Law 975) that allows significantly
reduced sentences (and in its implementation allows in some cases the avoidance
of prison altogether by serving sentences on farms or at home) for paramilitaries
who turn themselves in, confess, and pay reparations for their crimes24 (Human
Rights Watch 2007). Human rights groups and many members of the US Congress
found this legislation intolerable. Many of the paramilitaries benefitting from this
legislation have committed atrocities and other serious crimes, and it demonstrates a
lack of concern over punishing those that have committed human rights violations.
Further, the government has been accused of using overwhelming force to take back
control of areas occupied by guerrilla groups. For example, the town of Saravena in
the oil-rich province of Arauca, previously under the control of ELN, was the first
place targeted by security forces in 2002. Thousands were arrested without warrants,
hundreds killed, and the remainder live in fear of being accused of sympathizing
with the guerillas (Branford 2004).

Despite the questions surrounding the government tactics, as demonstrated
above, the early effects of the crackdown were seen in 2003 with a drop in certain
human rights violations. While these decreases should definitely be appreciated,
and demonstrate an improvement from an individual level, the aggregate still paints
a bleak picture. For example, similar to 2003, the US Department of State report
found some positive developments in 2004. In the State Department’s 2005 report
(covering 2004), it stated, “Although serious problems remained, the Government’s
respect for human rights improved in some areas.” Murders decreased by 16
percent, terrorist massacres by nearly 50 percent, and kidnappings by 42 percent.
These positive numbers are countered somewhat by the fact that disappearances
“continued to be a problem,” the overall number of displaced persons continued to
grow, and those killed for political motives or kidnapped remained alarmingly high.
In fact, DOS estimates that the conflict in Colombia caused between 3,000 and 4,000
deaths, and displaced at least 137,000 civilians in 2004 (Department of State 2005).
Overall, Human Rights Watch concluded, “Colombia’s forty-year internal armed
conflict continues to be accompanied by widespread violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law. All actors in the conflict—guerillas, paramilitary
groups, and the armed forces—commit serious violations, such as massacres,
assassinations, and kidnappings” (Human Rights Watch 2005).

The problems persisted into 2005 and 2006.25 Human Rights Watch sums up
2005 by stating, “Colombia presents the most serious human rights and humanitarian
situation in the region. Battered by an internal armed conflict involving government
forces, guerilla groups, and paramilitaries, the country has one of the largest
populations of internally displaced persons in the world” (Human Rights Watch

24 The Colombian Constitutional Court approved the legislation in 2006, but it was only
the ruling of the court that placed the requirements of confession and reparations payments on
the implementation of the legislation.

25 Plan Colombia officially expired in 2005, but was extended, and in 2006 was in its
sixth year, costing $4.7 billion.
Government abuse of its citizens continues to be an acute problem. For example, civilians, native Indians, and local government officials continue to be murdered, and innocent civilians were captured and accused of rebellion against the government. Early in 2006, “allegations were made public that units of the army had executed civilians and dressed the corpses as guerillas so that they could record them as killed in combat,” and in May, “an army unit [intentionally] shot and killed ten elite anti-narcotics police officers who had been trained by the US Drug Enforcement Administration” (Human Rights Watch 2007). Further, in September 2006, Amnesty International issued a report criticizing the Colombian government for failing to protect human rights workers and, in essence, giving a green light to attacks. Government authorities regularly question the legitimacy of such workers, and fail to pursue those who commit crimes against them. The US Department of State, while recognizing the government’s improved respect for human rights, listed numerous violations committed by the government in 2006. These violations included unlawful and extrajudicial killings; forced disappearances; insubordinate military collaboration with criminal groups; torture and mistreatment of detainees; overcrowded and insecure prisons; arbitrary arrest; impunity; and corruption (US Department of State 2007). Late 2006 and throughout 2007 brought an internationally embarrassing incident for the Uribe government. More and more proof continued to trickle out concerning the connection between government officials (including members of Colombia’s congress) and the paramilitaries. Thus, concerns about government perpetrated human rights abuses, and its connection with those committing other abuses, continue to plague the assessment of Plan Colombia.

In addition to human rights issues within the government, AUC, FARC, and ELN terrorists continued to violate the rights of citizens (a trend that was present in both time periods discussed here). A large percentage of civilian deaths caused by the internal armed conflict are attributed to the FARC and ELN terrorists. Together they have killed politicians, journalists, labor union members, and religious leaders, kidnapped thousands of civilians and members of the security forces, recruited child soldiers, and caused hundreds of additional deaths through random terrorist bombings. The AUC, despite a unilateral cease-fire begun in 2002 designed to facilitate demobilization negotiations with the government, also conducted numerous political killings and kidnappings, threatened and attacked human rights workers and journalists, and recruited child soldiers. In fact, Human Rights Watch estimated that in 2004 more than 11,000 children were fighting in Colombia’s hostilities, with one in four of every irregular combatant being under eighteen years of age (approximately 80 percent are members of FARC or ELN). These figures rank Colombia among the worst violators of international norms against child soldiers (Human Rights Watch 2005).

26 As noted previously, the instances of some of these abuses have decreased since President Uribe’s crackdown and demobilization efforts, but they nonetheless continue to be a problem.

27 Human Rights Watch estimates that in 2006 several thousand child soldiers are under the age of fifteen, which is the minimum recruitment age allowed under the Geneva Convention.
America to conclude in September 2004, “Colombia suffers the most dire human
rights situation in the western hemisphere” (WOLA, Colombia).

Despite the demobilization attempts under the Uribe Administration, and as
mentioned above the claim by the Colombian government that they have successfully
demobilized 30,000 paramilitaries, new abuses by guerilla and paramilitary forces
continued throughout 2005 and 2006. These activities included kidnappings, killings,
and indiscriminate bombings (Human Rights Watch 2007). For example, five human
rights activists from the non-governmental organization Comision Intereclesial de
Justicia y Paz were kidnapped by FARC gunmen in March 2005. Guerilla groups
are also responsible for most cases of anti-personnel landmines and the subsequent
injury and death they cause. As further evidence of the questionable success of the
demobilization effort, in October 2006, the confiscation of a computer “owned by
an associate of the paramilitary leader known as ‘Jorge 40’ had turned up evidence
of over 500 assassinations committed in just one Colombian state between 2003 and
2005. The computer also pointed to continuing plans by the paramilitaries’ Northern
Block to expand their political power and territorial control” (Human Rights Watch
2007). The US State Department listed numerous additional violations committed by
illegal armed groups (paramilitaries), including interference with personal privacy
and with the political system; forced displacement; suborning and intimidation
of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses; infringement on citizens’ privacy rights;
restrictions on freedom of movement; and harassment, intimidation, and killing of
human rights workers, journalists, teachers, and trade unionists (US Department of
State 2007).28

As a result of both government and rebel activities, Colombian citizens continue
to live in a dangerous environment. Colombia has more than 3.7 million internally
displaced persons, thus making it the world’s largest “internal displacement crisis
after Sudan.” In fact, forced displacement rose from 2004 to 2005. The internally
displaced tend to live in inadequate housing, fail to receive medical care, and
children do not have access to education. In 2004, the Colombian Constitutional
Court found the country’s system for assisting the displaced unconstitutional,
and as a consequence, the government has increased its budget through 2010 for
protection and humanitarian assistance for the displaced (Human Rights Watch
2007). While there was a decrease in the number of newly displaced persons in
2006, the overall number remains high and a significant area of concern (Amnesty
International 2007).

Thus, while recognizing improvements in certain aspects of the situation, there
is no definitive statement declaring an improvement in the security rights of
Colombian citizens. Regardless of the unit of measurement, whether considering the
cultivation of coca, the human rights situation, or the trends in Colombian violence,
Plan Colombia has failed to live up to the rhetoric. The debate over Phase Two of
Plan Colombia in 2007 and 2008 by the US Congress is heated and partisan. Many
members of Congress tout the importance of human rights and urge a different focus
to aid to Colombia (social and economic development, not military). As the global

28 The State Department report also listed numerous additional violations by FARC and
ELN in 2006, many the same as those committed by the paramilitaries.
Conclusion

The study of Plan Colombia highlights the empirical findings found in Chapter 4. Through the analysis of several key indicators, it is apparent that during the early years of Plan Colombia the security rights situation deteriorated. Aid through this program began reaching Colombia from the United States in 2000, and by all accounts security in Colombia decreased. Disappearances, kidnappings, killings for political motives, and displaced persons all increased through 2002, in some cases dramatically. While there was significant discussion of the impact on human rights, the goal of the administration in the program of aid was to hamper drug cultivation and trafficking, not truly aimed at human rights improvement. After the election of Uribe in 2002, the Colombia government began a crackdown against guerilla forces and attempted to demobilize the paramilitaries. As a consequence, there has been a demonstrable improvement in certain human rights indicators. The method by which this improvement has been achieved (that is, through state terror), and the fact that the overall human rights situation in Colombia continues to be poor, however, leave a continuing concern over the security situation for Colombia’s citizens. In considering the future allocation of funds to Colombia, members of Congress continue to use human rights as a rhetorical tool. The problem now is that members of Congress can interpret the security situation in Colombia differently. The point, however, is that when making decisions, an administration must consider the negative impact of providing such aid on the condition of the people. It seems that US foreign assistance is not the pacifying foreign policy tool that political rhetoric suggests. Rather, US efforts at improving human rights in Latin America have been hampered by their foreign assistance program.
Particularly in a period when promoting moderation and democracy in the Muslim world is particularly important to America’s interest, Turkey’s success as one of the few democratic countries in the Muslim world, I think, is important. So [the $1 billion granted to Ankara in the Bush Administration’s emergency funding request for the war in Iraq] is not a payment for something. It’s not a reward for something. It’s a recognition that Turkey as a frontline state stands to suffer some significant short-term economic losses as a result of this conflict (Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Defense Secretary, testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee, 27 March 2003).

One of the major themes of this book is that elected officials and bureaucrats, at least rhetorically, often link the allocation of US foreign assistance to human rights practices with the latter serving as an element of conditionality. Ultimately, policymakers want such aid to promote human rights and democracy. In the least, they argue that foreign aid should not be a tool for state abuse. For example, Congressman John D. Dingell lamented in 1989 that US foreign policy was contributing to poor human rights conditions in Turkey by continuing to supply millions in military aid and urged his colleagues in Congress “to consider that Turkey has repeatedly violated the conditions of its obligations. They have violated the US Foreign Assistance Act, the US Military Sales Act, the Lausanne Treaty, articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, and both the NATO and UN charters” (Dingell 1989). In Chapter 1 we highlighted the human rights concerns expressed by Congressman Bob Filner regarding Turkish treatment of the Kurds and it is worth repeating here. He argued that it “is imperative that we affirm a human rights linkage with any foreign aid given by the United States and oppose the furnishing of lethal equipment to those who would use it for repressive purposes” (Filner 1997). Paul Wolfowitz’s remark above suggests that US assistance to Turkey is meant to promote and strengthen democracy, and thus human rights, in a country bordering a mostly non-democratic region (the Middle East). Contrary to his own belief, however, the United States is indeed paying for something—US security interests in the region. We have also illustrated that the national security needs of the United States more often than not trump concerns for human rights for these same policymakers. We continue to query whether national security concerns and the desire to promote human rights are mutually exclusive when it comes to the allocation and distribution of foreign assistance. Or is it possible to accomplish both task simultaneously? Government officials often espouse the values of human rights and democracy when considering aid, but is there truly a connection? Our quantitative evidence presented in Chapter 4 suggests not, as does the discussion of US aid to Colombia presented in the previous
chapter. Here, we turn our attention to Turkey. The decision to allocate and distribute foreign aid to Turkey dramatically highlights the battle between national security (the primary US interest) and the protection of human rights and the promotion of democracy (secondary US interests). We consider if there are trade-offs and whether such trade-offs are acceptable from an ethical foreign policy perspective.

In this chapter we first examine the geopolitical location of Turkey and its influence on not only US foreign policy, but its effect on studying the region academically. We next turn our attention to US interests in the regions around Turkey to provide an overview of the level of foreign assistance as well as the degree of human rights violations found in the area. We include a brief quantitative analysis of the region in this section as well. The third section highlights US-Turkey relations, focusing on the major events that have influenced both foreign aid and the overall tone of the relationship. Lastly, we address the human rights conditions within Turkey examining the impact of both US foreign aid as well as Turkey’s application to the European Union.

**Turkey: Location, Location, Location**

One of the first considerations in attempting to replicate our previous statistical results using a regional analysis rests on the question, where is Turkey? This is not a question in the geographical sense, of course. We can all look at a map and see that the Mediterranean Sea, Greece, Bulgaria, the Black Sea, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran, Iraq and Syria surround Turkey. It is the question of regional alignment that poses an interesting dilemma for scholars and policymakers alike. More specifically, with whom do we compare Turkey? Is it part of the Middle East, Europe, or an emerging region referred to as Eurasia? The truth is that Turkey inhabits a strategic territory that serves as a bridge between Europe, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union. Turkey is the place “where the West and the Middle East, Christianity and Islam, the Roman and the Byzantine worlds meet” (Coleman 1994, 51).

Many consider Turkey to be part of the Middle East. This is based on the fact that Islam is the dominant religion, and among other areas, at its zenith, the Ottoman Empire ruled most of the Middle East. Today, Turkey is positioning itself as a broker in the Middle East, recently hosting Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli President Shimon in November 2007 for the purposes of signing an agreement to create an industrial park on the border between Israel and the West Bank. Turkey’s role in the project consists of aiding in the operation of the facility. Henry Barkey, an expert on Turkey at Lehigh University, comments that Turkey has worked to strengthen its diplomatic power vis-à-vis the region and that the leading Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) does not “have any qualms about seeing Turkey as part of the Middle East. But they don’t see the future as restricted to the Middle East. They see Turkey as a conduit between the east and the west in the most expansive sense of the word” (Schleifer 2007, 1–3).

However, the inhabitants of Turkey are not Arab (or Persian) and their government is a republican parliamentary democracy. Many elites in Turkey want to be considered part of Europe as the area of Turkey west of the Bosporus is geographically
considered part of Europe. Its western ties are evident in the fact that Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952, and in 1964 became an associate member of the European Community. In recent years, Turkey has undertaken political, economic, and social reforms in an effort to gain membership in the European Union (discussed later). Moreover, in purely economic terms, Turkey “has never been more part of Europe. Some of Europe’s most venerable brands, from Bosch to Fiat and Renault, are today being manufactured in Turkey, which has grown to become the largest exporter of televisions to Europe” (Schleifer 2006). With or without EU ascension, Turkey’s ties, particularly economic ones, to Europe are forging ahead. Despite this, Turkey appears to be closer geographically to Central Asia than to Europe and may be more closely ethnically linked to Eurasia. In sum, Turkey’s democracy is less evolved than those of Europe, it has ties to the Turkic populations in the former Soviet republics and religious ties to the Middle East, and of particular relevance here, it does not achieve the human rights standards of European nations.

US interests in Europe, the Middle East and Eurasia

In our previous chapter on Latin America, we outlined US interest in the region and provided an empirical model of human rights for the region. Since there is no debate regarding the geographic location of Colombia, developing the model was rather straightforward. We replicated the original model of all developing countries with a model of Latin American countries. In the case of Turkey, as just discussed, its geographic location is often debated if not misunderstood. Here, we provide a survey of US interest in Turkey and the surrounding regions, along with an empirical investigation of US foreign aid and human rights in the three different regions: Europe, the Middle East, and Eurasia.

As discussed in Chapter 2, US interest in Turkey and the surrounding regions was initially based on the East-West ideological division brought about after the end of World War II. Turkey’s ties to Europe rested on its fragile and volatile relationship with Greece which the Marshall Plan addressed from its inception. Both countries, along with the other war-torn nations of Western Europe, received economic and military aid as part of the Marshall Plan. Foreign assistance from this plan lasted between 1949 and 1952, with Turkey receiving $225.1 million in economic aid and $553.2 million in military aid. Greece received almost three times as much economic aid during this period ($733.4 million) and roughly the same amount of military aid ($593.7 million). As Figure 6.1 illustrates, in subsequent years Turkey would outpace other European states receiving $1.93 billion in economic aid and $1.46 billion in

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1 Eurasia can be viewed in several ways. One way is the combination of all of Europe and all of Asia. Second, it is a bridging area comprised of Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The United States considers Eurasia to include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. In a regional analysis of the determinants of personal integrity abuse, Poe (2003) included many of the countries listed above, along with countries in Eastern Europe as a region labeled Eastern Europe/ex-Soviet.
Strategic US Foreign Assistance

Military aid during the Mutual Security Act years (1953–1961) and over $5 billion in economic aid since. In fact, of the total $8.5 billion in economic aid allocated to Western Europe under the Federal Assistance Act (FAA) program since 1962, Turkey has received over 60 percent. Turning to the level of military aid during the FAA years, Turkey receives almost half of the amount allocated with a total of $11 billion out of over $24 billion.²

The United States utilized economic and military aid to first rebuild Europe in the immediate years following World War II. A total of $8 billion was spent in the Western Europe with the United Kingdom ($3.8 billion), Germany ($1.3 billion), Italy ($1.2 billion), and France ($709 million) receiving the lion’s share between 1946 and 1948. With the Marshall Plan, every country in Western Europe received economic aid except Switzerland; in terms of military aid, about half of the countries in the region received aid. By the end of the Mutual Security Act years, economic and political recovery in the major European nations had been accomplished. However, several motivating factors led to US continued interest in supporting several key Western European nations with economic and military aid. First, there was continued threat of collapse in susceptible states, such as Greece, which had viable communist parties. Second, the United States feared a general threat from the Soviet Union and was compelled to not only offer its own military presence, but continued its foreign assistance to the continent as a deterrent to communist expansion. Third, the United States allocated a vast amount of aid to shore up economic and political development.

² All dollar amounts discussed here are in historical dollars. Data is from the US Overseas Loans and Grants report for fiscal year 2004.
in the southern states of Western Europe including Spain and Portugal, which are the
top two recipients of foreign aid after Greece and Turkey in Western Europe. Lastly,
there is Turkey and its strategic location straddling the East and West.

Developing a statistical model of foreign aid for Western Europe for the purposes
of comparative analysis has proven difficult. First, in terms of human rights, there is
the problem of a general lack of variance across the sample. When Turkey is removed
from the sample, the mean value of security rights is 4.62 with a standard deviation
of .56 or approximately half a point. Turning to US foreign assistance, when we
consider Turkey as part of Europe, particularly as they strive toward membership in
the European Union, we run into the problem that the United States hasn’t generally
provided military and economic assistance to most European countries during the
years of our study. The only recipients of any significant levels of foreign assistance
are Turkey, Greece, Portugal, and Spain with the levels for Spain dropping to nearly
zero after the end of the Cold War.

![Figure 6.2](image)

**Figure 6.2** Total US foreign assistance: Select countries in Western Europe

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3 After receiving very little of the money allocated during the Marshall Plan years
(1949–1952), Spain was allocated over $900 million in economic aid between 1953 and 1961
as a result of the Pact of Madrid, while Portugal has received over $1.2 billion since 1962.
They both have received a great deal of military aid (Portugal with $1.5 billion and Spain
almost $3 billion since 1962) partly in return for the establishment of US military bases. As
these two countries became more integrated in the European economy, the level of aid has
diminished.

4 Both Spain and Italy have received a 3 on the PTS scale during the years of the study.
The data in Figure 6.2 illustrates the level of total foreign aid in historical dollars to these four countries. Once this aid is removed from the region, the level of US foreign assistance is nominal; the mean value of total aid is 47.39 billion for the whole region and only 2.17 billion with these four countries removed.\(^5\) Thus, there is little or no variation in the military and economic aid variables for most of the years in the sample once these outliers are considered. Nonetheless, a model of security rights for Western Europe was investigated. Table 6.1 provides the regression coefficients for economic and military aid for several regional models.\(^6\) The results from the Western European model indicates that while economic aid does not have any impact on security rights statistically, the effect of any military assistance to the region is extremely detrimental with a decrease in over half a point on the PTS for the Western Europe when Turkey is removed from the sample.\(^7\) When considering Eastern Europe, the bad news regarding the effect of US foreign assistance is compounded, particularly the impact of military assistance. However, the relatively few years of foreign aid must be taken into account here.\(^8\) A third model, with all of the countries in Europe, was investigated and both economic and military aid remains an impediment for the promotion of security rights.

### Table 6.1 US foreign assistance and security rights (aid as a percentage of GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Economic Aid</th>
<th>Turkey Omitted</th>
<th>Military Aid</th>
<th>Turkey Omitted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.78***</td>
<td>-.56**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>-.65***</td>
<td>-.50**</td>
<td>-.159***</td>
<td>-.306**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (all)</td>
<td>-.19*</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.87***</td>
<td>-.69***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>-.04**</td>
<td>-.04**</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East (w/o Egypt/Israel)</td>
<td>-.06**</td>
<td>-.06**</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurasia</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.82**</td>
<td>-.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: p<.10*; p<.05**; p<.01***; \(^*\) assuming a one-tail test.

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\(^6\) Since the economic and military aid variables are the primary variables of interest, the remaining control variables are not presented. Any anomalies in the results from the original models presented in Chapter 4 will be addressed in turn.

\(^7\) As expected, diagnostics indicated that Turkey was a potential outlier. Of the control variables, only the presence of an international war and the end of the Cold War were not statistically significant in the model for the region.

\(^8\) In the models for Eastern Europe, several variables drop out of the economic model (civil wars and British influence) or do not have theoretical import (end of the Cold War). The remaining control variables generally perform in a similar fashion as the model for the total sample presented in Chapter 4.
With respect to the Middle East, US interests in the region are obviously tied to oil as well as the US-Israeli relationship (discussed in Chapter 2), both dating back to the end of World War II and continuing through to today. While the level of economic and military aid to the region was minimal during the immediate post-World War II years and the Marshall Plan years, the amount of aid began to increase during the Mutual Security Act phase and simply exploded during the FAA period. Largely a function of the Middle East Peace Process, the total amount of aid to the region since 1962 totals over $83 billion in economic aid and over $99 billion in military aid. Israel and Egypt received a disproportionate amount of both types of aid as the graphs in Figure 6.3 illustrate. Their combined total constitutes over 70 percent of economic aid and over 90 percent of military aid allocated for the entire region. Turkey’s level of foreign assistance pales in comparison; however, they have traditionally been the third leading recipient of US foreign assistance leading up to the Iraq War. While the major oil producers in the region only receive nominal amounts of aid, other states within the region do benefit from primarily economic aid including Jordan with a total of over $4 billion in aid since 1962. Jordan is also one of the top recipients of foreign aid when it is calculated on a per capita basis (Jackson 2007). Much of the military aid (over $3 billion) comes in the form of F-16s, communications, and Blackhawk helicopters. Needless to say, Jordan is highly rewarded for its strategic relationship with the United States and its peace agreement with Israel. US interest in the Middle East will continue due to the US relationship with Israel, concern for oil, and as the war on terror focuses on the region. Today, the bulk of US aid (apart from Egypt and Israel) goes to Iraq primarily in the form of economic aid.9

Figure 6.3 Economic and military assistance to the Middle East and North Africa

9 As of the 2004 figures reported by the US Overseas Loans and Grants Greenbook, Iraq received over ten billion in economic aid and over two billion in military assistance.
When we consider Turkey as part of the Middle East in an empirical model, we encounter similar difficulty as in the European model. In terms of human rights, the level of security rights in the region is 3.02 on the PTS scale, over 1.5 points lower than in the European model. Ironically, the mean value for security rights in Turkey is 2.25. As for foreign assistance, the problem here is that rather than too little aid like in Europe, there is too much aid. Figure 6.4 provides an illustration of the total amount of aid between 1976 and 2003 for the three largest recipients of US aid in the region: Israel, Egypt, and Turkey. It also includes a graphical representation of the fourth largest recipient in the region, Jordan, whose aid, until recently, lags behind its neighbors. In essence, they all are potential outliers. Models of both economic and military aid for the region were investigated and the results are provided in Table 6.1. When considering the region as a whole, including Turkey, only economic aid is statistically significant at the p<.10 level if a one-tailed test is assumed. However, after Israel and Egypt are removed from the sample, economic aid does reach a p<.05 level of statistically significance. The variable for military aid is never statistically significant. Further, most the other variables that are significant in models of the determinants of security rights fail to perform, including democracy. The one constant variable that does achieve a level of statistical significance is economic standing or level of wealth. Thus continuing efforts at economic development in the region seems to be a policy that the United States, as well as the international community, should promote within the region.

Figure 6.4  Total US foreign assistance: Select countries in the Middle East/ North Africa
While Turkey is not a major producer or distributor of oil, they are a major conduit of it. The end of the Soviet Union meant that “virtually overnight, eight new independent states come into existence in an area rich with natural resources” (Morningstar 2006, 1) making Eurasia important to both the United States and Western oil companies. Both were interested in accessing oil reserves in the Caspian Sea; the United States for geopolitical reasons and Western companies for obvious economic ones. Hoping for stability politically and economically, the United States views the natural resources as a source of economic stability for the region, but also a means of alternative sources of oil and gas for the West. As a landlocked body of water, oil from the Caspian Sea must be delivered to the Mediterranean via pipelines that run through Turkey as well as some of the former Soviet republics in Eurasia. While several pipelines were already in existence, the United States supported the fact that the proposed Baku-Tbilisi-Seyhan (BTC) pipeline avoided going through both Russia and Iran.

Beyond oil, US interest in the region is dominated by the US-Russian relationship. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has been concerned with the transition to democracy and capitalism in Russia, which has often been bumpy. Security concerns also highlight the US-Russia relationship, with saber-rattling occurring over defensive weapons systems in particular.\(^{10}\) As Russia continues to attempt to regain its influential place in the world (and position as a great power), tensions will undoubtedly continue to arise. In addition to relations with Russia, the United States has also been concerned with the countries collectively referred to as the republics of the former Soviet Union. For example, the United States was an integral player in the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine while more recent concerns include the democratization efforts in the region. As outlined in Chapter 3, several specific foreign assistance programs target the region. As such, since their independence, countries in the region have seen increasing levels of foreign assistance. However, Russia is the leading recipient with approximately half of the $16.7 billion in economic aid allocated up until 2004. In fact, since the end of the Cold War, the mean value of aid to Russia (533 million) almost equals that of Turkey (551 million) for the same time period. Figure 6.5 provides a graphical representation of aid to Russia, the Ukraine, and Turkey since the end of the Cold War to illustrate the level of US interest in Russia as well as Turkey. The entire region only received $371.9 million in military assistance. In comparison to most countries of Eurasia, Turkey’s level of foreign assistance is quite high.

When we consider Turkey as part of Eurasia in an empirical model, we encounter several data availability issues, since many of these countries have only received aid for a short number of years. The level of security rights within the region is 3.39, well above the mean value of Turkey. None of the models for the region revealed any statistically significant relationship between US foreign assistance and security rights, however, the sign of the coefficients indicate a potential negative relationship (see

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\(^{10}\) The United States announced its intention to abrogated the ABM Treaty in December 2001 (and set a six month timetable for withdrawal) because the treaty was hindering US efforts to create a missile defense system. In 2007–2008, tensions developed over US plans to place defensive systems in Central Europe.
Strategic US Foreign Assistance

Thus, we are at a crossroads in the empirical analysis. Given the results of the regional models, as well as the models presented in Chapter 4, we conclude that in the aggregate, US foreign assistance generally has a negative influence on security rights. To continue this analysis, we now turn to a qualitative discussion of the US-Turkey relationship and its connection to human rights in Turkey.

US-Turkey Relations

From the inception of the Cold War to the War in Iraq, the amount of economic and military aid to Turkey has fluctuated. Figure 6.6 highlights the historical dollar amount of economic and military aid to Turkey since the end of World War II. The unique geopolitical position of Turkey was its main asset to the United States during the Cold War. While Soviet claims to parts of Turkey following World War II naturally upset the Turks, it had a chilling effect on the Americans. The United States feared Soviet control of the Middle East, and its most valuable resource, oil. As discussed in Chapter 2, this led to economic and military assistance through the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, as well as Turkish membership in

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11 In the models for Eurasia, several variables drop out of the models (military regime and British influence), while others fail to achieve any statistical significance. The presence of a civil war, as is expected, remains a significant factor in the lack of security rights.

Distrust, however, grew between the two allies in the 1960s and 1970s. This was caused primarily by three things. First, the US decision to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey following the Cuban Missile Crisis was viewed as a lack of US commitment to Turkish security. Second, in 1964, President Lyndon Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Inonu warning Turkey not to use US weapons in Cyprus and informing him that if their involvement in Cyprus prompted Soviet intervention, the United States would not support Turkey. This was viewed as humiliating by Inonu, and again demonstrated a lack of commitment to Turkish security. Lastly, and most dramatically, the United States imposed an arms embargo against Turkey for sending troops to Cyprus in 1974 (Kirisci 1998). Following the US embargo, Turkey established closer ties with the Soviet Union, however this ended when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. In March 1980, Turkey and the US signed a Defense and Economic Cooperation agreement (DECA), which enhanced economic and defense cooperation. This new phase of the Cold War, however, “did not generate a strategic relationship as close as it used to be in the first phase” (Guney 2005, 343).

The next phase of US-Turkey relations came with the end of the Cold War. This obviously caused a change in US priorities, and in the early 1990s, Congress ended the grant military aid program for Turkey (as well as Greece), converting the grants

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12 It was from this action that Turkey captured one-third of the island of Cyprus.
to low interest loans. Congress also lowered the overall military aid levels by ten percent. The United States no longer shared a military purpose with Turkey, and thus members of Congress perceived no further need for the same level of assistance. This new conception of the international environment was challenged, however, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Turkey once again demonstrated its importance to US security interests by joining the international coalition and opening a second front from the north (Guney, 2005). Turkey and the United States also shared additional common interests in the post-Cold War world: the expansion of NATO, Turkish accession to the European Union, concerns over WMD proliferation, oil pipeline routes from the Caspian Sea, the emergence of democratic, secular pro-Western regimes in the post-Soviet republics, and regional economic development (Kirisci 1998). By 1999, the US-Turkish relationship had a new title: “strategic partnership.” According to Robert Pearson, the US Ambassador to Turkey, there is “a new strategic space between Central Europe and Central Asia and down into the Middle East. In this space, the country with the best combination of land area, youthful population, democratic experience, economic potential and military security is Turkey. The US stands ready to support Turkey in this great endeavor” (Guney 2005, 347).

The current phase of the US-Turkey relationship took shape after 11 September 2001. Turkey views itself as a sympathizer in the war on terror because through 2007, Turkey contends to have lost 40,000 of his citizens to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and other terrorist groups. While Turkey contributed forces to the war in Afghanistan, the 2003 war in Iraq demonstrated significant rifts in the US-Turkish alliance. The United States wanted to use Turkey to open up a northern front against Iraq, but in a stunning move, the Turkish Parliament rejected a motion on 1 March 2003 that would have allowed foreign troops to be deployed in Turkey. Although later that same month, the Turkish Parliament voted to allow the United States to use Turkish airspace to cross into Iraq, the damage had been done. This demonstrated that the United States and Turkey no longer shared a common threat perception (that was communism and the Soviet Union during the Cold War), and as a consequence the strategic relationship was different. Paul Wolfowitz explained in 2004, “Our strategic partnership has changed...In the past, this relationship was based on a military basis. Only military relations used to be discussed. This era is now closed. Military relations, of course, do exist but the new strategic partnership is not based on a military field but rather on democracy and politics” (Guney 2005, 354). Thus, in the post-Cold War world, the United States should be demonstrating a heightened concern for democracy and human rights in allocating foreign aid to Turkey. But, what does the record show?

Human Rights in Turkey

Just as the chapter on Latin America, we focus on the level of security rights in Turkey. The mean value for security rights in Turkey is 2.25 out of a possible 5 as measured by the Political Terror Scale. Comparatively, the members of the European

13 For more on Turkey, the US and the war in Iraq, see Park (2003).
Union average 4.6 on the security rights scale. Along with Turkey, four other countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, and Romania) are vying for membership in the EU, however, their human rights records are approximately one point better on the scale. The mean value of security rights in the Middle East is 2.98, while in Eurasia it is 3.4. Thus, comparatively speaking, the level of security rights in Turkey is below the mean in all three regions.

As Figure 6.7 indicates, human rights in Turkey have been poor in the post-Cold War period (as well as during the Cold War). It has fluctuated, however, with extreme lows in the early to mid-1990s and some evidence to suggest improvement in the twenty-first century. Its human rights policies are based in large part on the fact that Turkey suffers from “a bloody identity crisis, which has simmered since the earliest days of the republic” (Marks 1992, 73). The southeastern part of Turkey has been embroiled in a seemingly endless conflict between the Turks and the Kurds. The conflict primarily manifests itself in the battle between Turkish security forces and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). The goal of the PKK is the establishment of an independent Kurdish state.

Figure 6.7  Security rights in Turkey

14 The PTS scores for Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia and Romania are 3.32, 3.25, 3.83, and 3.17 respectively.

15 This discussion of the relationship between the Turkish government and the PKK in many ways parallels the discussion in Chapter 5 of the battle in Colombia between the government and the armed rebel groups and paramilitaries (especially FARC). The core of the most egregious human rights abuses (torture, unlawful detention, and extrajudicial killings) in both Colombia
in parts of Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and the PKK argues that it is fighting against the attempted destruction of the Kurdish identity. The PKK has been implicated or taken responsibility for tactics that include: riots, kidnappings, bombings, suicide attacks, assassinations, and armed attacks. The United States, Turkey, and the European Union (among others) have all designated the PKK as a terrorist organization.

The PKK emerged in the 1970s, and the battle between this paramilitary organization and the Turkish government has effectively turned southeastern Turkey into a war zone in which human rights are routinely violated by both sides. The PKK began armed conflict against the government of Turkey in 1984, and since then nearly 40,000 people have been killed (Reuters 2007). During the 1980s and 1990s, Turkish security forces displaced Kurdish rural communities in an attempt to combat the PKK, which draws “its membership and logistical support from the local peasant populations.” According to Human Rights Watch (2005b),

Evacuations were unlawful and violent. Security forces would surround a village using helicopters, armored vehicles, troops, and village guards, and burn stored produce, agricultural equipment, crops, orchards, forests, and livestock. They set fire to houses, often giving the inhabitants no opportunity to retrieve their possessions. During the course of such operations, security forces frequently abused and humiliated villagers, stole their property and cash, and ill-treated or tortured them before herding them onto roads and away from their former homes. The operations were marked by scores of “disappearances” and extrajudicial executions.

By the mid-1990s, it was reported that 3,000 villages had been destroyed and 378,335 Kurdish peasants had been displaced and were homeless (Human Rights Watch 2005a).

A survey of the post-Cold War years (1989–2006) reveals that the Turkish government has routinely violated the rights of its citizens, with no demonstrative response from the United States. To highlight the fluctuation seen in Figure 5, this analysis will be broken into three sections or time periods: 1989–1991, 1992–1994, and 1995–2006. According to Human Rights Watch and the US Department of State, gross violations of human rights occurred in Turkey from 1989–1991. As demonstrated in Figure 5, Turkey scored a “2” on the political terror scale during this period. As would be expected in a state receiving such a score on the political terror scale, violations during these years included torture (arguably the most prevalent abuse), illegal detention of suspects, deaths at the hands of security forces, abridgement of the freedoms of speech, press, and political expression, and the continued abuse of the Kurdish population (See Chapter 3 for a complete explanation of the political terror scale). Although recognized and Turkey stems from their need to combat groups considered to be terrorist organizations. This, of course, does not excuse the violations, but provides a basis for comparison.

16 The PKK is also known as Kongra-Gel and the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress.

17 According to the 2007 Human Rights Watch Report on Turkey, the estimated 378,335 internally displaced persons continue to face serious challenges due to the failure of the Turkish government to rebuild the infrastructure of villages destroyed by the army. Thus, many villages continue to lack electricity, schools, and telephone access.
by the US government, none of these actions prompted a response under Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act. In fact, as Human Rights Watch highlights in its 1989 report, the Bush Administration neither “made significant efforts to persuade the Turkish government to improve its human rights record” nor requested a waiver under “extraordinary circumstances.” One can argue that during this period, Turkey still maintained military strategic value to the United States (as discussed above). The Bush Administration (and Bush himself) was extremely reluctant to recognize the changes in the Soviet Union (and the freedom of the satellite nations) as a legitimate alteration of the strategic environment (Matthews 2002), thus national security clearly took precedent over human rights (or improving the human condition).

The second period, from 1992 to 1994, brought extreme abuses of human rights in Turkey. In both 1992 and 1994, Turkey scored a “1” on the political terror scale, while in 1993 security rights were measured as a “2.” As discussed in Chapter 3, classifying a state as a “1” on the political terror scale indicates that murders, disappearances, torture, incarceration of political opponents, and arbitrary and capricious punishment are extended to the entire population (not just those who involve themselves in politics as would be the case with a “2” classification). A “1” indicates the most abusive type or record, where leaders operate without limits in the pursuit of their personal or ideological goals. As a frame of reference, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia would be characterized on this level.

Turkey received this designation as the ethnic crisis in southeastern Turkey exploded in 1992, at the same time bloody ethnic conflicts were tearing the Balkans apart and causing turmoil in some former Soviet republics, and again in 1994. Thus, during the period from 1992–1994, human rights conditions deteriorated to new lows. Although a new government took office in late 1991 and made promises of improving the human rights situation (including ending torture, enacting legal reforms, drafting a new constitution, respecting freedom of press), none of these promises were kept. The PKK significantly intensified its guerilla campaign from 1992–1994, and the Turkish military responded in kind. Both sides targeted many unarmed civilians, and the military killed suspects in their homes, “thus acting as investigator, judge, jury and executioner” (Human Rights Watch 1994). The military destroyed homes and bombed entire villages, and civilians were killed in death squad fashion. Further, Turkish police killed peaceful demonstrators, systematic torture continued, Kurdish villagers were forced from their homes, suspicious deaths increased, and violations of freedom of press, speech, and political expression continued (Human Rights Watch 1992, 1993, 1994). In 1994, the battle between the PKK and the Turkish government reached new heights. Of the estimated 13,000 civilian and soldier deaths from 1984–1994, half occurred in the latter two years. Both sides continued to violate basic human rights, with the PKK targeting supporters of the government and the government targeting those believed to be collaborating with the PKK (Human Rights Watch 1994).

18 Human Rights Watch did recognize that the government made some positive reforms: closing the Eskisehir Prison, some improvements in freedom of speech and press, and parents were allowed to choose Kurdish names for their children.

19 In this chapter, all citations for Human Rights Watch refer to the annual report on Turkey, unless otherwise noted.

As mentioned previously, a change in Congressional attitudes resulted in Turkey receiving military assistance in the form of $450 million in grants (not loans) in 1993, as well as $3 million in military grants and $125 million in economic grants. The State Department, under the new Clinton Administration, developed a new strategy for improving human rights in Turkey, specifically focusing on torture, extrajudicial killings, and freedom of expression. The Clinton Administration offered to reward Turkey for improvement of its human rights record, but did not threaten to punish them for failure to do so (Human Rights Watch 1993). In 1994, the situation changed, at least minimally. The Clinton Administration raised human rights issues with the government of Turkey on a regular basis, but continued to avoid directly linking aid to human rights. Congress took the action instead. In 1994, Turkey received $405 million in military loans and $120 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF). In the 1995 budget, the Clinton Administration proposed giving Turkey $450 million in military credits, but Congress reduced this amount to $364.5 and then withheld 10 percent (this was done pending an investigation into Turkey’s human rights practices). Thus, the US government began taking some steps to coerce Turkey into improving its human rights record, but aid was still granted.

The third period, 1995 to 2006, is characterized by relative improvement but continuing human rights abuses. The human rights situation in Turkey showed signs of improvement in 1995 when the designation on political terror scale increased to “2,” and in 1997 and again in 2002–2005 Turkey earned a “3.” However, it is important to keep in mind that while there are signs of improvement, this should not be confused with an argument that Turkey’s human rights record is good (see Figure 6.7). Despite incentives for improvement (discussed below), serious problems remain. According to Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the US Department of State, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture all continued as serious problems in Turkey throughout the period. In 1995 alone, 4,000 civilians and soldiers were killed in the southeastern provinces (Amnesty International, 20 The last available data from the political terror scale is 2005, but other evidence will be used to demonstrate the continued human rights abuses through 2006 later in this chapter.

21 As discussed in Chapter 3, a “3” on the political terror scale means that political imprisonment or a recent history of such exists; executions, political murders, and brutality may be common; unlimited detention for political views is accepted and imprisonment may be supplemented by involuntary use of drugs or incarceration in mental hospitals.
In 1996, the State Department reported deterioration in some aspects of human rights, concluding that “the Government was unable to sustain improvements made in 1995 and, as a result, its record was uneven in 1996.” Of particular concern in 1996, internally displaced persons from the southeast continued to grow, with a “reliable estimate” put at 560,000 (US Department of State 1996).

Signs of improvement came in 1997, however, as large-scale forcible evacuations ceased, and the overall number of reports of torture began to decline. Measurable progress should have been expected in 1999–2000 when the PKK abandoned armed conflict in Turkey (the PKK declared a cease-fire in 1999), effectively bringing the fighting to an end (although some units of the PKK did continue violent attacks). This, however, did not transpire, as torture, extrajudicial killings, and persecution for free expression all continued. As seen in Figure 6.7, Turkey’s rating on the political terror scale in 1999 through 2001 remained a “2.” In 2000, however, there were no reports of disappearances and there were much fewer cases of attacks on civilians (Human Rights Watch 1995–2005; Amnesty International 1998–2005; US State Department Country Reports 1996–2004). In 2002, Turkey’s rating improved to a “3,” where it remained through 2005. During this period, numerous laws were passed to improve the accountability of government forces, to reduce restrictions on the exercise of free speech, and to overhaul the criminal code. According to the State Department, although the changes have produced some positive results, “the government struggled to achieve full implementation of new laws” in 2006. Impunity remained a problem, torture continued to occur, due process was denied, freedom of expression was limited, non-Muslim religious groups continued to face restrictions, and women continued to be the victims of violence and human trafficking (US State Department Country Report, Turkey 2006). According to Human Rights Watch, “during 2006 the European Court of Human Rights issued approximately 200 judgments against Turkey for torture, unfair trial, violations of free expression, extrajudicial execution, and other violations” (Human Rights Watch 2007).

An increase in fighting in 2006 in the eastern and southeastern provinces between security forces and the PKK resulted in a further deterioration in human rights (the PKK ended its five year cease-fire in 2004 partially due to the Turkish government’s refusal to negotiate) (Amnesty International 2007). As a result of a visit to southeast Turkey in 2006, a UN human rights monitor concluded that “certain counter-terrorism measures taken by the State may have consequences that are incompatible with human rights,” and he expressed concern over the broad definition of terrorism in Turkey’s anti-terror act (Human Rights Watch 2007).

22 In this chapter, all citations for Amnesty International refer to the annual report on Turkey.

23 In this chapter, all citations for US Department of State refer to the annual country report on Turkey.

24 There have been a series of short-lived unilateral cease-fires called by the PKK since 2004.
The Turkish Parliament revised the Law to Fight Terrorism in June 2006, increasing the number and widening the scope of crimes punishable as terrorist acts. Any demonstration of support for the PKK throughout Turkey brings a harsh response. For example, 56 mayors from the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) were being prosecuted for “knowingly and willingly supporting the PKK” by signing a letter to the Danish Prime Minister requesting that a Denmark-based Kurdish television channel not be shut down, and other officials of the DTP “and those joining pro-Kurdish platforms faced frequent prosecutions amounting to a pattern of judicial harassment” (Amnesty International 2007).

As a consequence of the “strategic partnership” developed between the United States and Turkey (explained above) during this period (1995–2005), US behavior in the form of the pattern of economic and military assistance fluctuated dramatically (See Figures 6.6). For the remainder of the first term and throughout the second, the Clinton Administration continued to raise human rights concerns. However, they continued to use carrots instead of sticks in persuading the Turkish government to improve their human rights record. In addition, during certain periods, human rights concerns were raised less than concerns over the strategic relationship between the two states. In 1996, for example, the Clinton Administration backed away from pressuring Turkey on human rights for several reasons, including Kurdish fighting in Northern Iraq and the US desire to continue Operation Provide Comfort (that operated from bases in Turkey) (Human Rights Watch 1995–2002; US Department of State 1996–2000; Amnesty International 1995–2000). Ultimately, however, by the end of the twentieth century, the United States was providing Turkey with minimal economic and military aid, which exemplifies the new US conception of security in the decade following the end of the Cold War. As explained previously, the United States no longer needed Turkey as a military partner to fight the spread of communism and as a consequence the assistance sent to Turkey diminished. The situation, however, was about to change dramatically.

The terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, and the subsequent war on terror changed the situation and reestablished Turkey’s strategic importance to the United States. Turkey acted as a critical ally and took the lead of international peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan. As previously mentioned, however, relations became strained in 2003 over the failure of the Turkish parliament to allow US troops to use Turkey to invade northern Iraq. Fly-over rights solved this dilemma, and the US continues to consider Turkey an important ally and provide it with aid designed to promote democracy. For example, in the fiscal year 2005–2006 budget, the State Department included nearly $4 million for promoting democracy in the Muslim world, through promoting pluralism, human rights, and the rule of law in Iran, North Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Turkey (Boston Globe, 16 February 2006). As Figure 6.6 demonstrates, US economic aid to Turkey increased dramatically after the 11 September attacks. Turkey was receiving roughly $2 million in 2001, while in 2002 its economic aid allocation rose to $204 million and in 2003 Turkey received over $1 billion (historical dollars). This aid was distributed through

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25 The UN monitor was Martin Scheinin, the UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.
the Economic Support Fund (ESF), and as discussed in Chapter 3, money under ESF is not designated for any specific economic development program, but often done as a cash transfer, thus allowing it to be used for military purposes.26

The Big Carrot: Accession to the European Union

As discussed above, there have been some noticeable improvements in the human rights situation in Turkey beginning in the mid- to late-1990s. Any improvement in the human rights situation in Turkey in recent years is attributable to Turkey’s desire to become a member of the European Union, not as a response to US financial assistance. As the above discussion shows, the United States did not, and does not, in practice, link US foreign aid to human rights in Turkey, whereas the European Union clearly and unambiguously links accession to membership to human rights. In fact, “Turkey’s bid for EU membership…had frequently been described as an important ‘crossroads’ for Turkey, marking a seminal point in her history and tying her future firmly to Europe” (Yildiz 2005). Beginning in 1995, the European Union became an important element in Turkey’s view of human rights. In March, Turkey signed a “customs union agreement” (intended to reduce trade barriers and tariffs), but the European Parliament delayed ratification of that agreement until December citing concerns over Turkey’s human rights abuses. Shortly after ratification, the parliament called for periodic reports on the human rights conditions in Turkey before releasing millions of dollars in adjustment funds. In 1999, the European Union Commission commented on the continuing violations of human rights in its first regular report on Turkey’s progress towards accession. In December 1999, Turkey was recognized as an EU candidate, but acceptance into the European Union was conditioned on significant human rights reforms, economic development, and further democratization.

Despite the huge incentive of EU membership, no substantive improvement was made in 2000 towards the goals outlined by the EU. The following year, however, brought a national program of steps to be instituted in order to meet the requirements put forth by the EU. These steps included a review of the 1982 Constitution, the lifting of some human rights restrictions, and the establishment of governmental human rights bodies. Despite these reforms, there was no major improvement in Turkey’s human rights record in 2001. In fact, while “the government’s National Program for Accession to the European Union should have marked a turning point for human rights, [it] consisted mainly of vague and general undertakings that were clearly designed to delay or avoid significant change” (Human Rights Watch 2001). The European parliament concluded that despite the reform program, the human rights “situation on the ground has hardly improved.” The same year, in response to the Committee for the Prevention of Torture report declaring parts of the Turkish prison system as “not acceptable,” prison reform was made a priority area for meeting the criteria of accession (Human Rights Watch 2001–2002; Amnesty International 2001–2002).

26 Military aid to Turkey did not correspondingly increase after the 11 September attacks, as shown in Figure 6.6. As mentioned, this is due to the fact that the economic aid to Turkey was distributed as ESF funds.
Throughout 2002, Turkey passed a series of reforms intended to assist in meeting the requirements of EU accession. These reforms applied to certain aspects of free speech and religion, detention, access to legal counsel, and human trafficking, as well as abolishing the death penalty in peacetime. Human Rights Watch concluded in 2002, “At last European Union pressure for Turkey to meet its political and human rights criteria for membership began to produce substantial results...[as] the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU remained the most important catalyst for reform.” Despite this progress, the October 2002 progress report highlighted the fact that Turkey still needed dramatic improvement in protecting freedom of expression, combating torture, and curbing the influence of the military. In 2003, additional legislative reform resulted in the complete abolition of incommunicado detention, improvements in freedom of expression, the undermining of impunity for torture and ill-treatment, and the legalization of broadcasting and education in minority languages. Despite these reforms, police abuses and torture were still a concern, and the plight of the internally displaced continued to be a critical problem (Human Rights Watch 2002–2005; Amnesty International 2002–2005).

There is significant hope that the “carrot” of EU membership means genuine reform in Turkey. Problems remain, however. In its 2003 report, Human Rights Watch summed up the situation:

...[The] accession process has acted as an incentive to reform. Set against this is a profound institutional resistance to transparency and democratic norms among civil service, judiciary, and security forces that is acting as a counterforce to change. After a long period of delay, in which cosmetic reforms were offered as a substitute for genuine change, the reform process began to gain traction in [2003]...In November 2003 the EU’s annual Regular Report acknowledged progress but signaled that there is considerable work still to do.

In 2004, the Turkish government continued to enact reforms designed to bring it into compliance with accession requirements. International law was given priority over domestic law, the death penalty was completely abolished, and three laws were passed to assist the internally displaced. The slow and uneven progress on human rights was threatened however by the resumption of violence in southeastern Turkey that continues into 2008. The PKK announced in June 2004 that it was ending its unilateral ceasefire, and it resumed its attacks resulting in security operations in the area. In addition, torture, impunity, and mystery killings continued to be of significant concern. Although Turkey has shown a continual improvement, “reform has taken one step back for every two steps forward as police, governors, prosecutors, and government institutions tend to interpret legislation as restrictively as possible” (Human Rights Watch 2005). As recognition of the improvements made, the European Council began accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 (Human Rights Watch 2005; Amnesty International 2005). In late 2006, however, the EU suspended talks with Turkey in eight out of 35 policy areas (or chapters). Two issues continue to plague the negotiations: Turkey’s refusal to open its ports and airports to traffic from Cyprus (Turkey wants the EU to end its isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, but Cyprus is an EU member and will not agree to this demand) and the continued failure of Turkish law to meet European standards (encompassing...
the issue of human rights in Turkey). The accession process is expected to take at least a decade (although some estimates now are fifteen to twenty years), and during that time the EU will continue to monitor and consider Turkey’s protection of human rights.

The Future of US-Turkey Relations

Despite the change in the strategic environment after the 11 September attacks and the revised US perception of the role of Turkey in the war on terror, problems continue to punctuate the US-Turkey relationship. We previously mentioned the row over the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, but other issues have also strained relations between the two allies. In October 2007, the US House Foreign Relations Committee voted to condemn as genocide the killing of 1.5 million Armenians in Turkey that began during World War I. Turkey denies that the killings were genocide, but does admit that hundreds of thousands of Armenians died as a result of war. The issue is a sensitive subject in Turkey, and, in fact, identifying the killing as genocide is a crime in Turkey because it is considered an insult against Turkish identity. In response to the House committee vote, Turkey recalled its ambassador from Washington, threatened to withdraw its support from the Iraq War, and President Abdullah Gul warned that this course of action could be detrimental to the United States. Many members of the US Congress would like to see the resolution brought to the House floor for a vote, but other members, as well as the White House and Department of State strongly oppose the resolution. At the end of 2007, the resolution was delayed in the House and no date had been set for its consideration. This issue, however, has been a bone of contention before and will undoubtedly be so again.

Complicating matters further, the situation in Northern Iraq along the Turkish border heightened tensions in 2007 and 2008. By mid-2007, it was estimated that as many as 3,500 PKK rebels were based in Iraq and launching attacks across the border against Turkish soldiers. On 7 October, PKK rebels killed thirteen Turkish soldiers in an ambush near the border, and Turkey responded by shelling areas near the border. On 17 October, the Turkish Parliament approved possible military raids into northern Iraq which caused significant concern and a flurry of diplomatic activity in the United States. The PKK killed twelve Turkish soldiers on 21 October (and captured eight others), and the following day protesters in Istanbul criticized the government for failing to take military action. Shortly thereafter, Turkey began raids into Iraq, and on 16 December, Turkish jets bombed PKK targets (for what is believed to be the first time) inside northern Iraq. Coupled with additional air raids on 24 December, this marked the first large-scale assault by Turkey on northern Iraq. The first large-scale land assault came on 21 February 2008 when Turkey launched an offensive into Northern Iraq to prevent the area from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. Turkey claims to be targeting only PKK rebels and installations, and casualty figures are unclear, but what is undeniable is that this marks a significant escalation in activities and tension. Ankara has massed up to 100,000 troops with artillery and warplanes near the border, and US and Iraqi officials are trying to prevent a major military invasion.
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, during meetings in Ankara with Turkish officials in November 2007, reiterated that the United States considers the PKK a terrorist organization and views the group as a “common enemy” of Turkey and the United States. Despite its commitment to helping to protect Turkey from terrorist attacks, the US government does not want Turkey conducting military operations in northern Iraq. With the ongoing US and Iraqi operations to combat rebels and insurgents in Iraq, the northern, Kurdish-controlled region is the most stable part of the country, and any action that might destabilize the area is obviously undesired. The Iraqi government also does not want Turkey invading its territory and while officials have attempted to ensure the Turks that they are determined to halt the activities of the terrorists within their borders, they have laid the ultimate responsibility of stopping any such invasion on the doorstep of the United States. Diplomacy, however, appears to be the only steps the United States is willing to take into 2008 to prevent further Turkish action. Turkey’s role as an ally in the war on terror, and the fact that its conflict in northern Iraq is based on its attempts to root out an organization considered by the Western world to be a terrorist group, decrease the options available to the United States in curbing its activities. It remains to be seen how this situation will ultimately be handled, but given the pattern of US aid to Turkey, it seems highly unlikely that a reduction is on the horizon.

Conclusion

It seems clear that US foreign assistance to Turkey has done little to improve human rights conditions. While identifying the comparative sample for Turkey (in other words, determining to which region Turkey belongs) complicates the quantitative analysis, it is clear that Turkey has received a large amount of aid from the United States and that their human rights conditions are poor. The United States has done little to entice or demand an improvement in these conditions as a requirement for continuing aid. Any measurable improvement can be attributed to their efforts to satisfy the accession criteria imposed by the European Union. Security concerns, in particular the war on terror, dominate the US-Turkey relationship, and these concerns will trump human rights in every instance. The United States is well aware of the abuse heaped upon the Kurdish population in Turkey, but has yet to make curbing these violations a policy priority, and is not likely to do so in the future. As illustrated by this case study, when trade-offs must be made, security will always triumph. While it is the obligation of every state to protect its citizens and territorial integrity, as discussed in Chapter 1, there must be an ethical consideration in policy choices. US leaders might be wise to ask themselves this question: If accession to the European Union can cause Turkey to modify its human rights policy, why can’t demands from us have the same effect?
Chapter 7

US Foreign Assistance to Pakistan: Friend or Foe?

We have to demonstrate to the Pakistani people that we care about their needs, progress and interests…I believe…that we should be tripling our non-military assistance. We should sustain that commitment for a 10-year period. We should be focused on helping you build schools and roads and health care centers and dealing with the infrastructure of the entire country….The single most important thing is for Pakistan parties to get their house in order (Senator Joseph Biden, proposing a massive increase in non-military aid to Pakistan, 19 February 2008).

On 27 December 2007, Benazir Bhutto, the former prime minister of Pakistan was assassinated after leaving a campaign rally in the city of Rawalpindi. Immediate condemnation of the attack was forthcoming from all fronts, including President George W. Bush who decried that the “United States strongly condemns this cowardly act by murderous extremists who are trying to undermine Pakistan’s democracy” (Branigin and Gardner 2007, 1). Other US political leaders weighed in on the relationship between the United States and the allocation of military aid to Pakistan in particular. Candidates on the campaign trail for the 2008 US presidential election offered their condolences as well as a critique of current US policy vis-à-vis Pakistan. Bill Richardson, for example, urged that “President Bush should press Musharraf to step aside, and a broad-based coalition government, consisting of all the democratic parties, should be formed immediately…Until this happens, we should suspend military aid to the Pakistani government. Free and fair elections must also be held as soon as possible” (Alarkson 2007). Similarly, Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ) remarked that,

I hoped that the Bush Administration would have undertaken a better accounting of the billions of dollars sent to Pakistan in military and social aid…The administration has yet to adequately report if those funds have produced the desired results, or even if they have been kept out of enemy hands, but evidence on the ground suggests that Pakistan has become less stable since 9/11…At this crucial time, the administration must undertake the kind of diplomatic surge necessary to ensure that democracy in Pakistan does not die, and it must insist on full accountability of military and development assistance to Pakistan, which up to this point has been absent (Emanuel et al. 2007).

Beyond the political arena, academics offered their assessment of US relations with Pakistan. Frederick Kagan criticized the continuance of US aid to Pakistan suggesting that the army in Pakistan does little to curb terrorist activity in order to continue the flow of US aid, “I think that we have created a perverse incentive for the Pakistani
military. As long as there continues to be a terrorist threat in Pakistan [the military believes that US aid will continue]” (Khanna 2008). Hussain Haqqani, professor of international relations at Boston University, agrees and questions the efficacy of US foreign aid considering the number of terrorist-related deaths in recent years in Pakistan. He ultimately suggests that the United States should leverage more forcefully the aid sent to Pakistan in exchange for a stronger civilian government and civil society (Khanna 2008).

Thus, the US relationship with Pakistan exemplifies the tension between the promotion of human rights and national security concerns. The major concern for the United States prior to 11 September 2001, vis-à-vis Pakistan, as well as India, was connected to their nuclear aspirations as well as the volatile relationship between the two. In fact, foreign assistance was suspended, albeit temporarily, due to their respective nuclear activity. Here, however, we are concerned with the relationship between US national security interests and human rights, particularly when foreign assistance is at play. As the comments from politicians and academics above illustrate, the rhetoric between foreign aid and human rights is just as relevant in this region as we saw in the case of US foreign assistance to Colombia and Turkey in previous chapters. Thus, we continue to examine the juxtaposition of these two motivations of foreign assistance. After a brief discussion of the strategic location and US interest in the region as a whole, we provide an overview of the level of aid and a portrait of the human rights landscape in the region. We then turn our focus to the specific relationship between the United States and Pakistan as well as the role India plays in this relationship. We consider the events from the Cold War to the current war on terror and highlight the fluctuating levels of foreign assistance. At the same time, we focus on the human rights consequences of the distribution of US foreign assistance to Pakistan and to a lesser extent India.

**US Interests in the Region**

The assassination of Bhutto is, unfortunately, another episode of violence in the tumultuous history of Pakistan since its independence in 1947. It is one of the world’s most populous states and is geographically located in what is considered a very dangerous neighborhood. Southwest of Pakistan is Iran, currently embroiled with the United States and the rest of the international community in terms of its nuclear ambitions. Pakistan’s northwest border buttresses Afghanistan, a primary target in the war on terror. To the northwest of Pakistan there is the Kashmir region and the border with China. And on its eastern border lays India, Pakistan’s traditional rival and a country it is gone to war with numerous times since their collective independence. Just as Turkey was geopolitically important to the United States, so is Pakistan. This is evidenced by the level of US foreign assistance it has received since its independence, not to mention the drastic amount of increase since 11 September as Pakistan has found itself at the center of the war on terror. Figure 7.1 illustrates the total amount of US foreign assistance, in historical dollars, that has been allocated to both Pakistan and India since 1950. As for India, the United States has interest in supporting one of the few democracies in the region and subsequently infused
the state with very high levels of aid during its first two decades of independence. However, India’s continued allegiance and then leadership of the non-alignment movement in the 1970s led to a drastic reduction in US foreign assistance and the disbursement has leveled off since. Both of the countries were recipients of all this aid in spite of poor human rights records. Over the course of the years in the sample, the mean value of security rights for Pakistan is 2.39 while India’s is even lower, averaging 2.14 on the PTS. US interests in the region are paramount and once again we see a disconnect between human rights conditions and US foreign assistance.

Comparatively, the United States has had a greater interest in Asia as a region than Latin America if foreign aid allocation is any indication. Figure 7.2 provides a comparison, by decade, of the total level of economic and military assistance allocated to Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia, respectively. As we demonstrated in the case study on Latin America, that region receives far more economic aid than military aid, which we found to be a blessing considering the much larger effect of military aid on security rights. In the Middle East massive amounts of foreign aid (both economic and military) were pumped into the region beginning in the 1970s due to the Middle East Peace Process. As for Asia, it has seen a relatively steady amount of economic aid since the 1940s, indicative of the effort to stave off communism by attempting to address issues of poverty and economic well-being. The amount of military aid in the 1960s and 1970s is a function, of course, of the Vietnam War. The level of military aid has diminished greatly since that time. However, economic aid has been on the increase since the turn of the twenty-first century, primarily as a
reaction to the terrorist attacks of 11 September. The primary recipients are Pakistan, India, the Philippines, Indonesia, and to a lesser degree Bangladesh. Since 2001, the mean value of aid to Pakistan is over $615 million, this is over double that of Indonesia ($287 million) and over three times that of the Philippines ($206 million) and India ($189 million).

Similar to the case of Turkey, the location of Pakistan and India is one that bridges several major regions. The United States, in allocating foreign assistance, considers them to be part of Asia, whereas cartographers regularly place Pakistan and India in a sub-region referred to as South Asia. Asia can further be divided into two additional regions: Southeast Asia and the Far East. The immediate interest in the Asian region parallels the interest in Latin America and Turkey after World War II—containment. In fact, the policy of containment, and more specifically staving off the domino effect, was initially applied to the region: first on the Korean peninsula

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1 The following countries make up the Asian region according to the US Overseas Loans and Grants Greenbook: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, China (Hong Kong), China (P.R.C.), China (Taiwan), East Timor, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam.

2 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka make up South Asia.

3 Ten countries comprise the region of Southeast Asia: Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. We collectively refer to the remaining countries as the Far East.
and then in Southeast Asia. The US-led defense of South Korea in 1950 began a commitment to the region that has lasted over 50 years. In terms of US foreign assistance to the countries in the Far East, South Korea and Taiwan were the top recipients along with Japan. However, this assistance drops off for Japan beginning in 1970, Taiwan in 1980, and South Korea by 1987. However, the United States sustains its interest and presence in the region by maintaining several key military installations. In fact, prior to 11 September 2001, the border between North and South Korea was populated by more US military personnel than any other region and was one of the most heavily fortified areas in the world. According to the US State Department (2008), the 37,000 troops currently deployed to the region will be reduced by 12,500 in 2008; however the United States will increase South Korea’s defensive capabilities through the allocation of $11 billion for the purposes of “force enhancements.”

A short five years after the beginning of the Korean War, the United States would begin its 20 year involvement in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, first with aid and advisors and then a ten-year war costing more than just US treasure, but more importantly more than 55,000 American lives. Between 1955 and 1975, the level of foreign assistance, in historical dollars, to Vietnam dwarfs that of India and Pakistan combined as illustrated in Figure 7.3. Today, the focus of US interest lies in the Philippines and Indonesia. The US ascension to an imperial power included occupation of the Philippines, the legacy of which is not that much different than other colonies in the region—underdevelopment and in the case of the Philippines

![Figure 7.3: Total US foreign assistance during the Vietnam War](image-url)
a training ground for terrorist activity. Likewise, Indonesia attracts US attention given the fact that it is the most populous Muslim nation in the world. In addition, the Bali terrorist bombings in 2002 signaled that the region was also an area that was a concern in the war on terror.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought US attention further west on the Asian continent. Pakistan, as a neighbor, was viewed as an integral state that needed support in the face of communist expansionism. Throughout its short-lived independence, Pakistan had already fought several wars with India by the time of the Soviet invasion. Based on historical religious differences in what Stoessinger (2005) calls the “four battles over God,” the two countries went to war in 1947, 1965, and 1971 and experienced a dramatic increase in tension over nuclear weapons in 1998. The first war in 1947 was the result of decolonization and the withdrawal of Britain from the region. Almost immediately, the long-standing hostilities between Hindus and Muslims erupted with the latter calling for an independent state. Millions were displaced as Hindis in Pakistan fled to India and Muslims in India made their way to Pakistan (or what is now Bangladesh). Hostilities were renewed in 1965 over the Kashmir region located in Northern India where the majority identify themselves as Muslim. The war in 1971 was the result of the declaring of independence by Bangladesh, the former East Pakistan that had little in common with their western counterparts except their faith. Their civil war brought India into the conflict as their country became a way-station for millions of refugees. Existing in such a volatile region, both India and Pakistan sought the acquisition of nuclear weapons leading to underground testing in 1998 which would have repercussion in terms of US foreign aid (to be discussed in detail below). While both suffered a decline in foreign aid, Pakistan bared most of the brunt and admonishment of the United States. However, after 11 September 2001, all has been forgiven as Pakistan has once again found favor with the United States given its key geographic location. As Figure 7.1 illustrates, Pakistan has received an overwhelming amount of aid as an ally in the war on terror in spite of its poor human rights record.

What has been the consequence, in terms of human rights, of this significant level of US foreign assistance to the region? Recall from Chapter 3, the mean value of security rights for developing states in the sample is 3.32. The value for all of Asia is 3.04, close to one-third less; however, there are differences within the region: in the Far East the level of security is 3.55, in Southeast Asia it is 3.04 and in South Asia the mean value is the lowest at 2.69. Those living in South Asia experience security rights at almost a full point below compared to those living in the Far East. The bivariate relationship between foreign aid and security rights in Asia mirrors that of the total sample in that there is a statistically significant negative relationship between the two and the coefficients are almost exactly those of the total sample. The coefficient for economic aid (-.33 p<.01) and military aid (-.21 p<.01) are significantly stronger than the sample for developing states as presented in Chapter 3 (where economic

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4 The United States has labeled Abu Sayyaf as a terrorist organization that has as its primary goal the creation of a separate Islamic state in the Philippines. The United States also claims that Abu Sayyaf has connection to the al-Qaeda network.

5 The correlations were calculated utilizing the Spearman’s correlation coefficient.
aid was -.09 and military aid was -.03). These statistically significant relationships dissipated, however, when an analysis of the full model of the determinants of human rights was conducted for the entire Asian region. Furthermore, in a model of Southeast Asian countries, only the model for the relationship between economic aid and security rights maintained a statistically significant coefficient (-.35 p<.05). One of the most interesting findings is that in the analysis for South Asia, the model for economic aid and subsistence rights revealed a positive and statistically significant relationship, providing a small window of hope that perhaps economic aid can be beneficial to basic human needs in some cases. However, it is instructive that several of the other key control variables are not significant, particularly the democracy variable. This result should be considered as an anomaly given the robust findings of all the other models. In addition, the vast amount of aid to both India and Pakistan leads to these two countries presenting as outliers. As is evident here, and what will be demonstrated in more detail below, US interest in Pakistan has ebbed and flowed over the decades. Clearly the impetus for the changes has been security-related issues, not an interest in human rights. We now turn to a more in-depth discussion of relations between the United States and Pakistan and a more detailed description of the human rights situation.

**Human Rights and US Assistance to Pakistan**

What is the nature of the relationship between the United States and Pakistan when it comes to foreign assistance, human rights and national security? While the United States indicates that the issues of human rights and democratization are major areas of concern with regard to Pakistan, the issues of nuclear proliferation, counterterrorism and regional stability take precedence, with little effort by the United States to leverage foreign assistance against human rights concerns (CRS Brief 2002). As Figure 7.4 indicates, human rights conditions in Pakistan have been relatively poor in the post-Cold War period (as well as during the Cold War), never rising above a “3” on the five point scale (as mentioned above, the mean value for security rights in Pakistan is 2.39 out of a possible 5). As mentioned in previous chapters, at this level there is extensive imprisonment and detention for political views and in addition, police brutality and political executions are common. Citizens in Pakistan have consistently lived under a reign of political terror, a situation that is particularly precarious for the political opposition within the state. For the purposes of our analysis, we separate our discussion into three time periods: the Cold War, the post-Cold War, and the post-11 September time periods. Interwoven throughout the discussion will be the role India plays in the US-Pakistan relationship, as we cannot truly understand the issues and motivations surrounding US aid to Pakistan without considering the impact of the conflict between India and Pakistan.

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6 In a similar model of Southeast Asia, economic aid has a negative and statistically significant effect on subsistence rights indicating that US foreign aid might impact regions differently in terms of subsistence.
The Cold War

Both India and Pakistan gained their independence from Britain in 1947, followed quickly by the first war between the two over Kashmir. Pakistan began going “out of its way to present itself to the United States as a loyal, trustworthy, and reliable state that was firmly entrenched within the Western camp” (Sathasivam 2005, 104). Pakistan rejected communism and nonalignment and supported the United States in practically all international issues, with the exception of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. In 1995, Senator Hank Brown (R-Colorado) reflected on US-Pakistani relations and recounted that “[w]hen South Asia gained its independence from Britain in 1947, the countries of the region faced an important choice—alignment with the United States or nonalignment and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Pakistan unabashedly chose the United States” (Brown 1995, 1).

Up until the early 1950s, however, “the United States treated Pakistan with indifference at best, rejected all its pleas for military and economic assistance, refused to support its position vis-à-vis Kashmir,” and actually preferred to deal with India, which had acted with “unfriendliness” towards the United States (Sathasivam 2005, 104). As a consequence, Pakistan took steps to move itself towards the Soviet Union. This did not immediately convince the United States that is should readjust its thinking toward Pakistan (including its refusal to provide Pakistan with aid), as US officials did not believe that Pakistan would truly move into the Soviet camp. India, on the other hand, adopted a policy on nonalignment which meant that the
nation would pursue good relations with both the United States and Soviet Union. While the United States viewed this relationship as necessarily detrimental to the US-India relationship, India viewed any positive relationship between the United States and Pakistan as necessarily detrimental to the US-India relationship. As a consequence, as relations between the United States and Pakistan started to improve in the 1950s, the US-India relationship traveled a bumpy road.\(^7\)

The readjustment in US thinking vis-à-vis Pakistan came as a consequence of the Korean War, the continuation of crises between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and the continuous decrease of support for the West in Pakistan. These conditions caused the Truman Administration to reconsider its position towards Pakistan. In November 1951, for the first time, the United States sold military hardware to Pakistan, and in February 1952, Pakistan was brought into the “Point Four” program\(^8\) that allowed it to receive some “technical assistance.” The major shift in US policy concerning providing aid to Pakistan came when a bloodless coup occurred in April 1953, and the new leadership was viewed quite favorably in the United States.\(^9\) The first aid package to Pakistan was approved in late 1953, and the relationship between the United States and Pakistan became a “marriage of convenience” that resulted in the United States providing Pakistan with large amounts of economic and military aid until the mid-1960s (Sathasivam 2005, 95).

As part of this new relationship, Pakistan was persuaded by the United States to enter a security treaty with Turkey (the TurkoPakistan Pact in 1954), and to sign the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA) with the United States. Both agreements allowed the US to send large amounts of military aid to Pakistan. The United States also persuaded Pakistan to join SEATO (1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955).\(^10\) In the continuing effort to please Washington, Pakistan allowed US base leasings for intelligence and communications facilities, including U-2 reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union. Pakistan, however, demanded in return a bilateral

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7 This outcome is surprising because India would appear to be a natural ally of the United States, as it is a stable democracy. The relationship between the United States and India since 1947 has been turbulent and there have been few periods of true cooperative friendship between the world’s two largest democracies. As demonstrated by Figure 7.1, however, up until the 1970s the United States provided India with a significant amount of foreign aid. Initially, US officials refused to believe that India would side with the Soviet Union and hoped US policies would change Indian officials’ minds. There were numerous events that shaped the US approach to India prior to the 1970s, including India’s support of the communist government in China in 1949, Kennedy’s overwhelmingly positive view of India in the early 1960s, the Chinese invasion of India in 1962, and the Vietnam War.

8 The Point Four Program was announced by Truman in his inaugural address in 1949 and provided economic assistance to poor countries. While in the same vein as the Marshall Plan, it differed from other programs in that it was not confined to a specific region.

9 The new Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Borgia, was exceedingly pro-US, but was mostly a figurehead. The governor-general, Ghulam Mohammed, and the army chief-of-staff, General Mohammed Ayub Khan, held the real power and were also viewed favorably by the Eisenhower Administration.

10 The Baghdad Pact included Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan. When Iraq withdrew, the alliance was reconstituted as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959.
agreement with the United States, the Agreement of Cooperation (1959). In return for these actions, the Pakistani government received over $700 million between 1955 and 1965 in military grant aid and more than $5 billion in economic aid between 1951 and 1982 (CRS Brief 2002).

Although the PTS is not available for the years prior to 1976, the state of human rights in Pakistan were poor during this time as the Pakistani constitution was suspended in 1958 and martial law was declared, a pattern that would be repeated in the coming decades. A military dictatorship assumed the mantel of power under General Mohammed Ayub Khan. The overthrow of the government had no real impact on the allocation and distribution of foreign assistance as the emphasis on human rights as a condition of foreign aid was still years away. These were still the formative years of the Cold War and it was deemed important and necessary to keep Pakistan firmly entrenched in the allied camp.

This “marriage of convenience” hit its first serious roadblock in 1965. Although the United States continued to provide Pakistan with nominal levels of military assistance, the United States imposed an arms embargo in 1965 that lasted through the 1971 war between Pakistan and India.\(^{11}\) The embargo was not lifted until 1975. As a consequence, Pakistan withdrew from SEATO in 1972 and CENTO collapsed in 1979 (due to the fall of the shah in Iran). In that same year, the Carter Administration invoked the Symington Amendment suspending military aid again, “under Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act, because of Pakistan’s secret construction of a uranium enrichment facility” (CRS Brief 2002, 2). Economic aid was also reduced, and relations between the United States and Pakistan were further strained by the fact that Washington did not penalize India in the same way after it conducted its first nuclear test in 1974.\(^{12}\) While we see congressional and executive action in response to the recipient state’s actions, it is not related to human rights. In yet another pattern that will be repeated, the United States is extremely responsive to security issues with regard to foreign assistance, but not the human rights conditions in the recipient state. In this particular case, Pakistan is punished for its behavior only because it is seen as a threat to US security. Figure 7.5 illustrates the foreign assistance allocated to Pakistan during this time; in particular, it reveals a great difference in the levels of military and economic aid.

Amidst the nuclear tension between the United States and Pakistan (as well as India), the human rights conditions in Pakistan continued to be dire in the 1970s. In 1978, martial law was once again declared under the leadership of General Zia-ul-Haq. Almost immediately, the activities of any political opposition were

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\(^{11}\) The war in 1965 was the second Kashmir War and the United States imposed an arms embargo on both Pakistan and India. The war in 1971 was the third war between India and Pakistan. The failure of the United States to support Pakistan resulted in Pakistan moving away from the United States and towards China.

\(^{12}\) India conducted its first nuclear test on 18 May 1974. Relations with India were already poor as a result of the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, and the Nixon Administration saw little benefit in causing a further deterioration over an issue they could now do nothing about. Others in the United States, however, viewed the test as inexcusable, but the official American response was tepid. The US response was also restrained in 1975 when Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency and abridged civil liberties in India.
severely restricted. In addition, it was declared illegal to form a political party that was in direct opposition to Islamic ideology. As a result, Amnesty International estimated that over 7,000 individuals representing the political opposition were arrested, including journalists, trade unionists, lawyers, as well as thousands of political party workers representing the Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP) (Amnesty International 1979). The punishment for these crimes, adjudicated by summary military courts, included up to twelve months in prison and flogging. In February, the military regime passed “Islamic legislation [that] introduced stoning to death as maximum punishment for adultery and mutilation by amputation for theft” (Amnesty International 1979). By October, Haq had decided to postpone, indefinitely, the regularly scheduled elections in November. As a result, all political parties and membership were banned along with all trade union activity. By the end of the year, the Soviet Union was in Afghanistan offering additional rationale for a crackdown on human rights in neighboring Pakistan.

There was a revival in the US-Pakistani relationship from 1980–1989, due to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 and Pakistan’s stand against the invasion. India sided with the Soviet Union and excused the invasion, much like they had done in response to the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. This

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13 In this chapter, all citations for Amnesty International refer to the annual report for Pakistan, unless otherwise specified.

14 India sided with the Soviet Union and excused the invasion, much like they had done in response to the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. This
of the Cold War, and the Carter Administration took steps to demonstrate its support for Pakistan. In early January 1980, Carter declared that the United States would provide military and humanitarian supplies to Pakistan to help it protect its northern border from Soviet encroachment. Further, in the State of the Union later that month, Carter declared the Persian Gulf of vital interest to the United States, and included Pakistan in this new policy area, in what became known as the Carter Doctrine. Also in response to Pakistan’s new level of importance in the Cold War, US military and economic aid to Pakistan increased. However, an initial offer of $400 million in early 1980 by the Carter Administration was rejected by President Zia-ul-Haq, referring to the offer as “peanuts.” In 1981, the Reagan Administration was able to negotiate a five year economic and military aid package worth $3.2 billion with Pakistan. Congress facilitated the aid package “by adding Section 620E to the FAA, giving the President authority to waive 669 for six years in the case of Pakistan, on grounds of national interest. Pakistan became a funnel for arms supplies to the Afghan resistance, as well as a camp for three million Afghan refugees” (CRS Brief 2002, 2). Thus, in spite of a poor human rights record, Pakistan was showered with assistance due to national security concerns and their loyalty in the fight against communism.

By 1982, human rights conditions in Pakistan reached the lowest level possible, a “1” on the PTS, while the levels of economic and military aid increased. During the early 1980s, the Pakistani regime utilized military courts for summary trials, denying individuals the right to counsel and appeals in the trial process. Political prisoners, primarily members of the PPP, were regularly held incommunicado and were subject to floggings and beatings, oftentimes resulting in death (Amnesty International 1980–1982; Amnesty International, Torture in the Eighties 1984). Released prisoners reported that the while in prison, “people had been suspended upside-down, beaten on the soles of the feet and in the head, given electric shocks, burned with cigarettes, and deprived of sleep and food for several days” (Amnesty International 1982).

In March 1981, a hijacking was blamed on the PPP resulting in the arrest of hundreds of members and party sympathizers. In 1982, Amnesty International reported that “as the remaining powers to protect human rights were withdrawn from the civilian courts, thousands of people were arrested in 1981 solely for expressing their opinions, many tried by military courts applying summary procedures, and dozens sentenced to flogging.” In addition, “sentence of amputation and stoning to death were imposed but not carried out. Several prisoners died in custody allegedly as a result of ill-treatment. Many executions took place, including two political prisoners” (Amnesty International 1981, 222). In that same year, the regime amended the constitution suspending the right of habeas corpus for political prisoners. The implicit purpose of such action, according to Amnesty International, was to extract information, particularly about political activities, extract confessions regarding activities against the government, and to convince political prisoners to implicate

response infuriated Carter and members of his administration (Sathasivam 2005).

15 The waiver discussed here is of Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act barring aid to countries delivering or receiving materials used for uranium enrichment.
US Foreign Assistance to Pakistan: Friend or Foe?

others in illicit activities. All of this combined to contribute to the low rating for Pakistan in 1982 (see Figure 7.4).

By 1984, Pakistanis were living in the seventh year of martial law. In August, President Haq announced that an election would be held in March of 1985 all but ending martial law. By the end of 1985, freedom of the press and assembly was restored and the summary military courts were abolished; however, those previously convicted in the military courts were offered no redress. Amnesty International reported some improvement in conditions during this time period, yet they were still concerned about arbitrary arrests, flogging, and torture (Amnesty International 1984–1988). Elections were held in 1988 and “it seemed to indicate that the military would abdicate its role as the most powerful institution to a more appropriate role in a democratic society…this was a short-term reality” (Amnesty International 1989). The elections were dominated by the PPP and Benazir Bhutto became prime minister. The election of Bhutto brought praise from several in the US Congress. For example, Senator Alan Cranston (R-CA) congratulated the new prime minister, stating that “for those of us who remember the eleven long years of military rule before Prime Minister Bhutto restored democracy to her country, this is truly an important date…Pakistan is moving forward as a free and democratic nation, I congratulate the people of Pakistan…on their courage and commitment to the process” (Cranston 1989, 1–2). With the change in government, a majority of the remaining political prisoners from the 1970s were released and over 2,000 death sentences were commuted (Amnesty International 1989).

As the Cold War was winding down, there was a brief hope for a new direction for human rights in Pakistan. The latter half of the 1980s saw increasing improvements in conditions and the 1988 elections seemed to indicate a movement toward deeper and wider democratization efforts. US economic assistance during the 1980s had served to improve economic conditions in Pakistan and this undoubtedly helped improve human rights (Sathasivam 2005). However, under the surface sectarian violence was brewing particularly in the Sind and Punjab provinces. In addition, Indo-Pakistani relations were deteriorating as both embarked on serious attempts at acquiring nuclear capability. Thus, as the ideological war between the east and west was cooling down, a hot new war of nuclear brinkmanship was building in South Asia.

16 Our analysis in Chapter 4 addressed the relationship between foreign aid and human rights directly. There is a vast literature on the effect of foreign aid on economic development and our models indicate that economic standing does impact the realization of human rights. However, there is a lack of consensus in the literature regarding the nature of this relationship. Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that aid is beneficial if recipient states have good governance. This is the generally philosophy of the merit-based Millennium Challenge Account. Subsequent research (Easterly et al., 2003, 2004) has not been able to duplicate the exact results and thus is less enthusiastic about the effects, although they don’t find contradictory results. In addition, several studies (Spero and Hart 1979; Zimmerman 1993; Conteh-Morgen 1990) discussed in Chapter 1 found some benefit to economic development from economic aid (see Chapter 1).
Post-Cold War

The end of the Cold War and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan meant that Pakistan no longer occupied a special strategic position to the United States (much like we saw with Turkey in Chapter 6). US security interests were dramatically different after the Cold War and, as a result, Pakistan became expendable. The United States no longer needed Pakistan as a frontline state to contain the Soviet Union and communism. Thus, the issue of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and continuing tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir brought about a period of “cold estrangement” between the United States and Pakistan (Sathasivam 2005, 96). Several events occurred that contributed to the United States decreasing foreign assistance to Pakistan in 1990 (Figure 7.5 demonstrates a dramatic decrease in aid beginning in 1990). In August, Prime Minister Bhutto’s government was dismissed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Senator Cranston called on the United States to take action against this assault on democracy and suspend aid under Section 513, the clause of the FAA which “forbids US assistance if a democratically elected head of government is overthrown by military coup or decree” (Cranston 1990, 1). In examining the PTS scale (See Figure 7.4), although new elections were held in October, we see that in 1990 there was a drop in human rights conditions (the rating went from a “3” in 1989 to a “2” in 1990), which is not unexpected in response to a domestic crisis in a country already lacking respect for human rights. In addition, in October, the Bush Administration was unable to make the necessary certification under the Pressler amendment, thus ended all aid to Pakistan and imposed sanctions (See Figure 7.5). Pakistan again complained that India was not treated the same way for the same issues, and that India was not subjected to a Pressler-style amendment for actually having tested a nuclear bomb (which Pakistan had not). In retaliation, Pakistan refused to help fight the

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17 Causing further tension was a Kashmir insurgency that had begun in the late 1980s that was threatening Indian political authority within Kashmir.

18 In 1985, Congress passed the Pressler Amendment which required the president to certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear bomb before aid can be granted (note that this amendment only applies to Pakistan). Unlike other legislation we have discussed in previous chapters, the Pressler Amendment did not contain a presidential waiver option. Thus, if the executive branch could not certify Pakistan’s nonnuclear status, there was no national security waiver available. In early 1990, the Bush Administration believed that Pakistan had machined bomb cores and demanded that they be destroyed. Even though Pakistan declared that this was false and insisted they were in the same position as they were when they were certified under the Pressler Amendment in 1989, the Bush Administration refused to certify its nonnuclear status (Sathasivam 2005).

19 It should be noted that $3.5 million in narcotics assistance under the control of the US State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics Matters was not affected by the Pressler Amendment.

20 After the Cold War, the situation between the United States and India changed as well. The issue of India maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union was no longer relevant. While the United States was still concerned over conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and the nuclear programs of both states, from 1991 to 1998 relations between the United States and India were cooperative.
1990–1991 Persian Gulf War and many government officials professed support for Iraq (Pakistan did however send several thousand troops to Saudi Arabia).

In 1991, Pakistan also continued to experience domestic conflict with increases in ethnic violence in several of the provinces. This conflict pitted the PPP against the Islami Jamhorri Ittehad (IJI) otherwise known as the Islamic Democratic Alliance. Amnesty International attributes hundreds killed to this rivalry in primarily the Sindh and Punjab provinces where the PPP was the ruling party. This sectarian violence continued through 1992 and 1993. Reports during this time began to indicate that torture was again becoming more widespread for both criminal as well as political suspects in custody. Outside of the Sindh and Punjab provinces, members of the PPP, particularly trade unionists and journalists, were once again targeted for arrest by the government. They were detained due to their political opposition activities and were subjected to ill-treatment, including torture. According to Amnesty International, fifteen of the detainees died in custody as a result of torture. In addition, the death penalty was reconstituted and extended, with security forces committing at least twenty extrajudicial executions (Amnesty International 1992–1993).

The presidency of Bill Clinton marked a further decline in US-Pakistan relations. While the nuclear weapons issue became critical in Clinton’s second term (as we will discuss below), his first term saw continued tension over the Pressler Amendment and the insurgency in India-controlled Kashmir. In an effort to undermine India’s political authority, Pakistan was supporting the insurgency. This fact did not sit well with the Clinton Administration (nor with India for that matter), and Pakistan was repeatedly warned by the United States that it was in danger of being declared a state sponsor of terrorism (placing it in a category with states such as Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Iraq). Earning this label would have severely damaged Pakistan’s international standing and further limited its access to international aid (not just from the United States). On the issue of Pakistan’s nuclear program, the administration was “generally unsympathetic” to Pakistan’s desire to be certified under the Pressler Amendment. In 1995, in response to a row over 28 F-16s already paid for by Pakistan before the US military aid package was terminated in 1990, Congress passed the Brown Amendment to lift the ban on economic aid and release military equipment that was already promised (and paid for). The F-16s were excluded from this amendment (as some members of Congress simply could not accept their delivery), but the amendment allowed them to be sold to a third party so that Pakistan could recoup its payment. As a result of this amendment, the United States resumed a limited military relationship with Pakistan and bilateral relations improved slightly (Sathasivam 2005).

While there were some signs of improvement in US-Pakistan relations in 1995, Pakistan again received the lowest rating on the political terror scale. According to the US State Department (1996), the human rights situation in Pakistan was “difficult” as both the government and opposition forces (primarily the Mohajir Quami Movement or MQM), were guilty of extrajudicial killings. There were reports that these killings were “often in the form of deaths in police custody or staged encounters in which the

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21 Five years later, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2000 allowed the president to permanently waive all nuclear-test related sanctions. Clinton waived very few restrictions on Pakistan even after the passage of this bill.
police or paramilitary forces shoot and kill the suspects” (US Department of State 1996). Further, “police sources have confirmed unofficially that the police do not believe that the courts punish repeat criminals, and that encounter killings of criminals are a conscious strategy to deal with recidivists” (US Department of State 1996). In addition, there was an increase in the frequency of disappearances and torture, including “burning with cigarettes, whipping the soles of the feet, sexual assault, prolonged isolation, electric shock, denial of food or sleep, hanging upside down, forced spreading of the legs, and public humiliation” (US Department of State 1996).

By 1997, Pakistan’s rating in the PTS had rebounded to a “3,” primarily due to elections that were held in February. Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistan Muslim League won a two-thirds majority and maintained governmental power with the PPP in the minority. Unfortunately, the elections did little to curb the sectarian violence in the provinces where the PPP was the majority party. Amnesty International reported that over 200 were killed in Punjab Province and over 400 in Sindh Province (Amnesty International 1998). The government response was further crackdowns, arbitrary arrests, and detention. In August, the government passed the Anti-Terrorism Act which gave sweeping powers to the police, including the right to use lethal force. Amnesty International also reported that the opposition was committing its own share of human rights abuses.

Relations between the United States and Pakistan (as well as India) underwent another significant test in the late 1990s. Nuclear tensions in South Asia spiked in 1998, as both India and Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests. India conducted its tests first, on 11 and 13 May, and Pakistan followed shortly thereafter. As the Clinton Administration was trying to prevent Pakistan from conducting its nuclear tests following those conducted by India, “Pakistan was quite brazen and unapologetic” (Sathasivam 2005, 96). If the Clinton Administration was going to succeed in preventing Pakistan’s nuclear test, it would have to give in to Pakistan’s one demand: a security guarantee against India. Clinton was unwilling to take this step, instead offering unspecified security aid, and Pakistan rejected the counteroffer testing five nuclear devices on 28 May and another on 30 May. Several countries, including the United States, imposed limited sanctions on India and Pakistan, with Clinton imposing restrictions on non-humanitarian aid. Despite these efforts, the “United States attempts to use sanctions, embargoes, and other such coercive strategies to force a change in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development policy were a colossal failure, if anything only strengthening Pakistan’s resolve to avoid dependence on any other country for its national security needs” (Sathasivam 2005, 96).

Within a year of this crisis, the Clinton Administration undertook a policy shift towards India that undermined US-Pakistani relations. Clinton recognized the advantages to an enhanced strategic and economic relationship with India and proceeded to improve relations with Pakistan’s enemy (Sathasivam 2005).

22 In this chapter, all citations for US Department of State refer to the annual country report on Pakistan.

23 It is worth noting that human rights in India had no bearing on this approach by the Clinton Administration. As mentioned previously, the mean value for human rights in India is 2.14 (lower than that of Pakistan), with the exception of earning a “3” in 1999, India’s
addition, a military coup (the fourth since Pakistan’s independence in 1947) brought General Pervez Musharraf to power in Pakistan in 1999, further eroding Pakistani democracy and relations with the United States leading to additional sanctions. Tension was also heightened by Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban had refused US demands to expel Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan, and despite pressure from the United States, Pakistan refused to withdraw its support from its Afghan ally. As George W. Bush assumed the presidency of the United States in 2001, no one could have predicted the events about to transpire. These events would dramatically alter US relations with numerous countries, both friends and foes, including its now deteriorating relationship with Pakistan.

Post-11 September

The 11 September attacks caused a dramatic improvement in the relationship between the United States and Pakistan. Pakistan is once again a front-line state, but this time it is in the global war on terror, and as a consequence there were significant increases in US aid. Almost immediately, members of Congress were calling for the resumption of aid to Pakistan. Representative Henry Hyde (D-Illinois) argued in support of a bill lifting sanctions explaining that the bill would allow the executive branch “to scrape from the hull of a great ship, the foreign relations law of the Unites States, some of the barnacles that prevent us from aiding our ally Pakistan.” He believed that the bill was “an appropriate response to the emergency situation confronting our Nations and to the difficulties facing Pakistan” (Hyde 2001). There was, however, some opposition to the legislation. Representative Frank Pallone, a long-time critic of Pakistan and foreign assistance to that nation, objected pointing out that General Musharraf’s ascendancy to power by military coup in Pakistan prevented the United States from distributing any military assistance. This reality did not change as a result of 11 September and therefore military aid should not be considered. Representative Pallone did, however, think that economic assistance was appropriate in light of General Musharraf’s support in efforts to seize Osama bin Laden and eliminate the al-Qaeda terrorist network. He understood that Pakistan was a poverty-stricken country and a fragile society, and hence, “Pakistan’s pleas to the US for economic help are understandable, and any humanitarian, education, economic, and social assistance is worthy of being granted...However...I stand strong in my argument against military aid to Pakistan, even under the current circumstances” (Pallone 2001). Although there was clearly hesitancy by some, one could argue that the Cold War consensus in fighting communism was replaced with a war on terrorism consensus, at least initially as total foreign aid was significantly increased (See Chapter 2), military action against Afghanistan was approved, and domestic legislation was passed to assist law enforcement agencies in finding and apprehending terrorist (particularly through the Patriot Act).

human rights record earns it a “1” or a “2” throughout the 1990s. Much of India’s abuse of human rights occurs around Kashmir, and Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir violate human rights with impunity. In addition, there is significant caste violence, abuse of the Christian community, parliamentary election violence, and abuse of women.
Ultimately, all sanctions imposed under the Symington and Pressler amendments related to nuclear testing were lifted against both India and Pakistan. On 7 October 2001 the United States began its military campaign against the Taliban and to properly conduct the war in Afghanistan, US tactical aircraft and cruise missiles had to cross through Pakistani airspace. In addition, temporary bases were established from which special operations, search and rescue, and logistical forces could stage their operations. Numerous terrorist operatives and Islamic fighters have been hiding among the Pakistani population and the rough terrain, and the United States has counted on Pakistani cooperation in tracking these wanted persons. In return, Pakistan receives large amounts of economic and military assistance from the United States. By the end of October, a new law allowed the president to waive sanctions related to the Musharraf military coup if the White House could make the argument that continued aid to Pakistan would help the democratization process in that country and assist the United States in war on terror (with one extension this waiver lasted through 2006).\textsuperscript{24} In November, Bush announced that Pakistan would be the recipient of over $1 billion in US assistance, and Pakistan was awarded preferential terms of trade and debt relief from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Musharraf also gained domestic benefits from his cooperation through “international and economic support” that in turn strengthened his regime against domestic rivals (Ahmed 2001, 85).

Despite the benefits of cooperation, Pakistan refused to support the US-led war against Iraq in 2003, and refused to provide troops to assist in post-war Iraq. The strategic position of Pakistan post-11 September overcame even this obstacle, however, and in June 2004, President Bush named Pakistan a major non-NATO ally.\textsuperscript{25} As one scholar has noted,

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has been marked by a series of truly transformation events that establish a clear cyclical pattern in the relationship…The pattern within each cycle is as follows: a major international event that shocks American foreign policy compels the United States to seek out Pakistan as an ally; a subsequent major event compels the United States to distance itself from Pakistan, thereby engendering a sense of betrayal in an embittered Pakistan. This cycle has been repeated in full twice in the years since 1950 (Up: 1951–1965; Down: 1966–1979; Up: 1980–1989; Down: 1990–2000), and the two countries currently find themselves in the midst of a third iteration of this cyclical pattern (Up: 2001–?) (Sathasivam 2005, 99).

The “Up” cycle in this current iteration appears to be holding into 2008 despite significant problems in Pakistan. On 3 November 2007 a “state of emergency” was declared by Musharraf, much of the constitution was suspended, the independent

\textsuperscript{24} Pakistan was also freed from the restrictions placed on countries that default on international loans.

\textsuperscript{25} Being a major non-NATO ally comes with perks. Those in this club have a privileged security relationship with the United States, including priority delivery of defense material, participation in defense and research development, and loan guarantees. Other major non-NATO allies include Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand, and the Philippines.
media was silenced, judges were removed, and police and troops filled the streets. Musharraf declared the action necessary in his battle against extremism and unwarranted interference in the government by the judiciary. While the Bush Administration urged Musharraf to step down as head of the army (but remain president) and hold parliamentary elections, the White House was not going to push for sanctions or a decrease in aid due to Pakistan’s position on the front-line of the war on terror. The state of emergency was ended 15 December, Musharraf stepped down as army chief, and he announced that national elections would be held as planned on 8 January 2008. The assassination of Benizir Bhutto on 27 December (discussed at the beginning of this chapter) led Musharraf to postpone the elections, but, despite intense violence and shrouded in questions about the legitimacy, they were eventually held on 18 February 2008. Thus, democracy in Pakistan continues to be questionable, but the United States continues to view Musharraf as the best man for the job of countering extremism and as a result continues to supply his government with substantial amounts of aid.

Turning to the human rights conditions in Pakistan after 11 September, Human Rights Watch consistently and repeatedly calls the military in Pakistan the “leading violator of human rights.” Pakistan was given the worst rating in terms of the PTS in 1999, primarily in response to the military led coup by General Pervez Musharraf. Under Musharraf, military impunity for abuses has increased dramatically. These abuses include extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and the persecution of political opponents (Human Rights Watch 2006a). In a subsequent report, Human Rights Watch condemns the US role in perpetuating human rights violations in Pakistan, particularly the outsourcing of interrogation. They call on President Bush to actively denounce the conditions in Pakistan and argue that failing to do so will “grant legitimacy to the ‘democratic’ vision of his Pakistani counterpart…The promotion of trade and commerce between the United States and Pakistan is commendable. But Bush’s silence on human rights and the US government’s outsourcing of torture will bring nothing but poverty of dignity to both” (Human Rights Watch 2006b).

The war on terror has served to increase the number and pattern of disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests as well as counterterrorism operations in many of the remote provinces in Pakistan. Human Rights Watch calls on both the United States and Pakistan to desist from this type of behavior. Brad Adams, Asia director of Human Rights Watch asserts that “the counterterrorism partnership between the US and Pakistan should start to follow the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle” (Human Rights Watch 2006c). The 2007 “state of emergency” further undermined

26 Musharraf was re-elected President by the Parliament and State Assemblies in October, but the Supreme Court was hearing charges that the election was not constitutional. The decision of the court was to be handed down on 13 November, but Musharraf declared the state of emergency on 3 November.

27 While there continues to be questions concerning Bhutto’s assassination, the Pakistani government and the CIA claim it was the work of a pro-Taliban tribal leader. Some close to Bhutto believe the Pakistani government must be culpable in the assassination (as she had emerged as a rival to Musharraf despite initial attempts at brokering a power-sharing agreement and Bhutto wrote in a letter before her death that the government should be held responsible for any attempts on her life).
human rights. Detentions were allowed without charge or trial and within hours of the declaration, lawyers, human rights activists, and other perceived opponents were detained. To date, the relationship between the United States and Pakistan remains firm, with little repudiation from the United States regarding domestic conditions within Pakistan. Although USAID reports that economic aid has drastically improved conditions in Pakistan, suggesting that there has been tangible improvements in the areas of education, health, economic growth, and governance (USAID), the Department of State continues to recognize that “the government’s human rights record [remains] poor” (US Department of State 2007).28

**Conclusion**

Throughout this book, we have been asking if the United States is truly interested in improving human rights conditions in recipient states, or is national security the sole priority. In the case of Pakistan, it seems clear that US foreign assistance has little to do with human rights at all. Perhaps the closest argument made in relation to human rights was the call to end or suspend foreign assistance due to the coup in 1990 that overthrew the Bhutto government. Senator Alan Cranston (R-California), made the following comments,

> Mr. President, I have been disturbed and angered by the administration’s tepid response to events in Pakistan. The threadbare constitutional justification for the coup, according to our State Department, “is an internal matter for the people of Pakistan to decide.” Even now, there is uncertainty about whether the Bush Administration would consider the possibility of exclusion of the leadership of the PPP from the October election as sufficient cause for a suspension of military and economic assistance. This is no time for faint hearts or soft voices. The generals and their civilian footmen need to know that free, fair, and internationally supervised elections are the sine qua non of good relations between our two peoples. Mr. President, during the period of the cold war there were perhaps arguments for maintaining relations with Pakistan’s autocrats. These reasons, of uncertain validity, are even more irrelevant now. If democracy does not return to Pakistan in the clearest form next month, there can be no alternative to cutting off aid to Pakistan mired in the dark age of dictatorship (Cranston 1990).

While other events in Pakistan have also elicited calls for decreasing foreign assistance to Pakistan as a result of human rights (in particular, the Musharraf military coup in 1999 and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007), and some actions have been taken, the response has always been overtaken by events. The importance of Pakistan in the US led war on terror will trump any attempts to compel an improvement in Pakistan’s human rights in the foreseeable future. As shown

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28 The Department of State continues to list numerous problems with human rights in Pakistan, including restrictions on citizens’ right to change their government, extrajudicial killings, torture, and rape, disappearances, poor prison conditions, arbitrary arrests, abridgement of free press, limitations to freedoms of association, religion, and movement, government corruption, domestic violence and honor killings, trafficking in persons, child labor, and discrimination against persons with disabilities (US Department of State 2007).
in this chapter, Pakistan’s importance to the United States has fluctuated over the years—at times a front line state in the US battle of the day, either the Cold War or the war on terror, while at other times an expendable security risk in conflict with its neighbor and possessing nuclear weapons (and hence subject to a reduction in US foreign assistance). Regardless of which phase Pakistan might find itself, rhetoric aside, it is apparent that the United States is not going to press for an improvement in its human rights.
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Chapter 8

Foreign Aid and Human Rights: Strategic Priorities or Global Responsibility?

Neither in statecraft nor in common sense can good intentions be a valid excuse if accompanied by gross recklessness, carelessness, and indifference to the range of possible consequences. Such actions fail the test not only of general ethics, but also of the sworn moral commitment of state servants and elected officials to defend the interests of their peoples, and not simply to pursue at all costs their own ideas of morality—another central point in realist ethics (Lieven and Hulsman 2006, xviii).

This study has sought to answer a question that reflects a major dilemma regarding US foreign policy—when and how should the United States address human rights around the globe and what responsibility does the United States have in regards to the people in states that receive US foreign assistance? Specifically, we asked three major questions. First, what is the motivation for the allocation of foreign assistance? Second, what are the consequences of aid distribution? And, third, is the United States responsible for ensuring that the consequences match the stated motivation? This chapter will serve to summarize our findings in relation to these three questions.

The Motivation for US Foreign Assistance

Since the inception of the foreign aid program with the Marshall Plan following World War II, the United States has rhetorically claimed that providing monetary assistance to other countries is a way of improving the living conditions for their citizens. The historical narrative in Chapter 2 and the case studies in Chapters 5 through 7 have highlighted the rhetoric used to promote foreign aid. In reality, however, we found no evidence to suggest the improvement in the human condition in recipient nations is actually a primary motivating factor in aid allocation, particularly the allocation of military assistance and funding through the Economic Support Fund. In Egypt and Israel, as discussed in Chapter 2, aid is a function of peacemaking, alliance building, and, in the case of Israel, deterrence; in Colombia, as discussed in Chapter 5, aid is motivated by the desire to curb the flow of illegal drugs into the United States; in Turkey and Pakistan, covered in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively, the strategic location of these two egregious human rights violators has guided US assistance in the Cold War and now in the global war on terror. In spite of their respective human rights practices, the United States continues to provide each with significant amounts of foreign aid in the name of national security.
On the surface and even through the mission statement of USAID, it appears that the United States is interested in improving the human condition around the globe. According to USAID, “US foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of furthering America’s foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world” (USAID History). This twofold purpose becomes obscured when the US has to choose the former objective over the latter. During the Cold War, this expansion of democracy included support of authoritarian regimes and now in the war on terror the United States supports other questionable regimes in the name of democracy. Even some of our allies that are democracies have questionable human rights records (that is, Israel and India) and yet the aid continues to flow. In addition, we provided several examples from policy-makers on either their push for foreign assistance in order to improve human rights, or conversely, their call to end foreign aid based on human rights. However, national security interests more often than not supplant and overwhelm this seemingly ethical motive. Bill Clinton provided perhaps the most striking annunciation of the ordering of US priorities in the post-Cold War environment. During the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, Clinton explained,

The end of the superpower standoff lifted the lid from a cauldron of long-simmering hatreds. Now the entire global terrain is bloody with such conflicts, from Rwanda to Georgia…Whether we get involved in any of the world’s ethnic conflicts in the end must depend on the cumulative weight of the American interests at stake (Clinton 1994).

The conclusion drawn from this statement can only be that improving the human condition weighs far less than national security concerns in the grand scheme of US interests.

Ultimately, we find that the US foreign assistance program, in terms of motivation for allocating aid, has little to do with moral duty and is simply another blunt instrument aimed at shoring up US national security. Thus, the inconsistency of US human rights policy suggests that the promotion of human rights, the concerns for economic and social development in poorer nations, and ultimately peace within these regions, are often sacrificed for other concerns. In many ways, the US foreign assistance program has been accomplishing the goals that the United States intended—shoring up security concerns. Furthermore, we are not arguing that national security should take a backseat to improving human rights in other countries. The purpose of every government is the protection of its own citizens. What we are suggesting is that de-linking the decision to allocate foreign assistance based on human rights considerations might just solve the dilemma between our desire to promote human rights and democracy and the need to protect our national interests.

The Consequences of US Foreign Aid in the Recipient Countries

The empirical analyses in Chapter 4 and the case studies in Chapters 5 through 7 have led to several basic conclusions regarding the relationship between human rights and varying levels of US aid in recipient states. The analysis on the relationship between foreign assistance and human rights reveals that the former is negatively associated
with the latter. The bivariate and multivariate analyses consistently point to this negative relationship. The one exception is the relationship between military aid on subsistence rights, however, subsequent analysis indicated that this too has a negative impact at lags of four and five years. Thus, we conclude that US foreign assistance is not the pacifying foreign policy tool in terms of human rights that political rhetoric or policy objectives suggest. As one scholar noted,

American development assistance programs could not be said to forward or even in any systemic way to reflect the values and principles of the American political tradition. To some significant degree, in fact, US foreign aid policy had come to finance and promote practices that are inconsistent with the defense of liberty, inimical to the promotion of justice, and injurious to the nominal beneficiaries themselves (Eberstadt 1987, 8).

In fact, potentially dire consequences stem from the US foreign assistance program in respect to human rights. Over and over, the empirical results indicate that human rights conditions are negatively affected by economic and military aid from the United States. For example, the recent infusion of aid to Colombia, which most human rights activists oppose, would seem to be a bad human rights policy on the part of the United States. As a policy of national security, the likelihood for curbing the trafficking and supply of drugs into the United States is also suspect. Congressmen Ramstad (2000) pointed out previous failures at attacking the domestic drug problem at its source, “over the last 10 years…the Federal Government has spent $150 million to combat the supply of illegal drugs. Yet the cocaine market is glutted, as always, and heroin is reading available at record high purities…Our drug eradication and interdiction efforts have also been costly failure.” As Chapter 5 pointed out, there is a debate in Congress concerning the effect of Plan Colombia—both on the availability of drugs in the United States and the effects on human rights in Colombia. If we take the PTS as an indication, human rights in Colombia have not improved—they have and continue to receive a “1.” Thus, while some abuses have decreased (murders and kidnappings, for example), the overall condition of life for the people of Colombia is poor. Worse yet for an assessment of US human rights policy, the assistance the United States has provided to the Uribe government has helped him pursue his crackdown. On its face, the crackdown appears to be undermining the control of the paramilitaries and rebels, but these groups, along with government security forces, continue to violate the rights of Colombian citizens at an alarming rate.

The inclusion of key independent variables provided a more complete picture of the various economic, political, and social factors relevant to the realization of human rights. For instance, the wealth of a country, or its economic standing, positively influences respect for security rights. In essence, economic scarcity causes instability, which in turn leads to government repression; hence, the wealthier the country is, the less abuse of citizens at the hands of their government and the better their living conditions. Also, democracy has a significant effect on human rights levels. The more democratic a regime, the less abusive it is to its citizens and the better they are able to provide for basic human necessities. Highly democratized societies have less human rights abuses, but states in the process of democratizing have the potential for government repression and it appears that the infusion of
foreign assistance contributes to this instability. We can see this phenomenon in the study of Pakistan in Chapter 7. Pakistan has seen dramatic success in the democratic process (such as Benazir Bhutto’s election in 1988) and dramatic failures under periods of martial law. The most recent iteration has come with the military coup that brought Musharraf to power in 1999 and the attempts to restore true democracy in 2007–2008.\footnote{Musharraf assumed leadership in Pakistan in 1999 via a coup against elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Although there were repeated calls and promises to do so, for years he failed to hand real power to democratically elected officials, instead he sought to strengthen military rule. It is hoped that elections in February 2008 will result in long-lasting democracy.} Musharraf’s imposition of martial law in November 2007 was an attempt to push back the forces of democracy. Both domestic and international actors were calling for a return to civilian rule, and Musharraf was intent on holding back the tide. The process of democratizing (or in the case of Pakistan re-democratizing) was fought through repression and human rights’ violations. Ultimately, Musharraf resigned as army chief and allowed elections to proceed in February 2008, but not before hundreds were arrested, free media was abridged, and constitutional rights were violated.

In terms of regime type, the presence of a military regime is detrimental to the realization of human rights (again, Musharraf in Pakistan is a prime example). Thus, continued US support of military-backed governments, and any military assistance to such governments does not bode well for human rights in that state, although the allocation of foreign assistance might achieve national interest objectives. In addition, the models indicated leftist (or socialists) regimes were incapable of providing basic human needs and their inward economic focus may be to blame, however, they were not as likely to abuse the security rights of its citizens contrary to the theory supplied by Jeane Kirkpatrick (1979). This theory was embraced by the Reagan Administration and applied rather liberally, particularly in Latin America. Lastly, few studies have included the post-Cold War era as a variable, mainly due to the lack of data and the timing of the research. The results indicate that with the transition away from a bi-polar international system that kept nationalistic fervor under wraps comes the potential for political unrest and subsequent repression. The events that unfolded in the Balkans during the 1990s are a testament to this finding.

From the US perspective, a tough trade-off presents itself as a result of these findings. Are the negative results regarding the impact on human rights substantial enough to make the United States reconsider the trade-off in the name of national security? The relatively negligible impact on wealthier states in exchange for security assurances appears to be a strategic choice. However, impact on poor states needs further consideration. That is, poor countries receiving aid, often in spite of congressional stipulations, seem to suffer in the area of human rights. In our three case studies, the level of wealth does not come near to the level necessary for the effect of aid to dissipate (approximately $6,000 per capita GDP). The mean value of wealth in Turkey, the highest of the three, is $2,420 with Colombia at $1,800 and Pakistan far below at $430 per capita GDP. Contrary to some of the political rhetoric of the potential human rights benefit of aid, these results suggest that higher levels of US foreign assistance are not effective in improving human rights conditions in these
states; in fact, it appears to exacerbate an already poor condition for the poorest states. It appears that poor countries with poor security rights’ records receive US foreign aid which the elites in power simply use to maintain the status quo by silencing and even eliminating any potential political opposition. In cases where aid has been granted for self-serving reasons (that is, Cold War ideology, oil resources from the Middle East), it is important for the United States to realize the consequences of such action. Even in the instances where the aid is ostensibly granted for humanitarian reasons, the results are the same. This suggests that the present form of aid needs to be re-assessed. The consequences of unilateral aid from the United States, as critics suggest, is associated with poor human rights conditions.

The United States’ Responsibility for the Consequences of its Policies

Regardless of the motivation of aid, we have posited that the United States has an ethical responsibility to first do no harm. From a normative position, the United States still has an ethical responsibility to ensure that their national interests are not realized at the expense of humanity. In the least, their actions should be consistent with their rhetoric. Certainly if foreign assistance in granted in the name of humanitarian concerns (such as quality of life issues and the promotion of democracy), the United States should ensure (to the best of its ability) that the stated outcome is achieved, or at least pursued. When foreign aid is given in the name of national security, the United States is not freed from its ethical obligation. Although, as we have stated several times, we understand the primary goals of all states are national survival, territorial integrity, and the protection of its own citizens, the United States should not pursue policies in the name of its own national security that cause unnecessary harm to innocent civilians. Collateral damage may occur in war, but it should not occur as a result of foreign aid. As highlighted by Weber’s ethic of responsibility, good intentions (or bad ones for that matter) cannot free one from the responsibility of a bad outcome. As pointed out in Chapter 1, we cannot expect the United States to forgo its security interests to ensure human rights in other countries, nor can we honestly criticize the conviction of attempting, but failing, to improve human rights with foreign assistance. What we can expect, however, is for the United States to be honest about its policy objectives and divorce human rights conditionality from foreign aid programs that clearly have little to do with improving the human condition.

Accomplishing this feat will require a different approach to both foreign aid and human rights policy, an approach based first on humility and prudence. The realpolitik posture, particularly since 11 September, must be muted with a dose of responsibility and ethical behavior, both of which we argue will eventually increase US national security. We are suggesting that foreign assistance needs to remain strategic in nature, but with an ethical foreign policy approach. Delinking human rights as a condition of foreign aid and finding new ways to promote human rights are in order. This linkage, as we have shown, is fraught with problems, particularly when the United States has security objectives as well.
An innovative program like the Millennium Challenge Account is a move in the right direction, as it rewards good governance. However, the United States must still deal with states that are either poor economic or political performers or possibly both. Using foreign assistance as a leverage or bribe in exchange for human rights smacks of hubris and we have demonstrated that attempting to alter regime behavior regarding human rights with foreign assistance has been unsuccessful given the intrinsic link to national security. In the battle between human rights and national security, the winner is always the latter. Thus, a carrot like the MCA that relies on domestic changes sought from within may prove to be more productive. This type of carrot approach, as applied by the European Union, appears to be having some effect in Turkey. The Turkish government strongly desires to become a member of the economically beneficial and prestigious European Union and accession is predicated on an improvement of human rights conditions. While the progress in Turkey may be slow, demands by the European Union have shown some signs of success, and one can only surmise from this that if the United States employed a similar approach, it might also elicit some improvements for the people of Turkey. This carrot is tied to economics and no particular overt national security interest on the part of countries in the EU.

Second, a better understanding of the conditions and objectives of the recipient state and its citizenry will support an ethical human rights policy. Given the current international focus on subsistence, poverty, debt, and other “low” politics issues, a different human rights typology or landscape for the United States to operate within rather than security rights is necessary. As a starting point in formulating an ethical human rights policy based on recipient needs, the United States should broaden its focus beyond security rights to include economic or subsistence rights on an equal footing. While security rights violations capture the attention of governments, NGOs, IGOs, and especially the media, the plight of a larger number of the world’s citizenry are affected by poor levels of subsistence rights. In attempting to use foreign policy tools to alter regime behavior, the American government has adopted a predominantly western view of human rights; specifically that certain security rights are universal. A new paradigm is in order. The United States needs to fundamentally recalculate or redefine what is meant by gross human rights violations (which is the language utilized in much of the legislation linking foreign aid allocation to human rights conditions in recipient states). In addition, the United States must recalibrate how it defines human rights relative to the rest of the world. The United States, the United Nations, and other states as well as institutions think very differently about the various types of rights that are articulated in the international community. While some rights, from the United States’ perspective, can be derogated in times of national security, the international community generally thinks differently.

The United States attempts to address the development of basic human needs, primarily through programs associated with USAID. However, foreign policies regarding these types of human rights conditions are not nearly as straight-forward as security rights. Solving these types of problems require long-term commitments, continued engagement, and innovative prescriptions, in other words, foreign policies that do not fit neatly into the carrot and stick approach traditionally employed by the United States. While the United States cannot be expected to address every type of
human rights violation at every moment, the issue of economic rights and subsistence should be a priority (Shue 1980), along with security rights. The individual programs within USAID need further investigation in terms of their respective impact on human rights conditions. Further research should investigate whether economic aid and developmental assistance, absent the amount of assistance allocated through the Economic Security Fund, bears fruit in terms of human rights. Adopting the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights would go a long way in signaling to the international community that the United States is committed to the improvement of the quality of life of citizens around the world.

Lastly, and most importantly, an ethical policy is one where there is an acceptance of responsibility of the consequences of actions. In other words, the United States must attempt to reframe its policy decisions in terms of human rights and foreign assistance and consider the consequences of its actions. In the post-11 September world, there has been recognition that moral considerations and consequences of a state’s actions may be linked with national security. Following the devastating earthquake in Pakistan in late 2005, Senator Joseph Biden suggested a connection between morality and security. He argued that in areas and situations that the US fails to make significant contributions to disaster relief, extremist groups are filling the void. He argued, “There is a desperate need for more assistance—and that void is being filled by groups hostile to American interests” and to “prove that America is not engaged in a crusade against Islam” the US must do more. He concluded, “our moral duty and our national security interest are one” (Biden 2005). Policymakers are quickly realizing that the connection between levels of subsistence and national security is a burgeoning one, particularly the link between poverty, sub-standard living conditions, and terrorism. Thus, doing something because it seems right may actually have a positive effect on national security.

In addition, the US foreign assistance program has the potential to be used as a public relations tool. A recent survey by Terror Free Tomorrow conducted in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Pakistan supports this notion suggesting that the tsunami relief in 2005 left “lasting favorable opinions…The end result of the poll findings is that the United States has the ability to win ‘hearts and minds’ through ‘deeper American assistance, directly to the people’…” (Brainard 2006). Similarly, a recent article in the New York Times also addresses the changing perception of the United States as a result of foreign aid (Rohde 2005) and indicates that even though “it is too early to reach firm conclusions, anecdotal interviews with earthquake survivors in this picturesque mountain district, known as Mansehra, suggest that American assistance may be improving Pakistani’s perceptions of the United States—an image that has been overwhelmingly negative here since the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.”

For too long, the United States has been indifferent to the “range of possible consequences” (see opening quote) in regards to the consequences of its foreign assistance program in terms of human rights. While other policy objectives have been

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2 For a theoretical discussion of the connection between human rights conditions and terrorism see Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens (2006; 2007; 2008). Also see discussion in Chapter 1 regarding the role of Hamas in providing social services to Palestinians.
met, those related to human rights have been vitiated by the effect of US foreign aid. Consequently, the United States must assume responsibility for this effect and work toward a remedy for this outcome. It is truly in the best interest of national security to address human rights conditions around the world and the United States must rely on some other avenue beyond bilateral foreign assistance to assist in the realization of human rights. We contend that further recognition of the connection between moral considerations and national security would help improve the US image abroad and undercut the anti-Americanism that brews in certain parts of the world.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achen, C.</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed, S.</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alarkson, W.</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alesina, A.</td>
<td>3n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amstutz, M.R.</td>
<td>30, 32, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apodaca, C.</td>
<td>3, 3n2, 43, 44, 55, 57aa, 59, 60, 63, 66n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baehr, P.R.</td>
<td>22, 24, 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballenger, C.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banfield, E.C.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barratt, B.</td>
<td>3n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayless, M.</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayless, S.</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beck, N.</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berger, P.</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berthelot, J.</td>
<td>3n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blanton, S.L.</td>
<td>3n2, 66n4, 67n5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond, D.</td>
<td>67n6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond, J.</td>
<td>67n6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosco, D.</td>
<td>14n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brainard, L.</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branford, S.</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branigan, W.</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, C.</td>
<td>30, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, H.</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bull, H.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnside, C.</td>
<td>173n16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callaway, R.L.</td>
<td>17, 70, 71n15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carleton, D.</td>
<td>2n2, 3, 69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castellanos-Holleman, M.</td>
<td>22, 24, 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celik, A.B.</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chomsky, N.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cingranelli, D.L.</td>
<td>2n2, 3, 26, 66n4, 69n10, 71n15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark, B.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claude, R.P.</td>
<td>57, 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohan, A.S.</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohen, C.</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coleman, F.</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conteh-Morgan, E.</td>
<td>28, 173n16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crandall, R.</td>
<td>122, 125, 125n12, 126, 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cranston, M.</td>
<td>15, 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahl, R.</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalton, M.</td>
<td>68n8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danaher, K.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davenport, C.</td>
<td>68n8, 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davila, M.T.</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dixon, W.</td>
<td>67n5, 71, 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doherty, C.J.</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollar, D.</td>
<td>3n4, 173n16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donnelly, J.</td>
<td>15, 19, 32, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dos Santos, T.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drewnoski, J.</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easterly, W.</td>
<td>173n16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eberstadt, N.</td>
<td>22, 28, 38, 39, 40, 185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fein, H.</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forsythe, D.P.</td>
<td>19, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank, A.G.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabelnick, T.</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garcia, C.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardner, A.</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garonna, P.</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastil, R.</td>
<td>68–9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerner, D.J.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibney, M.</td>
<td>68n8, 69n12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gleditsch, K.S.</td>
<td>91n5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldstein, J.</td>
<td>67n6, 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guney, A.</td>
<td>149, 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gurr, T.R.</td>
<td>89n1, 103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwin, C.</td>
<td>27, 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrelson-Stephens, J.</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hart, J.A.</td>
<td>28, 38, 173n16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hattori, T.</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henderson, C.</td>
<td>68n8, 88, 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herman, E.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hicks, A.M.</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hicks, N.</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofrenning, D.J.B.</td>
<td>2n2, 66n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holsti, O.R.</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hook, S.W.</td>
<td>114, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howard, R.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hulsman, J.</td>
<td>34, 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isacson, A.</td>
<td>125, 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaggers, K.</td>
<td>89n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jentleson, B.W.</td>
<td>14n6, 114, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jodice, D.</td>
<td>67n6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katz, J.</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennan, G.</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kifner, J.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgis, F.L.</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirisci, K.</td>
<td>149, 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkpatrick, J.</td>
<td>89, 95, 121, 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krieger, H.L.</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster, C.</td>
<td>38, 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lappe, F.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larson, D.</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levitt, M.</td>
<td>20n12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieven, A.</td>
<td>34, 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lopez, G.A.</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luard, E.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark, C.R.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marks, J.</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall, M.G.</td>
<td>89n1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthews, E.G.</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCaffrey, B.R.</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCormick, J.M.</td>
<td>2n2, 3, 66n4, 67n5, 88, 89, 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGrenahan, D.V.</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKinlay, R.D.</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McNitt, A.D.</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meermik, J.</td>
<td>3, 3n2, 66n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekay, E.</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meyer, W.H.</td>
<td>3, 27, 28, 96, 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milner, W.</td>
<td>16, 88, 90, 91, 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milner, W.T.</td>
<td>70, 71n15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitchell, N.</td>
<td>2n2, 3, 66n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitchell, N.J.</td>
<td>67n5, 88, 89, 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moon, B.</td>
<td>67n5, 70, 88, 89, 90, 92, 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moon, B.E.</td>
<td>67n5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morgenthau, H.</td>
<td>25, 31, 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morris, M.F.</td>
<td>71, 72n16, 72n17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosley, P.</td>
<td>25–6, 26, 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neier, A.</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson, J.M.</td>
<td>27, 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson-Pallmeyer, J.</td>
<td>78n28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neumayer, E.</td>
<td>3n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niebuhr, R.</td>
<td>32, 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nieburg, H.L.</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olson, M.</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orentlicher, D.F.</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasquarello, T.E.</td>
<td>2n2, 3, 66n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poe, S.C.</td>
<td>2n2, 3, 3n2, 66n4, 67, 67n5, 68n8, 69, 88, 89, 90, 91, 91n6, 92, 92n7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramstad, J.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randall, V.</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasler, K.</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regan, P.M.</td>
<td>3, 29, 96, 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richards, D.L.</td>
<td>3, 29, 69n10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rohde, D.</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roth, G.</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rothgeb, J.</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruttan, V.W.</td>
<td>1, 22, 25, 26, 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sathasivam, K.</td>
<td>168, 169, 174, 176, 178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schifter, R.</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schleifer, S.</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schleifer, Y.</td>
<td>140, 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schoultz, L.</td>
<td>2n2, 66n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schutz, W.</td>
<td>20n12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scott, W.</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharp, J.M.</td>
<td>46, 49, 50, 51, 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shestack, J.J.</td>
<td>13, 19, 20, 21, 44, 45, 55, 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shue, H.</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shukri, M.</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sirirangsi, R.</td>
<td>2n2, 66n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skocpal, T.</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith, J.</td>
<td>3, 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spalding, N.L.</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanier, J.</td>
<td>114, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spero, J.E.</td>
<td>28, 38, 173n16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starr, B.E.</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimson, J.A.</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoessinger, J.</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stohl Carleton</td>
<td>67n5, 67n7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stohl Carleton Johnson</td>
<td>43, 44, 66n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stohl, M.</td>
<td>2n2, 3, 3n2, 59, 60, 66n4, 67, 68n8, 69, 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streiten, P.</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taffet, J.F.</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tate, C.N.</td>
<td>67, 67n5, 68n8, 69, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, C.L.</td>
<td>67n6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tepperman, J.</td>
<td>14n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theobald, R.</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson, K.</td>
<td>34, 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thorp, W.</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilly, C.</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turner, S.</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaicius, I.</td>
<td>125, 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Dusen, A.</td>
<td>38, 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasquez, J.A.</td>
<td>2n1, 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincent, R.J.</td>
<td>16, 22, 23, 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weber, M.</td>
<td>9, 32–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wenger, M.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weston, B.</td>
<td>57, 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilford, W.</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfers, A.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yildiz, K.</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanger, S.C.</td>
<td>3n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimmerman, R.F.</td>
<td>27, 28, 46, 87, 173n16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subject Index

Abu Sayyaf 166n4
Afghanistan 150
  al-Qaeda and war in 61
  and Pakistan 162, 178
  and Soviet Union 166, 171–2, 174
Africa 73–4
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (1954) 76
al-Qaeda 61, 177
Alliance for Progress 115
Andean Counter-Narcotics Initiative 77
Anti-Terrorism Act (Pakistan, 1997) 176
Arab-Israeli Peace Treaty 51
Arango, Andrés Pastrana 122
Arbenz Guzman, Jacobo 115
Argentina 44
Aristide, Jean-Bertrand 116
Armenian genocide, Turkish 23, 24
Asia
  Pakistan as part of 164
  security and subsistence rights variables, mean values of 73–4
  US foreign aid and security rights in 166–7
Baghdad Pact (1955) 169
Ballenger, Cass 11
banana republics 114
Bangladesh 164, 166
Barkey, Henry 140
Beers, Rand 127
Bhutto, Benazir
  assassination of 161, 162, 179
  dismissal of 174
  election of 173
Biden, Joseph 161, 189
Borga, Ali 169n9
Bosch, Juan 115
Bosnia 57
Brazil 41, 44
Brown, Hank 168
Bulgaria 151n14
Burton, Dan 127
Bush, George H.W. 57–8, 116, 153, 154, 174
Bush, George W. 10, 14n6, 24, 47–8, 61–3, 161, 178, 179
Carter Doctrine 172
Carter, Jimmy 3, 14, 17, 24, 31, 43–5, 63, 116, 170, 172
Caspian Sea 147
Cedras, Raoul 116
Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) 89n1
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) 169, 170
Chavez, Hugo 117
Chechnya 23, 59
Child Survival and Health Programs (CSH) 75–6
Chile 41, 117
China 22, 58, 162
Christopher, Warren 43
Clark Memorandum (1928) 114
Clinton, Bill 116, 184
  China, and Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status 58
  economic aid, and human rights 60
  ‘extraordinary circumstances’, waivers for 60–61
  India, and nuclear policy 59
  Plan Colombia 125–7, 132
  promise unfulfilled 58
  Russia, economic aid to 59
  Saudi Arabia, support for 59
  US-India relationship 176–7
  US-Indonesia relationship 59
  US-Pakistan relationship 175, 176–7
  US-Turkey relationship 60
Cold War
foreign aid, and need for allies 23, 184
foreign policy, realpolitik view of 31
human rights, countries with poor records 14–15
Pakistan 168–73
security rights model 95
South, economic assistance to 38–9
subsistence rights, and fall of Iron Curtain 91
Truman Doctrine 9–10, 38–9, 38–40
US-Egypt relationship 45
US-Pakistan relationship 168–73

Colombia 10–11
see also Plan Colombia

Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) 11, 22, 123–4, 132

Committee for the Prevention of Torture (EU) 157

communism, combating
Alliance for Progress (Latin American countries) 40–41
Carter Administration 43–5
case-by-case evaluation 43–5
‘extraordinary circumstances’ waivers 44
Foreign Aid Assistance Act (1961) 40, 42
human rights policy, obstacles to 44–5
Latin American countries, rejection of foreign aid 44
military dictatorships, support for 115–17
national security, and foreign aid 40
Reagan and Bush years 55–8
USAID, creation of 40

Community Import Program (Egypt) 46
Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) 67

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) 19

Coolidge, Calvin 114–15
Correlates of War (COW) project 91
Coulter, Michael 47

Cranston, Alan 173, 174, 180
Croatia 151n14
Cuba 114, 115, 149
Cyprus 149, 158

de Tocqueville, Alex 103

Declaration of Independence 17

Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (1975) 19

Defense and Economic Cooperation agreement (DECA) (Turkey) 149
democracy
human rights determinants 88, 94–5, 98, 120–21, 185–6
interaction effects 102–103, 110
promotion of
Latin America 56–7
Pakistan 184, 186
Turkey 140, 156

Democratic Society Party (DTP) (Turkey) 156

Development Assistance program 75, 76
Dingell, John D. 139
Dominican Republic 114, 115

Dulles, Allen 38–9

Eastern Europe 73–4, 144
economic development, effect of aid on 25, 28, 173n16

Economic Support Fund (ESF) 46, 51, 74, 75, 77, 113, 154, 157, 183, 189

Ecuador 122

Egypt 101, 145
Camp David Accords (1979) 45–6
Cold War 45
controversy over 47
economic aid 46, 47
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 46, 51
human rights abuses in 47–9
and Israel, total US foreign assistance to 1960–2005 45f
Middle East, total US foreign assistance to, 1976–2003 146
military aid 46, 47
security rights 48, 49f
El Salvador 44, 116, 117, 118, 120
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) 76
Engel, Eliot L. 129, 130
ESF see Economic Support Fund

Eurasia
defining 141n1
oil interests 147
security and subsistence rights variables, mean values of 73–4
total US foreign assistance to 147, 148f
Turkey as part of 147–8
US republics of former Soviet Union
relationship 147
Europe
  Eastern 73–4, 144
  Western 141–2, 144
European Court of Human Rights 155
European Union, and Turkey 141, 143
accession negotiations 158
‘customs union agreement’ 157
member countries 157–9
PKK attacks, resumption of 158
Excess Defense Articles (EDA) 46n10, 51n16

FAA see Foreign Assistance Act
FARC see Colombian Revolutionary Armed
Forces
Federal Assistance Act (FAA) 142, 145
Filner, Bob 12, 139
food aid, confiscation of 27
Food for Peace initiative 76
Ford, Gerald 42–3
Ford, Jess T. 127
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (1961) 3n3,
10–11, 14, 37, 40, 42, 43n7, 75, 77,
78, 153, 170
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 46, 51,
75, 77, 78
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act 60
Franco, Adolfo 128, 131
Freedom House scale 68, 69
FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) 76
FREEDOM Support Fund (FSF) 75, 76
French Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizen (1789) 18

Ghiet, Ahmed Abdul 47
Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI) 75
Good Neighbor Policy 114–15
Goulart, Joao 41
Greece 10, 141, 143–4
Grenada 115–16
group rights 17
Guatemala 44, 115, 117, 118, 120
Gul, Abdullah 159
Gulf War (1990–1991) 150, 175

Haig, Alexander 56
Haiti 114, 116, 118
Hamas 20
al-Haq, Zia 170–71
Harken Amendment (1982) 3n3, 57
Hastert, Dennis J. 129
Helsinki Agreement (1975) 19
Hezbollah 54
HIV/AIDS 62, 75
Honda, Mike 129
Honduras 114, 116, 117
human rights
definitions of 56
cultural relativism versus
universalism 16–17
first generation rights 18–19
foreign policy, and types of rights
17–18
in general 15–16
human rights priorities, country/
cultural differences 16
political and civil rights 18–19
second generation rights 19–20
security rights 18–19
subsets of rights 16
subsistence rights 18
western ethnocentrism 17
and foreign assistance
causal relationship between 2–4
negative effect of 97, 99–100, 184–7
measurement of 66–74
and national security, tensions between
9–13, 184
human rights policy
communism, combating 9–10
congressional legislation 14
foreign policy constraints 22–4
liberal perspective
developing nations, and civil-
political rights 28–9
donor- and recipient-interests 28
economic development, facilitation
of 28
official developmental aid (ODA) 29
motivation, for aid
categories, of foreign assistance 25,
25t
donor self-interest 26
economic development 25
ethical considerations 25–6
exceptionalism 25–6
goals, of foreign assistance 25, 25t
humanitarian purposes 25
military purposes 25
and national interest 183–4
national security, three pillars of 25, 26
realpolitik perspective 26
subsistence 25
practical arguments
human rights, as global issue 20
human rights, link with peace and security 20–21
human rights violations, and public opinion 21–2
just world order 21
radical perspective
democratic process, impact on 27
economic aid, impact of 27–8
imperialism, Yankee 28
repression, and foreign aid 27, 29
recipient countries, human rights records of 14–15
reluctance to implement 13–14
rhetorical arguments 20
strategic aid
deontological view 33
ethic of consequence 32
ethic of conviction 32–4
ethic of responsibility 30, 32, 33, 34, 187–90
ethical realism 32, 34–5
intentions versus outcomes 33–4
morality, and politics 30, 34
national security, and ethics 34
patriotism 34, 35
realpolitik versus liberalism 31–2
US responsibility for consequences of economic aid, and human rights 188–90
foreign assistance, as public relations 18
morality, and security 188
recipient state, understanding 188
war on terror 10
Human Rights Watch 48, 132, 134, 135, 136, 152, 153–4, 156, 157, 158, 179
IMET see International Military Education and Training program
India
Clinton Administration 176–7
India-Pakistan relationship 166, 167, 174–5
Japan 165
Jefferson, Thomas 17
as South Asia sub-region 164
total US foreign assistance to 1950–2005 162–3, 165
US-Pakistan relationship 168–9
see also Pakistan
Indonesia 77, 164, 165–6
Inonu, Ismet 149
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976) 19, 70, 74
International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (1976) 18, 19, 74
International Criminal Court (ICC) 14, 35
International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDDA) 76
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program 46n, 75, 77, 78
International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) 60
Iran 23, 61, 162
Iraq
axis of evil 61
economic aid to 145
Iraq War, 2003 150, 178
Turkish attacks on 159–60
see also Gulf War
Islami Jamhorri Ittehand (IJI) 175
Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) 140
Israel 96n12, 99n14, 145
aid allocation
and human rights 52–5
as peacekeeping tool 45–6
Carter, and moral commitment 50
economic aid 51
emergency packages 51
and Hamas 54
military aid 50–51
Palestinians, and human rights violations 52–4
proportional responses to attack, US call for 55
security rights in 52, 53f, 54, 55
Shultz, and strategic commitment 50
special benefits 51–2
substantive results of aid, on security and subsistence rights 101
US-Israel relationship 49–50, 145
Subject Index

Johnson, Lyndon Baines 115, 149
Jordan 145, 146

Kashmir 162
see also Pakistan, nuclear tensions
Kennedy, John F. 17, 40–41, 114, 169f
Khan, Ghulam Ishaq 173
Khan, Mohammed Ayub 169n9, 170
Kissinger, Henry 41
Korean war 40, 164–5
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) 150–51, 153, 155–6
Kurds 12, 23, 57, 60, 139

Latin America

democracy, promotion of 56–7
regional differences 116–17
security rights, and foreign aid
  British influence 121
civil wars 120
democracy 120–21
economic aid, as percentage of GDP 118
foreign aid, distribution of 118, 119
leftist regimes 121
multivariate analysis 118–21
population size 121
post Cold War 120
security rights, mean values of 117–18
wealth levels 118, 120
security and subsistence rights variables, mean values of 73–4
substantive results 101
total US foreign assistance 1976–2003 116f
US interests in 114

Law to Fight Terrorism (Turkey 2006) 156
Leahy, Patrick 11, 125, 126
Liberia 101
Lowey, Nita 47

Macedonia 151n14
Machiavelli, Niccolo 31
Marshall Plan 10, 38–9, 141–2, 145, 148
Marx, Karl 103
McGovern, James 129
measurement, of human rights and foreign assistance
correlations
  bivariate relationships 80–85
foreign assistance and security rights 81–2, 81t, 82f, 83f
foreign assistance and subsistence rights 81t, 82–3, 83, 84f
foreign assistance
development assistance 74
economic assistance 75–7
Economic Support Fund (ESF) 74
foreign assistance, mean values of 79–80
former Soviet Bloc, aid to 74–5, 76
humanitarian assistance 74
military assistance 75, 78–9
mulilateral assistance 75
US security interests 74–80

human rights
definition of 66
division, of rights 66
reliability 67
security rights 67–70
security and subsistence rights variables, mean values of 72–4
subsistence rights 70–72
validity 67
Physical Quality of Life (PQLI), subsistence levels 65
Political Terror Scale (PTS), security rights 65
statistics, and need for measurement of human rights 65
US foreign assistance program, analysis of 66

Meek, Gregory 129
Menedez, Bob 161

Middle East

oil interests 145, 148
security and subsistence rights variables, mean values of 73–4
total US aid to 146, 163–4
Turkey as part of 140, 146

Middle East Peace Process 145

Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) 76
military regimes 90, 95, 99, 115–17
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) 62, 75, 76n26, 188
Miller, Andrew 127, 127n14
Milner, Lord 28
models, of human rights
  AR (1) specification, inclusion of 93
human rights, determinants of
British influence 92, 96, 99, 121
civil wars 90, 95, 98, 120
Cold War 91, 95, 98, 186
democracy 88, 94–5, 98, 120–21, 185–6
economic standing 88, 97–8, 185, 186
international wars 90, 95–8
leftist regimes 89–90, 95, 99, 121, 186
military regimes 90, 95, 99, 186
population size 91, 96, 99, 121
interaction effects
democracy, levels of 102–3, 110
foreign aid, democracy and human rights 104–7
foreign aid, democracy and security rights 105, 106t
foreign aid, wealth and subsistence and security rights 107–9
military aid, and democracy 106–7
wealth, levels of 103–4, 110
lagged dependent variable, inclusion of 93
military versus economic aid 110
national security concerns 109–10
OLS, use of 92n8, 93
pooled cross-sectional time series analysis 92–3
substantive results, of aid on security and subsistence rights
client states 100–101
countries with worst security rights records 100
humanitarian case 101
security rights, and predicted values of economic and military aid 100–102
US allies 101
see also security rights model; subsistence rights model
Mohammed, Ghulam 169n9
Monroe Doctrine (1823) 114
Mubarak, Hosni 47
Musharraf, Pervez 63, 161, 177, 178, 179–80
Mutual Security Act 142
Narcotics Control program 77
National Liberation Army (ELN) 123–4, 135
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) 24, 51, 139, 141, 149, 150, 178
Nicaragua 23, 114, 115n4, 116–17, 120
Nixon, Richard 14, 41, 117, 124n11
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related Programs (NADR) 75
Noriega, Roger F. 113
North Africa 73–4
North Korea 61
Nur, Ayman 47–8
Obey, David 47
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) 113
Official Development Assistance 3n4
oil interests 23, 145, 147, 148
OLS 92–3n8
Operation Provide Comfort 156
Organization of America States 117
Ortega, Daniel 115n4
Oslo Accords (1993) 55
Pakistan
and Afghanistan 162, 166, 171–2, 178
Agreement of Cooperation (1959) 168–73
Clinton Administration 175, 176–7
‘cold estrangement’ 174
democracy in 186
elections 173, 176
geopolitical significance of 162, 164, 174, 183
habeus corpus, suspension of 172–3
India-Pakistan relationship, role of 167
Iraq War, support for 178
‘marriage of convenience’ 169–70
martial law 170–73
Musharraf regime 179–80
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA) 169
non-NATO ally, Pakistan as 178–9
nuclear tensions 170–71, 174–5, 176–7
Political Terror Scale ratings 175–6
region, US interests in 162–7
sectarian violence 175, 176
security rights 1976–2003 168f
Symington Amendment (1979) 170
Taliban, Pakistan’s support for 177
total US foreign assistance to 162–3, 165, 170
Truman Administration 169
TurkofPakistan Pact (1954) 169
and US-India relationship 168–9
war on terror, cooperation in 26, 177–8, 179–81
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 171, 172, 175
Palestinians, and human rights violations 20, 52–4
Pallone, Frank 177
Pastrana, Andres 11
Peace Corps 20
peacekeeping operations (PKO) 77, 78, 79, 183
Peru 120
Philippines 164, 165
Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) 65, 71–2, 74, 89, 92n8, 98, 100
Pinochet, Augusto 117
Pizano, Ernesto Samper 122
Plan Colombia 20, 77
Andean Counterdrug Initiative 128
Clinton’s aid package 125–7, 132
Colombia, total US foreign assistance 1976–2003 130f
communism, and support for military dictatorships 115–17
displaced persons, numbers of 1984–2003 132, 133f
economic aid, benefits of 28
‘ethical considerations’, and ‘donor self-interest’ 26
Good Neighbor Policy 114–15
human rights
impact on 129–31
poor record of 10–12
reported improvements 126t, 132–4
human rights, negative effect of foreign aid on 185
humanitarian crisis, FARC provocation of 132
international relations, trade-offs in 113–14
military aid 113, 127–8
Plan Colombia program, key areas of 113
and security concerns 15
security rights, 1976–2003 131f
security rights violations, 1998–2003 132, 133f
Uribe crackdown, effects of 185
citizens, government abuse of 136–7
guerrilla and paramilitary forces, new abuses by 137
human rights workers, failure to protect 136
internally displaced persons 135, 137
Justice and Peace Law 135
new legislation 134, 135
paramilitary groups, attempts to demobilize 134, 135, 137
war on terror 138
US economic interventionism 114–15
USAID, justice system reforms 128, 131
violence, cycle of
free trade agreement, opposition to 122–3
warring factions 123–4
war on drugs 124–5, 183, 185
Platt Amendment (1903) (Monroe Doctrine) 114
Political Terror Scale 52–3, 65, 68–9, 131, 134, 150–51, 152, 153, 154, 155, 172, 174, 175–6
Polity IV measure, of democracy 88–9
Portugal 143
Powell, Colin 55
PQLI see Physical Quality of Life Index
Pressler Amendment 174, 175, 178
PTS see Political Terror Scale
Ramstad, Jim 185
realpolitik policies 15, 21, 26, 31–2, 41–3, 63, 187
Rice, Condoleezza 160
Richardson, Bill 161
rogue states 14n4
Romania 151n14
Roosevelt Corollary (Monroe Doctrine) 114
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 9, 114–15
Russia 59, 147, 148f
Rwanda 101
Sadat, Anwar 45, 46
Saddam Hussein 24, 57, 61
SALT II Treaty 23, 44
Sandino Liberation Front (Sandinistas) 116, 117
Saudi Arabia 23
Scheinin, Martin 156n25
School of Assassins 78n28
School of the Americas (SOA) 78
SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) 169, 170

security rights, measurement of
civil liberties 68
events-based measures 67
as independent versus dependent variable 66
political rights 68
standards-based measures 67–9

security rights model
pooled cross-sectional time series analysis 94t
aid variables, three-year lag 96–7
British influence 96
civil wars 95
Cold War 95
democracy 94–5
foreign aid, negative effects of 97
international wars 95
leftist regimes 95
military regimes 95
population size 96
predicted values of 95, 96f
wealth and democracy, predicted values of 94, 95f

September 11 attacks 61, 156–7
Shultz, George 50
Six Day War 50
socialism, containment of 9–10
Solis, Hilda 123
Somoza, Anastasio 116, 117
Souder, Mark 11
South Korea 164–5
South Vietnam 23
sovereignty concept 23–4

Soviet Union
Afghanistan 166, 171–2, 174
demise of, and increased economic aid 57–8
post-World War II threat from 38
and Turkey 149
Spain 143

State Department Country Reports 69–70
subsistence rights, measurement of
basic needs indicators 70–71
change of focus to 66–7
demographic data 70
Human Development Index 71n14

Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI)
71–2, 74
wealth, measures of 70

subsistence rights model
foreign aid and subsistence rights,
relationship between 98t
British influence 99
Cold War 98
democracy 98
economic aid, as negative influence 99–100
economic standing 97–8
international/civil war 98
leftist regimes 99
military aid, as positive influence 99–100
military regimes 99
population size 99

Sudan 23–4
Suharto, Haji Muhammad 59
Support for East European Democracy (SEED) 75, 76
Symington Amendment 178

Taiwan 165
terrorism, and human rights conditions 189

see also war on terror

Thucydides 31

Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) 60

Truman Doctrine 9–10, 20, 38–40, 148

Turkey
democracy, promotion of 140, 156
foreign aid program 10
foreign assistance, mean values of 79–80
geopolitical location of 140–41, 148, 183
human rights in
abuses, and diplomatic relationships 22–3, 24
Bush Administration 154
Clinton Administration 154, 156
ethnic conflicts 153
extreme abuses 151f, 153–4
gross violations 151f, 152–3
relative improvements 151f, 154–7
and security concerns 139–40
security rights, Political Terror Scale score 1976–2003 150–51
September 11 attacks, and increase in US aid 156–7
Middle East, Turkey as part of 140
region, US interests in
Eastern Europe 144
Eurasia 141–147
Europe all 144
Marshall Plan 141–145, 148
Mutual Security Act years (1953–1961) 142–3, 145
Turkey, as conduit of oil 147
Western Europe 141–144
security and subsistence rights variables, mean values of 73–74
sovereignty, and Kurds as domestic problem 23
total US foreign assistance to 143–4, 147, 148–9, 148f
Turkish government-PKK relationship
23, 139, 150–51, 153, 155–66
US-Turkey relations
Cold War 148, 149–50
common interests 150
Defense and Economic Cooperation agreement (DECA) 149
distrust, reasons for 149
future of 159–60
’strategic partnership’, 1999 150
US-Turkey ‘strategic partnership’ 156
war on terror 26, 150
western ties, of Turkey 140–41
see also European Union, and Turkey
TurkoPakistan Pact (1954) 169
Ukraine 147, 148f
UN Millennium Development Goals 70
United Declaration on the Right to Development (1986) 19
United Fruit Company (UFCO) 114, 115
United Nations Charter 16–17
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 71
United Nations Security Council 55
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 124, 134
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDR) (1948) 13, 16–17, 19, 42, 74
Uribe, Álvaro Vélez 122–3, 124, 129, 134–8
Uruguay 44
US Agency for International Development (USAID) 14, 42, 71, 75, 76, 180, 184
Uzbekistan 12
Vance, Cyrus 17–18
Venezuela 122
Vietnam War 14, 21, 31, 41, 165
Virginia Bill of Rights (1776) 18
war on terror
human rights policy 10
Pakistan 26, 177–8, 179–81
Plan Colombia 138
Turkey 26, 150
Washington Office on Latin America 132, 136–7
Welch, David 47
Wellstone, Paul 11, 12
Western Europe 141–2
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation 78
Westphalia, Treaty of (1648) 23
Wilson, Woodrow 9, 17
Wolfowitz, Paul 139, 150
World War II, post-war reconstruction
communism, battle against 39
economic aid 37–8
humanitarian aid 37–8
Marshall Plan 38–9
Soviet Union, threat from 38
Truman Doctrine 38–40
Turkey, military assistance to 39
US allies, strengthening of defensive capabilities of 40
1950s, and shift in focus to security 40
Yeltsin, Boris 59
Yom Kippur War 45