

The top half of the cover features an abstract graphic. It consists of numerous concentric, slightly irregular lines that curve from the left towards the right. The lines are primarily in shades of blue and yellow, with some darker blue and black lines interspersed. The background of this graphic is a warm, textured orange. The overall effect is reminiscent of a stylized sun or a series of ripples.

gordon tullock

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american foreign policy

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction



Although “open secrets” seems a self-contradictory phrase, it seems also to be good English. My usage is, I think, less subject to criticism than most. In this essay, I will be dealing with some areas in American foreign policy in which the conventional wisdom is not only wrong, but can be disproved from open sources like newspapers. In some cases I will bring in from open sources things that will surprise the “usually well-informed” people, although I will criticize ignorance rather than error.

Like most people, I have been reading about the abysmal historic ignorance of the products of our educational system. Indeed, I have a good example. I wanted to send a letter to Lord Bauer and told my secretary she could send it to the House of Lords. She asked for its address, and somewhat surprised, I said “London” would do. She wanted a Zip and a little further conversation revealed that she had never heard of the institution.

Still, the fact that newspapers carry stories in which they report ignorant answers to historical questions under the apparent impression that most, or at least many, of their readers will know the correct answer is good evidence that the history of our country is not totally a closed book

to many citizens. Although the bulk of this collection deals with foreign policy, in some cases it will deal with domestic matters. Thus, there should be a lot of “well-informed” people who will realize there are holes in their information when they read the further chapters.

I should say that I think these “revelations” have some political relevance, but not much. There will be people who lower their opinion of certain historic figures, but I do not imagine this will shift many votes. Its effect on history books might be somewhat larger, but even there it is merely further revision in periods that have been subject to many revisions. Altogether, I think the main value of this study, like that of most historical writing, is entertainment. Since I enjoy history and read a lot of it, I do not regard that as a criticism.

As far as sources are concerned, except where I have noted otherwise, the reader can confirm my factual information from contemporary newspapers. Where it is drawn from more obscure sources, I have footnoted them. Mainly, however, I suggest the reader trust me or consult the *New York Times Index*. Nothing contained herein will bring the world, or even a political party, to destruction.

CHAPTER 2

Pearl Harbor



In order to understand Pearl Harbor, it is necessary to go back to 1904. In that year, the Japanese started their war with Russia with a surprise torpedo attack on the Russian Far Eastern fleet at Port Arthur. Their accuracy was not very good, but they did cripple the fleet so that it was not able to interfere with the movement of Japanese troops into Manchuria. These troops were able to take Port Arthur by land assault, thus making the Russian attempts to repair their ships nugatory.

The Russians undertook the very difficult task of moving their Baltic fleet to the Pacific. It arrived after the fall of Port Arthur and was destroyed at Tsushima while attempting to reach Vladivostok. The Japanese success resulted from two factors, one of which, of course, was their achievement of surprise. The other was the fact that although the Russian fleet was markedly bigger than the Japanese, it was divided, and the Japanese fleet was capable of beating each half. If the Russians had concentrated both fleets in Port Arthur, it is very doubtful that the Japanese would have dared attack. As the great naval theorist Mahan pointed out, however, if they had been concentrated in the Baltic, it would

have been also very dangerous for the Japanese to attack. They would have had temporary command of Far Eastern waters, but would have faced almost certain defeat when the combined Russian fleets arrived.

The American navy knew this history and their war plans took it into account. The bulk of the fleet was concentrated in the Pacific, with only three elderly battleships, a carrier, which was new, but had a serious design defect, and some minor ships in the Atlantic. This Pacific fleet was markedly superior to the Imperial Navy. On receipt of a war warning, in order to minimize the chances of surprise, the war plans called for the Pacific fleet going to sea and taking a course intended to make it hard for the Japanese to find them. With both fleets looking for the other, and the American bigger, it was more likely that they would first miss, which would mean no surprise, or the American fleet would locate the Japanese before the Japanese located it, or each locate the other, which would also mean no surprise. If, by chance, the Japanese located the American fleet before it located the Japanese fleet, the Americans would be on the alert and well able to defend themselves.

All of this was changed by a decision to move one battleship division and half of the scouting forces to the Atlantic. This made the surface fleet inferior to the Japanese and the carrier forces very much inferior. Instead of six carriers, they now had only three. The chief of naval operations wanted to base the fleet in San Diego, where it would probably have been safe from surprise attack. Roosevelt removed him and installed Stark, who was less obstructive to presidential wishes. For the same reason, he removed the commander of the Pacific fleet and replaced him with the more cooperative Kimmel. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, King was appointed commander of the navy and Stark was more or less ignored for the rest of

the war. Kimmel was blamed for the success of the Japanese attack and also removed. There are many who feel this was unjust and an apology is due. So far none has been offered, and it is far enough in the past so that most people have forgotten it.

Note that if they had moved the whole fleet, or most of it, to the Atlantic, this would have been equivalent to keeping the whole Russian fleet in the Baltic in 1905. The Pacific fleet was vulnerable, but threatened Japan's drive to end the European empires in the Indies. If the whole fleet had been in the Atlantic, it would have taken long enough to move it into the Pacific so that Japan could "liberate" (of which more is discussed later) what is now Indonesia, thus giving them an adequate petroleum supply. The American navy had been planning for some time a naval drive directly across the Pacific. This could not take place at the beginning of the war because the Japanese conscript army in their native islands was very much larger than the American forces that had only just begun adopting conscription. In any event, the remaining American Pacific fleet would still have been too weak.

President Roosevelt wanted to maintain the fleet as a threat to Japan, although it was weak enough so that the threat was rather feeble. It is not clear what he thought the ships he transferred to the Atlantic could do against the German submarines. They were not designed for antisubmarine warfare, nor were they easily converted to the type of ship needed to keep convoys safe. In any event, with the exception of one carrier, they were left in the Atlantic where they mainly stayed in harbor.

The three carriers still attached to the Pacific fleet had been sent to provide an air garrison for Wake Island. The decision to put a marine battalion and a small air group on this island was obviously very risky. Granted the

weakening of the Pacific fleet, it would be impossible to defend it given the location in what were Japanese-dominated waters. It was, of course, taken easily by the Japanese.

Roosevelt's policy of threatening Japan in hopes that they would withdraw from China was certainly risky, particularly after the Pacific fleet had been weakened. There is here, possibly, a very good bit of information on American and British foreign policy. The Germans maintained a listening post in the Channel Islands with good code breaking capacity. A three-volume report of the intercepts was published after the war. I will be quoting the intercepts, but it should be pointed out that they may be a post-war fake. Temporarily assuming that they are genuine, Roosevelt came to believe that he could trap the Japanese into an attack that would mean war. He discussed this with Churchill in these coded telephone messages that, maybe, were intercepted and decoded by the Germans. He wanted to join the war, and told Churchill that public opinion was overwhelmingly against it. He thought that a Japanese attack would change that¹.

Sometimes I hear, mainly from far right speakers, that Roosevelt deliberately caused the destruction of our fleet at Pearl Harbor. At a lesser, and more probable level, I have heard that Secretary of War Stimson said we would be willing to sacrifice three cruisers to get into the war, but not five. This might be true, but neither Stimson nor Roosevelt wanted to lose our entire battle line for that purpose.

¹ Douglas, Gregory, *Gestapo Chief: The 1948 Interrogation of Heinrich Müller*, R. James Bender Publishing, 1996. There are several printings carried by Amazon. The conversations do not seem to have been recorded by either the American or Russian government. The conversations relevant to our present subject are a small part of the three volumes.

The Russian mistake of 1904 was being repeated in spades. The Japanese were offered another opportunity to defeat their opponent in detail. A series of communication failures then led to the Honolulu army and navy commanders not being warned, although naval intelligence suspected the attack. Indeed, the British also knew and Churchill warned Roosevelt in one of their purported telephone conversations².

The fleet commander apparently thought that, with the weakened fleet, it would be dangerous to go to sea, particularly with the carrier fleet halved and away. He chose to stay in Pearl even after the receipt of a war warning on November 26. One special factor which made this appear particularly sensible was the fact that air-dropped torpedoes were thought to be unusable in shallow water, and Pearl Harbor was shallow. The successful British attack on Taranto, also shallow, but not as shallow, should have warned us that some torpedoes could be used in shallow water³.

Roosevelt, if the intercepts are to be trusted, mentioned the shallow nature of Pearl to Churchill as an argument that the fleet was safe, when Churchill said that British intelligence thought the Japanese were planning a carrier attack on Pearl⁴. Unfortunately, the Japanese had invented a torpedo which could be used in shallow water (as had the British). But it should be pointed out that the only battleship which the Americans admitted had been sunk, the *Arizona*, was a victim not of torpedoes, but of conventional bombs.

² *Ibid.*

³ Taranto was not as shallow as Pearl Harbor. It was much harder to repair the Italian ships resting on the bottom at Taranto than at Pearl because they were farther down in the water.

⁴ Douglas, *op. cit.*

The casualties at Pearl were concealed from the American people, but not from the Japanese. They flew a plane with night photography equipment over the Harbor on the night after the attack. They got excellent pictures and even published some of them in Tokyo papers. Pearl Harbor is rather shallow and although the entire fleet was resting on the bottom, most of it could be repaired in two years or so. In this it was like the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, although there was no army approaching Honolulu from the rear.

Why we had offered the Japanese this opportunity to defeat our fleet in detail is not obvious. In the post-war investigations, some Republican congressmen implied it was deliberate in order to join the war. The division of the fleet and the decision to keep it at Pearl rather than in the much safer (and better equipped) harbor at San Diego looks suspicious, but it was probably stupidity, not villainy.

I can offer an explanation from my own experience. At the time, I was a student at the University of Chicago with a hobbyist's interest in foreign and military affairs. I remember reading our November 26 note in the *New York Times* in Harper library. I put the paper down and said, "My God, we are at war". Then sanity returned, and I thought, "The Japanese would not dare attack the United States". I suspect that somewhat the same thought pattern dominated Washington. But it should be kept in mind that I was not a professional and did not know that the Pacific fleet had been weakened.

In any event, the only people disciplined were the navy and air force commanders in Hawaii, both of whom had simply obeyed orders. No one in Washington suffered, perhaps because the actual source of the stupid

decision to weaken the fleet was the President. At a lower level, the failure to inform the commanders at Honolulu is more mysterious. The Americans had deciphered the Japanese diplomatic code. It specified time of delivery of the message starting war to the Department of State, and a time equivalent to 7 in the morning of December 7th. Everyone of importance in Washington, various army commanders, and even MacArthur in far off Manila knew of the Japanese war message several hours before the attack⁵.

Why the commanders in Honolulu were not informed is a mystery, which was not cleared up even by the Republican congressional investigation after the war. Apparently it was the result of a communications glitch, but no one was ever disciplined for it. The commanders, having been kept in ignorance, were publicly blamed for the defeat and removed.

But Washington was not the only source of stupid decisions. Another was Vice Admiral Nagumo. The three remaining American carriers had been sent out to deliver planes to Wake Island. They were returning and, according to custom, flew off their planes as soon as they were in range of Hawaii in order to give the pilots an extra day of leave. The planes were trying to land when the attack on the airfield was delivered.

There were thus three carriers within flying range west of Hawaii that temporarily were deficient in aircraft. Further, getting their planes back without breaking radio silence would be most difficult. Their planes, having entered Hawaiian airspace during the attack by the Japanese attacking planes, should have been seen and the Japanese radio personnel should have detected them, thus giving away the presence of the carriers. Even if

⁵ Stinnett, Robert, *Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor*, Free Press, 2001, p. 391.

neither of these methods worked, Nagumo certainly should have looked for them. He did not and thus lost an opportunity to halve our carrier force.

In keeping with the deliberately deceptive report that only one battleship had been sunk, the newspapers were told that the American carriers had been ordered to search out and destroy the Japanese force. Presumably this was also meant for the public and not a serious order. Approaching Nagumo's forces would have been extremely dangerous, particularly until our carriers had recovered their planes.

Nagumo continued to fail. He took his carriers north of Australia and, rather pointlessly, bombed Darwin and then entered the Indian Ocean. The English had assembled a sizable fleet to keep control of the Indian Ocean, particularly the Bay of Bengal. Admiral Conningham had put to sea with the intent of engaging and defeating the Japanese fleet, leaving his chief of staff ashore. When the chief of staff realized how strong the Japanese force was, he sent a message to London feeling sure that Conningham would take it in. In this message he said that the British faced the likelihood of the worst defeat they had suffered since the long ago Dutch wars⁶.

Conningham took in the message and realized he should avoid action. Instead of turning away from the Japanese, however, he turned toward them. He felt that the Japanese reconnaissance would be at maximum range and hence would not find him at closer range. There was the chance that Nagumo would search nearer areas also, and planes going out to search or returning might overfly him by accident. Conningham spent the day watching the Japanese search on his radar (the Japanese did

⁶ Main Fleet to Singapore.

not yet have it) and worrying. Nagumo destroyed some minor ships and withdrew, thus for the second time missing an opportunity for a sizeable victory. Granted the number of planes he had, he should have searched more widely, not only in the area he thought was most likely.

The Japanese, hoping to win a further victory, decided to attack Midway on the theory that the Americans would have to defend it. Their battle plan was most peculiar, but that was Yamashita's fault, not Nagumo's. Yamashita divided his carriers, sending two of the six off to the Aleutians. This left only four, which was only slightly stronger than the American force if we realize that the airport at Midway also had planes which could have participated in the defense. Nagumo, although under Yamashita's command, was in charge of the carriers. Yamashita took his battleships along, but made no use of them.

I believe we were reading the Japanese messages and Nimitz knew about the division of the Japanese carriers. If he had known the whole Japanese fleet had been concentrated, I suspect he would have let Midway go as he had previously let Wake go.

Battleships are of little use against carriers that can always stay out of range of gunfire. Midway, however, had no such maneuverability and could have been wrecked by gunfire. The Japanese carriers could then have been reserved for use against the American carriers that, hopefully (and in accord with the Japanese plan), would try to defend Midway. The battleships, however, stayed back and Midway was bombed by carrier planes. This was not only inefficient; the fact that the torpedo bombers were armed with bombs, not torpedoes, caused difficulty when it was realized that there were American carriers in the area.

The Japanese sometimes sent scouting planes out alone or sometimes in pairs. In an account that I read, the carrier personnel were reported as wondering which method would be used and being mildly surprised at the choice of single planes. The scouting planes were a new type that had been rushed through for this mission. New planes sometimes have glitches, and the plane that overflew the American carriers had a radio failure with the result that the first indication that there were American carriers in the area reached the Japanese in the form of a surprise attack. Once again, Nagumo's reconnaissance had failed.

It is not clear what the outcome would have been had Nagumo detected the American carriers earlier. Counting the airport at Midway as part of the American forces, the two fleets were not too far from equal in air power. Still, it could hardly have been worse for the Japanese than what actually happened. In all three of these cases, Nagumo's reconnaissance failed. One failure of reconnaissance can be put down to bad luck, two to very bad luck, but all three show incompetence.

Addendum

One of the peculiar features of the attack on Pearl Harbor is continuing controversy over our being surprised. After I had written the first draft of the above paper, I read Stinnett's *Day of Deceit*. This is a strong and recent revival of the Roosevelt plot theory of Pearl Harbor. David Kahn gave it a very strong and negative review in the *New York Review of Books*. This review did not succeed in killing it; in fact, I bought a paperback copy from a pile in the Des Moines airport shop. From all of this, I deduce that Kahn's review was not very effective. Further, there was an afterword

and reproduction of some of the documents used by Stinnett that were not in my original hardback. Under the circumstances, I thought it would be a good opportunity to discuss both the plot theory and the general situation at the time.

Stinnett is a newspaperman and does not understand, or at least appreciate, scholarly footnote systems. Kahn complains, justly, about the impossibility of tracking down some of his sources. On the other hand, Kahn himself is not free from error. For example, he says, "Stinnett claims that bearings were taken from the Philippines and Alaska and that the fix or fixes were transmitted to Hawaii". On the other hand, a little farther down in his article he says, "Stinnett seems unaware that a single bearing does not fix a vessel's location. The line of bearing from the Philippines runs not only through the Kurile islands north of Japan, from which the strike force sailed, but also through the home waters of the Japanese fleet so it cannot be said to have located the strike force". Clearly he was sufficiently emotionally upset that he did not notice the contradiction.

This was a case in which there were many strong emotions. Devout admirers of Roosevelt could not concede that he was at fault, even if the fault was an error rather than a conspiracy. Opponents of Roosevelt like to think of him as deliberately setting off the attack. Nowhere in Kahn's account is there any admission that Roosevelt was in error. Similarly, Stinnett does not look for mistakes, but conspiracy.

There certainly were enough mistakes. The special message from Marshall about the Japanese diplomatic preparations did not reach Pearl Harbor, although it did reach Manila. This was a communication failure for which no one was punished or even criticized in public. Further, the

radar on the island detected the approaching Japanese planes. The lieutenant in charge thought they were American planes coming from California and failed to pass the message on. As a third example, in Hawaii, a guard destroyer at the entrance to Pearl Harbor sank a midget submarine trying to get into the harbor and reported this fact several hours before the air attack. So far as I know this has not been investigated, but I presume his higher officers thought that he had attacked a floating log.

A Japanese air force squadron destroyed the bulk of the American air force in the Philippines by an air raid on Clarke Field several hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. There has never been any explanation for MacArthur's letting this happen, but he may have had no alternatives. His air force was weak and prospects of either attacking Japan or successfully concealing it at other airports was probably small.

We can also ask what Kimmel could have done if he had been warned. Granted that his carriers were far to the West, he could probably not have made much use of them at the time of the attack. Of course, if he had advanced warning, he could have seen to it that they at least retained their aircraft. It is not clear that he would have been wise to put to sea; he was after all outnumbered, particularly in carriers, and if his ships had been sunk in deep water it would have been impossible to repair them. Putting them on alert would probably have been a waste of time granted the inaccuracy of the anti-aircraft equipment at that time. One of the battleships, as a matter of routine, always went to battle stations at dawn. It was sunk just like the other battleships whose anti-aircraft guns were not manned when the attack started.

If he had known the exact time of the attack, the army commander could have put his planes in the air to defend the air space. They would have been heavily outnumbered, however, and probably would only have moderated the attack. Altogether, even without the failure to get warning, the weak fleet in Pearl Harbor would probably have been lost. The basic errors were made in Washington, not in Pearl Harbor, but the idea of a plot rather than ineptitude is absurd.

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CHAPTER 3

The Collapse of Nationalist China



The current intellectual view of the Communist victory in China is well summarized by Lars-Eric Nelson in a paragraph at the beginning of an article on another subject⁷. He was writing in the context of the debate over “Who lost China?”, which was premised on the assumption that the “convulsive Chinese Communist revolution, a forty-year struggle involving hundreds of desperate people, could have been thwarted, or at least turned in a positive direction, by adroit diplomacy in Washington. The inanity of the China debate was instantly apparent, yet the illusion thrives”.

This is a pastiche of errors. The Manchu dynasty was overthrown in 1911. Incidentally, ineptness on the part of President Taft was one of the factors, although not the decisive factor, in this overthrow. As had happened many times before in Chinese history, the fall of the dynasty was succeeded by an armed struggle for dominance among various people and groups to establish a new centralized government. The country fell

⁷Nelson, Lars-Eric, “Clinton and His Enemies”, *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 47, No. 1, January 20, 2000, p. 18.

into a disastrous civil war with warlords controlling provinces or other local areas and at perpetual war with each other.

The Nationalists led by Chiang Kai Shek and with much Russian aid drove north from Canton and took the lower Yangtse Valley. It should be emphasized that not only was the Nationalist army given much aid by Russians, but also it was then allied with the Chinese Communist Party. Further, much of the territory nominally under control from Nanking was actually ruled by local warlords, some of whom rejoiced in formal commissions as local governors.

At this point, Stalin revealed his normal paranoia. He ordered the Communists in China to overthrow the then national government and take formal power. This was very badly timed and planned with the result that the Chinese Communists were literally beheaded on the mud flats outside Shanghai. There were a few high-ranking Communists who were safe in Moscow, and some lesser Communists holding small areas in south central China. Among these later was Mao Tse Tung.

Chiang began what he hoped would be the destruction of all the other warlords and the establishment of a true central government under his control. Among the armies he wished to destroy were the Communists in south central China, but they were far from his principal preoccupation. His reduction of the power of the various provincial governors was reasonably successful, but only reasonably. With time he might have succeeded, but he did not get that time.

His campaign did include the Communists in their enclave in south central China and was successful enough so that they decided to move to a location near the Russian (Outer Mongolian) border. Chiang made little

effort to stop them; they were in essence withdrawing from a part of China where he could replace them. The warlords controlling the provinces through which they marched, in general, were willing to let them pass without much fighting as long as it was clear they did not intend to stay. Eventually they reached a rather poor and lightly populated area around Yen-an where the Russians could supply them.

The most powerful warlord in China had been the "Old Marshall" in Manchuria. In the 1920s he had made an unsuccessful effort to establish himself as sole ruler of China, and on the way back to Manchuria was assassinated by the Japanese. His son, the Young Marshall, succeeded to the throne. He was less tactful than his father, and got into an unsuccessful war with the Russians by trying to reduce the special privileges of their old sphere of influence in northern Manchuria. He then began irritating the Japanese in their sphere in southern Manchuria. His army had been permitted to deteriorate and had demonstrated incompetence in its attempt to resist the Russian invasion that followed his efforts to establish full sovereignty in northern Manchuria. Incidentally, the Russian invasion of northern Manchuria was the first violation of the Kellogg-Briand pact.

The Japanese invaded southern Manchuria but politely stayed out of the Russian sphere in the north for some time. Stalin was busy domestically, and the Japanese, after a wait, took the north too. They established a puppet empire there and paused for a time.

Chiang continued his campaign to establish control over the rest of China. The elimination of the powerful Manchurian warlord regime by the Japanese was to some extent a help in this. The Chinese Communists, safe in far distant Yen-an, demanded war with Japan, but Chiang, who

appreciated the strength of the Japanese army, confined himself to protests. He surely intended war after he had been able to unite and strengthen China.

The Japanese, however, did not give him time. They continued to press into north China and in 1937 Chiang was forced, partly by Communist intrigues, to declare war. The Japanese promptly invaded and demonstrated their military power by seizing all the major cities, the Yangtse Valley, and the land along most of the scattered railroads in China. The Nationalists retreated to the provincial capital of Chungking. The Communists stayed in Yen-an, and the Japanese, who talked about anti-Communism, made no real effort to eliminate them. Presumably they knew that the sensible thing to do when your enemies quarrel is to help the weaker side.

The Japanese strategy, like that at Midway, was peculiar. They occupied the lower Yangtse and the land on its banks, most of the northern railroads and the coast including Canton. They then stopped and made no effort to take the rest of China until 1945, when it was too late. The railroad network was not very dense and there were large areas between the railroads and the rivers that the Japanese did not occupy. These areas remained under Chinese control and the Communists seized some of them. Incidentally, the western press referred to the Communists as guerillas and either did not mention the other Chinese forces in the other unoccupied areas or called them bandits.

The Communists and the "bandits" mainly left each other alone. Both types of Chinese, after December 7th, thought that the United States would win the war for them and hence did little fighting with the Japanese. There

was some fighting between the Communist and Nationalist forces trying to get in good position for the time after what they thought was the inevitable defeat of Japan, but it was minor. Neither was able to do much in Manchuria, where the Japanese were in firm control.

The point of all this, which may seem irrelevant to later events, is to show that the “40 year struggle” was fairly minor. In 1945, not only were the Communists present, but also there were many former or still warlords masquerading as provincial governors. The American newspapers simply ignored the phenomenon and counted most of them as part of Chiang’s government.

With the collapse of Japan and the invasion of Manchuria by Russia, everyone tried to occupy the newly vacated areas. The Communists withdrew the bulk of their forces into Manchuria where they were re-equipped by the Russians, mainly with Japanese arms. They also acquired the Japanese armament factories there. The Nationalists moved to replace the Japanese and Communists in the rest of China, although some Communists still remained south of the Great Wall. The provincial governors-warlords also took advantage of the opportunity. Most of them held formal commissions in the national army or civil service.

The Nationalists then moved north and invaded Manchuria. The Communists tried to stop them and at Su Ping Kai the Nationalists won a major victory. The United States quickly slammed an arms embargo on the Nationalists. What led General Marshall to do this has never been explained. Its ostensible objective was to force the Nationalists to form a coalition government with the Communists. At this time, preventing such coalitions in France and Italy was a major objective of American foreign policy.

I remember seeing a newsreel in which reporters asked President Truman why he was trying to set up a coalition with the Communists in China and trying to prevent similar coalitions in France and Italy. He responded simply by saying that a coalition between the Nationalists and Communists in China was very important and did not mention France and Italy.

Chiang, now being short of ammunition, stopped his offensive in Manchuria and began efforts to negotiate a coalition with the Communists, essentially because he thought it was necessary for even reasonably good relations with the United States. He even arranged to elect a national assembly. The embargo stayed on. The Communists, having plenty of ammunition, refused to negotiate on a coalition and switched to the offensive. They also withdrew their negotiators from Nanking. The Communist offensive drove Chiang to Taiwan, and the embargo stayed on. It was only relaxed after the outbreak of the war in Korea.

It is not obvious that the Nationalists would have won without the embargo, but clearly we not only failed to support them diplomatically or materially; we took measures which greatly weakened them. None of this was a secret but seems to have vanished into the memory hole. A whole generation of China specialists did not mention it and, for a time, favored the "agrarian reformers". The widespread massacre of "opposition elements" in the countryside was downplayed, but when mentioned, was normally approved. Apparently, many intellectuals regarded being a landlord as a capital crime.

I sometimes hear that the United States gave the Nationalists \$10 billion in arms after the Japanese surrender. I have been unable to find

a printed explanation of the “gift”, but I think I know what it was. As a sort of sop to those “reactionary” Americans who were not in favor of the Chinese revolution, all of the equipment left on the Pacific Isles when our troops went home was given to the Nationalists about two years later. This may have been carried on our inventories as worth something like the above sum.

It had, however, simply been abandoned when the troops left. It had been subject to a rather wet, hot climate, and was unguarded against theft. The Nationalists sent out a technical mission, which concluded it was junk. It was auctioned off to junk dealers in the United States with bids solicited for “Military equipment on Ulithi”, etc. The total receipts from the auctions was about \$200 million. Since this money was in the United States, it was subject to the embargo and could not be used to buy ammunition or other military supplies. It had no effect on the fighting, but was useful for the Nationalists in other ways.

Whether the Nationalists would have won without our arms embargo, or even if we had given them real aid, is not clear. What is clear is that we more or less made their success impossible. They had to economize on ammunition and the Communists, supplied by Russia, did not. Further, our obvious antagonism was bad for their morale. Our continuous pressure for them to make concessions, together with our lack of interest in getting Communist concessions, was a continual burden.

But why did we fail to help the Nationalists? At the time we were working very hard to keep Communists out of governments elsewhere in the world. Further, why the myth that we helped them as much as possible? The quotation above, from the solicitation of bids, does not take that

extreme position, but it does more or less say there was nothing we could do. Let me take up these questions one at a time.

Firstly, why did we not help the Nationalists? I was in Tientsin as a Vice Consul at the time it was taken by the Communists, so I can give part of the answer from my own experience. At the time I arrived in Tientsin, about a year before its capture, everyone in the Consulate General except myself and the Commercial Attaché thought that the Communists were likely to win and produce a markedly superior government. Both of us were recent arrivals, a matter whose importance will become apparent after a few paragraphs. The Consul General himself thought he was a personal friend of Chou En-Lai, the Communist foreign minister. After Tientsin was taken, he quickly found out that was untrue, and the lower-level Communist officials took various actions that made his life difficult.

Most of my other colleagues were similarly disillusioned. One Vice Consul told me that he had been a mild socialist until the takeover, but after a few weeks he began feeling that Senator Taft could bear watching. He was typical and my immediate colleagues were representative of our whole diplomatic establishment in China. Further, our English, French and Italian fellow diplomats had more or less the same experience.

Let me give a couple of examples of this attitude. A fellow Vice Consul with whom I later worked in Hong Kong had been in an aid mission to China right after the war. He reported that he had continual difficulties with the Nationalist officials, but got along well with the Communists. On questioning, I discovered that what he and the rest of the aid mission objected to in Nationalist behavior was that the grain being shipped into their areas was regarded by them as something they

could use to pay peasants to repair various war-damaged facilities instead of being distributed free, with the repairs being made either by conscripting the peasants or taxing them. This was apparently a violation of regulations, but clearly sensible, even if the US agency objected.

He said that the Communists did not do this. They did take the label which said "Gift of the American People" off, but their officials explained to him they had to in view of their political position. Children, he said, sometimes threw stones at them in Communist villages, but this also was explicable given what the children were told by the local Communist government. Clearly his position depended not upon the different behavior, but on a different initial position. I should say that he was not basically pro-Communist, but he was strongly anti-Nationalist.

My second example involves Fu Tso-Yi who controlled, more or less autonomously, a north China province west of Peking. With the withdrawal of the Japanese, he moved to Peking and was recognized by the Nationalist government as controller of that area and commander of the military there. He had acquired some foreign exchange and with the deterioration of the Nationalist position in Manchuria, he decided to get some new arms. In view of the embargo, he planned on getting them from Sweden. The American ambassador, Stuart, denounced the whole project in a circular message that I decoded as saying he was not going to permit warlords to flourish. Incidentally, the Swedish ambassador took the same view.

Note that in essence Ambassador Stuart was choosing the Communists rather than a warlord who was at least allied with the Nationalists. Fu took the obvious course of action. He made a deal with

the Communists in which he turned over Peking and the rest of the area held by his army to the Communists in return for being made a minister in their government. At the time I thought he had made a bad deal since I expected the Communists would get rid of him at the earliest opportunity. I was wrong. They left him in his ministerial post until his retirement.

Both of these are merely examples of the general attitude. Nor was it confined to diplomats. Missionaries looked forward to the arrival of militant atheists, and businessmen contemplated the arrival of socialist opponents of private property with glee. The Department of State did not warn Americans to leave China, but merely said that during the changeover there might be disorder and suggested temporary precautions that might involve moving until the fighting had passed their area.

Why this attitude? Something similar had developed with the Taipings in the mid-19th century, the Boxers at the change of the century, and with the 1911 overthrow of the Manchus. In my opinion, and as far as I know I am the only person who holds this opinion, it was a fundamental dislike of some aspects of Chinese culture. Further, if my theory is right, most people of western culture feel this way.

Different cultures normally differ in many ways; their moral codes are similarly different. The Chinese government, by following the Chinese moral system, was violating ours. They were, therefore, wicked and disliking them was the logical outcome. Our moral code requires toleration of different cultures, but also condemnation of wicked practices. The two aspects of our moral code were dealt with by most of the orientalisists that I knew by simply misinterpreting the Chinese moral code.

In those areas where the Chinese did things that were wicked by our code, it would simply be alleged that the Chinese, with the exception of certain villainous government officials, felt the same way we did. Toleration of their differences was confined to toleration of minor items, with some references to situations where their moral code resembled ours but was stricter.

Thus the Americans (and British, French, etc.) could claim toleration of differences while still condemning the “natives” for their “corruption”, etc. I should say that native opponents of the existing regime normally repeated these criticisms to foreigners, essentially for political reasons.

Very few Americans had much experience with the Communists, and the same could be said about the Taipings and Boxers. Since they opposed the “corrupt” regime, they must really be on our side morally, and hence we supported them. After we got more contact with the Communists, we began to show the same attitude to them. The people who so strongly opposed the Nationalists, however, had not forgiven them. Hence the quotation at the beginning of this essay, and the continuing, although declining, antagonism to the remnant Nationalists in Taiwan. In both the civil war in the late 1940s and the present situation, realpolitik considerations lead and will lead to some halfhearted realization that the Communists are not our friends and hence some support for their opponents is sensible. Our policy is essentially, although never explained in this way, based on intolerance of another moral system.

There were always American partisans of the Nationalists on the right, so our policy was not unrelentingly anti-Nationalist. Now that Taiwan is democratic, their former enemies on the left have even begun

to show tolerance for their government. Further, another historic western attitude to China has revived. In the 19th century, the vast size of the Chinese market attracted many economic groups. It was said that if the Chinese added a foot to the length of their shirts, it would keep Lancashire busy for years. The low labor cost in China also attracted, and continues to attract, industrial interest. So far no one has made much money from this apparent opportunity, but it still clearly affects both our policy and intellectual opinion⁸.

⁸ See Hobart's *Oil for the Lamps of China*, a novel but a realistic picture of business in China.

CHAPTER 4

The Korean War and the Army of the Republic of Korea



It is not really a secret, but also little known, that we forced the Republic of Korea (ROK) to keep their army at about 100,000 men until mid-1952. Further, they were not permitted to have a real air force until well after the armistice. This is one of the reasons our forces were so severely outnumbered. Supply difficulties would not have permitted the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans to much expand the forces they had in North Korea. President Rhee wanted 2,400,000 men in the ROK army, and the manpower would have been available. After the expansion of the ROK army was put in hand in the summer of 1952, the ROK army rose to 600,000 men by the summer of 1953, well after the end of the fighting. It obviously could have been larger, although probably not 2,400,000.

How did this happen? The first thing to talk about is President Rhee. He was undoubtedly a genius. He had passed high on the old civil service exams modeled after those in Imperial China. He then went on to Japan to get a more modern education. He returned to Korea, was arrested and tortured by the royal regime. When I knew him, his hands still showed

signs of the thumbscrews. He then went to the United States. Eventually he got a PhD in Theology from Princeton. He was elected as president by the group that tried to overthrow Japan right after World War I and was sent abroad to represent them while they engaged unsuccessfully in peaceful non-resistance against the Japanese. The first treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States was sealed with the seal he had been given so long ago in Seoul.

He remained president in exile, living mostly in the United States and marrying a German woman who was active in Seoul politics when he returned. He came back to Korea after the war and immediately began a very popular campaign against the armistice system, including the American forces as part of it. He was a very intelligent man and with his long residence in the United States he thoroughly understood our politics. The Korean whom he made ambassador in Washington had lived in the United States even longer and perhaps understood our politics even better.

He wanted Korea to be united and one of his favorite slogans was "March North". The northerners also wanted it united, but under other auspices. This led to a number of armed clashes along the 38th Parallel. The Americans were concerned about his starting a war with the Chinese and perhaps the Russians involved, and hence kept his army small (100,000 men with no air force). At the time this was not a bad idea if it was assumed that the small size of his army, together with the fact that he was not given decent antitank weapons, prevented his "March North". Unfortunately, it gave the north a wonderful opportunity of which they took advantage. The poor state of the American occupation army in

Japan, together with an almost pathologically stupid intelligence chief who consistently underestimated the northern forces, led to the early success of the northern armies.

Diplomatically the Communists negotiated an agreement, now publicly available, between Stalin, Mao and Kim under which the invasion would start – China would enter and Russia would provide air cover. Their air cover, incidentally, led to almost the only time that American and Russian military men exchanged shots in the whole of history. After the start of the war, the Russians provided aircraft and training to air forces for both China and North Korea, and when their air forces were adequate for the rather minor operations intermittently carried out south of the Yalu, the Russian air force, which had been badly shot up, withdrew. All three of these Communist air forces operated out of airfields in Manchuria, which we did not bomb. Indeed, we prevented the ROK from having an air force until well after the armistice.

The agreement between Mao, Stalin and Kim specifically provided that China would enter, so it was not our crossing the 38th Parallel which brought them in. But all of this was largely offset by the fact that Russia was boycotting the UN and hence could not veto the Security Council resolution ratifying our entrance. Whether, if they had been present and cast a veto we would have refrained from military action, I do not know. Recently we have been violating the UN Charter and ignoring the Security Council in many military operations, and we might have started in 1950 if we had been tempted by a veto.

Oddly, we kept the restrictions on the ROK army. President Rhee introduced conscription and put a lot of men in camps, but we refused

to arm them. As mentioned previously, he wanted 2,400,000 men in his army, which would be about the proportion of the adult population that France, England, Germany and Russia mobilized for World Wars I and II. We kept him to 100,000 legally, although General Van Fleet cheated on his orders from Washington and got it up to about 120,000. This restriction on the ROK army is the open secret of this chapter. It is almost entirely unknown in the United States. North Korea, with a much smaller population, put about four times as many men into combat.

Our intelligence listed the North Korean army also at about 100,000. It could have hardly been more wrong. Nevertheless, on the basis of this poor guess, our pre-war policy was not hopelessly stupid. I should, however, say that in my opinion the estimates were formed to support the policy, not the policy based on the estimates.

But when the war broke out and the superiority of the northern forces was obvious to every newspaper reader, we still stuck to our policy and G2 stuck to their 100,000-man estimate for several weeks. At the time I was studying Chinese at Cornell University, and when the newspapers said that Chinese soldiers had been captured in Korea, I realized that the Chinese were in, thus beating G2 by weeks. G2 took the view that they were "stragglers", although what they were straggling from was not stated. This error was one of the major reasons why MacArthur disposed his troops in the north in a formation with his right flank uncovered. Peng Te Huai took advantage of this gap.

The southern army remained limited to 100,000 men. General MacArthur asked for arms to raise it to 225,000, but Washington replied

that they just could not find the necessary arms. This absurd statement was believed, not only by the American press, but also, surprisingly, by General MacArthur. Further, when the Russian air force entered the war, G2 briefing officers made major efforts to convince the press that they were Chinese and Korean pilots who had been trained by the Russians and hence always used Russian on their radios. The Russians did eventually withdraw their air division that had been badly shot up. In the later part of the war, Chinese and Korean pilots, using Chinese and Korean on their radios, took the casualties inherent in flying the Migs. We continued to prohibit the development of a ROK air force.

One of the extraordinary features of this situation is that there was little press criticism or even mention of it. I have looked at the rather few histories of the Korean war and they normally ignore the situation until the time General Eisenhower brought it up in the course of his campaign. This led to an interesting denouement. Apparently, the fact that he was going to mention it leaked and the newspapers reported his plans about a day before he spoke.

The administration, reading the papers, immediately sent off an order to Korea for the expansion of the ROK army. When Eisenhower spoke on the subject, a few hours after the orders had been changed, General Bradley said, "General Eisenhower is wrong, the expansion of the Korean army has been put in hand". The armistice negotiations had already started and it was in a real sense too late, but by the summer of 1953 when the war officially stopped, the ROK army numbered over 500,000 men. Since they were mainly just inducted, they were not very well trained, of course.

As mentioned previously, General Van Fleet had cheated on his orders and actually added about 20,000 men to the ROK army before the campaign incident. He was always rather unenthusiastic about the army high command's policies and this may have been why he remained a lieutenant general until his retirement, although he commanded the forces longer than anyone else and, on the whole, was more successful than the others, all of whom were full generals.

This is a bit of non-history. As I said, I have looked at the few histories of the war and none of them criticized the restriction, although it must have cost many American lives. Some did, however, mention the eventual expansion which was said, correctly, to be politically inspired. Later Van Fleet, the American general who had the most experience with guerillas, and a mostly successful experience, was being sent to Vietnam when he made some off-the-record remarks about Stephenson. A reporter printed them and Van Fleet was left in his Florida retirement. Perhaps this cost even more lives.

Many years after the end of the war I met a former colleague in the political section of the American Embassy in Korea at a Far Eastern Society meeting. I remarked that it was astonishing that most historians seemed to leave out this restriction on the ROK army. He responded, "Of course, he would have marched north".

The restrictions remained for a long time. The air force was kept weak to non-existent and post-armistice precautions were taken to make sure that the petroleum supplies in Korea were very small. The ammunition supplies were also limited. Altogether, the bad relations between the Republic of Korea and the US continued.

As a final bit of evidence, I am a member of the Asian Studies Association that publishes a journal complete with many book reviews. It is notable that there were few books on Korea reviewed until recently. Now that there are many Koreans in the American academic community, the situation has changed and Korea now receives adequate attention.

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CHAPTER 5

The War of the American Revolution



The title of this chapter may surprise most readers who are accustomed to merely calling it the American Revolution of 1776. In fact, it was a world war with major naval battles in the Indian Ocean and almost the whole of Europe involved. Militarily, the American theater was a sideshow. Further, what little fighting there was in that theater normally resulted in American defeats. Washington was a very good strategist, but a poor tactician, and our troops rarely stood up to a British bayonet charge.

In order to understand the war, it is necessary to give a little earlier history. The Stuarts had normally gotten on well with France, but William of Orange was violently anti-French and devoted his reign to trying to destroy them. Ann, who followed, was a Stuart and after some time made peace. The Hanoverians who followed her picked up the feud and were in general successful. Some historians refer to a “second hundred years’ war”. The war of the American Revolution was the last of this series of wars, although American historians normally do not deal with it in those terms.

What we call the French and Indian war is called the “seven years’ war” in Europe. England, with only the support of Prussia, took on almost the whole of Europe. Frederick the Great was a brilliant general, but his army was small. At one point he lost Berlin to the Russians. Surprisingly England won, taking Canada and a lot of small but important sugar islands and most of the French posts in India from Louis XV. In India, Clive won a major victory over Indian forces at Plassey with the result that England could take over Bengal, the first major European holding on the subcontinent. Spain lost Florida and the Balerics. On the continent, Frederick retained Silesia. Altogether, England became the most powerful nation in Europe. In an outburst of tactless bad manners, the English ambassadors all over Europe insisted that they precede the French on ceremonial occasions.

As a result, the new balance of power led to a coalition against the strongest power, England. Those powers that did not actually declare war against England formed a “League of Armed Neutrality”⁹. Even Prussia joined. It occurred to France that since a third of the English lived on the west shore of the Atlantic, it might be possible to stir them up so that they became independent, thus greatly weakening England. Agitators, money and arms were employed to this end. Whether the American colonies would have revolted even without this support is unknown. Certainly their success would have been dubious¹⁰. In any

⁹ Students of the balance of power sometimes refer to the need for a “balancer” and say that England took that role. Necessarily they ignore the war of the American Revolution in these discussions.

¹⁰ The next few paragraphs are based on Bemis, Samuel Flagg, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, 3rd ed., Holt, New York, 1953.

event, the uprising was apparently popular. The elected colonial legislatures everywhere supported it and, apparently, local governments did so also¹¹.

Further, the British were unable to place small garrisons in the countryside, which made it impossible for them to get the area under their control. Their experiment in New Jersey led to the small garrisons in Princeton and Trenton being beaten by Washington's army. This was, incidentally, his only real victory before Yorktown. His strategic ability, which led him to realize the importance of an army in being that made it impossible for the British to divide their army up into small local garrisons, was vital.

Why, then, did the French not immediately enter the war, which they had done much to stir up? I have not read any serious attempt to answer this question, so I offer my own — they distrusted the fighting capacity of the American forces. American troops apparently could not withstand a British bayonet charge. Although the British suffered heavy losses at Bunker Hill, they did take it. Franklin was welcomed in Paris, and money and supplies were furnished to the revolting colonists, but France did not enter the war until Saratoga. When Burgoyne surrendered to Gage, France promptly declared war and convinced Spain they also should enter. The rest of Europe did not actually declare war, but the "armed neutrality" prevented an efficient blockade. The large Dutch navy

¹¹ The popularity of the revolt is sometimes denied on the basis of a 19th century statement by Adams. He said the revolution was favored by about 1/4, of the Americans, opposed by about 1/4 and the remainder did not care much either way. Since he was talking about the French Revolution, the relevance of the quotation is dubious.

cooperated with France and Spain¹². They pushed the British fleet out of the channel in preparation for an invasion of the Isle of Wight. The late Bourbons were not very efficient, however, and the army was not ready; by the time it was, the allies had changed their minds. DeGrasse took a powerful fleet to the Caribbean to retake the sugar isles which had been lost in the seven years' war, and the Spaniards sent an almost equally strong force to retake Florida.

In what eventually became the United States, little happened. The British army marched from Philadelphia, beating Washington on the way to New York, which Clinton held for the rest of the war. He was watched by Washington and, after a time, by Rochambeau's French forces. There was little fighting, but the British decided they might have more popular support in the South and Cornwallis was sent there with a small force. After his successful landing and the surrender of General Lincoln's army, he faced only minor, irregular opposition from Marion. Cornwallis decided to march north and was able to brush aside Marion's forces. Major Ferguson's detached cavalry column was wiped out at Green Mountain and an American force stopped a British detachment at Cowpens. Cornwallis was able, however, to continue his march north and eventually reached Yorktown.

In Yorktown he was in a familiar position for a British general, in possession of a port and awaiting the Royal Navy to reinforce or evacuate him. Washington here demonstrated his fine strategic sense. He arranged for De Grasse to come up from the Indies, thus interrupting the

¹² The combined French and Spanish fleets were stronger than the British, as they were at Trafalgar.

latter's campaign to reclaim the sugar isles, and with Rochambeau he marched south, managing to get away from New York without fighting. The march was uneventful except that the American troops refused to go on until they had been paid. The French provided the money.

The joint army at Yorktown was almost four times as large as Cornwallis' force. Further, although Cornwallis might have been willing to take on an American force larger than his, half of them were French. Meanwhile, the other part of Washington's plan brought DeGrasse's fleet to blockade Yorktown. A British fleet under Graves met DeGrasse off the Virginia capes, but after a brief cannonade, withdrew. Cornwallis was doomed. This tiny naval action should be listed as one of the decisive battles of history, but usually is not.

After Cornwallis' surrender the war continued, mainly without much fighting in the American colonies, but with active naval campaigns. Suffren, the French commander in the Indian Ocean, was the only French admiral who won Mahan's full approval. The largest battle of the war was fought off The Saints, in which Rodney beat DeGrasse. In a way, this British victory permitted the English to sign a most unfavorable peace without too much loss of face. Granted the odds against them, the British did well, but nevertheless, they were beaten. Historians frequently refer to the first and second British Empires — we were the first and the rest which, with a few exceptions, were taken after 1784, make up the second. The Caribbean and Indian situations were restored to the situation before the British victory in the seven years' war, although the British retained Bengal which had not been taken from the French originally. Spain got back Florida, but the British retained Canada.

The independence of the American colonies, which was the principal French objective, was achieved. It seems likely that had the French Revolution not broken out, they would have been partitioned by the European powers. Certainly the Continental Congress was sufficiently worried to make Hamilton a lieutenant general to organize their defenses.

CHAPTER 6

The Japanese Move South



In the summer and fall of 1941, the Japanese had more or less decided to enter the war and the only major problem debated in their councils was whether they should attack north into Siberia or south into the European colonial empires. They decided to move south and a Russian spy reported this to Stalin, who accordingly moved part of the army that was guarding Siberia against the Japanese to Europe. This had much to do with Hitler's failure to take Moscow in the fall of 1941.

The Japanese navy thought it would be dangerous to move south with the American navy free to intervene. Politically, I doubt that we would have directly intervened, but the Japanese analysis was far from stupid. We had arranged what amounted to a blockade on Japan, which had no domestic sources of petroleum. The British and Dutch did not want war with Japan, but they felt totally dependent upon the United States and went along with our wishes. We flatly refused to accept a compromise with Japan on China and, since blockades are normally thought of as acts of war (it was possible to do it at long range, like the British blockade of Germany in World War I), it could be argued that we initiated

the war. In any event, a Japanese attack on the colonial empires with the American fleet at full strength would certainly have been dangerous.

Not long ago I read a newspaper account of a visit of Japanese veterans to Malaya. The American reporter was astounded at the statements by these veterans that they had liberated Malaya. In fact, the native populations generally greeted the Japanese with enthusiasm, although the Chinese immigrants did not like them because of the invasion of China. They set up governments that the American press referred to as puppets, and while the natives were not completely self-governing, they were certainly more in control of the government than they had been under the former empires.

Consider the situation in France, Belgium and Italy when large allied forces were present. The local governments had varying amounts of autonomy ranging from France, where DeGaulle was hard to control, to Italy, where the royal government was quite weak. The same could be said in the territories to their south occupied by Japan. In general, the governments that we regarded as puppets seemed to have been accepted. After the war the leaders of these governments were not punished by the natives, and in most cases remained in or returned to power, which is fairly good proof that they were not regarded locally as merely puppets.

Long after the war, when these countries discovered that they could get funds out of Japan by complaining, the history of the wartime period was revised. Japan paid some reparations, possibly in part because the industries providing the exports to that area wanted them.

Let us now go through the Imperial territories overrun one at a time. The Philippines had been promised independence in 1943 and had a local

government complete with a president and an army (commanded by MacArthur and with many American staff officers). The army fought the Japanese, holding out at Bataan for a fairly long time, and the president accompanied MacArthur first to Bataan and then to the United States. The Japanese established the leader of the principal opposition party, Jose P. Laurel, as president. After the war, he returned to being head of the principal opposition party and his son succeeded him. Mrs. Aquino finally ended the Laurel dynasty, but there could not have been strenuous opposition to the Japanese puppet among the Filipinos, regardless of the view of the American press.

After the war, the American forces held a war crimes trial with several Japanese generals sentenced to death. One of them, interestingly, was a member of the Korean royal house. The commanding general, Yamashita, was executed after the court martial had been appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In a dissent, Murphy pointed out that Yamashita had nothing to do with the specific war crime for which he was executed.

When MacArthur landed in the Philippines, he quickly occupied the central Luzon plain. Yamashita withdrew his forces into the northern mountains quickly enough so that no significant part of his army was cut off by the invasion. He then held out until the end of the war. Unfortunately, a small naval unit failed to follow his orders and remained in Manila. What inspired this small ship repair unit, about 300 men under the command of an admiral, to remain, is unknown. They were not equipped with combat arms and made themselves some spears. Using these spears they attacked several hundred Filipino civilians,

mainly female, and killed most of them. They were themselves then killed. None of them survived to explain what they thought they were doing. Not only were they disobeying Yamashita's order to withdraw north, they also disobeyed his order to treat the Filipinos as allies, not as enemies. No troops actually under his control committed atrocities in the Philippines, a fact which Murphy emphasized in his dissent. Although this was a trial that the United States certainly cannot be proud of, it apparently was popular with at least some Filipinos, mainly relatives of the victims of the massacre.

Moving further south, to Indonesia, Soekarno and Hatta had been in a rather unpleasant detention center in the New Guinea jungles. As part of their defense preparations, the Dutch took them out and gave them minor positions in their government. When the Japanese arrived, they were put in charge of the new government. The Indonesians and the Japanese seemed to have gotten along reasonably well. The principal problem faced by the Indonesians during the war was the activities of the American submarines, which cut off almost all trade.

Towards the end, when the Japanese defeat was becoming obvious, there was some tendency to abandon them, although Soekarno gave a very strong pro-Japanese speech right after the signing of the surrender. Presumably information was not getting around very quickly.

In what was then known as French Indochina, the Japanese left the French in general control. The French had a set of their own puppets including a nominal emperor in Vietnam, a nominal king in Cambodia and a set of native "rulers" in Laos. After the fall of France, Cambodia and Laos fell under Thai control. They had been taken from the Thais earlier.

A few months before the end of the war the Japanese replaced the French in Vietnam, and in so doing improved the status of the native rulers. When they surrendered they let these native rulers, like Emperor Bao Dai, take complete control and it was some time before the English got troops in. The French took even longer to get there and they never re-established the kind of control they had before the war.

As an interesting sideline, Ho Chi Minh was in Nationalist south China during most of the war. He apparently thought that the French *deuxieme* bureau made it too dangerous to go into Vietnam. When the Japanese liquidated the French colonial government, he thought it was safe and went in. The initial occupation force in north Vietnam was Chinese, and they left both him and the French remnants undisturbed. When French troops arrived, the Chinese Nationalists withdrew and took no further part in Vietnamese politics. Once again, there was no effort to “punish” the people who had “collaborated” with the Japanese.

Moving to the west, Thailand was under control of a dictator, Pibul Songram, in 1941. He joined the Japanese in a rather halfhearted way. He formally declared war but made no objection to the Japanese expeditionary force that landed in southern Thailand en route to Malaysia. He permitted the Japanese to use Thailand for logistical support, but his troops took no significant part in the war. The American air force bombed Bangkok. At the end of the war he withdrew into private life, but a few years later he returned to politics and once again became dictator. There was no sign that the Thai people found the “collaborators” in any way criminal.

In the Malay peninsula, the native princes were in nominal control of most of the area, much like the native princes in India. The Japanese left them in control and after the war, the British made all of them abdicate because of their collaboration. However, there was no sign of popular opposition to them, and after a period they all withdrew their abdications. They remained in much the same situation as before the war until the British withdrew. At the beginning they played a major part in the new independent government, but they have been pushed into a mainly ceremonial role by the new government.

The small areas under direct English rule returned to that status at the end of the war. Singapore — Chinese in population and basically anti-Japanese — was also returned to direct British control. In spite of the Japanese invasion of China, which was resented by the Chinese population of Singapore, the Japanese seem to have gotten along reasonably well with the Chinese there.

Burma was invaded by the Japanese, who immediately set up a government made up of Burmese who had been kept down by the British. An army was established with Burmese officers and in general, the two nations got along well. When it became obvious that the Japanese would lose, the higher-ranking officers of the army prepared to change sides. They withdrew to northern Burma and converted their forces into the Burmese anti-Fascist army. When the British took over the country, they kept control of the hills in the north, and eventually negotiated independence with the British.

Their treaty of independence was negotiated in London by six high-ranking members of the army that had been organized by the Japanese,

but had, at the end, split off and formed the anti-Fascist army. When the treaty was presented to the Commons for ratification, Churchill, then leader of the opposition, pointed out that of the six delegates, three had been murdered and that the other three were in prison on charges of murdering them. The Labor benches chorused “shame”, I think they did not think the murders were shameful; rather, Churchill’s mentioning them was.

India was not actually invaded. When the officers of the Indian Independence Army suggested that to Togo, he said that an election was coming up and he could not afford to pay for such an operation at that time. This was fortunate for England because the entire Congress party had welcomed the Japanese advance and Gandhi said he would welcome them in India. The English responded by putting the entire higher level of the Indian Congress party in jail, where they remained for the rest of the war¹³.

Lower-level members of the party were able to organize various local pro-Japanese disturbances, but the British police and army were able to keep them under control. The British were not polite in their methods. Demonstrators were machine-gunned, sometimes from the air. The Japanese had made rather poor use of various Indian units they had encountered in the part of the empire they had overrun, but the numbers were quite small. Nevertheless, the Indian Independence Army was able to slip saboteurs into India to add to the popular disturbances.

¹³ For a discussion of the British Labor Party’s attitude on the matter, see Edwardes, Michael, *The Last Years of British India*, Cassel, London, 1963, pp. 82–83.

Subhas Chandra Bose, a leading Indian politician who was something of a thorn in the side of the Congress party in early 1941, succeeded in reaching Kabul in disguise. He approached the Russian Embassy for aid, but they refused to even speak to him. He then turned to the Germans, who arranged to get him to Germany. There he encountered an unexpected problem – Hitler was against independence for India. Nevertheless, Hitler arranged his transfer to Japan by submarine. He became the leader of the Indian Independence Army. He engaged in radio propaganda and his forces, although of little actual numerical strength, took steps to encourage desertions by Indian troops from the army of the Raj. Unfortunately, he was killed in an airplane accident a few days after the armistice. He apparently intended to continue his activities from somewhere in Southeast Asia. It is probable that nothing would have happened to him if he had fallen into British hands, given the public relations fiasco that resulted when the other commanders of the Indian Independence Army were tried in India after the war. They were defended by Nehru (an attorney) and other high-ranking members of the Nationalist Party. Although they were found guilty and sentenced to death, Mountbatten later commuted the sentence.

Meanwhile, the Muslims had been showing discontent with the Congress party, but Gandhi, Nehru, etc. had been able to keep the movement minor. With Gandhi, Nehru and most of the other leading members of the party in jail, Jinnah, who supported the English war effort, was able to greatly strengthen his party and his demands for Muslim independence. After the war the country was partitioned amidst an outburst of bloodshed, which looks positively Communist in magnitude if not in ideology.

Interestingly, the actual partition line was drawn in such a way as to basically favor India, not Pakistan. The British, now in power, was not interested in rewarding support of the empire. They no doubt thought that Jinnah was on the right, and hence he and his followers should not be advantaged.

Altogether, the Japanese idea that they came as liberators was not foolish nor wicked. What would have happened had they won is hard to say. Granted what did happen when they lost — the long civil war in Vietnam and other parts of former French Indochina, the short but violent war in Indonesia, followed by the mass murder of the Chinese, the long guerilla campaign in Malaysia, the many misfortunes of Burma and the long but minor guerilla war in the Philippines — it is hard to feel certain the result would have been much worse.

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CHAPTER 7

The Pinochet Effect



In a *Washington Post Editorial* on the Chilean Supreme Court's decision to waive Pinochet's immunity, the issue of persecuting General Pinochet is discussed as "a momentous international debate on the question of whether the signatory countries of international conventions on crimes against humanity may exercise what amounts to universal jurisdiction over perpetrators, including ex-heads of state, from outside their own borders. Rulings by the British Law Lords, Great Britain's highest legal authority, seemed to strengthen the principle of universal jurisdiction..."¹⁴. It is clear what side the *Washington Post* took in that debate.

In the same issue, Jim Hoagland¹⁵ says, "International tribunals have begun to proliferate to handle the extreme cases that outrage and/or terrify international public opinion." Interestingly, he then goes on to praise the not guilty finding by a committee that investigated war crime allegations against NATO's commanders and pilots for their 72-day bombing

¹⁴ "Prosecuting Gen. Pinochet", *The Washington Post*, August 10, 2000, p. A.28.

¹⁵ Hoagland, Jim, "Justice under Pressure", *The Washington Post*, August 10, 2000, p. A.29.

campaign against Serbia. This is particularly interesting because the bombing campaign was a clear-cut violation of the United Nations Charter and hence, should be regarded as a war crime. It involved the use of military forces without the sanction of the Security Council and without any colorable claim of self-defense. Of course, it was not a first — we had done the same thing in Vietnam, Grenada and Panama.

In order to clear myself of possible attacks, I should like to deviate from the main stream of this chapter to say that I believe most of the charges against Pinochet are true. It is also hard to like Milosevic. The theme of my argument is not that they are nice people, but that their crimes have little to do with their “legal” difficulties. They are being attacked not because of their crimes, which are real (but not remarkable in that terrible century), but because of their politics.

Returning to Pinochet, Chile is one of the few countries in Latin America that does not have a long history of coups and dictatorships. The Pinochet overthrow of the government, nevertheless, looks very much like the Latin American standard in this respect. His predecessor, who had been elected with only 36% of the vote (the two other candidates split the rest), was showing signs of what the president of their northern neighbor called a “self coup”. Whether he actually planned that is unknown, but suspicion was clearly not irrational. Further, he seemed to be organizing a separate military force that might replace or subordinate the existing services. There is nothing immoral about that, but the fact that it would anger the regular forces is clear.

They carried out, as I said, a rather typical Latin American coup. These things tend to be rather bloody. Not only are the supporters of the

outgoing administration likely to be killed, but innocent bystanders are in real danger. Further, once established, they tend to use unpleasant police methods to stay in power. Compared to Stalin, Pol Pot, Mao Tse Tung, the Viet Minh or Hitler, they are mild; but that does not mean that they respect our bill of rights.

Pinochet fitted into this pattern, but he did more. Chile, like most Latin American states, was rather socialist. He moved rapidly toward capitalism. Tariffs were cut, industries were privatized, and the social security system was also privatized. With respect to the last, the incompetence of his predecessors made radical reforms easy. The combination of inflation and mismanagement meant that the real value of the expected pensions for most Chileans was quite low. Pinochet simply issued government bonds for the "debt". He then established a pensions system based on compulsory savings and an annuity in old age.

In all of these things, he was a pioneer. Privatization, low tariffs and some sort of privatization of the old age pension system are all the rage in the present day. The political left is in two minds about this. Really they do not like it, but they realize that nationalization of the economy has failed. Consider the situation of Jack Straw, who was Home Minister in the present Labor government. In his youth, he demonstrated against Pinochet. However, he became a minister in a government that, rather tentatively, is copying his reforms. He then found himself deeply involved in settling the future of the man who introduced many of these ideas.

Pinochet, although not the beau ideal of the Chilean people, was not particularly unpopular during his reign. I was in Chile for a few days and saw him drive by. I presume his car was armored, but he had only four

motorcyclists as an escort. I was in Jerusalem when Clinton visited it and also saw him drive by. His security precautions were a high multiple of those of Pinochet. Pinochet did not find it necessary to close off the street in front of his house. He finally put his continuance in office up to a vote and, despite losing, he did not do badly. His policies are not only being adopted in Europe by nominally socialistic governments, but his successors in Chile have mainly continued them as well.

Now all of this does not indicate that the specific charges against him are false; indeed, I think they are mainly true. But I also think that these charges have little to do with his legal difficulties. In my opinion, it is his general image as a rightist that has caused the trouble. No person on the left has been similarly charged, even though many of them have committed similar acts. To take but one example, Castro was in Spain when the Spanish magistrate tried to extradite Pinochet. The Chilean government promptly requested the extradition of Castro on exactly the same charges. The newspapers reported this at the time, but it was quickly forgotten. Since Castro makes Pinochet look like a piker, this would at first seem surprising. But Castro has what may be the most socialistic (and unsuccessful) government in the world. His immunity is not surprising if the actual substance of the charge is not killing or torturing, but successful capitalizing.

The newspapers sometimes publish lists of potential defendants in these trials. Interestingly, none of them (except Pol Pot, to be discussed later) are on the left. Wolf in Germany is a particularly interesting case. He was in charge of the East German equivalent of the Gestapo. The deal entered into by Kohl to get the Russians to leave not only involved a large sum of money to build officers' quarters for the officers who left, it also

provided that no one could be convicted on the basis of activity which was legal at the time.

This not only excused all the numerous crimes of the occupation forces, it verbally meant that guards at Auschwitz were protected. There are not very many of them still around, but this aspect of the agreement seems to be completely ignored. I feel sure that if they find a German who carried out the Nuremberg laws, he would not be protected in spite of the literal meaning of the agreement.

At the time I was writing the first draft of this paper, there was, in fact, an example. An 84-year-old Austrian man who was accused of being a guard at Sachsenhausen was ordered deported to Austria by a US court. The judge made it clear that this was because of his guard service¹⁶.

Of course, an agreement by Kohl would not bind an American court. No guard from the gulag or its East German equivalent has been charged, although that would be much more recent. In any event, an effort was made to prosecute Wolf, the head of the East German equivalent of the NKVD (Russian Political Police), on the grounds that he had ordered the border police to shoot people escaping, even if they had got across the wall before they were seen. They would then be in West Germany, even if only by a foot or so, at the time. The German courts held that the amnesty held in this case too. Interestingly, although this was reported in the *Washington Post*, they did not seem much perturbed. Wolf had killed or tortured far more people than Pinochet, who also held a legal amnesty, but the *Post* apparently

¹⁶ A Reuters dispatch carried more or less unchanged by both the *Washington Post* and the *Washington Times*. In the *Post*, it appeared as "Nation in Brief", *The Washington Post*, August 15, 2000, p. A.4.

drew a political distinction. Wolf, however, did not get off entirely free. Before 1933 he had been a Communist activist in Berlin, and in that capacity had killed two Germans who disagreed with the Communists politically. This was not concealed in East Germany; in fact, he was proud of it. The amnesty did not cover acts before the conquest of East Germany, so he was finally tried, convicted and imprisoned for a few years. The prison would be much less unpleasant than the ones he had supervised.

The Communists in the rest of the former Russian Empire have been given a complete free ride. Since many of their atrocities occurred long after the end of the Third Reich, they would appear to be more easily prosecuted. Ex-guards that are much younger than 84 would be available. Putin, the current head of the Russian government, was a rather high official in the secret police in East Germany. He joined the service well after the death of Stalin, when it had become much milder. Nevertheless, he and his colleagues, who he has appointed to various high positions, were far from safe from the kind of charge being used against Pinochet, except, of course, that they were in what is now perceived as the left.

In the various areas that are now considered Eastern Europe, the situation is similar. Former members of the Communist apparatus are not prosecuted. Indeed, many of them have been elected to positions of power in such places as Poland and Serbia. The United States and its allies who prohibited similar developments for rightists in Germany and Japan after the war, made no attempt to keep politicians in their more recent enemy regimes from high positions in the successors. The mere fact that a man was involved in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, or pushing the boat people out to sea off Vietnam, is not regarded with

anywhere near the revulsion given a simple guard in a German concentration camp.

Pol Pot and Hen Sen were both officials; in Pol Pot's case, he was also the dictator in the government of Cambodia during the period of the mass torturing and murders. Although they did not kill as many as Stalin or Mao, as a percentage of the population they hold the world record. After these murders, Pol Pot decided to purge his own machine. Some of his officials, including Hen Sen, crossed over the border to Vietnam in time to escape torture and death. Later, when Vietnam attacked Cambodia, they brought Hen Sen along in their baggage train and made him puppet ruler. When they withdrew, he became dictator. Notably, he and his colleagues held public denunciations of Pol Pot and those of his officials who had survived the purge in Cambodia.

Eventually Hen Sen made the mistake that dictators frequently do make – he thought he was popular and held a fairly open election. He, of course, lost, but he simply stayed on as Prime Minister. For a while Cambodia had two, but the elected Prime Minister not only had no power, he began to think he would be killed and left Cambodia. No one has since suggested that Hen Sen be arrested and taken to The Hague. Pol Pot is dead.

Milosevic, like Pinochet, is another victim of the same phenomenon. He was in fact an elected official, but in a government which is now perceived as rightist. He is far from a nice man, but he did permit an opposition to exist and hold demonstrations. They had newspapers that did face difficulties, but still existed. It is possible to argue that Serbia was as democratic as Chicago.

Milosevic did not start the ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia, although he participated in it. Nevertheless, he and some of his officials are the only ones threatened with criminal prosecution for it. Interestingly, Holbrooke, in his book *To End a War*, mentions Milosevic's effort to get the Croats to advance into territory inhabited by Serbs in full knowledge that they would carry out ethnic cleansing without the slightest signs of feeling guilty¹⁷. Nor has Milosevic been criticized for it.

Returning to South America, a minor but significant case of the violation of amnesties for rightists occurred in Argentina. During the dirty war, both sides committed fairly numerous crimes. It was ended by a treaty in which the military were given an amnesty for their fairly numerous killings. For reasons that have always puzzled me, they did not announce the names of people they killed, hence the term "disappearances". In some cases these people had children, and the military arranged for them to be adopted. At the present day this set of acts which, given what had happened to their parents, seems more or less virtuous, is being called kidnapping, and the amnesty did not specifically cover kidnapping. As a result, a number of officers who would have been quite safe if they had simply killed the children are in danger of imprisonment.

In Chile, an equally bizarre legal method is being threatened. There, too, they did not announce the executions, and the current government (on the left) is threatening them with charges of kidnapping unless they can prove that they actually killed their victims and hence are covered by the amnesty. Think what this would mean for former members of the

¹⁷ Holbrooke, Richard, *To End a War*, Modern Library, 1999.

Communist establishment – they normally buried their victims without any identification.

Altogether, Pinochet's difficulties come, not from his ostensible crimes, but from a worse one – he favored capitalism and proved that it worked. He will never be forgiven.

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CHAPTER 8

The First War the United States Lost?



One of the things said about the Vietnam War is that it was the first war the United States lost. The people who said this were usually, but not always, opponents of the war. Thus, they normally did not mention the bloodshed after the end of the war or the fact that living standards fell sharply (they gave up the consumer society, to quote a prominent reporter). In truth, ignoring the merits or demerits of the war, it was the third or fourth war the United States lost. These figures do not include the various Indian campaigns in some of which our troops were less than outstandingly successful.

The very first war the United States fought, the war with the Barbary pirates, was a clear-cut loss¹⁸. The background is fairly simple. Adams had been building a navy, but when Jefferson took over he stopped construction on the ships of the line¹⁹, kept the frigates in commission and preserved every single naval shore station, apparently for purely pork reasons. The United States thereby became a very minor naval power.

¹⁸ There had been a few minor clashes between frigates of the French Republic and our navy, but these were never considered a war.

¹⁹ They were burned in their stocks by the British in the war of 1812.

The Dey of Tripoli had a habit of sending out his ships to capture merchantmen of countries who could not protect them, and the United States was obviously an example. The ships were captured and the crew enslaved, although he was normally anxious to have them ransomed. He was willing to stop the behavior for any country that was willing to make him regular payments, and some of the other minor powers made such payments.

The Americans, however, took up the slogan "Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute" and sent what was left of the navy out to attack Tripoli. They based themselves in Malta and from time to time sailed to Tripoli, where they bombarded the city. Although this attack on civilians rather resembled our air war in World War II, it was obviously much less effective. The guns fired round shots and the city was mainly mud brick and hence, easily repaired.

In the course of one of these raids, the *Philadelphia* ran aground and was captured by the Tripolitan forces, which floated it into harbor and put its now enslaved crew at work improving the fortifications of Tripoli. In a daring raid, indeed the only daring raid of the war, Decatur succeeded in burning the *Philadelphia* at anchor.

The Dey showed no signs of being other than mildly annoyed by the bombardment and the war might have gone on indefinitely had the US army not taken a hand. An army officer, with a few marines²⁰, collected another potential heir to the throne in Cairo, moved across the desert taking the second city of the kingdom, Derna, en route, and approached

²⁰ Hence "to the sands of Tripoli".

Tripoli with the intention of attacking it. The advance created a crisis, first for the Dey who was apparently uncertain of his ability to defend the city, given that his relative would have some supporters within the walls, and, more importantly, for the US navy which did not want the army to win the war after the navy had spent so much time with nothing to show for their efforts.

An emergency peace was patched up in which the United States paid a large ransom for the Americans held by the Tripolitarians. Thus, we ended up paying tribute and clearly lost the war. We were down the tribute and one frigate, whereas the Dey of Tripoli got the money and had his defenses strengthened by the labor of his American prisoners. The part of the wall they had worked on was called the Philadelphia bastion in remembrance of their labor. The “millions for defense” was responded to by laying up most of the frigates, although the pork-rich shore installations were retained.

Jefferson then decided he would try to put pressure on England. The English held Canada, which we wanted, and had a habit of stopping American ships at sea (including at least one American frigate) and removing seamen who they claimed were deserters from the royal navy. Modern historians agree that there were many such seamen on our ships, but it is not obvious that the naval officers were good at distinguishing them from native-born Americans. This led to an outburst of indignation on the part of the Americans.

Before Jefferson became president, Adams sent our leading diplomat, John Jay, to England to negotiate a treaty on the matter. Under the treaty, a commissioner in each American port would issue a certificate

that there were no English deserters on a given ship after having inspected it to make sure. For some reason, this also led to an outburst of indignation and Jefferson never even sent it to the Senate for ratification. He invented the embargo that has caused so much difficulty in the diplomatic history of the United States. The absurd idea that a third rate power, without a real navy, could coerce the then two leading powers, France and England, was absurd. It did cause more difficulty for the English than for Napoleon, but England did not stop impressing our seamen²¹.

The situation remained more or less in a deadlock, with the principal people injured being the maritime interests in New England. They were mainly Federalists, so Jefferson and his successor Madison were well able to withstand their pain. Finally, just as Napoleon was marching on Moscow, we entered the war on the French side. Our major objective was Canada, but preventing impressment of our seamen was also thought to be important. England fought a war that strategically was defensive, although tactically it sometimes involved taking the offensive. They had fought a major war with France for twenty years, and the United States had more than doubled in population since independence. Actually occupying it would have been an immense task and they did not want to try.

Our navy consisted of a small set of very good frigates and some half-built ships of the line. Our frigates distinguished themselves, but were only an annoyance to England. The British blockade of our coast together with occasional landings was also mainly an annoyance, but a more severe one than that inflicted by our miniature navy onto them.

²¹ The Republicans were rather pro-French, while the Federalists were rather pro-English.

The effort to take Canada was a frost, mainly because of the poor quality of our generalship. Scott, a very young and junior general, did well, thus starting what was to be a long and distinguished career. The quality of Madison's other appointees is illustrated by a general in command of 1,200 soldiers near Niagara who surrendered unconditionally to an English general with 300. The American general was the only one of our generals sentenced to death by court martial. Unfortunately, Madison commuted the sentence.

The war continued badly and the treaty of peace did not mention any of our war objectives. I remember that my high school history text emphasized our defeat. Politically, however, Madison did well and was able to hand on the presidency to another member of his party.

The third war that we did not win was the Korean affair. The North Koreans drove us back to Pusan; we then drove them back more or less to the Yalu when the Chinese, aided by the Russian air force, entered and drove us back nearly to Pusan. We then recovered and moved back north to an approximation of the pre-1950 dividing line. The American generals were seriously handicapped by the fact that MacLane was the officer in the British Embassy in charge of liaison on the Korean War. He kept the Russians and through them, the Chinese, fully informed on our plans. MacArthur thought somebody was betraying his plans because the enemy so often pre-empted them. At the time, there was a tendency to discount this, but we now know it was true.

In any event, the war ended more or less where it had started. After much death and destruction, nothing had been gained. We may not have lost, but we certainly did not win.

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CHAPTER 9

Did Kennedy Have More Popular Votes in 1960?



Table 1 was taken from *America Votes* and purports to show the popular votes in 1960. You will note that Kennedy had only slightly more votes than Nixon and neither had a majority. Kennedy had only slightly over 20,000 votes more than Nixon.

The top line on the table, Alabama, looks odd, however. “Other” got six electoral votes with only a little more than 8,000 popular votes, while

Table 1. Popular Votes – 1960

State	Alabama
Electoral Vote	
Republican	—
Democratic	5*
Total Vote	570,225
Republican	237,981
Democratic	324,050
Other	8,194
Plurality	86,069 Democratic

*Six Alabama Democratic electors cast their votes in the Electoral College for Senator Harry Flood Byrd for president.

the Republicans with about 238,000 such votes got none and the Democrats with about 324,000 got five. Clearly something is wrong, and the only comment on the figures offered by the editors is that the six votes were cast for Senator Byrd.

1960 was a peculiar year. The South was in revolt against the national Democratic Party and in a number of states there were electors who opposed the national party. In Mississippi, they won and all of their electoral votes went to Senator Byrd²².

In Alabama, the situation was more complicated. Alabama had a primary for electors and two slates – one pro- and one anti-Kennedy – ran. Five pro-Kennedy electors and six anti-Kennedy won. They were all listed on the ballot as Democrats. The anti-Kennedy electors carried on a strenuous campaign and the pro-Kennedy electors stayed home. On election day, 324,050 voters followed local tradition by voting a straight Democratic ticket. Granted the situation at the time, and in particular the primary vote, it is not very obvious whom they thought they were voting for.

My suggestion is to say that they spoiled their ballot by not indicating whom they favored. This would give Nixon more popular votes than Kennedy, although not changing the electoral votes. It would be the second case in which a presidential candidate with more popular votes was the loser in electoral votes.

There are two other possibilities. One is to divide the “Other” vote between the two candidates in accordance with the electoral vote, giving 6/11ths of the vote to “Other” and 5/11ths to Kennedy. Or, we could

²² Senator Byrd was not running. The decision to vote for him was an effort to get revenge on the national Democratic Party. This decision was made after the election.

divide the "Other" vote according to the vote in the primary. Either of these methods would, again, give Nixon more popular votes than Kennedy.

The newspapers and *America Votes* gave all of these votes to Kennedy. This is not obviously wrong, but it is peculiar. I can think of three motives, other than a dispassionate search for truth, for this allocation. The first is the feeling that we should not admit the candidate who stood second in popular votes was elected president, as this would cast doubts on our democracy. A second is that Kennedy is a hero to most intellectuals, while Nixon is widely regarded as a villain. The anti-Democratic Democrats in the South, most of whom were racists, were another group we would not expect intellectuals to give an even break. But although there are reasons for suspecting prejudice, probably the Scotch verdict of "not proven" will be most people's decision. Note that both sides are "not proven".

These are not the only questions about the election. Illinois was very close, with the Democratic vote only about 10,000 more than the Republican. There have been rumors that Joseph Kennedy used his mafia connections to get the Chicago machine to produce this majority. This is, however, silly. There probably has been no mid-century election in which the Chicago Democratic machine has not produced more than 10,000 votes from the honored dead and other illegal sources. No mafia connection was necessary.

Texas is another state where the election system is corrupt. Further, "Landslide Johnson" was on the Democratic ticket. Here the difference was greater, over 150,000, but certainly it was not beyond the bounds of possibility that the miscount was that large.

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CHAPTER 10

Drugs and Some Remarks on the Constitution



I should begin by confessing my personal attitude on drug consumption. I see no reason why people cannot be permitted to consume them if they want. I have had this attitude since the 1930s, although I have never taken anything stronger than alcohol. It is possible to argue that drugs are a sort of trap into which it is possible to fall, and hence, people should be protected from it. The scientific studies on the subject, however, seem to be poor, and I would suggest further research rather than prohibition.

That is my personal position, but it is offered only to warn the reader. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to methods of getting rid of drug addiction, not because I want to do so, but because our present methods are expensive, ineffective and lead to severe foreign policy problems. There are cheap, effective methods that would not necessarily lead to difficulties with foreign nations. I suggest that if we are to try to “solve the problem”, we should turn to these.

Before World War II, neither England nor the United States had large numbers of drug addicts. My first suggestion is that we consider

their procedures. They used different methods, but both were far more successful than we are today.

Beginning with England before the war, anyone who was addicted could get a certificate of addiction, and using it he could go to a doctor for drugs by prescription. The doctor was theoretically treating him with the intention of his eventually stopping drug consumption. The addict, however, could normally find a shady doctor who would simply give him as much as he wanted. The addict was a highly profitable patient since he paid his fee without putting the doctor to too much trouble.

The drugs purchased on the prescription would be cheaper than the smuggled product and of greater purity. Thus, there would be no market for illegal drugs and the illegal drug trade would (and did) disappear. There would be no one who could profit from addicting anyone, and hence, no trade. The total number of certified addicts in the whole of England was around 100; most of them were medical personnel who had succumbed to temptation to sample their own supplies. In essence, the procedure sacrificed the existing addicts to prevent the creation of more.

The United States followed a different and more expensive method. Drug addiction was considered a crime and anyone arrested for it was sentenced to one of two special institutions maintained by the federal government. They were called hospitals, but were actually rather unpleasant prisons. The addict would spend about a year being gradually dried out by slowly decreasing doses. This was the standard cure method then and was very unpleasant. At the end of the cure, the former addict would be released. He would have lost his physical addiction, but not his physiological one. Most of them simply stopped taking drugs at this time.

The police would watch the former addicts and if they saw signs of addiction, would arrest and test them. I am told that addicts can be detected by observation. In any event, there is no great harm in being tested if the former addict is genuinely “former”. He would have lost his contacts with his suppliers while in detention, and the suppliers would know that he was being watched and likely to once again cease to be a customer shortly after they resumed the relationship. Under the circumstances, the drug trade was small and unprofitable. The mafia stayed away from it. The total number of addicts was a small part of the number at present. In both nations, the “drug problem” was minor compared to today.

Adopting these procedures today in the United States would be possible, but, I think, very unpopular. The English procedure would involve certifying literally millions of people as addicts. The illegal trade would shrink or die, but there would be millions of certified addicts at large. Gradually, they would either die of or stop their addiction voluntarily. It would, however, take a long time. The total number of addicts would be less than today, but they would be more conspicuous. My guess is that politically, the procedure would fail.

The system is no longer working in England due to a peculiar byproduct of the National Health Service. Doctors in the service are not paid by the call. They have a list of clients and provide medical services for them as needed, without specific reimbursement per time. With this fee system, the drug addict is an unprofitable customer. The doctor must give him prescriptions fairly frequently and is paid only by the year he has him on his list. Under the circumstances, the doctor is likely to

actually try to cure him by gradually reducing his dose. Thus, there is a market for the illegal supply of drugs and a trade is gradually developing.

Attempting to apply the pre-war methods to the United States would require the building of many specialized prisons and training of medical personnel. The cost would be immense and it seems most unlikely that it would even be feasible. Thus, although these two methods worked before the war, we must either let people freely take drugs (the course I favor) or continue our present ineffective methods, or turn to something new. There is another method that would work better than our present methods, which I am about to outline.

First, however, I must say something about the Constitution. Most lawyers would say that the method that I propose is unconstitutional. This requires a brief constitutional discussion. The Constitution is a fairly brief document, but there is an enormous library of judicial decisions interpreting, misinterpreting and applying it. Lawyers regard all of this as constitutional law, but there is a distinction. The courts, having made a decision, can always change it. Indeed, they do so quite often. Thus, a suggestion that the courts overrule one of their decisions is on quite a different standing than amending the document itself. The proposal I am about to make could be made constitutional by either method.

The problem is "search and seizure". Our Constitution provides that a warrant must be obtained before search or seizure, except in a limited set of situations that are not relevant to our present concerns. This is the national Constitution, but many states have similar provisions in their constitutions. My discussion will be limited to the national document.

The original Constitution had a massive loophole in the prohibition of non-warrant search and seizure. Customs officers may search anyone in the general vicinity of the docks. Since the federal government had little jurisdiction in the interior, and mainly lived on customs duties, it seems unlikely that the search and seizure provision seriously limited the powers of the government.

In any event, tax collection has always been given special privileges in the courts. When I was in law school, we read a case in which the judge said that taxes were necessary to support the government, and in particular to pay the costs of courts. Thus, strict protection of the taxpayer was not necessary. Anyone who has dealt with the Internal Revenue Service or the local real estate assessment procedure will be able to testify to that from experience.

Until a little after the turn of the 20th century, the federal restriction had little effect. If the federal officer undertook a search far from the docks without a warrant he was guilty of a minor crime, but there was no other consequence. It was easy to get warrants, so the problem rarely arose. The Supreme Court, however, changed that by ruling that the “fruit of the poisoned tree”, i.e., evidence obtained improperly, could not be used in court. Since this applied only to federal cases, and they were rare, the matter was unimportant.

In the days just before I was drafted and sent to Europe, my teacher of criminal procedure, an old-fashioned liberal, expressed discontent with the ruling. He said that if a policeman conducted an illegal search, then the prosecuting attorney had two potential customers — the criminal and the policeman — but the criminal “should not profit

from the constable error". This was my opinion, and, I think, very widely held.

The argument on the other side was that the prosecuting attorney would probably not prosecute the policeman, and hence illegal searches would not be deterred. There was no empirical evidence on the point, but state courts dealt with most crimes, so the matter was of little importance until the late 1950s and the Mapp case. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the "fruit of the poisoned tree" precedent applied also to state courts. Some of the states had, of course, been applying similar doctrine on the basis of their own constitutions, but this decision made it nationwide.

It is interesting that at about the same time that the courts began imposing strict rules on searching people suspected of crimes, searches of all sorts of completely innocent persons suspected of no crime or misdemeanor suddenly became routine. This originally came from a burst of aircraft hijackings, but there were also some cases of bombs on aircrafts. Originally, the searches were manual, and would have led to immediate dismissal of the charges if they had been used on people suspected of other crimes without "reasonable cause".

The use of electronic procedures rather than physical search has now become common, but physical searches are still used in some cases after the electronic search. These special searches are more common for baggage than for the person, but I have had attendants reach into my pockets when the electronic system detects metal that is suspicious. It is interesting that these searches, particularly in the early days when the search was manual, sometimes turned up drugs. The ACLU (American

Civil Liberties Union) objected to this, although they did not object to the original search. In any event, in spite of the constitutional ruling, almost everyone has been searched, first electronically and then manually if the electronic search shows metal. In the early days, it was all manual.

The practice has spread. Most courts follow the same procedure for everyone who enters. Many stores have electronic search apparatus on their doors, mainly to detect shoplifters. The student restaurant and bookstore in my university are equipped to electronically search everyone who goes in or out. I should emphasize that I do not object to these searches, but I do object to the searches of genuine criminals being restricted. Note that the only cases in which searches of people suspected of crimes get to court are those in which the police find evidence in their search, only to have it then thrown out. I suppose that a person searched without a warrant or the circumstances in which the courts permit a police search, and in which no evidence was found, could sue the police. Such cases are rare to non-existent, however, and I suspect that juries would be sympathetic to the police if one were brought to trial.

I may as well confess that I think I have an explanation for this apparently perverse behavior on the part of the courts. They all involve the well-being of judges. Cheating on taxes might reduce the pay of judges, hence the almost complete absence of protection against official prying in cases of taxes. A judge can be inconvenienced by an aircraft hijacking or killed by a bomb in the luggage compartment. Certainly, friends of the defendant who brought guns into the courtroom would disturb the judge. In all of these cases, a search would reduce the risk. In a recent case, a bystander told the police that three passengers waiting to

board a bus had guns. The police patted them down, found the guns and arrested them. The Supreme Court freed them on the grounds that the oral report was insufficient to justify a search. If, on the other hand, they had decided to enter the court, they would have been routinely searched, electronically at first, but with a manual search if the electronic device suspected them, and arrested. Perhaps if there had been a judge on the bus, the search would have been upheld.

Drunk driving raises much the same issues. A judge can be killed by a drunk driver as easily as anyone else; in consequence, the police are permitted to stop people they suspect of being drunk and even set up road blocks. Further, if you are stopped for drunk driving you can be deprived of your driving license (a very severe penalty, particularly for people who need it to practice their profession like cab drivers), not only without a jury, but by an anonymous civil servant in the motor vehicle office with no hearing at all. Once again, I do not object, but I do object to the extension of the Constitution to protect more serious criminals

Long ago, in my book *The Logic of the Law*, I suggested that the police be permitted to search freely, but be compelled to pay a fee to the person searched equivalent to the inconvenience imposed. This would solve the whole problem. In order to conserve funds, the police would only search with good reason, and the people searched would either be convicted of a crime or reimbursed. No one but criminals would be hurt. This simple Pareto optimal solution would, I am sure, be held unconstitutional. To quote Mr. Pickwick, "The law is a fool and an ass."

CHAPTER 11

He Who Takes the Sword



In casual conversation, some of my friends, particularly my liberal friends, sometimes say that assassinating Saddam could solve our problems with Iraq. When I say that assassinating a chief of state is not easy they will normally ask, “Why?” This shows they have not given the matter much thought, but that is no sin. How often do the best of us carefully consider everything we say in casual conversation?

But if it is no sin to make a suggestion that you have not carefully considered, the question is still worth thinking about. Firstly, chiefs of state normally are well guarded. The President of the United States not only proceeds in quite a caravan, but there are two limousines and the one which contains the president is not announced. The Secret Service provides an extensive set of bodyguards when he is not in a car or plane.

There is also a sort of comity — “If I don’t try to assassinate you, you will not try to kill me”. It is a sort of trade union of chiefs of state. This will be discussed further below. Normally, although not always, our presidents do not try to kill their opposite numbers. Further, they are usually not targets of other governments. We have had four presidents assassinated,

but in only one of these cases, Lincoln, was it a matter of a hostile intelligence operation. The others were the victims of nut cases, although Kennedy is a little different as will be seen below.

American presidents have also rarely tried to kill other heads of state. Interestingly, Kennedy is an exception to this rule. He organized the overthrow of Diem under circumstances in which Diem would probably die. It should be said that there is no evidence Kennedy wanted him dead, but he was not particularly concerned with keeping him alive. Since Diem had the situation more or less under control, and it immediately collapsed when he was removed, this was one of the worst decisions any American president ever made.

There was also Lumumba, who had been causing difficulties for our African policy, although less violent means could have been used to solve that problem. Trujillo is a special case. He was a not very nice man who had been put in power in the Dominican Republic when the American forces withdrew in the twenties, and remained ever since. He had done nothing much to annoy the government in Washington, but was certainly not a model ruler.

The motives for Kennedy's arranging his assassination by the CIA are unclear. I suspect that Kennedy, who was trying to get Castro killed (by the mafia), thought that he had better hit a right-wing dictator in order not to appear too reactionary. It led to other considerable American intervention. When it looked like the Trujillo family could remain in control, a major naval demonstration off what was then Ciudad Trujillo was laid on and his relatives retired to the United States to live on their ill-gained wealth. Eventually Johnson sent in the 82nd airborne to straighten

out the situation. Fortunately, there was not much fighting. Not much more than a dozen were killed in the operation and a respectable man became president.

This leaves Castro. The Bay of Pigs was planned under Eisenhower, but implemented by Kennedy. The original plan was decidedly a long shot, but Kennedy intervened to make it a “no shot”. The Kennedy family (Robert was Attorney General) then turned to assassination. The CIA tried several things, achieving only bad publicity, before turning to the mafia. Castro, of course, knew about this and began talking about it in his radio broadcasts. He pointed out that two could play at that game. Whether the Kennedys gave up or not is still classified information.

It is possible that Oswald was inspired for his attempt to assassinate Kennedy by Castro’s broadcasts. He was certainly a careful and admiring listener. On the other hand, he first attempted to kill General Walker, which seems to show he was just a loose cannon. In any event, Johnson thought that Castro might be responsible and apparently told Chief Justice Warren that he was to eliminate that question in order to avoid war with Cuba. Why he wanted to avoid such a war is not obvious. Robert was also assassinated by a nut case.

There have been several other attempted assassinations of foreigners by American presidents. Reagan attempted to kill Qaddafi by an air attack, but only hit one of his daughters. Clinton’s effort to distract attention from his domestic difficulties by air attacks on what he thought were terrorist bases apparently killed no one. Certainly it did not cause the terrorists any difficulty, but the innocent owner of a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum lost his plant and so far has been unable to get compensation.

The shacks destroyed in Afghanistan may have been occupied by low-level terrorism trainees. On the other hand, they may also have been empty or the bombs may have hit the wrong targets.

Ignoring moral principles, assassination is difficult to carry out, even if the target is merely a terrorist and not a head of state. I titled this chapter "He Who Takes the Sword". Why I thought that a suitable title is, I presume, obvious.

CHAPTER 12

Further Thoughts on the Korean War



At one point in time, I was the expert on North Korea for the American Embassy in Korea. I was never very much of an expert, depending on the foreign broadcast interception service for most of my information. Nevertheless, I remained the principal expert in the Department of State for North Korea after I returned to Washington. The fact that someone as junior in rank as I was the principal expert shows how low a priority the Department of State gave to the subject. But even though I was not much of an expert, I know more than most people on the subject.

This chapter will deal with things which, although not secret, were mainly not published in the newspapers. Everything that I say, except a few cases of internal gossip in the Foreign Service, is available somewhere or other. Still, it will surprise many people, including those who were in the China service of the Department of State.

This is in part a discussion of our policy, but it is also partly a tragedy in the Greek mode. When I was in high school one of our teachers said that in each Greek tragedy, there was a hero who was very heroic,

but had a fatal flaw. In my case, the hero of the tragedy was O. Edmund Clubb.

Clubb went into the Foreign Service in the 1920s and became a China service officer, for which purpose he learned Chinese. This was during the late warlord period and each Foreign Service Officer in the political area wrote papers on various warlords. Clubb became interested in the Chinese Communists and wrote a couple of papers on them. Long after, I read these papers and was unimpressed. They were mainly based on Chinese newspaper stories and like those stories, were not terribly penetrating. No doubt he wrote papers on other Chinese warlords that I have never read. Nevertheless, he was clearly interested in the Chinese Communists, but it was impossible for him to make direct contact in China.

When he returned to the United States on leave, he decided to visit one of their important American intellectual allies, the *Pacific Review*, in the US. This was of course perfectly legal and basically harmless. I could find no evidence that his meeting with them influenced him in his later work. Unfortunately, in their office he met Chambers who was also simply visiting. From what little evidence there is, the meeting was brief and unimportant.

Clubb, however, was ambitious. He proposed to rise in the ranks of the service to become ambassador in several places, and perhaps assistant under the Secretary of State. When he reached the age of 65 he proposed to write his memoirs, and for that purpose he kept a detailed journal. In it he mentioned meeting Chambers and made a few remarks about his physical appearance. These remarks were completely harmless,

but indirectly, as I will explain, they led to his being forced to resign from the service.

He returned to Far Eastern service and developed a good reputation. There was only one criticism ever offered, which was that he was rather verbose in his communication with Washington. At one point, when he was in a small post and doing his own encoding, he said, " I wished to iterate and reiterate". The junior officers who had to decode the message kept repeating this in gossip. Other than that, he was liked and respected, became Counsel General in Peking and was there when the Communists took the place. So far as I know his general attitude was that of the other Foreign Service Officers' and like the other Foreign Service Officers, it changed rapidly with personal experience.

In Clubb's case, the change may have been less than that of other people. He had learned Russian and in World War II became the American council in Vladivostok. This was a tiny post established solely for wartime purposes because at the time, considerable amounts of American military aid for Russia were passing through that port. This tiny post was an unpleasant one and they had the usual difficulties with the Russians. I can remember his wife talking a great length at parties about how difficult it was and her difficult personal relations with Russians, including her maid. He was busy and I had little contact with him, but so far as I know he shared her feelings. Putting the matter more directly, he was not sympathetic with Communism as a world movement, although he may have at one point sympathized with them in China. If he had, he was only one of many.

The Department thought, as did I, that he had done a good job. When he returned to Washington, he was promoted to head of the China

desk. When the Korean War broke out, he obviously took an active part. After the breakout from the Pusan perimeter, he began arguing against crossing the 38th Parallel on the grounds that this would bring the Chinese in. At the time this did not seem particularly irrational, although I myself thought we should cross. Since at the time I was a language student in New Haven, my opinion had little weight.

Now we know that it made no difference. The basic diplomatic documents have now been released. They show that Kim, Mao and Stalin had planned war together with the agreement that United States support for South Korea was to be expected, China would enter, and the Russians would offer air cover. This arrangement was made before the North Korea attack and long before we crossed the 38th Parallel.

There is here a minor puzzle, namely why the delay in the Chinese entrance? Of course, in the early days of the war the Chinese troops were not needed. Then why were they not introduced as soon as the American forces broke out of the Pusan enclave and landed at Inchon? One would have thought they would have been prepared to move immediately when their troops were needed. Instead, they permitted almost the whole of North Korea to be overrun before they entered.

I have a solution to this puzzle that so far as I know has never been mentioned in the general discussion, except in a dispatch I sent back from Korea. The dispatch was classified as secret, but that was long ago. In any event, what I am about to say also draws heavily on a paper I read to a class as a student in Cornell. In the Communists' takeover, there were four field armies, each headed by a general who was appointed to run an area in each case of little less than a quarter of the country in the settlement at

the end. The area immediately around Peking was not in any of these areas and was occupied by a fifth army that was much smaller and apparently more fully under the control of Peking.

Apparently, Mao distrusted these generals to some extent. Since shortly later he removed one of them in disgrace and another died rather mysteriously, charged with a plot against Mao many years later, the suspicion would not be totally unfounded. On the other hand, it is doubtful that they fully trusted Mao. The actual shift of troops to Korea involved one large unit from each of these four armies and a somewhat smaller one from the Peking area. The forces were rotated and when units came out of Korea they were not sent back to their original army. I suspect that arranging all of this took time and hence, explains why the Chinese did not come in immediately. Thus it would seem that we would have faced the Chinese anyway, unless we had been driven out of Pusan in the first few weeks.

The view that we brought the Chinese in by crossing the parallel is fairly widely held among intellectuals. I did not, and do not believe it, but I should say that I also was wrong on an important matter. I thought that Kim had started war all on his own as a result of misunderstanding some newspaper reports from Moscow that he took as the go-ahead signal. The diplomatic documents now indicate that I was wrong, which puts me in the same boat as Clubb, albeit in a different seat.

But to return to the Greek tragedy, Clubb kept a careful diary with the intent of writing his memoirs when he retired at 65. He of course anticipated, justly, that he would serve as ambassador in various places and perhaps work under the Secretary of State. The diary contained

some information that should be secret and hence, was kept in secure custody in the various posts where he served.

When the American diplomatic establishment was removed from Communist China, it did not have diplomatic privileges or a courier system. Clubb deposited his diary with the British diplomatic establishment in Peking, just a few days before the British had recognized Communist China. The Chinese, however, had not recognized England and did not for quite some time. Thus, England had only a charge de affair in Peking, but their safes were probably secure against the Chinese. They were, however, insecure against British intelligence.

Clubb returned to Washington and, as mentioned previously, became head of the China desk. The Korean War then broke out and Clubb, not knowing about the treaty between Russia, China and North Korea, thought, as did many other people, that China would not enter if we did not cross the 38th Parallel and would if we did. He accordingly began a major campaign to influence our policy not to cross. Higher-ups, however, decided to cross and he was told to stop making trouble. He did not so stop, and Rusk, then Secretary of State, decided he had to be removed in order to improve relations between the Department and other parts of the government.

This was during the period when there was considerable concern about security. As we now know this concern was not misplaced, but it was also rather helter-skelter. Clubb, like many other officials (including me) had done various things that could be in a file as grounds for (faint) suspicion. The Secretary of State having ordered that he be removed, the easiest way of doing so was to suspend him on security grounds for

investigation. He was suspended, but nothing else was done for a number of months.

Meanwhile, Congress heard about the matter and he was asked to appear before the relevant committee. The committee looked at the charges and decided they were nothing much, which was true. Unfortunately, Chambers had remembered meeting Clubb and included it in his debriefing. One of the congressmen asked Clubb about it, and Clubb replied that he did not remember it, but it could be checked by looking in his diary. The fact that he referred to this source indicates that he also thought it was a minor matter, as indeed it was.

The committee, however, asked where the diary was. On being told it was in Peking, they asked the Department of State to get it. It was accordingly taken to London by British diplomatic courier and then to Washington by an American courier. It was read, not by the congressmen, but by officials of the Department of State, who decided it was "hot" enough and should not have been left in the custody of foreign powers, even an ally. I knew one of the officers who made the decision and he was very far from a McCarthyite. It was this minor indiscretion that was the fault I have referred to in connection with Greek tragedies. He was forced to resign and a brilliant career ended in obscurity.

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CHAPTER 13

Submarines



United States entered World War I because of the German submarine attacks on shipping in the Atlantic. We not only objected to the use of submarines, but also to the particular methods they used. When Germans first began using the submarines, they would surface fire a shot across the bow of merchant ships and wait until the crew were in the boats, sometimes even giving the boats a tow to someplace near land.

Whether they would have continued with this practice is dubious, but in any event, Churchill, then with jurisdiction over the matter, ordered merchant ships not to stop and if possible to ram the submarine. This led the submarines to change their policy, although they continued to occasionally offer some protection for the crew. This was the type of submarine war to which we took exception.

The intriguing feature of this is that in World War II, we began with direct torpedo attacks on Japanese merchant shipping and certainly did not do anything to save the crew. Of course, since they were Japanese, they would probably have refused aid in any event. Nevertheless, we followed in World War II the policy which, when applied by Germany, had

led us to enter World War I. Further, although our history books are normally accurate, I have never seen one that even hints there was anything odd in this opposing pair of policies on submarine warfare.

The War in Vietnam

I will start my account of our engagement in Vietnam with an incident that occurred far, far away and far, far earlier in the Far Eastern library of Yale. One of my fellow students who was rather more advanced than I happened to be there at the same time. At that time, the French were still trying to put down difficulties in Vietnam and we were giving them some minor assistance. Really, I think it would be more accurate to say that we were not impeding them rather than actually helping them. Our basic policy in all the empires was to favor independence, and certainly most American academics favored independence under more or less socialist regimes.

My colleague, whose name I have forgotten, expressed distress that we were on the French side in Vietnam. I myself have no strong feelings on the matter, but I did know that the northern forces had strong connections with the Communists. They were in fact, of course, simply a branch of the worldwide Communist movement that we were attempting to stall. At this time, the military situation was such that the French could have withdrawn, leaving the control of the government in the hands of Vietnamese who in fact were in favor of independence, but not Communists. However, it did not seem that the French would do this and, this being before Dien Bien Phu, their prospects of holding on indefinitely seemed not bad.

My colleague stated fairly strongly that he thought we should not help the French in Vietnam, which was then, of course, French Indochina. Although no admirer of the French Empire, I preferred it to the Communists, but I also felt it an unimportant matter from the standpoint of American foreign policy. At the time I was a Foreign Service Officer on detached duty at Yale to study Chinese, so he obviously expected me to express my views on the subject. More correctly, he thought that I would express the Department of State's views.

I responded by saying that Europe was more important than Indochina and we were attempting to restore the remnant of Germany to prosperity and give it possibly a little strength. The French were impeding this and I thought an implicit trade in which we gave them some minor assistance in their empire and they at least moderated their objections to the restoration of Germany would be sensible. He did not object to my statement about the world, but said, "I don't think we should do this kind of trading". Although this was only one person, his phrase stuck in my memory as representative of a general climate of opinion among academics studying the Far East.

Eventually the French gave up and after the armistice, we apparently took the view that we were to some extent responsible for the southern half. We gradually increased our forces there until there were about 15,000 people engaged in various military assistance activities but not in direct combat, except perhaps as advisers to small units.

The intellectual attitudes that I have given above continued, and since the average person knew nothing about the place, the general intellectual climate continued as mildly favorable to the northern regime.

The average citizen knew nothing much about the matter and objected to aggression on general terms. He also recognized the northern government as Communists and hence, opposed to us. Although the intellectuals generally disliked our feeble aid to the south, there was little effective political opposition. The likelihood that it would go into a real war was, of course, obvious.

The north had begun significant transfers of troops and supplies to support elements in the south that did not like the government on whose side we were. Further, in the United States, a number of Republicans had become quite strongly supportive of the south. During the 1964 presidential year, two incidents occurred in Vietnam. One of these, a minor brush between American destroyers and North Vietnamese torpedo boats, was mentioned by President Johnson as a reason for much larger aid to the south. The other, in which North Vietnamese-supported guerrillas shelled an American military hospital that had clear-cut Red Cross markings, killed about 15 patients. For some reason, Johnson did not mention this as among his reasons for sending troops to Vietnam.

We now began a very clumsy effort to intervene in Vietnam. Among other things, the draft which made many college students eligible for combat was arranged so that you could not tell in advance whether you were to be drafted or not. Further people engaged in advanced studies were exempted — a rule that led to a flood of people taking advance studies in areas that were not particularly difficult, like English.

It seems likely that the actual reason for Johnson entering the war was neither the brush in the Gulf of Tonkin, nor the shelling of the American hospital. I think Johnson simply saw that it would make it

much easier for him to defeat Goldwater if he stole from Goldwater his military position. In any event, the sending of troops, many of whom were drafted and were under command of a rather inept general, Westmoreland, rapidly developed serious domestic difficulties in United States for the war in Vietnam, but insured Johnson's victory in 1968.

We now come to the actual fighting. Johnson appears to have taken a fairly active role in the command. It was reported at the time that he actually selected bomb targets. If the newspapers are to be believed, he made the selection calls sitting on the toilet seat in the White House. Since almost all bombs were dropped over empty forest, it is hard to see why anybody would be concerned about which particular trees were killed.

There were of course suitable bomb targets in the north. Hanoi almost escaped bombing until the fall of 1972. It was not a major industrial city but nevertheless, in World War II we blew up many harmless cities in Germany and Japan. I occasionally visit Wurzburg, a pretty little city without industry. It was leveled late in the war for no known reason. Certainly Hanoi made at least an equally worthwhile bomb target.

There were two other rather good bomb targets. The northern boundary of Vietnam is mountainous, although not a major mountain range. There were two railroads connecting with China running through this mountain range. Breaking them up by use of fighter-bombers and then keeping them non-operational permanently was militarily obvious and probably worthwhile, certainly far more worthwhile than Wurzburg.

The north of Vietnam is very largely the lower reaches of the Delta of the Red River. Being on the outskirts of the traditional rice-growing area of Asia, it had been thoroughly converted into a long series of irrigated

and drained rice paddies. Breaking up the dikes would have been an easy task for the air force and it might have starved the North Vietnamese government out. However, we had announced at the very beginning of the war that we would not do that.

That the north was worried about it was demonstrated when an American fighter-bomber dropped a bomb on one part of a dike which had a road along it. The North Vietnamese propaganda agency saw to it that photographs of the bomb crater were widely distributed. Since this was an unique incident, it seems likely that the fighter pilot saw the road and did not realize it was on the dike. Presumably he had missed his assigned target earlier, and wanted to get rid of the bomb while doing some damage to the north. The issue, however, was played up in the American press, which never emphasized its unique nature.

Let us now turn to various other things that were not done, although the fact that they were not done was the open secret. The first of these was blockade of the north. There was no blockade until after the 1972 election when Nixon imposed a blockade and ordered a bombing of Hanoi. This speedily changed the northern negotiating tactics in the attempt to make peace. Thus, the open war ended at this time to be renewed later, of course. I never saw any explanation as to why the blockade had not been implemented earlier.

There was, however, a rather comic semi-blockade attempted. The United States tried (rather ineffectively) to get friendly countries to agree not to refuel merchant ships coming from Europe to Southeast Asia. I remember this because I was in the American Embassy in Seoul at the time and the middle-ranking Foreign Service Officer (FSO), who was obviously

the best example of such an officer and obviously rapidly rising to the top, expressed enthusiasm for the project. I said that the only effect would be to slightly reduce the cargo-carrying capacity of the freighters because it would be necessary to convert some of their cargo compartments to carry fuel. The immediate response to this remark by me was sharply negative, but the following day the upwardly mobile FSO said the objective of the rule was to reduce the cargo-carrying capacity of the freighters. He received general approval. Thus, I can claim to have had some influence in the embassy.

The north of Vietnam sent most supplies to the south by way of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which ran through Laos. This ran parallel to the Laotian South Vietnamese border and was not terribly far from it. We did not, however, make any serious effort to block it. It was bombed from time to time, but as it was in the forest and only a trail anyway, this did not do very much in the way of blocking it. On one occasion, the South Vietnamese army mounted a light raid on it but quickly withdrew. The only explanation I ever heard for failing to make any serious effort to block the trail was a statement by an employee of the Department of State in Washington, in which he said that if we moved into Laos, the Vietnamese would simply move their trail westward into Thailand, thus bringing the Thais into the war. Why that was thought to be undesirable was not explained. Surely if they were trying to defend their own territory against the North Vietnamese, their intervention in the war would have been to our advantage.

What happened after the war, although covered by the newspapers, has been largely forgotten. I suspect that the invasion of a large number of

intellectuals, who regarded their antagonism to the war and their demonstrations to that effect as a high point in their lives, means that they must forget or suppress the mass murders that followed the Communist victory.

The first of these mass murders occurred in Cambodia. As soon as we withdrew our forces from Vietnam, it was possible for the Communists to take over Cambodia without any interference from us. They carried off what was the most intense campaign of mass murder anywhere in the world. They only killed two million people, but as a percentage of the rather limited population of Cambodia, this was a record breaker. There was a brief attempt to blame it on the United States, but that faded out very quickly. Now I think it is safe to say that this whole thing has gone into a memory hole.

There were also the boat people. Apparently the Communist government in Vietnam was anti-Chinese and a large number of people (exact number is not known) were put into leaky boats and shoved out to sea. Estimates of the death rate run between three-quarters of a million to a million and a half. It may be that this was one of the reasons for China attacking North Vietnam. The boat people received a lot of newspaper publicity at the time, and a number of people who been strongly supporting the north in the war signed a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* in which they essentially apologized. The matter has, however, been largely forgotten since then.

As a final blow to the supporters of the north in the US, far from having democratic socialism, they retain their dictatorship, but have gone capitalist. From the standpoint of most American supporters of the northern government during the war this is a catastrophe, but from the standpoint

of the Vietnamese people it is a great step forward. On the whole, they have reached the living standard they had under the previous government. This again seems to be one of the open secrets with which this manuscript is concerned. I often read about how prosperous they are now and about their capitalism, but never is this contrasted with the objectives backed by the American supporters of North Vietnam.

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CHAPTER 14

Aggression



In the present-day world, “aggression” is usually regarded as a very serious sin. We have several times engaged in wars against aggressors and normally regard these wars as “just” because aggression is regarded as sinful. As a matter of fact, United States is one of history’s most successful aggressor nations. We conquered almost the entirety of continental United States through a series of small but undeniably aggressive wars against the Indians who were in possession. We also made a serious but unsuccessful effort to conquer Canada in 1812. Much of the southwest was originally taken from the Mexicans who were in occupation by two wars – one by the Texans and then, when we annexed Texas, by us. There were still many Indian tribes who did not recognize Mexican sovereignty or our sovereignty when we replaced them. The wars with Geronimo in that area were among our most difficult aggressive wars. We of course bought Florida from Spain, but only after making it clear we would compel an exit by force if they decided not to take our money.

Let us first consider the Indians. It should be said that in many cases there were European powers who claimed parts of the future

United States, and they were either forced to “cede” those parts by war, or sold them to us, but in most cases north of Mexico the area was actually controlled by Indian tribes and the European sovereignty was more or less theoretical. It is very hard to argue that these areas were actually in our possession until after our armies had driven out the Indians.

Let me start at the very beginning with the settlement of the English colonies. Beginning with the settlements in Virginia and those in New England, colonists had gradually built up a thin layer of essentially European civilization along the Atlantic coast of what would eventually become the United States. This colonization had proceeded by simply seizing land, sometimes compensating the Indians already there and sometimes fighting wars with them. In general, apparently no one ever really considered their rights in the matter. Colonial powers in these areas issued charters to their colonists that rather assumed they had a right to do this. Locke, for example, drew up a charter for the Carolinas in which people’s ownership of land came from their farming it. He paid no attention whatsoever to the natives already there.

But it should be said that the native tribes were not completely peaceful. Indeed, small groups of Indians tended to raid outlying white settlements. This would continue to be true almost up to the 20th century. In the late 18th century, there was one raid in which Indians attacked a federal court. In what the Europeans call the seven years’ war and we call the French and Indian war, the two major powers in the North American continent — France and England — attempted to involve the Indian tribes in their war. There were raids from some tribes on the English colonies and England entered into treaties with some of these tribes under which they

would protect our colonies in return for a guarantee of their keeping existing tribal lands. It was this guarantee that prevented or impeded the westward push for the colonists and they objected to it. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence in its long list of “crimes” of the king of England said: “He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only”²³. That it was also formidable to the Indians then in occupation was of course not mentioned.

In general, most of the European powers and United States, after it became an independent country, took the view that their government had the right, as it certainly had the power, to simply allocate land occupied by Indians to settlers. The Indians tended to object, which led to a long series of very minor wars of aggression by, firstly, the English, and then by us. In the course of these wars, we created the United States in its present borders.

On a personal note, my own moral code does not hold aggression as wicked per se. Those among my readers who do feel that it is always and under all conditions wicked, should feel guilty at the fact that they are living on real estate that was seized by an act of aggression.

It should be said that the Indians in general lived by hunting and gathering and required a great deal of land to support individual families and tribes. Efforts were made, particularly in the Louisiana Purchase, to

²³ We bought Alaska and the Gadsen purchase proceeded quite peacefully, although in neither case were the Indians in actual possession consulted. The same can be said about the Louisiana Purchase.

get them to farm the land, but this was generally unsuccessful. Thus, land that might support 20,000 settlers was occupied by perhaps only 500 Indians. Purchase of the land was difficult because the Indians had no clear-cut tribal or family ownership. The individual tribes were in almost continuous minor wars with each other and hence, purchase of land from one would not extinguish the claim of another. Nevertheless, with rare exceptions, we and the other "European" claimants simply ignored Indian rights and issued charters to settlers or, in the case of Mexico, conquistadors.

It is interesting that upon the occupation of the entire United States by Americans, we stopped engaging in wars of conquest. The Philippines and Cuba, which we took from Spain, were granted independence. Puerto Rico, also taken from Spain in the same war, has remained a minor burden on the United States, but surely could obtain independence if it wanted it. Guam remains as a minor product of the war with Spain. In neither World War I nor World War II did we really seize real estate. The mandates in the Pacific were taken from Japan and then given independence. The net long-run effect of this will, no doubt, be that we spend considerable amounts of money supporting these countries in their new-found self-government.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, American military forces occupied a number of minor Central American countries. In each case, however, we withdrew. During World War I we purchased from the Danes what is now the American Virgins and we have rented, also from the Danes, some air bases in northern Greenland. They are spectacularly of no economic value. We have various military bases scattered around

the world, but we in no case show signs of wanting to annex them. Indeed, I believe that any proposal to bring the troops in Germany back home would be objected to by the Germans.

In sum, we created the United States through a long series of minor acts of aggression. Since we acquired the entire continental area, however, we have not seized real estate of any importance by military means. Those Americans who feel that aggression is wicked can support American policy in the 20th and 21st centuries, but not in the 19th century.

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CHAPTER 15

The Democratic Peace



Many political scientists apparently feel insecure in their teaching that democracy is the best form of government. Thus, recently there has been quite a fad in political science arguing that democracies are one way or another peaceful. It is hard to argue that the Roman Republic was a peaceful conqueror, and the Athenian democracy was hardly reluctant to get into wars. It could of course be argued that these were long ago and maybe are not representative of true democracies. I suspect, however, that they have been left out simply because most modern political scientists know little about them. A classical education is no longer part of the normal background of a scholar.

Since democracies undeniably were involved in two major wars in the 20th century and United States succeeded in having a major war that was entirely internal in the 19th century, this contention seems hard to support. It has therefore been gradually modified in order to bring it into accord with the average political scientist's gradually growing historical knowledge. The first step was to allege that democracies did not engage in aggressive wars. After this argument had gotten into print, somebody

read a piece about the 19th century in which European democracies seized much of the world by a series of aggressive wars. Thus, that particular argument had to be abandoned. I should perhaps say that in no case did anyone say the previous argument was in error; they just stopped using it.

This leads us to the final version, which is that democracies do not fight with each other. It is to this myth that this chapter is devoted. The two largest wars in recent times were the two world wars. In each of these, there were democracies on both sides. This will surprise the average reader since the standard history in the United States and England claims that our opponents were dictatorships. Indeed, we normally call all of our opponents dictatorships. In essence, the wars became virtuous because the democracies fought with, and in fact defeated, dictatorships.

Let us start with World War I. On one side was a German Empire that was a constitutional monarchy with an elected legislature that had the power of the purse. In fact, it had a large number of socialist members in that legislature. Criticism of this from those who are proponents of the democratic peace hypothesis normally point out that the Upper House was elected by a method which permitted people of higher incomes to have somewhat more votes than the poor. This was true, but consider the Upper House in England, which was hereditary. It is true that its powers had been somewhat restricted, but it could still exercise an almost completely effective veto.

Germany had permitted women to vote from well before the beginning of the war. England did not fully make women eligible to vote until 1931. Indeed, during World War I, there were many males in England

who could not vote until the passage of the Representation of the People Act in 1918. The United States, of course, did not permit blacks living in the South to vote. I suppose it could perhaps be argued that this war does not contradict the thesis that democracies do not fight with each other, seeing how there were no true democracies on either side.

World War II raises somewhat the same problems in that Japan also had an elected legislature with a responsible Cabinet and the power of the purse held by the legislature. The Upper House was to some extent hereditary. The peers elected some among their number to that house. The English legislature still had an hereditary Upper House, but its power had been severely restricted.

During the war, I used to annoy people by asking them the name of the Japanese dictator. Sometimes they replied "the Emperor", which simply showed hopeless ignorance of the Japanese system. He was greatly respected, but with rare exceptions (one of which was the decision to surrender) respected his Cabinet's advice. Even on the decision to surrender he did not go against his Cabinet; he merely introduced the surrender and might well have given up had the Cabinet objected.

A second potential dictator of Japan was the prime minister. Inconveniently for people who favor this particular view, there is the fact that right in the middle of the war he was replaced. This does not usually happen to dictators. I have occasionally encountered people who say that the military class was the dictator. This involves a peculiar usage of terms, but I suppose it could be argued that it was an oligarchy rather than a democracy. So far as I know, there are no studies of how the military controlled the government, if in fact it did. Thus, I have produced two wars

with democracies on both sides — the second I agree is a little shaky, but the first is clear.

Political scientists will have to find another argument for democracy. Fortunately, such other arguments are easy to come upon. The real issue here is why this rather peculiar and new argument was ever introduced.

CHAPTER 16

City Bombing



In World War II, both American and British air forces engaged in very heavy bombing of cities in Germany and Japan and occasionally in other places. In this they were following the theories of an Italian air force officer named Douhet. His idea was that an aerial war by and of itself could destroy an enemy country and hence, win the war. He argued that industry would be destroyed and, in particular, the bombing would destroy the arms-making industry; therefore, the country would have no alternative but to surrender.

Since the war in both Germany and Japan lasted through long periods of very heavy bombardment of their cities, this seems dubious. Germany's surrender came only when a large part of the country had been occupied by either Russian or Western troops. The atom bomb, something which Douhet did not even dream of, played a large role in Japan's surrender. We might say that Douhet was merely premature, that eventually city bombing would work. But that raises the question of why there have been no city bombing raids since 1945, although there have been many wars in which the American air force commanded the air.

In trying to answer this question, a little examination of what actually happened in World War II is in order. The suffering inflicted on civilians in both Germany and Japan was very great. In general, however, it had little effect on military production. Post-war examination of German statistics indicates that military production remained high throughout the war. The vast fleets of strategic bombers inflicted great pain on the civilians but did not in general stop military production. The reason is simple: most military factories were not located in the center of cities, but in the suburbs. If you visit the United States, you will see the same phenomena. Most of our factories are not in downtown areas of the city, but in a sort of ring outside.

To take one example, Wurzburg, a quiet university town of about 30,000 people and with no military industry at all, was wiped out by a very heavy raid just before the war in Europe ended. No one has ever suggested any military motive for this particular raid. I suspect that the air force, having many planes and not much in the way of suitable targets, simply looked at the map for an undamaged city and chose Wurzburg. I visit Wurzburg from time to time and it has been completely rebuilt. I suppose one could argue that in the long-run making it necessary to rebuild the city had military effects.

Indeed, it would appear that strategic bombing inflicted greater damage on the United States and England than on our enemies. In both cases, almost half of total military production was devoted to the strategic bomb fleets, while they reduced our enemies' military production only trivially. Douhet got it backwards. The gigantic air fleets reduced our production of things like artillery and tanks more than they reduced the

production of similar equipment by our enemies. The armies we met were not badly equipped, although they were badly outnumbered by soldiers carrying relatively simple military equipment.

At this point, it is necessary to discuss Germany and Japan separately. In the case of Germany, in the fall of 1944, the Allied air forces temporarily changed their strategy. They attacked not the cities, but the German supplies of petroleum. The Germans had a number of factories for converting coal into petroleum and these were of course not located in cities. They also attacked the only oilfields within the control of the Axis at that time, in Romania. As a result, the German army was very short on petroleum for the latter part of the war.

This in turn had an effect on the air war. The Germans had invented the jet aircraft and built a number of them, but they simply did not have the fuel. I remember driving through the forest in Germany after the war, in which jet planes lined both sides of the road. It may be, of course, that the planes were not really finished, but it seems more likely that it was not the failure of the manufacturers, but the fuel supply that kept them idle.

Twice I saw German jets in action. One of them flew over the American lines in Belgium where I was on the ground. In spite of the almost complete control of the air by the Americans, the jet flew unimpeded and was not even attacked, since it was so much faster than the American planes. Indeed, it was followed by the explosion of antiaircraft shells, which exploded well behind the plane, presumably because the computers of our antiaircraft did not have capacity for such high speeds.

Later in Germany I saw a German jet fly over Western Germany, once again an area in which the American and British air forces were completely dominant, but it passed completely safely and did not even annoy the overwhelmingly more powerful Western air forces. The Germans could build jets because their general industrial plant had not been seriously damaged by the raids. They could not fuel them, however, because of a very few special raids on their fuel supplies.

There was another rather general problem of the German industry in the fall of 1944. With the occupation of France by the Western powers, fighter-bombers could effectively fly over Germany and attack the rail lines. The strategic bombers earlier had attacked marshaling yards. The fleets of hundreds of bombers placing their bombs more or less simultaneously would be a very ineffective way of attacking the rail lines themselves, but the marshaling yards were large enough so that they seemed, at least superficially, sensible as a mass bombing target.

Unfortunately there would be many tracks laid in marshaling yards and there was plenty of labor and equipment readily available, so in general, two tracks running through the marshaling yard would be available shortly after the end of the raid. Thus, these raids had little effect on the German rail system. The fighter-bombers operating out of France, however, could and did make direct attacks on the rail lines running through the countryside. The rail system was seriously inconvenienced by these attacks, although it had weathered the strategic bomb raids on the marshaling yards without much difficulty.

Altogether, although the city bombing in Germany inflicted great suffering on the citizenry and required a lot of rebuilding after the war,

thereby using resources which could have been used more productively had the houses, hotels and retail shops not been destroyed, its principal effect on the actual war was the massive diversion of resources into building the giant bomber forces.

The situation in Japan was somewhat different. There, again, the destruction of the centers in cities like Tokyo had little effect on industrial production of arms. Something else, however, did. In a previous chapter I pointed out that in World War II, the American navy followed a submarine policy very similar to the German submarine policy that led to our entering World War I. It was much more effective against the Japanese who did not have the massive ability to build convoy protection equipment that the United States and England did. As a result, almost all sea trade of Japan, an island country, had been cut off by the time we began our serious raids on their cities. They also had no source of petroleum in the home isles, or even nearby. Thus, their war production was doomed even without the B-29s.

It is interesting that this general failure of our strategic air force to have any effect does not seem to have been brought to the attention of the average citizen. It is, however, obvious that since the end of World War II, our air force has not engaged in any city bombing. The first opportunity was of course the Korean War. Our air force engaged in very active efforts to interfere with the transportation of supplies to the armed forces above the 38th Parallel, but did not bomb the cities.

The North Koreans noticed this and decided that the American air force would not bomb cities and hence, tore out the whole center of Pyongyang in order to build an air strip. They apparently calculated that

the strip would be immune to bombing by the vastly superior American air force because it was in the city.

This led to the air force publicly tearing itself apart over the question of whether it should or should not bomb this air strip. This debate was the first time that I ever saw any mention of an air force doctrine against bombing cities. It was not accompanied by any statement that city bombing in World War II had been a mistake. The fact that we did not accomplish much militarily by such bombing in World War II and inflicted great pain on the civilians was not mentioned in the public discussion. I cannot remember even reading any newspaper columnist mentioning it, although since I was in Korea at the time, I had only limited access to the American columns.

We did, in fact, decide that the airstrip was a suitable target even though located in the largest city in North Korea. We bombed it and it was not used as an airstrip during the rest of the war. After the war, it was renamed the Kim Il Sung Plaza, with the result that Pyongyang has an immense park in its center. Our policy of not bombing in cities, recognized by the Koreans although, as far as I know, never publicly announced, led to this massive destruction of buildings in downtown Pyongyang. It is a good example of the indirect effects that policies may have.

Similarly, we did not bomb Hanoi during most of the war in Vietnam. Very heavy bombing raids were carried out mainly over forested areas where we suspected there might be enemy troops. How much damage we actually inflicted is not known, but it is certainly true that the North Korean troops within the bombing area of North Korea or in South Korea found these things very unpleasant.

There was one bombing raid in Hanoi aimed at a bridge, but the North Vietnamese claimed that it hit a hospital. The American air force maintained that this was an accident. They did not say that Hanoi was lucky it had one brick on top of another, unlike so many German and Japanese cities. Neither did they announce a policy change from the World War II Douhetism. Nevertheless, such a change had been made.

North Vietnam was connected to China by two railroads running through the sizable but not gigantic mountain range along its northern border. They were almost perfect targets for fighter-bombers, but we never made any effort to take them out of action. Another potential target in North Vietnam was its elaborate irrigation network, which enabled agriculture and should have been easy to disrupt by either fighter-bombers or heavy bombers. At the beginning of the war, President Johnson announced that this would not be bombed, why I do not know. In any event, it was not bombed and when on one occasion, a fighter-bomber dropped a bomb on a road running along the top of an irrigation berm, it received a good deal of publicity and the air force never claimed that it was deliberate. Apparently both the irrigation network and railroads connecting to China all fell into the “no city bombing” rubric.

In our two wars with Iraq, much the same has happened. The first was over so quickly that the failure to bomb cities rather missed notice. In the second, we very quickly came into occupation of the country and might well have felt the blowing up of cities was unnecessary. However, we became involved in a very extensive guerrilla war. In this war, helicopters, light planes and a few specially equipped heavy airplanes that actually mounted cannon were utilized when we lost control of an area.

This happened not infrequently, but we did not simply level cities with aerial bombs. Once again, "no city bombing" was the slogan, but an unannounced slogan.

As a further item, we have spent a great deal of money building nuclear weapons. At first we planned to use them on bombers, but now we mainly talk about long-range rockets. It is notable that we do not actually threaten other countries with nuclear weapons. Like city bombing, it is apparently ruled out, although I have not seen any formal statement to this effect. We indeed maintain a rocket force suitable for such bombardment, but it is not obvious why. According to the newspapers, our military force is capable of taking on all the other forces in the world except guerrillas. I doubt that this is true, but certainly we are very powerful. This power is not so much because our forces are great as because most other countries have greatly reduced theirs. Notably, we appear not to be interested in city destruction, but in ground warfare, which leads to quite a number of our own soldiers dying. Once again I do not read any rationalizations for this change in policy. It is apparently thought to be something which is automatic and requires no argument. Whether it is sensible or not, I do not hazard an opinion.

CHAPTER 17

People Who Committed Atrocities



Occasionally, perhaps once a year or less, a former German concentration camp guard (usually in his eighties) is found in the United States, formally deprived of his American citizenship and deported to Germany. There, or perhaps in some other European country where he served as a guard in the concentration camp, he is found guilty of a crime and put in jail for the rest of his life. Granted that most of them, if they had refused to act as a guard, would have been put in the infantry where the death rate was high, it is possible to argue that this is an excessive punishment.

The point in this chapter, however, is not that these former guards are treated unkindly, but that former guards in the Communist concentration camp system are simply ignored. There must be far more of them than the former guards in the German concentration camps, simply because the gulag remained in existence for many years after World War II. Further, it was much larger than the German concentration camp system, and conditions in the gulag were worse than those in the

German camps if we leave aside the extermination camps such as Auschwitz²⁴.

Not only have these people been ignored, but the press has failed to mention it. When, as occasionally happens, an elderly janitor in Ohio is exposed as a former guard in the German concentration camp system, the press normally talks about what a wicked person he was and declares that he fully deserves further imprisonment. They never mention the fact that former concentration camp guards from Siberia or even western Russia or the Russian-occupied parts of Eastern Europe are not given such sentences. Since there surely must be far more of such people still alive than the ex-guards in the German system, which after all ended in 1945, this is surprising.

During the negotiations for the evacuation of East Germany by the Russian army, the West German representatives not only promised funds to build new housing for the officers of the Russian army of occupation in Russia²⁵, they also agreed that no one should be punished for an act which was legal at the time it was performed. This, of course, freed all Communist concentration camp personnel as well as many other Communist officials in the police and enforcement apparatus. It would, however, seem to also immunize guards in the Nazi system which was just as legal before 1945

²⁴ The camp on Nova Zemalya may have been an exception. Apparently no one returned from it. Whether this was because it was a conscious extermination camp or simply that the climate there was even worse than in the rest of the camps of the gulag is not clear. Indeed, it may have served as a sort of gradual extermination camp where people the GPU (Russian Secret Police) did not want to return were sentenced, in confidence that they would not return.

²⁵ Russia being a Communist country, obviously, no similar provision was made for the men in the ranks.

as the Communist system before and after 1945. I suppose no reader of this essay will be surprised to be told that this was not the way the law was enforced.

As an extreme example of the breadth of the amnesty, Communist guards on the wall shot people attempting to escape. On occasion, they were shot after they had got over the wall and were in West German territory. The guard who shot them, of course, was still in East Germany. An effort was made to prosecute these guards for murder. They were tried not by Communist courts, but by the regular German judiciary. Rather surprisingly, they held that these guards also were protected by the treaty. Of course, I do not know the exact wording of the treaty, so perhaps my surprise is misguided. In any event, this decision did not receive very much criticism either in western Germany or the rest of the West.

There was, however, one case of a mildly successful prosecution. Wolf, the head of the German secret police and the whole judiciary of East Germany during the period of Russian occupation, had been an active member of the German Communist Party before the Nazis obtained control of the German government. During that period, the Nazis and the Communists carried on a small civil war in Berlin. Activists of both these parties shot members of the other party from time to time.

Wolf was one of these activists and he not only killed three people who he had regarded as dangerous political opponents, but boasted of the matter after he became a high official of the East German government. Since this was before the killing of non-Communists by Communists was made legal by the Communist government, he was clearly guilty of crime not covered by the treaty. Moreover, it was easy to prove because he had

boasted of it. He was accordingly tried, found guilty and sentenced to a few years in a much less severe prison than the ones he had supervised in his previous official position.

To my knowledge, he is the only member of the former Russian apparatus of a repression who has been subject to any penalty at all. Putin, the current head of the Russian government, was a colonel in the GPU serving in Germany for a number of years. His job has not really been fully described anywhere, but it would appear, granted the time that he entered service and the time he was in Germany, that he did not have much opportunity to commit serious crimes. In general, after Stalin died, there was a gradual falling off in the severity of police control both in Russia and in the Russian-occupied parts of Eastern Europe. Thus, although we do not know for certain that he did not commit any atrocities, we also would not know if he did. It is notable, however, that even speculation on this matter is rare in the western press and of course totally non-existent in the Russian press. Not even his enemies, and he has many, seemed to speculate on this matter.

Altogether, the German atrocities in the German concentration camps have received a good deal of publicity. I myself, for example, was given a guided tour of Auschwitz, a grim experience. It is now part of Poland, but it is notable that none of the Russian concentration camps in which so many non-Jewish victims were kept and died are on exhibit. They, like so many other things that I have covered in this book, have gone into a memory hole.

CHAPTER 18

Elementary Theory



I must pause here and produce a little very elementary theory. A case in which there are many countries involved is subject to the balance of power. In recent years, many list the balance of power as a method of preserving peace. This is the exact opposite of the original meaning of the term. Early scholars like Hume reasoned that if one country began getting more powerful than others, the others would combine against it. Thus, in a way, the balance of power theory holds that war is inevitable because no single country can do what Rome did and eliminate all of its competitors. That this theory fits post-Roman history very well is obvious, but the preservation of peace by the balance of power is not.

To take a not very impressive example, since World War II the United States has been engaged in four wars – the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the two Iraqi wars. Meanwhile, China has engaged in three wars. They attacked Tibet which had been independent since the fall of the Ching dynasty; they fought in the Korean War; and they attempted an unsuccessful invasion of Vietnam. Russia was involved in the Korean War, mainly through the use of its air force. There is no point in going on.

Clearly the balance of power does not preserve peace. It preserves the national existence of countries, although even that is uncertain. Poland, for instance, was partitioned by its three neighbors in the 18th century.

The reason for this is obvious. If one country begins to show signs of being very strong and hence, jeopardizing the continued existence of other countries, the others are likely to unite against it. From the fall of Rome until very recently (and possibly in the near future), there have been many wars and boundaries have shifted radically, but few countries were actually eliminated.

We Americans owe our independence to the balance of power. In what we call the French and Indian war and the Europeans refer to as the seven years' war, England won a decisive victory and thus put the balance of power in danger. In an exhibition of bad manners, the English insisted that their ambassadors have priority over the French. An anti-English coalition was formed, and it occurred to the French that a third of the English population lived on the western side of the Atlantic. Further, there were a certain number of difficulties between the English and their colonies. Stirring up these difficulties seemed a good idea.

This led to what is usually referred to as the American Revolution. In fact, it was a world war with almost every country in Europe either in an alliance against England or engaged in what was called "armed neutrality". It was a genuine world war with three major naval battles fought in the distant Indian Ocean. Fighting in the area which eventually became the United States was fairly light, and indeed the American troops did not do well. Nevertheless, the French objective — weakening England by removing what was then the bulk of its empire — was achieved.

Shortly after that war the French Revolution broke out, which led to the rise of Napoleon. For a while, it looked as if the balance of power had failed and Europe would be united under one ruler. Napoleon, however, overreached himself and the balance of power was re-established.

This was followed by the 19th century and the development of worldwide empires. Before turning to that, however, we should look at the big empires which were in existence earlier. In 1492, Columbus sailed the ocean blue. As a result, very large empires were created in the Western Hemisphere. It is interesting that the major imperial acquisitions of Spain were achieved by independent entrepreneurs like Cortes and Pizarro. They were not only not backed by the local governors of the Caribbean islands, but Cortes, in any event, continuously feared an expedition from Cuba to defeat him. Pizarro on the other hand fell into disfavor with the court after his conquest, and he and his entire family were killed.

The Spanish Empire in the new world was distinctly limited. It consisted of most of Mexico, and the north and west coastal area of South America. Although they made occasional exploratory trips to other areas, they did not settle or bring them under control. They picked up the Philippines almost by accident, and never really developed it.

Portugal, under the leadership of Henry the Navigator, had been exploring the Atlantic and eventually sent a fleet around Africa to reach the spice isles. One of the results of their early exploration was the discovery that rounding the westward coast of Africa was easiest for sailing vessels that went well west. In consequence, they accidentally discovered Brazil. They settled along the coast and being conveniently

close to the African continent where there were many native chiefs willing to sell their subjects or the subjects in the next chiefdom over as slaves, they were able to develop plantations that mainly produced sugar. Notably they, like their Brazilian descendants, did not penetrate very far inland.

The Portuguese established a number of small trading posts in the Indian Ocean and a few along the African coast. They occupied almost all of the good harbors in the continent, which is notably short of such harbors. Still, these were small posts until the 19th century. It is notable that this particular empire was the longest-lasting of all.

The Dutch, English and French followed behind the Portuguese and, like them, established trading posts. Like them, they also did not seize any significant piece of land until much later, although the Dutch, wanting to get fresh food for the long trip east, settled a few farmers in southern Africa. It is no longer a true Dutch colony, but the descendants of those original settlers are still there, although not in control.

In the northeastern part of the Americas, more serious settlement was attempted. Firstly, the small islands of the Caribbean were developed into very wealthy sugar colonies dependent on imported slave labor. In those days, the French colonies in what is now Canada depended mainly on fur trading, and the English also engaged in fur trading in the Hudson Bay area. A number of small colonies were planted along the east coast of what is now the United States. The first of these, Virginia, suffered from the fact that the King of England was an early discoverer of the health effects of smoking, and tried to prevent them from raising their major cash crop.

The English colonies in the New World were in a way more successful than the Spanish and Portuguese. Because of the prevalence of piracy, the Spanish sent all their ships back and forth across the Atlantic in convoys. These convoys were generally successful in preventing capture, but they made the trans-Atlantic route much more expensive than it was for the single ships operating in the north. As an extreme example, there was only one ship per year between Manila and Acapulco. The Portuguese did much the same, building very large ships and sending only a few each year from their possessions in the Indies to Portugal. Once again, this kept them from being taken by pirates, but made shipping very expensive and hence, only a small trade developed.

While all of this was going on, the balance of power kept European nations from establishing continental empires in Europe. On the whole, the large-scale settlement of the American colonies of England, which at the time of the Revolution held one-third of the total English-speaking population, was not subject to much envy by other powers. These colonies were not considered highly valuable, nor were they in the conditions of the time.

I mentioned previously the independence of the United States which was used by France and Spain to restore the balance of power. I have also discussed what happened in Europe at that time; but there were also major developments in the rest of the world. Portugal and Spain, like England, lost their American colonies to independence movements. England, however, made up for this by developing a massive empire in Africa and Asia. France also built a massive empire, and the Dutch expanded their holdings in the Spice Islands into a sizable empire. At the

same time, the Portuguese began expanding their minor holdings along the coast of Africa into quite large colonies and Belgium took up the colonial habit and built the Belgian Congo. Note that all these countries at that time were more or less democratic. There is a myth that democracies do not engage in aggressive wars — the proponents of this myth obviously have not given any consideration to the 19th century empire builders.

CHAPTER 19

Puzzles in History: Perhaps the Reader Can Solve Them



Throughout this book, I have called attention to certain things that happened in the past, and pointed out the importance of their effect on our present-day situation. Note these things are not secret; indeed, some are mentioned in the standard histories. Standard histories, however, do not offer any explanation for them nor do they, in general, raise questions about why they happened. I will not be able to say why they happened, but raising the question and suggesting that other people try seems worthwhile.

The first problem has to do with the Pope's line. After Columbus and Da Gama completed their famous voyages of discovery, the Pope drew a line down the center of the Atlantic, ruling that all non-Catholic areas west of the line should belong to Spain and areas east of the line to Portugal. Spain and Portugal then entered into a treaty in which they moved the line slightly, but in general accepted the Pope's decision. This was shortly before Luther nailed his theses on the church door.

Christendom was then split, and a number of countries did not recognize the Pope's authority or the treaty. Nevertheless, and this is the point of my first discussion, settlement in the newly discovered areas remained quite different east of, and west of, the Atlantic Ocean.

The King of Spain at first showed little interest in the islands discovered by Columbus. There was some settlement and a little exploration in the area. Then, however, Cortes conquered Mexico and began shipping silver back to Spain. It should be pointed out that Cortes' operation was directly contrary to orders and, in fact, a small army was sent out to stop and arrest him. He succeeded in convincing them that they would be better off joining him in his expedition. Those who survived the *Noche Triste* were indeed better off.

Cortes himself became a Marquis, married into the higher nobility of Spain and received a massive feudal domain in Mexico. Further Spanish settlers moved into the area around the Caribbean with the result that the area is now heavily populated and, with the exception of some of the islands in the east of the sea, speaks Spanish.

Pizarro, an even more successful conqueror, did not have to worry about opposition from the Spanish government, but he also received no support. His expedition to Peru was by private enterprise. Even though the amount of precious metals sent back from Peru was greater than that from Mexico, Pizarro came to an unhappy end. He was killed by mutineers and his family eventually was wiped out by the King of Spain. Nevertheless, as in Mexico, there were immigrants and the area now speaks Spanish. Clearly, these two expeditions had a great effect on the present-day world.

Staying west of the Atlantic, Spanish efforts to push up along the east coast of the United States were stopped on the Florida border. Many islands in the Caribbean gradually fell into the hands of various European countries. They were used to raise sugar using imported black slaves. The business was extremely deadly for health reasons, with about 50% of the slaves and about 50% of their white overseers dying from tropical diseases. Nevertheless, these were thought to be the most valuable colonial colonies and various non-Spanish countries – in particular the Dutch, the English and the French – seized various islands in continuing bloody wars.

As a rather accidental byproduct of Magellan's expedition, the Spanish were able to occupy the Philippines. Geography was not easy in those days, and it was not clear whether this lay in the Spanish or the Portuguese sphere. The Portuguese did not complain, however. It was treated as a sort of annex to Mexico, with an annual ship from Acapulco being its principal contact with the outside world. It was not very valuable since it did not produce spices except for a little cinnamon. Its principal economic importance was as a trading post for the China trade. It was, however, settled and converted to Catholicism, except for the southern islands where the Moros held out. They fought a guerrilla war which is still continuing today, 400 years after the first Spanish punitive expeditions.

Staying west of the Atlantic again, Portuguese ships trying to get to the Indian Ocean sailed too far out in the Atlantic and found Brazil, which was occupied mainly by fairly primitive Indian tribes. The Portuguese had no trouble in taking it over. The Amazon was then, as it is now,

mainly unsettled. Archaeologists think they have found another Indian civilization there, but until more digging has been done, we cannot feel firmly convinced there was a civilized area in the lower Amazon basin.

In any event, the Portuguese realized they could raise sugar with the aid of slaves which they imported from Africa. They had trading posts in Africa (to be mentioned later) which made this slave trade easy. The export of sugar to Europe from the colony was prosperous enough to attract Dutch aggression. Northern Brazil was for a while occupied by the Dutch, but they were driven out. Once again, this early history has immense effect to today, since the area speaks Portuguese and has a basically Iberian culture.

All this raises no problems for the analytical historian. Aggressive countries, with psychological advantages in war, seized areas and settled them. This seems perfectly normal from the standpoint of history. When we turn to the areas east of the Atlantic, the puzzles begin.

The Portuguese had been working down the coast of Africa, inspired by Henry the Navigator. They did not, however, seize areas. They simply established trading posts. It should be said that some of these posts had very substantial forts. They did not try to rule the area around their posts, but mainly engaged in trade. Rather late, both the Portuguese and the later-coming Dutch established fairly unimportant colonies near the southern tip of Africa where health conditions were better.

The point of going down the coast of Africa was to reach India where one could buy spices. In this area the Portuguese established two traditions that would be followed by the Dutch, English and French who

followed them. Note that while France was Catholic, neither England nor Holland were. The first of these traditions was confining themselves to trading posts, some of which were quite substantial. They did not establish colonies until many years thereafter. Here again, the modern world is very much affected by this, but I do not find this case easy to understand. Why didn't they establish colonies until the 18th and 19th centuries? This question will be taken up later.

The second tradition they established was naval predominance. The Portuguese warships and the French, British and Dutch warships that followed them always won battles against native forces. The standard explanation for this is that the North Atlantic being a stormy place, ships designed to survive that were bigger and more strongly built than those in the Indian Ocean. They could therefore carry broadsides, which gave them predominance in naval action. I am not very convinced by this explanation. The Turks had possession of some of the northeastern Indian Ocean shoreline and in the Mediterranean, they maintained a navy with ships very similar to those used by the northern countries of Europe. Why they did not introduce them into the Indian Ocean and thus protect their possessions there, I do not know.

The Chinese had been building big ships and in the 15th century, they crossed the Indian Ocean to the African shore. They even brought back a giraffe for the Imperial Zoo. For domestic reasons, this naval operation was stopped and building of large ships was made illegal. Had this not happened, the Chinese could have equipped their ships with broadsides and fought off the European ships. Here at least is one case in which I have a good explanation for the historical development. It is, however,

a little odd because I do not have a really good explanation as to why the Chinese changed their policies. It is normally explained as part of an internal political squabble in China that led to the building of large ships being made illegal.

Here again we have a case in which the history of the early explorers and the governments which followed them has immense effect on the present-day world. All these areas are now, and were always, inhabited by the natives with only a few Europeans living in limited settlements, although much of the area came under European sovereignty. Why the difference east and west of the Atlantic Ocean? This is the first of puzzles which I present for the reader's study. They are important and I suggest thinking about them carefully, but I have to admit that my careful thought has not produced any explanation for this difference east and west of the Atlantic.

We now turn to my second puzzle. Until Clive's victory at Plassey, European influence in the Indian Ocean, and indeed in Africa, was limited to trading posts and a small settlement in the far south of Africa. One of the consequences of Plassey was that the Honorable East India Company obtained control of one province in India. This was to be expanded, and other countries were to acquire very large colonies east of the Atlantic. None of them, however, attracted large numbers of European colonists apart from the very special cases of Australia and New Zealand. Thus, while Mexico and Peru are inhabited by Spanish-speaking descendants of the original Indians, with a good deal of Spanish blood, the same thing did not happen east of the Atlantic. Why not? The Portuguese built a "Portuguese-speaking colony" in Brazil, but not east of the Atlantic. Once again, why not?

Beginning with Clive's victory at Plassey, the Honorable East India Company began a long and not very fast conquest of the Indian subcontinent. The Dutch, a little later on, began the conquest of the Malay archipelago. All this did not go uncontested by other European powers. During what we call the war of American independence, there were three major naval battles between the French and English navies in the Indian Ocean. The French established a colony in Indochina, and almost everybody put trading posts along the coast of China.

In Africa, 19th century colonies were established by France, England, Germany and even little Belgium. In a way, the United States had a colony since we had been resettling slaves in Liberia. At the same time, the conquest of India had been completed. In the 20th century, much of the former Turkish empire was brought under English influence. Meanwhile, a little noticed empire was established by Russia in the part of Central Asia inhabited by Turkish tribes.

I think the normal myth about this is that it was a search for profits. Ricardo, however, argued strongly that the costs were greater than the benefits, and most other economists in the 19th century also thought so. Modern economists agree. The people who had highly-paid government jobs and the generals who acquired titles of nobility clearly gained from such empires, but the citizens at home did not.

Here again, the argument that military powers tend to grab areas is perhaps the explanation. United States, of course, seized the continental United States from its original owners in the 19th century. In a way, the seizure of the Philippines was the last gasp of this policy. We quickly gave it up and indeed, have not used our great military power to seize any more land.

Notably, however, having created these empires, European countries gave them all up in the later part of the 20th century. The actual conquest of these weakly defended areas seems normal. A strong country grabbing the property of the weak is a common historic phenomenon. The abandonment, however, is not. I find no rational explanation for why the European countries seized these vast empires, only to abandon them. Perhaps the reader can do better.

I now turn to another and totally different historic puzzle. In general, when European countries grabbed land from someone else, they simply ruled while leaving the native inhabitants in place. There are, however, four exceptions to this rule. United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are all places where the native population has been largely, not totally but largely, replaced by immigrants. Once again, why? It can be said that the native population in all these places were very backward and rather thinly spread. But the same could be said of much of Africa and South America.

I should point out that these four countries speak English and none of the empty areas seized by non-English speakers suffered the same racial clearance. There is another problem here. When the Roman Empire fell, the barbarians broke in, and mainly they rather rapidly picked up Latin and began speaking what amounts to dialects of it like French, Spanish and Italian. This did not happen in the English part of the Roman Empire.

The Germans who broke into England continued speaking a German dialect. The German invaders who seized north France quickly learned a Latin language, and when they subsequently conquered

England, brought it with them. The Germanic tongues, however, turned out to be resistant, with the result that English is a sort of mix of Germanic and Latin roots. Thus, it may be that England is a fifth member of these places where the native language was wiped out. Once again, why?

But let me turn east of the Pope's line. I have mentioned previously the establishment of trading posts by the early European invaders. Beginning with Clive's victory at Plassey, larger empires were constructed. India as a whole was taken over in a long series of small wars. The Dutch expanded their holdings in Indonesia to take in the bulk of the archipelago. The French expanded mainly in Africa, but also in Indochina. In addition to the French possessions in Africa, the Belgians, the British, the Portuguese, and coming in late, the Germans and the Italians, grabbed sizable pieces of real estate east of the Pope's line.

The Turks had had sizable possessions in Arab lands. As a result of World War I, these mainly fell into the hands of the English and the French. The English established a set of puppet regimes, but the French actually had direct control over Syria and Lebanon.

In all of these areas east of the Pope's line (except Australia and New Zealand), the native population was not displaced by governing officials and armies from the European countries. In other words, unlike the colonies west of the line, they are still inhabited by their original occupiers. The only significant exception is Liberia which was, to a very small scale, occupied by ex-slaves who had been freed and resettled by charitable manumission societies in the United States.

Why the difference? In some cases there was a dense native population. India and Java are good examples. But there had been a dense

population in Mexico and Peru when the Spanish arrived. Although there was a good deal of intermarriage, the bulk of the population in these areas clearly shows some Indian ancestry. Up to the beginning of the 19th century, the areas west of the Pope's line which fell into the Portuguese and Spanish empires were governed by people who came out from the homeland, though the bulk of the population were locally born (although they may have had European ancestors).

Note that the settlement by immigrants from Europe was not confined to the Latin American area. The French, the British, the Dutch and the Danes all settled colonies in the Western Hemisphere north of Florida. In these cases, the native population was in general driven out. It had been in any event very light. But the same is true of much of Africa which lay on the other side of the Pope's line.

There is a sharp difference between different parts of Africa. The Arabs had taken over Africa north of the Sahara long before. They also had a good deal of influence in what we may call the southern fringes of the Sahara. Much of the area north of the Sahara had previously been part of the Roman Empire. Further, the Arabs had established sizable settlements on the east side of Africa. These small cities mainly lived off the slave trade. The Arabs frequently obtained their black slaves by military action, while the West purchased most of the slaves from local governments which may have, of course, previously grabbed them in small wars.

Although places like India, Burma, Indochina and Java had a fairly dense population, there were large empty areas, particularly in Africa and some of the islands incorporated in the Dutch Indies. In

spite of these empty areas, they attracted very few settlers from Europe. The European population in a place like India or Nigeria would largely consist of government officials, military officers or merchants. They generally did well but were only a small part of the population. In all these things, colonies east of the Pope's line were quite different from those to the west.

There are two other differences. In general, seizure east of the Pope's line, once you get out of the trading posts, came much later. Clive's victory at Plassey mentioned above was more or less the beginning of these empires, although not all of them by any means were English. Even the Russian conquest of much of the Turkish part of the former Russian Empire occurred largely in the 19th century, not in the 16th and 17th centuries like the empires west of the Pope's line.

Furthermore, empires east of the Pope's line were mainly created at the time that those empires in the west were gaining their independence. Though the difference in time is significant, it is a little difficult to see why this should make a difference. In the Western Hemisphere, during the period of the 19th century when the empires in Africa and Asia were established, the United States was in the process of conquering its continental land mass from its previous inhabitants. It, of course, gained independence as a sort of byproduct of a standard balance of power war in Europe.

The rest of the Americas gained their independence when Spain and Portugal had been greatly weakened by wars. In the case of Brazil, the government of Portugal had been moved from Portugal to Brazil as a result of French conquest. When the king went back to Portugal, his son,

the heir to the throne, declared Brazil an independent empire and took the title of Emperor for himself.

European countries, having spent the 19th century creating these massive empires in Africa and Asia, in the latter half of the 20th century gave them up. In some cases such as Indonesia, Algeria and Indochina, there were native revolts and it can be said that the natives drove the empires out. But that is only a small part of the total area involved. The remaining areas were given up largely voluntarily. Further, in some cases the natives are now much worse off than they were when they were part of the empires.

We thus have two clear-cut differences. East of the line, the empires were built up in the 19th century, and then given up after World War II. I tend to think that international politics is frequently rational from the standpoint of the individual conquering, although not necessarily from the group of warring countries. I cannot think of any rational policy for any country which would lead to seizure of these empires in the 19th century and then their abandonment in the 20th century.

Can the reader do better?

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