Notions of Security
Shifting Concepts and Perspectives

15 February 2007
Deliverable 1, Work package 2
'Citizens and governance in a knowledge-based society'

COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management (ML, Project Co-ordinator)
Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research TNO
Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y al Dialogo Exterior (ES)
Danish Centre for International Studies and Human Rights
Institute of International Relations Prague
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
A project financed by the European Commission under the Sixth Framework Programme
1. INTRODUCTION

Recent terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States give us good reason to reassess the meaning of the concept of security. At the same time, close examination of the evolution of and approaches to security studies can generate a more profound understanding of transnational terrorism as a 'security issue'. Security has long been by and large a matter of the state, executed in the formulation of foreign and defense policies. Since the end of the Cold War, however, many security issues have become increasingly transnational. The subject of transnational terrorism is commonly perceived as one of these new challenges that cannot be countered effectively at the level of the nation-state alone, as its roots, causes and effects are cross-bordering.

This report will analyze the concept of security and the key contemporary debates in security studies. It will also investigate how transnational terrorism fits into the conceptual development of security. These efforts result in the first deliverable of work package number 2 of the Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law (TTSRL) research project, a Priority 7 project of the Sixth Framework Programme 'Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-based Society'.

The objective of deliverable 1, as stated in the Technical Annex, reads:

we will survey the theoretical literature on how to define and categorize 'security'. Special attention will be devoted to the role that terrorism has played in this definitional development both in the traditional concepts of security, in the various debates around the end of the Cold War and in the subsequent decade, and in the new emerging consensus (Technical Annex, 2006: 5).

Understanding the wider context of terrorism and counterterrorism will be crucial to the TTSRL project, which will increasingly focus on the phenomenon of terrorism itself and on specific counter-strategies. Analyzing the changing security discourse allows us to better understand both the current state of the field and its place in the academia. Security is a contested concept which defies pursuit of a generally agreed definition. The concept refers to different sets of
issues, purposes and values, often closely reflecting conflicting theories in International Relations. The debate remains among academics on the conceptualization of security, most notably on the level of analysis and the scope of the study of security. This debate can be traced back to the dominant theoretical traditions in International Relations and the continuing competition between these different traditions. The influence of this debate is not limited to the academia. Policymakers and commentators alike invoke elements of the theoretical traditions when articulating solutions to security dilemmas. This preliminary report thus sets the stage for the remainder of the research project by presenting a survey of the academic literature. The focus is on the key debates and theories in security studies and on major contributions to this academic field published between 1991 and 2006.

Following this introduction, chapter 2 analyzes various notions and dimensions of security. We survey the academic literature on definitions, categorizations and dimensions of security. Section 2.1 provides a brief historical overview of security. Section 2.2 focuses on the leading definitions of security and explains the conceptual difficulties that follow. Conflicting theories in International Relations and their influence on the discourse of security studies are presented in section 2.3. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 examine in more detail the different dimensions of security and the ways in which they challenge traditional notions of security. These different dimensions are summarized in section 2.6. The third chapter concentrates specifically on transnational terrorism as a new security issue. Section 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 examine terrorism in an historical context, focusing initially on the Cold War and post-Cold War periods and later on international security and counterterrorism after 9/11. The final section, 3.4, revises the developments in counterterrorism at an EU level. In chapter 4 we will present a set of conclusions regarding notions and dimensions of security and the contemporary development of transnational terrorism as a prominent security issue.
2. NOTIONS AND DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

Despite the numerous efforts by scholars of security studies to conceptualize 'security' in a coherent and systematic way, no single, generally accepted definition of security has been produced. Security is a contested concept which defies pursuit of an agreed general definition (Buzan, 1991: 15-16). In this chapter we will analyze the ways in which security has been conceptualized in the academic literature and how the academic discourse of security has evolved over time. The purpose is to provide an overview of the concepts at heart, the academic debate and ultimately to pave the way to better understand the extent to which terrorism is a security concern.

The chapter is divided into six parts. First, a contemporary historical overview of the evolving concept of security is given (section 2.1). Hereafter, we will analyze the key debates in the field of security studies and identify the different theoretical traditions that underlie them. Section 2.2 focuses on definitions of security and on the multiple extensions of the concept of security as advocated by influential scholars. We will then analyze the different ways in which the major theories in International Relations frame the issue of security (section 2.3). It is argued that each of these theoretical traditions offers a particular view of the concept of security and on the means for ensuring security. The evolution of the security paradigm and the changes in conceptions of security, each based on different theoretical and political assumptions, are closely linked to the historical evolution of the international system and the intellectual progress in its interpretation. Each concept of security corresponds to specific values, threats, and capabilities to meet the perceived challenges (Haftendorn, 1991: 5).

The remainder of this chapter discusses the diverse dimensions of security, focusing on the development of security studies in the contemporary world. Proposed extensions of the concept of security are identified along two dimensions: the source of the security threat and the referent object of security. Section 2.4 focuses on the scholarly debate on the 'broadening' of security, which concerns the extension of security to other issues or sectors than the military one. Section 2.5 discusses the scholarly debate on the 'deepening' of
security, concerning the referent object of security. We show how recent contributions to security studies challenge the traditional state-centric focus on security. In section 2.6 we summarize the multiple extensions of the concept of security in recent years.

2.1 Security: a contemporary historical perspective

The concept of security has evolved considerably over the years. Traditionally, security was defined primarily at the nation-state level and almost exclusively through the military prism. This focus on external military threat to national security was particularly dominant during the Cold War. It would be misleading, however, to associate the origins of security studies with the Cold War and the attendant nuclear threat. To understand the impact of the Cold War on thinking about national security, one must first examine the pre-Cold War scholarship on the subject. The focus of security studies grew narrower and more rigid during the Cold War than it had been before (Baldwin, 1995: 119). Although this first deliverable of the TTSRL research program will focus principally on security discourses during and after the Cold War, as these are considered as strongly influencing contemporary thinking about security, we will begin our analysis with a brief consideration of pre-Cold War notions of security.

2.1.1 Security studies before the Cold War

The interwar period was of significance to the development of security studies. During this period scholars stressed that democracy, international understanding and arbitration were the main ways to promote peace and security (Fox, 1949: 69). These scholars emphasized the importance of international law and institutions rather than military force (Baldwin, 1995: 119). The new international system was viewed as a 'community of power' in which all states would cooperate in the common cause of providing security and justice for all rather than engaging in competition and coercion (Haftendorn, 1991: 7).

In the first decade after the Second World War academic interest in security studies increased significantly. Although questions of national security were usually treated within the broader framework of international relations and
foreign policy, this period has been described as 'the most creative and exciting period in the entire history of security studies' (Baldwin, 1995: 121). Two major graduate schools devoted exclusively to international affairs were founded in the United States, one at the Johns Hopkins University and one at Columbia University. Influential research centers focusing on national security were established at Yale, Columbia and Chicago. During this period two major academic journals were founded, *International Organization* (1947) and *World Politics* (1948), both of which have been functioning as a platform for scholarly debate on national security.

Although scholars were well aware of military instruments of statecraft, at this stage the field of security studies was not yet as preoccupied with deterrence and nuclear weaponry as it would become during the Cold War era. Baldwin (1995: 122) identifies four recurrent themes during the period 1945-1955. First, security was viewed not as the primary goal of all states at all times but rather as one among several values, the relative importance of which varied across time and space. Second, national security was viewed as a goal to be pursued by both military and nonmilitary techniques of statecraft. Third, emphasis on caution and prudence with respect to military policy were commonplace. Fourth, much scholarly attention was devoted to the relationship between national security and domestic affairs, such as the economy, civil liberties and democratic political processes. This relatively broad notion of security reflects in certain respects the contemporary debate in security studies on the 'broadening' and the 'deepening' of security. Considering these overlaps, the question can be raised why the work of scholars prior to 1955 has been almost entirely ignored. As Baldwin (1995: 122) argues: 'it is as if the field came to be so narrowly defined in later years that the questions addressed during these early years were no longer considered to belong to the field of security studies.' In the following section we discuss the development of concepts of security during the Cold War.

### 2.1.2 Approaches to security in the Cold War era

Throughout the Cold War era, several different approaches to security were developed in relation to the conflict between the 'East' and 'West'. The driving force in this debate was the presence of nuclear weapons which altered
international relations and security studies fundamentally because of its destructive force. For the first time in history weapons were produced that were capable of destroying the entire world. This historical discontinuity in weapons technology had a profound effect on academic and policy discourse. For instance, Sigal (1979) noted that 'the sheer destructiveness of nuclear war has invalidated any distinction between winning and losing. Thus, it has rendered meaningless the very idea of military strategy as the efficient employment of force to achieve a state's objectives.' In reaction to this argument, several strategists have claimed that the use of nuclear weapons in small-scale conflicts would be impossible. The tremendous effect of these weapons outweighed the objectives pursued by the initiating state.

Four dominant approaches to security during the Cold War can be identified: balance of power, bipolar world, containment and deterrence. Each of these approaches, which constituted major issues of the study of security and international relations during this period, will be discussed below.

**Balance of power**

The concept of 'balance of power' is complex and multifaceted (Deutsch and Singer, 1964; Rosecrance, 1966; Chatterjee, 1972; Healy and Stein, 1973; Wagner, 1986; Niou and Ordeshook, 1987). Waltz (1979) has noted that 'if there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-of-power theory is it. And yet one cannot find a statement of the theory that is generally accepted' (Waltz, 1979: 117). Despite the conceptual debates about its operability, the basic notion of the concept of balance of power in international relations is 'the relationship between the number of actors and the stability of the system' (Deutsch and Singer, 1964: 390). Haas (1953: 446) also states that the concept of balance of power has various meanings, 'one of the more common is a mere factual description of the distribution of political power in the international scene at any one time.' There is, however, also a theoretical component of the concept which acts as a guide for policymakers with the intention to avoid the dominance of one particular state in the system. Such a system may take on various forms, either with two or more dominant players, possibly accompanied by a balancer, a state who keeps the balance even.
The academic debate on the balance of power covered, among other things, the subjects mentioned above. Not only was some part of the debate narrowly involved with game theory and its quantitative approach, proponents of (neo)realism were centrally involved in this debate. Neorealist Kenneth Waltz formulated a balance of power theory that explains how states interact, "from the premises that the international system is anarchic and that states are "like units," Waltz derives the behavioral expectations that balances of power will form and recur" (Mastanduno, 1997: 52). We will return to this neorealist approach in section 2.3.1.

The debate concerning the balance of power evolved over time and resulted in a new discussion concerning the dominant actors in the international system. According to Sullivan (1973: 259), 'the balance of power debates of the 1950s and early 1960s passed away in the late 1960s (...) as bipolarity blended into growing multipolarity in the more complex 1960s.' The emergence of new powers in the international system led scholars and commentators of international politics to claim that the US-Soviet dominance would fade however, as we shall see below, the Cold War division of international politics remained.

**Containment**

The notion of containment was first conceived by the American diplomat George Kennan. As a charge d'affaires in the Moscow embassy, Kennan disagreed with US policy on the basis that it did not deal with the nature of 'Russia'. In what is commonly referred to as the 'X-Article,' Kennan points out the complete destruction of capitalism and any official, organized form of opposition within the country, leaving the Soviet leaders in absolute control of every aspect of Soviet life. Kennan further notes that these two factors are not to be understood unless a third factor is taken into account, namely the Soviet leadership's monopoly on truth claims. This means that truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves' (Kennan, 1947: 573). Kennan is pessimistic about a peaceful relation with Moscow due to the fundamental differences between capitalism and socialism. He argues that the Soviet regime is far weaker than the western world and:
this would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world (ibid.: 581).

Herein lay the basis of what became the policy of containment. Other parts of Kennan's article express the nature of his ideas concerning containment. The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies' and:

that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy (ibid.: 576).

Although occasionally contested by other strategies, containment would remain part of US foreign policy for a long time. It became the preferred strategy of US foreign policy from the 1950s onwards, lasting through the Vietnam War and the Cold War (Cumings, 1995: 363).

Deterrence

Deterrence is seen as the leading concept of stability of the Cold War. The concept rests on the notion that the parties involved do not dare to attack in fear of a retaliatory strike by the other. In the case of the US and the Soviet Union, both parties deterred each other from launching an attack. Critics of the concept claimed that deterrence raised unnecessary tensions between the superpowers and caused an arms race unprecedented in the history of mankind. Different types of deterrence can be identified, notably finite deterrence, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and war-fighting deterrence. Finite deterrence was based on the premise that leaders on both sides feared the prospect of nuclear war so much, that only a limited amount of nuclear weapons would be sufficient to deter
the adversary. MAD was adopted as the official US strategic doctrine in the 1960s. Its main proposition was that the United States should be able to retaliate and destroy at least 50 percent of Soviet population and industry in the case of a Soviet attack (Lebow and Stein 1995: 159). War-fighting deterrence was the most aggressive of the different types of deterrence. It was based on the idea that the US should be able to win any confrontation, requiring a much larger nuclear arsenal and highly accurate missiles (Lebow and Stein 1995: 160). During the Reagan administration war-fighting deterrence was part of the official doctrine; as a result, the American defense budget rose to immense proportions. This led some commentators to note that it contributed to a faster ending of the Cold War because the Soviet Union could not keep up with the arms race.

Several points of critique have been made in relation to deterrence theory and the study of security. The fact that it emerged from East-West issues and focused on military capabilities led Nye and Lynn-Jones (1988: 6) to point out that 'deterrence theory and game theory provided a powerful unifying framework for those central issues, but often at the cost of losing sight of the political and historical context.' Jervis (1979: 289-290) contended that the concept of deterrence was 'so vague as to accommodate almost all behavior' and that it 'merely summarized what statesmen and even casual observers already knew'. We will discuss the position of the concept of deterrence in international relations theory in more detail in section 2.3.

**Bipolar world**

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and United States dominated international politics as opposing superpowers. Their influence spread over almost every aspect of the international climate, and many countries that had strategic significance were affected by this division which resulted in 'the first true polarization of power in modern history' (Gaddis, 1987: 221; see also Kissinger 1994: 22). There are, however, multiple notions of bipolarity. A first understanding of the bipolar structure was that the US and the Soviet Union were locked in a battle for world dominance, or at least in a struggle for their relative positions within the world system. A second notion of bipolarity stated that 'substantial territorial and/or political changes can take place in international relations without impinging on the overarching stability' (Rosecrance, 1966: 316).
The discussion on bipolarity is intrinsically connected to its alternatives, multipolarity and unipolarity. The main issue of debate is the question which system delivers the most stable environment in the international system (Wohlforth, 1999; Mearsheimer, 1990; Mastanduno, 1997). This discussion has been dominated by realist scholars who viewed the Cold War division between the two superpowers as the most preferable.

Advocates of bipolarity state that a division of world dominance over two parties is the most favorable to international security. Rosecrance (1966) gives four reasons why bipolarity will reduce international conflict and violence. First, bipolarity divides the world evenly, which causes the superpowers to show interest in every part of world politics: 'the commitment on opposite sides has led to a solid and determinate balance' as 'counterpressure is always applied' (ibid.: 314). Second, the competition urges participants to compete at their maximum level. The intensity of competition has increased drastically, Rosecrance mentions the space race, economic growth, military preparedness, and domestic issues of all sorts that have gained importance in international relations. Third, the reoccurrence of crises, on the premise that conflict is a natural given fact, and will therefore reemerge, helps keep the international system quit when there are two main players in the system. Bipolarity forces the two players to be cautious and moderate towards each other. 'One pushes to the limit, but not beyond.' Finally, minor shifts in the balance of power do not have major implications for the parties involved. Defections in the system are not encouraged but can be tolerated (Rosecrance, 1966: 314-315).

Critics of bipolarity raise a number of issues. Morgenthau (1948) has stressed that in a bipolar world, a gain for one party is a loss for the other and therefore the only solution available to both parties is to increase their own strength at all times. In bipolarity there is no place for intelligent statesmanship. In addition, as Rosecrance (1966: 316) has argued, the bipolar structure creates a 'degenerative process': 'one side may think not only of the risks consequent upon striking his opponent, but also of the risks he may suffer if he decides not to strike.' Preventive war may thus be seen as preferable to war at the opponent's initiative.

The end of the Cold War meant the demise of the bipolar structure and gave way to discussions on the probability of a transition to a unipolar or a multipolar world order (Mearsheimer, 1990; Sorenson, 1990; Krauthammer,
1991; Allison and Treverton, 1992; Leaver and Richardson, 1993). This transition was accompanied by a greater scholarly attention for new, previously neglected, security issues. We will sketch this changing situation and its consequences for definitions and concepts of security in the following section.

2.1.3 Security issues in the Post-Cold War era

The end of the Cold War stunned policymakers and academics alike. None of the existing theories of international relations or security studies had predicted the end of an era that had kept the world in a tight grip. Discussions within the academia about the credibility and validity of the existing theories of international relations erupted (see section 2.3). From the early 1990s onwards, a number of major scholarly debates co-shaped thinking about security. The end of the Cold War offered scholars of international relations and security studies an opportunity to focus on subjects other than deterrence theory and balance of power. Other issues soon gained heightened attention. One of the most influential issues in this respect is the concept of globalization. The debate on globalization within international relations concentrated on the question whether the concept was a continuation of an old process of time-space compression or a new phenomenon triggered by the advent of new communications and transportation technology. The debate also focused on the consequences of the merging of markets and production schemes, causing either new and increased inequalities, or opportunities for all (e.g. Wade, 2003; Held et al., 1999; Castells, 1997; Urry, 2000). A prominent issue within this debate was the emerging influence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations in international relations. Keck and Sikkink refer to these 'new' players in the international system as 'transnational advocacy networks':

World politics at the end of the twentieth century involves, alongside states, many non-state actors that interact with each other, with states, and with international organizations. These interactions are structured in networks, and transnational networks are increasingly visible in international politics (1998: 1).
Kaldor (1999: 3) added to this idea that war, a subject which was intrinsically connected to international relations, had changed profoundly and that 'the new wars have to be understood in the context of the process known as globalization.' These new wars are different from the old wars in three ways considering goals, finance and methods of warfare. They are created by changing social relations in warfare, as a product of globalization and because of new technologies. The influence these 'new wars' have on international relations and security studies are believed to be profound. 'In today's international environment, security cannot be adequately understood without taking globalization into account' (Vennesson, 2006: 126; cf. Cha, 2000).

Closely linked to the globalization debate is the concept of global crime. As Makkai has noted:

Globalization of the world economy has had many positive effects on nation-states, but it is also evident that globalization has enhanced, unintentionally, the capacity of individuals to organize themselves to conduct crimes across borders - that is, transnational crime - on a scale not seen before (2006: 199).

Global crime covers several areas, of which drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering and internet-based crimes are the most infamous (e.g. Albanese, 2005). Money laundering, and particularly its connection to transnational terrorism, has received widespread interest from academics and policymakers alike in recent years. It has been argued that the events of 11 September 2001 'did more to change the perception of money laundering as public discourse is now focused on methods used by terrorists to secure financing for their nefarious deeds' (Serio, 2004; 435-436; Ehrenfeld, 2003; Napoleoni, 2003). The link between terrorism and global crime reflects the wider debate of the nation state versus non-state actors in the international system. Particularly complex about these criminal networks is that they are extremely flexible and operate on a global level, which makes them very hard to control for an individual state. Recent international terrorist attacks, for example 9/11, showed that terrorist could use 'globalization' to strike forcefully (Vennesson, 2006: 125). The subsequent campaign against terrorist groups was dubbed by some commentators as globalization's first war (Campbell, 2002).
We will examine these recent developments in more detail in Chapter Three. In the following section, we will analyze the scholarly definitions and categorizations of security against the background of the wider development of international relations and security studies.

2.2 Definitions of security: conceptual difficulties

2.2.1 What is security?

There is no agreement on the concept of security. Notwithstanding the wide range of studies of security published over the past sixty years, no single generally accepted definition of security has been produced. The concept of security is as contested as ever. Security has many meanings, some of which are not necessarily logically linked to conventional understandings (Dalby, 1997: 6). The term security is ambiguous in content as well as in format and it refers to different sets of issues and values. Wolfers (1952: 483) has characterized national security as an 'ambiguous symbol' which, if used without specifications, 'leaves room for more confusion than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford.' In this context, Haftendorf (1991: 15) argues that the field of security studies 'suffers from the absence of a common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualized, and what its most relevant research questions are.' She asks whether security 'is a goal, an issue-area, a concept, a research program, or a discipline' (ibid.: 3).

According to Buzan (1991: 1), the concept of security is, in much of its prevailing usage, 'so weakly developed as to be inadequate for the task.' Buzan suggests five possible explanations for what he calls 'the persistent underdevelopment of thinking about security.' Four explanations are of particular interest for present purposes. The first explanation is that the concept of security has simply proved too complex to attract analysts, and has therefore been neglected in favor of more tractable concepts. A second, and in Buzan's view more convincing explanation lies in the real scope for overlap between it and the concept of power as developed by realists (see section 2.3.1). Security was often viewed as a derivative of power, especially military power. A third reason for the conceptual underdevelopment of security concerns the nature of the various
objections to the realist paradigm up to the late 1970s. Rejecting the realist model as dangerously self-fulfilling and too war-prone, many critics turned instead to the grand concept of peace. A fourth explanation for the underdevelopment of the concept of security is that, for the practitioners of state policy, compelling reasons exist for maintaining its symbolic ambiguity. The appeal of national security as a justification for actions and policies which would otherwise have to be explained is a political tool of immense convenience for a large variety of sectional interests in all types of state. For example, many interests in the United States and the Soviet Union benefited from amplifying the level of threat which each posed to the other. Cultivation of hostile images abroad can justify intensified political surveillance, shifts of resources to the military, economic protectionism and other policies with deep implications for domestic political life (Buzan, 1991: 7-11).

In the late 1980s and 1990s the concept of security became more prominent and in some ways better developed than Buzan claimed. Garnett (1996a: 12) argues that 'security' has actually become an overdeveloped concept, 'so wide in its scope that it is in danger of being emptied of meaning.' However, according to Baldwin, many recent works on security would not qualify as serious conceptual analysis. He argues that although none of Buzan's explanations are convincing, security should still be described as a 'neglected concept':

Paradoxical as it may seem, security has not been an important analytical concept for most security studies scholars. [...] Security has been a banner to be flown, a label to be applied, but not a concept to be used by most security studies specialists (Baldwin, 1997: 9).

Security is an elusive term which resists definition. It is employed in a wide range of contexts and to multiple purposes by individuals, corporations, governments and academics (McSweeney, 1999: 1). It encompasses several important contradictions and subtleties, including that between means and ends and that between individual, national and international security. Acknowledging the difficulties in defining security, Schultze (1973: 529-530) noted that:
The concept of national security does not lend itself to neat and precise formulation. It deals with a wide variety of risks about whose probabilities we have little knowledge and of contingencies whose nature we can only dimply perceive.

Despite these warnings, a number of writers have sought to define the concept of national security.

Traditionalists in the field of security studies regarded the concept of security in exclusively military and state-centered terms, equating security with military issues and the use of force. This notion of security was intimately linked to the realist approach (see section 2.3.1). The focus on military threats and the use of force 'complemented ideas of power and interest and the rather tough-minded approach to foreign policy which seemed appropriate for the Cold War years' (Garnett, 1996a: 12). An example of a traditional definition of security, stressing the centrality of war, is given by Bellany (1981: 102): ‘Security [...] is a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur.’ Walt defines security studies, and by extension the concept of security, as 'the study of the threat, use and control of military force', especially of 'the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war' (Walt, 1991: 212). Walt emphasizes that military power is the central focus of the field, yet he concedes that 'military power is not the only source of national security, and military threats are not the only dangers that states face' (1991: 213).

2.2.2 Redefining security: incorporating neglected issues?

Conventional definitions of security have been challenged in discussions within the academia, and within international relations in particular. The first signs of a trend towards the expansion of the notion of security can be traced back to the late 1960s, when Robert McNamara suggested that security implied the freedom of a state to develop and improve its position in the future:

Security is development and without development there can be no security [...] development means economic, social and political progress. It means
Richard Ullman was one of the first scholars to criticize the almost exclusive focus on military threat in conventional (realist) thinking of security. Ullman (1983: 123) emphasizes that 'defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality.' He argues that the emphasis on military threats arising from beyond the borders of one's own country is doubly misleading. First, it draws attention away from the non-military threats that may undermine the stability of nations. Second, it presupposes that threats arising from outside a state are somehow more dangerous to its security than threats that arise within it. Adopting a broader definition of security, Ullman contends that:

- a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state (1983: 133).

In a similar fashion, Joseph Nye Jr. (1988: 6) states that today most security policies are designed to insure 'social autonomy as a group, and a degree of political status, not merely to insure the physical survival of individuals within national boundaries.' And, he adds, 'a certain minimal expected enjoyment of economic welfare.'

Ullman and Nye's definitions of security take account of a broad variety of contingencies, but they also raise questions of applicability. Haftendorn (1991: 5) argues that these definitions must be seen in their specific cultural context: the highly industrialized democracies of the West. Other countries may have very different conceptions of security. Many developing countries appear to emphasize the domestic as well as the economic and social dimensions of security. Scholars of security studies have long neglected the security situation in the Third World, where most members of the international system are located and where most of
the conflicts are concentrated (Ayoob, 1997: 123). In an attempt to overcome the ethnocentricity of traditional approaches to security, Haftendorn points at the search for a new and common paradigm for global security. Global security embodies a program of 'common security' for the global community of mankind, as proposed in 1982 by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, chaired by the late Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. The Commission argued for replacing the strategy of mutual deterrence with one of common security that rests on a commitment to joint survival and a program for arms control and disarmament (cited in Haftendorn, 1991: 11; Matthew, 2000: 105).

Often under the rubrics of 'common security', the themes of economic security, environmental security, drug threats and even human rights have been added in attempts to reformulate security policies to encompass many new items on the global political agenda (Dalby, 1997: 4). An increasing number of adjectives have been attached to the term security in order to bring these diverse phenomena under the rubric of security. These alternative concepts will be discussed in sections 2.4 and 2.5. For present purpose, it is important to note the major intellectual and practical hazards in adopting broad definitions of security. Scholars tend to confuse the issue of security by wrapping social problems such as environmental degradation in the security blanket in an attempt to make global management problems part of national and international security agendas (Ayoob, 1997: 125). In this context, Deudney has warned against the risk of:

creating a conceptual muddle rather than a paradigm or world view shift - a de-definition rather than a re-definition of security. If we begin to speak about all the forces and events that threaten life, property and well-being (on a large-scale) as threats to our national security, we shall soon drain them of any meaning. All large-scale evils will become threats to national security (1990: 465).

Expanded definitions of security, it has been argued, do not help in clarifying the security problematic. Instead, 'they tend to obfuscate issues, confuse the discussion about security, and end up by de-defining rather than redefining the concept' (Ayoob, 1997: 129). The broadening of the security
agenda has been criticized not only in terms of its practical implications, but also on the basis of its theoretical coherence. Against those who want to widen the agenda outside this strictly military domain, Walt (1991: 213) has argued that 'defining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.' Others emphasize that the construction of different conceptions of security also requires a re-theorization. While 'many analyses provide useful insights into areas traditionally ignored, or into new challenges that need to be taken account of, they have rarely reflected fully on their own foundations' (Krause and Williams, 1997: 35).

The contested nature of the concept of security is also evident in feminist critiques of conventional thinking about security. Feminist scholars view security in terms of masculinist modes of domination. In this view, built into masculine definitions of power are all the modernist assumptions of control, domination and surveillance that premise security in one way or another on violence and spatial control (Dalby, 1997: 7; Encloe, 1993; Tickner, 1992). Security secures patriarchal relations of power and renders women insecure precisely because they are women. This argument undercuts the state-centric logic of security and raises the question of who and what precisely is being rendered secure by the provision of national and international security.

2.2.3 Securitization

The difficulties in defining security are also acknowledged by Danish scholar Ole Waever (1995). In Waever’s view, there are no security issues in themselves, but only issues constructed as such by certain actors - called 'securitizing actors' - through 'speech acts'. By framing a particular issue as a 'security' problem, securitizing actors can move the issue into a specific area and claim a special right to use extraordinary means to block it: 'what is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience' (Buzan et al., 1998: 27; see also Williams, 2003). Securitization can thus be defined as the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. Two constitutive rules, both pertaining to the linguistic competence of the actors involved, are required
for a successful securitization: the internal, linguistic-grammatical (to follow the rule of the act); and the external, contextual and social (to hold a position from which the act can be made) (ibid.: 32).

Several scholars have criticized Waever's concept of securitization. Balzacq (2005: 172) argues that securitization 'is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction.' Bigo contends that securitization processes are not confined to speech acts, but also include the specific practices of security professionals. With reference to the case of migration, Bigo (2002: 65) contends that:

The securitization of immigration [...] emerges from the correlation between some successful speech acts of political leaders, the mobilization they create for and against some groups of people, and the specific field of security professionals [...]. It also comes from a range of administrative practices such as population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, category creation [...].

In search of a more coherent conceptualization of security, David Baldwin draws upon Wolfers' (1952: 485) characterization of security as 'the absence of threats to acquired values'. Baldwin (1997: 13) defines security as 'a low probability of damage to acquired values'. This reformulation focuses on the preservation of acquired values and not on the presence or absence of (objective or subjective) 'threats'. Baldwin suggests that security, in its most general sense, can be defined in terms of two specifications: security for whom, and security for which values. A concept of security that fails to specify a referent object makes little sense (see also Buzan, 1991: 26). Furthermore, a failure to specify which values are included in a concept of security tends to generate confusion (Baldwin, 1997: 14). Baldwin adds that in order to make alternative security policies comparable with each other and with policies for pursuing other goals, further specifications are also needed. How much security? From what threats? By what means? At what cost? In what time period? In the following section we will approach these issues from different theoretical traditions: realism, liberalism
and constructivism. Each of these theoretical traditions offers a particular view on the concept of security and on the means for ensuring security.

2.3 Conflicting theories in International Relations

The study of international relations can be viewed as a continuing competition between a number of delineated theoretical traditions. These International Relations (IR) theories not only influence the discourse of security studies, but they also shape both public discourse and policy analysis (Walt, 1998: 29). As Snyder (2004: 54) has noted: The influence of these intellectual constructs extends far beyond university classrooms and tenure committees. Policymakers and public commentators invoke elements of all these theories when articulating solutions to global security dilemmas.' For example, elements of the dominant theoretical traditions entered afresh the political and public debate in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States. Although scholarship on international relations has diversified significantly since the end of the Cold War - non-American voices are now more prominent and the security agenda has been increasingly broadened to include a range of new issues - the struggle between the competing theories is still at the very heart of the debate. Understanding the different theoretical traditions is therefore essential to the analysis of security. Each theory helps to explain the assumptions behind political rhetoric of foreign policy (Snyder, 2004: 55). It is recognized that the field of security studies is interdisciplinary, as it closely relates to history, psychology, philosophy, economics and sociology, among others. However, political science, and more specifically the study of International Relations, continues to dominate the field (Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988: 6).

Three major IR theories can be identified: realism, liberalism and constructivism. Each of these theories is discussed to some length below. We are aware of the fact that not all scholarship on international relations fits neatly into one of these theories, as is particularly the case with (neo-)Marxism and critical theory (for an overview of these theories, see for example Jackson and S0rensen, 2003; Doyle, 1997). However, the influence of realism, liberalism and constructivism as the three main theoretical traditions in (Western) security
discourses has been and still is dominant in world politics which is why this chapter deals with them respectively.

2.3.1 Realism

Realism has been the most dominant theoretical tradition in international relations and security studies. Its philosophical foundations were laid by Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau. The realist's worldview depicts international relations as a struggle for power among strategic, self-interested states. Realists discount any claims to system-wide international order other than that based ultimately on power or force. They argue that international society is best described as a condition of international anarchy, since there is no central authority to protect states from one another. States act as independent, sovereign political units that focus on their own survival (or expansion). For that reason, the objective of national security is survival of the nation-state rather then the guarantee of international security (Haftendorn, 1991: 8). Realists are not prepared to engage in long-term accommodation or cooperation. In this view, world politics is a 'jungle' characterized by a 'state of war', not a single continuous war or constant wars but the constant possibility of war among all states. Consequently, the realist perceives a period of peace as a state of non-war. The 'possibility of war requires that states follow "Realpolitik": be self-interested, prepare for war and calculate relative balances of power' (Doyle, 1997: 18). A state is constantly seeking relative gains and its behavior is therefore continuously determined to facilitate self-preservation by the actual 'balance of power' between political powers.

As a product of presumed uncertainty, a central issue in nearly all realist theory is the 'security dilemma'. Due to their continuous efforts to guarantee their own security and survival, states are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, constitutes a threat to the security of other states. Traditional Cold War concepts of nuclear strategies and deterrence only emphasize this line of thought. Striving to attain maximum security from attack therefore inevitably produces new insecurities: 'Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of
competing units, power competition ensues and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on' (Herz, 1950; cf. Herz, 1976: 10).

Realists are generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war. They share a skeptical attitude toward schemes for pacifist international order. Because of its emphasis on competition and power was consistent with the central features of the East-West rivalry, realism dominated in the Cold War years accordingly (Jackson and Sørensen, 2003: 44; Walt, 1998: 31). Realism also predicts the continued centrality of military strength and the persistence of conflict in the age of global economic interdependence. Consequently, realist theories explain the United States' forceful military response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, as terrorism is countered by the use of force. 'Despite changing configurations of power', Snyder (2004: 56) argues, 'realists remain steadfast in stressing that policy must be based on positions of real strength, not on either empty bravado or hopeful illusions about a world without conflict.'

Realism is not a single theory. It could be argued that there are two cross-cutting dichotomies: classical realism versus neorealism, and offensive realism versus defensive realism (Snyder, 2002: 150; cf. Brooks, 1997). 'Classical' realists, of which one of the most influential was Hans Morgenthau (see also Morgenthau: 1948), believe that states, like human beings, have an innate desire to dominate others, which leads them to fight wars. In this perspective, state power is an end in itself (Glaser, 1994: 53). Morgenthau also stressed the virtues of the classical, multipolar balance-of-power system and saw the bipolar rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union as especially dangerous. This pessimistic interpretation of human nature and international affairs is claimed to be an antidote to the naive belief that international institutions and law alone can preserve peace.

In contrast with classical realist thought, neorealist theory (also referred to as structural realism) ignores human nature and focuses on the effects of the international system. Neorealists see the international system consisting of a number of great powers, each seeking to survive. Because the system is anarchic and has no central authority, each state has to survive on its own. This driving force of survival is the primary factor influencing their behavior and in turn ensures that states develop offensive military force, as a means to increase their relative power. The classical focus on the centrality of power shifts gradually towards a more neorealist view whereby power becomes a means to gain
security (Glaser, 1994: 53). Neorealists bring attention to a persistent lack of trust between states which requires states to act in an openly aggressive manner. Though neorealists recognize that international democratic structures and liberal economics are imperative to peace, security stems from balancing strategies based on sound military capabilities (Chatterjee, 2003: 143-144). For that reason, neorealism can be considered the dominant paradigm in security studies.

Two influential variants of neorealism can be distinguished: offensive and defensive realism. Defensive realists such as Kenneth Waltz argue that states merely seek to survive and have little intrinsic interest in military conquest, since the costs of expansion generally outweigh the benefits. The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system' (Waltz, 1979: 126). In other words, the defense realist envisions a greater disparity in expansion on the international plane and pursues in general more moderate strategies to seek security (Taliaferro, 2000: 129). War is more likely when states can conquer each other easily. When defense is easier than offense, however, security is more plentiful, incentives to expand declined, and cooperation could blossom. In contrast, offensive realist John Mearsheimer (1990; 2001) asserts that the search for power and security is insatiable. In this view, a state's ultimate goal is to be the 'hegemon' in the system. Mearsheimer describes the differences between offensive and defensive realism as follows:

For defensive realists, the international structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power; instead it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the main goal of states. Offensive realists, on the other hand, believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs (Mearsheimer, 2001: 21).

Despite the varieties of realist thought, all realists stress the centrality of military threat and the use of force. The referent object of security is the state; states act as strategic, self-interested units which seek to ensure their own
security. As we will see in a later part of this chapter, the realist concept of security has been severely criticized as being too 'narrow' to account for the multiple dimensions of security.

2.3.2 Liberalism

The principal challenge to realism came from liberal theory, the foundations of which were laid, among others, by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Liberalism in international relations theory contends that realism has a stunted vision that cannot account for progress in relations between nations. Rejecting the view of international politics as a 'jungle', liberals see world politics as a cultivable 'garden', which combines a state of war with the possibility of a 'state of peace' (Doyle, 1997: 19). Liberal states exist under international anarchy, but their anarchy is different from the state of war depicted by realists, as liberalists believe that they understand the intentions of foreign liberal democracies. Rather than a zero-sum game, their contest is a positive- or negative-sum game. The costs and dangers of war are fundamental for liberals to discard war in principle as it is understood that ceteris paribus people are better off without war. War will therefore only occur when it increases self-preservation and well-being. Note that this motivation is based on self-interest rather than on what is perceived to be just (Owen, 1994, 95-96). Liberalism foresees a slow but inexorable journey away from the anarchic world the realists envision, as economic interdependence widens and democratic norms spread. Many liberals also believe that the rule of law, limitations of state power and transparency of government and democratic processes make it easier to sustain international cooperation, especially when these practices are enshrined in multilateral institutions (Snyder, 2004: 56).

In the liberal view, the state is not a hypothetical single, rational actor in a state of war, but a coalition or conglomerate of coalitions and interests, representing individuals and groups. Liberals argue that 'a state's interests are determined, not by its place in the international system, but by which of the many interests, ideals, and activities of its members captures (albeit temporarily) governmental authority' (Doyle, 1997: 19; cf. Doyle, 1983a; 1983b). A central principle of liberalism is the importance of the freedom of the individual. Foreign policy should reflect the rights and duties of individuals. Liberals' understanding
of security differs in part from that of realists. Reflecting the aims of the individual, liberal states view security not only in military terms, but also in terms of the protection and promotion of individual rights. For example, the liberal approach to combating terrorism focuses far more on the application of legal instrumentalities than on the use of military force. The liberal concept of security tends to include issues such as migration, environmental degradation and transnational organized crime (and also the nexus between terrorism and transnational organized crime).

Like realism, liberalism is not a single theory. Although all liberal theories imply that cooperation is more pervasive than even the defensive version of realism allows, each view offers a different recipe for promoting it (Walt, 1998: 32). One version of liberal thought argues that economic interdependence would discourage states from using force against each other because warfare would threaten prosperity. A second strand sees the spread of democracy as the key to world peace, based on the claim that democratic states are inherently more peaceful than authoritarian states. It rests on the belief that although democracies seem to fight wars as often as other states, they rarely, if ever, fight one another. This theory is commonly known as the democratic peace theory, which could be seen as a contemporary version of Immanuel Kant's (1795) theory of perpetual peace'. Some fear that the democratic peace theory may be used to justify the use of force against non-democratic regimes in order to bring lasting peace, in a 'democratic crusade' (Chan, 1997: 59). The belief that 'democracies don't fight each other' has been an important justification for the Clinton administration's efforts to enlarge the sphere of democratic rule (Walt, 1998: 39). Critics however, such as Waltz, claim that this theory is merely valid for 'democracies of the right kind (i.e. liberal democracies)' and even then history has proved us differently already (Waltz, 2000: 7). A third, more recent strand of liberal theory argues that international institutions such as the International Energy Agency and the International Monetary Fund could help overcome selfish state behavior, mainly by encouraging states to forego immediate gains for the greater benefits of enduring cooperation (ibid.: 32). This strand is also known as 'institutional liberalism' or 'neo-institutionalism', which draws on elements from (Wilsonian) idealism.

Even though idealism proper was relatively short-lived, it has had a considerable impact on politics and political theory in general and therefore
deserves a short elaboration. Wilsonian idealism holds that a state should make its internal political philosophy the goal of its foreign policy. In this view, foreign policy should be guided by legal and ethical standards. Following the collapse of internationalism, international law and the League of Nations during the Great Depression of the 1930s, scholars sought to separate international theory from its supposed interwar idealism (Doyle, 1997: 27). The idealistic view of international politics was heavily criticized for ignoring the role of power (e.g. Carr, 1939). Neorealists warned that without a world government, no state will be able to trust other states because it cannot be assured of their peaceful intentions (Herz, 1950; 1951). Moreover, during the Cold War idealism acquired a negative reputation among both politicians and academics for its supposed 'naivety' and 'Utopian' thinking (Snyder, 2004: 60; Jackson and Sorensen, 2003: 39-40).

A subsequent strand, liberal institutionalism, also known as functionalism (or international functionalism), preaches international cooperation as a means to softening antagonism in the international environment. Indeed, functionalism is closely related to liberalism (and idealism) and shares similar principles of peace and freedom, yet it focuses on the function of a system rather than on the actors within it. Instead of self-interest of the nation-state, the functionalist puts common interests and needs of states first. For that reason, functionalism has been leading the way in the globalization process. According to functionalists, form follows function in the process of integration. The function of an international organization becomes the type of authority that determines its direction within the specific area. This process promotes collective governance and creates interdependence, which results in widespread acceptance of principles of the international system and thereby meeting human needs (rather than the need of national subjects) and contributing to collective welfare. Ideologically, this process would ultimately reduce global conflict and poverty.

This functionalist approach can be witnessed in the reconstruction of post-WWII Europe. The European and Atlantic institutions provide us with a good example of integration through cooperation on shared areas of interest. In the late 1950s a new functionalist movement, neo-functionalism, came into existence, intrigued by the demonstrated successful European cooperation. Neo-functionalism "argues that certain prerequisites are needed before integration can proceed ... Once these changes take place there will be an expansion of
integration caused by spillover" (Archer: 2001, 14). Ernst Haas, one of the protagonists of the neo-functionalist school, believed after carefully studying the implementation of the European Coal and Steel Community that there was an 'expansive logic of sector integration' (Haas: 1968, 283). The ECSC originated as a temporary project with limited goals. However, in time public support expanded and attitudes changed: political elites supported integration and power shifted to new authorities. Focusing specifically on regional integration, neo-functionalist observe in general two forms of spillover: functional and political. The first represents the interconnection of sectors, whereby one affects the other. The latter signifies the creation of supranational models of governance as a result of integrated functional sectors. It is disputed whether integration leads to a better understanding and if it reduces sovereign power over time. Moreover, it is unlikely that states will become the lesser player in a functional system. In addition, it is difficult to prove that international cooperation will indeed result in the reduction of poverty and conflict as it can also do quite the contrary (e.g. weapons trade).

Liberalism has such a powerful presence that the entire political spectrum of the Western world, from neoconservatives to human rights advocates, assumes it as largely self-evident. It is therefore no surprise that liberal themes are constantly invoked as a response to contemporary security dilemmas. But the last several years have also produced a fierce strive between disparate strains of liberal thought. Supporters and critics of the Bush administration, in particular, have emphasized very different elements of the liberal canon. For its part, the Bush administration highlights the promotion of democracy while largely neglecting the international institutions that most liberal theorists champion (Snyder, 2004: 57).

2.3.3 Constructivism

As a more contemporary strand of idealism, constructivism obtained a prominent place in debates on international relations theory in recent years. Constructivist theory emphasizes the impact of ideas and identities, but it is important to note that constructivist approaches are quite diverse and do not offer a unified set of predictions on any of these issues. Instead of taking the state for granted and
assuming that it simply seeks to survive, constructivists regard the interests and identities of states as a highly malleable product of specific historical processes. They emphasize how ideas are created, how they evolve and how they shape the way states understand and respond to their situation. Constructivists pay close attention to the prevailing discourses in society because discourse reflects and shapes beliefs and interests, and establishes accepted norms of behavior. Debates about ideas are viewed as the fundamental building blocks of international life. Individuals and groups become powerful if they can convince others to adopt their ideas. People's understanding of their interests depends on the ideas they hold and, to that extend, actors in the international system understand different actors differently. Alexander Wendt (1992; 1999) argues that the realist conception of anarchy does not adequately explain why conflict occurs between states. The real issue, he contends, is how anarchy is understood: 'anarchy is what states make of it' (Wendt, 1992). States claim that anarchy is a concept mutually constituted by actors sharing the same constitutive rules and practices. Constructivism provides an understanding of, or gives meaning to, situations and intentions. For example, constructivism does not resolve the security dilemma (certainty is not a source of security), it reduces uncertainty however (Hopf, 1998: 174; 188).

Constructivism is particularly attentive to the sources of change and, as such, the approach has largely replaced (neo)Marxism as the pre-eminent radical perspective on international affairs. For constructivists, international change results from the work of intellectual entrepreneurs who proselytize new ideas and 'name and shame' actors whose behavior deviates from accepted standards. Consequently, constructivists often study the role of transnational activist networks in promoting change (Snyder, 2004: 60). The end of the Cold War played an important role in legitimating constructivist theories because realism and liberalism both failed to anticipate the event and had some trouble explaining it. Constructivists had an explanation, arguing that former president Gorbachev revolutionized Soviet foreign policy because he embraced new ideas such as 'common security'. From constructivist perspective, the central issue in the post-Cold War world is how different groups conceive their identities and interests and how these are perceived by others. Conspicuously, this is particularly interesting in the study of terrorism.
Recent events seem to vindicate the 'resurgence' of constructivist theory. According to Snyder (2004: 59-60), 'a theory that emphasizes the role of ideologies, identities, persuasion, and transnational networks is highly relevant to understanding the post-9/11 world.' Echoes of the constructivist approach can be found, for example, in recent studies of globalization, social movements and, as mentioned, terrorism. The past two decades have also witnessed an explosion of interest in the concepts of culture and identity, a development that overlaps with the constructivist emphasis on the importance of ideas and norms (Walt, 1998: 42; cf. McSweeney, 1999). Security and insecurity, from this perspective, are essentially related to the competition and perceived incongruity between social identities. In this context, Appadurai has recently introduced the concept of 'predatory identities'. Predatory are 'those identities whose social construction and mobilization require the extinction of other, proximate social categories, defined as threats to the very existence of some group, defined as we' (Appadurai, 2006: 51).

The three theoretical traditions described in this section are summarized below in Figure 1. In the following sections we will examine the academic debate on the concept of security, which highlights elements of each of the three theoretical traditions. In particular, we will describe the gradual move away from the traditional, realist-based concept of security towards a broader approach to security.
Figure 1: Dominant theoretical traditions in the study of international affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main theoretical proposition</th>
<th>Realism</th>
<th>Liberalism</th>
<th>Constructivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highest virtues</td>
<td>Self-interested states compete constantly for power and security</td>
<td>Political or economic considerations override concern for power</td>
<td>State behavior is shaped by collective norms and social identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main units of analysis</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>States; non-state actors</td>
<td>Individuals (especially elites); groups; states; supra-state actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key instruments</td>
<td>Force, principally military; diplomacy</td>
<td>Varies (spread of democratic values; international organizations; economic exchange)</td>
<td>Ideas; discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with other states</td>
<td>International anarchy; balance of power; accidental alliances</td>
<td>Varies (international institutions; cooperation between democracies)</td>
<td>Segmented international cooperation (on the basis of shared interests and needs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main threat to (national) security</td>
<td>External military threat</td>
<td>Non-democratic regimes</td>
<td>Non-cooperation, externalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4 Dimensions of security

In this section we will analyze the development of security studies and the concept of security in terms of two inter-related key debates: on the one hand, the 'broadening' of security and, on the other hand, the 'deepening' of security. These debates already started during the Cold War period, mostly in the 1980s, but became particularly intense after the end of the Cold War. The 'broadening' dimension concerns the extension of security to other issues or sectors than the military one. The 'deepening' dimension questions whether entities other than the state should be able to claim security threats, moving either down to the level of individual or human security or up to the level of international or global
security, with regional and societal security as possible intermediate points (Krause and Williams, 1996: 230; see also Buzan, 1991; Waever et al., 1993; Wyn Jones, 1999). Although the two dimensions are logically intertwined, they focus on different questions. The broadening debate is essentially concerned with the question of the source of threat to security. The deepening debate, on the other hand, deals principally with the question of the referent object of security: security for whom? In section 2.4 we will focus on the broadening of the concept of security. The expansion of the referent object of security is discussed in section 2.5.

2.4.1 Extending the scope of security studies: what threat to security?

From the 1980s onwards, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars of international relations increasingly began to emphasize the need for a broader understanding of security. They argued that it is misleading to confine security analysis to traditional military threats to the territorial integrity of states (Garnett, 1996a: 14). They criticized the intense narrowing of the field of security studies imposed by the military and nuclear obsessions of the Cold War. They argued that these traditional threats have not disappeared, but that other, non-military sources of threat now seemed more pressing. Although few scholars today defend such a narrow definition of security, no consensus on what a more broadly constructed conception should look like, exists.

One of the most prominent attempts to widen the security agenda has been provided by Barry Buzan and his colleagues (Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al., 1998). They stress that the security of human collectivities is affected by factors in five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. Generally speaking, military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of
traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. These five sectors do not, Buzan (1991: 19-20) stresses, operate in isolation from one another. Each one defines a focal point within the security problem, but all are woven together in a web of linkages. Their common denominator is the threats to and defense by the state. In other words, Buzan's concept of security, even with the formulation in terms of five sectors, has the state (and state sovereignty) as the core referent object of security (Waever et al., 1993: 24). In section 2.5 we will show how this state-centered approach of security has been contested in recent years.

In recent years a variety of scholars have argued for a widening of the security agenda to cover a variety of economic, social, ecological and demographic issues (e.g. Gardner, 2005). Among the most discussed non-traditional security issues are transnational terrorism, organized crime, international migration, asylum seekers and environmental degradation. In the 1998 text book *World Security* a wide range of 'new categories' of security challenges are examined, including arms proliferation, international migration, transnational crime, ethnic warfare and environmental degradation (Klare and Chandrani, 1998). According to the editors, it is likely that the future security environment will be characterized by the presence of many threats, each demanding the attention of international policymakers. All 'are likely to figure prominently in the global discourse on international peace and security' (Klare and Chandrani, 1998a: vii-viii). Chalk (2001) also emphasizes the range and diversity of threats to security. He identifies seven issues that are commonly associated with contemporary sources of transnational instability: internal war and conflict; terrorism; heroin and cocaine trade; piracy; the transnational diffusion of infectious disease; environmental degradation; and unregulated mass population movements.

The growing influence of scholars seeking to broaden the security agenda has important implications for both academic and policy discourses. From the late 1980s onwards, there has been a tendency among academics, law enforcement agencies and political thinkers to develop a concept of security that links together a range of 'security issues' as diverse as terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, illegal migration and asylum seekers. Moreover,
there has been a blurring of the distinction between internal security (police, in a broad sense) and external security (involving diplomacy and military expertise), as the threat of a conventional military attack on Western Europe has declined. Bigo (1994; 2000) has termed this linkage of internal and external security a 'security continuum'. The linkage between security fields lies at the core of the redefinition of Western European security following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Anderson and Apap, 2002: 1; cf. Politi, 1997). In this part of the world the conceptual convergence of internal and external security has perhaps been more evident than elsewhere (Pastore, 2001: 1). This development has been criticized by some scholars for linking very different activities and for criminalizing illegal immigrants (e.g. Bigo, 2000; Balzacq et al., 2006).

Below we discuss two controversial 'new security issues': environmental degradation and international migration. A third security issue - transnational terrorism - will be analyzed more extensively in chapter 3 of this report.

2.4.2 Environmental security

While the structure and nature of the Cold War shaped security thinking in much of the Western world, the elaboration of broader concepts of security did gain some attention (Matthew, 2000: 105; Soroos, 1994: 318). Scholars like Lester Brown (1977), Richard Ullman (1983) and Jessica Mathews (1989) have all sought to broaden the concept of national security to include nonmilitary threats such as environmental degradation. Their arguments varied, but they shared the basic idea that environmental change was serious enough to be considered a security issue. Robert Kaplan's article The Coming Anarchy' (1994), which identified the environment as the national-security issue of the early twenty-first century, played a catalytic role in bringing environmental security to the attention of the highest levels of the Clinton Administration. Numerous statements have since been made by government officials identifying the environment as a contributing factor to conflict and stability (Dabelko and Simmons, 1997: 135-6). However, despite the increased scholarly and political attention for the issues of environment and security, the term environmental security still lacks a common definition.
During the 1990s scholars envisioned multiple sorts of environmental threats to national interests (Matthews, 2000: 108-110). A major type of threat, it is argued, is the tension, instability, conflict and violence that are caused, amplified or triggered by environmental problems. Thomas Homer-Dixon (1991) has studied the ways in which environmental scarcity plays a growing role in generating violent outcomes, especially in developing countries already straining under the burdens of poverty, inefficient and corrupt governments, and ethnic or religious conflict. McNeill (2005: 186) describes environmental security as 'the relationships between environmental variables and political ones'. In this respect, the key question is whether environmental issues can have such a profound effect on political life and society that they cause security problems of any kind. These security problems include flooding, deforestation and soil degradation, which have direct impact on the societies where they occur. Other problems include dependence on fossil fuels, global warming and the emission of greenhouse gases. Peter Gleick has written on the possibility of 'water-related conflicts'. He suggests that future conflicts over water are increasingly likely due to growing competition for limited water supplies (Gleick, 1993; see also Brown, 2004 on food security). Similarly, Peters (2004: 207) concludes that resource wars (e.g. over oil supplies) 'constitute a new feature in the international arena and a threat to global security.'

The link between environmental change and security is contested both theoretically and conceptually. Several issues are typically raised. Scholars such as Levy (1995) and Deudney (1990) argue that the evidence for a causal relationship between scarcity and conflict is weak. It has also been argued that the concept of security loses clarity and meaning when it is used more broadly. The term environmental security encounters relatively little resistance if it is interpreted narrowly to refer to situations in which environmental and resource conflicts heighten the probability of armed conflict. However, there is less acceptance of broader conceptions of environmental security which acknowledge the ways in which environmental degradation directly threatens human welfare, even without the immediate prospect of armed conflict (Soroos, 1994: 319). Critics raise the concern that combining environment and security will have the unintended effect of 'securitizing' environmental issues (e.g. Deudney, 1990; 1999). Brock (1992: 98) contends that: defining environmental issues in terms of security risks is in itself a risky operation' since 'we may end up contributing
more to the militarization of environmental politics than to the demilitarization of security politics.' Levy (1995) concedes the existence of potential environmental hazards to human well-being, but he argues that their place as security issues cannot be sustained. The attempt to make the environment a security issue is marked more by a desire to heighten the political profile of environmental concerns by placing them within the rhetoric of security than by any sustainable status as security issues (Krause and Williams, 1996: 234).

2.4.3 International migration

Migration is increasingly seen through security lenses, especially in Europe. Recent years have witnessed a proliferation of scholarly works using the concept of security to study the different facets of migration in Europe (Leonard, 2004). One of the first scholarly accounts of the links between international migration and security was provided by Myron Weiner (1992). Viewing security as a social construct, Weiner identified five types of situations in which receiving states may consider migrants as security threats. The first is when migrants strain relations between sending and receiving countries, a situation that may arise when refugees and migrants oppose themselves to the regime of their home country. The second is when migrants are seen as a political threat or security risk to the regime of the receiving country. The third is when immigrants are perceived as a threat to the culture of the receiving country. The fourth is when migrants are viewed as a social or economic problem in the host country. Finally, the fifth is when the receiving country uses migrants as an instrument of threat against the country of origin (Weiner, 1992: 105-6).

In a more recent publication, Lohmann (2000) identifies four ways in which migrants are perceived as a security issue in Western countries. First, migrants are seen as posing a threat to public order, as they are allegedly involved in criminal activities such as drug trafficking, trafficking in human begins, thefts or terrorism (see Kyle and Koslowski, 2001; Engbersen and Van der Leun, 2001; Wong, 2005). Second, migrants with different cultural lifestyles are seen as a threat to identity and 'societal security'. Third, migrants are viewed as influencing the domestic and foreign policies of their host country, which can foster political tensions between the receiving country and the country of origin.
Fourth, irregular migration and trafficking in human beings are increasingly considered important security issues. In this context, Engbersen (2001: 222) argues that the illegal immigrant is the archetypal representative of the trend towards the regularization and securitization of migration.

The securitization of international migration is contested by a range of scholars. Tsoukala (2005) has analyzed the assumption frequently made by politicians and policymakers that the 'terrorism/immigration nexus' poses a major threat to the internal security of members states of the European Union. Scholars such as Luciani (1993) and Bigo (2001) draw attention to the 'criminalization of migration'. Similarly, Engbersen (2001) contends that the unanticipated effects of 'Panopticon Europe' raise the main issue of a growing imbalance between the effects of severe enforcement of internal controls and the problems governments want to deal with in the first place. Cholewinski (2000) criticizes EU member states' insufficient attention to the protection of the rights of illegal immigrants. He argues that an 'EU agenda based almost wholly on security aspects cannot alleviate the problem of irregular migration in the long term' (Cholewinski, 2000: 362).

2.5 The centrality of the state revisited

In addition to the debate on broadening the focus of security studies to include non-military issues, conventional thinking about security was also challenged by those who criticized the state-centric approach of neorealists. In their view, the privilege given to the state is inadequate to address problems of 'common' or 'human' security, which would need consideration on the level of the individual, sub-state groups or on the level of humanity as a whole (Munster, 2005: 2). Their aim to extend the security debate is closely related to the key debate discussed in the previous section. As Wyn Jones (1996: 209) correctly asserts: 'When one begins to focus on security referents other than the state, it becomes apparent that "existential" threats to those referents - be they individuals, nations and so on - are far broader than those posed by military force.'
2.5.1 Rethinking the referent object of security: security for whom?

The state centrism of the traditional approach to security is a product of the fact that the approach is itself based on a realist understanding of world politics. As we have seen, state-centrism is one of the central tenets of realism. From a realist perspective, states will behave in certain state-like ways no matter what its internal composition because of the constraining influence of international anarchy. Thus, 'states are still the main actors on the world stage and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future' (Mearsheimer, 2005: 139-140). Buzan (1991) has two main justifications for adopting this state-centric perspective: in his view the security dynamics at the international and sub-state levels are all mediated through the state and, normatively, states can in fact provide individuals with a level of security.

Several scholars of security studies and international affairs have criticized the state-centric view of security, claiming that 'any attempt to rethink security in the post-Cold War era must move beyond the traditional focus on the state as the referent object for security discourse' (Wyn Jones, 1996: 197-8). These critics have sought to extend the security agenda by shifting the focus away from states onto other levels of analysis, as is also common in contemporary sociological theory (e.g. Castells, 1997; Urry, 2000; Touraine, 2000). Brown (1998: 1) has argued that the state-centric lens 'fails to illuminate many of the momentous developments occurring within, above, and across the jurisdictions of the nation-states that are creating dangerous incongruities in world politics and society.' Brown emphasizes that separate nation-states have become increasingly impotent in dealing on their own (that is, through national laws and national institutions) with threats to security and safety: 'Sovereign national enclaves of security and order, fenced off from the "chaos" of the world at large, are becoming unviable' (Brown, 1998: 4). A striking example of this new reality is the transnational dimension of terrorism and counterterrorism. Since terrorism is facilitated by the new technologies of mobility and due to the fact that it appears to manifest itself in transnational networks, counterterrorism will be very ineffective if it is conducted unilaterally through national agencies. We will discuss this issue in more detail in chapter 3.
2.5.2 Societal security

In recent years Barry Buzan and his colleagues seem to have distanced themselves somewhat from state-centrism, evidence of which is their introduction of the concept of 'societal security' (Waever et al., 1993). They contend that Buzan's original formulation of five major sectors of security (see section 2.3) is untenable due to an excessive concern with state stability. In the original conception the referent object of each security sector was the state, and society was merely a sector where the state might be threatened. Re-conceptualizing Buzan's original conception of security, Waever has developed a concept of security based on a duality of state security and societal security. Both types of security concern survival, yet the former has sovereignty as its ultimate criterion and the latter is being held together by concerns about identity.

Societal security concerns:

the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom. This definition makes it difficult to give any objective definition of when there is a threat to societal security. [...] Societal security is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms (Waever, 1993: 23).

The concept of societal security highlights that there are many circumstances in which the security of the state and the security of society do not line up and may well be opposed to one another (Waever et al., 1993: 186; Buzan, 1993: 57).

Although the concept of societal security seems to open interesting avenues for empirical research, several scholars of international relations have criticized the concept of societal security. Leonard (2004), for example, argues that one of the main problems with the concept is that it has been developed on the premise that 'society is about identity' (Waever, 1993: 6; 24). One can argue that the concept of societal security neglects other values that collectivities may also see as important. As McSweeney (1999: 72) argues:
If, rather than assuming that identity is the unique value vulnerable to threat, the authors had posed as a problem - 'What is the focus of the security concerns of the people who comprise 'society'?' - the intuitive evidence alone would have suggested a range of values, with economic welfare prominent.

Moreover, one can question the relevance of the distinction between state security and societal security (Leonard, 2004). This point is made by Ceyhan (1998) who contends that this distinction does not appear when analyzing the discourses or practices of politicians or security actors.

### 2.5.3 Human security

Other analyses have broadened the concept of security even further through the development of the concept of 'human security'. Importantly, while most security studies scholars remain skeptical about the idea of human security, arguing that it is too broad a concept to be useful either analytically or practically, policymakers increasingly recognize the importance of the concept of human security as a policy framework (Bajpai, 2000: 2; Suhrke, 1999; Henk, 2005). The highest profile articulation of the concept of human security comes from the United Nations Development Program (1994; 1995; see also Jolly and Basu Ray, 2006; Commission on Human Security, 2003). The authors argue that the concept of human security has at least four essential features. First, it is a universal concern relevant to people everywhere. Second, the components of security are interdependent. Third, human security is easier to ensure through early prevention. Fourth, and perhaps most relevant for present purpose, is the shift of the referent object of security from states to people. It focuses on people's security and sustainable human development rather than on territorial (state) security and armaments. Human security is defined as: 'first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life - whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development' (United Nations Development Program, 1994: 23).
Global threats to human security in the twenty-first century are said to include at least six categories: unchecked population growth; disparities in economic opportunities; excessive international migration; environmental degradation; drug production and trafficking; and international terrorism. These threats to human security are caused more by the independent actions of millions of people rather than deliberate aggression by specific states. They would therefore not be considered security threats under narrow formulations of the concept of security (Dalby, 2000: 5). King and Murray (2001) suggest a way to measure human security by using five key indicators of 'well being' namely, income, health, education, political freedom, and democracy. In their view a true definition of human security will result in '[a]n agenda for research and action to enhance human security [which] follows logically from this definition in the areas of risk assessment, prevention, protection, and compensation' (ibid.: 586).

An interesting sidestep between societal security and human security is what Beall et al. (2006) call the 'security-development nexus'. A long relationship between the security agendas of nations and their interest in developing other countries to achieve a higher level of security exists. The issue has received much attention after 9/11, and leads Beall to state that there is a reemerging pattern of states applying development thinking, and policy, in terms of its own security. Stewart (2004) and Picciotto (2004) have argued that the relation between security and development is benign or positive, it can be a win-win situation. There are however some issues concerning this relationship. For instance, it is unclear whose security is referred to; one must make a clear distinction between the security of the people in developing countries and that of the donor country. Another point that can be made is that when a counter-terrorism element is brought into the development policy, governments can more easily generate funding for development programs. The underlying thought here is that citizens who are concerned about their own security will allow their government to spend more on development if it generates more security for themselves.

Debate has ensued whether the increasing attention for development will generate long-term results in poverty reduction, or that the focus will be on highly visible projects such as bridges and roads, under the label of security which will only achieve minimal long-term results. Similarly, the harmonization of defense and development is visible in the cooperation between government
departments. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Department for International Development have increased their cooperation during missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this cooperation also leads Beall et al. (2006) to state that the neutrality of NGOs and aid workers becomes unclear and could also lead to the confusion of peacekeepers, combat troops, and aid workers, resulting in more complex mission.

2.6 Themes in rethinking security

The issues discussed in this chapter reveal the multiple extensions of security proposed by scholars from the 1980s onwards. These extensions can be summarized in four inter-related themes. The debate on the 'broadening' of security reveals two main types of extension concerning the source of the security threat. First, a horizontal extension can be observed in concepts of security to include a range of non-military threats, such as transnational terrorism, environmental degradation and international migration. The horizontal extension of security has been accompanied by a second, vertical type of extension involving the extension of the political responsibility for ensuring security. Whereas in the traditional, neorealist concept of security state-level military forces were seen to play a crucial role in ensuring security, responsibility for security is now diffused in multiple directions:

from national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local governments, and sideways to non-governmental organizations, to public opinion and the press, and to the abstract forces of nature or of the market (Rothschild, 1995: 55).

Two other types of extension can be identified with regard to the referent object of security, that is, the sorts of entities whose security is to be ensured. Critics of the state-centric approach to security have argued for an upwards extension of the concept of security, from the security of nations to the security of the international system, or of a supranational physical environment. Finally, the concept of security is extended downwards from the security of states to the security of groups and individuals. It is important to note that these themes are not entirely new. Both the multidimensionality of security and the conceptualizing
of security at levels other than the nation-state are not new 'discoveries', as we have sought to show in this chapter (see Baldwin, 1997: 23). Of particular interest for present purpose is the fact that the multiple extensions of security have become increasingly dominant in academic and policy discourses of security. Thinking about security has been increasingly influenced by the four extensions outlined in this section, reshaping the more traditional concept of security into a broader and more diffuse understanding of security. In the next chapter, we will examine the ways in which these developments have shaped the securitization of transnational terrorism.
Chapter 2 analyzed the multiple extensions of the concept of security in recent years. In particular, we have shown how scholars have argued for a broadening of the security agenda to cover a variety of economic, social, ecological and demographic issues. To illustrate this development, we described two 'new' security issues: environmental security and international migration. In this chapter we will examine a third type of security threat: transnational terrorism. Although terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon, in recent years terrorism, and particularly its transnational dimensions, have come to be appreciated as a prominent threat to western and European security. The chapter first explores the academic debate on terrorism during the Cold War. We then discuss the changes and continuities in terrorism studies in the post-Cold War period. In the final part of this chapter we examine the securitization of transnational terrorism in the post-9/11 period at an international and an EU level.

3.1 Terrorism during the Cold War

The phenomenon of terrorism did not emerge for the first time during the Cold War. There are numerous incidents and groups in history that have been labeled 'terrorism', such as the Jewish Zealots and the Islamic Fidayeen (Rapoport and Alexander, 1982; Laqueur, 1978). To classify certain actions, individuals or groups as 'terrorism' or 'terrorists' requires a definition of terrorism. The definition of terrorism constitutes a major element of the third work package of the TTSRL research project, and we will therefore not explore this issue at great length here. We will, however, briefly examine the academic debate on terrorism that emerged during the Cold War in order to outline the position of terrorism on the Cold War security agenda.

A number of high-profile violent events sparked a wave of international media attention during the late 1960s and early 1970s. These violent acts, which included murder, hijackings, hostage-takings and other subversive actions against states or (multinational) organizations, were not characterized as
'normal' interstate war. These types of violent action soon received the label of 'terrorism'. In this context, some scholars made a distinction between guerrilla warfare and terrorism (Laqueur, 1999: 8), while others viewed terrorism as an unjustified form of opposition against a democratic state in which non-violent forms of opposition are also possible (Cruise O'Brien 1983: 93). In other words, terrorism was a contested phenomenon which was difficult to capture within a single concept, as was expressed in the familiar saying 'One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' (e.g. Gutteridge, 1986).

Paul Wilkinson was among the first scholars to study and conceptualize the phenomenon of contemporary terrorism. Wilkinson (1974) distinguished between political terrorism and other forms of 'physic terror'. He viewed political terrorism as 'the use of coercive intimidation by revolutionary movements, regimes or individuals for political motives' (Wilkinson, 1974: 11). This distinction was widely accepted by scholars during the Cold War (e.g. Wardlaw, 1983; Schmid and Jongman, 1984). Wilkinson further distinguished three types of political terrorism. Revolutionary terrorism involved 'systematic tactics of terrorist violence with the objective of bringing about political revolution.' Sub-revolutionary terrorism was 'employed for political motives other than revolution or governmental repression'. Repressive terrorism encompassed 'the systematic use of terrorist acts of violence for the purposes of suppressing, putting down, quelling, or restraining certain groups, individuals or forms of behavior deemed to be undesirable by the repressor' (Wilkinson 1974; 36-40).

The category of terrorism that was of particular interest to scholars during the Cold War was state-sponsored terrorism, which focused on states as instigators of terrorism in another country. Prominent scholars argued that the Soviet Union became increasingly successful 'in its interventions in support of selected national liberation movements' (Wilkinson, 1986: 35). An important part of the Soviet Union's strategy 'has been to train and deploy cadres from these movements in the arts of terrorism and subversion'. These cadres were deployed both in regional conflicts and, occasionally, 'as a method of sowing disruption and helping to weaken non-communist states elsewhere' (idem). Wilkinson adds that 'nor do communist states miss any opportunity of offering propaganda support to terrorists operating in the West, even when the groups is ideologically poles apart from Soviet Marxism-Leninism' (ibid.: 36).
While not fundamentally disagreeing with Wilkinson's distinction between political terrorism and other forms of terror, some scholars preferred the term 'international terrorism'. Slater and Stohl (1988: 4), for example, noted that 'terrorism is a phenomenon of international politics and should be analyzed as such'. Like Wardlaw (1982), they stress the international dimension of terrorism. Wardlaw adds that the international dimension of terrorism has grown because of increasing technological developments and the changes these developments have brought forth:

Corresponding to these changes have been significant evolutions in terrorist philosophy and tactics. All of these factors have resulted in a different threat to stability than that posed by previous terrorist movements (Wardlaw, 1982: 33).

Technological developments in the fields of transport, communication, media and weaponry changed the nature of international political terrorism because it enabled actors to use different tactics and methods. Changing philosophies or self-justifications can be constructed due to the possibility of a more anonymous way of striking a target. Also, the transnational flow of information enables different terrorist groups to exchange information and tactics. These developments have continued to evolve during the last years of the Cold War and into the post-Cold War period.

3.2 Terrorism in the post-Cold War period

The East-West confrontation that dominated the international security agenda during the Cold War has largely receded from view. We have seen in Chapter Two that although the end of the Cold War transformed the perceived threats to international security, the field of security studies retains a full agenda of practical and intellectual issues. No longer is the field of international security fixated on how to deter the 'Soviet threat' or how to reduce the risk of nuclear war between the superpowers. The newly revealed agenda is, in fact, broader in its focus, giving greater attention to previously neglected threats to security (Lynn-Jones and Miller, 1995: 3). Transnational terrorism is one of the issues that are increasingly viewed through the security prism, that is, as a prominent
threat to international security. Although during the Cold War international terrorism occurred in many places and in different forms, the blanket of the Cold War that lay on the security debate prevented transnational terrorism from becoming a major issue in the academic literature. According to Gurr and Cole:

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the US defence community radically re-assessed the risks and challenges facing the USA, and the West in general. The outcome was that the primary threats to international security were perceived to come from a greater number of smaller, more amorphous sources, such as regional states seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in pursuit of regional political ambitions, and transnational threats from non-state actors involving terrorism, crime and narcotics. These threats had always existed but had previously been dominated by Cold War issues. All that happened was that there was a radical re-ordering of threats, and they rapidly rose to assume the primacy that the superpower confrontation had once held (2000: 3).

The late 1990s and early 2000s saw a steady increase in academic publications on the subject of terrorism. During the first stages of the TTSRL research project we concluded that there was a numerical increase in English-language academic publications containing the term 'terrorism' in the title. Our results demonstrate that in the year 2001 the number of publications show a spectacular increase (see Figure 2).
Figure 2  Number of hits for articles with the word terrorism in the title in six scientific journal databases, 1998-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Online Contents</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>1237</td>
<td>1589</td>
<td>1126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide political science abstracts</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic source premier</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business source premier</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econlit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social sciences citation index</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the 1990s several issues dominated the academic debate on terrorism: separatist terrorism, including ETA, IRA and various Palestinian groups; Marxist-Leninist groups such as the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), the Red Brigades and the Japanese Red Army; the apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo; and right-wing extremist groups in the United States. A prominent issue in the scholarly debate during this period was the advent of nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism, so-called 'weapons of mass destruction' (WMD). The disintegration of the Soviet Union caused many scholars to fear that the enormous amounts of poorly guarded biological agents and chemical or nuclear materials would fall into the hands of terrorists. The attack by the Aum Shinrikyo cult, releasing a deadly nerve agent in the Tokyo subway system in 1995, sparked fierce debate among scholars about the probability and destructiveness of WMD terrorism (Cameron, 1999; Falkenrath, 1998; Falkenrath et al., 1998; Claridge, 1999; Stern 2000; Hoffman, 2000; Nye and Woolsey, 1997; Carter et al., 1998). In this context, Laqueur (1998) has stated that although terrorism is obviously a tragedy for the
victims, ‘seen in historical perspective it seldom has been more than a nuisance. Even the bloodiest terrorist incidents in the past [...] affected only relatively few people.’ Laqueur contends that ‘this is no longer true today, and may be even less so in the future’, since ‘for the first time in history, weapons of enormous destructive power are both readily acquired and harder to track’ (Laqueur, 1998; 3-4). The general conviction among scholars of terrorism was that a new era had emerged.

Despite the growing interest in the study of international terrorism in the course of the 1990s, the subject still lacked the academic and popular attention it would receive after the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. 9/11 sparked fierce debate among scholars as to the implications of the events for international security and the threat of transnational (Islamist) terrorism. For example, IR scholar Steve Smith argued that 9/11 had major implications for security analysis. Some of the key implications are: (a) states are no longer, if they ever were, the key actors in international arenas; (b) the future world order will be marked by asymmetrical conflict in which the weapons of the power will no longer automatically defeat the weapons of the weak; (c) the future world order is characterized by virtual war, a war in which the propaganda battle is as (if not more) important than the military campaign; and (d) the events shatter the key assumption of many proponents of globalization that the conveyor belt of economic development and the spread of liberal democracy were in some way inevitable, irreversible and universal (e.g. Fukuyama, 1992). We will cover the post-9/11 academic debate in detail in the third work package of the TTSRL research project. In the following section, we will discuss the growing priority given to transnational terrorism on the European security agenda in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

### 3.3 International security and transnational terrorism after 9/11

The changing security perceptions in the West over the past two decades have been conceptualized by Tunander (1997) as a shift from a 'Friend-Foe' to a 'Cosmos-Chaos' divide. During the Cold War period, Tunander argues, the bipolar divide between the 'Free World' and the 'Evil Empire' structured security perceptions. It was not until the Gulf War and the US-led coalition against Iraq
that a partnership between the West and Russia against a new 'Other' became possible (Rusman, 2001: 445). The new 'Other' was no longer a major Toe'. It had now become those peripheral terrorist regimes and unpredictable rules that were to be policed by the 'World Society', giving rise to a 'Cosmos-Chaos' divide. Closely reflecting certain key elements of the liberal canon, 'Cosmos' should extend its order step by step into the world of 'Chaos', envisioning not only the end of major ideological splits but also the end of major wars (Tunander, 1997).

In recent years the two types of perceived divide appear to have become increasingly intertwined, at least rhetorically. The US-led 'war on terrorism' targets not only 'Chaos' ('rogue regimes' or 'failed states'; see Spaaij, 2003; Tanter, 1998), but also a new major 'Foe': transnational Islamist terrorism. The promise of a 'long war on terrorism', to be fought on multiple fronts, recalls in some ways the clearly defined enemy of the Cold War (Howard, 2002: 8; Campbell, 2002: 10). Already in the 1995 La Gomera declaration explicit reference was made to the threat of 'Islamic fundamentalism' (see section 3.4). Replacing the 'old' external threat of communism, Islamist fundamentalism was signaled as a major threat to European identity. The self was thus constructed in relation to a new 'Other' through 'culturally defined differentiation' (Behnke, 1996: 16). A recent publication by the Australian government explicitly addresses this 'new foe' rhetoric:

Transnational terrorism confronts us with a new kind of foe. It is diverse, complex, adaptable and continually evolving. It is uncompromising, global in reach, and its operations are highly networked. Its approach is asymmetric, using unconventional and unexpected means to wreak maximum damage. It is of a previous unknown scale. It is being perpetrated in the name of an extremist Muslim cause but it is a type which, in a future world order, could be applied by others. It signals a new era of conflict (Australian Government, 2004: 8).

Australia's perception of transnational terrorism as a major threat to national and international security should principally be viewed as a consequence of 9/11 and the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002, in which a combined total of 98 Australians were killed. Following these atrocities, it was concluded that 'Australia is now a target of transnational extremist-Muslim terrorism and
Australians are being targeted overseas' (ibid.: 5). In response to the terrorist attacks and the perceived change of the country's security environment, the Australian government has taken decisive and far-reaching action, both at home and abroad. At the international level, the government has been a staunch supporter of the US-led global war on terrorism and it has also been actively promoting counterterrorism at the regional level, signing agreements with key Southeast Asian nations. At the domestic level, counterterrorism and emergency response capabilities have been reviewed and upgraded. The government has introduced tighter financial, aviation, and border control measures. Other initiatives included the development of a nation-wide response mechanism to manage possible terrorist attacks inside Australia (Michaelsen, 2005: 322).

3.3.1 Transnational terrorism and the EU

The predominance of transnational terrorism on the security agenda is not restricted to Australia and the United States. Halliday (2004: 17) and Huntington (2002) have drawn attention to the recent convergence in security identities among Western democracies. Whereas before 11 September 2001 Europe and the United States were moving apart on a whole series of issues - for example on genetic foods, missile defense and a European military - 9/11 and the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London have, at least for the moment, generated a 'common security identity'. In the United States concern about terrorism had risen during the 1990s due to a number of major attacks against American citizens, both on US territory and abroad. The Clinton administration had placed the fight against transnational terrorism prominently on its security agenda, including the threat of WMD terrorism (Van Leeuwen, 2003a: 1). In Europe, however, only a few states considered terrorism a major threat to national security during the 1990s. Several European countries had either no real experience with terrorism on their territory or, in the case of countries like Germany and Italy, had been spared from terrorist attacks for quite some time. Only in the United Kingdom, Spain and France terrorism remained a major national security priority over the years (Alexander, 2002; Neve et al., 2006). Moreover, before 9/11 rhetorical attempts to frame external security threats by identifying post-bipolar enemies - notably illegal immigration, organized crime
and terrorism - failed to spin off a genuine common threat to the European Union itself (Den Boer, 2000: 221). The European security identity thus remained hugely fragmented and did not provide a unified strategy against terrorism (Zimmermann, 2006).

The events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent terrorist attacks in Madrid and London had a major impact on the security agendas of European governments. They equalized threat perceptions among citizens of EU member states and led to a gradual harmonization of states’ counterterrorism measures. Many European governments professed that these violent actions represented an attack on western democratic values and that democratic states should unite to confront this common danger (Van Leeuwen, 2003: 228). Public awareness and fear of transnational terrorism increased dramatically, even in countries that had not had traumatic experiences with terrorism on their territory (Den Boer, 2003: 185-6). 9/11 also triggered a re-evaluation of legislative, judicial and investigative policies to combat terrorism at a national and international level. The initial sense of urgency following 9/11 materialized in several measures aimed at the prevention of terrorist attacks, including the protection of critical infrastructures and objects, increased intelligence, the strengthening of legal structures and a crackdown on money laundering (Linde et al., 2002: 24). Cooperation with the United States intensified in comparison with earlier periods (Van Leeuwen, 2003: 228-9; Fijnaut, 2002). In the final section of this chapter we will examine the securitization of transnational terrorism at an EU level.

3.4 The development of an EU counterterrorism policy

The responses of EU Justice and Home Affairs to 9/11 signaled an important step in the development of a European counterterrorism strategy. For the first time in its history, the European Union formulated a common counterterrorism policy (Fijnaut, 2002: 33). The heightened attention for terrorism at an EU level is based on the perception that the EU is 'not only a target for terrorist attacks but also an important staging area for preparatory and logistic purposes in the widest sense' (European Council situation report, 20 February 2002, cited in Fijnaut, 2002: 41). As Gijs de Vries, the EU counterterrorism coordinator, recently argued:
The attacks on 9/11 have turned the fight against terrorism into a central dimension of international relations. How best to combat terrorism - or, as some would have it, how to conduct the war on terror - has become a defining issue in multilateral affairs as well as in bilateral relations. Terrorism has changed the global agenda. It has also changed the role and functioning of the European Union (2006: 1).

The contemporary EU discourse on terrorism is moving from state-based terrorism to transnational terrorism, from organized terrorist groups to terrorist networks, and from anti-terrorism to a 'war on terrorism' (Den Boer, 2003: 191).

The increased weight of terrorism on the EU's political agenda setting in the post-9/11 period should be assessed in its wider historical context, since attention to terrorism at an EU level is not new. The concern about domestic (and partly international) terrorism in the 1960s and early 1970s led to the creation of the Trevi group in 1975 as a framework for international security cooperation, notably the intensification and expansion of police strategies against terrorism. During this period a number of 'coalitions' between intelligence services were organized to improve mutual cooperation in the fight against terrorism, for instance the Police Working Group on Terrorism established in 1979.

A meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers on 14 October 1995 resulted in the La Gomera Declaration, which echoes in many respects the terms of reference used in the context of Trevi. The La Gomera Declaration denounced terrorism as a threat to democracy, to the free exercise of human rights and to economic and social development from which no member state of the European Union can be regarded as exempt. The Ministers argued that terrorism had increased significantly, principally as a consequence of 'fundamentalism', and that terrorism was operating on a transnational scale. Therefore, it could not be dealt with effectively solely by means of isolated action and using each individual state’s own resources. In order to prevent and combat terrorism effectively, the Ministers prescribed, there was an urgent need for increased coordination between member states of the European Union.

Despite these calls for international cooperation between EU member states, negotiations about an EU counterterrorism policy and the mandate of Europol have long been frustrated by the lack of a collective sense of urgency.
Several European countries did not regard terrorism as a major challenge to national or European security in the 1990s. Prior to 9/11 only seven member states had specific counter-terrorist legislation, namely France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Terrorism within the EU had to compete for policy attention with other international security issues, such as drug-trafficking, organized crime, illegal immigration and asylum seekers (Den Boer, 2003: 187). It was not until 2001, just before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, that alarming statements about the threat of transnational (Islamist) terrorism were published. For example, only one week prior to 9/11 the European Parliament, in its recommendations about the EU's fight against terrorism, regretted the EU's slowness in responding to the 'terrorist threat'.

The events of 11 September 2001 generated, at least temporarily, the sense of urgency that had lacked historically. The weeks following 9/11 are characterized by some scholars as 'the month of transformation' (Guild and Bigo, cited in Den Boer, 2003: 189). 9/11 accelerated decision-making about terrorism at an EU level. The EU priority program placed 'combating terrorism in an area of freedom, security and justice' first in a list of six key priorities, even before the introduction of the Euro and EU enlargement. The program called the EU's future fragile '[...] with the emergence of new transnational challenges and dangers such as terrorism and organized crime' (cited in Den Boer, 2003: 189) During this period the EU also declared its solidarity with the US-led war on terrorism, resulting in a greater influence of US counterterrorism strategies on EU policy (Fijnaut, 2002: 28). Traditional internal threats were being reconceptualized:

Non-European, transnational components of political terrorism have gained greater relevance in public opinion and political discourse, in spite of the persistence of various forms of terrorism in several European countries (Den Boer, 2003: 193).

In conjunction, the terrorist attacks in the United States, Madrid and London have contributed to gradual convergence of national security agendas and anti-terrorism legislations. Illustrative in this respect is the fact that by December 2005, 21 EU member states had completed the implementation of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, as ratified by the European Council on 13 June 2002. The remaining five states had either partially implemented it
(Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia) or had new counterterrorism legislation under preparation (Cyprus and Latvia) (Council of the European Union, 2005).

The intensification of the fight against terrorism at an EU level can be identified on four different dimensions (Den Boer, 2003: 191). The first sphere of activity is the active pursuit of legal harmonization. A second objective is the rapid expansion and reinforcement of institutional capacity within the EU. A third area of activity is the encapsulation of counterterrorism in the EU's foreign policy agenda and the reinforcement of transatlantic relations. The final dimension of heightened EU activity is 'the construction of a uniform conception of terrorism as a dominant security threat, building on the merging process between internal and external security' (ibid.) The latter dimension, the gradual convergence of internal security (policing, in a broad sense) and external security (involving diplomacy and military expertise) principally involved the conceptual, political and operational externalization of internal security. Internal threats to security were redefined and the external, extra-European origin or dimension of each of them was emphasized (Pastore, 2001: 1-2; Bigo, 2000). As Anderson and Apap argue:

> Within law enforcement agencies, and frequently in political discourse, the idea of a security continuum was advanced making connections between categories of activities: terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime, trans-frontier crime, illegal immigration, asylum seekers, and some minority ethnic groups (2002: 3).

The Europeanization and the externalization of internal security have had a major impact on the policy-making process in the field of EU Justice and Home Affairs. The externalization of internal security issues created an incentive for national law enforcement agencies to devote an increasing proportion of their institutional and operational efforts to the international arena (Anderson and Apap, 2002: 4). The externalization of internal security has generated an increased overlap, and occasionally open competition, with the policy communities and public agencies traditionally dedicated to the task of ensuring external security (Pastore, 2001: 2).
4. CONCLUSION

In this final part of the report, we present a concise set of conclusions regarding the notions and dimensions of security. In addition, conclusions are formulated concerning the development of transnational terrorism as a security issue and its consequences for the conceptualization of security.

1. Security is a contested concept which defies pursuit of a generally agreed definition. The concept refers to different sets of issues, purposes and values, often closely reflecting conflicting theories in International Relations. The debate remains among academics on the conceptualization of security, most notably on the level of analysis and the scope of the study of security. This debate can be traced back to the dominant theoretical traditions in International Relations and the continuing competition between these different traditions. The influence of this debate is not limited to the academia. Policymakers and commentators alike invoke elements of the theoretical traditions when articulating solutions to security dilemmas.

2. The focus and scope of security studies has evolved significantly over the years. During the pre-Cold War years several scholars advocated a relatively broad understanding of security. At this stage the field of security studies was not yet as preoccupied with deterrence and nuclear weaponry as it would become during the Cold War era. In the Cold War period the concept of security became more narrowly defined, primarily at the nation-state level and almost exclusively through the military prism. The concepts proposed in the pre-Cold War years have been neglected by the vast majority of scholars since the Cold War, despite the historical continuities in scholarly attempts to broaden the scope of security studies.

3. The dominant concept of security during the Cold War was intimately linked to realist theory, which focuses on states' behavior in ensuring security by military means. This concept equated security with military issues and the state-centered use of force. The conventional concept of
security has been increasingly challenged on a number of issues. Some scholars criticized the almost exclusive focus on military threat in realist thinking about security, stressing the need for incorporating a range of neglected issues into the concept of security. Others challenged the state-centric focus of the concept, opting for a more multi-level analysis of security. Some academics also rejected the ethnocentricity of traditional approaches to and definitions of security, arguing that these approaches should be seen in their specific cultural context: the highly industrialized and modernized democracies of the West. Feminist critiques of security studies challenge the masculinist modes of domination underlying the concept of security, claiming that security serves patriarchal relations of power and therefore renders women insecure. Recent studies also emphasize the framing of certain issues as a security problem. In this view, there are no security threats in themselves, but only issues constructed as such by certain actors through speech acts and through the specific practices of security professionals. In the process of securitization an existential threat is designated, which requires immediate action or special measures to fight the perceived threat.

4. The end of the Cold War generated heightened scholarly debate on the future of national and international security. The new research agenda became broader in its focus. Several influential scholars concentrated on issues other than deterrence and military force, giving way to the multifaceted extension of the concept of security. One of the most dominant issues in this debate has been the consequences of globalization, notably the relations between states and non-state actors in the international system and the rise of transnational criminal networks. Globalization is commonly viewed to have fundamentally altered both the threats to security and the means for ensuring security.

5. Several scholars have argued for the 'broadening' and the 'deepening' of the concept of security. Each of these debates focus on different questions. The broadening debate is essentially concerned with the question of the source of threat to security. In this context, many scholars stress the importance of extending the concept of security to other issues or sectors
than the military one. The deepening debate deals principally with the question of the referent object of security. In this sense, questions have been raised whether entities other than the state should be able to claim security threats, moving either down to the level of individual or human security or up to the level international or global security, with regional and societal security as possible intermediate points.

6. The academic debate on the 'broadening' and the 'deepening' of security reveals the contested nature of security. The alternative concepts of security have, to varying extents, been challenged on several aspects. Incorporating new dimensions and levels of security, it is argued, may not be very useful at all since it may damage the term's conceptual coherence and render it void of meaning. There is no consensus on the analytical usefulness and operability of alternative concepts of security and, as a consequence, the concept of security is as contested as ever.

7. As recent terrorist attacks on American and European soil demonstrate, transnational organized networks of non-state actors can pose a significant threat to national and international security. These recent events have had a profound impact on the scholarly debate concerning the consequences of globalization and, more specifically, the threat of non-state actors to security and the means for individual states to ensure security. Policy perceptions of terrorism have also been moving away from state-based terrorism to transnational terrorist networks.

8. Only in recent years has transnational terrorism come to be considered as a prominent threat to Western and European security. Transnational terrorism is one of the issues which are increasingly viewed through the security prism, reflecting the broadening of security studies in general. Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon, during the Cold War the study of terrorism received comparatively little attention as the East-West confrontation dominated the international security agenda. The main focus during the Cold War was on state-sponsored terrorism, and more specifically on Soviet support for revolutionary movements. In the 1990s the focus of terrorism studies shifted towards the threat of terrorism with
weapons of mass destruction. Contemporary terrorism studies increasingly focus on fluid cross-bordering terrorist networks.

9. The perceived threat of transnational terrorism has had a major effect on EU member states' counterterrorism strategies, both individually and collectively. Recent attacks have generated a heightened and shared sense of urgency, although significant national variations remain. The recent terrorist attacks in the United States and in Europe equalized threat perceptions among member states and led to a gradual harmonization of states' counterterrorism measures, including specific anti-terrorist legislation. The heightened attention for terrorism at an EU level is based on the perception that the EU is not merely a likely target for terrorist attacks, but also an important stage for preparatory and logistic purposes. Recent terrorist attacks had led to an intensification of a fight against terrorism at an EU level, including increased cooperation with the United States.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


63


79


