Patriotism has become a dirty word to some and a nostalgic exercise for others. For many on the left, it is a problematic concept, seen as the gateway to jingoism, nationalism and arrogance. For the right it is equated with outdated symbols of Britishness like the battle of Trafalgar and the Union Jack. On both sides of the spectrum, patriotism has been misconstrued, misrepresented and its significance undervalued.

A Place for Pride finds that there is disconnect between political narratives of patriotism and ordinary citizens’ pride in Britain. Drawing on qualitative research with over 2,000 British people from England, Wales and Scotland, this pamphlet argues that patriotism does not, and should not, come from either top-down narratives about Queen and country nor from so-called ‘progressive’ notions based on values. Instead, modern British patriotism is founded in a profound, emotional connection to the everyday acts, manners and kindnesses that British people see in themselves. This research also demonstrates, for the first time, the links between greater levels of patriotism and civic pride and pro-social attitudes and behaviours – those who love their country most are shown to volunteer more and to trust their neighbours more than those who are either ambivalent or ashamed about Britain.

In order to remedy the uneasy relationship the public has with patriotism, this pamphlet recommends overhauling the ‘Life in the UK’ citizenship test and radical changes to the way that history is taught in school. Finally, it recommends new narratives about pride, patriotism and the Big Society – explaining how politics can reconnect with the emotion and the practice of pride.

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A PLACE FOR PRIDE

Max Wind-Cowie
Thomas Gregory
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As ever, all mistakes and inaccuracies remain entirely my own.

Max Wind-Cowie
November 2011
Politics can no longer be distilled into questions of money and law. The bad things that we can bear to ban are – for the most part – banned. The good things that we can afford to provide are – for the most part – provided. Political clashes between libertarianism and welfarism, capitalism and socialism, or liberalism and fascism are – for the most part – historic rather than contemporary; they are certainly wars that we fight more elsewhere or against minority interest than they are genuine struggles for majority support. None of which is to say, of course, that politics is any easier or more straightforward now.

The conflicts may not be as big and bold as once they were but it is in their nuance and complexity that they come to life. The debate that captured the general election was, superficially, an old fashioned one about the size and form of the state. On the one side we saw Conservatives, with their freshly minted (if not tested) Big Society vision of a Britain with a smaller government. On the other stood Labour – still wedded to the good that the state can do and certain that the Big Society was little more than a beard for Thatcherism reborn. But buried beneath the big-state–small-state dingdong to which it was reduced, this argument told us a lot about where the real dividing lines of British politics are.

For the Conservative leadership the Big Society was buildable because of people’s innate altruism, kindness and generosity – attributes that would kick in once government ceased to misdirect people through its meddling and regulatory interventionism. For Labour this was nonsense – people rely on the state because they need it, not because they have been
perversely induced to do so. What is more – once the state
abdicates from swathes of public life, people will have less, not
more, control over how society functions; equality, fairness and
accountability will inevitably suffer as a result.

This argument may seem at once old-fashioned and petty –
it talks of the size of the state and results in quibbling about
which Sure Start centres stay and which go. But in truth it is
both relevant and profound – this is a debate about human
motivation and identity that Adam Smith would recognise well
and which goes to the very heart of the question of how society
ought to be formed. Of course, neither of these descriptions of
human nature is an entirely fair representation of the whole of
either of the political movements discussed. There are some on
the left – Blue Labour being the most recent and high-profile
home of this argument – who are passionately convinced of the
need to move away from the Fabian state. And there are many on
the right – from the neoliberal economic libertarians to the
experts of the ‘Nudge Unit’ – who see that pro-social behaviour
must be driven by the state, not simply left to flourish. But these
conflicting perspectives on who people are have nonetheless
driven the deepest political wedge between the parties that we
have seen in recent years.

The truth is that neither side has got this quite right. As
Patrick Diamond suggests in his essay, *From the Big Society to the
Good Society*, neither the left nor the right has stood up to ‘the
crisis of society’ – the fundamental importance of shared values
and traditions in our common life, which are being eroded and
undermined.²

The left’s pessimism about human nature, and its natural
trust in government to restrain our impulses, rubbed against a
desire for autonomy and for more tangible, local and practical
power for communities to exercise over themselves and their
environment. The right’s optimism depends too much on
altruism, generosity and – when that fails – financial incentives.
For most people altruism does not sufficiently motivate real
behaviour change – if it did then surely there would be no need
for a drive towards a ‘Big Society’, we would have one already
delivered through the milk of human kindness. Of course the
right acknowledge that this is probably so – and so they fall back on much the same levers as the left in order to try to solve it once they decide that, after all, rational self-interest is the mechanism that will deliver for them. But while incentives may work for simple policy objectives they do not work (or at least they do not work as well) for more complex objectives and long-term cultural change. A higher tax on aircraft fuel – an old-fashioned, incentive-based policy intervention – may well prohibit aircraft travel for some, lessen the number of flights and cut carbon emissions from air travel. But such an intervention will not lead to the cultural change that is required to really tackle global warming – it cannot inspire greater recycling or a more deeply felt individual responsibility to ration and restrain consumption in the interests of the wider environment. So called wicked problems – those issues that are fundamentally complex and cultural – are on the increase; they require a new set of interventions and a fresh approach to policy, one that places culture at the heart of both the problem and the solution.

In attempting to understand policy through culture, and to devise cultural solutions to political problems, we have to move beyond simplistic altruism too. The Big Society is in danger of being washed up on the shores of its own naivety – its own mistaken and self-evidently false perception of human nature. Conservatives have sought to deny the dark side of the self; yes, people can be generous, but they can also be selfish; yes, people can be persuaded to behave selflessly, but they are also prone to look out for their own and exploit others’ kindness. What is needed is a more nuanced, more realistic paradigm through which to understand human nature, culture and how each may be changed and channelled. That paradigm must be premised on a truer feeling for why people do good things, what forges a shared sense of achievement, worth and esteem, and of what it is that prevents some from doing things that might serve their immediate interest but which are uncivil or antisocial. That paradigm is pride and, naturally, its countervailing sentiment of shame.
What your granny already knows
Speaking at a Demos panel event in May 2010, the *New York Times* columnist and author David Brooks gleefully admitted that most of what was contained in his new book on happiness and success was ‘what your granny already knows’. He argued that many of the key debates in modern policy are not about discovering some all-encompassing new idea but about rediscovering, and finding ways to measure and prove the value of ideas and beliefs that society has partially forgotten. This pamphlet can be seen in that light.

As Adam Smith explained in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, ‘The most sincere praise can give little pleasure when it cannot be considered as some sort of proof of praise-worthiness.’

This pamphlet is concerned with how public forms of pride – both the civic and the national – might be better understood, better cultivated and better used to serve broader policy and behavioural objectives. We find that pride in the personal is deeply related to pride in the civic, which in turn is key to patriotism and – confusingly – that chain of pride works backwards as well as forwards. People who are proud of their house, friends or town are more patriotic and those who love their country are more likely to feel proud of the community around them.

We also find that pride in Britain is strong but that people are alienated by the way in which politicians talk about patriotism. British people are highly dubious of efforts to politicise their everyday, felt patriotic sentiments and they deeply distrust efforts to intellectualise their pride in their country. British politicians are at risk – through their wide-of-the-mark ventures into the discourse of patriotism – of turning British people off their sense of themselves.

And that is dangerous. Because many of the policy objectives that our politics widely agrees on – the need for more interpersonal trust, social cohesion, self-policing and greater levels of voluntarism – can be motivated by pride much more effectively than they can by either diktat or blind altruism. People respond to pride in their community and their country by behaving in positive ways.
All of which, as it were, my granny could tell you. And indeed, our polling showed that British people understand the positive role of pride as a motivator and signifier of positive behaviour. Our focus groups also told us something surprising and important – while they may not like talk of ‘values’ or of esoteric concepts of justice, British people have a very clear idea of what British culture and British pride is all about:

When you ask about what’s best about being British I think of all the people that give up their time to help other people, or to do good things in the community. That’s what makes me proud of this country.

Not only are volunteerism, social action and greater cohesion the products of pride but they are the things British people say they are proud of about our country.

**Defining pride**

Throughout this pamphlet a number of terms are used to describe different kinds of pride. It’s important to clarify what we mean from the start. After all, pride has long suffered from a duality of meaning and a contradiction of place – it both ‘comes before the fall’ but is also a sign of strength, consistency and moral righteousness.

The first thing to say is that pride is roughly analogous to, but not identical to, love. To be proud of one’s self is to love one’s self. To be proud of one’s family is to love them. To be patriotic, to be proud of one’s nation, is to love one’s country. Like love, pride can be felt in different ways towards different people, things, ideas, places and institutions. We can love both our parents and our partners, but not in the same way. So it is that we have divided pride into three broad types – in order to better describe what we mean by it and better understand how different forms of pride relate to each other and to behaviour:

- **Personal pride** is pride in things that are unique to an individual, under the control of the individual or affect only the individual.
Included in this category are pride in one’s appearance, one’s family, one’s friends and one’s home.

- **Civic pride** is pride in one’s locality or one’s community. This means pride in things that are not universal but which are collective, shared and not solely under one’s control. Included in this category is pride in things such as one’s town, region, religion and class.

- **National pride** is pride in one’s country. This is the simplest category; it refers essentially to patriotism.

  Like love, pride is not an exclusive sentiment. To feel proud of one’s haircut does not prevent one being proud of one’s garden too. But how proud one is of one thing can affect how one feels about another. This pamphlet aims to understand those relationships and, also, to understand how pride in different things leads to different outcomes and actions.

**The truth about pride**

In order to establish what British people are proud of, how they express that pride and how they feel about it we ran focus groups with representative samples of British citizens and polled over 2,000 British people from England, Wales and Scotland. We asked them about everything from their self-esteem to their view of the royal family. Many of the results are included in this pamphlet and there is a list of key findings included as an appendix. The full tables are available from the Demos website.

The truth about pride – as expressed to us by British people – should encourage us and also forewarn us of the difficulty we will have in promoting and cultivating it. Pride is a virtuous circle – pride in oneself makes one prouder of one’s family, community, identity and nation, and the same is true in reverse. Interventions to bolster and support pride at one end of this spectrum will have ripples elsewhere on it. The virtuous circle also applies to the impact that pride has – prouder people, for instance, volunteer more, while volunteering inspires greater levels of pride. Promoting positive behaviours will, therefore, have the neat side-effect of producing a prouder populace while
promoting pride should also provoke people to act in ways we approve of and celebrate. The difficulty comes – as it does with any complex system or network – in identifying where in these cycles intervention is best placed to make a positive difference and to improve the shape and nature of our society.

This pamphlet urges government to rediscover a concern for patriotism – which lies at one end of the spectrum of pride – with the intent of bolstering it, supporting it and producing the cascade in pride that will follow. Concurrently, it urges a feeling for the other end of that scale, for the small and the local – for grassroots pride. Here, public agencies can develop robust identities and frameworks for pride and shame that feel rooted in people’s lives, make visible difference and drive achievable change. These two ends of the spectrum, if tended to with due care and attention, will spread to fill the middle.

Most important, more important than action, is attention, understanding and concern. Government must pay regard to pride as both an end, a means and a symptom. Pride is what government should hope its citizens will feel; it is a means of persuading people to do (and to avoid) without using either money or the law and it is a sentiment that must be measured and tested in order to understand whether society is fulfilling its members.

Pride matters; this pamphlet aims to help us to understand why and how it matters and to give pride its proper place in policy.
It is clear that British people are worried about a perceived decline in our collective pride and patriotic sentiment. Overwhelmingly, British people believe that we are – collectively – less proud of Britain than our forefathers: 53 per cent believe that Britain is less patriotic than it was 25 years ago and 61 per cent argue that patriotism has declined over the last 50 years – over half of British people believe that we are ‘a lot less proud’ than we once were of Britain.

However, four in five British people are still happy to declare themselves ‘proud to be a British citizen’ and levels of patriotism in the UK are – when compared with those in other European nations – relatively healthy (figure 1).

So what is the truth of British patriotism? If, as British people worry, it is in decline, why is it that most people are prepared to admit pride in their British citizenship? And if it is healthy, alive and well – as the European Values Survey (figure 1) implies – then why the neuroses of politicians and public alike over British self-confidence?

Ordinary British citizens are proud of Britain – in the same way that most British people are proud of their community, family and values. But of those who agreed with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’ less than half agreed strongly. What is more, many members of focus groups from representative samples of British citizens had a strong disengagement from ‘patriotism’ – as a frame and perceived set of values – even when they expressed immense pride in their country.

People felt that ‘patriotism’ meant the last night of the Proms, the Union Jack and singing ‘Jerusalem’ – for most people none of these are familiar or particularly evocative and so they accept that they must not be patriotic after all. Many people feel excluded from the imagery and pomp of traditional patriotism.
and, while they are proud of Britain and of being British, assume that the term ‘patriotic’ just doesn’t, really, describe them:

*Patriotic means flying the flag and standing up for the national anthem and things like that. I think it’s fine that people do that but it’s not really me, if you know what I mean? I suppose I’m not really ‘patriotic’ but I do think I’m proud of British things.*

*It’s a bit weird to be really, really patriotic. I don’t think it’s racist or anything, like people say, I think it’s harmless really but it’s more that it’s old-fashioned. It’s sort of more for posh people, isn’t it?*
This attitude – one of distance from traditional forms and expressions of patriotism but robust national pride – was borne out in our polling. That distance from the perceived emotions of patriotism has led British people away from the kind of self-confident and self-expressed patriotism that politicians from Gordon Brown to David Cameron have sought to mourn and to revive. It is not that pride in Britain has demised, rather that it no longer fits into the mould that has been pushed and promoted as the appropriate means of identifying and expressing it. And in that mismatch strong feelings of pride in Britain have declined – as people feel that while they feel proud they cannot truly describe themselves as proud because they do not share the feelings and habits of those who are seen as ‘patriotic’.

Part of the perceived demise in patriotism may also relate to the uneven and uncertain devolution that has empowered some home nations with assemblies and parliaments in the hope of recognising politically regional identities. While the European Values Survey paints a picture of robust patriotism in the UK, our findings drill down into what really commands the loyalty and pride of British people and tells us that while some regional identities appear not to detract particularly from a broader, patriotic national pride, others do.

It is also the case that, while regional pride (a sense of identification with and pride in the part of Britain someone comes from) is strong, it is highly variable between regions of the UK. The extent to which it is hyper-local communities, cities, regions, countries or Great Britain as a whole of which people are proud also varies very considerably depending on where people live.

When asked to complete the sentence ‘I am proud to be from...’ – and given the option of ‘my city/town/village, my country or region, my part of the UK (eg England, Scotland, Wales), Great Britain, Europe, the World as whole, another country, or other’ – almost three in ten English and one in five Welsh respondents replied ‘Great Britain’ while that answer was given by just over 15 per cent of those living in Scotland. In Scotland almost two-thirds of respondents gave ‘my part of the UK (eg Scotland, Wales or England)’ as the place they are
proudest to be from (compared with just a quarter of English people and just half of the Welsh). Furthermore, English residents are far more likely to say that they are proud to be a British citizen than are residents of Scotland and Wales – in fact, only a fifth of Scottish residents strongly agree to feeling pride in Britain, compared with a third of English and a quarter of Welsh residents.

Even within England, there are real divides over to what extent citizens are ‘proud’ of Britain. People living in the North East and the North West of England are much more likely to strongly agree with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’ than those from the South – and residents of London are most likely, of anywhere in the UK, to say that they are ‘proud to be from Great Britain’.

At the same time, shame and embarrassment in Britain are strongly felt. More than half of British people have been ‘embarrassed to be British’ while only 24 per cent said that they had never been embarrassed by Britain.

**Proud... of what?**

Contrary to many of the more pessimistic narratives about our collective identity and view of ourselves, British people are ready to identify things about Britain and our communities of which they are proud. What’s more, the sources of pride that British people volunteer marry closely to behaviours and activities that are, in fact, commonplace in British society and promote other positive sentiments and behaviours.

However, it is vital that government – if, as it should, it wishes to inspire and cultivate pride – recognises that British people are substantively less susceptible to many of the tools of patriotism that are most often used by leaders than they imagine.

Traditional symbols of patriotism returned relatively healthy scores in polling but failed to ignite full-blooded support in focus groups and were by no means able to command an overwhelming positive level of pride. The traditional institutions of British patriotism – including the royal family – inspired around the same level of pride (some two-thirds of participants agreed
they were proud of these symbols and institutions) – leaving a sizeable minority nonchalant and uninspired. It is worth noting that those we polled consistently had more pride in the National Trust, Shakespeare and family group and social network than in more explicitly patriotic institutions.

We asked members of our focus groups whether they took pride in some British institutions and cultural icons. The results are shown in table 1.

What is more, our focus groups shed light on the declining pull of traditional institutions such as the royal family:

*I like them. And I don’t want to get rid of them and have a president or anything like that so I suppose I think they’re a ‘good thing’, but proud? I don’t think I’m proud of them at all.*

*It’s not so much the scandals. More that they’re just there, aren’t they? They haven’t really done anything, except for the Queen Mother, but she’s dead. So I don’t think we can be proud of them, even if we keep them.*

The sentiments expressed towards the royal family were overwhelmingly positive but they were not, on the whole,
feelings of ‘pride’. This is borne out by our polling: while the royal family scored positively, only 33 per cent of people felt strongly that they were proud of the royal family.

Rather – when seeking to explain and describe things that make people feel proud of their community or country, British people tend to reach for behaviours and actions that they approve of and feel contribute to a wider sense of the good. Our focus groups brought up social action, community engagement and volunteering as facets of Britain in which they felt pride:

*I think of being British as being about littler things, more boring I suppose. Like doing your bit and manners and helping out. The thing about British people is that we do things for each other, you know? Being British is more about the way we are than things like Buckingham Palace or Parliament.*

Our more in-depth work with members of the British public leads us to the conclusion that the royal family, while popular, does not in and of itself inspire widespread pride. However, it is certainly the case that – through their unique capacity to hold and lead genuinely national events – the royal family has a central role to play in developing pride. As proof of this our polling, which was carried out shortly after the royal wedding between Prince William and Katherine Middleton, showed the positive impact of collective mass moments – particularly those covered by international media. Of those who watched the royal wedding, nine in ten were ‘proud of how Britain was represented’ while those who watched the event either in person or live on TV – and therefore, in their own small way, took part – were 21 per cent more likely to claim they were ‘proud to be a British citizen’.

Similarly, both our polling and our focus group research pointed to a lack of purchase of more esoteric, but nonetheless oft-used, symbols of British patriotism and uniqueness.

The concept of ‘British culture’ does relatively little to inspire pride in Britain. As with attitudes to the royal family, the public are not negatively predisposed towards the idea of British culture but they find it vague, are sometimes put off by
seemingly esoteric discussions about it, and are not passionate about it as a reason for pride.

Only one in four people say they are ‘very proud of British culture’ and just one in three are ‘very proud of British history’. This finding was again borne out by the responses of focus group participants – who felt that culture and history were lacklustre and vague as cleavages or symbols of pride:

_Not one of the people of this table can give the date of the Battle of Trafalgar. How can that be a symbol of Britain for normal people then?

_I don’t really know what ‘culture’ is. You said about democracy and the law in your examples but they’re not just British are they? If you asked an American what was good about America they’d say the same thing, or the French._

Only half of people say they are proud of Britain’s legal system, while less than that are proud of the British Parliament. Both scored less than either the Beatles or British sporting achievements.

There is a well-established argument that this relative nonchalance concerning historic British victories and the British contribution to the norms and values of the world must be met with a renewed effort to educate and inspire. To some extent, this may be the case. However, there is very limited appetite among British people for ‘propaganda’ about Britain and Britishness:

_I know they do all that in the US – with the flag and re-enacting the Thanksgiving dinner – but that’s just not us, is it? It’s almost like if you tried to make Britain more patriotic like that you’d be being sort of unpatriotic because it would be so un-British._

It is important for government to attempt to cultivate public forms of pride in Britain. Both at the community level – where it inspires more pro-social behaviour and greater collective efficacy – and at the national level – where it increases social cohesion and interpersonal trust – pride is a vital and often missing component of public policy. But our polling and
detailed research with British people demonstrates the inadequacy of premising such efforts on ancient institutions or on vague – easily dismissed – claims to uniqueness.

Some symbols, ideas and institutions shone through as being sources of pride for British people – foremost among them, and of particular significance given the growing political consensus for a more communitarian and active set of social norms – was voluntarism.

The British are among the most likely people in the world to give up our time to volunteer. We have significantly higher levels of social action – and a greater and more established independent charitable sector – than most peer European countries. This heightened public engagement was highlighted in our own polling: two-thirds of respondents had volunteered at some point in the past 12 months.

That figure is impressive enough on its own – but it is also worth bearing in mind that even that two-thirds majority probably understates the amount of voluntary action undertaken by British citizens. Previous polling on volunteering and charitable behaviour have under-reported volunteering because respondents fail to identify activities in which they participate – collecting shopping for elderly neighbours, collecting a friend’s children from school – as volunteering. We can see, therefore, that social action and voluntary behaviour in British society is well established. What is more, it is an area of British life about which British people are proud and, indeed, patriotic.

Our focus groups – which featured in discussions about what features of life are ‘uniquely British’ and cause feelings of pride – returned time and again to the idea that volunteering and community and social action are both British behaviours and ones about which people are immensely proud:

*When you ask about what’s best about being British I think of all the people that give up their time to help other people, or to do good things in the community. That’s what makes me proud of this country.*

*In my area a group of residents decided to get together and clear up the park. It was really a mess because all the kids used to hang out there and*
leave their rubbish all over it. Anyway, they organised a day and we all went along and helped to clear it and that made me feel good about myself for helping but also really good about the community. And now, because we all helped to do it, I feel much more like it’s mine, you know?

Not only was volunteering something that made people feel proud of Britain, but it was also something that they felt demonstrated pride:

When someone’s proud of where they live or who they are they protect it, don’t they? People who are proud of their street keep it clean, people who are proud of their neighbourhood keep an eye out for it and people who are proud of their country – well, they’re prepared to fight for it like in the war. I worry people don’t seem as proud as they were. You wouldn’t get them volunteering like they did in the war now.

This link between volunteering and pride – the feeling that prouder people are more socially conscious people – also shone through in our polling. Four in five respondents agreed with the statement ‘People who are proud of themselves and their community behave in more positive ways’.

The feeling that British people have of there being a clear link between a person’s level of pride and their level of volunteering and social action is confirmed by regression analysis of our polling. When other variables – such as class, gender, age and ethnic origin – were controlled for, the connection between a person’s level of volunteering and feelings of pride and patriotism was clear. Those who had volunteered in the 12 months before our poll were not only more likely to feel proud of their community – as one might intuitively expect – but were also significantly more likely to respond positively to the question ‘Are you proud to be a British citizen?’

This sense of British identity being interlinked closely with volunteerism and social action also fed into people’s feelings about institutions in which they were happy to invest pride. The institution that scored the second highest level of patriotic sentiment among our focus group participants was the National Trust, a charity that depends on volunteers throughout the UK.
The personal and the public
Throughout the research for this pamphlet we have attempted to draw a line between personal and public pride, as while personal pride – pride in those things directly controlled by you or only affecting you – is important, it does not lead to the same positive social outcomes as does public pride – pride in those things that are not directly controlled by you or which affect more people than yourself. This assumption is borne out by our polling work, which demonstrated, for instance, that while there is a strong causal connection between your level of pride in your community or your British citizenship and your level of volunteering there is none whatsoever between your pride in your appearance and volunteering. However, personal pride is not to be dismissed. It too has social policy implications – primarily because certain forms of personal pride are linked inextricably to public pride in the civic and the national.

Levels of personal pride in the UK are much higher than are levels of public pride. Nine in ten respondents to our polling said they were proud of their family and four in five of their friends. When asked, nine in ten of people say they are proud of their personal values while only two in five claim to be ‘proud of their local community’.

However, we cannot dismiss personal pride out of hand – it is an important stepping stone towards greater public pride and a useful, more easily impacted, area for targeted public policy intervention. For example, strong levels of pride in one’s home, family, personal values and ethnic group are all strongly correlated to feelings of wider, public pride – either in one’s community or in Britain. This is an important link in the chain that connects pride in the community with pride in Britain and, in turn, produces positive behavioural outcomes in those who are proud.

There are some clear policy lessons from our analysis of pride levels and the connectivity between personal and public pride. For example, our research shows that people who are proud of their ethnic group – be that white British or black and minority ethnic (BME) – are far more likely to say they are proud to be a British citizen. This finding highlights the vital importance of encouraging individuals to be confident in talking about their ethnic identity:
I have no problem being a Muslim and being British. But I think, in a funny way, part of that comes from growing up without many other Muslims around. I was always having to explain what a Muslim is and what we believe and why I wasn’t eating.... It was annoying sometimes but it made me confident talking about who I am. And it meant I could express that without having to go over the top or wear something special to prove it.

The clear implication of our research is that, contrary to the fears of many on left and right, strong ethnic and religious identification and pride do not necessarily disrupt social cohesion and those who are confident about their differences are better able to sign up to and invest in British identity. That in mind – and with the clear and causal links proven between public pride and further social engagement, interpersonal trust and volunteerism – government should be seeking to aid the development of ethnic and religious confidence in young people as a means to boosting their patriotism and pride in the wider community.

One way to do this is to learn from existing initiatives that encourage mixing between people of different faiths and ethnicities in order to develop confidence and promote joint working. The Three Faiths Forum – which exists ‘to build lasting relationships between people of different faiths (and those of non-religious beliefs)’ – is an organisation with a strong track record in this area, and one from which government can certainly learn. Its Undergraduate ParliaMentors programme brings together groups of young people from different faiths and non-religious beliefs and assigns them to an MP or Peer, who mentors them through a social action or public education project of their own choosing. The scheme not only encourages and enables positive outputs from the young people involved but also presents them with an opportunity to work closely with people of the same age but from very different backgrounds and beliefs. One mentee said:

I hadn’t really had to explain being Jewish before because most of my friends are Jewish anyway. But the people I worked with, neither of them had even met a Jewish person before. I found it quite daunting but it was
good and it helped me in a way to understand who I am as well as to know more about Islam and Christianity. In the end, the things we sometimes fell out about were what we were doing on the project – not God.

On issues of private identity the temptation is sometimes to encourage people to leave their differences at the door in order to better engage in public and civic life. Patriotism is seen by some as a replacement for, or a higher order than, ethnic and religious identities. But our research suggests, strongly, that public pride and personal pride are not only compatible but complementary – those who are more proud and confident in their ethnic identity are also more patriotic and more invested in their wider community. Prouder people are more patriotic and all of these sentiments cause behaviours and attitudes that we want more of – government should, therefore, be calibrating its engagement with young people from religious and ethnic minorities to support and build their pride and confidence in their identity. This is not as a replacement for promoting patriotism – patriotism follows from a more assured sense of who you are – but as a means to doing so that is not at risk of alienating or appearing disconnected from the realities of young people’s feelings and experiences of Britain.
2 The mechanics of pride

As the discussion has so far illustrated, pride and patriotism correlates with a number of positive social outcomes, including a more trusting society and an active citizenry. People who are patriotic about Britain are also more active and more socially minded – and those who are proud of their community (geographical and/or ethnic and religious) are much more likely to be patriotic. This causal relationship between personal, community and patriotic pride and between forms of public pride and positive behaviour form a chain, which – if government can act in ways to boost and support it, and to encourage individuals to feel more pride at its various levels – is a promising area for public policy aimed at behaviour change.

As has been outlined above, not only does pride lead to volunteering but volunteering also feeds back in order to develop and strengthen pride. In social policy, these kinds of relationships are often described as ‘mechanisms’ – they are the connections between feeling, actions and behaviours that make us the people we are. We know that pride is a mechanism that triggers more social involvement, interpersonal trust and positive action – but we also know that these behaviours are mechanisms that trigger greater pride. It is important, therefore, to understand what factors help to predict whether someone enters into this virtuous feedback loop – what makes some people more likely to be proud, to volunteer and to increase their pride?

There are a number of factors associated with low levels of public pride and the risk of degrading pride that exists; some of these are individual and some are more broad, social challenges. Below we lay out the individual factors that may impact heavily on a person’s level of pride and also look at the social threats to public pride in the UK.
Social factors
Immigration and identity
Less than a fifth of British people disagree with the statement ‘immigration can make it harder to identify Britishness’. Further, more than 60 per cent of people agree that ‘it is important that British culture remains different from other cultures’ and only two in five people believe that ‘immigration contributes to Britain’s culture’.

This is a worrying set of results but they should be interpreted not as simplistic racism or xenophobia but as a more complicated, nuanced range of concerns about migrant populations in the UK. Our focus groups emphasised a level of pride among participants in Britain’s perceived tolerance, openness and receptiveness to new arrivals and different cultures. However, they too highlighted genuinely held concern that local and national pride are being damaged by mass immigration and, particularly, by a perceived failure of arrivals to fully integrate into British life and the communities to which they move.

The language used to discuss these problems was not the language of a ‘civilisation clash’ or of insurmountable religious and ethnic difference. Rather, participants used the language of manners and practical difficulty to explain their frustrations:

*When people in my area don’t speak English it makes it harder. You can’t speak to them even to say ‘hello’ because they won’t understand it and that just makes trouble and is embarrassing.*

*Some of the families on my road, from other countries, they don’t have the same approach that everyone else on the street does, you know? They sit out on the street and make noise and I don’t know what to say to them about it because I don’t know if they speak English even and I don’t want to get called a racist.*

*My mum’s street, they all used to know each other and they all got on – not exactly best friends but, you know, to say hello to and to watch each other’s kids, stuff like that. But now it’s so mixed-up you don’t really know who’s who and you can’t ask someone for help when you’ve never met them and you don’t know them from Adam. It makes it harder to feel like you’re part of a community. It feels like you’re just living in your house and*
everyone else is just living in their houses and you’ve nothing to do with each other at all.

What is clear is that integration, at root, is a more pressing issue for British people than either race or a more technocratic argument around numbers and economics. Cultural difference – coupled with language barriers and an uncertainty about the acceptability of challenging behaviour seen as inappropriate or antisocial – is perceived as undermining community and the sense of commonality that people regard as important for building localised pride.

Focus group participants were keen to outline successful immigration stories from their own lives. These stories overwhelmingly involved migrants participating in community activities and ‘giving something back’ to the community – which behaviours appeared not only to make British citizens feel more warmly about particular migrants but also to reassure communities and individuals that migrants had indeed integrated into the wider community:

There’s a woman works at my son’s school. She came over from Africa, Nigeria or somewhere, and she’s part of the community. She runs the after-school club and she’s always at the school fete and helping out with things at the church. There’s no problems there at all.

It is also worth noting that our focus groups and poll were socio-economically and ethnically representative of the UK population overall. As previous studies have shown, concern about immigration and integration are by no means limited to white British individuals. In our focus groups the conversations about problems caused by migration were often led – and were certainly heavily contributed to – by black and minority ethnic (BME) members of the group. This may be, in part, a product of the social dynamic of focus groups – BME participants may have felt more able to speak openly about fears stemming from mass immigration without worrying that their views may be misinterpreted as racially motivated or xenophobic. But it is also borne out by our polling, which showed that BME respondents were
just as likely to express concerns about the impact of immigration as white British respondents.

What is eminently clear is that British people perceive uncontrolled and poorly managed migration as being a threat to pride at both the community and national level.

The sources of that threat are not – it would appear – racial, religious or necessarily about sheer numbers. Rather, people are concerned that there are practical consequences of poor integration that make it harder for communities to come together and harder to accept migrants as part of the British national story – the more migrants there are the more of a threat migrants pose to national identity.

British people associate their pride heavily with actions and behaviours rather than with esoteric concepts, religious beliefs or ethnic identity. Volunteering, social action, common manners and customs are vital to British people understanding and celebrating their communities and national sense of self: the perceived lack of integration among migrant communities therefore is a real threat to collective pride:

_They don’t queue up – some of them – like in the Post Office; they just march up to the counter. And it makes me think, what is this country becoming? When there are people who live here but don’t know, or can’t be bothered with, normal manners?_

Individuals, families and groups who – either for practical reasons such as a lack of English language skills or because they are focused on action within their communities – are seen to reject the expectations, customs and norms of the communities in which they live are not only perceived to be rejecting British identity but can also wound the pride of the people they live alongside and erode their sense of collective identity.

Of course it would be fair to say that a great many non-migrants fail to volunteer, fail to observe soft social codes and expectations and are anything but pro-social. Indeed, the overwhelming emphasis on community and social action – in our polling and focus groups – when discussing patriotism and pride
may be more aspirational than reflective. While it is true that Britain volunteers a great deal, it is not the case that this is so enshrined within our way of life as to make it universal.

However, British people feel strongly that there is a greater burden of effort to be placed on those who migrate here:

*British people aren’t perfect. God knows our society isn’t. But if you come over here and expect to be made welcome – and you should be made welcome – then you have to understand how to be polite and how to do your bit for the community you’re joining. Otherwise it’s like going to someone’s house and having your dinner at six o’clock in the evening even though they all eat at nine.*

We also asked focus group participants their views on citizenship tests. There was wide support for these tests – three-quarters of respondents felt they were important and there was overwhelming support for the principle – if not the practice – of expecting applicants for UK citizenship to sit them.

Yet our poll also showed great support for reform to the way in which the test is carried out and its focus. Support for a test rose to 82 per cent when it focused on values rather than knowledge. As discussed above, the primary source of British pride in values is exhibited in support for social action, volunteering and common manners rather than in more intellectual ideas such as ‘justice’ – it is clear there is considerable support for changing the test to reflect this.

It is also important to note that while focus group participants and those polled felt, overall, that immigration was a threat to national identity and to patriotic sentiment, greater levels of personal patriotism reduced antipathy towards migrants themselves. Our poll asked whether non-British people living in the UK were ‘generally trustworthy’; people who self-identified as proud to be a British citizen were almost twice as likely to agree than those who were ambivalent or negative about their own British identity.
Regional nationalism

Devolution in Scotland and Wales has led to self-governing nations within the UK. In both countries there are high levels of pride at the national or regional level but there are stark differences in how pride in Scotland and pride in Wales impact on patriotism in Britain as a whole.

Overall, in looking at England, Scotland and Wales, it is clear that English people have a weak conception of ‘English nationalism’ while Scottish people have a strong sense of ‘Scottish nationalism’ and a weaker sense of ‘British nationalism’. Meanwhile Welsh people have been able to combine a strong sense of ‘Welsh nationalism’ with a strong sense of ‘pride in being British’.

More than three-quarters – 81 per cent – of English people agreed with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’; the number of Welsh people who were proud to be British citizens was only slightly lower at 75 per cent, but the number of Scottish people who were proud to be British citizens was substantially lower at 61 per cent. Surprisingly, the Welsh were the most likely to agree with the statement ‘I am proud of Britain’s role in the world’. Over 50 per cent of English people agree with this statement, over 55 per cent of Welsh and 46 per cent of Scots.

Our survey also asked respondents to complete the sentence ‘I am proud to be from...’ and given the options ‘my city/town/village, my country or region, my part of the UK (eg England, Scotland, Wales), Great Britain, Europe, the World as a whole, another country, or other’. Almost three in ten respondents in England and Wales stated ‘Great Britain’, compared with just 15 per cent of Scottish respondents. Scottish people are less likely to state that they are proud to be a British citizen than the Welsh and English.

It is clear that regional and national patriotism does not necessarily correspond with a breakdown in support for, and pride in, Great Britain and the UK. Welsh citizens felt most comfortable and confident articulating their support for Britain in the world and their pride in our national actions while maintaining significant pride in their home nation. In this sense, as with ethnic and religious identities, regional and national identities within the UK need not be seen as threats to patriotism.
in Britain – indeed, they may even be helpful in bolstering and supporting pride. It is possible that Welsh identity – having been sufficiently expressed through the National Assembly and cultural institutions – helps to support the higher levels of pride in Britain’s role in the world in Wales.

However, Scottish citizens are less adept at combining their Scottish identity with their British identity – choosing on the whole to take pride in one or the other. This presents a very real threat to British patriotism as Scottish identity appears to be displacing a wider sense of British pride rather than reinforcing or coexisting with it. It is possible that the political use of patriotism by the Scottish National Party has contributed to this phenomenon.

**Unemployment**

Unemployed people register lower levels of pride across the whole spectrum of pride we tested – particularly in social networks and community. They are at high risk of having low levels of personal and public pride and, therefore, at high risk of having low levels of interpersonal trust, being unlikely to volunteer, and likely to have high levels of mistrust for non-British residents of the UK. This risk factor is, to some extent, an individual challenge; however, because of high levels of current unemployment, particularly among young people, and because of the concentration of unemployment in particular regions and communities, we believe it to be a key social factor.

People in full and part-time work were 20 percentage points more likely to agree that they are proud of their friends than unemployed people are – highlighting low levels of community pride and interpersonal trust among those who are out of work. This pattern was continued through other important strands of personal pride – such as pride in the family and the home – so unemployed people are less likely to enter into the ‘chain of pride’ with the building blocks of strong, confident esteem in their networks and themselves. This low level of pride also significantly reduces the likelihood of their engaging with social capital – reducing their likelihood of
building pride, interpersonal trust and the positive behaviours related to them.

The lack of important personal pride and vital public pride among the unemployed is a very real social and individual problem. Socially, it means that these individuals are less likely to engage in activities that further bolster and support a sense of esteem, and they have no important motivating factor encouraging them to volunteer. Individually, this presents problems for individuals in their capacity to engage in social capital building.

An obvious solution would be to find these individuals jobs. It is not surprising that employment has such a significant impact on pride at both the personal and public level – employment often requires mixing with individuals of different social class, ethnicity, age or faith, boosts esteem through personal achievement and involves participation in the norms of everyday British life (factors that our polling show are crucial to building pride). However, it is unrealistic to demand that government provides jobs to all those who find themselves unemployed – and if any government was prepared to do such a thing it would be unlikely that its motivation was pride on its own. The challenges to pride of unemployment, though, can be met through means other than job creation. These risks can be mitigated just as well through social action projects as they would by work.

That is not to say that the unemployed would be fine if only they volunteered – they would still be economically vulnerable – but the negative and corrosive effects of unemployment on both their self-esteem and public pride could be countered. Engagement in well-managed and purposeful social action projects – which aimed for social mixing as far as possible and produced visible community outcomes – would help to prevent the slide out of pride that appears to be a feature of British welfare.

**Individual factors**

In our quantitative research we also looked at the distribution of patriotism among different demographic groups. This has
allowed us to create a picture of the characteristics of a patriotic person and to identify those factors that make a person significantly less likely to feel strong public pride in either their community or their country. We find that gender, age and religion are all important factors in determining how proud people are.

Gender
When other variables – such as class, occupation and ethnicity – are controlled for – there are highly significant differences in the kinds of pride felt by men and women.

All other things being equal, men are more likely to be ‘very proud’ to be a British citizen than women. Only 30 per cent of women say they are ‘very proud’ compared with 35 per cent of men. This highlights a gender disparity in feelings of patriotism – with men seemingly much more comfortable expressing and affirming pride in Britishness than are women. Yet in other areas – particularly personal pride – women had much higher levels of esteem; for instance women were more likely to say that they were proud of their friends, family and local community than men.

Our research shows there is a direct correlation, for the population as a whole, between pride in one’s community and patriotism. This is positive as the research also demonstrates that patriotic sentiment promotes greater levels of social engagement because it feeds into the ‘cycle’ of pride, reinforcing esteem at other levels. However, for women this cycle appears to be less straightforward. They have high levels of personal and civic pride but do not translate this as readily into greater patriotism. This is a risk factor in the cycle discussed – it makes women’s local and personal pride more vulnerable as it is not reinforced at the national level.

Some women in our focus groups displayed dissatisfaction with the nature of patriotism as they understood it, describing a heightened sense of the wider feeling of redundancy that emerged through the sessions and our polling:
If being ‘proud to be British’ is about celebrating the Second World War or whatever then I guess I’m not really. I’ve got other things to worry about; I just don’t really care so, no, I guess I’m not patriotic.

It all just seems a bit silly to me. Flags and the national anthem and things. I suppose it’s nice for those who like it – for older people and things – but I don’t think I’ve ever really thought about being British or what that means.

Age
There are disparities in patriotism and pride between generations but these are not as marked, nor as straightforward, as people believe. Our polling shows that British people overwhelmingly fear that levels of patriotism have declined over the last 25 and 50 years. To some extent they are right – people aged over 65 are indeed more likely to say that they are proud to be a British citizen. However, the degree of difference in patriotic sentiment between those post-retirement and those aged between 18 and 24 was only 10 per cent – less stark than the difference in the comparative levels of pride in their social networks between the employed and the unemployed.

While marginally prouder of their British identity than younger people, those aged 65 and over are significantly more pessimistic about Britain’s future: 54.6 per cent of older people compared with just one-third of young people believe that ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’. Of course, part of that level of pessimism is related to stage in the life-cycle – it may well be the case that many older people, preparing to take a less dynamic role in their work or their community, feel that British society is getting worse. However, there is also a degree of unfamiliarity – or more precisely, a strong feeling among some older people that young people are unfamiliar with them – that hinders optimism:

I do feel Britain is getting worse, not better. The young people now don’t feel like they owe anything to anyone, they’ve no idea really. How can you say that we’re part of one society or community or whatever when they’re not interested in anything I have to say?
My grandson, he doesn’t know anything really about my life. The Miner’s Strike, the Winter of Discontent, even the referendum on Europe – he’s never been taught about any of it. Ask him about the Victorians and he could tell you though.

Our analysis showed that the most beneficial activities to inspire civic or national pride were those that involved the greatest mixing of social class, gender, ethnicity and, importantly, age. A focus on contact between older and younger people would not simply help to reassure and familiarise both groups with the norms and ideas of the other – it would bolster pride significantly among younger people while increasing interpersonal trust and optimism among older people.

Religion
People who are religious are more likely to be patriotic than are those who self-define as atheists or non-believers. This finding is significant for a number of reasons – but most importantly because it shows that:

· a strong identity aside from the national or civic does not necessarily conflict with patriotism and public pride but supports greater feelings of national esteem
· in order for a person’s religious identity to contribute to, and support, feelings of patriotism it does not necessarily have to be a religion that is in some way ‘national’ or even majority

Our polling shows that 88 per cent of Anglicans and Jews agreed that they were ‘proud to be a British citizen’ alongside 84 per cent of non-conformists and 83 per cent of Muslims – compared with 79 per cent for the population as a whole. Religious faith also influences optimism about Britain’s future – although here the results are a little less clear-cut, with differences between different faiths in how they respond to the statement ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’. Almost 50 per cent of Anglicans agreed with the statement – compared with a baseline of 45 per cent, making members of the Anglican
Communion marginally more pessimistic about Britain than the population as a whole.

However, significantly, British Muslims were less likely to agree – only 31 per cent believe that our best days are behind us – than either Anglicans or the population as a whole. This optimism in British Muslims is significant as – combined with their high score for pride in British – it runs counter to a prevailing narrative about Muslim dissatisfaction with and in the UK. While it is true that there are significant challenges to integration for some in the British Muslim community – and justified concern at the levels of radicalism and extremism in some British Muslim communities – overall British Muslims are more likely to be both patriotic and optimistic about Britain than are the white British community.

Volunteering
By far and away the most significant controllable individual factor in your level of civic and national pride is the extent to which you participate in voluntary activities and, within that, the form of voluntary activity you undertake.

Only 25 per cent of those who ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’ had never volunteered – compared with almost 40 per cent of those who had volunteered. If respondents had volunteered in the past 12 months there was a 35 per cent chance that they strongly agreed with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’, compared with 29 per cent among those who hadn’t volunteered in the past 12 months. Volunteers are much more likely to be patriotic about Britain and are, therefore, much more likely to be proud of their community.

But the relationship between pride and volunteering is more complicated than simply, but importantly, the positive impact that voluntary activity has on pride and patriotism. Both these positive sentiments are also primary drivers of positive, pro-social behaviour.

People who express patriotic sentiment are 10 per cent more likely to be volunteers and, when other factors are
controlled for, volunteering is a significant driver of national and civic pride. Those who agreed that they volunteered more now than they had five years ago – and had therefore upped their involvement in their community in the recent past – were almost twice as likely to be proud to be a British citizen than those who had maintained or decreased their level of voluntary activity.

People who volunteer are also substantially more optimistic about Britain than those who do not – 27 per cent of respondents who had volunteered in the past 12 months disagreed with the statement ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’, compared with 19 per cent of those who hadn’t.
3 Proving pride’s worth

*Where motivation is concerned the journey is more important than the destination.*

Jon Katzenbach, *Why Pride Matters More than Money*

Pride can be easily dismissed as too soft, vague or subjective to be used as a metric or a factor in policy decision making. After all, unlike household wealth or a population’s physical health, it is not simple to develop a wholly accurate measure of ‘pride’ – nor easy to check whether one’s policy has succeeded in raising the pride of citizens.

But we should not allow the difficulty of pride – or its comparative complexity when held up against financial or physical outcomes – to dissuade us from taking it seriously as an ingredient of public policy and a desirable outcome. In that sense, pride must be addressed from a similar starting point as have issues of ‘wellbeing’ and ‘trust’ in recent decades. Yes, this involves allowing the subjective, sentimental and emotional into policy but that door is already now ajar (after all, no measure of wellbeing is complete without an attempt to understand ‘happiness’). What is more, as the evidence built up and laid out below helps us to understand, pride does not only deserve a place in the firmament alongside wellbeing and trust but is, in fact, crucial to achieving both these modern policy objectives.

All of which makes for difficult territory for policy makers. It is only fair, then, before demanding that government respects, understands and bolsters pride that we should explain what the rewards for government and society might be of a framework that promotes a prouder population.

So, what are the effects of pride? What rewards are there for a society that boosts and sustains high levels of pride within its population?
The chain of pride

We were interested in how different types of pride were related to each other and to important social outcomes, including levels of interpersonal trust and volunteering. We looked at pride on three key levels: personal pride – looking at pride people have over aspects of their life such as their appearance and family – pride in one’s community and pride in Britain. Our results, based on logistic regression analysis, show that certain forms of personal pride, particularly pride in one’s home, family and community, are positively correlated with local pride, even after controlling for background characteristics such as age, social grade and gender.

Importantly, our findings demonstrate the importance of localised, civic identity and pride to building socially positive behaviour and to galvanising national, patriotic sentiment. People who are proud of their community and region are much more likely to be invested in British identity, to feel positive about Britain as a whole, and to feel confident and comfortable with their Britishness. Local pride is also strongly correlated with whether someone volunteers or takes part in social action – which, in turn, are associated with greater levels of interpersonal trust and bolstering and supporting existing feelings of civic and national pride.

This finding is important but not particularly surprising – it is, perhaps, an example of proving what one’s granny already knew. A great deal of work has been undertaken in management and business theory and practice – in particular by the academic John Katzenbach – on the importance of pride as a motivator in the workplace. Katzenbach’s book Why Pride Matters: The World’s Greatest Motivational Force claims that while financial incentives can generate short-term productivity in periods of growth, pride works in periods of slow economic growth and creates a far greater commitment to an organisation over the long term. Leading management and leadership experts Newstrom and Pierce agree with Katzenbach’s claims about the motivational potential of pride in the institution. They go so far as to suggest that pride may be the key to ‘unlocking the motivational spirit of any employee at any level’.

Our polling and regression analysis demonstrates that what is true inside a business or large organisation is also true.
for communities and society as a whole – that those who feel more proud of the institution are more motivated to do their best for it.

Our polling also shows there is a strong belief, among the British public, in the importance of pride and patriotism to communities and as motivators of pro-social behaviour. Four in five respondents agreed with the statement ‘people who are proud of themselves and their community behave in more positive ways’ while focus group participants pointed to volunteering, membership of bodies such as the neighbourhood watch, and helping to organise community activities as symptoms of pride.

The public understand pride and patriotism as active virtues rather than intellectual exercises – they are right to do so. Pride in the local leads to, and bolsters, pride in the national. But – importantly – it is closely related to voluntarism, civic responsibility and agency – all of which are both symptoms and drivers of pride (figure 2).

This self-enforcing chain of pride can be a central means by which social goods can be achieved. Building up pride on a personal level drives that in the local and the civic which, in turn, promotes a more cohesive and patriotic sense of Britain. What is more, the extent of pride is driven and evidenced by the extent to which individuals participate in their communities. Volunteering – especially social action that involves social mixing between generations, socio-economic groups and ethnicities – is the key indicator of whether a person will be proud of their community and, ultimately, of Britain. Those who take part in such activities are not just prouder people – motivated to participate by a level of pride – but also have their pride reinforced and strengthened through their experiences. Public policy makers and managers of institutions should understand that pride is an important tool in pursuing a more active, responsible and cohesive society.

Local pride is a gateway to national pride. Almost eight in ten respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’ agreed with the statement ‘The people in my neighbourhood are generally trustworthy’ compared with six in ten respondents who ‘neither agreed or
disagreed’ with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’. The prouder you are of Britain as a whole, the more trusting you are of your neighbours and the greater your level of confidence in your community.

We also tested how different types of personal pride – including pride in one’s family, friends, home, attitude and work – impact on pride in one’s local community and patriotism.

 Certain forms of ‘personal pride’ are also highly significant in influencing these outcomes. Those who were proud of their home were much more likely to be proud of their local community and also to volunteer. This is a truth that is only just beginning to be understood by behavioural scientists and psychologists who are reassessing the role of pride in promoting positive behaviours:
Altruistic behaviour can be understood... [as]... a line of action initiated and controlled by the individual and deeply valued by most societies. Moreover, because sustained altruistic behaviour – for example, repeated volunteering in a soup kitchen – allows the individual to discover that his or her actions are endorsed and supported by the social judgments of others, it is more likely to be reinforced by the experience of pride than are actions that are performed only once. Experiences of pride, then, can be a powerful motivator for sustained altruistic behaviour.8

Pride is important to promoting positive behaviour because it rewards and sustains altruism. It is a mechanism for encouraging the volunteer to return, the chivalrous to open the door, the stranger to help. It is no wonder, then, that those who are proud of their community are most likely to volunteer and to do so regularly and recently; they have higher reserves of pride on which to draw. The same is true of those who agreed that they were proud of their values.

The connection between social capital and good social outcomes, such as increased volunteering, are already widely discussed in academia and public policy. But what much of the literature misses is the important role pride plays as an intermediary in that relationship. Having more pride at all levels – personal, local and national – increases the likelihood of an individual engaging with social capital.

For example, our survey shows that people who have attended a local fete in the past six months register about a 20 per cent improvement in rates of volunteering in the past 12 months. Yet we find that people who have more personal pride in their friends, home and community are far more likely to have attended a local fete or carnival. People who are proud of their local community are almost twice as likely to have attended a local fete or carnival (an important form of social capital) in the past six months. Building social capital must therefore be accompanied by building pride to ensure that capital is efficiently used in a Big Society.

Volunteering can also help increase national pride and a sense of optimism about Britain’s future. Those who have volunteered in the past 12 months are more likely to disagree
with the statement ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’: 27 per cent of respondents who had volunteered in the past 12 months disagreed with the statement compared with 19 per cent of those who hadn’t volunteered in the past 12 months.

It is clear that the link between personal, public and national pride can be very strong – and also that these links are affected by particular forms of activity and experience. This finding supports the early findings of research using the MIDUS cohort study in the USA to look at the effects of pride on behaviour. This research used regression analysis of survey data generated from 4,242 US citizens picked to form a representative sample of the adult population. The survey assessed people’s self-descriptions of their levels of pride against their likelihood to feel and behave in certain ways. The findings are compelling:

In other words, the level of pride that a person has in their community determines their likelihood of volunteering so strongly that it can outweigh even vital factors such as personality trust. It is fundamentally and profoundly important to driving social action.

Greater levels of pride were also closely associated with a series of other positive behaviours and sentiments:

Pride differentiation [high levels of pride] was positively correlated with generosity (r = .31), openness (r = .20), agreeableness (r = .14) and conscientiousness (r = .20). Pride differentiation was negatively correlated with neuroticism (r = -.16).¹⁰

Pride gives individuals a greater sense of civic and social responsibility, higher levels of trust and social capital, and greater motivation to engage in pro-social and positive behaviour. It is therefore a useful paradigm through which government institutions can view the success of policy interventions that
are aimed at social cohesion, collective efficacy and greater community agency – such as the Big Society – and also a vital tool in building a more active citizenry whose members are ready and happy to take on the challenges of collective endeavour.

**Pride’s place in policy**

Government should recognise and incorporate pride’s unique role as a signifier and a motivator of healthy communities. Our research demonstrates clearly, and for the first time, the centrality of public forms of pride – in a community, a locality, a region or a nation – in changing behaviour and providing a motivating sentiment for voluntarism and civic action. We have shown the key role pride has in determining a person’s level of interpersonal trust, their readiness to engage openly with others from diverse backgrounds and their ability to feel optimistic and aspirational. We have also shown that the very behaviours that pride motivates are also vital to building pride – a chain or feedback loop that enhances and reinforces positive feelings through action. Government should therefore be looking both to break new people into that loop – through social action, social mixing and volunteering – and to measure its own effectiveness by looking at its level of success in building pride in individuals and communities. It would be nonsense – and counter to the evidence presented in this pamphlet – to claim that there is a silver bullet by which central government can render British people prouder people and then reap the benefits. The complicated, and delicate, nature of a sentimental objective does not lend itself readily to the levers of government. However, we can – and should – use our understanding of pride’s potential as an incentive mechanism for positive behaviour and our new knowledge of how to build it to influence policy.

Government can achieve this by ‘pride-testing’ its social, community and educational policy agendas by addressing how any change or shift in policy is likely to impact on each of the three interlinked levels of pride – personal, local and national – and, therefore, understanding what impact a policy is likely to have on the important sentiments of pride and the outcomes
associated with pride. Below we lay out a number of changes to current policy that may follow from applying such a test – looking in particular at education and history teaching and at how Britain integrates migrants. However, these recommendations are by no means exhaustive – the central aim of this pamphlet is to encourage government to take pride seriously as an objective and an ongoing and dynamic indicator. More important than implementing the precise policies laid out below – effective and useful as they would be – is to develop that understanding and apply pride as a test to policy more widely, in order to understand government’s behaviour in the context of its success (or otherwise) at building positive sentiments and behaviours in citizens.

**Pride testing the route to citizenship**

Since 2005 the UK has required all applicants for UK citizenship, whose English is at a sufficient level, to sit the ‘Life in the UK’ test. According to David Blunkett, the Home Secretary who introduced the system, the test would ensure ‘that those who become British citizens... play an active role, both economic and political, in our society, and have a sense of belonging to a wider community’ while also ‘raising the status of becoming a British citizen’. And there is popular support for the notion of a test for would-be citizens: three in four respondents to our survey of over 2,000 people stated that they supported the idea of the citizenship test.

But the test as it stands fails in promoting and achieving the aims laid out for it. For many it is simply a cramming test that favours those who can learn by rote, at the expense of those who are actively involved in British life and share British values. A 2008 review of the citizenship test by Lord Goldsmith concluded that ‘[t]he present test is not seen typically as a stimulus for learning, though that was one of its stated aims’.

The test should be scrapped and replaced by a robust system of naturalisation, requiring would-be citizens to be actively involved in society through volunteering. Only then will
How would-be citizens achieve British citizenship

1. Leave the UK?
   - Foreign UK resident

2. Citizenship application types
   - Registration - Entitlement
   - Registration - Discretionary
   - Naturalisation - Residence in the UK
   - Naturalisation - Marriage to a British citizen

3. Knowledge of life in the UK/English language test
   - Pass
   - Fail

4. Apply for British citizenship
   - Grant British citizenship
   - Refuse British citizenship

5. Grants of British citizenship made at Foreign and Commonwealth Office posts abroad

6. 18 years of age or over
   - Citizenship ceremony
   - British Citizenship

7. Under 18 years of age
   - Citizenship ceremony
   - British Citizenship

Possible path

Likely path
British citizenship achieve the status it deserves and the public trust and support it needs.

The Life in the UK test follows a similar structure to the driving theory exam: a computer-based test consisting of 24 multiple choice questions lasting just 45 minutes. In order to pass the applicant is usually required to correctly answer three in four questions.

From the outset the test faced an array of criticism. Early versions of the set text *Life in the United Kingdom: A journey to citizenship* were lambasted by leading historians as ‘a bizarre tour of British history’ riddled with ‘factual errors, sweeping generalisations and gross misrepresentations’. A second edition of the text corrected many of these problems. However, the more fundamental problem with the citizenship test is its failure to promote Britishness and the sharing of British values in a meaningful way.
Questions on the citizenship test can be both mundane and ethereal. They may cover the number of MPs, the year women were given the right to divorce, where the European Union is based or the ratio of Scottish to English people. It is doubtful that the majority of British people would be able to answer such questions. And *Life in the United Kingdom* does little to connect applicants with British society and culture. Further, an applicant who fails the test may take it again after just seven days at a cost of £50 a time. This does not encourage the engagement with British society and culture that the test is supposed to inspire. We need a system that promotes learning by action and engagement, not learning by rote.

Over two-thirds of the more than 900,000 people who sat the test in 2009 passed. Yet there were substantial variations in pass rates according to nationality. There was a 98 per cent pass rate for those taking the test from Australia and the USA and 90 per cent for those from Zimbabwe. In contrast, there was a 55 per cent pass rate for those from Sri Lanka, 51 per cent for those from Thailand and 44 per cent for those from Bangladesh. Each of these countries had more than 13,000 applicants sitting the test. Lord Goldsmith’s review on citizenship argued that the low pass rate for some nationalities can lead these groups to believe the odds are stacked against them and result in a lack of stimulus for learning more about Britain.

**Robust citizenship**

British people have a clear notion of the character they believe a proud citizen has. Respondents to our poll said that a person who was proud of their community and themselves would be more likely to be politically engaged and vote more often, to support British companies by buying British goods, and to be actively engaged in their community through local events. Our system of naturalisation should work to build this in would-be citizens.

Demos’ poll found that support for the citizenship test among the public rises even further if it takes into account sharing British values: 82 per cent of respondents agreed that the naturalisation process should include a ‘values test’.
Our qualitative research reinforced this. We asked focus group participants their opinions on citizenship tests. There was strong support for the idea of a citizenship test but they felt that knowledge-based questions failed to gauge what was valuable about British citizenship. Far more important, they argued, was that the test should ensure a person shared British values and was involved in British society. One older British Muslim who had arrived in the UK aged ten said:

I don’t think simply living here and passing a knowledge-based citizenship test is enough. When people look at me they can see I’m not from Britain, but inside I am, and that’s what British citizenship should be about.

A central principle for a good system of citizenship testing should therefore be that the would-be citizen must demonstrate that they both support and share British values through having partaken in and contributed to the social and cultural life of Britain. Our quantitative research found that people believe that if someone is proud of their community and themselves then they behave in more pro-social, positive, ways. Therefore it is important that would-be citizens share in this sense of pride. Four in five of our respondents agreed with the statement ‘people who are proud of themselves and their community behave in more positive ways’. And as shown in earlier chapters, one of the best ways to build pride in people and their communities is through making them engage with society, such as through volunteering. This is not about building a singular culture – half of the respondents to our poll said that Britain benefited from having a cosmopolitan culture and two in five that immigration contributed to British culture – but it is about building a more bonded and bridged society.

The former Labour Government planned to implement a complex system of ‘earned citizenship,’ running alongside the citizenship test, which would have come into effect in July 2011. The system would have meant that a migrant no longer had the right to apply for full citizenship after residing in the UK for five years. Instead they could become a ‘probationary citizen’, which could lead to ‘full citizenship’ by earning credits, or ‘points’. The
applicant may earn points through a number of mechanisms, including having the right skill set for the UK economy or ‘civic activism’, which included trade union membership. The Coalition Government scrapped the idea. Home Secretary Theresa May described the proposed system as ‘too complicated, bureaucratic and, in the end, ineffective’.

But another way exists which achieves the end of promoting integration and the sharing of British values without succumbing to the complicated, bureaucratic points-based system. By scrapping the current citizenship test and instead requiring all applicants to take active part in local volunteering we may simultaneously promote integration, build pride in the local community and work towards the Big Society. Our quantitative research showed that pride in one’s local community was a gateway to national pride and higher levels of interpersonal trust. All applicants for citizenship who would be expected to sit the citizenship test should instead have to commit to at least 16 hours a month of voluntary community work through an accredited scheme. This is the same amount of time volunteer ‘special constables’ must give to the Metropolitan Police each month. The volunteer scheme the applicant chooses should cover a range of socially worthwhile activities provided by any of the members of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO). Before volunteering applicants should be provided with all the information they need to help them make an informed decision on which scheme to engage with and the requirements that will be made of them. How the minimum time is allocated over the six months should be decided through agreement between the individual and the organisation involved. Failing to fulfil the time commitment without good reason, or failing to properly engage with the work, should mean that the applicant does not pass this stage of their citizenship application.

Through this reform we can begin to reinstate value into our citizenship process – one of the original goals behind the Life in the UK test. At the same time it will ensure that groups in our society that may not formerly have engaged with Britain begin to do so. And importantly, those who engage in voluntary
activity at least once are more likely to volunteer again, therefore working towards the Big Society agenda.

**Pride-testing history teaching**
The public consider learning about history to be associated with pride in themselves and others. Nearly half – 45 per cent – of men and women thought that someone who is proud of themselves and their community would wish to learn more about British history. Different generations were generally united in associating historical interest with pride: 52 per cent of those over 65 thought this, the highest proportion, and 40 per cent of those aged 24–44 (the lowest proportion; 42 per cent of their juniors aged 18–24 believed it). British history had a clear emotional resonance with our focus group participants. They associated learning about British history with patriotism and pride. One focus group participant said: ‘A few years back is the most patriotic I have ever felt. That’s when I went to Ypres, to see what British soldiers had sacrificed. That made me proud to be British.’

However, one of the findings of our focus groups was frustration and disappointment in the kind of history children were learning in schools. Participants expressed disbelief that young people learnt history, even British history, which taught them little about their elders’ experiences and circumstances. They felt isolated from the young as a result, one saying:

*My grandson, he doesn’t know anything really about my life. The Miner’s Strike, the Winter of Discontent, even the referendum on Europe – he’s never been taught about any of it. Ask him about the Victorians and he could tell you though.*

The Coalition Government clearly regards the teaching of British history to have potential to instil patriotic pride. Michael Gove told the 2010 party conference that British history was ‘one of the most inspirational stories I know’. Gove, David Cameron and the history tsar Simon Schama have expressed their wish for a narrative of national history to lie at the heart of history lessons:
‘there can be no true history that refuses to span the arc’, Schama argues, ‘no coherence without chronology’. Our focus group participants agreed that chronology was important to understanding. However, they felt that a chronology of history within (their own) living memory was more important for their relationship with the young than the Armada or Alfred and the cakes.

This is indicative of a troubling gap in younger and older generations’ understanding of each others’ lives and experiences. Traditional forms of association between generations, like trade unions, pubs and post offices, are in decline. Our findings reveal very low levels of voluntary contact between young and old. The public are highly unlikely to volunteer to work with old people until they are middle-aged. Just 4 per cent of those aged 18–24, and 4.4 per cent of those aged 24–44, volunteer to work with old people, compared with 11 per cent of those aged 45–64. It is increasingly unlikely that the young will learn about the past experiences of older people and of their own communities in the course of their day-to-day lives.

Schools have a statutory duty to promote community cohesion and are evaluated on their performance towards this aim by Ofsted. However, schools have practically no formal means of promoting intergenerational cohesion. An effective way to counter the gap between older people’s experiences and young people’s knowledge would be to encourage meetings through schools.

The national curriculum currently provides some opportunities for schools to invite individuals from the community to meet pupils through citizenship teaching. At key stages 1 and 2 (when children are aged 5–7 and 7–11 respectively), citizenship lessons should allow pupils to meet and talk to outside figures like religious leaders or police officers. At key stage 3 (children aged 11–14 in England and Wales), teachers are instructed to offer pupils opportunities for various forms of community engagement that might involve contact with older people:

- through community-based citizenship activities: encouraging pupils to work with people outside school to address ‘real issues
and decisions’; this can involve inviting people into school to work with pupils, or pupils working off the school site through community partners, possibly including voluntary organisations or public and private bodies; for example, working with MPs or MEPs on work related to democracy and government.24

Pupils are also to be offered the opportunity to consider historical context as a factor affecting problems of citizenship.

However, the national curriculum does not suggest that schools invite older people to talk to pupils. Indeed, differences of outlook between older and younger people are not recognised by the national curriculum as forms of diversity worthy of study in citizenship lessons, unlike ethnicity, sexual orientation and class. This seems counterintuitive, as the national curriculum does recognise the need to study factors that bring about change in communities over time, a subject about which, our polling suggests, older people feel more aware.25

The national curriculum for history at key stage 3 (after which history is no longer a statutory subject) demands that children learn about the British Empire, but not British history after 1945. History teachers do receive some encouragement to facilitate meetings between older people and school pupils through the teaching of local history. The national curriculum currently emphasises that history teaching at key stage 3 should offer pupils the opportunity to

· explore the ways in which the past has helped shape identities, shared cultures, values and attitudes today
· investigate aspects of personal, family or local history and how they relate to a broader historical context26

The national curriculum does not currently demand that local history teaching be linked to specific historical topics, but should rather contribute to the curriculum’s wider requirements.

Some teachers have found oral history projects useful within the context of projects on local history. The Historical Association has published reports of useful examples where
pupils have collected the oral testimony of local older people. These projects were academically rigorous and provided pupils with training in oral history techniques, yet their teachers remarked that the projects also acted as bridges between the lives of older and younger people, groups that otherwise might rarely meet.

One teacher, whose pupils interviewed older people on their views about respect and ‘yob culture’ in the past, reported that the interviews

*generated warm feelings of satisfaction on behalf of all of those involved. Both the students and the interviewees benefited from the experience. We were bringing the community into the school and the school into the community.*

The Historical Association has publicised an example of oral history teaching in East London, a study of an historic local youth club, which pupils judged to have changed their outlook on older people. After conducting interviews with old club members, participating pupils reported that not only had they learnt about and been inspired by local history, but they had also learnt to socialise with older people. Again, the project was rooted in the discipline of oral history: pupils learnt interviewing techniques and were expected to interact critically with interviewees. However, their teachers noted the potential contribution that oral history could make towards citizenship objectives.

Still, wider oral history projects in schools do not necessarily contribute towards these aims. They demand much preparation and pupils often have to volunteer to participate. Another example, a well-funded project undertaken by history teachers in Doncaster, worked with Help the Aged to create a bank of interviews with local older people on the subject of local industry. However, their pupils did not actually meet any older people (though they learned about their lives). The Historical Association recommends smaller-budget alternatives such as organising interviews with grandparents, individuals whom pupils would likely already know and with whom they could
already talk comfortably. These approaches do not offer the same opportunities for interaction and (mutual) learning between generations as face-to-face meetings with non-familial members of the community.

We can identify factors that might, in some cases, make positive intergenerational discussions of history or values problematic. For example, the respondents to Demos’s survey anticipated that older generations would feel differently from younger ones on issues like national pride and class. They felt that, in the past, people were more proud to be British and of their religion. Half felt that people in Britain were less proud of their class today than they had been 50 years ago. There were indeed significant differences between generations in the way they viewed British history. Older people were significantly more likely to think that ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’ than younger people. The anticipation of potential disagreement on such issues might affect volunteering rates among older people and enthusiasm among the young. Face to face discussions themselves might lead to disagreement or embarrassment.

However, such potential differences in outlook obviously offer a strong argument in favour of intergenerational contact through schools. Part of their purpose would be to promote mutual understanding between members of the community who might share few life experiences. In an illustrative anecdote, the teacher leading the East End oral history project noted that of the 18 boys who took part, one of the few from a white working-class background quickly formed a particular rapport with the white working-class older people being interviewed. The teacher attributed this to a shared culture; however, this was no barrier to the development of friendly relationships between the non-white majority and the interviewees. By no means did the obvious cultural distance between groups reveal a weakness in the approach.

We should also note that, though our survey revealed some apparent ambivalence about taking pride in British history (only 19 per cent of Scottish people were proud of it, compared with 36 per cent of the English and 33 per cent of the Welsh), this should not be taken as evidence of attitudes towards local history.
It would be desirable to implement minor changes to the national curriculum to encourage more frequent intergenerational contact within schools, involving all pupils (therefore at key stage 3, during compulsory history and citizenship lessons). This contact between old and young should be aimed at enhancing pupils’ understanding of the experiences of older people, the way their communities have changed within living memory, and the views and concerns of older people.

Equally, such meetings would serve to instil confidence among older people – even those who would not actually speak to children – that the young had knowledge of their experiences.

Organising contact with older members of the community for a new programme would be time-consuming for teachers, but once established could be easily and inexpensively repeated. Meetings would also take advantage of the professed desire by the public to volunteer for activities aimed at promoting civic and national pride. Two in five of our respondents said they wanted more opportunities to demonstrate their pride in Britain. Two in three had volunteered in the previous 12 months, one of the highest volunteering rates in the world.

We make the following proposals. Within history teaching:

- The national curriculum should specify the teaching of post-1945 British history as a topic to be studied at key stage 3, next to the world wars, the British Empire and the Holocaust.
- The national curriculum should suggest that oral history studies of local people’s testimony, in relation to local and British history after 1945, would be an innovative way of meeting this new requirement, and the existing requirement to study local history.
- Oral history projects should involve direct contact between pupils and older people. The advantageous cross-curricular links between history, citizenship and engagement with older local people should be emphasised to teachers.
- It should also be emphasised that intergenerational meetings would primarily teach children skills of enquiry, critical thinking and oral history techniques like interviewing. Teachers should not feel that such meetings would be citizenship lessons posing as history, diluting the rigour of their subject.
The Historical Association’s examples for teachers proved to be rigorous, even groundbreaking for knowledge of local history, while generating understanding of change in the recent past and greater sociability within the community.

Within citizenship teaching:

- The national curriculum at key stages 1–3 should recognise differences in the outlooks of older and younger generations as forms of diversity that should be studied as part of statutory citizenship teaching.
- These differences should be studied partly through the same kind of visits from members of the community as law, justice and democracy, which might involve interaction with policemen or local politicians.

Greater direct contact in schools between older and younger people, allowing them to discuss their differences and the factors that unite them (such as the experiences of their local area) would help encourage greater mutual trust and understanding within communities. It would prompt young people to consider the impact of their behaviour on the community through the prisms of historical change and good citizenship. Hearing of the lives of older people, locally but also elsewhere in Britain and internationally, would be likely to encourage sociability within the community, and civic and patriotic pride.

**Pride-testing the Big Society**
The Big Society should be a great British political success story. After all, volunteering is ingrained in the British culture and our qualitative work shows high levels of pride in social and community action. The Big Society aims to promote engagement in local communities – something much needed in a country where only 44 per cent of people say they are proud of their community – and to facilitate volunteering, something people say that they want. But the Big Society has failed to ignite mass appeal: nearly two-thirds of British people feel they do not have a clear
understanding of what the Big Society is and a two-thirds majority believe that ‘The Big Society probably won’t work’.  

The problems are worse than simple ambivalence. Rhetoric around the Big Society frequently elicits cynicism and criticism from the very sector it is supposed to aid and promote – volunteers and those involved in running and working for charities.

This doubt and suspicion is understandable – the Big Society is described by the Prime Minister as consisting of three key-planks of which the most important is the ambition of getting more people to volunteer and more charities to deliver services. But, as our polling shows – in unison with much prior research – Britain is already a world leader in volunteering, with 66 per cent of people having volunteered at some point in the last year. The UK has a much more robust, diverse and independent charitable sector than almost any European peer nation and has a strong tradition of voluntary involvement in public service provision.

All of these facts are intuitively understood by the public at large. British people are proud of Britain’s culture of volunteering and raise it in focus groups and discussions of patriotism. When asked to describe ‘British culture’ and ‘British values’, our focus group placed enormous emphasis on community action, volunteering and charity alongside common manners such as queuing:

*I think of being British as being about littler things, more boring I suppose. Like doing your bit and manners and helping out. The thing about British people is that we do things for each other, you know? Being British is more about the way we are than things like Buckingham Palace or Parliament.*

Our polling showed that British people are proud of their relationships with their communities and of what they feel they do – 80 per cent were proud of their attitude to others and 55 per cent felt they made a positive contribution to society. However, people were dubious about the involvement of politics in these facets of society:
Sometimes when they [politicians] talk about volunteering and all that, it sounds like they think they invented it or something. I don’t volunteer because the Government tells me to, I volunteer because I want to – I enjoy it and I think it’s important, when you get to my age, to give something back and to stay in touch with what’s going on.

I’m always a bit dubious when the politicians see something good and then say ‘that’s what I believe in’ because usually they take that thing and they ruin it.

In order to engage the public in the concept of the Big Society it is necessary to approach the issues involved with humility and humbleness. Volunteering is intricately connected, in British people’s minds, with both British identity and with pride – 80 per cent of people believe that those who are proud of their community and their country are more likely to behave positively. Focus group participants suggested that volunteering is being ‘the best of British’ and social action is perceived as being part of what makes Britain unique. For all of these reasons, fairly or otherwise, people are suspicious of volunteering being used as a political tool:

Honestly, I hate the Tories. And I feel angry that they’ve taken something I’m most proud of in my community – the way we pull together and organise to keep the street tidy and safe – and they’ve said ‘this is a Conservative thing’. It’s not a Conservative thing, it’s a British thing.

Well I think it’s good that the Government is supporting volunteering. And I agree with the Big Society or whatever it’s called. But I don’t like it all being so political – Tories say it’s good, Labour say it isn’t, and then it becomes like the Labour Party are saying volunteering isn’t good. I think it’s a bit divisive to carry on like that.

There is a danger that the Big Society agenda – as used by the Conservative party and as opposed and mocked by the Labour party – risks politicising a core British value and alienating some from pride in social action. The lack of consensus built around it as a concept has led to a feeling that
the debate itself in some way sullies a source of everyday pride for British people.

A real effort to avoid this is demanded of politicians from both main parties. No serious policy maker believes that Britain would benefit from a decline in voluntary endeavour and greater collective and community efficacy – indeed, it is fair to say that much of the Big Society agenda could fit easily into either David Miliband’s proposals for ‘double devolution’ or into Maurice Glasman’s concept of a more ‘relational’ society. Both parties can get behind the broad sweep of the Big Society – and in doing so they can help to reinforce and support a key component of British pride.

But government also has a serious role to play in depoliticising this debate. In order to achieve this, government must reframe its approach to the Big Society – deliberately dissociating it from more politically disputable issues such as deficit reduction and returning the agenda to its original principles: that promoting social engagement and building social networks are good things.

**Trusting in pride**

We know that a more trusting society is also a better functioning society. It is well known that communities where people know their neighbour’s name and trust the people on their street are also the safest and happiest communities. What is more, interpersonal trust is important to establishing a public sphere for debate and deliberation that is safe and civil and in which agreement and compromise are possible.

If government is to play a positive role in promoting the Big Society then it should be by ensuring that the Big Society meets one of the objectives that David Cameron has set for it – it should support the idea that ‘We have obligations to those beyond our front door, beyond our street’. Rather than entering into political debates about the virtues of volunteering, or giving the dangerous and patronising impression that it believes it has invented it, the Coalition Government should concentrate on adding to our existing and proud culture of social
action where that culture requires support. Nowhere is this more important than in promoting social mixing in order to develop higher levels of civic pride and mutual trust.

It is a reality that many volunteering and community schemes draw from pools of people who either already know one another or come from similar ethnic, social and economic groups. For example, hyper-local projects such as that to regenerate Balsall Heath in Birmingham (a project often held up by ministers as an example of ‘the Big Society in action’) have been very successful in achieving their purpose but have not necessarily served to mix the residents of that estate with people from the wider city of Birmingham. In a similar vein, many of our most active small charities are faith groups which – while doing incredible work – can sometimes fail to reach outside their congregation when they are recruiting. Of course, all forms of volunteering that bring individuals together are positive – they build social capital and lead to positive improvements. But social mixing between classes and areas is vital in building broader trust, cohesion and pride and also in turning from simple social capital building to bonding, bringing people together who would not otherwise be connected: It should be an objective of the Coalition Government’s sponsorship of schemes under the Big Society banner.

The way in which such a focus could work is evidenced by the new National Citizen Service, which during the school holidays takes young people to get involved in community work and to develop and learn key skills through group activities. Mixing young people from different backgrounds is one of the core objectives of the National Citizen Service and this is specified in the commissioning arrangements for potential providers. Of course, where for some reason it is impossible to ensure that participating young people are mixing with those from differing backgrounds the scheme will still go ahead and will still do much good. But it is, rightly, an active concern that the Citizen Service be geared towards promoting mixing.
A social mixing clause
In the same way in which social mixing is built into the commissioning guidelines for the National Citizen Service – not as a ‘deal breaker’ but as an aspiration – so too should it be at the heart of other Big Society initiatives. This should be achieved by placing a social mixing clause in all the funding arrangements undertaken by the Big Society Bank – tying the Big Society to an effort to bring society closer as well as to make it bigger.

The Schools Linking Network
Government should learn from successful organisations that attempt to address social mixing through their work. The Schools Linking Network (SLN) is one such organisation – which predates the Big Society as a frame but has not been sufficiently learned from and understood.

SLN began in Bradford – following race riots there it was set up in answer to the widespread concern that children of different ethnic backgrounds were schooled almost entirely separately and, therefore, had little opportunity to mix. Its work offers practical examples of how to overcome barriers to trust, like ignorance and prejudice, and encourage local pride. SLN now has a national presence and works with 40 local authorities.

It introduces groups from local primary and secondary schools through group work, mixing children of different levels of wealth, religions and ethnicities, and from urban and rural homes. For example, its project Bradford Matters set up meetings between pupils from different schools and shared creative tasks, including researching local history. Other events incorporated intergenerational interviews and meetings, then arranged follow-up sessions between the children to galvanise the programme’s longer-term impact.

SLN’s adaption of the Model UN, which started in Bradford but now has a national network of participants, is an excellent example of how a focus on mixing leads to small but important changes in how to carry out work. Rather than simply bringing schools together to compete, mixing is built into the programme from the start. Children are paired with partners from other schools and are mentored, in turn, by a teacher from
a third school. They work together over a period of months – researching and preparing – and are then expected to work closely at the final, day-long event. This model – which has social mixing and joint working between young people at its heart – is not simply effective in bringing children of differing ethnic and religious groups together, it can break down entrenched class barriers as well. We observed an SLN Model UN event in Buckinghamshire, the last county in England to still have a wholly selective secondary education system. In discussions with children and teachers alike the issue of mixing with those from other types of school was raised again and again.

SLN provides schools with auditing tools, allowing them to measure attitudinal change among participating pupils (which can be presented to Ofsted as evidence that the school is fulfilling its statutory responsibilities regarding community cohesion). Schools can also measure the impact of their work on the local pride and the strength of identity in the young people involved.

Organisers, parents and children report that the events encourage pupils to consider the diversity of their area and the experiences of others whom they had never previously met. Audits reveal strong evidence of, for example, greater openness to mixed friendship circles among participating children and positive responses to meeting and learning from adults from a different background.

SLN provides us with an example of how to encourage social mixing and how a concern for it might affect our planning. Such a decision would do much for public pride. Our regression analysis demonstrates that the types of volunteering most likely to generate higher forms of civic and national pride in participants are those that promote mixing with those from different backgrounds. Social mixing also has a well-established positive impact on interpersonal trust and on social cohesion.

But it could also serve to unite politicians of different parties around the core mission of the Big Society itself and, therefore, could mitigate the harm to pride in British volunteering culture that partisan debates about it can have. A key concern expressed by politicians of the left about the Big
Society is that ‘sharp-elbowed’ middle class people will benefit to the detriment of those less affluent and less eloquent. In particular, the worry is that wealthy areas will use the opportunity of greater autonomy to shirk responsibilities to those less fortunate. By recalibrating the Big Society agenda to promote social mixing, the Government can head off some of that criticism and persuade the left of its potential virtue – greater social mixing, greater cohesion and a shared identification between the middle and the bottom is likely to produce a more responsible and more empathetic society.

**Giving pride its place**

The recommendations above show what practical difference a concern for pride, its drivers and its effects can have on the design of policy across widely differing areas of government intervention. It is not a matter of creating a single policy that drives pride in British citizens, more of ensuring that pride as both a potential motivator and as an aspirational outcome is considered and accommodated.

Our polling reinforced the concerns British people – across class and, indeed, pride divisions – have about the impact of immigration on community cohesion, culture and identity. It also showed that people are not only more trusting of individual migrants when they are proud of themselves, their community and their country but they also identify pride-building activities such as volunteering as signifiers of integration. The answer to ensuring a higher-level of comfort and confidence about immigration in the UK, therefore, lies in building levels of social action, volunteering and social mixing among those seeking to live and work in the UK. This will not only boost interpersonal trust by occupying immigrants in activities that British people identify as being core to British identity but also help build civic pride and understanding in migrants themselves.

Evidence from our polling and focus groups also points to the crucial role of intergenerational mixing and communication in building pride and intergenerational trust. What is more, our research undermined many of the traditional narratives about
patriotism and British-identity. Participants identified a mismatch between history presented as a ‘great island story’ and what they felt was important, and inspiring, about modern Britain. They wanted young people to understand the events, changes and achievements of Britain in the more recent past – in order to help them to feel more genuinely connected to the story of Britain. We also know, from our polling, that those who regularly mix with people from other generations are among the most solidly proud across all three categories – of themselves, their community and their country – and so most likely to engage in pride-inspired pro-social behaviour. Therefore, encouraging more localised and recent history in schools should be a key objective of the ongoing curriculum review. What is more, intergenerational contact builds pride and can be a key means of providing both localised and recent knowledge – we must get older people into schools and into contact with young people.

These are but two examples of how policy might be revised and reworked with pride in mind. This does not mean simply approximating Americanisms – flags, oaths and anthems – and nor should it mean reaching for intellectual excuses for pride and patriotism. Instead it should involve applying our understanding of what British people are proud of, our knowledge of the good that pride does and our insights into how pride can be developed and nurtured. In doing so – and in applying the subtle changes that this approach points us towards – we can expect to bolster an important driving sentiment, which will produce and promote the kind of responsibility and civic action that we want to see more of from society. The Big Society, double devolution or any of the other terms politicians use to describe volunteerism and collective efficacy depend on pride – we know how to build it and to nurture it and so we must apply these lessons.
Conclusion: how to talk about pride

Sympathy... does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation.... We sometimes feel for another, a passion of which he himself seems to be altogether incapable; because, when we put ourselves in his case, that passion arises in our breast from the imagination, though it does not in his from the reality.

Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*[^31]

The end point, and starting point, for public pride is patriotism. The virtuous circle of pride begins and completes with a sense of pride in one’s country and a firm rooting of one’s individual identity within a community and a nation. Our polling shows there is a strong correlation between patriotic sentiment and pride in one’s self, one’s family, one’s neighbourhood and one’s region – each area of pride reinforces those on either side of it.

And it is patriotism that causes much of the unease and difficulty with pride as an objective of policy – particularly for the left. When the left looks at patriotism it sees the gateway to jingoism, nationalism and arrogance in much the same way that when the right looks at fairness it sees a slippery slope to nanny statism and abusive interventionism. For many on the left, patriotism is a weak spot that is either to be ignored or to be contained – a source of frustration in that the public yearns for it and yet the left struggles to either explain or satisfy its demands.

So it is that when Labour politicians talk about patriotism they attempt to distinguish it from the broader spectrum of pride, to separate it out and treat it as a discrete beast that exists outside and above everyday, common or garden ‘pride’. In doing so – whether to describe patriotism’s latent evil or to attempt to capture it for their purposes and ideas – the left has a deficit model approach to dealing with patriotism.

[^31]: Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*
This approach is doomed to failure. It neither satisfies the public longing for a patriotism that suits and reflects them and is capable of grabbing and holding their attention nor does it allow the left to engage fully and comprehensively with pride as a public policy problem. They refute the relationship between pride in one’s class, family, community or faith with pride in one’s country – often, instead, attempting to deal with these sources of pride as if they were not simply detached but opposed to one another. In doing so they are arguing against the grain of reality and stymie their attempts to inculcate pride in the things they do value – community, work and so on. What is more, they sound a duff note in their attempts to engage with patriotism because they fail to view it through the reality of people’s lives and experience, instead treating patriotism as an adjunct that is formed of intellectualised narratives about history or institutions. They attempt to invent new such narratives and institutions to replace those with which they take issue in the vain hope that this will reignite ‘the right kind of patriotism’ – a left-wing, ‘progressive’ formation that binds pride in Britain into pride in the advance of liberalism and welfarism. In doing so they are playing a version of the right’s own patriotic game but the rules of that game are wrong, inaccurate and dangerous.

The right conceives of patriotism as being about history and institutions too. They are more correct than the left in that they see patriotism for what it is, an a-partisan sentiment that is not easily wrenched from its moorings and transferred elsewhere, but they are just as constrained by a false imagining of patriotism’s origins and place within the spectrum of pride. For too long the right and the left have treated patriotism as religion. It is either a mystic, timeless and ephemeral bond, if you are of the right, or a somewhat unsophisticated response to a human weakness, if you are of the left. So too do their responses, modelled on this approach, mirror their usual response to church: the right glorify it for either intrinsic or consequential reasons, the left attempt to either break or reform it.

Both these views ignore or misinterpret patriotism. It is not distinct from more everyday forms of pride; it is connected deeply to them. It is not mystical, it is formed of the shared
culture of expectation and behaviour that springs from public pride. And it is not to be found in institutions, history or vague notions of value – although symptoms of a healthy patriotism will be found in our responses to all of these.

If we are to rekindle patriotism – as politicians of both the left and the right now claim to want – we must stop pretending that patriotism exists in isolation from how people feel about themselves, their families and their communities. We must found our efforts in patriotism in the broader spectrum of pride and begin to see patriotism as both a-political and a-philosophical, rooting it once more in emotion instead.

**Fear and loathing on the left**
The left does not do patriotism well. Those on the left have no positive explanation for it nor a positive vision of where it might lead. And yet they recognise its vitality and pull on people, even their own supporters. Maurice Glasman – Godfather of Blue Labour, founder of London Citizens and mentor to Ed Miliband – has spoken of the need for the Labour movement to ‘rediscover patriotism’. His vision for patriotism – one founded in communities and tied in with narratives of collective efficacy and action – is one that has purchase with British people and speaks to both their sources of pride and their view of Britishness. But it is too early to tell whether Ed Miliband will prove willing or able to articulate that same vision for his party as a whole – and it is clear from the difficulties that Fabian politics has long had with genuinely felt patriotism that an attempt to enshrine the ‘flag’ element of Glasman’s ‘faith, family, flag’ mantra within the Labour Party will prove an uphill struggle.

The British left’s occasional historic dalliances with patriotism have been entered into with closed hearts – its adherents might not loathe patriotism but they are afraid of it. They fear the consequences of patriotism – which they see as chauvinism, racism and bigotry. They fear the right, more comfortable with unthinking patriotism, will manipulate this powerful emotion to render populist havoc. They fear that patriotism is necessarily conservative and that, without their own
story to tell about nation and pride, they will be left behind. And so it is that efforts from the left to develop patriotic narratives are strangled at birth – they begin not from a love of nation but from a fear of allowing patriotism to continue unchallenged and unchanged.

Talk of ‘progressive patriotism’ speaks to Tom Nairn’s theory of myths – that patriotism is merely a story for filling the desire to belong and to identify in unenlightened and uneducated men and women. It is this mythology that the supporters of the left then seek to appropriate and reconfigure so as to sculpt a patriotism that better suits their perspective on human nature and the proper arrangement of society. Gordon Brown urged people to take pride in Britain as a progressive country – in doing so, he urged people to replace their patriotic feelings with a kind of political pride. But he was ignoring, or misunderstanding, the form and function of patriotism: it is not a decision to buy into one myth or another; it is a felt pride in one’s country and one’s wider, national community. A person who is more patriotic than others may be led to celebrate certain things about their country more than others, but that is a symptom of their patriotism, not the cause of it. A parent who is naturally proud of their child will pick out good things that their child has done or achieved because they are proud of them, they are not simply proud of their child because of their achievements. It is the same for patriotism – people who are proud of their country naturally look to the good in it. Those who are not proud, who are either nonchalant or ashamed, will be less likely to do so. It is in viewing patriotism as some mysterious conceit – removed from and startlingly different from other feelings of pride – that those on the left have become trapped in its need to reconfigure patriotism for their own ends. They see it as political when, in fact, it is emotional.

But this frustration with patriotism is borne out of a misunderstanding of what it is that has led their attempts to engage to sound hollow and insincere. People do not, on the whole, intellectualise their pride in their country any more than they do their pride in their children, their family in general or their community, class or race. Gordon Brown’s patriotism was
dependent on a set of justifications for Britain’s existence that people were expected to work through in order to arrive at a sense of achievement and pride – we abolished slavery, we won the war, we are a fair nation, we look after people. All of these things are indeed symbols of patriotic pride but Brown got the process of patriotism the wrong way round entirely – he began with a set of achievements, which then led him to feelings of pride of his country. For most people patriotism is an equation that travels in the opposite direction – they begin with a sense of pride in their country, which predisposes them to identifying things about their country, its history and institutions which reinforce that pride.

Just as, like pride in other walks of life, patriotism is more felt than rationalised, it is also more bottom-up than it is top-down. Even if Tom Nairn’s story of patriotism were true once – that it is the story elites tell plebs to gain their loyalty and sacrifice – it is no longer the case. We live in a society with multiple sources of information and competing narratives of mass education and mass media. If it was ever possible to simply drive an identity downwards from the top it is no longer. Patriotism, therefore, will not survive in a more complicated, educated and questioning society.

The dawn of mass information may have disrupted the narratives of the elite but it has certainly not abolished patriotic desire or driven it into the margins of extremists, as so many on the left have argued. Patriotism cannot be an exercise in story telling from the top – the marketplace is too crowded now – but it can still be the pride in place, community and nation that comes of experience, interaction and shared expectations mutually met. Here patriotism rubs against another of the left’s discomforts with it – the problem of localism.

In a world where attempts to deliver a commanding narrative of nation from on high will fail – or, worse, backfire – we must be prepared to allow the virtuous circle of pride to deliver people to patriotism in a more autonomous way. It is no good devising a strategy for patriotism, giving speeches to explain your new story of Britain and expecting the public to sign on some intellectual dotted line. It will not happen for you.
Instead you must be prepared to engage in the hard and unpredictable graft of building the framework and infrastructure to support patriotism and pride as it grows; you must consider it as a means, an end and a metric in what you do elsewhere; and you must devolve responsibility for building it to a local level, where experience can be delivered to facilitate its growth. The command and control heights of leftist government are predisposed to discomfort with such an approach, more used to meeting an objective through a series of regulations, interventions, incentives or laws. But if patriotism is a goal – as Blue Labour at least now claims it to be – then it must be pursued in this way and by these means. Else we risk not simply failure in our attempts to cultivate pride in Britain but also damage to it where it already exists.

**Yesterday’s men**

Those on the left have misunderstood the form and function of patriotism but those on the right have got it wrong too: they think patriotism means adherence to a set of institutions, historical narratives and deference to certain manifestations of the mystic nation. Where those on the left attempt to politicise patriotism as one story of many and then win an argument – from the top – about which of those stories is best, those on the right divorce patriotism from the modern and from any form of public deliberation. What makes it into the right’s pantheon of patriotism is largely determined by a narrow, historical and sometimes mythological set of beliefs about Britain, which are unbendable, unchanging and increasingly inaccessible. The royal family, spitfires, the Houses of Parliament and the Union Jack may all stir pre-existing patriotic sentiment and provoke a tear or a lump in the throat but they should not be the non-negotiable basis for our national pride. They are too brittle and too fixed – where the left’s beliefs are too changeable and politicised – and they risk turning patriotism into particularism. There is nothing wrong with any of these symbols but they are not enough to forge a common sense of ownership, expectation and culture in which we can take pride and by which we can judge ourselves.
The fetishisation of particular institutions and traditions as markers of patriotism has contributed to a disconnect between what people believe patriotism is in principle and how they feel it in reality. One of the reasons British people self-describe as unpatriotic (especially in comparison with Americans) is that we are aware of our deficiencies of feeling towards the symbols that we have been led to believe enshrine that patriotism. We are broadly supportive (or, more accurately, good-naturedly ambivalent) about the royal family, the Union Jack and other fetishes of Britishness but they do not hold the same sway over us that at one point they may have. The right often answers this complaint with a call to arms – to re-engage the public with those symbols and institutions, but this, like the left’s attempt to provide alternative narratives, gets patriotism quite wrong. We do not identify with the Queen and, because of our affection for her, acquire a love of our country. Our love of Britain makes us more receptive to the Queen and to other symbols of British history.

It is not just that the demand from those on the right that we learn to love the past again doesn’t work, it harms patriotism. Their narrative is compelling, clear and strong – despite suffering the hindrance of being absolutely wrong. It is clearly established in popular imagination that patriotism is synonymous with the institutions and symbols that the right uses to describe it. The declining sentiment and feeling for those institutions and symbols leads British people to question whether or not they are, in fact, patriotic and whether or not they indeed have pride in their country. This questioning demands that pride in Britain be rationalised against levels of pride and affection for specific British things – just as the left’s narrative demands that patriotism be rationalised against specific achievements or ideas – and unravels what is in fact an emotional response to general pride and wellbeing.

The virtuous circle of pride can just as easily be a vicious circle of self-doubt. As those who are proud of their families are more likely to be proud of their community and their country and so on, so doubt about one’s pride in Britain can travel down the chain and affect our perception of our more immediate
surroundings. Patriotism, when pressed into a particularist and fetishising mould, excludes some from its sentiment and moves, over time, away from the bulk of the people. Its loss affects their feelings for Britain, their community and their place in the world. Ironically, in their attempts to salvage patriotism, the right exacerbates that decline by reinforcing the message that the symbols to which we no longer feel attached are the symbols of Britain and of national pride.

They spoiled it for us all
Of course, one kind of patriotism has experienced a resurgence in modern Britain – the patriotism of rebellion. In Scotland this has taken flight in the form of the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), which trades on pride in Scotland as an alternative to Britishness. In England the St George flag has experienced a revival – especially in working class communities – and to talk to those who take pride in Englishness is to hear a roll call of complaints about the oppression of that identity by elites and a sense of glee at partaking in patriotism that is seen as subversive. In Wales, Plaid Cymru has failed to establish the political dominance of the SNP but has proved effective in persuading Welsh people to subscribe to the idea that their language (once almost dead) represents something of their identity and is deserving of their pride.

These sub-patriotisms are a result of an acute failure to keep British patriotism alive, relevant and meaningful. The yearning that exists for patriotism is the same as the yearning for pride in oneself, a complex and emotional response to human existence. It has not been fulfilled by Britishness in modern times and so it has been filled by alternatives. While public pride exists in a circle, with local pride contributing to national belonging and pride, it is possible to break into that circle and redirect its energies – especially where the patriotic end-point is not recognised, acknowledged or supported. People’s pride must continue to somewhere in order for it to be meaningful – my pride in myself is linked to my pride in my family and so on – where that end point is denied it will be replaced.
This is what has happened in Britain; the flow of pride having hit a barrier of irrelevance and embarrassment when it comes to British identity, it has sought out other space to fill. It is the failure of both the left and of the right that has led to this void. Those on the left have sought to subvert the natural path of patriotism, to intellectualise and redirect it and to address their own deficit of patriotic understanding by means of a reinvention. People have responded to this intelligently – sensing the cynicism and lack of sincerity that underpins the case for Brownite ‘progressive patriotism’ and rejecting it out of hand. Those on the right have insisted that people attach their pride to a set of institutions and persons that are less and less relevant to people’s experience of Britain or to the sources of their everyday pride. It has, inadvertently, offered such an unattractive and unrealistic view of British patriotism that people become deterred from investing their emotion and pride in it. Instead, then, pride has increasingly flowed to the more adaptable, but nonetheless understandable and straightforward, identities of Englishness, Scottishness and Welshness relatively untouched and ignored by meddling elites. The left and right, in their battle for Britishness, have spoilt it for the rest of us.

If not this, then what?
It is insufficient to point to the flaws in the patriotic imaginations of those on the left and right. While neither have managed to articulate patriotism as what it is and why it works, both have attempted to engage with the idea, both have recognised its power. And the potential for advance in political and policy engagement on the issue of patriotism lies on both sides of the political spectrum. Those on the left are wrong in their paranoid and self-denying assumption that patriotic pride belongs to the right: they must give up on the self-pity and self-doubt that leads them to try to reinvent patriotism so that it might become acceptable to their political sensitivities. Equally, those on the right are wrong that patriotism belongs to the past, and that the solution to declining national pride is to ever more energetically force ancient fetishes on the people. They must
abandon their nostalgia for a more confident, less particularist vision. And both sides must step back from Tom Nairn’s prescription of how patriotism might be forged – they must be confident that it is real and beneficial but doubtful and cautious of their ability as government to create it or to redirect it.

The first step to refreshing and correcting our view of patriotism is to acknowledge its proper place in the world. Patriotism is not unique or discrete – it is formed of, grows out of and influences more localised forms of public pride. People who take pride in their day-to-day lives, who appreciate their community and are proud of it, are more likely to feel predisposed to pride in Britain as a whole. This is entirely predictable and understandable – after all, it is in our locality that we experience Britain as we know it; it is in our community and in our day-to-day interactions that we form our view of British society and shared culture; it is through our personal sense of achievement and expectation that we judge the overall fairness, parity and worth of our membership of Britain. Patriotism is, therefore, an extension of our pride in ourselves and how we relate to our experience of the British way of life, but it is also a factor in informing how we feel about ourselves and our community. After all, nonchalance or self-loathing about Britain makes it less attractive to engage with institutions and processes that – albeit at the community level – reaffirm and reinforce our collective national identity. And it is these institutions and processes that lend us pride in our community and ourselves. Patriotism is not remote or distinct from pride – it is forged of it and, in turn, drives it into other spheres of our lives.

In recognising that patriotism is, at heart, a communal and collective response to feelings of belonging and shared pride, both left and right can begin to reappraise their approach to it. The left can observe that it is not a threat either to their ideas or their identity. Patriotism does not replace or disrupt pride in one’s class or community – it is not an alternative to take pride in these identities but rather an extension of it. Patriotism is not, as a felt reality, the ally of conservatism and the enemy of progress – it is merely a reflection of a society comfortable with itself and at ease with its identity. Nor does patriotism mean bigotry. It is
about pride, not anger. Pride in one’s country involves placing of feelings of community, social bonding and mutual and collective achievement in a broader context than one’s relatively insular everyday existence allows. It does not make people small minded; it contextualises them within a wider society and leads them to a greater understanding of the communal nature of success. Those on the left do not need to reimagine patriotism so that it conforms better to their worldview – to do so is unnecessary and ultimately futile. Instead they should learn to work with what is there and to appreciate that patriotic pride does not threaten their politics but has the potential to support and reinforce it.

Those on the right, likewise, should attempt to engage with reality. People do not view their patriotism as cynical or as confected – it is not – but they do see it as detached, old-fashioned, whimsical and off-putting. By accentuating only relics of a Britishness that the majority view as irrelevant to them and to their experience of their country, those on the right run the risk of killing patriotism through misguided kindness; they want to tell a positive story of Britain but, in doing so, tell a story that fails to chime and feels remote.

For example, there is a call by many on the right for a Trafalgar Day – a public holiday to commemorate the battle of Trafalgar and aimed at bolstering pride in British history. It is understandable that some conservatives – who instinctively view patriotism through a historical paradigm – would see the use of a day of national celebration for a British historic victory. But this is to misunderstand patriotism as felt emotion – attempting once more to rationalise it as an argument – and there is little evidence that a Trafalgar Day would serve any purpose other than to provide an additional public holiday and give those who already view the Battle of Trafalgar with pride the chance to revel in their feelings more freely. In the course of our focus groups we asked participants when the battle of Trafalgar was – one participant was able to tell us the year, none was able to tell us the date. Of course, for a nostalgic patriot, this may in itself be a cause for concern and a reason for action. But granting a public holiday simply to encourage greater awareness of the date seems over the
top – and are we to grant public holidays for all historic occasions that we think British people ought to remember? If the intent – as many of its proponents claim it to be – is to inspire and reinforce patriotic sentiment and feelings of Britishness, it seems highly unlikely that this will be achieved by virtue of a day off work that coincides with the anniversary of an event which few have any feeling for, understanding of or pride in.

Rather than bludgeoning people over the head with what we feel they ought to be proud of – be it the ‘progressive story’ of the left or a set of historic events and institutions for the right – we would do better to attempt to understand what it is that British people are actually proud of about their country. In doing so we can begin to understand which patriotic narratives survive and appeal and which do not.

This means getting to patriotism via a different route. No longer can we begin at the top and work our way down; instead we must start at the bottom, in the day-to-day sentiment of people’s lives, and work our way upwards and outwards to determine the best symbols, ideas and institutions to represent and bolster that sentiment. Patriotism’s relationship to pride is clear, it invigorates it and is fed by it, and we can build the former best by fuelling and supporting the latter. This relationship gives people a sense of justified, public pride in their family, street, neighbourhood and town, and drives and builds affection for their country and a strong commitment to it. A modern patriotism will be built not by the grandeur of monuments or flags but by the sometimes mundane fabric of people’s direct experience of life as part of a collective, a community. Those who still feel connected to a shared, public framework of custom and morality feel proud and are spurred by that pride to take action to maintain their community. Those who are detached from that public framework drift away from both patriotism and from the felt pride that would push them to public action and civic responsibility. Politics must abandon the confected patriotism that has for so long dominated both right and left; instead it must embrace real pride, real patriotism and real sentiment.

The benefits of such an approach – to those on both sides of the political spectrum – are clear. There are strong
correlations between healthy levels of patriotism and general, non-partisan social goods. Patriotism relates strongly to pride, which, in turn, drives positive behaviour, increasing voting, volunteering, trust in one’s neighbours and respect for others. But there are also particular, political and partisan benefits to be reaped by a party that gets patriotism right – it will allow that party to engage with voters on the issue of identity and Britishness from a genuinely mutual understanding of what these ideas mean and why they matter.

For Labour, the benefits of a better understanding of patriotism are evident in how those on the left communicate and pursue their social ends. Their attempts to engage in this area have fallen short, resulting in them being open to ridicule for their clumsy rhetoric and lack of feeling for patriotism. They have failed to build a genuine rapport with the public in discussions about patriotism – our focus groups strongly associated the Conservative party with patriotic pride but were far less convinced by Labour. The Blue Labour movement shows that there is room on the left for a more strongly felt and openly expressed love of country.

For Conservatives the benefits are no less clear. While the Conservative party carries a strong association in the public’s mind with ‘patriotism’, that has proven a burden as much as a prize. Because the Conservative party’s patriotism is so closely aligned with a set of institutions and symbols that are of declining importance and relevance to people’s experience of Britain, their classic patriotism has contributed to the sense that the Conservative party is out of touch and remote. The public has been successfully convinced that patriotism is embodied by the Queen, the flag and the battle of Trafalgar but they have no real feeling for these things. And so, despite a longing for patriotism, they feel detached and isolated from it and, in turn, from its proponents on the right. The Conservative party would, therefore, be able to unite its natural tendency to patriotism with its need to reconnect with Britain and to demonstrate its affinity with modern sentiments, feelings and ideas. By beginning to articulate a patriotism that once more connects with people’s reality, lives and feelings, the Conservative party can make
patriotism a strength rather than an oddity, a value shared with British people rather than one admired by them.

But the benefits of a reinvigorated patriotism go far beyond petty, partisan advantage. They extend into the very fabric of society and stretch to going some way to help answer those wicked problems that trouble modern governments of any stripe. A country with higher levels of felt patriotism, civic and community pride and esteem is a country whose citizens are more predisposed to collective action, more ready to volunteer and to vote, and at ease with itself. Patriotism and pride are closely intertwined and a reinvigorating of one inspires growth of the other – restoring a shared framework of public pride in Britain would mean encouraging a renewed sense of shared expectations and ambitions and a country more at home and at ease with itself. It would embolden communities to take greater responsibility for themselves, to challenge anti-social and disruptive behaviour more confidently, and to work collectively for the mutual betterment of their area, community and country.

These outcomes are neither overstated nor illusory – they are supported by evidence of the impact of high and low esteem on behaviour. There is no denying the complexity of pride and patriotism as political and policy purposes, they are indeed complicated and frustrating. But a shared fabric of pride and a heightened sense of esteem in Britain are necessary to promoting a more resilient and robust nation and to limiting the cost of social change. For the political parties there are direct, political advantages to learning how to communicate with people about patriotism and pride in a more realistic and empathetic way. In the longer term, policy perceived through the lens of pride and delivered with the intent of building pride and patriotism will lead us to interventions that better reflect the reality of people’s motivations and help to forge a more cohesive, coherent and self-policing society.
Appendix Key polling results

This is a summary of statistics on patriotism based on a Demos-commissioned survey of a weighted sample of 2,086 British citizens, which took place in May 2011.

Headline results: 79% of respondents were proud to be British citizens.

Part 1 Overview of statistics on patriotism

Trustworthiness

British people are over a third less likely to trust a non-British person in Britain than a British person:

- 59% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘British people are generally trustworthy’, and only 38% agreed with the statement ‘Non-British people living in Britain are generally trustworthy’.

  More patriotic people are more trustworthy of British and non-British people:

- Almost 3 in 4 respondents who stated they ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’ agreed with the statement ‘British people are generally trustworthy’. In contrast, just over 1 in 3 people who ‘neither agree nor disagree’ with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’ stated they agreed that ‘British people are generally trustworthy’.
- Respondents who stated that they ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’ were almost 10% more likely to say they agreed with the statement ‘non-British people living in Britain are generally trustworthy’.
- Almost 60% of respondents who ‘strongly disagreed’ with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’ disagreed with the
statement ‘non-British people living in Britain are generally trustworthy’.

- Local pride is a gateway to national pride.
- Almost 8 in 10 respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’ agreed with the statement ‘The people in my neighbourhood are generally trustworthy’ compared with 6 in 10 respondents who ‘neither agreed or disagreed’ with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’.

**Traditional cleavages are not felt to be as important as in the past**

- Almost 60% of respondents felt that people in Britain were less proud of Britain today than 25 years ago. Almost 70% felt that people in Britain were less proud of Britain today than 50 years ago (and almost 50% stated that they believed people were ‘a lot less proud’).
- Almost 4 in 5 respondents believed that people in Britain are less proud of their religion than they were 50 years ago.
- 1 in 2 respondents felt people in Britain were less proud of their class than 50 years ago.

**Are Britain’s best days behind her?**

- 44% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’.
- Welsh people are about 10% more likely to disagree with the statement ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’ than the Scots and English.
- Men are almost 15% more likely than women to agree with the statement ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’.
- Those from lower social grades are more likely than those from higher social grades to agree with the statement ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’.
- 42% of ABC1 respondents agree with the statement ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’ compared with 50% of C2DE respondents.
· Older people are significantly more likely than younger people to agree with the statement ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’.
· 32.5% of respondents aged 18–24 agree with the statement ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’ compared with 37% of 25–44-year-olds, 51.1% of 45–64-year-olds and 54.6% of over 65s.
· Anglicans are more likely to agree with the statement ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’ than secularists and Muslims.
· Almost 50% of Anglicans agreed that ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’, compared with 42.5% of secularists and 31% of Muslims.
· White British people are almost 10% more likely to agree with the statement ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’ than minority groups.
· 46% of white British agreed, compared with 37% of those from mixed backgrounds, 37% of Indians, 39% of ‘other Asian background’ and 30% of Black people.
· Those who have volunteered in the past 12 months are more likely to disagree with the statement ‘Britain’s best days are behind her’ than those who have not.
· 26.8% of respondents who had volunteered in the past 12 months disagreed with the statement, compared with 18.7% of those who hadn’t volunteered in the past 12 months.

British peoples’ opinions on immigration and identity

· 41% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘immigration contributes to Britain’s culture’.
· 55% of people aged 18–24 agree with this statement compared with 30% of over 65s.
· 46% of ABC1 respondents agree with this statement compared with 29% of C2DE respondents.
· 37% of white British agree with the statement compared with 63% of non-white ethnic minorities.
· 48% of Scots agree, 40% of English and 35% of Welsh.
· 64% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘Immigration can make it harder to identify “Britishness”’.
64% of English agreed with the statement, 58% of Scots and 50% of Welsh.
66% of white British agree compared with 42% of non-white ethnic groups.
50% of 18–24-year-olds agree compared with 71% of over 65s.
50% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘Britain benefits from being a cosmopolitan country’.
63% agreed with the statement ‘It is important that British culture remains different from other cultures’.
78% of respondents agreed that having a citizenship test for people to become a British citizen was a good idea.
Support rose to 82% when asked if the test should include a values test.

Regional nationalism

When asked to complete the sentence ‘I am proud to be from...’ and given the option of ‘my city/town/village, my country or region, my part of the UK (eg England, Scotland, Wales), Great Britain, Europe, the World as whole, another country, or other’, almost 3 in 10 English and Welsh respondents stated ‘Great Britain’ but only just over 15% Scottish respondents stated ‘Great Britain’.
62% of Scots cited ‘my part of UK (eg Scotland, Wales or England) compared with 50% of Welsh and 24% of English respondents.
17% of English respondents said ‘my city/town/village’ compared with 6% of Welsh and 8% of Scots respondents.
13% of English respondents said ‘my region or county’ compared with 8% of Welsh and 3% of Scots respondents.
Of the regions, respondents from London were the most likely to cite ‘Great Britain’.
28% of respondents in urban areas cited ‘Great Britain’, compared with 27% in ‘town and fringe’ and 20% in rural areas.
Almost 36% of English respondents strongly agreed with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’, compared with 29% of Welsh and 21% of Scots respondents.
· Respondents in the North East and North West of England were most likely to ‘strongly agree’ with the statement.

**British peoples’ opinions on other propositions**

· 74% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘it’s important to buy British’.
· 31% agreed with the statement ‘My community represents what is best about Britain’.
· 49% agreed with the statement ‘My neighbourhood is very similar to other neighbourhoods in Britain today’.
· 36% agreed with the statement ‘I wish I had more opportunities to demonstrate my pride in Britain today’.
· 46% respondents neither agreed nor disagreed and 18% disagreed.

**Hurt pride**

· 54% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘Sometimes I am embarrassed to be British’.
· 61% of Scots respondents agreed with the statement compared with 53% of English and 46% of Welsh respondents.

**Pride in how Britain treats gay people**

· Women are about 10% more likely than men to agree with the statement ‘I am proud of how Britain treats gay people’.
· Over 60% of young people aged 18–24 agree with the statement ‘I am proud of how Britain treats gay people’ compared with just 35% of people aged over 65.
· British Muslims are more likely than secularists to strong agree with the statement ‘I am proud of how Britain treats gay people’ (almost 20% of Muslims and less than 10% of people no religion).
· British Asians are around 10% more likely than white British people to agree with the statement ‘I am proud of how Britain treats gay people’.
British peoples’ pride in Britain’s position
To what extent do you agree with the statement ‘I am proud of Britain’s role in the world’?:

- Over 50% of English people agree with this statement, compared with over 55% of Welsh and 46% of Scots respondents.

To what extent do you agree with the statement ‘I am proud of how Britain looks (eg landscape, architecture and style)’?:

- 33% of English strongly agree with this statement, compared with 23% of Welsh and 22% of Scots respondents.

To what extent do you agree with the statement ‘I am proud of British culture’?:

- 27% of English respondents strongly agree with this statement, compared with 18% of Welsh and Scots respondents.

To what extent do you agree with the statement ‘I am proud of British history’?:

- 36% of English respondents strongly agree with this statement, 33% of Welsh and 19% of Scots respondents.

What people take pride in

About themselves
Respondents were more likely to take pride in the things that were closest to them – for instance their family and home – than in the ‘nation’ more generally:

- 87% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of my family’.
- 77% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of my friends’.
- 62% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of my work’.
- 51% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of my appearance’.
- 44% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of my local community’.
· 72% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of my home’.
· 60% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of my ethnic group’.
· 55% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of my possessions’.
· 55% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of my contribution to society’.
· 80% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of my attitude to others’.
· 90% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of my values’.
· 70% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of my taste in things’.
· 79% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of my knowledge/intelligence’.

**About Britain**

· 79% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’.
· 81% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of how Britain looks (eg landscape, architecture and style)’.
· 74% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of British culture’.
· 72% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of British history’.
· 59% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of British people’.
· 52% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of how Britain treats people who have different lifestyles’.
· 51% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of Britain’s role in the world’.
· 46% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of how Britain treats gay people’.

**Institutions**

· 75% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of Shakespeare as a symbol of Britain’; 19% ‘neither agree nor disagree’.
· 72% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of the National Trust as a symbol of Britain’; 24% ‘neither agree nor disagree’.
· 72% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of the armed forces as a symbol of Britain’; 18% ‘neither agree nor disagree’.
71% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of the Union Jack as a symbol of Britain’; 19% ‘neither agree nor disagree’.

70% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of the pound as a symbol of Britain’; 22% ‘neither agree nor disagree’.

69% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of the NHS as a symbol of Britain’; 19% ‘neither agree nor disagree’.

68% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of the Monarchy as a symbol of Britain’; 17% ‘neither agree nor disagree’.

63% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of the BBC as a symbol of Britain’; 24% ‘neither agree nor disagree’.

58% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of British sporting achievements as a symbol of Britain’; 29% ‘neither agree nor disagree’.

55% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of the Beatles as a symbol of Britain’; 30% ‘neither agree nor disagree’.

51% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of the Legal system as a symbol of Britain’; 28% ‘neither agree nor disagree’.

47% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of Parliament as a symbol of Britain’; 30% ‘neither agree nor disagree’ and 22% disagree.

32% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of David Beckham as a symbol of Britain’; 30% ‘neither agree nor disagree’.

28% agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of Harry Potter as a symbol of Britain’; 37% ‘neither agree nor disagree’.

**Patriotic events**

Over 9 in 10 respondents who had watched the royal wedding agreed that they ‘felt proud of how Britain was represented at that event’.

**Bonding social capital**

People who engage with certain forms of bonding social capital are more likely to be proud than others, and vice versa:

- 86% of respondents who watched the royal wedding agreed with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’ compared with 65% among those who didn’t.
**Patriotism and civic action**

Our results show that people who volunteer are slightly more likely than those who don’t to be proud to be a British citizen, and there is a slightly stronger relationship between people who are proud and those who volunteer:

- 80% of respondents agreed with the statement ‘People who are proud of themselves and their community behave in more positive ways’.
- 66% of people had volunteered in some way over the past 12 months.

**The effect of volunteering on pride**

- Only 1 in 4 people who ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’ had never volunteered compared with almost 2 in 5 of those who had volunteered.
- If a respondent had volunteered in the past 12 months there was a 35% chance that they strongly agreed with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’, compared with 29% among those who hadn’t volunteered in the past 12 months.
- If an individual stated they ‘volunteered a lot more than 5 years ago’ there was a 41% chance they ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’, compared with 27% among those who had never volunteered.

**The effect of pride on volunteering**

- If a respondent stated they ‘strongly agree’ with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’ there is a 72% chance they have volunteered in the past 12 months. If they neither ‘agreed nor disagreed with the statement’ that figure fell to 65%.
- 3 in 10 respondents who strongly agreed with the statement ‘I am proud to be a British citizen’ stated that they had engaged in a sports club – taking part, coaching or watching – compared with 1 in 4 who neither agreed nor disagreed and less than 1 in 5 of those who ‘strongly disagreed’.
Part 2 Question by question breakdown

Volunteering in the past 12 months
q2 From the list below, please pick out the ones which best describe any groups, clubs or organisations you’ve taken part in, supported or helped over the last 12 months.

- Sport groups/clubs was the most common group people volunteered in (29%), followed by hobbies recreation/arts/social (22%), children’s education/schools (14%), religion (12%), environment/animals (10%), local community or neighbourhood groups (10%), politics (10%).
- Only 4% had been involved in trade union activity and 2% in ‘citizens groups’.

Levels of volunteering
q3 Thinking back 5 years ago compared with now, do you volunteer …?

- 34% said they had never volunteered.
- 9% said a lot more than 5 years ago, 8% said somewhat more than 5 years ago.
- 22% said about the same as 5 years ago.
- 10% said somewhat less than 5 years ago, 17% said a lot less than 5 years ago.

q3b To what extent would you agree or disagree that ‘you would like more opportunities to volunteer’?

- 27% agree. This rises to 48% among 18–24-year-olds, 31% among 25–34-year-olds.
- ABC1 respondents are slightly more likely to agree (29%) than C2DE respondents (23%).
- People in urban areas are more likely to agree (28%) than those in rural areas (24%)
- Black or minority ethnic people are far more likely to agree (37%) than white British (25%) respondents.
- 50% of long-term unemployed agree.
27% of English respondents, 25% of Welsh respondents and 21% of Scottish respondents agreed.
47% neither agree nor disagree.
26% disagree.

**Patriotic activities**
q4a Which, if any, of these have you done or attended in the last 6 months? Please tick all that apply:

- 67% had watched the royal wedding.
- 61% had been to local pub.
- 57% had seen sporting event on TV.
- 22% had been to a local fete or carnival.
- 22% had been to a sporting event at a stadium.
- 19% had been to a car boot sale.
- 14% had attended a Church of England service.
- 15% had attended another religious service.
- 5% had worked on an allotment.
- 3% had been to a local political party meeting.
- 3% had been to a parent–teacher association meeting.

**Pride in different things**
I take pride in my...

a) Family

- 87% agree.
- 3% disagree.

b) Friends

- 77% agree.
- 2% disagree.
c) Work
· 63% agree.
· 8% disagree.

d) Local community
· 44% agree.
· 15% disagree.

e) Appearance
· 53% agree.
· 15% disagree.

f) Home
· 73% agree.
· 7% disagree.

g) Ethnic group
· 63% agree.
· 4% disagree.

h) Possessions
· 57% agree.
· 8% disagree.

i) Contribution to society
· 54% agree.

j) Attitude to others
· 80% agree.
k) Values
- 89% agree,
l) Taste in things
- 72% agree.
m) Knowledge
- 79% agree.
n) Car
- 35% agree.
o) Faith
- 35% agree.
Notes


2 P Diamond, ‘From the Big Society to the Good Society’, *Civitas* 8, no 1, Feb 2011.


6 Ibid.


9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Equivalent of ESOL Level 3 or above. Alternatively, if the applicant’s level of English is not sufficiently good, they must take English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) and citizenship classes.


18 Based on the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009.


31 Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. 


Diamond P, ‘From the Big Society to the Good Society’, *Civitas* 8, no 1, Feb 2011.


References


Historical Association, Teaching History, March 2009.


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Patriotism has become a dirty word to some and a nostalgic exercise for others. For many on the left, it is a problematic concept, seen as the gateway to jingoism, nationalism and arrogance. For the right it is equated with outdated symbols of Britishness like the battle of Trafalgar and the Union Jack. On both sides of the spectrum, patriotism has been misconstrued, misrepresented and its significance undervalued.

*A Place for Pride* finds that there is disconnect between political narratives of patriotism and ordinary citizens’ pride in Britain. Drawing on qualitative research with over 2,000 British people from England, Wales and Scotland, this pamphlet argues that patriotism does not, and should not, come from either top-down narratives about Queen and country nor from so-called ‘progressive’ notions based on values. Instead, modern British patriotism is founded in a profound, emotional connection to the everyday acts, manners and kindnesses that British people see in themselves. This research also demonstrates, for the first time, the links between greater levels of patriotism and civic pride and pro-social attitudes and behaviours – those who love their country most are shown to volunteer more and to trust their neighbours more than those who are either ambivalent or ashamed about Britain.

In order to remedy the uneasy relationship the public has with patriotism, this pamphlet recommends overhauling the ‘Life in the UK’ citizenship test and radical changes to the way that history is taught in school. Finally, it recommends new narratives about pride, patriotism and the Big Society – explaining how politics can reconnect with the emotion and the practice of pride.

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