January 26, 1998

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing you because we are convinced that current American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and that we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War...

The policy of "containment" of Saddam Hussein has been steadily eroding over the past several months...we can no longer depend on our partners in the Gulf War coalition to continue to uphold the sanctions or to punish Saddam...Even if full inspections were eventually to resume...experience has shown that it is difficult if not impossible to monitor Iraq's chemical and biological weapons production...

Given the magnitude of the threat, the current policy, which depends for its success upon the steadfastness of our coalition partners...is dangerously inadequate. The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction...this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.

Sincerely,

Elliot Abrams
Richard L. Armitage
William J. Bennett
Jeffrey Bergner
John Bolton
Paula Dobriansky
Francis Fukuyama
Robert Kagan
Zalmay Khalilzad
William Kristol
Richard Perle
Peter W. Rodman
Donald Rumsfeld
William Schneider, Jr.
Vin Weber
Paul Wolfowitz
R. James Woolsey
Robert B. Zoellick

GARY DORRIEN

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Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana

GARY DORRIEN

ROUTLEDGE
NEW YORK • LONDON
For Christopher Latiolais and Laura Packard Latiolais, 
treasured friends
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Introduction

Neocons in Power

In the waning months of the cold war, shortly before an expiring Soviet Union finally disintegrated, a group of neoconservative policymakers and intellectuals began to argue that the moment had come to create an American-dominated world order. Some of them called it “the unipolarist imperative.” Instead of reducing military spending, they contended, the United States needed to expand its military reach to every region of the world, using America’s tremendous military and economic power to create a new Pax Americana. This book describes how the ideology of American global preeminence originated during the presidency of George H.W. Bush, developed in the 1990s, gained power with the election of George W. Bush, and reshaped American foreign policy after September 11, 2001.

Structured as a narrative, my account deals with government policymakers, policy specialists, political operatives, intellectuals, and pundits. It tells the story of the development of unipolarist ideology and its role in recent American foreign policy. It makes an argument about the nature and problems of this ideology, emphasizing that an unrivaled superpower makes the whole world its geopolitical neighborhood. It offers a critique of the unilateralist militarism of the second Bush administration. And it contends that the problem of imperial expansiveness, though dramatically heightened by the Bush administration, did not begin with it. The problem is inherent in the anxiety of being a global hegemon.

Eleven years ago I wrote a critical analysis of neoconservativism titled The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology. A comprehensive work that dealt with neoconservative economics, social policy, foreign policy, and cultural arguments, it was written just in time to catch the neocons’ transition from the cold war to what they variously called “unipolarism,” “democratic globalism” or “neo-Manifest Destinarianism.” In my interviews with prominent neocons it struck me that most were anxious to find a substitute for the energizing and unifying role that the cold war had played for them. The neocons fell out of power shortly afterward, and in the mid-1990s they attracted attention mostly by waging what they called “culture wars,” but it seemed to me that the foreign policy issue was the key to their identity and political future.
Against the liberal internationalism of the Clinton administration and the neoisolationist nationalism of the Republican Congress, the neocons had a forceful vision of a world reshaped by American power. On the basis of this vision they forged alliances with hardline conservatives Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, strengthened the foreign policy wings of the American Enterprise Institute at other neocon think tanks, established the *Weekly Standard* magazine and the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), and divided between John McCain and George W. Bush in the Republican primaries. Bush’s campaign advisory group on foreign policy, the self-named “Vulcans,” “was a patchwork of neocons led by Paul Wolfowitz and hawkish realists led by Condoleezza Rice, all eight of whom were unipolarists. If the neocons were to regain power, it would be as advocates of maximizing America’s unipolar moment.  

That is what happened after George W. Bush won the presidency, though the neocons were quite frustrated with Bush until September 11, 2001. Thanks to Cheney, who favored the neocons, and Rumsfeld, who was selected by Cheney to limit Colin Powell’s influence, and Paul Wolfowitz, who was one of Bush’s two chief foreign policy advisers, the neocons did stunningly well in the appointment derby. More than twenty of them won high-ranking positions, notably Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams, Kenneth Adelman, John Bolton, Stephen A. Cambone, Paula Dobriansky, Stephen J. Hadley, Douglas Feith, Zalmay Khalilzad, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, William Luti, Richard Perle, Peter W. Rodman, and David Wurmser. The Vice-President’s office, the Pentagon, and the semi-independent Defense Policy Board became neocon strongholds. By the time that Bush and Cheney were inaugurated, they shared the neocon fixation with overthrowing Iraq; at Bush’s first National Security Council meeting he put regime change in Iraq at the top of his foreign policy agenda. But it was not until 9/11 that George W. Bush fully joined his own administration. Before 9/11 he adopted Clinton’s defense budget, concentrated on the politics of tax-cutting, and outwardly continued Clinton’s containment policy toward Iraq; like the neocons, he was also more interested in Iraq than al-Qaeda. On 9/11 Bush discovered what his presidency was about. In need of a defined and militant foreign policy, he adopted the determined unipolarist vision of an administration that was already in place and its sense of urgency about overthrowing Iraq. Before 9/11 Bush struck his neocon and hardline conservative supporters as a half-hearted unipolarist. In the aftermath of 9/11 Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld urged Bush to respond to al Qaeda’s fiendish attacks by invading Iraq; Bush pressured counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke to find a link between Saddam and 9/11; and less than two months after the U.S. attacked Afghanistan, Bush secretly ordered a war plan to smash the Iraqi government.

I do not argue that Bush is a puppet of the neocons and Cheney/Rumsfeld. His administration has been very short on sustained policy discussion; his top officials are not neocons (though that could change in a second term); and he apparently made up his own mind (in consultation with Cheney) to scuttle the
doctrine of deterrence, pursue anti-terrorism as a world war, propound a radical doctrine of preventive war, and invade Iraq. Neither do I argue that Bush has adopted a consistently neocon foreign policy. He has not (yet) taken aggressively neocon policies toward North Korea, Iran, and Syria; the neocons have run hot and cold over his handling of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict; and with great frustration they have implored Bush and Rumsfeld to pacify Iraq with greater military force. Neither do I believe that unipolarist ideology is some kind of conspiracy or a cover for hardline Zionism. The neoconservative phenomenon is a highly public enterprise, and though virtually all neocons are Likud-style Zionists, they are chiefly devoted to the cause of “American Greatness.” A significant number of neocons and unipolarist hawks are not Jewish, contrary to the stereotype, and the neocons genuinely believe that the maximal use of American power is nearly always good for the world.

I do argue that the entire Bush foreign policy team advocates some version of unipolarist ideology, that Cheney and Rumsfeld are committed to PNAC-style unipolarism and are closely associated with movement neocons, and that the Bush administration’s determination to overthrow Iraq was rooted historically and ideologically in the neo-imperial ambitions of the neocons. The kernel of the latter story is the unfinished business of Cheney, Wolfowitz, and their deputies from the first Bush administration, but more broadly and importantly, the same people and others regarded Saddam Hussein as an intolerable obstacle to their designs for the Middle East and, indeed, the world.

Of course, that is not what they said during the buildup to the war. Bush officials badly exaggerated the evidence about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, although they were undoubtedly sincere in believing that Saddam possessed large stockpiles of them. They soft-pedaled their most important reason for invading Iraq because this reason—to consolidate a new American power base in the land of a tyrannical enemy and shake up the entire Middle East—was and is terribly difficult to discuss in American life. Administration officials hyped the weapons issue because that was the most effective way to get a stampede going.

They could not say that the war was a form of social engineering on a grand scale halfway around the world. They could not repeat what Rumsfeld told the National Security Council on the twelfth day of the Bush administration: “Imagine what the region would look like without Saddam and with a regime that’s aligned with U.S. interests. It would change everything in the region and beyond it. It would demonstrate what U.S. policy is all about.” It would not have been prudent for Bush officials to say what U.S. policy was now about, though the presence of so many neocon unipolarists in the Pentagon and Vice President’s s office should have been a clue.

Three months after American troops took Baghdad, British historian Niall Ferguson noted and exemplified the public discourse dilemma that constrained the Bush administration. In a debate with Robert Kagan at the American Enterprise Institute, Ferguson argued that America needed to relinquish its
precious denial that it had an empire, because this denial prevented the United States from doing a good job of imperial maintenance in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. An historian of the British Empire, Ferguson assured that there is such a thing as good imperialism. He wanted Americans to aspire to it in their nation’s present and future occupations. But near the end of the debate he dropped half of his argument, explaining that he was an academic, not a politician. Academics could tell the truth because students had to come to class, but politicians had to play to the prejudices and self-images of the public to get things done. Thus he didn’t really believe that Bush should talk about America’s imperial designs in the Middle East; in fact Bush was obliged not to do so, given America’s tenaciously innocent self-image.5

The neocons have a colorful history on this point. Some have kept their guard up, especially when constrained by government office, but many have proclaimed strong opinions most of the time. The irony of the conspiracy thesis is that neoconservatism is the most prolifically in-your-face persuasion in American politics. Though the PNAC didn’t get much attention in its early years, that was not for lack of trying. “People think there’s a conspiracy” Bill Kristol laughingly observes. “It’s not as if Paul [Wolfowitz] and Richard [Perle] and I get together every month and decide what the next move is going to be.” Commenting on the common use of the term often by neocons themselves, to describe the unipolarist group, Kristol adds, “If it’s a cabal, it’s the most visible cabal ever… We write articles.” Wolfowitz makes the same point, though in a bristling and defensive tone: “It’s completely out in the open who holds these views in this administration. It couldn’t be more transparent.”6

Resisting the conspiratorial trend, the present work takes the new Pax Americana seriously as a foreign policy option, building its case as much as possible on published documents. Its subject is the development of unipolarist ideology in relation to events of the past generation. Imperial Designs argues that the unipolarist vision is plausible, important, and wrong. The ideology of American dominion is a serious response to the circumstances of the post-cold war world, but it is selfdefeating as a strategy to prevent the emergence of rival power blocs and it is not the best way to fight terrorism.

Chapter 1 discusses the historical rootage of the unipolarist persuasion in American neoconservatism and, more broadly, the idea of American exceptionalism. Chapter 2 focuses on the government policymaking of Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, and Richard Perle in the Reagan and first Bush administrations. It is centrally concerned with the efforts of Wolfowitz, Cheney, and Powell to develop a new grand strategy for the United States after the cold war. Chapter 3 moves from the mid-1970s to the present day, focusing on the thinking of Charles Krauthammer, Ben Wattenberg, and Joshua Muravchik. The central concern of this chapter is to track the development of the realist and democratic globalist versions of unipolarist ideology. Many observers have sought to simplify the neoconservative phenomenon by identifying it exclusively with democratic globalism, but this approach has the strange effect
of excluding Irving Kristol, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Charles Krauthammer, John Bolton, and other nationalistic unipolarists from neoconservatism. Most neocons are universalistic democratizers, but not all. Chapter 4 describes arguments by William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Max Boot, and Lawrence F. Kaplan for a foreign policy of “American Greatness” as well as Kristor’s founding of the Weekly Standard magazine and the PNAC. The PNAC is significant because most of its early associates took high-ranking positions in the second Bush administration.

Chapters 5 and 6 are synthetic and reflective. Chapter 5 analyzes the Bush administration’s case for invading Iraq, the politics of the Iraq occupation and hardline Zionism, and arguments between American paleoconservatives and neoconservatives. Chapter 6 has a stronger reflective emphasis but also discusses the liberal imperialism of Stanley Kurtz and Robert D. Kaplan, arguing that the goal of an American empire increasingly bridges the disagreements between democratic globalists and realists. The last chapter develops my critique of the compulsive expansionism of Pax Americanist ideology, especially its unilateralist spirit and politics of perpetual war.

Terminology is a slippery problem for a work such as this. Policymakers generally avoid labeling themselves, aside from market-tested vagaries such as “compassionate conservatism,” while intellectuals are more inclined to define themselves. But in the case of the unipolarist persuasion, the preferred monikers are various and fluid. Bill Kristol says that “neo-imperialist,” “neoconservative,” “Pax Americanist,” “unipolarist,” and “neo-Reaganite” apply equally well to him; Charles Krauthammer coined the term “unipolarism” and also goes by “neo-imperialist”; Joshua Muravchik prefers “neoconservative” or “Pax Americanist,” and is a chief proponent of democratic globalism; Ben Wattenberg calls himself a “neo-Manifest Destinarian” and “unipolarist”; Max Boot describes himself as a “liberal imperialist” and also claims “neoconservative”; Stanley Kurtz prefers “liberal imperialist”; the Vulcans named themselves after a huge statue in Condoleezza Rice’s hometown of Birmingham, Alabama, which conveyed their sense of themselves as tough, unrelenting, powerful warriors.

This book discusses these terms in their pertinent contexts, distinguishing among nationalistic realists who favor an aggressive unilateralism based on America’s economic and security interests, pragmatic realists who contend that America cannot get its way without cultivating allies, and democratic globalists who believe in creating and/or imposing pro-American democracies throughout the world. In the context of recent debates, nationalistic realists like Krauthammer, Rumsfeld, and John Bolton want the U.S. to stay out of the peacekeeping business; pragmatic realists like Colin Powell and Dick Armitage want the U.S. to share the burdens of warfighting and peacekeeping with others; democratic globalists like Bill Kristol and Joshua Muravchik argue that if the American empire is overstretched it has to increase its capacity to fight wars, police the world, and export democracy. Many of the unipolarists want to ignite democratic revolutions in the Middle East and some believe that that’s the last
thing America should want, but all of them are deeply committed to consolidating American power in the region and entire world.

Unipolarism is not an exclusively neoconservative enterprise. Hawkish unilateralists such as Rumsfeld and Cheney are unipolarists, but not products of the neoconservative movement. The same is true of conservative realists such as Powell, Armitage, Rice, and Henry Kissinger, and Democrats such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Peter Beinart, and Michael Ignatieff. But the ideology of American unipolarism is largely a neoconservative phenomenon. Most of the leading unipolarist theorists and policymakers are neocons, just as most of the leading think tanks and magazines on the right are neoconservative. Because the story that I am telling is largely a development within the older and broader phenomenon of neoconservatism, it is appropriate to begin with an account of what neoconservatism was and is.
In the early 1970s the American socialist leader Michael Harrington and his friends at *Dissent* magazine hung the label “neoconservative” on a group of former allies as an act of dissociation. Many of these former allies had until recently been Harrington’s comrades in the Socialist Party; others were old liberals (some of them former socialists) who disliked what liberalism had become since the mid-1960s. The former group included veteran Cold War socialists Arnold Beichman, Sidney Hook, Emanuel Muravchik, Arch Puddington, John Roche, and Max Shachtman; the latter group included political figures and intellectuals such as Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Henry Jackson, Max Kampelman, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Irving Kristol, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Ben Wattenberg. A few refugees from the new left, notably Richard John Neuhaus, Michael Novak, and Norman Podhoretz, also migrated to the “neoconservative” camp, as did politically homeless conservatives such as Peter Berger and James Q. Wilson.¹

Most of the original neocons supported America’s war in Vietnam, but more important, all were repulsed by America’s antiwar movement. To them it was appalling that the party of Harry Truman and John Kennedy nominated George McGovern for president in 1972. They despaired over the ascension of antiwar activism, feminism, and moralistic idealism in the Democratic Party, which they called “McGovernism.” McGovernism stood for appeasement and the politics of liberal guilt, whereas the neocons stood for a self-confident and militantly interventionist Americanism. The neocons were deeply alienated from what they called the “liberal intelligentsia” and the “fashionable liberal elite.” To them, good liberalism was expansionist, nationalistic, and fiercely anticommunist; it prized patriotic values that were sneered at by the liberal elite. Most of the neocons contended that they had not changed, at least not on the important things. They were not the ones that needed to be renamed. It was Harrington, Irving Howe, Lewis Coser, and others in the orbit of *Dissent* magazine who had changed, selling out the cause of socialist anticommunism. Worse yet, Harrington’s group had done it to win over the children of the 1960s, who had turned liberalism into a politics of guilt-breeding, anti-interventionist, anti-American idealism.

Harrington and his friends sought to make clear that a parting of ways had occurred. They were no longer associated with the neoconservatives. In the wake
of McGovern’s crushing electoral defeat the Socialist Party had imploded, the old left launched a new organization called Social Democrats U.S.A., Harrington formed a new organization called the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, and the Cold War liberals founded the Coalition for a Democratic Majority to take back the Democratic Party from McGovernism. Harrington wanted to convert the McGovern liberals to democratic socialism. Ten years earlier his emotional and ideological ties to old left anticommunism had alienated the youthful leaders of the new left; now he envisioned a party-realigning coalition of baby boom liberals and progressive social democrats.

But first he had to excommunicate his rightward-moving former comrades from the left, partly to establish his separation from them. By calling them “neoconservatives,” he implied that the old social democrats were not the right wing of the left but the left wing of the right. The difference was crucial, as the labeled party keenly understood. The neocons disputed their label and its insinuations, protesting that they had nothing in common with American conservatives. Many of them didn’t know any conservatives personally. To them, conservatives were country clubbers, reactionaries, racists, and Republicans, nothing like mainstream Democrats or tough social democrats.

The neocons lacked conservative nostalgia. They did not yearn for medieval Christendom, Tory England, the Old South, or laissez-faire capitalism. They were modernists, longtime supporters of the Civil Rights movement, comfortable with a minimal welfare state, and many were trained in the social sciences. Most of them were New York Jews who shuddered at the anti-Semitism and xenophobia of the old right. They may have voted for Richard Nixon but only because the Democratic Party had lost its bearings and the Socialists had stopped running presidential candidates. Calling them conservatives of any kind was insulting.

But the name stuck because they were changing more than they acknowledged. Although they had no conservative friends at the outset of their political transformation, the neocons went on to objectively align themselves with the political right. From the beginning they hated the anti-interventionist and cultural liberationist aspects of the new liberalism, and increasingly they added that liberal economics was wrong, too. Irving Kristol’s *The Public Interest* led the way on socioeconomic issues, showing the unintended consequences of progressive taxes and government antipoverty programs. The new liberalism, like the old, thought too highly of equality, he argued. Liberal economics penalized achievers, prevented wealth creation, and created a bloated welfare state. The enemy wasn’t merely a youthful overreaction to Vietnam, for the egalitarian illusions of the old liberalism paved the way to the disastrous new liberalism. The Civil Rights movement gave way to “affirmative discrimination” and Black Power nationalism; Lyndon Johnson’s war on poverty mostly benefitted a “new class” of parasitic bureaucrats and social workers; the emancipatory rhetoric of liberalim invited new assaults on the social order such as feminism, environmentalism, and gay rights; and America was losing the fight against communism.
Kristol and, later, Michael Novak explained that liberalism catered to the self-promoting idealism of a new generational power bloc, the “new class” children of the 1960s who swelled the ranks of America’s nonproducing managerial class. In the name of compassion, liberals created new government programs, but the chief effect of the programs was to service the career ambitions of new class baby boomers. Modern liberalism wanted America to be weak but government to be strong. With a polemical style and vocabulary that betrayed their backgrounds in the left, the neocons skewered the new class for its appeasing antimilitarism and devotion to expanded government engineering.2

In the mid-1970s the neocons tried to retake the Democratic Party but their presidential candidate, Henry “Scoop” Jackson, was soundly defeated in the primaries, and by then some neocons were well to the right of Jackson on economic policy. Tellingly, the first neconervative to accept Harrington’s label, Irving Kristol, was also the first to join the Republican Party, in the early 1970s; later he moved all the way to supply-side economics. While Kristol’s colleagues at the Public Interest bristled at their consignment to the political right, Kristol acknowledged that he had become some kind of conservative. Having renounced his hothouse socialist background before most of his friends, Kristol had more emotional distance from the left than they did, which made it easier to acknowledge that he was drifting toward some kind of conservatism. His affinity for neo-orthodox theology helped him accept the term neoconservative.

Some neocons held on to their social democratic values after Kristol and Michael Novak made neoconservatism an emphatically capitalist ideology. Others such as Bell and Moynihan distanced themselves from neoconservatism after it became an overwhelmingly Republican movement. The key to the movement’s Republican turn, however, was foreign policy. The neocons failed to purge the Democratic Party of McGovernism, and in 1976 they ruefully witnessed the triumph of a moderate Southern moralist who shared none of their foreign policy agenda. They warned Jimmy Carter that the Soviets were winning the Cold War; he replied by appointing none of them to high-ranking positions in his administration. The neocons turned on him furiously, making “Carterism” an epithet ranking with McGovernism. Prominent neoconservative and Commentary editor Norman Podhoretz led the charge against the Democratic president. Less than a year after Carter took office, Podhoretz scolded that the same liberals who had run the Vietnam War under Kennedy and Johnson were atoning for their sins by keeping America at home. He noted that Carter had recently congratulated himself and his fellow Americans for overcoming their “inordinate fear of communism.” To Podhoretz, this declaration epitomized the stupidity and corruption of spirit that characterized America’s “culture of appeasement.” America was surrendering to Soviet power throughout the world because American leaders secretly feared it.3

This reading of the American condition had little place in the Democratic Party, but it perfectly suited Ronald Reagan, who replaced Scoop Jackson as the
political hero and rainmaker of the neoconservatives. By 1980 they were happy to call themselves neoconservatives. The term legitimized their place in the Republican Party while distinguishing the neocons from forms of conservatism that were less urbane, ethnic, and ideological than themselves. Neocons Elliott Abrams, Kenneth Adelman, William Bennett, Linda Chavez, Chester Finn, Robert Kagan, Max Kampelman, Jeane Kirkpatrick, William Kristol, Richard Perle, Richard Pipes, Eugene Rostow, and Paul Wolfowitz won high-ranking positions in the Reagan administration; The New Republic half-seriously warned that “Trotsky’s orphans” were taking over the government. Neoconservatives provided the intellectual ballast for Reagan’s military buildup and his anticommunist foreign policy, especially his maneuvers in Central America. While disagreeing with each other over how much should be done with America’s enhanced firepower, they agreed that a massive military buildup was necessary and that America needed to “take the fight to the Soviets.”

They were the last true believers in the efficacy of Soviet totalitarianism. In the mid-1980s, most neoconservatives brushed aside any suggestion that the Soviet economy was disintegrating, or that dissident movements in the Soviet bloc were revealing cracks in the Soviet empire, or that Gorbachev’s reforms should be taken seriously. For them, the absolute domestic power of the Communist Party and the communist duty to create a communist world order precluded the possibility of genuine change anywhere in the Soviet bloc. Neocons such as Podhoretz, Frank Gaffney, and Michael Ledeen outflanked Reagan to the right on fighting communism. In the early years of Reagan’s presidency Podhoretz bitterly complained that Reagan, despite his militant rhetoric, skyrocketing military expenditures, and appointment of neoconservatives, capitulated to the Soviets in the struggle for the world. In the later years of Reagan’s presidency, Podhoretz bitterly judged that Reagan betrayed the cause of anticommunism.

The neocons warned repeatedly that the United States was in grave danger. America was surrendering unnecessarily to the Soviet enemy in the name of realism and peace. Foreign policy realists such as George Kennan, Stephen Cohen, and Jerry Hough lifted geopolitics, material interests, and mutual security above America’s ideological war with the Soviet Union, portraying the Soviet Union as a competing superpower wracked by internal problems. To them, the Soviet Union was a greatpower foe with which the United States could negotiate accommodations on specific issues. The neocons replied that these factors were trivial compared to the Cold War struggle for the world. To portray the Soviet Union as a competing superpower was to undermine America’s will and capacity to fight communism. It was the tragic legacy of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations to have undermined America’s life or death mission. What was needed was a courageously ideological leader who recognized the implacable hostility of the Soviet state and faced up to the necessity of making life intolerable for it. Neocon policy makers Kenneth Adelman, Max Kampelman, Richard Perle, Richard Pipes, and Eugene Rostow made the case for huge
increases in military spending, while Perle fashioned Reagan’s peculiar combination of beliefs into the “zero option” for disarmament; neocon intellectual and U.N. ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick defended America’s practice of supporting rightwing dictatorships as bulwarks against communism; outside the administration, Podhoretz warned that the struggle for the world was being lost. 

Neocons invoked the doctrine of totalitarianism as an article of faith. It taught that the Soviet system had immense competitive advantages over democracies by virtue of not being a democracy and that Soviet power was invulnerable to internal challenges. The Soviet state was a fearsome monolith that surpassed the United States in military power and threatened to win the struggle for the world. Repeatedly, *Commentary* magazine blasted the “culture of appeasement” that appealed for a nuclear freeze and refused to fight communism in Central America. Podhoretz heaped special scorn on antiwar church leaders, homosexual pacifists, and liberal politicians; he also attacked big business appeasers who wanted to do business with the Soviets, complaining that Reagan was too solicitous of the capitalist class to fight the Soviet Union. In his rendering, liberal church leaders and politicians were cowardly moralists and fools, homosexuals opposed war out of their lust for “helpless, good-looking boys,” and the capitalist class perversely sold Soviet leaders the rope that would be used to hang America.

Podhoretz charged that the new peace activists were motivated by fear, which made them more loathsome than the fellow traveling dupes of an earlier generation who actually liked the Soviet Union, or at least their fantasy of it. The new pacifists felt no attraction to the Soviet Union, he explained; they were simply terrified of it and lacked the courage to resist it. The new movements for nuclear arms control and disarmament were fueled by the cowardly fear that the evils of war always outweighed the worth of any objective for which a war might be fought. But sadly, even Reagan had no stomach for actually fighting communism; his few invasions were tiny and inconsequential; and thus, everywhere he was losing the Cold War.

Podhoretz’s disappointment in Reagan turned to outright contempt during Reagan’s second term. In 1985 he complained that Reagan was repeating the worst mistakes of his predecessors. Reagan’s emerging arms control agreement was a throwback to the Basic Principles of Detente of 1972; his approach to Central America resembled the ill-fated resolution of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis; his approach to Nicaragua, in particular, recycled the disastrous 1962 Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, which called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the area. A truly anticommunist president would have crushed the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and Salvadoran guerrillas; Reagan played political games with them. Podhoretz warned that if Reagan continued down this road in his second term, he would cruelly disappoint those who had believed in his commitment to fight communism.
The titles of Podhoretz’s articles told the story of his bitter disappointment during Reagan’s second term: “Reagan: A Case of Mistaken Identity,” “How Reagan Succeeds as a Carter Clone,” and, most plaintively, “What If Reagan Were President?” When Gorbachev surprisingly accepted Perle’s zero option and Reagan agreed to take yes for an answer, Podhoretz thundered that Reagan betrayed the cause of anticommunism. He was incredulous that Reagan bought the “single greatest lie of our time,” that arms control served the ends of peace and security. In 1986 Reagan traded a Soviet spy for the release of an American journalist; Podhoretz protested that Reagan “shamed himself and the country” because of his “craven eagerness” for an arms agreement with Gorbachev. The culture of appeasement was winning. By playing on the fear of war, Podhoretz claimed, the culture of appeasement turned even Ronald Reagan into a servant of the Big Lie.10

Some neocons resisted this verdict, gamely relieving Reagan of responsibility for the foreign policies of his administration. Under the slogan, “let Reagan be Reagan,” “they blamed a series of Reagan officials—Alexander Haig, James Baker, Michael Deaver, and finally George Shultz—for pushing Reagan toward a policy of “Finlandizing” appeasement. But Podhoretz spurned these pious evasions. The Reagan administration was craven and foolish because that was Reagan’s character, he charged. The real Reagan was not the courageous anticommunist of Reagan speeches but a vain politician whose greed for popularity drove him into the arms of the Soviets. Reaching for the ultimate insult, in 1986 Podhoretz desperately announced that Reagan had become a Carter clone. But although poor Carter never got away with being Carter, he complained, it seemed that Reagan would get away with it.11 The only hope for his administration was for Reaganites to stop ganging up on scapegoats like Shultz and vent their rage at Reagan himself. “Maybe if they did,” he wrote, “the President would think twice before betraying them and his own ideas again.”12

To Podhoretz and the hardest-line neocons, America stood in greater danger than ever before, because it faced a Soviet leader who had figured out how to strengthen the Soviet empire and disarm the West. Gorbachev was a cunning Leninist who seduced America into lowering its guard. He softened up Western opinion by making the world less afraid of the Soviet Union. Neocons relied on the doctrine of totalitarianism to explain what was happening. According to this doctrine, the twin pillars of communism were the absolute domestic power of the Communist Party and the duty to create a communist international order. It was absurd to believe that any Soviet leader would try to democratize the Soviet system or curb its drive for world domination. Just as Lenin loosened economic restraints during the 1920s to impede an economic collapse, Gorbachev opened the Soviet system just enough to entice Western aid and thereby save his totalitarian structure.13

The neocons debated whether Gorbachev had found a cunning way to disarm America, but they agreed about totalitarianism. In the upper regions of the first Bush administration, months after Reagan proclaimed the end of the Cold War?
Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz maintained that the Cold War was still raging. Charles Krauthammer doubted that Gorbachev had suckered the West, but he pined for American leaders who matched Gorbachev’s commanding skills. Podhoretz and Frank Gaffney contended that America was losing the Cold War because Gorbachev seduced the Reagan and Bush administrations to stop fighting it. All of them believed that Soviet totalitarianism defied the rules of politics. The doctrine of totalitarianism taught that Soviet leaders were not free to assess the national interest. Thus, it was inconceivable that Gorbachev would undermine the basis of his rule by genuinely opening the Soviet system or dismantling the Soviet empire. Podhoretz inveighed against the Arias Peace Plan for Central America on the same grounds, arguing that it was “naive to the point of dementia” to believe that the Nicaraguan Sandinistas would ever permit a legitimate election.¹⁴

Why was the West falling for Gorbachev’s peace offensive? Podhoretz darkly suggested that the answer lay in the warning he had issued ten years earlier. Unless America committed itself to attaining strategic superiority, he had warned, the West would become Finlandized in the name of peace. An unspoken fear of Soviet power would lead the West to sign trade agreements with the Soviets involving the transfer of technology, grain, “and anything else the Soviets might want or need …negotiated on terms amounting to the payment of tribute.” Reagan’s military build-up was too small and had come too late. Thus, he crawled to Moscow “with bags of tributary gold.” Having lost the Cold War, the West frantically negotiated the terms of its Finlandization. It was a species of surrender.¹⁵

In the fall of 1989 the “totalitarian” regimes of Eastern Europe collapsed overnight, most of them without violence, and the theory of totalitarianism collapsed with them. To the neocons the experience was exhilarating, confounding, and deflating all at once. Asked in June 1990 why he had stopped writing, Podhoretz explained that he no longer knew what to think. He still wasn’t convinced that the Cold War was over or that Gorbachev was serious about trying to democratize Soviet politics, but he wasn’t prepared to make anything of these suspicions, either. He had lost his compass. The moment for politics had passed; he found himself losing interest in it. He laughed that Irving Kristol moved to Washington just before the spirit blew out of the Beltway.¹⁶

Against Kristol and Kirkpatrick, who had no interest in crusading for world democracy, Podhoretz supported the neocons who called for a policy of democratic globalism and unipolar dominion. He noted that his wife, Midge Decter, was one of them, and he admired Charles Krauthammer’s writings on this subject. At the time, the new Pax Americanism was in its infancy. Democratic globalists dominated the argument for it; Krauthammer’s turn from democratic globalism was just beginning; like Krauthammer, Kristol was uneasily making his way to a realist unipolarism that didn’t believe in universal democracy. But Podhoretz was certain that neoconservatism’s next phase would have to be led by younger figures such as Krauthammer and Paul Wolfowitz.
They had the energy and acumen to start a new movement and defend it from a barrage of criticism, he explained. In his view, the main battleground for neoconservatism was shifting to the cultural realm. Neoconservatives had changed the American right, which prevailed in foreign policy, economics, and politics, but the left still controlled the commanding heights of American culture. The political wars of the 1990s would be over culture.¹⁷

**The Next Generation**

In *The Neoconservative Mind*, I defined neoconservatism as “an intellectual movement originated by former leftists that promotes militant anticommunism, capitalist economics, a minimal welfare state, the rule of traditional elites, and a return to traditional cultural values.” I emphasized that neoconservatism was a distinctively American brand of conservatism. It was expansive and forward-looking, not nostalgic for a lost paradise, and carried no animus against modernism. It defended the American establishment that was actually there, asserted the universal superiority of the American idea, and projected American power into the world with buoyant self-confidence.¹⁸

This account served well enough for a history and analysis of neoconservatism up to 1992, but because the Cold War had been over for almost three years, my description had already begun to creak. It didn’t quite describe what youthful neocons would be joining when they became part of a declining neoconservative movement in the later 1990s. Neoconservatism marked the last stage of the old left, being the last movement in American politics to define itself principally by its opposition to communism. It was a generational phenomenon launched by mostly Jewish liberals and old leftists, although a significant number of prominent neocons were not Jews, notably William Bennett, Peter Berger, Francis Fukuyama, Zalmay Khalilzad, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Ernest Lefever, James Nuechterlein, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Michael Novak, Richard John Neuhaus, George Weigel, and James Q. Wilson. The sensitivity of the early neocons to being identified with American conservatism was distinctive to their generation; the fact that Moynihan and Berger subsequently drifted away from neoconservatism reinforced the mistaken impression that it was a Jewish phenomenon. The old right was anxious to preserve America’s racial and cultural Anglo-Saxonism, but most of the early neocons came from the first generation of Jewish New Yorkers who didn’t think of themselves as hyphenated Americans. They passionately identified with their Americanism and were appalled when the privileged children of American suburbia shouted slogans against their country in the 1960s.

But generational experience cannot be replicated. The second generation of neocons was less insistent on the “neo” than the first; in 1989 the Cold War ended; and the movement’s third generation had little sense of joining a distinctive movement. Neoconservatism faded in the 1990s for three reasons: it was identified with bygone debates, it was out of power, and to a considerable
degree it merged with the mainstream of American conservatism. The movement’s twin icons, Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, reasoned that neoconservatism had faded by succeeding. The neocons had joined and changed American conservatism, making it possible for their children to call themselves, simply, conservatives.19

But that was not entirely right, either. The neocons merged into the mainstream American Republican right, but the term persisted. It referred to something that was still too important not to be named. The neocons had a more dramatic idea of politics than other kinds of conservatives, one that featured a radical, expansive faith in American power. Mainstream Republican conservatives revered Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, and Barry Goldwater, but as Irving Kristol was fond of noting, neocons never did. Their heroes were Theodore Roosevelt (TR) and Ronald Reagan. They shared the mainstream right’s affection for Reagan, but had no feeling at all for the cool, grim, or sour worthies of the party’s country club and reactionary past. TR was their idea of a good conservative, because he was expansive, buoyant, and roaringly nationalistic. With TR, as with Reagan, the vigorously patriotic impulse was always primary. Even the realist-leaning neocons had messianic ambitions for the United States, and most neocons were idealists. Their blend of ideology, idealism, and an increasingly frank neo-imperialism offered a coherent view of what the United States should do with its unrivaled economic and military power. Dwelling on crisis, and also thriving on it, they had a ready-made worldview when the second President Bush unexpectedly found need of one in the crisis of September 2001.

After the neocons regained power and fame in the second Bush administration, Irving Kristol revoked his requiem for the movement. Recalling its original character as a thoroughly American enterprise, Kristol reflected that neoconservatism was the first variant of American conservatism that was distinctively American. It was forward-looking and outward-moving. Neoconservatives believed in cutting taxes to stimulate economic growth; they defined the national interest in global terms; their favorite text on foreign affairs was Thucydides on the Peloponnesian War. Nothing like neoconservatism existed in Europe, because the key to neoconservatism was its interventionist, expansive, patriotic impulse. Kristol acknowledged that to European conservatives, this wasn’t conservatism at all. To him that explained a great deal about why American conservatism was much stronger and more vital than European conservatism.20

This quality of self-respecting, neo-imperial expansionism is the key to the not-quite-a-movement neoconservatism of the past decade. Some neocons learned to prize patriotism by reading Thucydides and University of Chicago political philosopher Leo Strauss, although the direct influence of Strauss is sometimes exaggerated in the literature about neoconservatism. Some commentators employ the term neoconservatism as a euphemism for “Jewish conservatism,” despite the fact that the movement has always included prominent non-Jewish advocates. Even to speak of neoconservatism as a movement can be misleading, because
neocons do not have a creed or self-referential organizations in the manner of libertarians or communitarians. Neoconservatism is more of an impulse or current of thought than a self-referring movement; Kristol aptly calls it a “persuasion.” But it has spawned and taken over so many institutes, think tanks, and magazines, and wielded so much influence in national Republican politics, that movement language is unavoidable.

To those who joined the neoconservative cause in the 1990s, neoconservatism had little to do with debates over bureaucratic collectivism or radical chic. They were not liberals who had been “mugged by reality” as Irving Kristol described the first neocons, for the new neocons had never been progressives of any kind. To them, neoconservatism was the form of mainstream American conservatism that stood for growth, intervention, unilateralism, optimism, and the universality of the American idea. It usually espoused the ideology of democratic globalism, but even its realist versions wanted to base foreign policy on the goal of sustaining America’s global dominance. And it controlled most of the right’s advocacy and policy institutions, notably the *Weekly Standard*, *Policy Review*, *Commentary*, *The Public Interest*, *First Things*, the *National Interest*, *National Review*, *American Spectator*, *Commentary*, *First Things*, *Claremont Review of Books*, *American Enterprise*, *Journal of Democracy*, *Public Opinion*, *Orbis*, the editorial page of the *Wall Street Journal*, the *American Enterprise Institute*, the *Hoover Institution*, the *Manhattan Institute*, the *Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs*, the *Center for Security Policy*, and the *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. (*The New Republic* is sporadically neoconservative and antineoconservative.) It was the neocons who got most of the conservative foundation money that paid for think tanks, journals, research assistants, TV studios, and agents who got them on TV.

All of the figures featured in this book are unipolarists, and nearly all are neocons. The book is about their return to power and their ambitions for America’s use of its immense economic and military power. Two pairs of fathers and sons symbolize the irony of this story. George H.W. Bush and Irving Kristol are willing interventionists, but also cold-eyed realists who, in their heyday, spurned visionary foreign causes. In the flurry of excitement over the Gulf War, the elder Bush briefly committed his administration to the building of a “New World Order” but quickly thought the better of it. He did not send American troops to conquer Iraq, because, as Irving Kristol put it, “no civilized person in his right mind wants to govern Iraq.” Bush’s son, witnessing the compulsiveness of the American superpower in the 1990s, vowed while campaigning for the presidency to be less compulsive, but as president he converted to the politics of new world orderism on an unprecedented scale. He and many administration officials were influenced by the leading advocate of neoimperial “American Greatness,” William Kristol, who spurned his father’s belief that America needed to pick its fights carefully. The younger Kristol usually dispensed with the “neo” in describing himself, on the ground that the old neoconservatism had become the new conservatism of the Republican right. But he reserved the right to confer
the title as a badge of distinction, and in December 2003 he and Robert Kagan declared that the younger Bush had ascended to it. “Bush has broken from the mainstream of his party and become a neoconservative in the true meaning of the term,” they asserted, explaining that true neoconservatism was about the aggressive promotion of pro-American liberal democracy throughout the world. It believed that exporting democracy is a moral imperative and an essential national interest. A former official in the first Bush administration took a different view of the younger Bush’s evolution: “What’s happening in Iraq is puzzling. The president ran on no-nation-building. Now we’re in this drifting, aimless empire that is not helping the road map to peace.” But to the unipolarists the struggle for the world had just begun.21

America the Exceptional

The unipolarists emphasize that the United States is not like other nations but also maintain that other nations should be more like the United States. Americans have long imagined that their country is an exception to history, a fact that both supports and cuts against the unipolarist idea. Throughout the Cold War, American political leaders maintained that Soviet Communism was evil because it was ideologically driven to rule the world. Democratic and Republican administrations alike conceived the Cold War as a struggle to contain an inherently expansionist and totalitarian power. America built a global military system and fought proxy battles with the Soviet Union not because it aspired to dominate the world, but to keep the Soviet Union from doing so.

But along the way the United States created a new kind of empire that vastly outstripped its Soviet rival. It also sustained its long-running denial about its global posture. American history is replete with self-images of superiority and divine favor—God’s New Israel, the Redeemer Nation, the City on a Hill, the New Order of the Ages, Manifest Destiny, the Pax Americana, the Arsenal of Democracy, the Leader of the Free World—but for more than a century Americans regarded their country’s exceptionalism as something to be protected by avoiding foreign entanglements. The American Revolution was an anti-imperial rebellion; George Washington famously cautioned against foreign wars and alliances; James Monroe, in an 1823 address to Congress authored by John Quincy Adams, warned the European powers to keep their colonizing hands off Latin America; in the same spirit, from Adams’s point of view, Adams proclaimed in his July 4th oration of 1821 that the American democracy “does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.” Like many Americans, Adams saw no contradiction between proclaiming the Monroe Doctrine and claiming the mantle of anti-imperialism.22

After 1898 the United States could no longer say it was the occupier of none, but it insistently claimed that it never acted out of imperial self-interest. Upon winning the Spanish-American War, the United States became, in its self-image, the world power that occupied only for the sake of freedom. President William
McKinley annexed and occupied Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines; in the excitement of imperial expansion he also annexed the Hawaiian islands, thus requiring a navy; in 1899 he partitioned the Samoan Islands; in 1900 he helped suppress the Boxer Rebellion in China; in 1902 the unabashedly imperialist Theodore Roosevelt inserted the Platt Amendment into the Cuban constitution, rendering the island a U.S. colony in all but name.

This sudden imperial maneuvering and Roosevelt’s colorful statements about it forced Americans to relinquish a bit of their innocent self-image. Some contended that there was such a thing as good imperialism; others insisted that it wasn’t really imperialism if the occupying power had good intentions. Indiana Republican Senator Albert J. Beveridge urged that it would be sinful for Americans to luxuriate in domestic contentment rather than follow ‘‘the Star of Empire,’’ for God had spent a thousand years preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic people to redeem the world. Every great nation became a colonizer of inferior peoples, he argued; great nations became greater by colonizing widely, they declined when they abandoned ‘‘the policy of possession and administration,’’ and the United States was called by God to be history’s greatest empire: ‘‘We cannot retreat from any soil where Providence has unfurled our banner; it is ours to save that soil for liberty and civilization.’’ Protestant social gospel leader Lyman Abbott concurred that it was ‘‘the function of the Anglo-Saxon race’’ to confer the civilizing gifts of law, commerce, and education ‘‘on the uncivilized people of the world.’’ Against William James, social gospeler Graham Taylor, and other anti-imperialists, Abbott proclaimed: ‘‘It is said that we have no right to go to a land occupied by a barbaric people and interfere with their life. It is said that if they prefer barbarism they have a right to remain barbarians. I deny the right of a barbaric people to retain possession of any quarter of the globe Barbarism has no rights which civilization is bound to respect. Barbarians have rights which civilized people are bound to respect, but they have no right to their barbarism.’’

Liberal leaders throughout the Progressive era typically said the same thing more nicely. The father of social gospel liberalism, Washington Gladden, admonished imperialists and anti-imperialists alike for wrongly assuming that self-interest was the basis of U.S. foreign policy. Gladden held out for the primacy of good intentions. ‘‘We are not going to be dragged into any war for purposes of conquest—neither for the acquisition of territory nor for the extension of trade,’’ he assured in 1898. ‘‘And those who are preaching this jingoism to-day should be warned that the Nation has a conscience that can speak and make itself heard, and that will paralyze its arm whenever it is lifted to do injustice to any weaker people.’’ To Gladden, it was ‘‘morally unthinkable’’ that the United States might set free the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam after these colonial possessions were relinquished by Spain. ‘‘Degraded races’’ never worked their way up to freedom, he explained; they had to be lifted up to civilized standards of behavior by stronger races. In this redemptive mission of
saving the world, Gladden rejoiced that his country had finally linked arms with imperial England.25

The American democracy sought no empire, and to the extent that it acquired one, it did so only to promote the freedom and self-determination of weaker nations. When President Woodrow Wilson took the United States into World War I, he and his followers had to have idealistic reasons for doing so; the war was a crusade to make the world safe for democracy and collective security. In the succeeding generation, American administrations rationalized their occupations of Nicaragua and Haiti with similar assurances. Shortly after the United States entered World War II, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr lamented that the same American moralists who had resisted going to war could now be counted upon to clothe America’s war effort with insufferable visions of a transformed world order. Niebuhr had led the recent struggle to turn mainline American Protestantism away from its pacifism, but he could hardly bear the idealistic calls to war that he knew were coming. Americans habitually failed to acknowledge the power of self-interest in their politics, he complained; thus, they insisted on moralizing even their wars and imperial occupations. In his later career, having zigged and zagged his way to a neoliberal realism in theology and a neoliberal anticommunist realism in politics, Niebuhr lamented that Americans actually believed that their country was the world’s redeemer nation. Every president since Wilson felt obliged to pretend that America championed world democracy with no imperial designs or interests: “We are tempted to the fanatic dogma that our form of community is not only more valid, ultimately, than any other but that [it] is more feasible for all communities on all continents.”26

To Niebuhr, a strong dose of realism about America’s struggle for world power would have been redemptive. Americans needed the love perfectionism of Jesus and the cunning realism of Machiavelli. Realism without a moral dimension is corrupt, he cautioned, but any moral idealism not chastened by the world’s evil is pathetic and dangerous. The cynically realistic “children of darkness” were wise in their recognition of self-interest and will-to-power, but evil to the extent that they recognized no transcendent moral law. The idealistic “children of light” were good by virtue of their obedience to moral law, but foolish in their underestimation of the pervasive and brutal power of collective egotism. In Niebuhr’s reckoning, the fascists and Soviet Communists were both children of darkness but with a significant difference. The fascists had no inspiring ideal that appealed to anyone beyond themselves; thus, they could be smashed directly by armed force. But the Communists had the moral power of a utopian creed that appealed to millions in the Third World; thus they had to be fought differently.27

In essence, Niebuhr believed that communism was an evil religion. It was devoted to the establishment of a new universal order, not merely the supremacy of a race or nation. In 1954 he put it sharply: “We are embattled with a foe who embodies all the evils of a demonic religion. We will probably be at sword’s point with this foe for generations to come.”28 Because the utopian element of
Communism made it more appealing and dangerous than fascism, Niebuhr reasoned, it had to be fought in the way that the Christian West should have fought militant Islam in the high Middle Ages. Crusading attempts to wipe out the enemy directly would not work; what was needed was a patient, forceful, selective policy of containment that put the Soviet state on the defensive. Like his friend George Kennan, Niebuhr believed that the Soviet Union would eventually self-destruct on its failures and internal contradictions. The chief purpose of Cold War containment was to heighten the pressure on an unworkable Soviet system, although, unlike Kennan, Niebuhr judged that Soviet Communism might survive for several generations.29

These were the foreign policy keynotes of a “Vital Center” liberalism that claimed the mainstream of American politics in the late 1940s and 1950s. Niebuhr, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., John F. Kennedy, and Hubert Humphrey were its standard bearers. It combined a liberal internationalist commitment to the United Nations and international law with a balance of power realism in diplomacy and an ideological abhorrence of Communism. In the early 1960s, while accepting the Medal of Freedom from President Johnson, Niebuhr supported America’s war in Vietnam. Like most Cold War liberals, he reasoned that Southeast Asia would fall to the communists if the United States gave up on South Vietnam. But the Niebuhr- quoting realists in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations created a disaster in Vietnam, and the Vital Center exploded, hurling Niebuhrians to the right and left. To his sad surprise, Niebuhr tackeled to the left, joining the antiwar movement. By 1966 he lamented that America had turned the Vietnamese civil war into an American imperial war: “We are making South Vietnam into an American colony…. We are physically ruining an unhappy nation in the process of ‘saving’ it.” By 1967 he called for an American withdrawal from Vietnam and a public outcry “against these horrendous policies.”30

The carnage and futility of the war sickened him. Niebuhr protested that containment should not be enforced beyond the boundaries of America’s vital interests, and that anticommunism had become overideologized and militarized. “For the first time I fear I am ashamed of our beloved nation,” he confessed. With Kennan, Niebuhr disavowed “any simple containment of Communism,” urging that the two superpowers had to work out a coexistence that lessened the threat of a nuclear war. In his last years, Niebuhr worried that his country had become a reactionary world power through its arrogance of power: “Perhaps there is not so much to choose between Communist and anti-Communist fanaticism, particularly when the latter, combined with our wealth, has caused us to stumble into the most pointless, costly, and bloody war in our history.”31

Thus did the Cold War liberals back away from the ravages of anticommunist containment in Vietnam; a long succession of Kennedy and Johnson administration officials followed Niebuhr in repenting of imperial overstretch. That was the political context that gave birth to neoconservatism. Many old-style Cold Warriors were appalled by the liberal abdication of the anticommunist...
struggle and the rise of a youthful counterculture; eventually they agreed to call themselves neoconservatives.

*James Burnham and National Review Conservatism*

The neoconservatives insisted on the “neo” because traditional American conservatism was alien to them, but in the 1950s William F.Buckley, Jr.’s *National Review* had begun to clean up the old right’s prejudices. It also repudiated the old right’s America-first isolationism. Buckley perceived that only a new kind of conservatism would be able to enter the mainstream of American society and play a leading role in the fight against communism. His magazine established that there was such a thing as an interventionist, intellectually aggressive, American conservatism.

To the neoconservatives of the 1970s, *National Review* was still a far cry from their kind of politics, but it had the right idea. Their chief concern was foreign policy, and in this area, *National Review* made its sharpest break with the provincialisms of the old right. The foreign policy conservatism of *National Review* emphasized ideology, international engagement, military expansion, and the Cold War. Its foreign policy position was shaped principally by a maverick intellectual, James Burnham, who, like most of the neocons, had started on the left.

In the 1930s James Burnham was America’s leading Trotskyist, but in 1940 he broke with Leon Trotsky over the socialist status of the Soviet Union, and by the end of World War II he had migrated to a fiercely right-wing anticommunism. Burnham’s 1947 blockbuster, *The Struggle for the World*, announced that World War III had already started and the West was losing. The Soviet Union had already absorbed the Baltic States, East Poland, Moldavia, and Mongolia, he warned; it dominated Finland, Scandinavia, Poland, Germany, Austria, the Balkans, the entire Middle East, North China, Manchuria, and Korea; it was struggling to control France, Italy, all of Latin America, Southern China, and the lesser Western European states; and it had deeply infiltrated the United States and Great Britain. The Soviets were certain to conquer the entire world unless the United States accepted the mission and responsibilities of a World Empire.

An American empire already existed in Latin America, Japan, the Philippines, and parts of Europe and Africa, Burnham noted, but the United States denied it was an imperial power, and thus it made a bad one. He assured that Latin Americans would complain less about their situation if the United States took responsibility for having invaded so many times. Americans thought that their country couldn’t be an imperial power because it was a model democracy; Burnham replied that the two greatest democracies in history, Athens and England, were two of history’s greatest empires. Facing a Soviet enemy that rejoiced in power and force, he wanted his country to defeat communism and win global dominion. The American Empire would have to be called something else, he allowed; some euphemism for the imperial superstate would have to be found: “Whatever the words, it is well also to know the reality. The reality is that
the only alternative to the communist World Empire is an American Empire which will be, if not literally world-wide in formal boundaries, capable of exercising decisive world control.”

Burnham believed that Truman-style containment was weak and uncomprehending. It lacked a comprehensive foreign policy vision, took a merely defensive posture toward the Soviet threat, lacked a consistent military strategy, implicitly conceded earlier communist gains, and failed to bring about an economically unified Europe. It was too empty and futile to die for. Burnham lamented that his country was too provincial and moralistic to think in global-imperial terms, and he worried that Americans had a cowardly fear of Soviet power. He wanted to organize European opposition movements and train national armies backed by American forces to wage anticommunist wars in Eastern Europe, all in the cause of a new Pax Americana.

In 1955 he joined Buckley, whom he had recruited to the CIA, in launching the magazine of a new American right, *National Review*. Buckley proclaimed that the magazine’s mission was to stand athwart History yelling “Stop!” History, in this Burnhamian usage, was the march of socialism. Although Burnham never warmed up to religion or capitalism, he found his home at a magazine that mixed conservative Catholicism with free enterprise ideology. He became a pillar of the new conservatism by establishing what it meant to fight communism. *National Review* had many writers on this theme, notably the former radicals John Chamberlain, Whittaker Chambers, Max Eastman, Frank Meyer, William Schlamm, and Richard Weaver, but Burnham was its dominant foreign policy voice. For twenty-three years, he wrote a biweekly column that excoriated every president from Truman to Carter for appeasing the Soviets.

Burnham won no plaudits from the Nixon/Kissinger administration, but after the Republican right won the White House in 1980, he was lauded as a foreign policy giant. Throughout the Reagan era he was lionized as America’s leading anticommunist. In 1980 Buckley called him “the dominant intellectual influence” on *National Review*, and in 1983 President Reagan awarded him the Medal of Freedom. Burnham’s citation declared that he “profoundly affected the way America views itself and the world.” Reagan added that he owed Burnham a personal debt, “because throughout the years traveling the mash-potato circuit I have quoted you widely.” Conservatives took pride in his success, praising him as the Moses who rescued the American right from isolationist provincialism. Conservative historian George Nash put it typically: “More than any other single person, Burnham supplied the conservative intellectual movement with the theoretical formulation for victory in the cold war.”

The neocons were equally indebted to Burnham, although chary about acknowledging it. He originated or developed the signature ideas of the neoconservative right: the revolution of the New Class; the determinative role of cultural elites; the primacy of ideological conflict; the competitive advantages of communist ideology over liberal democracy; the totalitarian, expansionist, conspiratorial nature of communism; the struggle for the world; the culture of
appeasement; democratic neoimperialism; the quest for American global dominance. Burnham’s rapid transition from the socialist left to conservatism set an often-followed example. Like the first generation of neocons who followed it, his later writings bore the marks of his sectarian training. Some neocons shared, in more palatable forms, his emphasis on elite rule and his realistic cynicism. Many more of them repeated his strictures against the culture of appeasement, charging that American foreign policy was shaped principally by an unacknowledged and cowardly fear of Soviet power. Most neocons repeated his opinion that America erred in Vietnam only by failing to use sufficient military force. They recycled his images of the Soviet threat, his denigrations of neutralism, and his calls to take the offensive in the war against communism. The first generation of neocons made heavy use of his theory of the New Class, arguing that it explained the expansion of government entitlement programs in the 1960s.

But the neocons were not eager to claim Burnham as a forerunner. He was too cynical and reactionary to be a model of good American expansionism. Most of them did not share his elitist disdain for the masses or his contempt for liberal democracy. His imperial ambitions were too naked, patronizing, and apocalyptic for them. Burnham had an old-fashioned idea of imperialism as outright domination, while many neocons had an idealistic faith in the universal power of American democracy that he found very strange. Human rights doctrine was idiotic to him; he hated that his country “betrayed” the racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia “with all this garbage about peace and democracy.”

Thus, the neocons did not cite Burnham when they held forth on the cowardice of war resisters, the nature and threat of communism, the competitive advantages of totalitarian rule, the foundations of American Greatness, or the politics of the New Class, but the echoes were very strong. And when the Cold War was over, they renewed the language of empire.
On March 8, 1992, the *New York Times* announced that the Department of Defense had nearly completed its new grand strategy for U.S. foreign policy. Under the supervision of Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, the *Times* explained, Pentagon Undersecretary for Policy Paul Wolfowitz had drafted a forty-six-page policy statement that discarded the post-World War II strategy of “collective internationalism,” replacing it with the concept of “benevolent domination by one power.” According to the Wolfowitz plan, the new purpose of American foreign policy was to prevent any nation or group of nations from challenging America’s global domination, or, as Wolfowitz preferred to call it, “global leadership.” The *Times* reported: “The classified document makes the case for a world dominated by one superpower whose position can be perpetuated by constructive behavior and sufficient military might to deter any nation or group of nations from challenging American primacy.”

Reaction was swift and mostly incredulous. Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy protested that Wolfowitz’s plan appeared “to be aimed primarily at finding new ways to justify Cold War levels of military spending.” Democratic Senator Alan Cranston ridiculed Wolfowitz’s ambition of making the United States “the one, the only main honcho on the world block, the global Big Enchilada.” Democratic Senator Robert C. Byrd called the Pentagon strategy “myopic, shallow, and disappointing. The basic thrust of the document seems to be this: We love being the sole remaining superpower in the world and we want so much to remain that way that we are willing to put at risk the basic health of our economy and well-being of our people to do so.” Democratic Senator Joseph Biden called it “literally a Pax Americana.... It won’t work. You can be the world superpower and still be unable to maintain peace throughout the world.” Pentagon officials launched into damage-control mode, cautioning that there was a difference between maintaining America’s superpower primacy and dominating the world. The debate over the new Pax Americana had exploded into a front-page story, although only briefly.
The administration of George H.W. Bush was an unlikely venue for a fractious debate over foreign policy ideology, and it did not indulge this one for long. Dominated by professional realists who called Wolfowitz and his allies “the Reaganauts,” among worse things, Bush’s foreign policy team was led by Secretary of State James Baker, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. Wolfowitz was number three in the Defense Department. Bush immediately disavowed the Wolfowitz plan, imploring the press corps to ignore it. Vice President Dan Quayle’s chief of staff, William Kristol, later recalled that on the morning that the plan hit the front page of the New York Times, Scowcroft attended the White House senior staff’s 7:30 A.M. meeting: “Though he was always very close-lipped and taciturn about his thoughts, it was clear there was unhappiness at the highest levels of the White House about this document. And, of course, the White House ordered that it be walked back. They sanitized it…. Wolfowitz was ahead of his time.”

Cheney was the only hardline Cold Warrior in the administration’s top rank. The Bush realists believed in Gorbachev, who had risen to power four years earlier; Cheney believed that the Soviet Union was still America’s mortal enemy and that glasnost was a ruse to disarm the United States. As defense secretary he cultivated a team of hardline holdouts, led by Wolfowitz, in the Pentagon’s policy directorate. A month after Cheney took office he declared on CNN that Gorbachev’s regime was bound to fail and the next Soviet leader was bound to be hostile to the West. CIA Chief Robert Gates later recalled that when Bush’s senior advisors—the “Gang of Eight”—discussed policy toward the Soviet Union, it was always Cheney versus the rest.

Cheney realized that his unreconstructed Cold Warriorism made him vulnerable to partisan criticism, especially after administration officials derided him to reporters as a Cold War relic. He bristled at Democratic attacks on his lack of strategic vision. In October 1989, the same month that Colin Powell became chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a month before the Berlin Wall was torn down, Cheney began to stew over his 1991–1992 defense budget, facing a February deadline. The size and scope of the next defense budget had extraordinary significance, and in December, while the United States overthrew Panamanian President Manuel Noriega, Cheney listened skeptically to Powell’s vision of America’s post-Cold War military. Although he rejected Powell’s premise that the Cold War was over, he and Powell agreed that the lure of a “peace dividend” could be disastrous for the United States. The Pentagon had to find a new strategic rationale to ward off Congressional calls for drastic reductions in the military budget. As Powell later recalled: “Congress, independent national security think tanks, and self-styled freelance military experts were blanketing the town with proposals. We had to get in front of them if we were to control our own destiny.”
Having served as Ronald Reagan’s national security advisor, Powell had firsthand acquaintance with the changes taking place in the Soviet Union. He had met with Gorbachev five times, spoken to numerous Soviet military officers, and developed the distinct impression, as he told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “that this place was rotting inside.” Gorbachev’s perestroika was not merely a form of enlightened leadership, he judged: “It was desperate leadership to do something about what was happening in the Soviet Union.” Powell believed that the Soviet empire was finished and that a transformation of the Soviet Union itself was inevitable. With Baker and Scowcroft he reasoned that the crucial question, as Baker put it, was whether the empire would crash or make a soft landing. At the same time, he cautioned that there was “a great deal of uncertainty in the world.” The world situation had become less threatening but also less stable: “We also must remember that we are a superpower and notwithstanding what happens in Europe and in our relationship with the Soviet Union, we have worldwide interests beyond Europe.”

Cheney puzzled over the next defense budget, warning that the present moment was “the worst possible time to contemplate changes in defense strategy.” At the same time, he and Powell tried to picture what a soft landing would look like. Powell projected that within five years the Soviet Union would develop a multiparty system, establish market pricing, remove its forces from Eastern Europe, cut its military budget by 40 percent, and cut the size of its armed forces by 50 percent. He didn’t expect the Soviet Union to hold together; sometimes he mused about whether a fractured Soviet Union would call itself a commonwealth or federation. Less presciently, he judged that Gorbachev would hold on to power. The Cold War was already over, Powell believed; for the next five years America’s chief trouble spots would be Korea, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and the Philippines. He reasoned that the United States needed to plan for a very different future. Some cuts in military spending were politically unavoidable, but a new strategic vision that projected American military power in more places with fewer troops might ward off congressional budget cutters.

His idea was to move from a threat-based, Cold War force to a leaner, more flexible, threat-and capability-based force. America’s military system was designed to fight a major war in Europe on short notice against the Soviet Union, but now it needed to concentrate on projecting a “forward presence” in unexpected places. It had to focus on regional trouble spots and be ready to project military force anywhere in the world. No less than Cheney, Powell was committed to maintaining and strengthening America’s global military dominance. Repeatedly, he cited the singular dominance of the United States—“We have to put a shingle outside our door saying, ‘Superpower Lives Here,’ no matter what the Soviets do”—and told congressional leaders not to diminish America’s warfighting capacity: “We exist to fight. We’re not a social agency. We exist to go kick someone’s butt if necessary. I believe that if you look like you can kick somebody’s butt, more than often it will not be necessary. That’s
the position we occupy in the world now. It’s a good position to have
Gentlemen, don’t lose this, don’t break this.”
Powell wanted global military capacity with maximum flexibility. The U.S.
military was, and had to be, the world’s global police force, “the cop on the
beat.” It had to sustain and extend its global reach to protect American interests
while making generous cuts in defense spending. He exhorted: “We’ve got to
make sure that as we build our new force structure in this new environment, we
have the ability to respond to the crisis nobody expected, nobody told us about,
the contingency that suddenly pops up at 2:00 in the morning.” All of this could
be done with a leaner military; Powell called his strategy the “Base Force”
concept. As the Army and Air Force were structured to fight an air-land war in
Europe against the Soviet army, they had to take the deepest cuts; the Navy, too,
was oriented toward an anti-Soviet war in Europe, protecting the Atlantic sea-
lanes; the Marines were less vulnerable, having fashioned themselves as
America’s rapid response force. Powell proposed to cut the Army from 760,000
to 525,000 troops, the Navy from 550 to 450 ships, and American troops in
Europe from 300,00 to between 75,000 and 100,000.

Just as Cheney doubted that the Cold War was over but had to deal with a
president who believed otherwise, he believed that Powell’s reductions were
unwise but preferred to see Powell make them rather than Congress. Lacking a
strategic vision of his own, he allowed Powell to pitch the Base Force to
President Bush, and supported most of Powell’s positions in congressional
hearings. In February 1990 he told Senate leaders, “I would be the first to
recognize that, in fact, it is important for us to revisit many of the basic
assumptions that have guided our national security policy over the last several
years, but I think it needs to be done very carefully We do not believe radical
departures are required or justified at this point.” At the same time, Cheney set
up his own shop to devise a new grand strategy.

In most administrations the Pentagon policy directorate concentrates on
mundane fare such as negotiating basing rights and arms sales, but
Wolfowitz’s seven hundred-person team was encouraged by Cheney to think
big. Aided by Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Policy I.Lewis
“Scooter” Libby, Wolfowitz focused on the geostrategic issues that he preferred.
Institutionally, the defense policy team had a built-in rivalry with the State
Department’s Bureau of PoliticoMilitary Affairs; Wolfowitz’s team was a mini-
State Department within the Pentagon, just as the politico-military bureau was a
mini-Pentagon within the State Department. Although Wolfowitz was well
regarded personally by most colleagues, he was also the most hardline Cold
Warrior in the upper regions of the Bush administration, which heightened the
natural rivalry between the Pentagon’s and State Department’s policy divisions.
In 1990, neither he nor Cheney believed that American policy should change in
anticipation of the end of the Cold War. They feared that the Soviet Union would
soon revert to hardline communism and the Cold War; thus, they formulated a
policy that anticipated a recommunized Soviet state.
The son of a Nebraska soil conservation agent, Cheney spent most of his childhood in Wyoming, dropped out of Yale, racked up two arrests for drunk driving during his lost years, and eventually finished college in Wyoming. He was saved by a romantic relationship with his future wife, Lynne Cheney, and by getting into politics during his graduate school years at the University of Wisconsin. In 1969, a year after he joined the congressional staff of Wisconsin Republican William Steiger, he caught the attention of Donald Rumsfeld, who headed the Office of Economic Opportunity. Five years later Cheney joined the Ford administration as Rumsfeld’s deputy, and after Rumsfeld moved to the Defense Department, Cheney became, at the age of thirty-four, Ford’s chief of staff. Thus he entered national politics as the protégé of one moderately conservative Republican, Rumsfeld, in the administration of another, Gerald Ford.

But Cheney’s politics were significantly to the right of Ford’s, as his subsequent congressional career demonstrated. He represented Wyoming with hard-right positions on taxes, welfare, affirmative action, gun control, anticommunism, military spending, and South Africa; Cheney opposed the implementation of the Panama Canal treaties, he plugged hard for the MX missile, and he voted to keep Nelson Mandela in prison, a position that caused George W. Bush some campaign heartburn after he made Cheney his vice presidential running mate. Like Rumsfeld, Cheney was short on personableness, although friends such as Kenneth Adelman found him affable. Rumsfeld might have been president had his arrogance not alienated Republican power brokers; or had Reagan selected him for vice president at the last minute in 1980, instead of George H.W. Bush, after former president Gerald Ford backed out. Cheney was not grating like Rumsfeld, but many colleagues found him brusque and distant in personal relations. Although he had presidential ambitions, too, his personal bearing disqualified him. Powell later recalled that in four years of working together, he and Cheney never had a social hour together. At the end of Bush’s presidency, Powell stopped at Cheney’s office to say goodbye, only to learn that Cheney had already departed without bidding farewell. But Powell disagreed with colleagues who found Cheney unlikable, and he greatly admired Cheney’s bureaucratic skills. Cheney could get things done, and he was very tough. David Halberstam later recalled that when Cheney took over the Pentagon for the first President Bush, he quickly established that he would run it: “Anyone who crossed him on an issue of policy might pay dearly for it.” Powell put it with a hint of competitive ridicule: “This man, who had never spent a day in uniform, who, during the Vietnam War, had gotten a student deferment and later a parent deferment, had taken instant control of the Pentagon.”

In 1990, Cheney disliked Powell’s strategy while encouraging him to refine it. Powell told reporters that the United States could live with a 25 percent reduction in military spending; Cheney insisted that 2 percent was the maximum figure. Powell believed that the battlefield was no place for nuclear firepower; Cheney and the Army wanted to spend more money on tactical nuclear weapons. In
February 1990 Wisconsin Senator Les Aspin, chair of the House Armed Services Committee, protested to Cheney and Powell that “there are new realities in the world, but no new thinking at home to match them.” Georgia Senator Sam Nunn, the respected chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, sharply asked: “Has our military strategy been revised in light of these changes in the threat to our national security?” Nunn allowed that America’s fundamental security objectives—deterring attacks and insuring access to world markets—had not changed, but he worried that the administration’s $295 billion defense budget had a gaping “threat blank” that assumed an outdated security picture.11

These exchanges rang alarm bells in the Pentagon, which feared a deep cut in appropriations. Powell later recalled, “We knew that unless we came up with an overarching strategy to guide reductions, the Pentagon’s political enemies were likely to come after us with a chain saw.” Powell and Wolfowitz filled the blank with separate plans, while consulting each other. Gradually Wolfowitz accepted the main features of Powell’s strategy, although he altered the pace of Powell’s force reductions from seven years to four. He also insisted that the entire process of transition had to be reversed if the Soviet Union showed signs of a relapse. Wolfowitz later recalled, “I gave a quite substantial briefing to Secretary Cheney and what was then called I guess the Defense Resources Board on a post-Cold War defense strategy.” That briefing became the basis of the leaked Defense Policy Guidance of 1992.12

Powell argued that, during the Cold War, the United States thwarted Soviet attempts at global dominance. Now the objective of U.S. policy was to maintain America’s global leadership, which could be done with less money and a reshaped military. That reassuring argument brought Powell, Cheney, and Wolfowitz together. Blending their ideas, in late June they pitched a plan to President Bush, and, on August 2, 1990, Bush declared in Aspen, Colorado, that the United States had a new military policy. Instead of focusing on the threat of global war with the Soviet Union, the United States would concentrate on responding quickly to “regional contingencies” in every “corner of the globe”—a gigantic undertaking that would require most of the major weapons systems that many politicians wanted to scrap. Bush considered this speech a major event of his presidency, but a few hours before he gave it he learned that eighty thousand of Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guards had invaded Kuwait.13

Despite the fact that the Republican Guards were Saddam’s elite forces that protected his regime, the CIA had judged that his troop buildup on the Kuwait border was to gain leverage with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) not invade Kuwait. Two years later, U.N. inspectors discovered an Iraqi nuclear weapons program that was much more advanced than the intelligence agencies had suspected. Cheney developed a deep distrust of intelligence analysts in response to these events. Bush moved immediately to protect Saudi Arabia, Margaret Thatcher admonished him against going wobbly, on October 30 Bush finally decided to expel Iraq from Kuwait, and Congress supported his decision.
The day after Bush announced his new security strategy, Powell, Cheney, and Wolfowitz went to the Capitol to promote it, only to find that congressional leaders were transfixed by the Iraqi invasion. The season for grand strategy had passed. The Bush administration pushed Resolution 678 through the United Nations, which authorized Iraq’s expulsion from Kuwait, and it never seriously debated whether the United States should overthrow Saddam’s regime. Powell later explained that even Saddam’s crimes did not justify the destruction of Iraq. The Bush administration wanted Iraq to remain a counterweight to Iran; it did not want a Shiite regime in southern Iraq or a Kurdish regime in northern Iraq; it respected the limitations of its U.N. authorization; and it had no desire to occupy Iraq. Even Wolfowitz and Cheney did not advocate overthrowing Saddam, although Wolfowitz changed his mind in the mid-1990s, and Cheney changed his by the time he was vice president. Powell recalled, “In none of the meetings I attended was dismembering Iraq, conquering Baghdad, or changing the Iraqi form of government ever seriously considered.” Bush spoke of creating a “New World Order” and described Saddam as “Hitler revisited,” but both were boilerplate motivators, not serious claims. He never seriously intended to follow through on the implications of either statement, to the subsequent regret of many neoconservatives.14

Upon visiting American troops in Riyadh in December, Powell promised that they would not get bogged down in a Vietnam-like quagmire. An essential feature of his foreign policy strategy emerged from this assurance. Powell contended that the United States needed to be slow to decide for war, and that upon committing to fight, it was imperative that the United States employ overwhelming force to smash the enemy quickly. He was so emphatic on this theme that journalists dubbed it “the Powell Doctrine.” The Powell Doctrine became a staple of Powell’s case for an aggressive Base Force strategy. With the end of the Cold War, he argued, the United States was not likely to fight a war that required more than 250,000 troops, but the days of fighting half-hearted wars were over, too. He wanted a “proud, free, strong America” to be the champion of freedom throughout the world, and he complained that the Bush administration was not given enough credit for restructuring the military. It was possible to get world-embracing force projection and a peace dividend, he urged; in fact, the Bush administration was doing it, with little applause.15

“We abandoned the old way of doing business, forever asking for more, forever sending up requests that we knew could not possibly be supported by the Congress” Powell told the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1991. “We did away with all of that…and I don’t believe the Secretary of Defense, the President, or the Department of Defense has gotten sufficient credit.” By 1991 the Bush administration had begun to downsize the active Army and the Air Force by one-third, the Navy by one-fourth, and the Marine Corps by 20 percent. Powell was willing to live without Osprey aircraft, the F-14D fighter, and the AHIP light helicopter, but he supported an upgraded B-1 nuclear bomber (the B-1B) and plugged hard for the B2 bomber because of its strategic agility. The B-2
could be sent anywhere in the world on a moment’s notice without having to refuel at a base. Asked if all four services really needed their own air force, Powell replied, “I thank God that the Congress in its wisdom gave us four air forces.” All of America’s air forces were uniquely valuable.16

Powell traded on his rising national prestige to reshape the military. His friendliness, immense dignity, and moral integrity were respected across the political spectrum. Millions of Americans who knew nothing of Cheney or Wolfowitz knew admiringly of Powell’s resumé: the son of Jamaican immigrants who worked in New York’s garment district; grew up in the Bronx; joined the ROTC unit at City College of New York; served his first tour of duty from 1958 to 1961; stayed in the Army for two tours in Vietnam; rose through the ranks as a staff officer, not a division commander; named a White House Fellow in 1972, where he made friendships with Republican powerbrokers; off to Korea for a tour of duty as a colonel; back to Washington to attend the National War College and work at the Pentagon; called to the Carter administration in 1977, where he worked for the defense and energy departments, and was promoted to brigadier general; on to the defense department of Ronald Reagan, for whom he had voted, and where he was promoted to major general; chosen by Reagan in 1987 as National Security Advisor. By the end of the Gulf War he was a political superstar. At a renomination hearing in September 1991, Republican Senator Strom Thurmond hailed him as “the catalyst that brought together the forces which overwhelmed the power of Saddam Hussein.” Republican Senator John Warner expressed “my just unlimited respect and admiration for you.” Republican Senator John McCain added that “you have contributed enormously not only to our national security, but, frankly, to our society because I think you are a role model to young Americans all over this country, and you are, frankly, I think, amongst the best that America can produce, and frankly, a testimony to our system in the military that does provide us with leadership such as that which you have displayed.”17

Powell was mindful of his public standing; reporters claimed that he could cite his approval rating on a weekly basis. In 1991 he used his public stature to make the case for a leaner, more agile, global-reaching force structure. That year, in August, a coup against Gorbachev failed in the Soviet Union. The following month Powell assured Senate leaders that Gorbachev was back in control, the Soviets were foolish to waste their money on strategic modernization, and a cooperative Soviet superpower was in the making. At the same time, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait had shown that America had to be ready to fight almost anywhere. With an unusual rhetorical flourish Powell declared: “We have seen our implacable enemy of 40 years vaporize before our eyes, a victim of its own contradictions, its imperial ambitions destroyed by the flame of freedom and by our willingness to meet the challenge that was put forward to us by the Soviet Empire over the last 40 years. The Soviet Union, or whatever we are calling it now, turns inward to try to make something of itself, and in this process there is cause for enormous hope.”18
But the global crisis of the Cold War had given way to many smaller crises, especially in Iraq and Yugoslavia. Powell noted that in the two years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, America had been forced to intervene “again and again in small ways and large ways to protect our interests and to protect the interests of our friends around the world.” Those who called for a demobilization or pulling back of American military force ignored history and the many trouble spots of the moment. America needed major troop deployments in Europe, southwest Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic Ocean: “The world can’t tolerate a demobilization of the armed forces of the United States, and every time we have demobilized in this century we have lived to regret it.” He didn’t want America to intervene in every regional or humanitarian crisis; Powell’s Pax Americanism was tempered by interest-oriented realism. The Bush administration had been wise not to extend the Gulf War to Baghdad, he contended, because it didn’t want to destroy or occupy Iraq, and there was no “Jeffersonian democrat waiting in the Ba’ath Party to take over.” The United States was better off not getting “mired down in a Mesopotamian mess.”

He and the Bush administration realists felt the same way about Yugoslavia. In 1991 Croatia and Slovenia broke off from Yugoslavia to form independent states; Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia also declared their independence; and Serbian-backed Bosnian Serbs launched a vicious campaign of ethnic terror and mass murder against the Bosnian Muslims. Powell told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Obviously, we could do anything that the President would call upon us to do, but I have absolutely no enthusiasm for seeing the Armed Forces of the United States becoming involved in that very, very difficult situation.” The New York Times compared Powell to General George McClellan, who trained the Union army during the Civil War but was averse to using it; the Times pleaded that a limited U.S. intervention could save thousands of Bosnian Muslims. Powell replied that he didn’t believe in limited wars. Air strikes and limited deployments were half-measures that created major quagmires. He believed in clear objectives, a clear political decision for war, and the use of overwhelming force upon going to war. If the United States could not intervene massively with ground troops—as it should not in the ethnic tangle of the former Yugoslavia, he argued—it had no business intervening at all.

Bush, Cheney, Scowcroft, Baker, and Powell agreed that Yugoslavia failed the test of U.S. self-interest; Eagleburger stewed back and forth on the question; even Wolfowitz agreed that America should keep its troops out of the Balkans. But Wolfowitz wanted the United States to arm the Bosnian Muslims; he was appalled that the Bush administration participated in the U.N. arms embargo against Bosnia. Powell told Wolfowitz to come back to him after he convinced the State Department. After Bush lost the 1992 election, some administration officials acknowledged that they had failed miserably in dealing with the tragedy in Yugoslavia, but Bush and Powell were not among them. Bush’s 1998 memoir, A World Transformed, which he coauthored with Scowcroft, barely mentioned Yugoslavia. Powell contended that only ground troops would have stopped the
Serbs, and the Muslims and Croatians were just as committed to fighting for their vital interests. Bosnia flunked the test of national interest, intervening would have required an indefensible “heavy sacrifice of lives,” and only a long occupation could have kept the parties from killing each other.21

For several months before the *New York Times* revealed Wolfowitz’s strategic plan, Powell pressed hard for his version of it. Repeatedly he reminded congressional committees and reporters that he had anticipated most of the extraordinary changes in the former Soviet empire, although Les Aspin and Senator Carl Levin disputed his claim that he predicted the breakup of the Soviet Union. In February 1992 Powell allowed that if the August 1991 coup had succeeded, the Base Force strategy would have been scrapped; as it was, the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991 and the Base Force idea saved the United States from being stuck with an outdated policy. Because Cheney had allowed Powell to proceed with a policy that he didn’t like, the United States was well positioned to take advantage of its singular superpower status. America’s military mobility, in particular, was substantially improved and getting better. Even Cheney struck a celebratory note, observing that “the threats have become remote—so remote that sometimes they’re difficult to ascertain. This is a very desirable situation and one we ought to work to maintain.” Aspin chided in reply that until recently Cheney had been “very grumpy” about closing military bases.22

Powell’s regionally oriented Base Force strategy rested on four pillars: deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and the possibility of reconstituting a threat-based system if needed. In 1990 the United States had thirteen thousand strategic nuclear warheads distributed across its triad of bombers (forty-five hundred), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (twenty-five hundred), and submarines (six thousand). The START Treaty of 1991 brought the total number down to ninety-five hundred, and in President Bush’s 1992 State of the Union address, less than a month after the Soviet Union dissolved, he proposed cutting back to forty-seven hundred. Powell assured that forty-seven hundred strategic nuclear warheads would give the United States ample superiority for years to come; he and Cheney emphasized that in every sense excluding strategic nuclear forces, the United States had no global challenger at all. Powell declared that being an unrivaled superpower was a very good thing for America: “My preferred way of fighting wars is to never let anybody think that they could win one against us. I want to be the bully on the block.” Years later he put it more graphically: “I believe in the bully’s way of going to war. ‘I’m on a street corner, I got my gun, I got my blade, I’ma kick yo’ ass.’”23

That was the essence of the Powell Doctrine, “putting it in the mind of an opponent that there is no future in trying to challenge the armed forces of the United States.” If the United States retained its military superiority, it would be able to get its way most of the time by intimidation or the mere threat of force. And when it chose to fight, it would be able to smash the enemy quickly.
Regarding strategic forces, Powell stressed, “never be second to anybody.” Regarding worldwide engagement, he believed in the Pax Americana: “We must remain engaged. Our allies around the world want us to and expect us to, whether it is in Europe or in Southwest Asia or in the Pacific, it is the same everywhere I go and everywhere the Secretary goes. Our new friends, our old friends, our counterparts say to us, America, stay engaged this time. America, do not abandon us. America, we have seen too often what happens when, in this sort of new environment, you leave the world stage.”

If America had no serious enemies, it followed for Powell and Cheney that America had to worry in a new way about the whole world. While allowing that the United States did not have vital interests everywhere in every situation, they contended that the world’s only superpower had to protect the world’s stability and be ready to intervene anywhere on short notice. Powell remarked, “Though we can still plausibly identify specific threats—North Korea, Iran, Iraq, something like that—the real threat is the unknown, the uncertain.” Containing communism had been ambitious and taxing; guarding against the unknown was no less so.

Powell’s appearances before the House and Senate armed services committees were star turns. Congressional leaders heaped extraordinary praise upon him, and his immense prestige often seemed to inoculate him from criticism or even pointed questioning. Was the rest of the world really so eager for the United States to be the bully on the block? Doesn’t everyone hate bullies? Instead of consolidating its power and dominating the world in its own way, wouldn’t the United States have done better to emphasize multilateral cooperation? Aspin occasionally clashed with Powell and Cheney—he called Cheney “the Sphinx”—and at one joint appearance by Powell and Cheney he retorted, “I know damn well you guys aren’t always right.” Democratic Representative Ronald Dellums admonished that a strategic force of forty-seven hundred nuclear weapons still carried enough overkill capacity to incinerate the planet several times. But Powell’s Pax Americanism got a free ride at House and Senate hearings; most congressional leaders seemed to find nothing new or alarming in it. A month after Powell spelled out his vision of an American-dominated world order, however, the New York Times reported that the Defense Department had recently drafted a strident version of this vision. For a moment, the American empire became the issue.

Preserving Unipolarity: Defense Planning Guidance

The Powell/Cheney briefings of the early 1990s were unusually detailed and extensive. For the first time since 1947, fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of America’s foreign policy were in play. Powell and Cheney felt the historic weight of the moment. For the most part they had the same strategic vision, although Powell pointedly reminded reporters that he belonged to no political party and didn’t “do politics,” while Cheney was a winger through and
through. In one of their skirmishes over tactical nuclear weapons, Powell argued that the Army’s artillery-fired nukes were trouble-prone, too expensive to modernize, and, because of the increasing accuracy of conventional weapons, useless. The Army insisted on them only because it took pride in having nuclear weapons. Powell contended that the Army needed to swallow some of its pride while the three other service chiefs needed to stop indulging the Army on this point. Cheney replied that his civilian advisors agreed with him against Powell; Powell countered: “That’s because they’re all right-wing nuts like you.”27

Wolfowitz’s policy staff was a hardline stronghold; right up to the implosion of the Soviet Union itself, Wolfowitz spun out scenarios in which a liberalizing Soviet state continued its quest of world domination. He emphasized that Gorbachev still supported the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan, the Sandinista government in Nicaragua (through Cuba), and the Communist government of North Korea. In March 1990 Wolfowitz warned in the Army War College’s quarterly journal that as a foreign policy, glasnost was merely a cunning method of pursuing “the same ends by different, less costly, and less controversial means.” At least, he claimed, the “weight of evidence” still supported this conclusion.28

Thus, when Cheney first asked Wolfowitz to draft a policy statement for a new strategic situation, neither of them believed that the United States was actually in one. Both had to suspend their beliefs about the existing situation to imagine a post-Cold War world. Formally, the document that Wolfowitz and his team composed was part of the Pentagon’s routine budgetary process. Typically issued every two years under the title “Defense Planning Guidance,” it instructed military and civilian leaders in the Defense Department on how to prepare their forces, budgets, and strategy for the next decade. Pentagon leaders viewed this one as unusually important. Wolfowitz and his top assistant, Scooter Libby, briefed Wolfowitz aide Zalmay Khalilzad on what it should say; Andrew Marshall, Richard Perle, and Albert Wohlstetter also provided input; and Khalilzad composed a draft that circulated at the highest levels of the Pentagon. But the plan was leaked to the New York Times and Washington Post by a government official who believed that it broke new ground that needed to be publicly debated. Wolfowitz later recalled that he had not reviewed the leaked version and that “someone leaked it to the New York Times, apparently because they didn’t like it.”29 For several days, after the plan sparked a furor, Wolfowitz tried to distance himself from it, and for several years he resisted the convention of calling himself its author, even as everyone else involved called it the Wolfowitz plan.

The Wolfowitz plan eschewed diplomatic vagueness: “Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to gain global power.” The plan cautioned that America’s objective was not merely to prevent any unfriendly regime from becoming a
Soviet-like rival. It was to assure that no other country became a superpower and thus diminished America’s global supremacy: “The United States must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.” It was not a question of military supremacy only: “In non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order.” Even the desire of other countries for great-power stature had to be thwarted: “We must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.”

The planning guide affirmed that unilateralism goes with unipolarism. There is a place for coalition-building in the politics of a dominant superpower, it allowed, but cooperative efforts pertaining to key security interests had to be organized only on a situational as-needed basis: “Like the coalition that opposed Iraqi aggression, we should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond the crisis being confronted, and in many cases carrying only general agreement over the objectives to be accomplished.” The world would be more stable when nations realized that the ultimate guarantor of the world order is the United States, not the United Nations or any temporary coalition of nations: “The sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S. will be an important stabilizing factor.” Although the United States could not assume responsibility for “righting every wrong,” it held “the preeminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations.”

The new Pentagon strategy asserted America’s right to wage preemptive wars to prevent nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks or to punish aggressors. It called for a global missile defense system and a “U.S.-led system of collective security.” It opposed the development of nuclear programs in other countries while asserting America’s need to maintain a nuclear arsenal on something like its present scale. It warned that in Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, and India, the United States might have to take “military steps to prevent the development or use of weapons of mass destruction.” It admonished that allowing Japan or South Korea to grow into regional powers would be destabilizing in East Asia. It judged that America needed to thwart Germany’s aspirations for regional leadership in Europe and restrain India’s “hegemonic aspirations” in South Asia. It asserted that in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, “our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region’s oil.” And it warned that a Russian relapse or backlash was a dangerous possibility.

Wolfowitz fixated on the Soviet threat until a month before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The “Defense Planning Guidance” cautioned: “We continue to recognize that collectively the conventional forces of the states formerly
comprising the Soviet Union retain the most military potential in all of Eurasia; and we do not dismiss the risks to stability in Europe from a nationalist backlash in Russia or efforts to reincorporate into Russia the newly independent republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and possibly others.” Russia could still turn away from democracy, or fail at creating it, “with the potential that an authoritarian regime bent on regenerating aggressive military power could emerge.” But even if democracy took root, “Russia will remain the strongest military power in Eurasia and the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the United States.”

The Wolfowitz plan was roundly criticized for its chauvinistic vision and tone, causing embarrassment for the Bush administration in an election year. Bill Clinton’s deputy campaign manager George Stephanopoulos called it an excuse for huge defense budgets; old right conservative Pat Buchanan called it a “blank check” for all the countries that imperial America would have to defend; Senator Robert Byrd charged that “in the long run, it will be counterproductive to the very goal of world leadership that it cherishes.” Even some who agreed with the plan wished that Wolfowitz/Khalilzad had said it in a nicer way. Powell was one of the plan’s few unapologetic defenders. It was a very good thing that the United States had become the world’s dominant power, he argued, and the United States needed to keep its supremacy. Wolfowitz merely spelled out what it would take to do so. “I don’t think we should apologize for that” Powell said, adding that America’s European allies trusted the United States to use its power justly. He stressed that the United States had to be able to fight two regional wars at once; otherwise, “we might invite just the sort of crisis we’re trying to deter.” If the United States could be tied down by one war, an opponent could be tempted to take advantage. The United States had to be able to fight two wars while still keeping the rest of the world in check. Charles Krauthammer agreed that the alternative was to allow Germany and Japan to rearm; the Wolfowitz plan merely made sense.

But Bush, Baker, and Scowcroft were embarrassed by the plan, and Powell and Cheney quickly accepted that the controversy was bad for the Bush presidency. Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams, while allowing that the document expressed Cheney’s essential position, contended that Cheney and Wolfowitz had not read it; numerous Pentagon officials replied that it was based on Wolfowitz’s ideas and briefings. Williams claimed that the document had circulated only at “the deputy assistant secretary level” but a cover memorandum indicated that it was sent on February 18 to Powell, all four military chiefs of staff, and the civilian service secretaries. More accurately, Williams reported that a forthcoming revised edition of the plan would eliminate all statements about preventing the rise of regional competitors in Western Europe, Asia, and the former Soviet Union.

For several days Wolfowitz worried that the controversy would end his government career and Khalilzad worried that he was being set up for a fall, but Cheney liked the plan, aside from its public relational problems, and he
encouraged Libby to smoothen its scary parts. Libby judged that since America had no serious rivals, it was unnecessarily provocative to go on about repressing or blocking them. Why not rewrite the plan in a way that accented the positive? America’s real goal was to become so overwhelmingly powerful that no nation would dream of challenging the United States. On May 23, 1992, the Defense Department leaked Libby’s revision of the plan, which bore the influence of Cheney and Powell. It was a softer version of the same strategic vision. “Our most fundamental goal is to deter or defeat attack from whatever source,” it declared. “The second goal is to strengthen and extend the system of defense arrangements that binds democratic and like-minded nations together in common defense against aggression, build habits of cooperation, avoid the renationalization of security policies, and provide security at lower costs and with lower risks for all.” The original version had spurned collective action through the United Nations, but the Cheney/Powell/Libby version spoke of strengthening the United Nations. Instead of preventing every nation from becoming a regional power, it prevented “any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests.” The revised version urged that the United States could not allow its vital interests to depend “on international mechanisms that can be blocked by countries whose interests may be very different than our own.” Stripping away the specific warnings about power-hungry nations, the revision settled for bureaucratic generalities about the struggle for a stable world order.36

The controversy passed. It had been very strange that the Bush administration, having recently authorized the Gulf War through the United Nations, appeared to spurn the United Nations. It was equally strange because the administration was about to ask the U.N. for a new mandate to make Saddam comply with his ceasefire obligations. George H.W.Bush and his inner circle of conservative realists wanted no part of this strangeness in an election year. The leaks from the Pentagon stopped, the story faded, and Bush avoided talking about it. Years later he said nothing about the planning guidance episode in his memoir. He did say what he had always believed, that the United States had “an obligation to lead” and that his country was a “benign” superpower, “without territorial ambitions, uncomfortable with exercising our considerable power.”37

Quietly, however, Cheney kept tinkering with the policy plan. In January 1993, after Bush lost the 1992 election, Cheney put his name on a final version of the plan that restored some of Wolfowitz’s neo-imperial themes. It stated that the objective of U.S. foreign policy was to prevent the rise of a new superpower and preclude “hostile competitors from challenging our critical interests.” Although the United States preferred to fight alongside allies, it needed to take the lead in all coalitions, recognize that collective strategies are not always possible, and assert its right to intervene unilaterally. Thus, the United States needed to maintain a huge military superiority over the rest of the world. Cheney published the plan’s grand strategy, while leaving its second part (on military implementation) classified. David Armstrong later observed: “It was kinder,
gentler dominance, but it was dominance all the same. And it was this thesis that Cheney and company nailed to the door on their way out.”38

Scoop Jackson Republicanism

The neoconservatives despaired of Bush 41’s status-quo realpolitik and lack of ideological conviction. Although they cheered when Bush went to war and called for a New World Order, they felt marginalized in his administration, lost the key policy disagreements, and resented the condescending way they were often treated by Bush’s inner circle. They remembered Reagan more admiringly after they had dealt with Bush; some of them had to be reminded that they accused Reagan of betraying anticommunism. Several neocons were so disgusted with Bush’s cramped realism that they supported Bill Clinton in 1992, notably Penn Kemble, Edward Luttwak, Stephen Morris, Joshua Muravchik, Richard Schifter, and Aaron Wildavsky. Muravchik explained that for him (as for most of them), foreign policy was the crucial matter, and in this area, “Clinton’s stands are preferable to Bush’s. On what I care about—human rights and promoting democracy, keeping some sense of ideals in our foreign policy—Clinton is more amenable than Bush.” The neocons wanted aggressive, principled foreign policies, especially toward Bosnia, Burma, China, Croatia, Iraq, Israel, Russia, and Syria. In 1992, Clinton called for a vigorous internationalism “infused with democratic spirit.” That was just enough to get some disaffected neoconservatives to vote Democratic again.39

But most of the neocons had moved too far to the right to come back to the Democrats. Their political home was now the Republican Party. Wolfowitz exemplified the neoconservative perspective, having switched to the Republicans during the Reagan administration. For Wolfowitz and the neocons, the world was always better off when America aggressively pursued its global interests.

He was raised to feel the perils of the world and his great fortune at being an American. Wolfowitz’s father, Jacob Wolfowitz, was a Polish Jew who emigrated from Russian-held Warsaw in 1920, worked for the U.S. Office of Scientific Research Development during World War II, and taught mathematics at Cornell University from 1951 to 1981. Many Wolfowitzes perished in the Holocaust. At the family dinner table Jack Wolfowitz often spoke about the totalitarian horrors of Europe, the benign security of America, and America’s global responsibilities. He had passionate interests in politics and history, which he passed to his son; Wolfowitz later recalled that his father pored over the New York Times every day “as though the future of the world depended on his reading the New York Times.” As a youth Wolfowitz adopted his father’s passions and identified politically with Cold War Democrats. During college he attended Martin Luther King, Jr.’s March on Washington and took courses from his father in pursuit of a mathematics major. Although Jack Wolfowitz was fascinated by politics, he looked down on nonscientific disciplines. Wolfowitz later recalled that his father regarded political science as not much better than astrology: “He
really did think that the ultimate thing in life was to be a mathematician or a theoretical physicist.” Finding mathematics too abstract, Wolfowitz drifted into chemistry, pictured himself doing cancer research, and met political philosopher Allan Bloom, a resident scholar who lived in Wolfowitz’s elite student dormitory, Telluride House. Bloom was eccentric, learned, a charismatic teacher, and an insatiable gossip; his seminar enthralled Wolfowitz, whom he exhorted to follow his passion for politics. Wolfowitz debated his career decision to the end of his college days. Braving the disappointment of his father, he applied to Harvard in government, Chicago in political science, and MIT in biophysical chemistry. He rationalized that he could do a bit of political science before returning to chemistry, but his disappointed father told him that science stars didn’t waste time on diversions. Wolfowitz chose the University of Chicago, largely because Leo Strauss was there.40

Wolfowitz realized that he probably didn’t belong in mathematics or chemistry; he spent his spare time reading politics and history. Logically, his interest in international politics should have taken him to Harvard rather than Chicago, which emphasized political theory, but Wolfowitz reasoned that he could learn international politics on his own. Chicago represented the opportunity to learn theory from a master, Leo Strauss, who was Bloom’s guru. Contrary to much that has been written about Wolfowitz, however, he was never much of a Straussian. He took two courses with Strauss (on Plato and Montesquieu), but otherwise paid little attention to political theory; Wolfowitz’s background in mathematics drove his graduate training in a very different direction. On his first day at Chicago he met Albert Wohlstetter, a mathematical logician and legendary strategist of nuclear war, who asked if he knew Jack Wolfowitz. Wohlstetter had studied mathematics under Wolfowitz’s father at Columbia, and, like Jack Wolfowitz, he was a product of the City College of New York. Wohlstetter’s college classmates were the legendary New York intellectuals: Kenneth Arrow, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Irving Howe, Alfred Kazin, Irving Kristol, Melvin Lasky, Seymour Martin Lipset, Bernard Malamud, Seymour Melman, and Philip Selznick. In the 1950s, while his classmates became writers and social scientists, Wohlstetter revolutionized the field of nuclear strategy. Wolfowitz later recalled that although he had never heard of Wohlstetter before applying to Chicago, and was not well prepared for graduate-level political science of any kind, “when Albert discovered I was a math major he immediately glommed onto me. His approach to issues was very technical and very technologically oriented and I was the perfect student.”41

Wohlstetter was another guru figure, brilliant and eccentric. In the 1950s and early 1960s he had worked with Herman Kahn, James Schlesinger, Andrew Marshall, Daniel Ellsberg, and his wife Roberta Wohlstetter at the original think tank, the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, which contracted for the U.S. Air Force. Using game theory and statistics, he constructed precise scenarios of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Kahn called it “thinking about the
unthinkable”; along with Kahn, Wohlstetter was a model for Stanley Kubrick’s movie, *Dr. Strangelove*.

During his years at Rand, Wohlstetter formulated the “fail-safe” and “secondstrike” concepts of nuclear deterrence. He argued in the early 1950s that instead of locating Strategic Air Command bases as close as possible to the Soviet Union, the United States would do better to rely on long-range missiles launched from bases inside the United States. This argument prevailed after Wohlstetter developed its “fail-safe” recall options, convincing the Defense Department to withdraw Strategic Air Command bombers from overseas. In the late 1950s he contradicted nuclear orthodoxy again, arguing that what mattered in nuclear war and deterrence was not the total accumulation of weapons, but the second-strike capability that remained after a first strike. Deterrence doctrine wrongly supposed that “a general thermonuclear war is extremely unlikely” he wrote. “Deterrence in the 1960’s will be neither inevitable nor impossible but the product of sustained intelligent effort, attainable only by continuing hard choice.” Rather than continually add to America’s stockpile of Minuteman missiles, it was more important to build shelters and hardened silos.

Wohlstetter advised the Kennedy administration during the Cuban missile crisis, and by 1964, when he left full-time work at Rand to join the University of Chicago faculty, he could take credit for important changes in American nuclear policy. He was the godfather of the nuclear hawks, although less ideological than many of his disciples. In the mid-1970s he was the first to recognize that the Tomahawk cruise missile would be more valuable as a conventional delivery system, because of its long range, than as a nuclear delivery system. Wohlstetter took a hard line on arms control treaties with the Soviet Union, opposed all forms of accommodating coexistence, and pushed hard for the development of an antiballistic missile system. Persistently he advocated military flexibility and precision targeting, contributing to Andrew Marshall’s “Revolution in Military Affairs” strategy (in acronym-happy defense lingo, “RMA”). With Marshall, he touted the importance of technological breakthroughs that made it possible to fight precise, high-tech nuclear and conventional wars.

It galled Wohlstetter that his work on second-strike warfare led to a new form of deterrence complacency, the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. Deterrence theorists reasoned that the second-strike capabilities of both sides created a “balance of terror” that deterred both sides from starting a nuclear war. Wohlstetter countered that the doctrine of mutual assured destruction placed too much trust in the deterrent value of massive retaliation and wrongly placed millions of lives at risk. An accidental nuclear war was quite possible, he warned; moreover, Soviet leaders might not be deterred by the threat of massive retaliation, especially because American strategy targeted cities. Wohlstetter advocated the targeting of Soviet missiles, not civilians, the development of highly accurate weapons, and the attainment of military superiority over the Soviet Union.
Highly energetic, self-consuming, and filled with righteous indignation, especially against communism, Wohlstetter was often caricatured as an obsessive Cold Warrior, if not a freakishly apocalyptic one. Though he didn’t love the bomb like Strangelove, colleagues described him as “an impossible person, a mad genius.” To Wolfowitz he was a riveting model of real-world intellectual engagement. Working under Wohlstetter, Wolfowitz focused his graduate work on aspects of decision making in national security affairs. He studied critical decisions by U.S. presidents, especially the difficulty of making judgments about presidential decisions that still had unknown consequences. Wolfowitz argued in his doctoral dissertation that Eisenhower’s proposal to build nuclear water-desalting plants in the Middle East underestimated the problem of nuclear proliferation. By the time that he finished his doctorate in 1972, he believed that the arms control policies of every president since Truman inadequately dealt with America’s lack of certainty about Soviet intentions and strategic plans. He was a Wohlstetter disciple who worried that policy makers overtrusted in the systems analyses of defense experts; both groups pretended to know more about Soviet plans than they really knew. Years later Richard Perle aptly remarked, “Paul thinks the way Albert thinks.”

In 1969 Wolfowitz got his first taste of Washington by helping Wohlstetter research the congressional debate over ballistic missile defense. They were joined by Richard Perle, who was then a graduate student at Princeton. An underachieving student at Hollywood High School, Perle had dated Wohlstetter’s daughter Joan. He met Wohlstetter at the family swimming pool, who introduced himself by handing Perle a copy of his famous article, “The Delicate Balance of Terror.” Perle later recalled: “Sitting there at the swimming pool I read the article which was a brilliant piece of exposition and obviously so. We started talking about it.” Although he knew nothing about nuclear strategy, and was failing high school Spanish at the time, Perle found a model. He had been a liberal without thinking much about it; now he wanted to be like Wohlstetter. Like nearly all the neocon hawks, he took no interest in actually joining the military. Turned down by the University of Chicago, Perle went to college at the University of Southern California, relinquished what remained of his liberalism, and began graduate work at Princeton with the idea of becoming a political scientist. He later recalled, “Reality and rigor are important tonics, and if you got into the world of international affairs and you looked with some rigor at what was going on in the world, it was really hard to be liberal and naïve.” In 1969 he and Wolfowitz interviewed government policy makers for Wohlstetter’s promissile defense group, the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy, which included Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze. One of the policy makers was Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson.

Scoop Jackson was the first hero of the neocons, a fiercely anti-Soviet Democrat who led the party’s fading Cold War faction. Old-style Democrats touted him as America’s next president; Jackson endeared himself to Perle and Wolfowitz by getting on the floor to study Wolfowitz’s chart on the feasibility of
an antiballistic missile (ABM) system, which was under debate in the Senate. Perle later recalled: “It was love at first sight. I will never forget that first encounter with Scoop. Here were a couple of graduate students, sitting on the floor in Scoop’s office in the Senate, reviewing charts and analyses of the ballistic missile defense and getting his views on the subject.” Jackson exhorted them to get some experience of Washington policy making before completing their doctorates. In politics, Capitol Hill was the real world, academe an indulgence. Perle took the bait: “Scoop said, ‘You’re never really gonna understand how these governments work until you have some direct experience, so why don’t you come and work for me for a year and you can work on your thesis in your spare time?’” That was the end of Perle’s doctoral career. He joined Jackson’s staff, stayed for eleven years, and never wrote his dissertation; the ABM system passed the Senate by a single vote, which provided Nixon with an extra bargaining chip in his negotiations with the Soviets. Wolfowitz taught political science at Yale for three years, finished his doctorate, yearned for a government position, and hooked on with Wohlstetter’s “New Alternatives Workshop,” a research and lobbying outfit that pressed for technological breakthroughs. Wolfowitz later recalled that during the Gulf War of 1991 it gave him great delight to watch the Tomahawk missiles turn right-angle corners, doing “what Albert Wohlstetter had envisioned fifteen years before.” In 1973 Wohlstetter used his vast Washington network to get Wolfowitz a job with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which was undergoing a political purge.46

Having negotiated the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement in Moscow, Nixon had to protect his right flank to get the treaty through Congress. Thus he pushed out thirteen senior staff members of the arms control agency, many of whom he and Kissinger had bad relations with anyway. Wohlstetter’s former Rand colleague Fred Iklé got the job of heading the agency, and Wohlstetter recommended Wolfowitz to him. While Perle immersed himself in Jackson’s foreign policy causes, especially the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, Wolfowitz worked on the SALT treaty and a variety of nuclear nonproliferation issues. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment and the SALT process were defining causes of the early neoconservative movement. Jackson-Vanik, which was cosponsored by Ohio Democratic Representative Charles Vanik, refused “most favored nation” trade status to nations that prohibited emigration or imposed expensive fees upon it. Aimed specifically at allowing Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union, its prohibitions encompassed all rights of equal trade as well as financial credits from the Export-Import Bank, the Commodity Credit Corporation, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The SALT process, on the other hand, legislated a military relationship between the United States and Soviet Union that reduced nuclear weapons on both sides. Neoconservatives supported Jackson-Vanik because it struck a blow against Soviet totalitarianism on behalf of a human right. They opposed the SALT process because they opposed detente, although for
Wolfowitz it was professionally awkward to put it quite so bluntly. As a member of the Nixon administration he was obligated to support the president’s policies and thus oppose Jackson and Perle, though in fact he shared the neocon distrust of the arms control process. Neocons believed, with varying degrees of intensity, that arms control agreements helped the Soviet Union stabilize its empire.\textsuperscript{47}

Jackson argued that leaving is a fundamental human right and that, despite the Nixon administration’s desire to grant most favored nation status to the Soviet Union, the Soviet government disqualified itself from it by imprisoning its citizens. He opposed the Nixon administration’s desire for an arms agreement on the grounds that the United States should not prevent itself from winning the arms race and that the Soviets could not be trusted to abide by any treaty. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment forced the Soviet Union to open its system in a way that undermined its political control and legitimacy; through his Senate leadership roles on energy and natural resources, Jackson pressed for alternatives to America’s dependence on foreign oil; and his skepticism about arms control encouraged young neoconservatives to take a hard line against it. To them he showed what it meant to stand up to the Soviet Union without betraying American values. He was also, unfortunately, the chief symbol of their marginalization in the Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{48}

In 1960 Jackson stood in the mainstream of the Democratic Party, chairing the Democratic National Committee; by 1970, although he had not changed, the mainstream of the party was alien to him. Perle and Wolfowitz came of age politically during the transition, sticking to Jackson-style anticommunism. They admired his insistence that good nations had to be militarily strong to remain free. As a soldier in World War II, Jackson served with the American forces that liberated Buchenwald. For the rest of his life he admonished against appeasement. His Norwegian heritage had something to do with his revulsion for accommodation and military weakness. Jackson took pride in Norway’s welfare state and highly civilized culture, but he raged at the memory of its crushing by the Nazis. Perle recalled: “The conclusion he drew was you’ve got to be strong. It’s all very well to have the right values but if you’re not strong, those values are vulnerable. That was his view and he said it endlessly and I believe that was Paul’s view and it was certainly my view.”\textsuperscript{49}

Wolfowitz called himself a “Scoop Jackson Democrat” until he switched parties, whereupon he called himself a “Scoop Jackson Republican.” For four years he worked with other conservatives in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to resist the arms reduction bandwagon. The fact that detente was a Republican administration policy kept him in the Democratic Party during the 1970s. To neoconservatives, the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of patient coexistence with the Soviet Union was a disaster. It legitimized Soviet communism and allowed the Soviet Union to keep itself on a military par with the vastly more productive United States.

Jackson led the political opposition to Kissingerian detente, and in remarkably little time, Perle became Jackson’s indispensable organizer, bad-cop partner, and
staff lightning rod. With a distinctly combative flair, he maintained that America should challenge the Soviet Union on every front, not merely contain it or make accommodations with it. He partied as strenuously as he worked, while learning the finer points of strategic doctrine; a friend later described the 1970s as Perle’s “Philip Roth period.” Often he didn’t make it to work until nearly noon, but still ran circles around his legislative opponents. Opinionated, charming, intellectually formidable, ruthless, highly skilled at bureaucratic politics, and supremely confident in his ideology and person, Perle became a hero to conservative Republicans, although he kept his registration in the Democratic Party, mostly out of loyalty to Jackson. Years later in his memoir, Kissinger recalled that Perle’s arguments were “more cynical than substantive” and that Jackson, “with Perle’s indispensable assistance, skillfully transformed administration successes into liabilities by an extraordinary ability to manipulate vague, symbolic allegations.” In 1974, after the Jackson-Vanik Amendment struck a blow against Kissinger’s prized detente, Kissinger put it more graphically: “You just wait and see! If that son of a bitch Richard Perle ever gets into an administration, after six months he’ll be pursuing exactly the same policies I’ve been attempting and that he’s been sabotaging.”

But Kissinger proved to be wrong about Perle’s future, and in 1976 the angry and resurgent party was the Republican right. Although hardline Democrats had their own organization, the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, and their own presidential candidate, Scoop Jackson, both flopped at presidential politics, while the Republican right nearly unseated its own incumbent president. It denounced Gerald Ford’s adoption of the Nixon-Kissinger policy of detente, demanded an aggressive military buildup, and backed Ronald Reagan for president. Reagan lost the New Hampshire primary by one percentage point; later he won the North Carolina, Nebraska, and Texas primaries; persistently he charged that detente had allowed the Soviet Union to surpass the United States as a military power.

His authority on this theme was Albert Wohlstetter, who charged that the CIA systematically underestimated Soviet missile deployments. This accusation gained new political respectability in March 1976, when Republican and Democratic hardliners established the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD). Led by Richard Allen, William Casey, Max Kampelman, Paul Nitze, Richard Perle, Norman Podhoretz, Eugene Rostow, and Elmo Zumwalt, the CPD supported the Jackson/Reagan warning that Kissingerian coexistence had dangerously turned the United States into a weaker power than the Soviet Union. In the spirit of the Air Force’s “missile gap” alarm of the late 1950s, which Kennedy used against Nixon in the 1960 presidential election, hardliners charged that the government had failed to keep America strong. Ford tacked to the right to appease his critics, but the charges grew louder, especially against the CIA. It didn’t help that the CIA’s director was George H.W.Bush. In July 1976, Ford and Bush tried to defuse the attacks by asking the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to appoint representative hardliners to evaluate the CIA’s recent National Intelligence Estimates.
“Team B” consisted of three groups, but only one of them sparked a controversy, thus earning the name exclusively. One group analyzed Soviet low-altitude air defense capabilities; another studied Soviet ICBM accuracy; the third group, “Team B,” focused on Soviet strategic objectives. Chaired by Harvard historian Richard Pipes, Team B’s members were veteran negotiator Paul Nitze, University of Southern California political scientist William R. Van Cleave, retired Army Lt. General Daniel O. Graham (a former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency), Retired Air Force General John Vogt, Air Force Major General Jasper Welch, Ambassador Foy Kohler, Ambassador Seymour Weiss, Rand analyst Thomas Wolfe, and Wolfowitz. It met during September and October, issued its report in December, and, at first, kept out of public view. The team’s civilian members were media-sawy, however. Pipes, Nitze, and Van Cleave played leading roles in the CPD, which declared that “the principal threat to our nation, to world peace and to the cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup.” The CPD warned that “the Soviet Union has not altered its long held goal of a world dominated from a single center—Moscow.” Graham contended in the September Reader’s Digest that the Soviets had built their forces to fight and win a nuclear war, not to deter one.51

That was the thesis of the Team B Report, which charged that American intelligence analysts failed to perceive crucial differences between Soviet thinking and their own. The hardliners explained that Soviet leaders did not distinguish between war and peace, confrontation and detente, offense and defense, strategic and peripheral, or nuclear and conventional: “Soviet thinking is Clausewitzian in character... it conceives in terms of ‘grand strategy’ for which military weapons, strategic ones included, represent only one element in a varied arsenal of means of persuasion and coercion.” Soviet leaders did not regard nuclear war as an unthinkable evil, and they were not deterred by a so-called balance of terror. Blasting the CIA’s recent National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), Team B contended that the intelligence community overemphasized hard data about Soviet capabilities and ignored the Soviet objective of conquering the world.52

This was a terrible mistake, and a lazy one: “For unless we are prepared to acknowledge that our adversary is ‘different’ and unless we are willing to make the mental effort required to understand him on his own terms, we have no choice but to fall back on the only alternative position available, namely the postulate that his basic motivation resembles ours.” The CIA assumed that Russians and Americans shared the same fear of nuclear war, and thus it produced perfectly inappropriate examples of “mirror-imaging.” Team B warned that Soviet and American leaders were radically unalike. American society was commercial, democratic, and insular. It took for granted that peace and profit-seeking were normal, war was an aberration, human nature was the same
everywhere in the world, social equality was natural, the military was a marginal factor in politics, and using weapons of mass destruction was “something entirely outside the norms of policy.” But, in fact, the hardliners asserted, this outlook was *sui generis*. No nation in the world shared the American worldview, yet American intelligence analysts projected their own beliefs onto the Soviets. The real Soviet enemy was a giant conglomerate that fused its military, political, and economic institutions into a single arsenal of power, “all administered by the same body of men and all usable for purposes of persuasion and coercion.”

CIA officials missed the point about everything they meticulously quantified. They underestimated the ideological component of Soviet policy and the monolithic nature of the Soviet system. They assumed that Soviet nuclear strategy was defensive because they couldn’t imagine assuming anything else. Team B admonished that the CIA needed to learn about eighteenth-century Russian military doctrine. Russian strategy since Field Marshall A.V. Suvorov in the eighteenth century was primarily offensive, idealizing the “science of conquest.” To American leaders, the SALT treaty of 1972 (which froze nuclear arsenals at current levels) was a big deal, but to Soviet leaders it was “a minor sideshow” that had little effect on their drive for world dominion. Team B imagined that Soviet leaders liked their odds of success when they looked at American society: “A population addicted to the pursuit of consumer goods rapidly loses its sense of patriotism, sinking into a mood of self-indulgence that makes it extremely poor material for national mobilization.”

Team B persistently pictured the worst possible case as the reality. It projected that by 1984 the Soviets would have 500 Backfire bombers; in fact, the Soviets built 235. It predicted that by 1985 the Soviets would have replaced 90 percent of their longrange bombers and missiles; in fact, they replaced less than 60 percent of their long-range force. It warned that a test site for nuclear-powered rocket engines was developing nuclear-powered beam weapons; in fact, this claim wildly overestimated Soviet capabilities. It charged that the CIA ignored “an intense military buildup in nuclear as well as conventional forces of all sorts, not moderated either by the West’s self-imposed restraints or by SALT.” In fact, the rate of growth in Soviet military spending slowed in the mid-1970s and was virtually flat for the next decade. Team B’s report was not uniformly alarmist. Although it spoke in a collective voice, individual differences showed. Wolfowitz’s section on mobile missiles respectfully discussed the CIA’s view that the SS-20 was a replacement for the 88–4 and SS-5 intermediate range missiles. He warned, however, that the 88–20 undoubtedly used the same launch and ground handling equipment as the SS-X-16 intercontinental missile, which gave the Soviets “a real potential in a breakout situation.” In his view, the CIA was too sanguine, overlooking that the 88–20 force might be upgraded to intercontinental capability and that SS-X-16s could be concealed and launched from mobile launchers. Wolfowitz cautioned that the latter fact posed “a serious potential threat” that the CIA had barely begun to address.
Team B closed its report with a Cold War flourish. It asserted that while Americans used force only reluctantly as an occasionally necessary departure from normal life, Soviet leaders embraced and admired force: “The Soviet Union, to an extent inconceivable to the average Westerner, relies on force as a standard instrument of policy. Militarism is deeply ingrained in the Soviet system and plays a central role in the mentality of its elite.” The authors allowed that during the Kruschev years, Soviet leaders may have flirted with “Western concepts of deterrence,” but this was only because the United States had strategic superiority at that time. By 1976, the Soviets no longer doubted their capacity to achieve clear superiority: “Soviet leaders are determined to achieve the maximum attainable measure of strategic superiority over the U.S., a superiority which provides conservative hedges against unpredictable wartime contingencies.” They placed a high priority “on the attainment of a superiority that would deny the United States effective retaliatory options against a nuclear attack.” Team B did not spell out what the latter statement meant; it lacked a consensus on what strategic superiority was actually good for. Some neocons worried that Pipes communicated a stronger hatred of Russia than of communism. But with commanding self-assurance, Pipes and his colleagues pictured the Soviet enemy as a towering dynamo that not unreasonably believed it would conquer the world.56

Team B and the CIA were both wildly wrong about the crumbling Soviet economy. The burden of superpower-level military spending on the Soviet Union was much greater than the CIA or its hardline critics recognized, and eventually, it destroyed the Soviet system. A month after Jimmy Carter won the presidency, Team B issued its report. Except for one leak to the Boston Globe, the group’s existence had been kept out of public view, but in late December, after Carter indicated that he might replace Bush as CIA director, Bush leaked the story to the New York Times and discussed it on Meet the Press. Bush and Pipes got the uproar they wanted, lighting the fuse of a controversy that simmered throughout Carter’s presidency.57

The chief arguments of the Team B report (which remained classified until 1992) were promulgated as factual imperatives by the CPD. After Carter declined to take the report seriously, the Republican right used it against him as a political weapon. Many neocons joined the Republican Party and supported Reagan, who awarded thirty-two members of the CPD with administrative positions after he won the presidency. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Commentary magazine led the charge for an aggressively militant policy.58 Richard Pipes, Edward Luttwak, and Walter Laqueur warned that Soviet military strength was superior to America’s and that Soviet communism was winning the struggle for the world. New Commentary writers such as Robert Jastrow, Patrick Glynn, and Angelo Codevilla made the case for a massive nuclear rearmament leading to strategic superiority.59

The key figure was Pipes, who began to write for Commentary the year after Team B submitted its report. For fifteen years Pipes pleaded for the report’s
declassification; in the meantime he reprised its themes and spelled out how the Soviet Union could win a nuclear war. Pipes insisted that because the Soviets did not believe in nuclear deterrence, Americans were foolish to believe in it. Unlike the United States, he explained, which relied on countervalue deterrence (targeting Soviet cities), the Soviets built land-based counterforce missiles with the intention of launching a first strike on America’s counterforce arsenal. Americans thought that threatening to incinerate tens of millions of people constituted an ample deterrent, but Soviet leaders didn’t think that way. They did not share the “middle-class, commercial, essentially Protestant” notion that nuclear weapons were primarily useful for their deterrent value. America’s Protestantized governing elites assumed that resorting to force was a sign of weakness or failure, but the Soviet leaders were Russians who admired force and domination. To a Russian, Pipes explained, failing to use force revealed a fatal inner weakness.60

American and Soviet nuclear doctrines differed accordingly. Soviet rulers did not place nuclear weapons in a separate category or assume that the main reason to possess them was to prevent nuclear war. They sought to build a superior counterforce arsenal because they believed that a surprise counterforce attack could lead to the winning of a protracted nuclear war. The Soviets sought “not deterrence but victory, not sufficiency in weapons but superiority, not retaliation but offensive action.” American defense strategists were reluctant to adopt the Soviet view, or even to accept that the Soviets subscribed to it, because it was alien “to their experience and view of human nature.” For Pipes, the chief threat to American security lay in this reluctance.61

He did not deny that even a fantastically successful Soviet attack would leave part of America’s counterforce arsenal intact, as well as thousands of submarine-based countervalue missiles. To obliterate every city in the Soviet Union, the United States would need less than three hundred of its ten thousand countervalue missiles. Assuming even the most horribly imaginable attack, the United States would retain enough nuclear overkill capacity to incinerate the Soviet population more than thirty times over.

But that wasn’t enough to deter Russian Communists. Because the United States placed too much emphasis on the retaliatory capacity of its countervalue arsenal, it tempted the Soviets to launch a surprise attack. They were seriously tempted, Pipes claimed, because they were fully prepared to accept tens of millions of casualties to win a nuclear war. Having lost tens of millions in World War II, the loss of forty million more in World War III was a tolerable prospect. After all, they did not place the same high value on life as America’s Protestantized elites. The American squeamishness about committing nuclear genocide was precisely what made a Soviet nuclear attack conceivable. American officials would have approximately thirty minutes to retaliate with their own counterforce missiles. The Soviets therefore had to assume that millions of citizens living near the silos along the Trans-Siberian railway would be killed.
Their next assumption was the crucial one. The Soviets counted on America’s unwillingness to take the next step, initiating countervalue warfare. Although they were prepared to sustain massive losses, Soviet leaders knew that an all-out countervalue war would incinerate both countries. Their wager, Pipes explained, was that nuclear war would never go that far. A successful Soviet attack would leave America with the choice of launching its countervalue missiles or submitting to a Soviet dictate.62

This was the ultimate Present Danger, which rested on Pipes’s highly dubious claims about the feasibility of a successful first strike—an attack covering thousands of miles in the teeth of winds, rough weather, and gravitational fields. Commentary and the CPD argued for the MX missile and, later, the Strategic Defense Initiative on the basis of this supposed danger. Pipes was right that the most important issue was personal, but he avoided the most important part of it. In his portrait, Soviet leaders were so depraved that the deaths of tens of millions of Soviet citizens meant nothing to them and fighting an all-out counterforce war was a serious temptation. Pipes and other neoconservatives failed to explain why Soviet leaders would not become more likely to start a nuclear war if they saw America building toward strategic superiority.63

The immense insecurity of Soviet leaders would have presumably heightened at the spectacle of an American government that did not believe in deterrence. Neoconservatives also failed to explain why a Soviet counterforce strike would leave the United States and its allies with only two (suicidal) options. Even with forty million dead and the loss of most of its counterforce arsenal, America would have retained thousands of countervalue missiles, its military forces, its superior industrial capacity, its remaining counterforce arsenal, and its network of highly armed and technologically advanced allies. A Soviet attack would have provoked the combined force of this economically and technologically superior alliance in a protracted conventional war, backed by the threat of countervalue nuclear strikes. Neoconservatives insisted that Soviet leaders regarded this as a tempting prospect. A “window of vulnerability” was inviting Soviet leaders to launch a suicidal attack. What neoconservatives ultimately failed to explain was how any defense strategy would have worked if Soviet leaders were so thoroughly depraved.

To the CIA’s Director of Strategic Research, Richard Lehman, Pipes-style Cold Warriorism was beyond rational discussion. Lehman was a CIA analyst for thirtythree years, the originator of the President’s Intelligence Check List, and before taking over the Strategic Research office in 1975, director of the CIA’s office of Current Intelligence from 1970 to 1975. He respected the other Team B’s. The group on low-altitude air defense made several points about CIA estimates that stuck to the evidence; the group on missile accuracy rehashed an old debate about the MIRVing of Soviet SS-9s; Lehman felt that both groups raised legitimate points. But he judged that Pipes’s group showed no capacity for objective assessment. It was “a team of howling rightwingers” that crusaded for a coherent, hysterical, evidencedeprived, and inflammatory argument. He
described Pipes’s oral presentation as “all full of things that were nonsense but which sounded good.” It was a thoroughly political exercise through which “the right wing had their triumph.”

The Team B episode gave an unsettling display of the political power of alarmism. To Wolfowitz, however, it was a slightly exaggerated enterprise that bore good fruit. He later recalled that he had not been a true believer that the Soviets planned to fight and win a nuclear war. But he strongly believed in the group’s purpose, which was to challenge the CIA’s competence. He believed that the intelligence community gave insufficient attention to Soviet military doctrine and intentions, that it projected American values about the sacredness of life onto Soviet leaders, and that many U.S. policy makers had a political interest in understating the Soviet threat. Because the United States had retired its intermediate range missiles, American officials expected the Soviets to do the same; thus, they were unprepared for the Soviet Union’s decision to modernize its intermediate range missiles. Wolfowitz remarked: “The B-Team demonstrated that it was possible to construct a sharply different view of Soviet motivation from the consensus view of the analysts and one that provided a much closer fit to the Soviet’s observed behavior.”

Wolfowitz believed that if the CIA and the Carter administration had taken Team B seriously, they would have anticipated the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As it was, “the bureaucratic reaction to the whole experience was largely negative and hostile.” Lehman typified that reaction, judging that “it was, as anticipated, a disaster.” To the neocons, the B-Team report was a prophetic statement that put arms control advocates on the defensive and helped make neoconservatism a powerful movement. It was also a model of how to challenge the intelligence community.

Disasters, Bluffs, and Treaties

Wolfowitz’s appointment to Team B barely three years into his government career was a sign of his movement standing. He was already known as an outspoken hawk and energetic analyst with a talent for anticipating unforeseen trouble spots. Upon arriving at the Pentagon during the Arab oil embargo and the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, he was surprised to learn that the Pentagon paid little attention to the Persian Gulf. The Pentagon had a large NATO office, a modest sized East Asian office that oversaw the Korean peninsula, Japan, and the Soviet Pacific fleet, and what he called “a cats-and-dogs office.” Upon asking where the Persian Gulf office was located, he was told that the United States had no forces in the Gulf and no plans to put any there. Wolfowitz later recalled that one of the Pentagon’s unspoken reasons for keeping its hands off the Gulf was its aversion to creating another Vietnam: “But one of the spoken reasons was, ‘the Shah takes care of the Persian Gulf for us.’ And I said, ‘Well, that’s a little shortsighted.’”
In 1977 he nearly wrecked his Republican future by staying on in the Pentagon after Carter was inaugurated, accepting a midlevel position under defense secretary Harold Brown titled Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs, which focused on anticipating future conflicts. Assembling a group that studied possible military threats in the Persian Gulf, Wolfowitz directed a secret report that war-gamed various Soviet interventions, and also pointed worrisomely at Iraq. He warned that Iraq’s territorial disputes and outsized military had to be watched carefully, in case Iraq was preparing to invade Kuwait or Saudi Arabia to gain a monopoly over Middle Eastern oil. He advised the Carter administration to establish a military presence in the region as a deterrent to Iraqi ambitions, but by 1979 Carter viewed Iraq as a regional bulwark against the revolutionary regime in Iran. Wolfowitz doggedly insisted that the Iranian problem should not deter America from facing a potentially larger crisis in Iraq; the United States had to get heavy weaponry into position. Near the end of 1979 Wolfowitz got a call from his old boss Fred Iklé, who was working for Reagan’s presidential campaign. Iklé warned him that if he wanted a job in the next administration, he had to get out of the Carter administration. Wolfowitz got out just in time to repair his reputation among the Reaganites. Two years later, while serving as State Department Director of Policy Planning, he won a significant victory. As a response to Wolfowitz’s warnings and with his direct assistance, the Reagan administration permanently pre-positioned U.S. cargo ships loaded with tanks, artillery, and ammunition in the Gulf region. A decade later this heavy weaponry, although a bit rusted, formed the basis of the initial U.S. deployment in Operation Desert Shield.

Although often described as an unrelenting ideological hawk, Wolfowitz was more complicated than his image. A cultured, quiet-speaking workaholic who played classical piano and spoke French, German, Russian, and Hebrew, he was generally affable in demeanor, relatively open-minded on most issues, and rigorously analytical. Interviewers found him unusually calm and collected, although one noticed that his inside suit pocket contained a row of ten ballpoint pens. Leaving nothing to chance, Wolfowitz tried to anticipate all contingencies, thus the arsenal of pens; he also took three cellular phones on a rare family vacation. Unlike Perle, whose large-living indulgences were chronicled by society columnists, Wolfowitz skipped the parties and avoided the press. For a while during the first Bush administration he was provided with two shifts of secretaries in recognition of his 16-hour workdays.

He could be surprisingly detached on certain issues that inflamed neocons, notably Vietnam. In the 1960s Wolfowitz supported America’s intervention in Vietnam; in the 1970s he judged that Vietnam was “a very costly overreach”; in neither case was it a consuming issue for him. Dennis Ross, a political moderate who worked with him on the threat-assessment in the Persian Gulf, recounted that Wolfowitz was more willing than other neocons to consider evidence that didn’t support his ideology: “What I always found in him that separated him from everybody else on that side of the political spectrum is not that he didn’t have
predispositions, but that he was much more open, much more intellectually open, to different kinds of interpretations.” Charles Fairbanks, who worked with Wolfowizt and Ross in the State Department’s policy planning office, agreed that Wolfowizt approached most issues analytically without a rigidly ideological mindset. In Fairbanks’s assessment, Wolfowizt got his reputation for zealotry on a handful of issues that stirred his passion. The Soviet Union and Israel were always high on the list, as was the radical Baath Party of Iraq; in the early 1980s, Wolfowizt also seethed over Muammar el-Qaddafi’s Libya. Fairbanks recalled: “I once presented talking points on Libya, which I considered very tough. He said: ‘You don’t understand. I really want to destroy Qaddafi, not just constrain him.’”

For two years Wolfowizt ran the State Department’s policy planning staff in the Reagan administration, working out the department’s long-term goals. His recruits to the 25-member staff included neocons later to be heard from: Francis Fukuyama, Alan Keyes, Zalmay Khalilzad, and James Roche. After two years Wolfowizt asked Secretary of State George Schulz for a real-world assignment as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Neoconservatives had streamed to Washington to reshape American foreign policy and education; Wolfowizt was surrounded by hardline comrades and friends; Perle was acquiring extraordinary influence as an Assistant Secretary of Defense. But Wolfowizt wanted to be known for more than policy analysis and hawkish advice; he could also get things done. In late 1980 and early 1981 he monitored the Reagan camp’s negotiations with the Carter administration over the release of the American hostages from Iran; ten years later he and Lawrence Eagleburger were dispatched to Israel to keep the Israeli government from retaliating against Saddam in the Gulf War. Although Shultz hesitated at Wolfowizt’s lack of management experience, he finally appointed him to the East Asian and Pacific position, which made Wolfowizt responsible for U.S. relations with more than twenty nations.

Again Wolfowizt challenged Kissinger’s geopolitical realpolitik, this time on the importance of playing China against the Soviet Union. Wolfowizt and Shultz believed that Kissinger catered too much to Chinese interests and overplayed China’s role in the Cold War, which caused the Nixon and Ford administrations to overlook Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Wolfowizt objected that Kissinger’s balancing realpolitik prized stability over doing the right thing, a view that perturbed Reagan’s first secretary of state, A1 Haig. Wolfowizt also questioned the policy of selling airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia and sympathized with Reagan’s desire not to end America’s arms sales to Taiwan, though in the end he helped Shultz restrain Reagan’s longtime favoritism toward Taiwan. For many years Reagan insisted that Taiwan was the legitimate government of China and the United States should strongly support it militarily. As president, he had to be persuaded by Shultz and other officials not to sell attack aircraft to Taiwan and thus destroy the entire Nixon/Kissinger reconciliation with China. By 1983 Reagan wanted to visit
China, but Wolfowitz urged him not to go before Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang came to Washington; otherwise China would look like the stronger party and the United States would look like it was indulging China again. Wolfowitz’s view prevailed, Zhao visited Washington in January 1984, and at the end of April Reagan made his historic first visit to a communist country.71

Wolfowitz argued that the U.S. needed to approach China warily in its own right, not as a helpful bulwark against the Soviet Union. He believed that the Nixon/Kissinger/Haig school exaggerated China’s helpfulness; Reagan’s second secretary of state, Shultz, sided with Wolfowitz. Wolfowitz also played a key role in coordinating U.S. policy toward the Philippines during the Filipino uprising against the Marcos dictatorship, again joining with Shultz to prevail against Reagan’s predisposition. The United States coddled Marcos for twenty years—in 1981 Vice President Bush ludicrously gushed over Marcos’s exemplary adherence to democracy—and Reagan fervently admired Marcos. He waved off Marcos’s stupendous corruption, lauded him as a bulwark against communism, and often repeated his fraudulent story about having provided intelligence to U.S. forces during World War II. Reagan opposed any U.S. action that tacitly supported a democratic alternative to Marcos. Believing that the Carter administration should have backed the Shah of Iran in 1979, he was determined to prevent an Iranian-like disaster in the Philippines.72

A few officials closer to the situation understood that the Filipino situation was nothing like Iran, the Aquino insurgency against Marcos actually represented a restoration of the old Filipino aristocracy, and the United States was disgracing itself by supporting Marcos. Navy Commander for the Pacific (and later Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman) William Crowe pressed hard on these themes, as did Wolfowitz, U.S. ambassadors Michael Armacost and Stephen Bosworth, Assistant Secretary of Defense Dick Armitage, and eventually, George Shultz. In a cunning move that backfired spectacularly, Marcos used an American television appearance to call for a “snap” election, which he lost handily to Corazon Aquino on February 7, 1986. Marcos brazenly stole the election, but Reagan stuck with him, claiming that both sides were guilty of fraud; his source was Imelda Marcos via telephone calls to Nancy Reagan. That pushed Reagan’s advisors to belatedly turn him around, telling Reagan that the United States had to get on the side of democracy. Shultz told an irate Bosworth to calm down and hold together the American embassy in Manila: “Okay, you’ve made your point. Now relax. We’ll try to fix it.” Shultz blandly recounted: “I continued to emphasize the facts to the president, facts that were now so public and clear that they could not be denied.” Reagan and his chief of staff Donald Regan bitterly resented the lesson, but on February 24 Reagan relented, calling for Marcos’s resignation. The next day, Reagan’s emissary to the Philippines, Republican Senator Paul Laxalt, offered Marcos asylum in the United States. Marcos promptly did as he was told and the former U.S. colony became a democracy. Although Reagan fumed at the advisors who pushed him to abandon Marcos, his acquiescence to them probably averted a bloodbath in Manila.73
Wolfowitz later claimed that this episode proved “that the commitment of the United States to democratic solutions runs deep.”⁷⁴ Judging that his family deserved a respite from Washington, Wolfowitz spent the last three years of Reagan’s second term as U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, the world’s fourth largest country and largest Muslim country. His wife Clare (from whom he later divorced) was an anthropologist who specialized in Indonesia. Wolfowitz energetically took up the tasks of public diplomacy, learned the language well enough to hold public briefings, and played a careful hand with the Suharto regime. At the end of his stay, he challenged Suharto to open up the country’s political process, a parting shot that he relished for years afterward. “I honestly started out believing my friends who predicted that within six months I would be craving a dose of high policy,” he later recalled.⁷⁵ Although he was a minor player among Reagan’s advisors, Wolfowitz got a strong dose of high policy upon returning to Washington as Bush’s Pentagon policy director. His high-tide years lay ahead of him. Perle, by contrast, although merely an Assistant Secretary of Defense, was a major player in the Reagan administration.

Wolfowitz and Perle both came to Washington to fight Woolfleter’s battle against arms control, but Wolfowitz took a wider and slower career track. Having shot into prominence as Scoop Jackson’s point man against arms control, Perle handled the same job in the Reagan administration, where the stakes were higher. His extraordinary influence for a third-tier appointee owed much to his considerable skills and even more to the total trust and responsibility that his boss, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, vested in him. Working with Weinberger, Perle turned Reagan’s concoction of sentiments about nuclear weapons into a policy. Like Perle, Reagan believed in nuclear superiority, not deterrence, and he was committed to the deployment of new U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Much more than Perle, Reagan believed there could be such a thing as a good arms control agreement, although his record indicated otherwise. Unlike Perle and virtually all his advisors, Reagan prized a utopian belief in the possibility of complete nuclear disarmament. Juggling Reagan’s predispositions, in 1981 Perle and Weinberger devised the so-called zero option, which called for the removal of all Soviet SS-20s from Europe and Asia in return for America’s agreement not to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Europe.⁷⁶

It was a Machiavellian stratagem that synthesized Reagan’s peculiar combination of beliefs. In his entire career Reagan had never supported an arms control agreement. He opposed the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the SALT I agreement and ABM Treaty of 1972, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and the SALT II agreement of 1979. But he insisted to Perle and Weinberger that he did believe in arms control agreements that abolished entire classes or deployments of nuclear weapons; thus, they devised the zero option. Perle assumed that the Soviets would never remove actual missiles in return for a promise not to install weapons that were still in production. Although he denied it when pressed on the question, it was
widely believed that he opposed arms control in principle. Perle told aides that arms negotiations lulled Americans into complacency and thus were harmful to American interests; the only merit of arms control was its propaganda value. At the same time he was the chief arms control policy maker for a president who claimed to support real disarmament. In public, at least, Perle professed to agree with the president. The trick was to indulge Reagan’s utopian side and get the propaganda value of pursuing arms control while pursuing military superiority. The zero option set the model for Reagan’s novel blend of hardline-militarism and utopian-disarmamentism, which bewildered conservatives, liberals, American allies, and American critics alike.77

Throughout Reagan’s first term Perle was widely accused of smokescreen obstructionism. Shortly after joining the administration he told an interviewer, “It’s not in our interests to sign agreements that do not entail a significant improvement in the strategic balance.” Because Perle did not expect the Soviets to sign agreements that damaged their strategic position, the implication was that no agreement was conceivable. Critics protested that Perle’s “significant improvement” principle guaranteed that the arms race would continue. In 1983 he observed to a special panel of the House Armed Services Committee that “it has become commonplace for the Administration’s critics to accuse it of a lack of seriousness about arms control.” He complained that according to the conventional wisdom, the “good guys” who supported arms control were blocked by “bad guys” led by himself “who are secretly opposed to arms control and block it at every turn but go through the motions in a false show of seriousness.” By various turns Perle reinforced and denounced this image of himself while waiting for a stable Soviet leadership with which he might at least make a show of pursuing arms control.78

The Reagan administration came to power just as the Soviet economy and the Brezhnev generation of Soviet leaders began to expire. Leonid Brezhnev died in November 1982; his successor Yuri Andropov died in February 1984; his successor Konstantin Chernenko died in March 1985. Later in 1985, while Reagan prepared to meet Mikhail Gorbachev, he remarked that he had always been willing to negotiate with Soviet leaders but they “kept dying on me.” Reagan’s eagerness to negotiate with Gorbachev surprised many Americans and horrified his right flank, which smelled a Soviet ruse to disarm the United States. After Gorbachev took office, Perle had to take an unlikely “yes” for an answer on the zero option, although Gorbachev bargained for concessions on the strategic defense initiative, Soviet SS-20s in Asia, counting British and French nuclear weapons, and onsite verification. Gorbachev feared the deployment of American Pershing II missiles in Europe, which could hit Soviet targets very quickly, and Soviet leaders were frightened that the United States might be capable of building an effective missile defense system. But after two years of stalling Gorbachev relinquished all the Soviet Union’s “non-negotiable” positions, accepting Perle’s zero option of 1981. In 1987 Perle resigned from the government; later that year the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed;
and on the day that Reagan left the White House he declared to the great
discomfort of Cold War hardliners and the incoming Bush administration: “The
Cold War is over.”

Neoconservative and conservative hardliners were glad to see him leave.
During Reagan’s last years in office, while Podhoretz accused him of betraying
anticommunism, William Safire acidly remarked that Reagan “professed to see
in Mr. Gorbachev’s eyes an end to the Soviet goal of world dominance.” George
Will was harsher: “How wildly wrong he is about what is happening in Moscow
Reagan has accelerated the moral disarmament of the West—actual disarmament
will follow—by elevating wishful thinking to the status of political philosophy.”
Bush officials spent the first year of their administration denying that the Cold War
was over; afterward, some conservatives exaggerated just as wildly that Reagan
had the Soviets figured all along. Jocularly remarking on the ironic legacy of his
career, Perle explained that the Reagan administration’s arms control policies were
developed by taking the worst parts of several conflicting policy options,
including his own, and fusing them “into a single, incoherent proposal.”
Although most insiders credited Perle with the zero option idea, Weinberger
remembered the story differently: “My memory is that Richard was able to
conceal quite well any enthusiasm he may have felt for my idea. Later, however,
he supported it loyalty and effectively.”

Perle’s numerous critics called him “the Prince of Darkness,” a tag that stuck
to him so tightly—mostly because of his occasional dark rages—that by the
mid1980s even his friends used it. Many critics predicted that his style was too
factional and devious to make the transition from Capitol Hill guerrilla fighter to
administration official; others believed that his politics would have to change if
he became a policy maker; Perle disproved them all. In 1980 Frank Carlucci,
slated for the Pentagon’s number-two slot, had worried about Perle’s personal
reputation. Republican arms control specialist Kenneth Adelman assured him that
the Prince of Darkness’s immense skills were worth every bit of trouble that came
with being on his team. Perle’s many years on Capitol Hill made him invaluable
to the Reagan team, which was short on arms control expertise, and Weinberger
gave him complete control of the Pentagon’s arms control portfolio.

Moody, self-dramatizing, sometimes bullying, and prone to depression, yet
also quick with a smile and a humorous aside, Perle was frank about his desire to
make a lot of money. He needed a lot of it to support his taste for fancy cars,
beluga caviar, Monte Cristo cigars and Gauloises, and shopping trips to foreign
capitals. By 1987 Perle was finished with government-level money and
government-duty restrictions on his sometimes over-the-top opinions. His style
and ideology would not have fit in the first Bush administration. He went into
business, cashed in on his government contacts, sat on corporate boards, became
chair and chief executive officer of Hollinger Digital and director of the
Jerusalem Post, and took up media punditry as a Resident Fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute. By 2000 Perle was ready to help the second Bush
administration, but only on his terms, which kept the big money coming while
providing an outlet for the opinionated policy makers of the Bush 43 presidency.81

Building a Unipolarist Opposition

The Reagan wing of the first Bush administration felt that it went poorly, especially at the end. In public Wolfowitz was a careful speaker, often editing himself in midsentence, but in 1990, while serving as the first Bush’s Pentagon undersecretary for policy, he issued a rare critique of his government superiors in the name of speaking for them. “We do not favor spheres-of-influence schemes that are often proposed by armchair strategists,” he declared, invoking a royal “we” that excluded Bush 41 and Baker. “Dividing the world into spheres of influence won’t end superpower competition; the dividing line itself would become the crucial locus of contention.” Wolfowitz insisted that it was wrong and impractical to conduct foreign policy by trading influence in one country for advantage in another. He agreed that America should keep its ground troops out of the Balkans, but pleaded against the administration’s arms embargo toward Bosnia. Baker explained that America had “no dog in that fight”; Wolfowitz told friends that that attitude appalled him. On the record he supported the administration’s termination of the Gulf War, but argued against removing American troops from the Gulf and urged Bush to support the Kurdish and Shiite rebellions against Saddam’s regime in Iraq. It took him until November 1991 to accept that the Cold War was over. “The threat from the Soviet Union has gone away” he finally admitted, a month before the Soviet Union dissolved. “I never thought I would be before an audience saying that kind of thing, and it still makes me uncomfortable, I have to admit.” A year later he acknowledged, “I’m one of those people who thought communism was entrenched forever.”82

Some of his friends had the impression that Wolfowitz wanted Bush to send American troops into Iraq. Saul Bellow’s roman a clef about Allan Bloom, Ravelstein, gave Wolfowitz a walk-on part as a former student (“Philip Gorman”) who treated his mentor to inside dope about White House policies. During the Gulf War, Ravelstein/Bloom reported to his friends after a Gorman/Wolfowitz phone call, “Colin Powell and Baker have advised the President not to send the troops all the way to Baghdad. Bush will announce it tomorrow. They’re afraid of a few casualties. They send out a terrific army and give a demonstration of up-to-date high-tech warfare that flesh and blood can’t stand up to. But then they leave the dictatorship in place and steal away…. Well, that’s the latest from the Defense Department.”83

That was fiction, but after Bill Clinton assumed the presidency, Wolfowitz blasted Clinton’s vacillation toward Saddam and the former Yugoslavia from his academic perches at the National War College and Johns Hopkins University. In 1993 he taught at the National War College as the George F. Kennan Professor of National Security Strategy; for the next seven years he served as dean and professor of international relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies at Johns Hopkins. Wolfowitz’s academic exile from government was highly productive. He doubled the School of Advanced International Studies’ endowment to $150 million, shifted its focus from the Cold War to American globalism, and, in a period of ideological confusion and realignment on the American right, blasted Clinton for abdicating America’s leadership role in world affairs.

Barely a year after Clinton took office, Wolfowitz complained that he shifted world-managing responsibilities to countervailing regional states and multilateral institutions. Instead of intervening in Bosnia, Clinton asked the Europeans to intercede; instead of dealing with North Korea directly, he sought relief from Japan and South Korea; where he did intervene, in Somalia and Haiti, he chose and acted foolishly. Wolfowitz conceded that Clinton inherited a bad policy on Bosnia, but charged that Clinton made things worse by continuing the same policy. Having created the expectation during the presidential campaign that he would take an aggressive approach to Bosnia, Clinton’s subsequent failure to do so made the United States look weaker than before, in a region where the United States had sizable national interests. By contrast, Clinton committed American blood and treasure to Somalia and Haiti, where America had no interests.

Unlike many conservative critics, Wolfowitz did not deride the humanitarian impulse of Clinton’s Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, which saved tens of thousands of Somalis with little risk to American forces. Humanitarian stabilization is legitimate and morally commendable, he allowed. The Clinton administration should have stabilized the situation with military forces, relieved the humanitarian crisis, and then turned the mission over to United Nations peacekeepers. Instead, Clinton endorsed the U.N.’s overreaching attempt at nation-building and permitted American troops to be drawn into combat against General Aideed’s rebel forces. In Wolfowitz’s view, nation-building was too difficult, “if not impossible,” and the United States rightly fought only when it had important national interests at stake. He viewed Haiti as another Somalia in the making, where the Clinton administration compounded Bush’s mistake of committing U.S. prestige to a democratic regime led by the former Catholic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Wolfowitz judged that Aristide’s democratic credentials were dubious, Haiti had nothing the United States wanted, and Clinton’s tightening of the Bush sanctions would not diminish the flow of illegal Haitian immigrants to the United States.

“The use of force cannot be approached in an experimental way” he admonished. Clinton’s idea of intervention was to dispatch American troops and then withdraw them if they met opposition; Wolfowitz lectured that this approach caused allies and enemies alike to lose respect for the United States: “The ability of the United States to use force effectively—wherever it decides to do so—is itself a major interest of this country and is the foundation of the substantial military stability among the major powers that the world enjoys today.” What mattered was sustaining and using America’s predominant power to maintain a favorable world order. There was an argument to be made for forging
alliances with friendly nations, but not for joining “looser groupings” that didn’t share important interests with the United States. Multilateralism was like peacekeeping. If narrowly conceived, it had a useful function; otherwise, it led to disasters. Wolfowitz judged that Clinton’s enthusiasm for multilateralism and peacekeeping was expansive; with a sharp edge, he also took offense at Clinton’s offhand remark that he almost missed the clarity of the Cold War. Clinton’s party was the party of weakness and appeasement during the Cold War, Wolfowitz scolded. In 1972 the Democratic candidate for president, George McGovern, wanted to slash the U.S. defense budget to $55 billion; for many years the Democratic leader in the Senate, Mike Mansfield, called for the with drawal of American forces from Europe; during the Reagan administration, Republicans had to overcome Democratic opposition to deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. For these reasons, it was offensive for Democrats to joke about the clarity of the Cold War struggle; moreover, they still needed to learn that “America cannot have it both ways.” The United States could not accomplish great things abroad if it limited itself to multilateral interventions.

He seemed to doubt that Clinton was significantly different from McGovernesque liberals, although Clinton had already pushed the North American Free Trade Agreement through Congress, resisted calls for deep cuts in military spending, increased military outlays in the Gulf, and advocated the termination of the U.N.’Zs trade embargo on Bosnia. Wolfowitz bitterly observed that while Clinton overreacted to Haiti he continued Bush’s policy of ignoring Libya, despite the fact that Qaddafi murdered hundreds of Americans. Toward Iraq, Clinton seemed determined to do as little as possible, despite Saddam’s crimes against Kuwait and the Iraqi Shiites. Wolfowitz acknowledged that Clinton was very smart, with an unusual ability to master the intricacies of policy issues. But sophistication is a low-priority value in foreign policy, he cautioned; it is far more important to be strong, clear, resolute, and selfassertive: “Although the issues are often complex, with powerful arguments on both sides and agonizing risks involved, a certain simplicity and clarity of articulation are ultimately required when vital U.S. interests are at stake.”

With mounting anger Wolfowitz fixated on Iraq in the mid-1990s, fueling a neoconservative campaign to rectify America’s unfinished business there. In 1995 Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress tried to launch an insurrection in Iraq’s Kurdish northern region that flopped embarrassingly. The following year Saddam Hussein intervened in the Kurdish civil war, killing hundreds of Kurds inside the northern safe-haven set up by the allied coalition in 1991. Wolfowitz wrote a blistering article in the Wall Street Journal that accused Clinton of betraying the Kurds and ignoring Saddam’s noncompliance with U.N. inspectors. “It is impossible to overemphasize how important it is, especially in the Persian Gulf region, for our friends to trust in our promises and for our enemies to take our warnings seriously,” he wrote. “In order to claim success, President Clinton and his aides pretend that no promises were made to the people of northern Iraq or to those we enlisted in the effort to oppose Saddam. This
betrayal is one reason the coalition against Saddam is in tatters.” Clinton bombed Iraq and extended the southern no-fly zone, but his pin-prick bombings accomplished nothing and Saddam’s air force was useless anyway. Even worse, Wolfowitz fumed, Clinton refused to intervene in the civil war between the two Kurdish factions, Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. After Barzani appealed to Saddam for assistance, Clinton reasoned that there was nothing he could do. Wolfowitz retorted: “This is appalling. Does it mean that if there were internal disorder in one of the Gulf countries, we would be able to do nothing if one of the factions invited Iraq to intervene?”

James Baker brought the Kurdish factions together for the Gulf War, Wolfowitz recalled, but Clinton failed to keep them together. Real statesmanship forged strategic alliances between conflicting groups for common purposes; it did not “sit back waiting for events to present you with simple choices.” Clinton’s acquiescence to U.N. Resolution 986, which allowed Saddam to sell oil in transactions monitored by the United Nations, was equally atrocious. Wolfowitz warned that Saddam was too dangerous to be contained. With his stockpile of biological weapons, “he could kill the entire population of the world.” Having gassed the Kurds, he had no compunctions about killing Americans: “Saddam is a convicted killer still in possession of a loaded gun—and it’s pointed at us.”

For that reason the United States needed a serious policy toward Iraq that put northern Iraq off limits to Saddam’s regime, cut off Saddam’s access to oil money, and declared Saddam a war criminal. Wolfowitz exhorted that “Iraq is not a sideshow; it is about vital American interests. We have lost a lot of ground. The U.S. has virtually abandoned its commitment to protect a besieged people from a bloodthirsty dictator.” Instead of sitting by, “with our passive containment policy and our inept covert operations,” the United States needed to take concerted action to get rid of Saddam.

Wolfowitz’s plan, like his scathing anger toward Clinton, had a personal angle. Chalabi was a secular, wealthy Shiite who had fled Iraq in 1958 after a military coup that overthrew the British-installed monarchy. He was also a former student of Wohlstetter’s and a longtime friend of Wolfowitz and Perle. In 1992 Chalabi went on the CIA payroll after founding the refugee-based Iraqi National Congress, but the same year he was convicted of bank fraud and embezzlement by a Jordanian court after the collapse of the Petra Bank, which he founded. Chalabi was sentenced in absentia to twenty-two years in prison. Clinton officials believed that Chalabi was too tainted by scandal and too much of an outside dandy to be credible as a political leader in Iraq; by 1996, the CIA and State Department had similar misgivings. Although Chalabi claimed that the CIA supported his coup attempt, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake emphatically denied it. The Clinton administration feared another Bay of Pigs, Lake recalled, and thus “everyone agreed that we needed to be crystal clear with Chalabi. The United States had already betrayed the Kurds twice, and we didn’t
want to see it happen again by our encouraging such a dubious operation. So I personally sent him a message that we didn’t support him.”91

That lack of support and the failed coup against Saddam enraged Wolfowitz. In 1997 he and Rand strategist Zalmay Khalilzad called for Saddam’s forcible over throw by the United States and its Iraqi allies. “If we are serious about dismantling Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction, and preventing him from building more, we will have to confront him sooner or later—and sooner would be better,” they wrote. Although military force alone would not be enough to solve the Iraqi problem, “only the substantial use of military force could prove that the United States is serious.” Wolfowitz and Khalilzad demanded new U.S. assistance for a serious Iraqi rebellion, not merely coup plots and “CIA manipulation of exile groups.” They wanted to “arm and train opposition forces,” provide U.S. military protection for Iraqi rebels, and broker an end to the “fratricidal struggle” between the two Kurdish factions. Tactfully, they did not mention Chalabi by name, but Chalabi’s exile organization was crucial to their vision of a liberated Iraq.92

Meanwhile, Chalabi’s friendships with Perle and Wolfowitz and his energetic lobbying in Washington gave him another political lifeline after he alienated the CIA. Through Perle’s annual conferences in Beaver Creek, Colorado, which were cosponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and former President Gerald Ford, Chalabi met Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other conservative hawks. In Washington he forged key alliances with Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman and led the lobbying drive for the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, aided by a new Washington think tank, the Project for the New American Century.

The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) was founded in 1997 by the ringleaders of the new Pax Americana: William Kristol, Donald Kagan, Robert Kagan, Elliott Abrams, John R.Bolton, R.James Woolsey, Wolfowitz, Perle, Cheney, Khalilzad, and Rumsfeld. Bankrolled by the Bradley Foundation and led by Kristol, its ideology was unabashedly unipolarist. The Republican hawks were determined to challenge Clinton after he defeated Bob Dole in the 1996 presidential election, and to restore the aggressive internationalist image of the Republican Party. Some PNAC hawks were appalled that House and Senate Republicans vented their hatred of Clinton by opposing his interventions in Haiti, the Balkans, and later, Kosovo. Despite their own contempt for Clinton, the last thing they wanted in their party was a revival of the racialist isolationism of the old right. They also wanted a think tank that focused on foreign policy, unlike the all-issues conservatism of the American Enterprise Institute, with which the PNAC was closely affiliated.

Essentially they advocated the politics and grand strategy of Wolfowitz’s Defense Planning Guidance; following Wolfowitz’s current example, they focused on Iraq. In January 1998 the PNAC unipolarists wrote an open letter to Clinton that called for the overthrow of Saddam’s regime. “We can no longer depend on our partners in the Gulf War coalition to continue to uphold the
sanctions or to punish Saddam when he blocks or evades U.N. inspections,” they declared. With or without U.N. inspections, the United States could not be certain whether Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction, and thus containment could not ensure safety: “If Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world’s oil supply will all be put at hazard.” Diplomacy had already failed, and the United States did not have the time or sufficient opportunity to prove that Saddam was stockpiling chemical weapons. The “only acceptable strategy” was to eliminate the possibility of catastrophe, using the “full complement of diplomatic, political and military efforts” to overthrow Saddam’s regime. Eighteen PNAC members signed this letter, including Wolfowitz and Perle; three years later, eleven of them held positions in the administration of George W. Bush.

In October 1998 Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which directed the State Department to grant $97 million to Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress for the purpose of removing Saddam from power. But the State Department quickly soured on Chalabi, charging that his organization had “accounting irregularities” and although Clinton bombed Iraq on a weekly basis to enforce the no-fly zone, he never committed to a policy of forcible overthrow. While Perle and other neocons blasted the State Department for obstructing the liberation of Iraq, Clinton pledged “to do what we can to make the opposition a more effective voice for the aspirations of the Iraqi people.” Iraq needed a new government, he affirmed, and the United States needed Iraq to have one; thus, “we have deepened our engagement with the forces of change in Iraq.” But Wolfowitz knew from the Washington grapevine that Clinton would not launch serious military action against Saddam’s regime. Although Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act, administration officials told reporters that the Iraqi opposition was “feckless” and the bill idiotic. By December 1998, Wolfowitz did not spare George H.W. Bush in his indictment of American fecklessness toward Iraq. Bush made a terrible mistake in not heeding his advice to defend the Kurds and Shia after the Gulf War, Wolfowitz charged, and Clinton’s smooth words on behalf of a liberated Iraq were characteristically empty.

Wolfowitz had taken Clinton’s measure early in his administration. In June 1993, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported to Clinton that Saddam had apparently plotted to assassinate former president Bush during his ceremonial visit to Kuwait in mid-April. Although the case against Saddam was murky at best, Clinton responded by firing twenty-three Tomahawk guided missiles from American Navy warships in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea at the Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad. Each missile contained a thousand pounds of high explosives; three of them missed their target, striking nearby homes; and eight Iraqi civilians were killed. White House officials hailed the attack as a success; Wolfowitz dismissed it as a minimal gesture. The deaths of eight
innocent Iraqis counted for nothing in both assessments. While the White House boasted that the attack showed Clinton’s toughness, Wolfowitz bitterly replied that Saddam obviously had little to fear from Clinton. Five years later Wolfowitz still stewed over Clinton’s response, calling it “a minimal cruise missile attack that introduced the concept of ‘pin prick’ into the American military lexicon.” Besides failing to punish Saddam in 1993, Clinton did nothing to stop his intervention in the Kurdish civil conflict of 1996, and instead of seriously supporting an armed insurgency, Clinton officials blathered warnings about another Bay of Pigs.95

Wolfowitz allowed that the Bay of Pigs analogy, invoked by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, had some merit under the circumstances. The Cuban insurgents in the Bay of Pigs fiasco were inadequately supported by President Kennedy, and the Iraqi insurgents were still waiting for serious support from the Clinton administration. The question was not whether America could topple Castro or Saddam, but whether American leaders had the political will and toughness to do so. Berger warned that it would be a bad thing to disappoint armed Iraqi insurgents. Wolfowitz replied that it was Berger’s job not to disappoint them. Wolfowitz wanted American forces to invade Iraq, establish a protected area for anti-Saddam forces, organize the oppositionists into a warfighting army, and support their fight against Saddam’s regime. “This policy is risky” he acknowledged. “But it is less risky than the present course, which is leading us to the day that we are obliged to face Saddam ourselves, when he is armed with weapons of unparalleled destructiveness.”96

To Wolfowitz, Clinton’s “most important foreign-policy legacy” was to allow a weak and thuggish dictator to become a threat to the world: “Saddam Hussein is not 10 feet tall. In fact, he is weak. But we are letting this tyrant, who seeks to build weapons of mass destruction, get stronger.” It was galling to Wolfowitz that only a handful of conservatives and neoconservatives seemed to agree with him about the urgent importance of Iraq. Not coincidentally, they were the same people who believed that American world dominance was an end in itself—the most important objective of American foreign policy.97

Near the end of Clinton’s second term Wolfowitz turned the tables on his liberal Democratic critics, noting that they were Pax Americanists, too. The difference was that they wanted to use the Marines for social work missions that didn’t serve American interests, while he espoused a nationalistic, self-respecting concept of global leadership. Recalling the controversy over his Pentagon defense strategy, Wolfowitz observed that “just seven years later, many of these same critics seem quite comfortable with the idea of a Pax Americana. They have supported or urged American military intervention in places like Haiti and Rwanda and East Timor, places never envisaged in my 1992 memorandum.” Liberal Democrats weren’t really anti-interventionist; they only opposed military interventions that were tainted by selfinterest. In the “seemingly benign international environment” of the post-Cold War world, liberal Democrats had even given up their instinctive anti-interventionism toward some of the world’s
trouble spots. They no longer called for troop withdrawals from Korea or Europe, and in recent months Clinton had bombed Iraq on a steady basis “without a whimper of opposition.” Wolfowitz might have added, but did not, that Clinton saved Kosovo from mass murder and ethnic cleansing despite the bitter opposition of House and Senate Republicans.98

Sometimes he turned the tables with a sharper edge, recycling his bitter complaint about “Clinton’s phony nostalgia” for the clarity of the Cold War. Wolfowitz reinvoked the Mansfield amendment, the Democratic opposition to Reagan, and the Democratic abandonment of Scoop Jackson’s Cold Warriorism before crowning the list with the Democratic objections to his Defense Planning Guidance of 1992. He allowed that Clinton had brought the Democratic Party back to the mainstream of American politics, but judged that Clinton was simply a shrewd political opportunist, not a national leader. And why had Clinton’s opportunism succeeded? How had it happened that a Democrat negated the Republican advantage in foreign policy? Wolfowitz’s theory was that American interventionism no longer required any courage or risk. The United States had become so dominant that even Clinton stood tall merely by virtue of being its president. His intervention in Kosovo stirred some debate, but he didn’t have to worry that the United States might suffer serious losses in Kosovo, and thus it was easy for him to strike a hawkish pose.99

While conceding that this change of political fashion marked some kind of progress, Wolfowitz warned that the world was still a dangerous place and America still needed courageous leaders. Liberals could be counted upon to suffer a failure of nerve whenever real courage was needed. Although Clinton was a beneficiary of America’s overpowering economic and military might, the United States would not sustain its global predominance with liberal Democratic leadership. America needed a strong and self-respecting leader who vanquished threats to American safety, did not apologize for promoting America’s interests, and proclaimed that what was good for America was good for the world. The neocons wanted a president who believed that patriotic self-interest was the best reason to fight and that America had vital interests throughout the world.

Some of them imagined John McCain as that leader. During the 2000 Republican primaries the most vocal unipolarists believed that McCain’s expansive vision of American power and his legendary toughness and courage made him the best presidential candidate. William Kristol, David Brooks, and the Weekly Standard magazine touted McCain as the candidate of “creative destruction” who would drag an “ossified Republican establishment” into the twenty-first century. They explained that while George W. Bush was saddled “with the old Republican coalition” of religious fundamentalists and the rich, McCain stood for a more vital, aggressive, truly American nationalism: “When McCain talks about remoralizing America, he talks in terms of reinvigorating patriotism…. When John McCain starts talking about religious faith, he ends up talking about patriotism.”100
That was Kristol’s idea of good religion, exuding faith in American power and the American way. McCain had the neocon sense of politics as historical drama. Although Kristol acknowledged that Bush pledged to sustain “an era of American preeminence,” he was more convinced by McCain’s pledge to extend the current “unipolar moment…for as long as we possibly can.” Kristol and other PNAC unipolarists cheered McCain’s forceful insistence on overthrowing Saddam, although they were mindful that Bush had a personal reason to loathe the man who had tried to kill his father. The *Weekly Standard* worried that neither candidate leveled with Americans about the sharp increase in military spending that his foreign policy would require; Kristol pegged the need at an additional $100 billion per year. Bush was hard to read, McCain bristled with unipolarist spirit, and Bush was beholden to the Republican establishment. Some unipolarists viewed the latter fact as an important Bush advantage, however. Although most of the passion was on the McCain side, some of the neocons judged that Bush was more educable than McCain and had a better chance of winning the presidency.101

Wolfowitz and Perle were prominent among them. Wolfowitz told friends that Bush was “the new Scoop Jackson” because he shared Jackson’s impatience with the muddle-along foreign policy establishment and was willing to be instructed by hardline experts like himself. Perle said the same thing more expansively: “The first time I met Bush 43 I knew he was different. Two things became clear. One, he didn’t know very much. The other was he had the confidence to ask questions that revealed he didn’t know very much. Most people are reluctant to say when they don’t know something, a word or term they haven’t heard before. Not him. You’d raise a point, and he’d say, ‘I didn’t realize that. Can you explain that?’ He was eager to learn I came away thinking he had some of Scoop’s qualities of character. You got the sense that if he believed something he’d pursue it tenaciously.” Perle gave lessons while envisioning himself as an outside advisor with inside status in a second Bush administration; chairing a reshuffled, neocon-oriented Defense Policy Board would be perfect for him. Wolfowitz took repeated calls from Bush while picturing himself as the next secretary of defense; Bush called him so many times that Wolfowitz’s friends took for granted that the top Pentagon job would be his. On September 23, 1999, Bush gave a foreign policy speech, his first of the campaign, that reflected the influence of Wolfowitz, the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission on missile defense, and his father upon him. Speaking at the Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina, he came out for military strength, a missile defense shield, and the RMA line on military technology.102

Bush pledged to “renew the bond of trust between the American president and the American military…defend the American people against missiles and terror …and begin creating the military of the next century.” Charging that the Clinton administration starved and overused the military, he described Clinton’s legacy as a sorry trail of open-ended deployments, unclear missions, cuts in appropriations, and demoralized soldiers: “The last seven years have been wasted
inertia and idle talk. Now we must shape the future with new concepts, new strategies, new resolve.” Clinton wasted his opportunity to do something meaningful with America’s unrivalled power; Bush promised to extend the “era of American preeminence” by increasing defense spending and replacing “diffuse commitments with focused ones.” With a nod to the RMA faction in the Pentagon, he pledged an “immediate, comprehensive review of our military” toward the end of creating a mobile, swift, world-embracing, and technologically oriented fighting force: “Safety is gained in stealth, and force is projected on the long arc of precision-guided weapons—Our forces in the next century must be agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require a minimum of logistical support. We must be able to project our power over long distances.”

On most of the key issues, Bush straddled between the party’s neocon and realist factions. He knew that he didn’t want most of his father’s foreign policy team, although his closest foreign policy adviser was Condoleezza Rice, a Scowcroft protegé; his other chief adviser was Wolfowitz. Observers judged that Bush oscillated between them, and that he seemed a bit uneasy with Wolfowitz’s intellectualism and ideology. Thus, his first foreign policy speech showcased the one position he felt sure of that cut across the party’s ideological factions. Bush’s idea of missile defense came straight from his father’s 1991 State of the Union address, which embraced Reagan’s vision of a shield that defended against a Russian missile attack or a volley of missiles fired by another country. Known at the Pentagon as GPALS, for “global protection against limited strikes” the Bush 41 version of star wars envisioned 750 ground-based interceptors deployed at six sites in the United States and 1,000 space-based interceptors using “brilliant pebbles” technology. At the Citadel, the younger Bush promised: “At the earliest possible date, my administration will deploy anti-ballistic missile systems, both theater and national, to guard against attack and blackmail.”

The Project for the New American Century was mostly impressed. Thomas Donnelly, the organization’s deputy director, praised Bush’s emphasis on “American hegemony” and rebuilding the military. Bush’s stress on American preeminence was not merely about the preeminence of American power, Donnelly observed, but also the “victory of American ideals.” That was exactly what the Project for the New American Century was about: the strengthening of American dominance for the purpose of winning the world to American ideals. Donnelly enthused: “It is encouraging to hear a political leader who does not shy from the responsibilities of preeminence.” He also liked Bush’s attack on Clinton’s underfunding and demoralization of the military, and lauded Bush’s promise “to inject a spirit of innovation in the Pentagon.”

Donnelly worried that Bush still lacked a grand strategy, however. He never quite explained what America should do with its preeminent power, or what is worth fighting for. And Bush took cheap shots at Clinton’s “open-ended deployments” that Donnelly did not like. What was Bush alluding to? He couldn’t have been thinking of Kosovo, because he supported the intervention there. He couldn’t have been thinking of Somalia or Rwanda, because the United
States no longer had any troops there. He couldn’t have been thinking of Haiti, because American troops were withdrawing there. Donnelly hoped that Bush wasn’t thinking of Clinton’s no-fly-zone operations in Iraq, or America’s two hundred troops in East Timor, or America’s forces in Korea and Europe.

The Project for the New American Century was well aware that there were political points to be won in the Republican Party for deriding Clinton’s interventions, but it cautioned Bush against doing so. Bush was almost a unipolarist, but he needed to get clear about what American dominance was for, and he had to stop pandering to anti-internationalist Republicans. His instincts were right, he had the right tone, and he had Wolfowitz, Perle, Cheney, and Rumsfeld in his corner. Although Kristol was the ringleader of the PNAC, most of the PNAC heavyweights played their cards more carefully than Kristol. Unlike him, they wanted positions in the next Republican administration. What they got was a windfall that stunned even them.
The theory and practice of the new Pax Americana arose simultaneously. Neoconservatives changed the world by making arguments and getting appointed to policymaking positions, not by running for office. In both of the Bush administrations, the unipolarists who took government positions got to make things happen, but they felt the constrictions of office. Those who specialized in persuasion had little direct power, but they were free to say what they thought. Those who made policy sometimes felt the constrictions of office even when they were between government positions; Wolfowitz’s published writings were rarely as frank as his leaked Defense Planning Guidance. From the beginning of the Cold War’s end, the new Pax Americana had inside and outside advocates, but the sharpest expressions of unipolarist ideology came from outsiders. Some of them argued that a truly American unipolarism had to advocate global democracy; others argued for a strongly nationalistic realism; one of the movement’s leading advocates moved from the former to the latter.

In the late 1980s two prominent neoconservatives, Irving Kristol and Jeane Kirkpatrick, announced that the time had come for Cold War conservatives and neoconservatives to go back to being nationalistic realists. For them, the age of ideology had passed. The Cold War was over and no ideological or moralistic substitute for it was needed. The crucial task for American foreign policy, in their view, was to identify America’s vital interests and pay minimal attention to everything else. Foreign policy was a means of coping with a world in which conflict is inevitable. Kristol argued that it was not in America’s interest to accept responsibility for the fate of Kashmir, or enforce the peace between India and Pakistan, or pour money into the Philippines, or defend Lithuanian sovereignty. These were snares that drained America’s strength. He was not a balance-of-power realpolitiker; Kristol delighted in America’s superpower dominance, and he wanted America to do whatever was necessary to keep it. But America had no business signing treaties with other countries or trying to build a world democracy, he urged. It needed only to form “attachments” with democracies and negotiate with other nations on a case-by-case basis.¹

To adjust to a deideologized post-Cold War situation, Americans had to give up their determined moralism. Kristol explained that Americans viewed themselves and their country in moral terms, believing in a single standard of
right action, but in foreign affairs this belief was ridiculous. It forced American policy makers to pretend to ascribe to a single moral standard, while actually employing “as many standards as circumstances require.” Now that America’s crusade against communism was over, it was time to demythologize American moralism. The United States needed to treat Chinese repression more gingerly than it treated Soviet repression, and Americans needed to accept that their country has no “special moral-political mission in the world, as we habitually think we do.” Anti-interventionists, liberal internationalists, and democratic globalists all believed in some version of this conceit. In Kristol’s view, there was a crucial difference between upholding American primacy and establishing a Pax Americana. He was all for superiority, but not for missionary campaigns and global police work.²

That was a realist version of unipolarism; Kirkpatrick edged a bit further toward classic realism, wondering if the United States might become a normal country. Although she later swung back toward the neocon unipolarists, supporting the Project for the New American Century, in 1990 Kirkpatrick asserted that it was not in America’s interest to mitigate between Japan and India, or between North and South Asia, and that America had no business trying to contain Japan’s role in Asia or redesign the Soviet empire. “Americans do not know at this stage what is best for the Soviet people,” she observed. “Any notion that the United States can manage the changes in that huge, multinational, developing society is grandiose. It is precisely the kind of thinking about foreign policy which Americans need to unlearn.” The twentieth century’s great crusades against Nazism and communism were over, and the need for heroism had expired with them. The collapse of the Soviet empire permitted America to return to normalcy: “Today, when the Soviet Union has lost its political dynamism, when democracy is growing in strength, when Europe, Japan, Taiwan, Korea are strong and friendly, the United States is free to focus again on its own national interests without endangering the civilization of which it is a part.”³

**Democratic Globalism and Pax Americana**

Some political conservatives who operated in the orbit of neocon journals and conferences wanted no part of the crusade for a new Pax Americana. Peter L. Berger, a prominent sociologist, declared: “It’s another politicized religion. The idea that the United States has some obligation to export democracy in the world is an extremely dangerous doctrine. The last thing that we need, or that the world needs, is for the United States to become the world’s policeman.” Owen Harries, editor of The National Interest and a former Australian ambassador to UNESCO, kept the neoconservative National Interest open to conservative realists like himself who, as he put it, didn’t believe in visions. But the visionary impulse prevailed so thoroughly among neocons that it came to define the new neoconservatism. Midge Decter observed: “The great struggle in the neoconservative movement is going to be between the people who used to be
called unilateralists like Irving who are now isolationists and us old interventionists who still think the United States has to be a strong and great military power, to keep things steady in the world.” Authentic neoconservatism kept the crusading spirit, she argued. It promoted not only democratic capitalism but the Pax Americana—in the name of a new ideological mission.4

Joshua Muravchik, a product of the New York Socialist faction fights that gave birth to neoconservatism, issued the call before the Cold War was over. “The West knows little about ideological war,” he observed in 1987. “But the place to start is with the assertion that democracy is our creed; that we believe all human beings are entitled to its blessings; and that we are prepared to do what we can to help others achieve it.”5 In his book, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny (1991), Muravchik put it plaintively: “For our nation, this is the opportunity of a lifetime. Our failure to exert every possible effort to secure [a new world order] would be unforgivable. If we succeed, we will have forged a Pax Americana unlike any previous peace, one of harmony, not of conquest. Then the twenty-first century will be the American century by virtue of the triumph of the humane idea born in the American experiment.”6

Ben Wattenberg, Richard Perle, and Michael Novak also advocated the new Pax Americana; like Muravchik, all of them worked for the corporate-funded, media-connected American Enterprise Institute. Wattenberg was especially skilled at mass media communication. A former speechwriter for President Lyndon Johnson, advisor to Senator Hubert Humphrey, and two-time presidential campaign advisor to Scoop Jackson, he was a veteran host of PBS television programs, a weekly commentator for CBS radio, and a bestselling author on demographic trends. Wattenberg loved to reminisce about Jackson, his model politician, and, like Perle and Wolfowitz, he sorely regretted the Democratic Party’s overreaction to Vietnam. Buoyant and colloquial, his book titles conveyed his optimistic spirit, though he worried a great deal about America’s low birth rates: The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the American Electorate (1970); The Demography of the 1970s: The Birth Dearth and What It Means (1971); The Real America: A Surprising Examination of the State of the Union (1974); The Good News Is the Bad News Is Wrong (1985), and The Birth Dearth (1987).7

The latter book warned that America’s enormous military empire and its beneficial influence on Third World cultures could be jeopardized if Americans did not begin to breed in higher numbers. The world desperately needed America’s military, political, economic, and cultural leadership and productivity, Wattenberg urged. Poor countries had to be shown how to create wealth and freedom, and they needed to live in a secure world order, but the Western countries that had wealth and freedom refused to replace themselves. Wattenberg puzzled over the strangely “unreal” assumption of Americans that they could shrink in population and remain a superpower. Citing a speech by Perle, he warned that if America did not reverse its birth decline, it would not be able to maintain its vast military operations around the world. Moreover, Wattenberg
admonished, “it is equally unreal to suggest that our values will remain untouched as our numbers go down, and down, and down, if our economic and military power go down, and down, and down.”

Aside from his alarm at America’s declining birth rate, however, and his dismay that the Democratic Party abandoned its Wilsonian foreign policy heritage, Wattenberg specialized in a bouncy optimism that debunked bad news. Persistently he maintained that America is the best country in the world in nearly every way that matters and that Americans “never had it so good.” Contrary to conservatives, the United States moved forward during the Carter years, and, contrary to liberals, it moved forward during the Reagan years. “Something is happening: we are becoming the first universal nation in history” Wattenberg enthused. “Holy smoke! The halftrue, evolving, poetic proclamation of America is becoming truer and truer: we are a free people; we do come from everywhere.”

After the Soviet empire crumbled, Wattenberg’s optimism soared to new heights. Reprising his “first universal nation” theme at a higher pitch of national pride, he made a case for America’s benevolently imperialist mission.

“We are the first universal nation,” he declared. “‘First’ as in the first one, ‘first’ as in ‘number one’. And ‘universal’ within our borders and globally.” The United States needed an aggressively interventionist foreign policy, and it was warranted in taking one because America was uniquely universal. America’s unique universality was that it created and represented what the rest of the world wants, and as the first universal nation, the United States had a unique right to intervene in other countries on behalf of a democratic world order. Wattenberg urged that the proper business of American foreign policy was to “let freedom ring on a big brass bell labeled ‘America.’”

He and Muravchik sought to provide a new ideological grammar for the democratic globalist cause. Muravchik observed that ideological wars begin with new creeds; Wattenberg coined new slogans. The Cold War rhetoric of totalitarianism, Finlandization, Present Danger, fifth columnist, infiltration, and choke point went down the Orwellian memory hole; only “appeasement” survived the death of communism. The new Pax Americanists spoke instead of neo-universalism, neomanifest destinarianism, waging democracy, pro-democracy, democratic idealism, declinism, and unipolarism. Wattenberg explained that new ideological wars required new bumper stickers. “An American foreign policy, to be successful, must quicken the public pulse,” he wrote. “Americans have a missionary streak, and democracy is our mission. The new sticker should read ‘pro-democracy.’ That’s what it was before Lenin.”

Theodore Roosevelt tried to export democracy; Woodrow Wilson pledged to make the world safe for democracy; Wattenberg conceded that America’s previous flings at democratic globalism were not “perfect policy, but American values were spread.” America is the only mythic nation, he exhorted, and its primary myth is Manifest Destiny: “Only Americans have the sense of mission—and gall—to engage in benign, but energetic, global cultural advocacy. We are the most potent cultural imperialists in history, although generally constructive
and noncoercive.” He allowed that America’s earlier Manifest Destinarianism “at times did go overboard, into distant geographic expansion and wild-eyed cultural imperialism.” Neo-Manifest Destinarianism was more chastened. Wattenberg urged that with the communists out of the way, America could return to its earlier mission of making the world look more like America, while accepting that America could not exactly clone the world in its image. To begin, America could resume its long-interrupted battle against European decadence.13

The rise of communism interrupted the war between the Old and New Worlds, which Wattenberg characterized as a fight between European feudalism and America’s enterprising republicanism. “There was a rich and fine fight between values of the New World and the Old,” he recounted. “The ‘News’ were winning, and we still are. Now, with the totalitarians out of the way, we ought to kick it into overdrive.”14 America’s struggle for the world was a crusade to fulfill the destiny of America itself. Like most neoconservatives, he insisted that the war against communism was never merely a struggle to defeat communism. For America, it was primarily a crusade to shape the world’s destiny. The Cold War was essentially a struggle for the world between Soviet-style communism and American-style democracy. Wattenberg explained, “American taxpayers didn’t put up trillions of dollars in the Cold War to create a few more Swedens.” Having won the Cold War, the United States was now required to do something with its victory. This was the historical moment to “go for the gold,” “he declared, remaking the world—so far as possible—in America’s image.15

The neocons proclaimed that this mission was perfectly suited for America’s unparalleled cultural, military, political, and economic power. In addition to his senior fellowship at the American Enterprise Institute and his weekly CBS radio commentaries, Wattenberg was a former vice chairman of the Board of International Broadcasting, a research council member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a member of the U.S. delegation to the 1984 United Nations Population Conference in Mexico City, the host of PBS programs “In Search of the Real America” and “Ben Wattenberg at Large,” and vice chairman of the board of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. He was highly practiced at what he called “waging democracy.” “We have the biggest cultural arrows in the biggest quiver,” “he enthused. “These include our global entertainment monopoly, immigration, the spreading English language, the prime tourist destination, the best universities, the most powerful and far-flung military, an opportunity society, and a worldwide information operation.”16 To redeem America’s global destiny, he wanted the United States to increase the National Endowment for Democracy budget by fifteen times and raise the budgets for the State Department, the U.S. Information Agency, foreign aid, and Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe.17

To the democratic globalists, the crusade for world democracy and the struggle to preserve America’s unipolar dominance were the same thing. Wattenberg, Muravchik, Perle, Novak, Decter, and Norman Podhoretz assured that any increase in American power and influence was simultaneously a boon
for world democracy. America helped the world by promoting its own interests, and because the United States was a universalist superpower that epitomized the democratic idea, it was compelled to pursue an aggressive foreign policy. Wattenberg, as usual, provided the bumper sticker: “A unipolar world is a good thing, if America is the uni.”

The democratic globalists were stronger on policy advocacy than political philosophy, although some tried to deepen the movement’s philosophical basis. Gregory Fossedal argued that the warrant for democratic globalism was drawn from the fundamental rights of humankind, on which American democracy was based: “The rights of mankind are not good or just because they promote democracy, or any other form of government; rather, democracy exists to promote and protect those rights, and as soon as it ceases to do so, it ceases to act in accordance with the principles of just government, of natural law.” Since rights are universal, he reasoned, Americans are obliged to promote world democracy: “Whatever is peculiar to some is no right at all. Whatever is a ‘right’ is universal. And what is universal certainly applies to American foreign policy.”

It followed that the “democratic imperative” was unavoidable for all democrats who claimed their rights. Fossedal asserted: “There is no middle position to take in this matter. The rights of man are not a matter of multiple choice, but a true-or-false proposition. Without a universal right to self-government, republican democracy is merely a condition that happens to exist in some places and seems to have served some peoples well.” Republican democracy may have produced superior economic growth and trial procedures, but “unless we start from some common notion of what is just and right, we cannot even say that economic growth is good or arbitrary trials bad. We are left with a sturdy vessel, but no direction to sail it.” Fossedal called for a League of Democracies that promoted world democracy, replaced many of the functions performed by the United Nations, and expanded the force of international law among member states.

Global Democracy and the Reagan Doctrine: Charles Krauthammer

The leading advocate of democratic globalism, Charles Krauthammer, was a former speechwriter for Vice President Walter Mondale and, before that, a psychiatrist. Born to Orthodox Jewish parents in Canada, he was educated at McGill University, Oxford, and Harvard. Krauthammer studied political science at McGill and Oxford, but switched to medicine after marveling at the crisply organized notebooks of a medical student. He longed for hard truths and intellectual certainty, which he could not find in politics. He also had to cope with living in a wheelchair after injuring his spinal cord at the age of twenty-two.

He enrolled at Harvard Medical School and practiced medicine for three years as a resident, earned his M.D. in 1975, and served as chief resident in psychiatry
for two years at Massachusetts General Hospital. But psychiatry was filled with ambiguity, too. By 1978 Krauthammer realized that uncertainty is unavoidable, and in that case, he preferred the ambiguity of his first love. Quitting medicine, he returned to politics, directing psychiatric research planning for the Carter administration. On the side he wrote a few articles for the New Republic, and in 1980 joined Mondale’s staff for the presidential campaign. Speechwriting was a dismal experience for him; he later reflected that at least it didn’t ruin his writing career: “I think speechwriting is the most destructive form of writing known to man. It’s geared to emotions, to certain musical rhythms and pitches in language.”

After the campaign Krauthammer joined the New Republic as an associate editor, where he honed his cool and compact writing style. In 1982 he was promoted to senior editor; the following year he took a second post, writing essays for Time magazine; in 1985 he acquired a third employer, writing a weekly syndicated column for the Washington Post. Along the way his politics drifted to the right, although Krauthammer was not a joiner and did not think of himself as a movement neoconservative. The neoconservative label “defines a certain worldview and defines a certain history” he explained. By temperament and personal history he was a bit less ideological and more self-contained than most neocons.

But Krauthammer led the way on the foreign policy questions that consumed neoconservatives, first as a democratic globalist, later as a unipolar realist. Characteristically, during his global democracy phase, he cut straight to the heart of its paradox. “There seems to be something self-contradictory about intervening on behalf of self-government,” he wrote in 1985. “It is a lot more straightforward to intervene the old-fashioned way: on behalf of the alleged superiority of the metropolitan civilization. At best, to intervene on behalf of democracy means leaving quickly. Occupation mocks the idea of self-government.” Krauthammer contended that this was a manageable problem, however. In 1954 the Eisenhower administration overthrew Guatemala’s democratically elected government on shabby grounds, although the land-reform policies of Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz were rather moderate by contemporary standards. Thirty years of vicious dictatorial governments was a high price—for Guatemalans—to pay for this particular American mistake. By contrast, Krauthammer noted, in 1985 the United States supported the Duarte government in El Salvador, “whose land-reform policies are not very different from Arbenz’s.” His first lesson followed: “Should the sins of 30 years ago in Guatemala discredit our policy today in El Salvador?”

He drew his second lesson from America’s most successful experiment in exporting democracy. The United States’ relationship with Japan proved that democracy can be exported by force of arms; it showed that if America was sufficiently self-respecting, it could export its political system. Krauthammer did not deny that imposed democracies worked best if the conqueror’s bayonets were quickly removed. But sometimes they could not be removed; that was the point.
Forty years after World War II, America’s nuclear-tipped bayonets were still planted in Germany and Japan. “And though many Americans object to the cost, and some to the danger, there is no real opposition on principle,” he observed. “There is no real case to be made that it contravenes our values to be stationing troops on German soil. Yet Germany is not ours. We have no colonial claim. Still, we do have a persuasive reason: we are needed to defend a democracy.”

America’s obligation to defend the world’s democracies thus provided a moral justification for American intervention, though the moral claim was not sufficient to compel intervention. Krauthammer argued that America is compelled to intervene in the affairs of other nations only when its own strategic interests are threatened. Foreign policy is not philanthropy. Philanthropists give away their own money, but government officials are trustees; they spend the blood and treasure of others. Intervention therefore requires a moral justification and a strategic rationale: “If these criteria appear too general and all-encompassing, let me point out that they exclude, and are meant to exclude, considerations that tend to dominate American debates over intervention: international law, world public opinion, and the public sentiments of our own allies.” Krauthammer wanted America to break free from its tangle of self-imposed alliances, pieties, and guilt. Liberal internationalism was bankrupt; his crusade for world democracy was not to be hampered by a League of Democracies that extended the force of international law. Multilateralism was a formula for tying America’s hands.

He argued instead for “a kind of global unilateralism in the moral area” that blended Kristol’s unilateralism with the globalist campaign to export democracy. The United States needed to believe in the rightness of its values, which provided a warrant for its own unilateral actions. He conceded that nationalist unilateralism blends uneasily with democracy. How could the leader of an alliance of democracies act alone? Global unilateralism seemed to defeat its own democratic purpose, but Krauthammer replied that America’s allies were not free agents in the first place: “They are bound by weakness and fear. They are subject to the kinds of threats and blackmail from which the United States, owing to its power, is immune.” Thus, it was useless, or worse, to consult with America’s allies, because they were prevented by their vulnerability from telling the truth. The positions they took—usually opposing American intervention—rarely represented their true interests. It was America’s responsibility to gauge these interests by its own lights. That was the burden of the democratic empire.

“Global unilateralism is not really a choice; it is an existing reality” he argued. “The European democracies, exhausted by two world wars, depleted and turned inward, did decide to place the ultimate responsibility for their safety in the hands of the United States.” There was no realistic alternative. The United States was compelled to unilaterally promote its own ideological and strategic interests and assume that other democracies benefitted from this policy. “An American foreign policy should be confident enough to define international morality in its own, American terms,” Krauthammer declared. “Is that parochial? I think it is
parochial to do otherwise. If we take our own ideas about democracy, rights, and self-government seriously, then it is the height of parochialism, and worse, to believe that these values are applicable only to a few largely white Western countries.” The universality of the democratic faith engendered universal obligations.

Krauthammer cautioned that this did not mean that America was obliged to overthrow all the world’s dictatorships. The moral justification for intervention was necessary, and fighting for democracy was always morally justified, but intervention required more than a moral warrant. Foreign policy was not philanthropy. The United States supported guerrillas in Nicaragua, but not in Haiti or South Africa, because Haiti and South Africa failed the strategic test. “One doesn’t intervene purely for justice,” he explained. “One intervenes for reasons of strategy, and if justice permits. Neither Haiti nor South Africa is about to allow itself to be used for the projection of Soviet power; the same cannot be said of Nicaragua.” The Cold War drew the boundaries for America’s imperial idealism.26

In the mid-1980s, Krauthammer discovered the Reagan Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine committed the United States to anticommunist containment; the Nixon Doctrine leaned on allied regimes—like Iran under the Shah—to police their regions; the Carter Doctrine sought to use rapid deployment forces to defend Western interests. But the rapid deployment force never got off the drawing boards, and as Krauthammer listened to Reagan’s 1985 State of the Union Address, he heard a new doctrine buried under Reagan’s boilerplate for a balanced budget amendment, school prayer and a line-item veto: that America would support anticommunist rebellions throughout the Third World. Krauthammer allowed that there were precedents for such a policy, including Carter’s arms shipments to Afghan rebels. What made the “Reagan Doctrine” a new departure was that Reagan vowed to challenge the Soviet empire throughout its periphery. The United States would reverse Soviet expansionism by rolling back its Third World client states. Like the Nixon Doctrine, the Reagan Doctrine relied mostly on proxies but, unlike the Nixon Doctrine, it advocated revolution, not the status quo.27 Although Reagan never invoked the phrase, it was adopted by journalists and pundits. The following year Krauthammer enthused that the Reagan Doctrine had become “the centerpiece of a revived and revised policy of containment.” In essence, the Reagan Doctrine resolved the Kennan-Burnham argument over containment and liberation by saying yes to both. It contained the Soviets in Europe and rolled them back in the periphery, “where there is no threat of general war.”28

Throughout Reagan’s second term Krauthammer urged that America could remain a republic at home while operating as an empire abroad. He acknowledged that American life “would be happier and more prosperous (less defense spending) and less riven by division” if the United States scaled back its global commitments.29 Anti-imperialists were right that America’s vast military empire required a vast military-industrial complex, centralized government
authority, and a great deal of government secrecy. Left-wing anti-interventionists emphasized the economic costs of empire, he noted, and right-wing anti-interventionists the costs to liberty. Both were right; the burdens of empire unavoidably effected “a diminution of democracy.”

But for two reasons—to defeat communism and promote the democratic idea—the costs were worth bearing. America’s crusade to expand democracy was “an American vocation, for which we have long sacrificed blood and treasure,” Krauthammer observed. To accept constraints on America’s own democracy for the sake of advancing world democracy was a form of self-sacrifice, “a kind of foreign aid program in which the transfer is made in the coin of democratic practice rather than cash.” Democracy was a universal mission, and missionaries required a strong and self-confident faith: “If we believe democracy is good for us, then we must believe it will be good for others.”

Near the end of the Cold War Krauthammer found himself halfway between Reagan and Podhoretz. In September 1988 he cautioned that Reagan was wrong to suggest that the Cold War was over, but he doubted that Gorbachev had found a cunning way to disarm America. Krauthammer judged that Gorbachev’s foreign policy was a species of imperial triage. Gorbachev dropped the Brezhnev Doctrine that communism accepted no losses, cut his losses in Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia, and kept the jewels in Central America, China, and Europe. The latter regions were “great geopolitical prizes,” Krauthammer observed. The Soviets would not pull out of Nicaragua; Gorbachev was desperate for a rapprochement with China, and Europe was “the grand prize.” Shrewdly, Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty to break up the alliance between the United States and Western Europe; Krauthammer warned that a neutralized Europe was now a serious possibility: “The goal of Gorbachev’s foreign policy is not to end the cold war and certainly not to lose it, but to continue the struggle with the subtlety and finesse that befits the modern man he is.” He admitted to being “a bit envious” of the Russians, because they had a skilled leader: “Would that our leaders had his foresight and command.”

Adjusting to Unipolarity

As long as he believed that the Cold War was still raging, Krauthammer plugged for world democracy. The United States did not have to choose between the democratic imperative and the national interest, for America’s promotion of democracy served American interests and the interests of world democracy. By the end of the 1988 presidential election, however, which he found unbearably vacuous, Krauthammer began to hedge. If the “Evil Empire” went out of business, he mused, it would be easier for the United States to promote world democracy, but also harder to justify the effort. Would Americans be willing to “embrace Wilsonian idealism?” They didn’t want it in 1918, so why would they want it in 1990?
The following year, after the Soviet bloc collapsed and neoconservatives rushed to Krauthammer’s crusade for world democracy, he told them not to bother. The rules of the game had changed. During the Cold War, the United States fought to preserve a “structure of freedom” against an aggressive foe that sought to destroy freedom. But, by winning the Cold War, America fulfilled the Wilsonian mission of making the world safe for democracy. The mission to make democracy possible was an historical absolute; American interests and values compelled nothing less than a crusade to make democracy possible throughout the world. But it was another matter to make democracy actual throughout the world. “A great power undertakes great battles, because no one else can,” Krauthammer argued. “But with the great battle won, the question of whether to engage in the mop-up work is a very different one. A communist Nicaragua in isolation is far different from a communist Nicaragua as an outpost of the Soviet empire or as an outpost of communism as an armed creed.” The strategic meaning of the outer Soviet empire had been altered profoundly by the withering of the empire’s metropolis. The collapse of the Soviet base made the Soviet-dominated periphery states suddenly unthreatening. Krauthammer expected these regimes to disintegrate from their own contradictions. It was fine for the United States to accelerate the process, “but, unlike containment, that process of encouragement does not rise to the rank of defining purpose of American foreign policy.”

This was not an argument against democratic globalism or in favor of a chastened realism. Krauthammer observed that Americans had “no stomach and very little tolerance” for realpolitik; Henry Kissinger had proved the point. But with the passing of the Cold War, waging democracy was mostly mop-up work. It was necessary, but uninteresting. America shouldn’t have to bother with the drudge work of converting Third World nations to democracy, he argued. The mission for the United States was to strive for universal dominion, a world order described, however problematically, by Francis Fukuyama’s celebrated article on “The End of History,” which proclaimed that the Hegelian end of history was occurring. The worldwide triumph of liberal democracy ended the West’s ideological debates and created a “common marketization of the world.”

Krauthammer conceded that Fukuyama’s announcement was premature, for the worldwide triumph of liberal democracy had not been solidified and was not inevitable. But Fukuyama had the best vision of what America should strive for. Krauthammer explained: “America’s purpose should be to steer the world away from its coming multipolar future toward a qualitatively new outcome—a unipolar world whose center is a confederated West.” The foreign policy mission that suited America’s greatness and power was to work for “a super-sovereign West economically, culturally, and politically hegemonic in the world.”

Unipolarism assumed that community begets structure. Krauthammer’s idea of a super-sovereign West replicated most of his earlier democratic globalist vision, but now he took a different approach to achieving it. Like the Reagan Doctrine, democratic globalism focused on the periphery, working to convert
Third World nations to democracy. Unipolarism focused on the center. The death of communism changed the structure of America’s obligations, Krauthammer argued. The primary aim of America’s democratic crusade was to unify the West, not convert Third World nations to democracy. A strengthened democratic West would serve American interests and “lead inexorably to the spread of democracy to the second and third worlds.”

It was a top-down strategy. James Burnham had described the Soviet drive for world domination by drawing four geopolitical rings around the Soviet center; Krauthammer applied the ring image to the post-Cold War United States. At first, he imagined a confederated West as the unipolar center. An increasingly unipolar world would diminish the role of national sovereignty, and the super-sovereign West would be in the center: “Around it would radiate in concentric circles, first, the Second World, the decommunizing states, dependent on the West for technology and finance. As they liberalize economically and politically, they would become individually eligible for status as associate members of the unipolar center. The outer ring, even more dependent on the center, would consist of the developing states. Its graduates too (say, Korea, Brazil, Israel) might also eventually attach themselves to the center.” Like other Western and allied powers, the United States would have to subordinate its national interests to the interests of the Western alliance.37

For a few months in 1990, Krauthammer admonished Americans against feeling deflated. Confederating the West was not an exciting cause, and he acknowledged that politics suddenly seemed boring. The great debates over ideology and America’s destiny were over. Washington was no longer interesting, even to Beltway political columnists. America was mightier than ever, but American politics was in decline. Krauthammer analogized that instead of building America’s house, politics had been reduced to roof repair. Instead of asking Americans to bear any burden to keep the torch of freedom alive, “American politics is about the Clean Air Act.” This historical turn was good for Americans, he counseled. History is made by economics, demographics, and especially science and technology, not politics. Only bad times are saturated with politics. Unlike many neocons, Krauthammer could imagine himself as a regular conservative. He shook his head at communitarians and goodgovernment types who worried about low voter turnouts. To him, America’s lack of interest in Bush versus Dukakis was a sign of health; it showed that most Americans were sufficiently content not to care about politics. He urged that Bush 41 was the perfect leader for such a time: “George Bush’s great good fortune is that he is a man utterly incapable of vision at a time when the people do not want vision and do not need it. Vision is for Khomeini and Castro, for Jesse Jackson and Pat Robertson. Happily, if only for now, Americans will have none of it.”38

“If only for now” ended in August, at least for Krauthammer. After Iraq invaded Kuwait and the Bush administration assembled international support for the Gulf War, Krauthammer insisted that Bush’s war was not an example of something called “collective security.” There is no such thing as collective
security, he contended. The U.N. would not have kicked Iraq out of Kuwait. What was real was American power and resolve; so-called multilateralism was just a political cover for reality. Krauthammer had nothing against cover—“it is nice to have”—but warned that it carried two dangers. The first was that Americans would mistake the illusions of “collective security” or the “international community” for the real thing, which was American power. These illusions led to the dangerous illusion that Americans could afford to dispense with real power, making a fetish of multilateralism. Three months before the fighting began, Krauthammer worried that muddled thinking about multilateralism might keep America from fighting the war correctly. The so-called coalition was merely a means to an end, he warned; it was worth having only as long as it furthered the warfighting end. If it became a hindrance to that end, it had to go; otherwise American policy became a prisoner to the wishes of its putative partners.39

Krauthammer was surprised to put it so strongly, because he had expected Japan and Germany to become great powers. But when Japan and Germany hid under the table, he got clear about the new world order and stopped using euphemisms for the world’s unipolar center. The center of world power was not a super-sovereign West, he judged, but, rather, the world’s “unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies.” England and France made respectable responses to the Persian Gulf crisis, but neither nation possessed the economic base to become more than a second-rate power. After the Gulf War, it was pointless to pretend that the unipolar center was anything besides the United States. The Gulf War revealed the true geopolitical structure of the new order, that “a single pole of world power” the United States, dominated the world. The unipolar moment had arrived. Only the United States possessed the military, diplomatic, political, and economic power to shape events “in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself.”40

“Nothing changes a country more than war,” he remarked, enthusing that after the Gulf War, “we will no longer speak of post-Vietnam America. A new, post-gulf America will emerge, its self-image, sense of history, even its political discourse transformed.”41 Krauthammer allowed that there was still “much pious talk” in America about multilateralism, collective security, and a larger role for the United Nations as a guarantor of world order. But the United Nations was not the guarantor of anything, he contended: “Except in a formal sense, it can hardly be said to exist.” Faced with the reality of American dominion, many Americans pretended that the U.N. was important, and American policy makers indulged them with “pseudomultilateral” gestures: “A dominant great power acts essentially alone, but, embarrassed at the idea and still worshiping at the shrine of collective security, [the United States] recruits a ship here, a brigade there, and blessings all around to give its unilateral actions a multilateral sheen.” Krauthammer urged Americans to grow up, so their government could stop pretending. He professed not to comprehend the popular desire for U.N. approval: “But to many Americans it matters. It is largely for domestic reasons,
therefore, that American political leaders make sure to dress unilateral action in multilateral clothing.” With enough practice, he warned, American leaders might begin to believe their own pretense—and thus endanger American interests.  

Unipolarism fought on several fronts. It was predictably criticized by what Krauthammer called “the usual pockets of post-Vietnam liberal isolationism (e.g., the churches).” It was forced to fight off the resurgence of old right isolationism that fueled Pat Buchanan’s subsequent presidential campaigns. And it had to correct the domesticated realists who wanted America to become a normal country in a normal time. Krauthammer replied that there is no such thing as a normal time: “The world does not sort itself out on its own.” In the nineteenth century, the United States was able to keep to itself because it was protected by two great oceans patrolled by the British navy. But the British navy was gone. The best policy for the United States was “American strength and will—the strength and will to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them.”

With echoes of Burnham, Krauthammer declared that the new world order “should be an assertion of American interests and values in the world, if necessary asserted unilaterally. Where possible, we should act in concert with others. Where not, we should proceed regardless.” The neocons were not alone; Krauthammer took for granted that hardline conservatives like Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld would never settle for balance-of-power realism or follow Buchanan into old right isolationism. The Republican Party, at least, had a strong core of aggressive foreign policy nationalists. But Krauthammer became a neocon hero by daring to say that the purpose of American foreign policy should be to preserve America’s dominance.

On the first day of the Iraq War, Podhoretz exulted that a quick American victory “would remoralize our whole country. Everyone would experience a new surge of confidence in America.” The same week, Muravchik proclaimed that the war would redefine American politics, confirm America’s “ideological supremacy,” and demonstrate the worldwide supremacy of American military power. “The gulf war marks the dawning of the Pax Americana,” he declared. The bipolar world of the Cold War was a memory; America’s victory in the Cold War had created the possibility of a unipolarist peace; and now the Gulf War was establishing the new order. Muravchik predicted that the worldwide consolidation of the Pax Americana would bring the world “not only to the joys of jeans and rock and Big Macs,” but also to “our concept of how nations ought to be governed and to behave.” Michael Novak agreed: “This is the end of the decline. This is the decline of the declinists. The mother of all battles turned into the daughter of disasters for the declinists. For years, people are going to cite the lessons of the Persian Gulf.” Elsewhere he enthused: “There is now only one superpower…. While the rest of the world debated, the U.S. acted.”

Repeatedly the neocons boasted that the Gulf War refuted critics of American empire such as Yale historian Paul Kennedy. In his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Kennedy argued that America’s vitality was threatened by the
same pattern of imperial overcommitments that dragged down Imperial Spain in the early seventeenth century and the British empire in the early twentieth century. The military empire of the United States was created to protect its increasingly far-flung economic interests and take economic and strategic advantage of America’s power, he argued. Like Spain and England, however, the United States inherited a vast array of foreign commitments from a time when it held greater comparative political, economic, and military power. The United States’ network of foreign commitments was essentially fixed in 1945, at a time when the United States possessed more than 40 percent of the world’s wealth and power. More than forty years later, America still had over five hundred thousand troops abroad—sixty-five thousand of them afloat—while holding a substantially reduced share of the world’s wealth and power. Kennedy called the resulting condition “imperial overstretch.” America’s accumulated foreign interests and obligations outstripped its relatively declining power. The dynamics were familiar to all historians of the rise and fall of empires: “Even as their relative economic strength is ebbing, the growing foreign challenges to their position have compelled them to allocate more and more of their resources into the military sector, which in turn squeezes out productive investment and, over time, leads to the downward spiral of slower growth, heavier taxes, deepening domestic splits over spending priorities, and a weakening capacity to bear the burdens of defense.”

In Kennedy’s view, America’s relative decline was masked by its enormous military capabilities and its success at internationalizing American capitalism and culture. American policy makers needed to bring their nation’s commitments and power into balance, smoothly managing its relative decline to the status of “a very significant Power in a multipolar world.” The next great challenge for the United States was to recognize, and reorganize on the basis of, “both the limitations and the opportunities of American power.”

The neocons replied that Kennedy stood truth on its head. Krauthammer insisted that American power was not militarily overstretched at all. American defense spending averaged between 5 and 6 percent of GNP, he observed—nearly half of what it was in the early 1960s. Although Kennedy was right that America’s economic strength had declined, this erosion was caused by its low savings rate, inferior educational system, deteriorating work habits, stagnant economic productivity, and “rising demand for welfare-state entitlements and new taste for ecological luxuries,” not imperial overstretch. To Krauthammer, it was not America’s military commitments that made America poorer, but something deeper within Americans themselves.

The latter point was the crucial one for the democratic globalists and unipolarists. Novak asserted that Kennedy’s theory of imperial overstretch “could not have been more wrong in predicting American decline.” Kennedy aimed at the United States and hit the Soviet Union. More important, Kennedy exemplified the deep spiritual wrongness of America’s “declinist” intellectuals and liberal activists. The declinists made false assumptions and allowed anti-
imperialist biases to control their interpretations of the data, Novak argued; even worse, they were guilty of the unforgivable sin, the sin against the spirit: “They have unforgivably damaged our national morale, especially among the impressionable young in our colleges and universities. It’s wrong to steal hope for the future from the young, and to deprive them of the sense of belonging to a noble national experiment—the most universally attractive of our era.”

Wattenberg explained that Kennedy didn’t comprehend that American exceptionalism was real: “Kennedy doesn’t really understand America. He’s an Englishman. He emigrated here as a young adult. My sense is that he hasn’t got the whole message yet.” Ruefully, he allowed that Kennedy found a market among those who “want us to decline ourselves. They don’t like being Number One.” Wattenberg wanted Americans to love being number one while still wanting other nations to grow: “The American empire is not like earlier European imperialisms. We have sought neither wealth nor territory. Ours is an imperium of values. We have sought to boost a community of ideas—political democracy, free market economics, and science and technology. These days those values are advancing, not eroding.”

Twelve years later Kennedy admitted that the neocons were right about America’s increasing dominance, if not about spiritual wrongness and the rest. In the aftermath of 9/11, he became an advocate of the Pax Americana. “Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power, nothing,” he marveled. “I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close. The Pax Britannica was run on the cheap, Britain’s army was much smaller than European armies, and even the Royal Navy was equal only to the next two navies. Right now all the other navies in the world combined could not dent American maritime supremacy.” He judged that America was not only the dominant empire of the past century, but the greatest of all time. No other empire belonged in the same league: “Charlemagne’s empire was merely Western European in its reach. The Roman empire stretched farther afield, but there was another great empire in Persia, and a larger one in China. There is, therefore, no comparison.”

Unipolarism without Pax Americana

Only a year after Krauthammer lauded Bush 41 as the perfect president for a depoliticized time, he passed a scathing verdict on Bush’s foreign policy legacy. Bush was not his kind of conservative realist, for Bush was the kind that preferred “strongmen and dictators” over democratic insurgents. He preferred Gorbachev over Boris Yeltsin, although Yeltsin was a genuine democrat; he favored Deng Xiaoping over the democratic opposition in China, even after the massacre at Tiananmen Square; he left Saddam Hussein in power, abandoning the Iraqi Shiites and Kurds; he wanted a unitary state in Yugoslavia, although that would have put Serbian communists in control. Krauthammer acidly
remarked that the Bush team prized stability, familiarity, and club manners, and its laziness reinforced these predispositions. Bush deserved good marks for German unification and the first part of the Gulf War, but otherwise his group was more lucky than good: “Its general foreign policy prowess has been overrated. This has been the luckiest Administration in American history. After 40 years of struggle against the Soviet empire, it happened to be on station on the day the empire collapsed.” Realism does not have to be antirevolutionary, Krauthammer admonished, but Bush never saw a revolution that didn’t scare him.52

That capsulized the neoc onservative case against Bush 41. Krauthammer believed that Bush wasted golden opportunities to remake the world, and he worried that Bush’s greatest achievement—going to war against Iraq—set a multilateralist trap for future interventions. After Clinton gained the presidency, his fears were realized.

The Clinton administration gave Krauthammer many opportunities to expound on the differences between the self-respecting nationalist interventionism of a superpower and the misguided shibboleths of “collective security.” Persistently he argued that great powers have no business intervening in places where no vital national interest is at stake. Bosnia was the first test. Against “a rising chorus for intervention” that greeted Clinton upon taking office, Krauthammer countered: “It is a call to folly.” The Bush administration might have prevented the Balkan wars, he allowed, but by 1993 it was too late to save Bosnia—“a fiction with no history of independence”—and even bombing for a partitioned solution was not worth the trouble. The Bosnian state could not be saved because the Serbs and Muslims hated each other, and if the United States bombed the Serbs, the Muslims would become more intractable.53

Liberals were prominent among those who urged Clinton to intervene in Bosnia; Krauthammer was incredulous. The same people who opposed the Gulf War wanted Clinton to sacrifice American blood and treasure against the Serbs? Reflecting on the “amazing transmutation of Cold War and Gulf War doves into Bosnia hawks” he lamented that realism never had it so bad. New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis called Bush a “gutless wimp” for letting the Serbs conquer and terrorize the Muslims and Croats. When asked why he had opposed the Gulf War, Lewis explained that America fought the Gulf War for oil, not to save lives. Krauthammer replied: “Any wimp, you see, can go to war for some vital national interest. Real men go to war for reasons of right.” Now the transmutation made sense; Krauthammer gathered that the new species of liberal hawk took pride in fighting for moral reasons alone. To the liberal hawks, self-interest was not a necessary criterion for going to war; it was disqualifying. Incredibly, liberals like Lewis argued “out of the deep desire to purify, to redeem America by making it an instrument of justice.”54

Krauthammer struggled to assimilate the moralizing liberal mind: “What to say of these liberal hawks? That they are marked by good faith but a terrible confusion.” Liberal moralizers, he explained, even those of the hawkish variety, mixed together the realms of individual and national morality. They failed to
grasp that the ideal of personal morality—altruism—has no place in national morality and is destructive to national ends. In personal morality, self-interest is a suspect motive, but at the national level it is the paramount concern: “Nations are not individuals. Nations live in a state of nature. There is no higher authority to protect them. If they do not protect themselves, they die.” Unlike Reinhold Niebuhr, who taught that a three-pronged idea of justice is the highest end in national morality, Krauthammer’s realism was stripped clean of moral dialectics. He stuck with the sharp line between personal virtue and national interest that characterized Niebuhr’s early realism. “In such a dangerous arena, thinking with one’s heart is a serious offense,” he warned. “Foreign policy is not social work.” Krauthammer did not believe that the morality of war excludes conscience, but he admonished that conscience must never be the sole reason for going to war: “God protect us from our better instincts.”

Clinton zigged and zagged toward Bosnia, but in Somalia, Krauthammer bitterly observed, he indulged his moralistic sentimentality in “the most unalloyed, most unprecedented example of humanitarian intervention in memory, perhaps in history.” In December 1992 Clinton sent the Marines to help the United Nations avert a famine in Somalia; six months later, in the midst of nation-building projects, U.S. gunships shot rockets into crowded villas, U.N. troops fired into crowds of demonstrators, and some forces refused to take orders from U.N. commanders. Krauthammer condemned the whole business. It was ridiculous to convert the United Nations into “the all-purpose ambulance service for bleeding countries,” and even worse to subordinate national troops to U.N. commanders. The U.N. was a fictional enterprise with no sovereignty, Krauthammer protested; it had a bureaucracy and a building, but no army, taxing authority, or independent will. U.N. commanders had no business expecting soldiers to obey them. Until the U.N. got its own army, cases like Somalia had to handled “in the old way” by some world power that took the trouble “to seize and rule it, as France once ruled Lebanon.” Krauthammer allowed that Third World peoples didn’t like to be ruled by a real army that took orders from a real nation, “because it smacks of colonialism. And so it does. It is colonialism. But no one has come up with a better idea for saving countries like Somalia from themselves.”

Clinton actually believed in the United Nations and multilateralism; that was the key to his disastrous foreign policy. Krauthammer protested that instead of directly using American power to serve American ends, Clinton shucked off his superpower responsibilities to the U.N. or whatever “multilateral constructions” he could find. He couldn’t bear to stand aside from the slaughter in Bosnia, but he also feared a quagmire, so he intervened indirectly through NATO and the U.N. To Krauthammer, that was the worst option. The best option was to stay out, recognizing that America had no interest in Bosnia worth the cost; the second best was to directly bomb the Serbs into submission; the third best was to send American troops if the second option didn’t work; the worst option was to
put U.S. forces under U.N. command, “devoid of initiative, yet committed to spasmodic engagement whenever the U.N. rouses itself to action.”

It galled Krauthammer that Clinton gave away his power so willingly. At an April 1994 press conference on Bosnia, Clinton described the U.N.’s authorization system for the use of air power, patiently explaining the distinctions between no-fly zone, close air support, and open-ended authority. “He went into extraordinary detail” Krauthammer observed. “The President appeared fascinated by the issue, as if the principal problem of foreign policy is finding its correct legal justification.” That was what domestic politics is about, Krauthammer lectured. Passing a health bill is a big legal issue, but foreign policy is not supposed to revolve around the problem of legal authority: “In foreign policy, you don’t think like a Governor. You think like a President. You don’t decide what to do by parsing Security Council resolutions. You decide what to do by making a calculus of American national interests, strategic objectives and military capabilities. From that you fashion a policy with clear objectives. Then you hire the best international lawyers to find the authority for what you had decided to do in the first place.”

Haiti was Clinton’s next fiasco, where twenty thousand American troops, acting under U.N. authorization, escorted Jean-Bertrand Aristide to his elected office as president. Krauthammer predicted that it would take Haiti less time than it took Somalia to drive the Americans out. In Somalia the United States intervened to prevent starvation, until eighteen Army Rangers were killed; in Haiti, America intervened to rule, and Haitians were sure to resent it. Thus even the beneficiary, Aristide, had to be flattered and cajoled to express a word of thanks; more instructively, Clinton needed this sign of gratitude, because it was America’s only reward for stupidly intervening in Haiti. Krauthammer explained that a foreign policy of selflessness is necessarily desperate for gratitude, “and selfless intervention, unmoored from any conception of national interest, defines Clinton foreign policy.” Lurching from one sentimental mission to another while trying to avoid major disasters, the Clinton administration fudged on Bosnia, took a chance on Somalia until G.I.s were dragged through the streets, took a pass on Rwanda, and begged for gratitude in Haiti. Krauthammer wished for a president who commanded respect for America.

He railed against Clinton’s Bosnia policy at every turn to the end of Clinton’s presidency. In 1993 Clinton rejected the Vance-Owen partition plan that gave the Serbs 42 percent of Bosnia, because it rewarded Serb aggression; two years later the Serbs had 70 percent of Bosnia; Krauthammer tartly remarked that the Muslims and Croatians paid a high price for Clinton’s moral high-mindedness. But in 1995 the Croatians launched a ferocious ethnic-cleansing attack on Krajina that drove the Serbs to the Dayton peace talks, where Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke presided; Krauthammer urged that there was still a chance to keep American troops out of Bosnia, by taking an impossibilist position at the peace talks. The best option was to sabotage the Dayton talks, for if Dayton...
failed, the United States could avoid having to honor or renege on “Clinton’s supremely foolish commitment” of twenty thousand ground forces.60

There was such a thing as the Clinton Doctrine, Krauthammer believed, and it was a disaster. Clinton expressed it on March 23, 1999: “I want us to live in a world where we get along with each other, with all of our differences, and where we don’t have to worry about seeing scenes every night for the next 40 years of ethnic cleansing in some part of the world.” Three months later he put it this way: “Whether you live in Africa or Central Europe or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it’s within our power to stop it, we will stop it.” Repeatedly Krauthammer countered that this was utter nonsense that wasted American prestige, dignity, and resources on selected objects of Clinton’s sentimentality. The United States did not stop China from oppressing Tibet, or Russia from ravaging Chechnya, or Indonesia from savaging East Timor, because the United States needed good relations with China, Russia, and Indonesia. And the Clinton administration did nothing to stop the slaughter of innocents in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Congo, Sudan, and Sri Lanka, so why should Bosnia be different?61

Predictably, the wars of the former Yugoslavia moved to Kosovo, Serbia’s historic heartland, which was 90 percent Albanian. Krauthammer lectured: “It matters not a whit to the United States whether Kosovo is ruled by Serbs or Albanians or Tartars. It has no economy to speak of, no industry, no military. It doesn’t even have a seacoast. It is a destitute, landlocked geopolitical wasteland.” Some critics charged that Clinton came to the rescue of the Kosovars because they were white and European; Krauthammer reminded them that Clinton also recklessly intervened in Somalia and Haiti. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger pointed to proximity, noting that Kosovo was in the middle of Europe; Krauthammer corrected his geography. Kosovo had no strategic importance either, but it did have something that set it apart from Tibet, Chechnya, and East Timor: a victimizer that America had no reason to indulge. The Kosovars were lucky in being attacked by a country, Serbia, that counted for nothing to the United States: “We blithely bombed our way into Yugoslavia because the country we needed to bludgeon is of no strategic significance.”62

Mistakenly, Krauthammer assumed that the war for Kosovo would require ground troops; he suggested that he might have stomached such a war if America had respectable leaders: “If we had a serious President (say, John McCain) and a serious Secretary of State (say, Jeanne Kirkpatrick) and a serious NATO commander (say, Colin Powell), it might make sense to go in on the ground to win. But we don’t. Which is why we are where we are.”63 He passed on the irony that Clinton bypassed the U.N. to bomb Kosovo; the fact that Clinton went through NATO didn’t make the war smell better or worse. Krauthammer told his mass circulation audience that a serious foreign policy was something very different. Clinton wanted a moral, universal foreign policy, but serious foreign policy was calculating and particular; even Clinton was more calculating and
particular than he let on: “The essence of foreign policy is deciding which son of a bitch to support and which to oppose—in 1941, Hitler or Stalin; in 1972, Brezhnev or Mao; in 1979, Somoza or Ortega. One has to choose. A blanket anti-son of a bitch policy, like a blanket anti-ethnic cleansing policy, is soothing, satisfying and empty. It is not a policy at all but righteous self-delusion.”

Krauthammer supported missile defense, took a Likud-style position in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and called for a containment policy toward China. Just before the Israeli/Palestinian summit of 2000, he warned that while Israeli leaders had long prepared their people for serious concessions over the West Bank, Jerusalem, and a Palestinian state, Yasser Arafat had done nothing of the kind. His demands never changed, and “he keeps inflaming his people with visions of a return to all of Palestine—including Israel.” Having rolled the dice, Krauthammer warned, Clinton had to produce a definitive agreement. If he forged a partial agreement that failed to resolve the problem of Jerusalem or the refugees, the summit would be a disaster. Any unresolved issue would “bring out the stone throwers. Then the machine gunners. Then the tanks. And then the neighboring Arab states, including Egypt, into battle in solidarity with the new Palestinian state. There can be no greater failure than that.”

On U.S. policy toward China, he called for containment of the old-fashioned kind, not an ideological Cold War. Krauthammer assured that there was no ideological component to the struggle between the United States and China. Post-Maoist China was simply an old-style dictatorship out for power, not a messianic movement. But China was a bully, and “containment of a bully must begin early in its career.” He wanted a “coldly geopolitical” strategy that sought better American relations with Vietnam, India, and Russia, and that lessened America’s economic pressure on Japan. The Clinton administration was “so hell-bent on selling carburetors in Kyoto” that it jeopardized America’s Pacific security. Moreover, geopolitical containment was just the outside strategy; equally important was the inside strategy of supporting Chinese dissidents. Krauthammer judged that economic sanctions were pointless, because China’s economy was a fast-growing dynamo, but China could be embarrassed by public criticism of its human rights record. He wanted American officials to be much less delicate about offending Chinese leaders.

He paid less attention than Wolfowitz, Perle, William Kristol, and the Project for the New American Century to Clinton’s Iraq policy, but said mostly the same things, with a realist spin. For Krauthammer, as for them, the low point came in 1996, just after Clinton warned Saddam not to make the “serious mistake” of intervening in the Kurdish civil conflict. Saddam invaded Iraqi Kurdistan anyway and was punished with pinprick missile attacks that Clinton called a “proportional” response; Krauthammer raged that proportionality “leaves the other guy with nothing to fear.” Instead of letting Saddam dictate the level and intensity of the conflict, a real American president would have made him pay a disproportionate price. “Disproportionality works better,” he admonished. The Powell Doctrine had the right idea, “inflicting massive, decisive, aggression-
reversing damage at a scale of our choosing.” In Iraq and elsewhere, Krauthammer despaired of Clinton’s “gratuitous grant of power to the U.N.” Repeatedly he lectured that there was no such thing as “the international community” and one did not handle bullies by submitting them to a fiction. After Clinton trashed his presidency in the Monica Lewinsky sexual fiasco, some observers questioned whether his diplomacy had weakened. Krauthammer responded, “Impossible. In a foreign policy so inert, any weakening would be imperceptible.”

Always alert to new presidential doctrines, Krauthammer discovered George W. Bush’s before he gained the presidency. Bush was an advocate of missile defense and the primacy of defensive weapons, but that was nothing new for policy hawks. The exciting new news was that Bush opposed arms control negotiations. Instead of continuing to negotiate with the Russians over how the ABM Treaty might be revised and how many offensive missiles each side should possess, Bush wanted America to scrap the ABM Treaty and decide on its own how many missiles it needed. Krauthammer enthused: “We don’t need new agreements; we only need new thinking.” If America wanted to build a defensive shield or cut its offensive arsenal, why should it dicker with the Russians? “The new idea—extraordinarily simple and extraordinarily obvious—is that we build to order. Our order. Read my lips. No new treaties.”

The Clinton years did not end as badly in Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo as Krauthammer predicted, but the explosion that he predicted for Israel did occur before Clinton left office. Krauthammer believed that the intifada—“the most virulent, most frenzied anti-Israel violence in at least a half-century”—settled the debate between hawks and doves regarding the Palestinian problem. For thirty years, doves promised that concessions leading to a Palestinian state would yield peace and hawks countered that the Palestinians wanted to abolish Israel, not merely gain their own state. After thirty years of debating whether Israel should offer an open hand or an iron fist, Krauthammer judged, the argument was over: “Rarely does history settle such debates as decisively and mercilessly as it has this one.” Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered the West Bank (including the Jordan Valley) and a divided Jerusalem (including control of the Temple Mount) and was rewarded with a ferocious onslaught of terrorism. “No dove ever wanted or pursued peace more fervently,” Krauthammer commented. “And what does he get? War. Neville Chamberlain was equally perplexed on Sept. 1, 1939.”

The Unipolar President

Although he spent most of the 1990s denouncing Clinton’s leadership, Krauthammer enthused that American power and dominance continually expanded nonetheless. “America bestrides the world like a colossus,” he marveled. “The miracle of the ’90s has been the dog that didn’t bark: Where is the opposition, where are the coalitions of second-rank states rising to challenge
Pax Americana?” It was not that Clinton did anything right, he assured; American hegemony was remarkably benign with or without Clinton, and thus it inspired no serious opposition. Moreover, Clinton just happened to preside over the period of America’s exemption from history. America had “somehow managed” to achieve low employment, low inflation, and rapid growth simultaneously, while also lowering its rates of welfare dependency, teen pregnancy, and crime. Krauthammer expected the “unipolar moment” to last for at least a generation; by contrast, he warned that the laws of history, especially international politics, “cannot be defied forever.”

The next American president had to be stronger and more self-respecting than Clinton, for America’s problems were sure to increase. The democratic globalists and “neo-Reaganite” ideologists were getting the upper hand in the unipolarist wing of the Republican Party, but Krauthammer rebuked them on imperial policing and nation-building. He was fond of saying that “superpowers don’t do windows.” The neocon idealists argued that America had to intervene in small wars to deter others from doing the same thing elsewhere. Krauthammer replied that others would do the same thing anyway; the Russians ravaged Chechnya at the very moment that America made an example of the Serbs. The neocon idealists also used a psychological argument, that America had to fight the small wars to keep from getting too flabby to fight the big ones; great powers had to assert their greatness all the time. To Krauthammer that was a rationalization for waste; the big threats were sure to come, even if only one of them—the Gulf War—materialized in the 1990s.

He believed that the next administration had four strategic responsibilities: (1) deter and disarm rogue states that acquired weapons of mass destruction; (2) contain China; (3) guard against a revanchist Russia; and (4) maintain order as the “ultimate guarantor” of world stability. America was the “balancer of last resort in the world,” Krauthammer reasoned. It required enormous resources to maintain its vast military empire and had to be ready at all times to put down rogue states that could not be “balanced” by anyone else. Instead of wasting its resources “on humanitarian missions best left to Sweden,” America needed to take itself seriously. It had to sustain high force levels at military bases throughout the world, not squander its troops in places like Kosovo and Haiti: “Trouble will come looking for us—from rising powers, from regional conflict in a place we may not even anticipate, and from the spread of weapons of mass destruction to outlaw states. We had better gird ourselves for those threats with our powder dry.”

Barely six weeks into the presidency of George W. Bush, Krauthammer announced the existence of the Bush Doctrine. “This decade starts with a return to the unabashed unilateralism of the ’80s,” he declared. The Bush motto, in Krauthammer’s rendering, had a Reaganite spirit: “We build to suit—ourselves.” The Clinton Democrats were exquisitely sensitive to the Russians, he explained. They fed money to the Russians that disappeared corruptly, looked the other way when the Russians brutalized Chechnya, and were sympathetic to
the Russians’ tender feelings about missile defense. Clinton assiduously nurtured the Russian bear, but Ronald Reagan never went in for “bear contentment.” Reagan practiced a “judicious but unapologetic unilateralism” on the theory that things would go better if the United States advanced its interests unilaterally.

Krauthammer believed that America’s new president had Reagan’s unilateralist spirit Bush 43 was self-confident and optimistic like Reagan, and he understood that the United States had immense power to create reality, not just cope with it. Faced with an assertive American president in the 1980s, the Russians gave up communism; faced with a Reaganite president twenty years later, it took barely a few weeks for the Russians to surrender on missile defense. The sky did not fall, as Clinton’s experts had feared. Krauthammer discerned that George W.Bush understood and embraced America’s superpower dominance. Liberal internationalists conceived the United States as merely the strongest nation in a community of nations, he explained, but Bush correctly viewed the United States as “the dominant power in the world, more dominant than any since Rome.” Barely a month into his presidency, Bush showed that the Russians were willing to be led; Krauthammer believed that most others would follow.

He cheered Bush’s unapologetic unilateralism. The early Bush administration disavowed the ABM Treaty, rejected the Kyoto Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention, abrogated the Land Mine Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and denounced the International Criminal Court. Arms Control and International Security Undersecretary John Bolton insisted that Americans had to be exempt from prosecution by the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague; Krauthammer only wished that Bush had enough nerve to oppose Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s deportation to the international court as well. He hated to see the court acquire legitimacy and prestige, especially with American help. Liberal internationalists and human rights activists rejoiced that Milosevic’s deportation was a triumph for the rule of law; Krauthammer retorted: “It is nothing of the sort. Milosevic’s deportation is testimony not to the power of international law but to the power of the U.S.”

Milosevic was untouchable as long as he remained in power; he was discredited only by the American-led NATO bombing of Kosovo. Krauthammer explained that the Hague’s indictment of Milosevic for war crimes would have meant nothing if America had not devastated Serb forces in Kosovo, used its “raw economic power” to unseat Milosevic, and then used more of it to deport him. The United States poured millions into Vojislav Kostunica’s election campaign, helping to defeat Milosevic at the polls, and threatened to withhold reconstruction aid to the new government of Yugoslavia. That was how Milosevic ended up in the Hague, which, like NATO and the International Monetary Fund, was “a subsidiary of Pax Americana.” Krauthammer believed that Bush officials would come to regret their role in delivering Milosevic to the Hague. Besides feeding the “shibboleth” that there is such a thing as international law, Milosevic’s deportation threatened to destabilize Serbia, the
key to a stable Balkans. Instead of asking themselves whether their nation could afford the price of justice, the Bush administration failed the test of statesmanship.77

9/11 and the Age of Terrorism

Krauthammer put it more starkly and gravely on September 11, 2001. His column of September 12 opened with these words: “This is not crime. This is war.” Against Secretary of State Colin Powell, who pledged on September 11 “to bring those responsible to justice,” Krauthammer snapped, “This is exactly wrong.” The terrorists who attacked America must not be conceived as objects of a police action, he contended. In the past, the United States issued subpoenas against those who declared war on American civilization. Now, war itself had been launched against America, and the days of conceiving anti-American terrorism as criminality were over: “You bring criminals to justice; you rain destruction on combatants. This is a fundamental distinction that can no longer be avoided. The bombings of Sept. 11, 2001 must mark a turning point.” Krauthammer called for a congressional declaration of war; two months later he clarified that he meant a declaration of total war.78

“We no longer have to search for a name for the post-Cold War era,” he declared on September 12. “It will henceforth be known as the age of terrorism.” America’s enemies were not deranged or cowardly perpetrators of senseless violence: “They are deadly, vicious warriors and need to be treated as such.” Krauthammer took for granted that the terrorists were radical Islamists: “Who else trains cadres of fanatical suicide murderers who go to their deaths joyfully?” The average terrorist could not fly planes into buildings or coordinate four hijackings at once, he observed; the world did not have a large pool of skilled pilots seeking martyrdom. Only radical Islamism produced them, especially Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Israel, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and various Arab liberation fronts in Damascus. Emphatically he pointed to the nations that harbored them, contending that this was the front for the war against terrorism. For thirty years America had refused to confront the fact that terrorism does not exist in a vacuum. Terrorists need and thrive upon the protection of governments. Now the United States had to face the fact that any country that harbored or protected terrorists was America’s enemy. Eight days later, at the urging of Paul Wolfowitz, President Bush made exactly that declaration.79

Inevitably there were dissenters to rebuke, especially prominent intellectuals like Susan Sontag, who complained in the New Yorker that the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon inspired an explosion of “self-righteous drivel” that ignored specific Muslim grievances against the United States. She doubted that many Americans realized that the United States had bombed Iraq for years. Krauthammer called that an obscene example of blaming America first. The United States bombed Saddam’s antiaircraft positions “because we know he is
developing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.” In the 1990s, he observed, America fought a war to save Kuwaiti Muslims from Iraq, a war in the Balkans to save Bosnian Muslims from Serbia, and a war in Kosovo to save Muslims from Serbia: “In every one we saved a Muslim people. And then were was Somalia, a military operation of unadulterated altruism. Its sole purpose was to save the starving people of Somalia. Muslims all.” For many intellectuals, he lamented, it was always time for relativism, and in more despicable cases like Sontag’s it was always time to blame America first. But after 9/11 there was no such thing as oversimplification: “Has there ever been a time when the distinction between good and evil was more clear?”

He urged the Bush administration to focus its attacks on terrorist-harboring countries, not terrorist networks. It was important to capture bin Laden, he allowed, “but the overriding aim of the war on terrorism is changing regimes.” First the United States had to smash the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, not hunt for bin Ladin in Afghan caves; then it had to abolish other regimes that harbored terrorists. Krauthammer cautioned that Islamism was riding a victory streak. In 1983 it killed 241 Marines and drove the United States out of Lebanon; in 1993 it killed eighteen American soldiers in Mogadishu and drove the United States out of Somalia; in between it drove the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan; on 9/11 it massacred five thousand people in a spectacular display of evil. “The terrorists feel invincible, and those sitting on the fence in the region are waiting to see whether they really are,” he remarked. At the same time, the radical Islamists wallowed in a cult of martyrdom that gloried in the immolation of infidels and the self-immolation of avenging Muslims. Krauthammer pointed to a children’s song on Palestinian television that romanticized “the blood pouring out of a fresh body.” He reached for the ultimate insult: “Not since the Nazi rallies of the 1930s has the world witnessed such celebration of blood and soil, of killing and dying.”

Powell offered the Taliban incentives to avoid a war in Afghanistan; Krauthammer chastised him sharply, insisting that the Taliban had to be destroyed by war. Powell implored the Taliban to give up bin Laden and al-Qaeda; Krauthammer replied that the Taliban had to pay even if it delivered both: “If the administration goes wobbly on the Taliban, it might as well give up the war on terrorism before it starts. The Taliban are dripping blood.” He was confident that Bush would not abort the war on terrorism: “President Bush was serious when he told the nation that we make no distinction between the terrorists and the governments that harbor them. The take-home lesson must be: Harbor terrorists—and your regime dies.” Afghanistan was just the beginning, he declared, still in September 2001. Krauthammer wanted the United States to overthrow Syria next; the Assad regime was a “low-hanging fruit” that harbored terrorist groups. The United States would probably be able to overthrow Syria without having to fight an all-out war, he believed. Then the United States had to kill the regimes in Iran and Iraq, probably with considerable bloodshed. Krauthammer hoped for some help from dissident Iranians, but thought that
Iraqis probably would not assist an American war against Saddam’s Baathist regime. Overthrowing Iraq would plant the American military in the heart of the Middle East and deliver a fatal blow to Islamic terrorism. “The war on terrorism will conclude in Baghdad,” he predicted. “If this president wants victory in the war he has declared, he will have to achieve it on the very spot where his own father, 10 years ago, let victory slip away.”

The war against radical Islamism was necessarily and primarily a total war against Muslim states that harbored terrorists. It would not be enough to capture bin Laden or destroy al-Qaeda, Krauthammer cautioned. If bin Laden were caught and merely “brought to justice,” as the saying went, his trial would be a media circus presided over by fully wigged Scottish judges at the Hague. He would not get the death penalty, every week there would be hijackings and suicide bombings to win his release, and he would be out within weeks. Even the entire al-Qaeda network wasn’t the heart of the problem, because other networks could easily take its place. The war on terrorism was about individuals and terrorist networks, to be sure, but, more important, it was about the governments that aided, protected, and/or harbored them. “You do not make weaponized anthrax in Afghan caves,” he observed. “For that you need serious scientists and serious laboratories, like the ones in Baghdad.” Citing Richard Butler, the former U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq, Krauthammer warned that Iraq, Iran, and Syria sponsored terrorists, Iraq had weaponized anthrax and VX gas, Syria had chemical weapons, and Iran was developing a nuclear bomb. To abolish terrorism, these governments had to be abolished, for “the next attack, catastrophic beyond our imagination, is waiting to happen.”

All of this was in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, before the United States bombed Afghanistan in early October. Having battled the neocon democratic globalists in the 1990s over Bosnia and Kosovo, Krauthammer locked arms with them for the war on terrorism. But unlike many of them, he saw no reason to sell the war on terrorism as a liberationist crusade or struggle for world democracy. The Bush administration’s emancipationist rhetoric seemed ridiculous to him: “When the administration repeats again and again that our aim in Afghanistan is to free the people from the tyrannical Taliban and the destitution and oppression they had wrought, one has to wonder: Why are we offering this ‘liberationist’ rationale?” It couldn’t be for domestic consumption, Krauthammer thought: “We hardly need liberation as a rationale for this war. We are fighting because the bastards killed 5,000 of our people, and if we do not kill them, they are going to kill us again. This is a war of revenge and deterrence.”

So it must have been for foreign consumption. Krauthammer surmised that administration officials believed that the war would go down better in the Muslim world if they pitched it as a war for Afghanistan’s liberation rather than a war on Afghanistan. He told them to stop being ridiculous. The administration’s liberationist claims had not “the slightest effect” in the Muslim world and didn’t pass the laugh test in the United States. Everyone knew that “a free Afghanistan was not high on our national agenda”; emancipating the Afghans was not a
serious motive for going to war. Afghanistan had become important to America “because of what was done to Americans, not Afghans.” Krauthammer worried that liberationist talk created expensive expectations. America’s objective in Afghanistan was to destroy the Taliban, not create a modern democracy: “We should do only as much as is necessary to leave behind a structure stable enough to prevent the return of the Taliban.”

Afghanistan was just the beginning of a worldwide war against terrorism; the United States could not afford to get entangled in a nation-building project. Having enjoyed a “holiday from history” in the 1990s, when it indulged even the illusion of humanitarian war, America had to get real. Krauthammer cautioned that war is about killing people and destroying things, not building democracy. The United States had to give up the morally conceited image of itself as the world’s compassionate savior: “This is going to be a long twilight struggle: dirty and dangerous, cynical and self-interested.” It was crucially important for Americans to absorb this reality, because otherwise they wouldn’t be able to stomach the many years of killing, occupation, and turmoil that lay ahead.

The traditional rivalry between the State Department and Pentagon spiked sharply in the Bush administration, and by October 2001, it was a very public matter. The State Department, led by Colin Powell and Undersecretary of State Dick Armitage, wanted to establish a broad antiterrorist coalition on the model of the Gulf War coalition. It resisted the Pentagon’s rhetoric about “ending states” and seeking to build democracies in the Arab world. The Pentagon, led by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, was more interested in bilateral deals and what Rumsfeld called “shifting coalitions” than the kind of broad, diplomatic, deliberative coalition envisioned by the State Department. It urged Bush to emphasize that America sought to abolish rogue regimes and replace them with modern-style democracies, although, on the latter point, Wolfowitz was a true believer and Rumsfeld was not.

Krauthammer took the Pentagon’s side, except for its democracy-boosting. To some degree, he allowed, the disagreements between the two departments reflected their different functions. The State Department existed to make friends and the Pentagon existed to win wars. But being surrounded by too many “friends” can be hazardous for a superpower, Krauthammer warned; so-called allies can get in the way of punishing adversaries and fighting wars. In mid-October the first Bush administration weighed into the debate over America’s strategy, as Brent Scowcroft called for a broad coalitional fight against terrorism. Scowcroft defended Bush 41’s decision not to overthrow Saddam, explaining that “our Arab allies would have deserted us, creating an atmosphere of hostility to the United States in the region.” To Krauthammer, this appeal was revealingly perverse. Arab hostility to the United States was off the chart despite the fact that the United States did not march to Baghdad, he replied. If anything, overthrowing Saddam might have played better among Arabs than what America did do—bombing Iraq for years and starving Iraqis with sanctions. If Bush 41
had overthrown Saddam, the United States wouldn’t have needed to keep armed
forces in Saudi Arabia, which so inflamed Osama bin Laden. And why didn’t Bush
finish the job? Because the coalition would have opposed him. Yet this was
the very strategy that Scowcroft and others like him recommended for the war
against terrorism!88

Krauthammer bid good riddance to all that: “You take friends where you find
them and when you need them. But in the end, we decide.” Scowcroft-style
coalitionism tied America’s hands and produced least-common-denominator
decisions. On December 13, Bush unilaterally withdrew the United States from
the ABM Treaty, and Krauthammer rejoiced. He was fed up with liberal sermons
about America’s need for allies in the war against terrorism: “We need friends,
they said. We need allies. We need coalition partners. We cannot alienate them
again and again. We cannot have a president who kills the Kyoto Protocol on
greenhouse gases, summarily rejects the ‘enforcement provisions’ of the
bioweapons treaty, trashes the ABM Treaty—and expect to build the coalition
we need to fight the war on terrorism. We cannot? We did.”89

That is, the United States had already done so in Afghanistan. Krauthammer
raved that in three months Bush made a mockery of the claim that America
needed to act multilaterally: “Coalition? The whole idea that the Afghan war is
being fought by a ‘coalition’ is comical. What exactly has Egypt contributed?”
America destroyed the Taliban by running its own war, cutting bilateral deals
with a few neighbors, and adding a “sprinkling” of Brits and Australians on the
ground. That was the right model for the war on terrorism, he believed: “We
have demonstrated astonishing military power and the will to defend vital
American interests, unilaterally if necessary.”90

Still, he worried that Americans weren’t ready for the hard part. The Bush
administration indulged America’s flattering image of itself as a redeemer, and
thus it did not prepare Americans for the total war that America was already
fighting. Krauthammer tried to facilitate some of that preparation. Most of
America’s wars were wars of choice, he explained, but the war on terrorism was
a war of necessity. Wars of choice could be fought for reasons of geopolitics,
ideology, or even humanitarianism, and having been chosen, they allowed some
room for moral delicacy. Vietnam was such a war, as was the Gulf War and the
war for Kosovo. Wars of choice could be fought for reasons of geopolitics,
ideology, or even humanitarianism, and having been chosen, they allowed some
room for moral delicacy. Vietnam was such a war, as was the Gulf War and the
war for Kosovo. Wars of choice inevitably involved a certain amount of moral
reflection in making the choice, and after war was chosen, it was hard to banish
moral squeamishness altogether, especially in the United States. But the war on
terrorism was like World War II: America was attacked; it had to respond in
kind; there was no choice.

“A war of necessity is a life-or-death struggle in which the safety and security
of the homeland are at stake,” Krauthammer wrote. America had not fought
such a war in fifty years, and it showed. American officials, pundits, and
intellectuals were applying the language of wars of choice to the war against
terrorism. Krauthammer protested that this language was “heavily freighted with
moral anguish, obsessively concerned with proving how delicate and
discriminating, how tolerant and sensitive we Americans are.” Television pundits seriously discussed whether the United States should refrain from bombing on Ramadan “in deference to Muslim sensibilities”; Colin Powell begged and borrowed Muslim allies “so that we can claim that this is not a war against Islam”; Bush officials claimed that America fought against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, not Afghanistan. Krauthammer begged them to stop this “ridiculous solicitousness.” A war of necessity is necessarily a total war, he admonished; it cannot afford the luxury of moral squeamishness. On Ramadan bombing: “The enemy cannot murder thousands of innocents then call time out for piety.” On coalition fetishness: “Why do we need borrowed legitimacy to fight back?” On destroying Afghanistan: Not all the Germans were Nazis, either, but Churchill took no account of such “niceties” when he bombed German cities. Of course, America tried not to kill civilians, Krauthammer acknowledged. But America could not fight a limited war against an enemy that fought a total war: “The asymmetry is potentially suicidal.”

In November 2001 Bush authorized special military tribunals to quickly and secretly deal with suspected terrorists. The New York Times blasted this measure as “a travesty of justice” and “a dangerous idea, made even worse by the fact that it is so superficially attractive.” Krauthammer replied that “superficial attractiveness” was fine by him. America would still be at war against terrorism long after bin Laden and al-Qaeda had been eliminated; thus there was no analogy to the Nuremberg trials after World War II. The stately Nuremberg trials were possible because Nazism was finished; it would be insane to give bin Laden a megaphone trial in the middle of a world war.

During the 2000 presidential campaign Bush ridiculed Clinton’s “nationbuilding” missions, but on October 11 he announced that “so-called nation-building” would be unavoidable after the war. Krauthammer defended the president from liberals crowing “gotcha!” Bush never meant that his administration would categorically oppose nation-building, Krauthammer explained: “The conservative critique of nation-building for the past 10 years has been about nation-building in places of strategic irrelevance. No sane person opposes nation-building in places that count. The debate is about nation-building in places that don’t.” For eight years Clinton wasted America’s assets and diminished its standing: “The world’s sole superpower has no business squandering its resources and diluting its military doing police work and hand-holding in places like Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.” But nationbuilding in countries that mattered was totally different. In Haiti it was “lunacy”; in Germany and Japan after World War II it was prudent, though expensive. “Reconstructing countries in our own image is a huge, decades-long undertaking,” he observed. America still had troops in Germany and Japan, but the stakes were too high in those cases not to make the effort: “Germany and Japan count. Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo—the archipelago of Clintonian do-goodism—don’t. After Sept. 11, Central Asia does.”
Central Asia mattered as the nesting ground of the next world war. There was a difference, however, between true nation-building and the patchwork enterprise that the Bush administration intended to pursue. Krauthammer explained that real nation-building costs billions of dollars and many years. America would merely stabilize Afghanistan, not rebuild it as a modern democracy. As a rule Krauthammer was against stabilization projects, too, which he called “nation-building lite,” but sometimes stability-work was unavoidable. Stabilization is mostly about peacekeeping, he explained, which any country can do, but only the United States can destroy a nation in a few weeks, dropping thousand-pound bombs “with the precision of a medieval archer.” That was the distinct role of the world’s dominant power. The best arrangement was for America to do the smashing and leave the postwar cleanups to others. Peacekeeping was a good job for Canada, which invented it in the 1950s: “There are dozens of countries that are never going to fight a real war against a real enemy but whose armed forces are perfectly suited for peacekeeping,” he observed. American soldiers made rich targets; every terrorist group fantasized about capturing an American soldier. In 1983, 241 American peacekeepers were massacred by a terrorist group that fulfilled its fantasy. Krauthammer remarked: “That should have cured us for life. We fight the wars. Our friends should patrol the peace.”

By the end of the year, three months after the United States declared war on world terrorism, he believed that America was winning the war. The Taliban was destroyed, Arab leaders were scrambling not to be next, and the Arab street was frightened into silence. “We were from the beginning a little too impressed,” Krauthammer recalled, already speaking retrospectively. The experts had warned that ordinary Muslims would explode in rage if America destroyed a Muslim country; Krauthammer replied that bombing Afghanistan had chastened the Arab mobs that brayed against America. Radical Islamism was finally on the run. After thirty years of terrorizing Israel, the Muslim radicals had awakened the American giant, and were paying the price. Krauthammer observed that Americans puzzled at the religious language of the enemy, which seemed indestructible. If they attacked religious fanaticism, wouldn’t it come back with greater force? This anxiety gave rise to the magazine covers that asked why radical Muslims hated America, which carried the suggestion that America had sins to atone for.

But Krauthammer had learned from Israel’s experience what radical Islamism was and how it had to be fought. “There is no assuaging those who see your very existence as a denial of the faith and an affront to God,” he declared. “There is no placating those who offer you the choice of conversion or death. There is only war and victory.” Radical Islamism was about the elimination of infidels, the unification of all Muslim lands, and the reestablishment of the original Muslim caliphate. Krauthammer remarked that it was very much like Hitler’s dream of a Thousand Year Reich. It was an ideological movement armed with a messianic vision of its own future glory. “That is where the mad dreamers are vulnerable,” he counseled. “The dream can be defeated by reality.” Just as the Nazi dream had
to be smashed by armed force, and was destroyed in a few years, radical Islamism would end the same way. Its abolition began in Afghanistan, which marked its first great defeat. Krauthammer reached for a Cold War expression: “We have just witnessed something new in the modern world: the rollback of Islamic fundamentalism.”

For thirty years the West tried to contain Islamic terrorism, just as it tried to contain communism. But Ronald Reagan showed a better way to fight communism, Krauthammer argued, and George W. Bush showed a better way to fight radical Islamism: “Just as the Reagan doctrine reversed containment and marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet empire, the Bush doctrine marks the beginning of the rollback of the Islamic terror empire.” Afghanistan marked the “turning of the tide,” although the hard part lay ahead, in Iraq and Iran. In both places, as in Afghanistan, the key to winning a holy war was to “bomb the holy warriors—and overawe the fence-sitting spectators.”

Neocons such as Daniel Pipes and Norman Podhoretz made the radical Islamist and Palestinian issues more central to their work than Krauthammer, but Krauthammer’s influence on these issues was distinctive by virtue of his mass circulation audience. Emphatically he maintained that the war against Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and others had to swing through Palestine, although in the latter case Israel could do the actual fighting. Arafat was committed to a strategy of war and the destruction of Israel, he contended, Palestine was “a nasty police state” where an offhand crack about Arafat could land one in prison, and there was no alternative to eliminating the Palestinian Authority. Although Arafat signed the 1993 Oslo peace accords on the White House lawn, that was just another trick, a Trojan Horse that gave the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) an army, autonomy, and territory to bolster its war of annihilation. Citing Palestinian moderate Faisal Husseini, Krauthammer warned that Arafat would settle for nothing less than Palestine from the Jordan to the Mediterranean, “from the river to the sea.” The PLO’s two-phase strategy did not change after Oslo: gain territory that became the forward base to destroy Israel. If the United States and Europe could not bring themselves to bring down the Palestinian Authority, Krauthammer argued, “Israel should be allowed to go in and do the job itself.”

Israelis had been toughened by their fight against terrorism; four months after 9/11, Krauthammer enthused that Americans were beginning to toughen up as well. Americans were no longer averse to casualties, he explained. Osama bin Laden wagered that America was too self-absorbed and decadent to fight, taunting that in Somalia “you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you…. The extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear.” Krauthammer replied: “Big mistake. Same mistake the Japanese made on Dec. 7, 1941.” Americans may have lost their warfighting habits for wars that didn’t matter, he allowed, but for wars of necessity “America’s capacity to sustain casualties is near infinite.”

Bush’s State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, officially expanded the war on terrorism, identifying Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an “axis of evil”
and taking special aim at Iraq. Congress’s joint resolution of September 14 had merely authorized the use of force against the perpetrators of September 11; Bush implicitly contended that the axis of evil had to be overthrown even if it had no connection to 9/11. To Krauthammer, the real bad guys were Iraq and Iran; North Korea was just for show: “Thank God for North Korea. Mentioning it is the equivalent of stripsearching an 80-year-old Irish nun at airport security. It is our defense against ethnic profiling.” North Korea was a pathetic and remote Stalinist wasteland, albeit with nuclear ambitions, he judged. Impoverished, bleak, and isolated, it was perhaps capable of “spasmodic violence,” but it made the axis of evil chiefly because “it has the virtue of being non-Islamic.”

Iraq and Iran were the point of this story. Iran was a crazed anti-American theocracy, and Iraq was “a truly mad police state with external ambitions and a menacing arsenal.” Krauthammer discerned that Bush had already decided to move against Iraq, that he was committed to overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime, and that he hoped Iranians might do the job for him in Iran. Krauthammer conceived the war as a three-stage project. Afghanistan was stage one; capturing low-hanging terrorists in places like Yemen, Bosnia, and the Philippines was stage two; Iraq and Iran were stage three. He predicted that by the next State of the Union Address, America would be at war in Iraq: “That was the unmistakable message of this astonishingly bold address. This is not a president husbanding political capital. This is a president on a mission. We have not seen that in a very long time.”

To Krauthammer, the war against Iraq was about two things: eliminating the threat of weapons of mass destruction and consolidating American power in the Middle East for the purpose of changing the region. He took for granted that Saddam possessed stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and that he was dangerously close to acquiring nuclear weapons. “We do not know that Saddam is sane enough never to use them against us,” he warned, recalling that Saddam was sufficiently demented to launch a catastrophic war against Iran in 1980. Keeping Saddam in a Clinton-style box was not enough, because that strategy required some degree of trust in his rational capacity to be deterred. Moreover, Krauthammer cautioned, a nuclear weapon does not have to be used to confer immense power; the mere possession of one creates an “umbrella of inviolability.” If Israel had not destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981, the United States probably would not have expelled Saddam from Kuwait in 1991; and if Saddam had possessed nuclear weapons in 1991, “he would probably today be king of all Arabia.” Time was short again; Saddam had to be overthrown before he got the bomb.

The second reason was a regional transformation. Krauthammer noted that of the twenty-two Arab states, none was a democracy, none had a freely elected ruler, and nearly all were hostile to Israel. The war against terrorism was essentially a war against Arab-grown radical Islamism, and the key to changing the Middle East was to overthrow the Baathist regime in Iraq: “This is about more than the terrible weapons. It is about reconstituting a terrorized society. A de-Saddamized
Iraq with a decent government could revolutionize the region.” Upon overthrowing Iraq, America would acquire a crucial base “for the outward projection of American power” and the dissemination of “democratic and modernizing ideas.” That was why the Bush administration was planning America’s longest occupation since postwar Germany and Japan. Americans preferred to patrol “from over the horizon” but now America had to come ashore. To do so was risky, daunting, arrogant, and necessary, he exhorted: “After 9/11, we dare not shrink from it. America is coming ashore.”103

While the Bush administration and many Americans fumed at France’s opposition to the war, Krauthammer explained that dealing with the likes of Jacques Chirac was part of America’s imperial burden. The French didn’t really care about Iraq, but they cared very much about their nation’s world status and its subordination to American power. They felt more threatened by America than by Iraq; containing the United States was more important than containing Saddam. Just as Charles de Gaulle once remarked that he was motivated by “a certain idea of France,” Krauthammer explained, the French were nostalgic for their lost empire and resentful of America’s. They hoped to regain esteem for France by slaying the giant and accepting the world’s laurels: “Leader of the global anti-American camp. Heady stuff. And Iraq is the least of it.”104

Unipolarism Reaffirmed

A few weeks before America went to war in Iraq, Krauthammer published a sequel to his 1990 manifesto, “The Unipolar Moment.” He allowed that he had mistakenly predicted that isolationism would make a strong comeback; by contrast, even his 1990 celebration of America’s new dominance had not foreseen how incredibly, incomparably dominant the United States would become in the next decade. Japan had declined, Germany stagnated, and the Soviet Union dissolved while the United States grew tremendously to the point of an historically unprecedented dominance. America’s warfighting powers were staggering, he enthused, and its military spending exceeded that of the next twenty nations combined. In Kosovo, the United States won a war exclusively from the air, giving “a hint of America’s quantum leap in military power”; in Afghanistan, America’s “concentrated fury” gave more than a hint of its awesome firepower.105

“The American hegemon has no great power enemies, an historical oddity of the first order,” Krauthammer observed. “Yet it does face a serious threat to its dominance, indeed to its essential security.” Having launched a total war on the world’s rogue states and terrorist allies, the Bush administration produced a remarkable crop of doctrines to support America’s total war. First came the ultimatum against every state that aided or harbored terrorists. Then came the doctrine of preemptive attack against any enemy state that possessed weapons of mass destruction. Then came the doctrine of regime change against any such state. Krauthammer marveled: “The boldness of these policies—or, as much of
the world contends, their arrogance—is breathtaking.” Bush’s antiterrorism ultimatum put the entire world on notice; his doctrine of preemption turned aside the last resort principle of just war theory; his policy of regime change defied 350 years of post-Westphalian Western practice: “Taken together, they amount to an unprecedented assertion of American freedom of action and a definitive statement of a new American unilateralism.”

Krauthammer acknowledged that this political turn was scaring the rest of the world. The Bush administration was firmly unilateralist before 9/11, but not in a way that caused longtime allies to denounce American imperialism; preventive war and regime change were on a new level from the Kyoto Protocol. Because many of America’s friends found the new doctrines alarming, Krauthammer judged that unipolarity faced its first real crisis since its establishment at the end of the 1980s: “It revolves around the central question of the unipolar age: Who will define the hegemon’s ends?” The Clinton administration gave the liberal internationalist answer, favored throughout Europe, that the West must move forward through multilateral discussion. To Krauthammer, that was ridiculous. How could something as pathetic as the U.N. Security Council confer moral authority on American policy? Liberal internationalists believed in a world order governed by international law and multilateral agreements; Krauthammer believed that the world order is governed by power. Realists didn’t fall “for the vain promise of goo-goo one-worldism.”

Of course, not all realists were unipolarists, and some realistic unipolarists believed in multilateral diplomacy. Realists like Colin Powell and Dick Armitage shared Krauthammer’s commitment to American supremacy but sought U.N. support on practical grounds. Pragmatic realists argued that working through the United Nations spreads risk and expenses. They had no illusions that multilateralism confers any special moral authority but contended that a cooperative United States would be less likely than Krauthammer’s unilateralist-hegemon to incur resentment among other nations. Krauthammer replied, not really. The United States tried multilateral cooperation in the Gulf War, and its reward was a bad ending followed by a decade of anti-American hostility.

He preferred Donald Rumsfeld’s answer, which Rumsfeld gave during the war against Afghanistan: “The mission determines the coalition.” The mission is primary, it comes first, America decides what it is, and then America seeks allies where it can find them. “We take our friends where we find them, but only in order to help us in accomplishing the mission,” Krauthammer explained. It was to be expected that longtime European allies would fall away, sometimes saying bad things about American imperialism: “As the unipolar power and thus guarantor of peace in places where Swedes do not tread… we cannot afford the empty platitudes of allies not quite candid enough to admit that they live under the umbrella of American power.” Under the circumstances, it probably made sense that Europeans placed their trust in “a norm-driven, legally-bound international system broken to the mold of domestic society.” The American superpower scared them; the new American unilateralist hyperpower really
frightened them; and they were determined to tie down Gulliver “with myriad strings that diminish his overweening power.”

Krauthammer counseled them to make their peace with America’s global dominance, which was mostly benign anyway. “The American claim to benignity is not mere self-congratulation,” he contended. “We have a track record.” The American empire did not plunder conquered peoples or seek to remake human nature, it fussed over exit strategies, and “unlike other hegemons” of the past it did not impose grandiose visions of a transformed world. Krauthammer declared: “The form of realism that I am arguing for—call it the new unilateralism—is clear in its determination to self-consciously and confidently deploy American power in pursuit of those global ends” [of maintaining world peace and stability]. In 1990 he had suggested that unipolarity might last thirty or forty years; in 2002 he was more optimistic: “The unipolar moment has become the unipolar era.”

He ended with a summary of his position and a call to imperial greatness: “The new unilateralism argues explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for sustaining America’s unrivaled dominance for the foreseeable future. It could be a long future, assuming we successfully manage the single greatest threat, namely, weapons of mass destruction. This in itself will require the aggressive and confident application of unipolar power rather than falling back, as we did in the 1990s, on paralyzing multilateralism. The future of the unipolar era hinges on whether America is governed by those who wish to retain, augment and use unipolarity to advance not just American but global ends, or whether America is governed by those who wish to give it up—either by allowing unipolarity to decay as they retreat to Fortress America, or by passing on the burden by gradually transferring power to multilateral institutions as heirs to American hegemony. The challenge to unipolarity is not from the outside but from the inside. The choice is ours. To impiously quote Benjamin Franklin: History has given you an empire, if you will keep it.”

The Wilsonian Faith: Wattenberg and Muravchik

Krauthammer’s self-confident clarity and his access to a mass audience made him the leading advocate of the unipolarist movement’s realistic-imperialist wing, and a hero to younger unipolarists such as Stanley Kurtz and Max Boot. He was the first to recognize that George W. Bush was a unipolarist and the first, as usual, to identify the new president’s distinctive doctrine. Later he defended Bush and the Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz wing of the administration in a way that showed his feeling of deep ideological kinship. Although he rarely joined movement organizations—Krauthammer waited until 2001 to sign a statement by the Project for the New American Century—he promoted movement causes assiduously. Blasting Clinton constantly and ridiculing liberals as goo-goo idealists, he took repeated shots at Colin Powell and stoked the movement-right’s hostility toward the State Department. Just before America invaded Iraq, while liberals split over
the war, Krauthammer tartly remarked that liberals would not have fought for Kosovo if it had oil. Liberals were quite capable of killing for humanitarian reasons, and they could manage wars of self-defense, as in Afghanistan, but they got all twisted up when confronted with wars of complex self-interest. Thus, America needed very much to keep them out of power.\footnote{112}

Krauthammer provoked a bit of anxiety on the right for some of the same reasons that James Burnham did in the 1950s. Both were imperialists with a cynical edge; neither could have made it as a speechwriter. But Burnham was ahead of his time, whereas Krauthammer aptly noted that his unipolarist vision had trouble keeping up with America’s increasing dominance. He also was less cynical than Burnham about democracy. Burnham thought that democracy was a useful ruse to hold down the masses in the West, and he had no vision at all of world democracy. Krauthammer thought that democracy was a good way to regulate power, even beyond the West, though democracy-building was not worth the trouble of a superpower. On the latter theme, he had followers in the Bush administration, especially the State Department. Krauthammer believed that Bush agreed with him about the pitfalls of democratic nation-building and the appropriate tasks of a unipolar colossus.

But when the Bush administration went to war, it unfurled the rhetoric of world democracy. Bush officials must have wished that Krauthammer had remained a democratic globalist. At the beginning—1990—the most outspoken advocates of American dominion and Pax Americana were democratic globalists. Irving Kristol’s realism seemed pale and self-absorbed compared to the world-embracing democratic idealism of Wattenberg, Muravchik, Novak, Fossedal, Podhoretz, Decter, and at the time, Krauthammer. Throughout the Clinton years and into the new century, the democratic globalists resisted a resurgent anti-immigrationism on the right led Peter Brimelow, Samuel p. Huntington and Pat Buchanan.

Brimelow claimed that America was turning into a racially “alien nation.” Huntington urged the United States to treat illegal immigration from Mexico in the same way that it would treat an invasion of a million Mexican soldiers—as a “major threat” to America’s security. Buchanan warned that Mexican culture and U.S. culture were profoundly different, that Mexicans were “of another race,” “and that Mexican immigrants did not assimilate to the United States or make it their home in any way except making money. “Mexican immigration is a challenge to our cultural identity, our national identity, and potentially to our future as a country,” he wrote. “Uncle Sam is taking a hellish risk in importing a huge diaspora of tens of millions of people from a nation vastly different from our own.”\footnote{113}

Wattenberg replied that immigration made America the first universal nation and that America needed new immigrants to grow. “Immigration helps us become a stronger nation and a swamper of others in the global competition of civilizations,” he contended. “Immigration is now what keeps America growing.” Against Buchanan’s fixation on Mexican immigration, Wattenberg
noted that Mexicans accounted for only 22 percent of the legal immigrants to America and that adding illegal immigrants boosted the Mexican total to no more than 30 percent. Moreover, the Mexican fertility rate was dropping like a rock, from 6.5 children per woman in 1970 to 2.5 children in 2000 and still falling. The Mexican hordes imagined by Buchanan were disappearing, just like the United States. Wattenberg worried about the West’s declining birth rates, not too many immigrants. The European fertility rate in 2000 was 1.3, “radically below replacement level” and the United States was only slightly better at 1.9.114

“The West as a whole is in a deep demographic ditch,” he warned. So was Japan, which he suggested might as well change its name to Dwindle. Because America was stuck in a ditch, bashing immigration was the last thing it needed. Buchanan/Huntington alarmism about immigration was wholly misguided. By contrast, Wattenberg took seriously Huntington’s thesis that the chief problems of the post-Cold War world are civilizational conflicts over culture, religion, and ethnicity. While downplaying religion in any specifically theological or moral sense, Wattenberg strongly asserted that “values matter most.” He was devoted to the preservation and expansion of “Western values,” especially liberty, free markets, democracy, technology, and individualism. He observed that in 1950, the nations that created Western civilization made up one-third of the world’s population; by 2000 they were down to one-fifth; by 2050 they would be one-eighth: “If we end up in a world with nine competing civilizations, as Samuel Huntington maintains, this will make it that much harder for Western values to prevail in the cultural and political arenas.”115

To sustain its unipolar dominance, America had to boost its population, expand its military reach, and export its liberal-democratic values to other civilizations. “Americans have a missionary streak,” Wattenberg wrote. “They will offer what they have…. There will be a great and essentially healthy contest for culture in the years to come. The result will be democratic, but in what style remains to be seen.”116 Elsewhere he put it more combatively: “We are called the world’s sole superpower. I call America the only omni power. We’re the law west of the Pecos.” Stubbornly he clung to “Neo-Manifest Destinarianism” as the best name for the unipolar movement, brushing off its problematic historical connotations. To Wattenberg America’s all-powerful global dominion was “obviously a good thing and a benign thing and important thing” that grew out of America’s original Manifest Destiny.117

Theodore Roosevelt was his model president, because TR called America “to determine the course of world events, not merely to react to them.” He was “unabashedly optimistic, even jingoistic” pushing his nation to become a global power armed with naval and economic supremacy. That was the Manifest Destinarian spirit that Wattenberg wanted Americans to reclaim. “Our people stepped forward and accepted the challenge of The American Century,” he exhorted, but the twenty-first century was destined to be the American Century even more so, if only Americans willed it.118
Muravchik’s Pax Americanism was cut from the same cloth, although he wrote in the measured prose of a foreign policy expert, eschewing bumper stickers like “the only omni power.” In essence, he espoused an idealistic version of unipolarism that considerably expanded on Krauthammer’s ambitions for America. Muravchik was the product of a New York Jewish family in which the family religion was socialism. His grandfather, Avraham Chaim Muravchik, belonged to the far-left Socialist Revolutionary party in Russia before immigrating to the United States in 1905; his father Emanuel Muravchik grew up in the New York nucleus of the Socialist Party and became a leader of its militantly anticommunist faction; as a young man Joshua Muravchik joined the Socialist Party and served for five years as national chair of the Young People’s Socialist League (YPSL). “Socialism never caught on in this country, despite my father’s efforts and my own,” he later recalled. “His have persisted for more than seventy years, while I became an apostate in my thirties and began to grope my way back to Judaism.”

But Muravchik retained from his Socialist past a fervent hatred of communism and the belief that Western democracy is the world’s best hope.

As a youthful socialist he identified with the right-leaning social democrats on whom Michael Harrington originally hung the label, “neoconservative.” Having served as National Chairman of YPSL from 1968 to 1973, Muravchik moved to Scoop Jackson’s Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) in 1974, shifted to the Jackson for President campaign in 1976, and returned to CDM for two years as its executive director. In 1976 he played a behind-the-scenes role in preventing President Carter from appointing arms negotiator Paul Warnke as Secretary of Defense. An anonymous four-page memo accused Warnke of advocating unilateral disarmament; after Harold Brown was selected defense secretary, it was revealed that Muravchik and CDM co-founder Penn Kemble had authored the controversial attack on Warnke. To Muravchik, working for the Socialist youth league and for Jackson’s hawkish advocacy group were basically the same thing; years later he described the period from 1968 to 1979 as his “apparatchik” years.

But Muravchik wearied of movement activism at the organizational level. He later recalled, “I became ever more impressed with the impact of ideas and argument—as opposed to mere interest and influence—in shaping our political life. I concluded that I would rather be a wordman than an ‘orgman.’” Enrolling at Georgetown University, he earned a doctorate in international relations in 1984, joined the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in 1984, and in 1987 accepted a resident scholar position at the American Enterprise Institute. Emphatically he rejected Krauthammer’s realist dichotomy between public and private morality, as well as Krauthammer’s insistence that superpowers don’t do windows, contending that “political acts are subject to measurement against moral standards, and that the virtues of kindness, compassion, generosity, honor, and reason should guide public life as well as private.”
Muravchik wanted America to make pro-American democracy its national mission and creed. Having supported Clinton in 1992—"his campaign had taken the initiative of reaching out to me and other neoconservatives"—he quickly despaired of Bill and Hillary Clinton. Muravchik was appalled by Clinton’s selection of Warren Christopher as Secretary of State, whom he regarded as an empty, vacuous appeaser in the mold of Christopher’s mentor, Cyrus Vance. He was equally appalled by Clinton’s “rampant imposition of ethnic and gender preferences “which extended “even [to] homosexual groups.” He took a dim view of Hillary Clinton, judging that she was a closet leftist who pulled her husband toward the party’s feminist, peacenik, multiculaturalist interest groups. Muravchik had a stormy history with these groups—“I had been polemicizing against their ilk for a full 25 years by then”—although he hoped to be named Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy and Human Rights; Clinton dropped the idea after liberals howled against it. As president Clinton proposed to cut defense spending by $127 billion, more than twice the $60 billion figure on which he campaigned. At that point Muravchik gave up on him. For eight years he charged that Clinton damaged American credibility and wasted precious opportunities to strengthen America’s dominance. Specifically, Clinton renewed China’s most favorable nation trading status, failed to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, dithered on Bosnia, waffled on Iraq and Iran, indulged Russia, deferred to the United Nations, gave weak leadership to NATO, and gave too much aid to Haiti. Clinton was very good on trade issues, Muravchik allowed, but trade was much less important than security, and Clinton took little interest in security.122

In Muravchik’s reading, Clinton took a “starry-eyed” view of the United Nations until a company of U.S. army rangers under U.N. mandate was slaughtered in Somalia in October 1993; after that Clinton’s foreign policy was “a jumble of improvised responses to crises.” He attacked Clinton for allowing Christopher to meet with Syrian President Hafez al-Assad on numerous occasions, which enhanced Assad’s stature. He blasted Clinton for cutting defense spending, protesting that America could not police the world while cutting defense spending by 17 percent in three years. And he scorched Clinton’s twisting and turning on Bosnia. Clinton shamefully allowed the United Nations to control his policy in Bosnia, Muravchik charged, and his secretary of state pathetically moaned that Bosnia was “a problem from hell.” Clinton inherited the Bosnian disaster, Muravchik allowed, but his “feckless” performance there “weakened the main principle of world peace, namely the rule against aggression.”123

Nearly two hundred thousand people were killed in the war for Bosnia, and the Dayton Accords of 1995 ceded 51 percent of the territory to the Serbs and 49 percent to the Muslim-Croat alliance. Muravchik protested that if Clinton, George H.W. Bush, or NATO had intervened fast and hard in Bosnia, many fewer people would have been killed or brutalized, the Serbs would not have been awarded for their aggression, and the principle of intolerant ethnic
nationalism would not have gained a huge victory. “The international community’s response to Serb aggression has been a litany of empty threats and feeble acts,” he wrote in 1996, putting it mildly. “Fighting continued for months until a combination of Serbian satiation and Croatian resistance brought it to a halt.”

To Muravchik, stopping aggression was elementary, especially for a superpower with the means to do so. Although he and Krauthammer were friends, Krauthammer’s realism was impossible for him on this count. Krauthammer turned a deaf ear to the cries of people from unimportant countries; Muravchik was a universalist who spoke the language of the good. This did not mean that he automatically supported humanitarian missions. Muravchik cautioned that there was a threshold for humanitarian intervention: many lives had to be in peril. Somalia passed the threshold, although the U.N. should have stopped short of nationbuilding; Rwanda easily passed the threshold, but the Clinton administration had just been burned by Somalia; it should have been obvious that Bosnia passed the threshold, but Bush and Clinton feared a quagmire; Haiti did not pass the threshold.

Muravchik called Haiti “a small, sad country of no strategic importance and weak democratic prospects.” He judged that there was no threat of massive slaughter in Haiti and that the military dictatorship of Raoul Cedras was no worse than most Haitian governments of the past. The U.N. authorized America’s invasion of Haiti in the only terms permitted by the U.N. Charter, that the Cedras regime was “a threat to peace and security.” That was ludicrous, Muravchik replied; Cedras’s regime was vicious and illegal, but no threat to anyone outside Haiti. But what about the real reason that the U.N. authorized America’s Haitian adventure, to restore democracy? Muravchik affirmed that democracy carried “a high humanitarian valiance.” Haiti was a tough case for him, because he believed in spreading democracy by the sword when the United States was compelled to occupy a nation because of its aggression. If Aristide had not been a radical liberationist theologian, Muravchik might have given Clinton and the U.N. a pass on Haiti, although he later reflected that he hoped not. Aristide was not his kind of democrat, but legality was the more important consideration. Muravchik was one of the few neocons—John Norton Moore and Eugene Rostow were other exceptions—who believed strongly in international law. For all of his devotion to exporting democracy, he hated to see Haiti become the model of spreading democracy by the sword. The U.N. Charter does not mean whatever the Security Council says it means, he cautioned. Haiti failed the aggressive-threat test, and to pretend otherwise was to weaken the force of international law.

During the Cold War, he argued, the crucial division in foreign policy politics was between hawks and doves. After the Cold War, the key division was between Washingtonians and Wilsonians. The Washingtonians echoed George Washington’s warning about entangling alliances and foreign wars; the Wilsonians echoed Woodrow Wilson’s warning against withdrawing from
Irving Kristol

Norman Podhoretz
William Kristol

Robert Kagan
Max Boot

Laurence F. Kaplan
international power politics. Muravchik conceded that by invoking Wilson’s controversial name, he risked a host of bad connotations and peripheral arguments. He had no interest in debating the Versailles Treaty and did not commend Wilson’s “woolly-headed” belief in the League of Nations; in his view, Wilson’s commitment to multilateral cooperation was the “hollowest” part of his legacy. The key to Wilsonianism was Wilson’s belief in the power of ideas and moral values in international politics. “Wilson championed the spread of democracy, seeing it as a key to solving many of the world’s problems,” Muravchik explained. By this standard, the greatest Wilsonian of recent times was Ronald Reagan: “Likewise, Reagan launched the National Endowment for Democracy and succored a global trend of democratization. Above all, Reagan, like Wilson, viewed American leadership as the linchpin of world order.” Bill Clinton, by contrast, despite his interventions, was “a very non-Wilsonian president.”

Muravchik emphasized that democracies are generally peaceful and almost never go to war with each other. In 1941, England declared war against Finland, but Finland was allied to Germany at the time, and no fighting took place between them. In 1948, Lebanon played a minimal role in the Arab League’s war against Israel, after arguing against the war. These strained exceptions proved the rule that democracies don’t fight each other. While acknowledging that the evidence is more ambiguous about the general peacefulness of democracies, Muravchik noted that nineteen of the twenty-five interstate conflicts between 1945 and 1985 were launched by dictatorships, and that democracies rarely launched offensive invasions. The exceptions in his accounting were India’s attack on Pakistan in 1971, the French and British attacks on Egypt during the Suez crisis, and “perhaps” the United States invasions of Grenada and Panama. Since the end of the Western colonial era in 1945, he observed, the democracies have not fought to conquer and take possessions, but to respond “to some egregious behavior” by the government they attacked.

Moreover, the world’s democracies have been friendly to America, and whenever democracy expands, so do the values of peace, human dignity, economic opportunity, and civil rights. Like Wattenberg, Muravchik emphasized that these values are both American and universal. There is a strong correlation between democracy and comparatively high levels of literacy, economic development, and cultural individualism, but people everywhere want to be free and self-determined. Japan and South Korea are democratic, although not Western; India and Botswana are democratic, though not prosperous. Muravchik reasoned that if Christianity and Buddhism can be transplanted across cultures, so can Western democracy. The strongest correlate of democracy is British colonialism, for it is precisely in the areas of the world once ruled by the British empire that democracy flourishes. But the British empire merely planted the seeds of democratic development, imparting “certain ideas and certain features of government that comported with democracy.”
Muravchik pressed hard on the theme that the United States is the world’s ferocious engine of democratic expansion. To him, the 1991 Gulf War offered a showcase example of the principle that when the United States is compelled to invade and occupy a nation, it should finish the job by installing a democratic regime. In 1996 James Baker opined that Iraq was incapable of democracy; Muravchik countered that the United States “could have ousted Saddam, pulled together an interim governing coalition of Iraqi dissidents, supervised an open election, and still withdrawn within a year.” Even a half-democracy would have been a great improvement on Saddam’s regime and thus repaid America’s invasion and occupation. In 1998 Muravchik urged Clinton to dramatically increase U.S. support for Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress for the purpose of overthrowing the Iraqi government. “We ought to be prepared to respond with overwhelming force if Saddam challenges us militarily” he contended, hedging on whether Iraqis could do the job themselves. “But even if he does not, we must put an end to his evil and dangerous regime. There are Iraqis who want to do it, and it is time we got serious about helping them.”

Five years later, after the United States invaded and occupied Iraq, negative feelings toward the United States skyrocketed throughout the world. Muravchik claimed that anti-American feeling was ascending “because in the 1990s we unilaterally disarmed ourselves of the weapons of ideological warfare.” To be true to its own values and character, he argued, America had to aggressively police, reorder, and democratize the world, and these actions were bound to cause negative reaction. The real problem was that the United States did so little in the field of ideological warfare to counter negative reactions. In the early days of the Cold War, the CIA created Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which were controversial, but did valuable work for the United States. Later the National Endowment for Democracy and the U.S. Information Agency performed similar tasks. America took its ideological responsibilities seriously during the Cold War, Muravchik argued, but after the Cold War ended, “USIA funding was slashed repeatedly, as conservative isolationists and budget hawks teamed up with liberal cultural relativists aversive to American ‘propaganda.’” He admonished that aggressive ideological warfare is supremely important; the new tide of anti-Americanism could not be defeated without it: “We must carry out a campaign of explanation aimed at Europe and the rest of the world about our view of the uses of American power.”

His version of that explanation echoed Wolfowitz’s 1992 Defense Planning Guidance. When this document was leaked to the New York Times, Muravchik recalled, it was published at the top of page one, “as though it were scandalous.” He countered that the Wolfowitz plan was exactly right. Wolfowitz lost the political war of the day, but only because Bush 41 lacked the stomach for a serious discussion of America’s foreign policy objectives. Four years later, Muravchik lamented that a precious opportunity was lost in 1992, and that America had to resume the discussion. “It would have been edifying to have heard the critics of the leaked draft explain why America should not seek to
prevent the emergence of a new superpower rival” he remarked. Was unipolar dominance too expensive? About 4 percent of America’s gross domestic product (GDP) would do the job. Would other nations be provoked to band together against the American giant? Muravchik assured that America was too obviously benign for that to happen.131

“America’s hegemonic tendencies, whatever they may have been when the country was young, disappeared as it became a mature power” he explained. The United States does not dictate to Canada or Mexico; in fact it has long indulged Mexico’s friendship with communist Cuba. If only the United States waged effective ideological warfare, the nations could be made to see that American supremacy is good for the entire world. And what would it take to maintain America’s benign dominance? Muravchik gave the Wolfowitz/Powell answer: Enough military spending to prevent the emergence of a new rival, fight two simultaneous regional wars, meet new threats, and maintain America’s supremacy in military technology.132

The neocon democratic globalists had the right spirit for America and the world, he urged. They renewed Wilson’s world-embracing democratic idealism while shedding Wilson’s illusions about multilateral cooperation and disarmament. Unlike Wilson, they understood that democracy is perishable, nations want to be self-determined, and military strength is indispensable to the struggle for world democracy. With Wilson they refused to wait and react; they were visionaries who believed in remaking the world. Muravchik favored a stronger and expanded NATO but not a stronger U.N. He cited Krauthammer favorably on American unipolarism, but not on foreign policy realism. When asked if America should police the entire world, Muravchik replied, “of course,” before heightening the metaphor. Police officers take their orders from a mayor or city council, he explained, but America takes orders from no one: “So we have to be more than the policemen. We have to be the leader of the world. We have to be the ones who are shaping the decisions about where military might needs to be applied.”133

In that spirit, he cheered Bush’s National Security Strategy, especially its doctrine of preemptive war and its commitment to maintain America’s vast military supremacy. Was the doctrine of preemption too open-ended, permitting the United States too much latitude in striking first at perceived enemies? Muravchik assured that it applied only to rogue states that brutalized their own people, tried to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and hated the United States. Did the doctrine give other nations a license to launch preemptive wars? Muravchik replied that international law is not self-enforcing anyway; nations do whatever they can get away with. It’s up to other nations, especially the United States, to stop any particular nation from misusing the doctrine of preemptive war. Then the doctrine of preemptive war shreds the fabric of international law? Not really; international law offers an objective standard for the exercise of power, and it is good to have a standard. International law recognizes the right of preemptive self-defense, and though Bush’s broad doctrine of preemption cannot
be parsed out of the U.N. Charter, the U.N. Charter does not override the prior rights of states. But didn’t the Bush doctrine move beyond preemptive self-defense against an immediate, palpable threat to a new right of preventive war? This is a murky area, Muravchik advised; the Bush Doctrine may break new ground, but the difference between preemption and prevention is unclear. When Israel bombed Iraq’s nuclear plant at Osirak in 1981, the United States joined the rest of the United Nations in condemning the action as a violation of international law; today, however, the United States is quite pleased that Israel didn’t fuss over the difference between preemption and prevention.134

Outside the constraints of office, the unipolarist idealists and unipolarist realists spoke their minds, worked their inside connections, and jostled for influence on George W.Bush’s administration. Many of them urged Bush to revisit his father’s unfinished business in Iraq, and after Bush did so, all of them proclaimed that a new day had come in American foreign policy.
In 1996 the Republican Party was fragmented and confused. Bill Clinton had stolen the party’s winning issues—crime, education, welfare reform, free trade, economic policy—and left the Republicans with assault weapons and abortions. In foreign policy, conservative Republicans hated Clinton’s humanitarian interventionism, but groped for a palatable way of saying why; meanwhile most Americans paid very little attention to foreign policy. The party’s presidential candidate, Bob Dole, was reduced to asserting in a major address that despite the appearances, there really were important differences between him and Clinton on foreign policy. Often he implored voters to give his elderly generation one last fling at power. In this unpromising context, William Kristol and Robert Kagan glimpsed an ideological opportunity. Writing in the establishment policy journal *Foreign Affairs*, they issued a manifesto titled “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy.”

Kristol, the son of neoconservative icon Irving Kristol and historian Gertrude Himmelfarb, had served in the Reagan administration as Education Secretary William J. Bennett’s chief of staff and in the first Bush administration as Vice President Dan Quayle’s chief of staff. A former academic with a doctorate in political science from Harvard, he taught at the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government before deciding, in 1985, that he was not cut out for scholarship. Bennett, a friend of Irving Kristol’s, gave the younger Kristol a staff job and promoted him to chief of staff, where he mastered the art of leaks and spin. In his next post Kristol made a name for himself boosting a lightweight vice president; for four years he was routinely identified as “Dan Quayle’s brain.” After Bush lost the presidency Kristol set up his own Washington advocacy operation, the Project for the Republican Future, which employed a ten-person staff and supplied discouraged Republicans with hard-edged policy advice. Kristol played a leading role in the fight against Hillary Clinton’s health care plan and strongly supported Newt Gingrich’s Contract with America. He was a fixture on the television news programs, especially *Good Morning America*, *This Week with David Brinkley*, and *The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*; later he transcended even fixture status on *Fox News*.

In 1995 Kristol enlisted John Podhoretz and Fred Barnes to help him launch an upstart, often cheeky right-wing magazine, *The Weekly Standard*. Founded with
Rupert Murdoch money, the magazine blasted Democrats and Republicans alike for betraying the cause of American Greatness. In 1997 Kristol founded a unipolarist foreign policy think tank, the Project for the New American Century, with Bradley Foundation money. In both endeavors he was assisted by his friend Robert Kagan. Having worked in Republican administrations and tried their hands at punditry, Kristol and Kagan preferred punditry. They believed that if the Republican Party was to be renewed, it had to happen chiefly through the battle of ideas.

Kagan was also a product of a highly educated, politically conservative home and the Ivy League academic/Republican nexus. His father, Donald Kagan, was a distinguished Yale classicist, diplomatic historian, and outspoken advocate of an aggressive American military posture. His brother Frederick Kagan was a professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and a coauthor, with Donald Kagan, of *While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness and the Threat to Peace Today*. Robert Kagan was educated at Yale and Harvard’s Kennedy School, where he earned a master’s degree in public policy and international relations. From 1984 to 1988 he served in the Reagan administration as a deputy for policy in the State Department’s Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and as the principal speechwriter for Secretary of State George Shultz. Joining the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he served as director of its U.S. Leadership Project in Brussels, and in 1995 helped Kristol launch the *Weekly Standard*, where he and Kristol collaborated on editorials and articles. Kagan joined Charles Krauthammer as a contributing editor on international affairs for the magazine, and in 2000 he joined the *Washington Post* staff as a monthly columnist.1

“Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy” explained its nomenclature immediately. The mid-1990s felt a lot like the mid-1970s, Kristol and Kagan observed. In the 1970s conservatives were demoralized by the stifling domination of Kissingerian realism; in the 1990s conservatives were demoralized by the confusion of conservative ideology, the public’s lack of interest in foreign affairs, and the “tepid consensus” that made foreign policy boring to almost everyone. The Republican Party, having been transformed in the 1970s by Reagan’s radical challenge to a lukewarm consensus, was due for another transformation. It was time “once again to challenge an indifferent America and a confused American conservatism.” Instead of drifting along with Clinton’s nannyish view of America’s role in the world, conservatives needed to offer something bolder and greater. Kristol and Kagan called it “benevolent global hegemony.”2

Four years after Wolfowitz nearly wrecked his government career by advocating unipolar hegemony, the time had come to haul his vision out of the closet and into the Republican Party platform. America’s hegemonic dominance was a very good thing for America, the world, and American conservatism, Kristol and Kagan argued: “The first objective of U.S. foreign policy should be to preserve and enhance that predominance by strengthening America’s security,
supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and standing up for its principles around the world.” They acknowledged that aspiring to universal hegemony “might strike some as either hubristic or morally suspect.” But hegemony simply meant “preponderant influence and authority over all others in its domain,” they explained. It was simply a fact that the United States possessed hegemonic power over the entire world, and world leaders respected this fact. At the recent Russia-China summit meeting, Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin denounced post-Cold War “hegemonism”: “They meant this as a complaint about the United States. It should be taken as a compliment and a guide to action.”

Kristol and Kagan noted that the past six months had been typical for the United States. The U.S. Seventh Fleet deterred China from harassing Taiwan; American troops in South Korea deterred a possible North Korean invasion; the United States sent twenty thousand ground troops to the Balkans to implement the Dayton peace accords; American troops in Europe kept the peace between Greece and Turkey; the United States deterred Iraq and Iran with a strong naval presence in the Persian Gulf; America mediated the Israeli/Syrian conflict in Lebanon; the United States completed its mission in Haiti, withdrawing fifteen thousand soldiers; U.S. expeditionary forces came to the rescue of Americans and others trapped in Liberia’s civil war; and the United States prevented a military coup in Paraguay. These were routine tasks for the American hegemon; most of the world depended upon and was the beneficiary of the Pax Americana: “The principal concern of America’s allies these days is not that it will be too dominant but that it will withdraw.” But in the next sentence the authors lamented: “Somehow most Americans have failed to notice that they have never had it so good.”

Americans had become spoiled and insular. They were lucky to be Americans, but didn’t seem to notice, and took no interest in their country’s hegemonic tasks and responsibilities. This was a serious problem, Kristol and Kagan warned, because the good life has to be struggled for. Freedom and prosperity cannot be sustained by people who think it’s unnecessary to try. This was a cultural problem, but also a political one, because “the dominant strategic and ideological position the United States now enjoys is the product of foreign policies and defense strategies that are no longer being pursued.” The Clinton administration was cruising on the achievements of past administrations, and Americans, taking their cue from the Clinton administration, “have come to take the fruits of their hegemonic power for granted.” During the Cold War, the authors claimed, liberals denied that America had dangerous adversaries; now that the Soviet Union was gone, liberals were even more disbelieving that America had to be fully armed. Kristol and Kagan admonished that “peace and American security depend on American power and the will to use it.” The main threat to America’s security was no longer an external enemy or even a collection of them, but America’s own weakness: “American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order. The appropriate goal of American foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the
future as possible. To achieve this goal, the United States needs a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy and moral confidence.”

They called for an additional $60 to $80 billion per year in defense spending, expanded forms of reserve service that brought more Americans into the military, and an unabashedly moral purpose. America’s moral goals and vital interests were “almost always in harmony,” they assured. During the Reagan years, according to their memory, “the United States pressed for changes in right-wing and left-wing dictatorships alike.” That was their professed standard also; Kristol did not quote his father on the impossibility of a moral defense policy. Realists retreated to America’s vital interests in Europe and Asia, but Kristol and Kagan countered that foreign policy realism undermines itself: “Without a broad, sustaining foreign policy vision, the American people will be inclined to withdraw from the world and will lose sight of their abiding interest in vigorous world leadership. Without a sense of mission, they will seek deeper and deeper cuts in the defense and foreign affairs budgets and gradually decimate the tools of U.S. hegemony.” If Ronald Reagan had led the Gulf War, he would have rallied Americans to his vision of a new world order shaped by American power; as it was, Bush’s secretary of state, a realist to the core, told Americans that the war was about “jobs, jobs, jobs.”

Kristol and Kagan took some comfort from Dole’s victory over Pat Buchanan in the Republican primaries, but not much. All the passion was on the side of Buchanan and his old right populist followers, and Dole’s conservative realism was tired and beleaguered, like Dole himself. They worried that the Republican Party could still go isolationist under the pressure of Buchanan’s “America First” rhetoric and the budget cutters on Capitol Hill. Elsewhere, Kristol pleaded wanly that Dole’s “basic decency and petty vanity” made him the president that America deserved. Dole combined “admirable personal courage with a conventional go along-to-get-along ambition,” Kristol explained. “He rises above the worst aspects of our time while being swept along by many of its unattractive features. And he is confused about where the country should go.” These qualities made Dole an appropriate leader for the United States in 1996. “But Bill Clinton? We know we deserve better than Clinton.”

Kristol and Kagan ended their manifesto with a call for an unabashedly Pax Americanist conservatism. “President Clinton has proved a better manager of foreign policy than many expected, but he has not been up to the larger task of preparing and inspiring the nation to embrace the role of global leadership,” they judged. America needed a moral vision of national greatness in domestic and foreign policy. Too many Americans still harkened to the wrong kind of American exceptionalism, epitomized in John Quincy Adams’s declaration that America ought not “go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.” Kristol and Kagan countered: “But why not? The alternative is to leave monsters on the loose, ravaging and pillaging to their hearts’ content, as Americans stand by and watch.” The two best Republican presidents of the twentieth century, Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, were aggressive interventionists: “Both
celebrated American exceptionalism. Both made Americans proud of their leading role in world affairs. Deprived of the support of an elevated patriotism, bereft of the ability to appeal to national honor, conservatives will ultimately fail in their effort to govern America. And Americans will fail in their responsibility to lead the world.”

Kristol later recalled that when he and Kagan wrote their manifesto, Republicans were badly fragmented and the Republican Congress was woefully isolationist: “They were spending more time opposing Clinton on Bosnia and Kosovo than encouraging Clinton to be tougher on Iraq.” He knew plenty of policy wonks and academics who shared his unipolarist vision but was short on prominent figures; Wolfowitz and John McCain headed the list. In January 1997 Kristol blasted the “spectacle of Republican timidity and defensiveness now evident on Capitol Hill.” Two months later he called for “one, two, many insurrections” in a “brain-dead Republican Party.” House Majority Leader Dick Armey, “who used to be something of a firebrand,” and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott were burned-out symbols of Republican decline: “No agenda. No fireworks. No nothing.” Kristol wanted the Republicans to demand huge defense spending increases, take the fight to Saddam Hussein, and reject the Chemical Weapons Convention. Lott defended Air Force Lieutenant Kelly Flinn against Air Force charges of sexual fraternization; Kristol exploded in reply: “Will no one step forward to defend the honor of Republican principles and the dignity of the conservative cause? Are we all Clinton Republicans now?”

Designing the Next American Century

The same month, June 1997, Kristol founded the Project for the New American Century. He and Kagan declared in the organization’s statement of principles: “American foreign and defense policy is adrift. We aim to change this. We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership.” Instead of using America’s immense power to remake the world in a way that conformed to America’s key interests and values, they protested, American political leaders were cutting military investments, underusing the tools of statecraft, and failing to lead: “We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration’s success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities.” In addition to Kristol and Kagan, the original PNAC had twenty-five associates, including Republican foreign policy stalwarts Elliott Abrams, Dick Cheney, Eliot A.Cohen, Paula Dobriansky, Frank Gaffney, Fred C.Iklé, Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, I.Lewis Libby, Norman Podhoretz, Peter W.Rodman, Stephen P.Rosen, Donald Rumsfeld, William Schneider, Jr., George Weigel, Paul Wolfowitz, and Robert B.Zoellick. A sprinkling of politicians, intellectuals, and activists included Gary Bauer, William
J.Bennett, Jeb Bush, Midge Decter, Francis Fukuyama, Dan Quayle, and Vin Weber.12

The PNAC was closely linked to the American Enterprise Institute, from which it rented office space, and with which it shared a vital connection to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. Between 1995 and 2001, AEI took in $14.5 million from the Milwaukee-based Bradley Foundation, and PNAC got $1.8 million. PNAC pressed hard for the expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic; above all it called for huge increases in defense spending. To Kristol, NATO was a priority concern because America was its dominant player; to expand NATO was to promote “the continuing exercise of American leadership in European affairs.” It also took the three states of Central Europe out of play as security concerns: “Locked into a U.S.-led alliance, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will not invite the kind of competitions and great power machinations that have plagued Europe in the past.” Kristol assured that the European Union would never replace NATO. Instead of encouraging Europeans to establish their own security regime for Central Europe, the “world’s preeminent power” needed to strengthen the existing order of things: “America’s core strategic interest lies in preserving and, where feasible, expanding the current favorable security environment.” When Secretary of Defense William Cohen consigned defense policy guru Andrew Marshall and his Office of Net Assessment to the National Defense University, the PNAC blasted Cohen’s bureaucratic small-mindedness. America needed the apostle of the revolution in defense information technology in the Pentagon, where he had served for twenty-five years.13

In January 1998 the PNAC formally asked Clinton to get serious about overthrowing Saddam Hussein; five months later, it formally asked House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott to press for a major military buildup in the Persian Gulf. By then the PNAC luminaries also included John R.Bolton, Richard Perle, William Schneider, Jr., R.James Woolsey, and Robert B.Zoellick.14 Kristol spent much of the year deeply absorbed in the politics of Clinton’s sexual scandal and impeachment, repeatedly telling Republicans that Clinton was the key to Republican revival. One issue of the Weekly Standard featured a cover illustration of a naked Clinton frolicking at an orgy with six girlfriends while Hillary Clinton, scowling, watched through a window; the president, Monica Lewinsky, and Paula Jones were pictured having sex upon a donkey.15

At the same time, Kristol told Republican leaders to be more like Reagan, whose vision was “militarily strong, morally assertive, and politically daring.” Reagan promoted American interests and principles without apology, exalting American principles not merely because they were American “but because they are morally superior to competing principles.” To Kristol, current leaders paled by comparison: “This is all too much for today’s politicians, who do not want to confront such responsibilities and who in one way or another have embraced doctrines of American retreat.” Multilateral liberalism and Kissingerian realism
were alike in this respect; both lacked Reagan’s basic confidence in the superiority of the American idea: “Any politician who now embraced a Reaganite vision would need the courage to challenge the odd mixture of fearful complacency and willful shortsightedness that characterizes the mood of the American establishment today.”

After the Republicans made a poor showing in the November 1998 elections, Kristol glumly observed that Clinton had beaten them again and that polling data showed only one bright spot for the Republicans, on protecting “strong moral values.” National opinion polls showed that the public favored the Democrats by margins of twenty points or more on education, Social Security, Medicare, health care, “caring about people,” and dealing with the problems of families. Even the longtime Republican advantage on taxes had been lost. Kristol returned to the bright spot. The Republican nominee for president in 2000 had to make the most of the party’s bedrock strength, “its willingness directly to confront troublesome questions of public and private morality.” The Republican standard bearer had to be a Reaganite true believer and moralist who knew how to espouse strong positions “with grace and wit”—Kristol’s television appearances were models of low-keyed civility. He exhorted that even the best ideas need champions; they do not speak for themselves: “Someone must step forward who is capable of making the case for conservative principle as the animating force of a governing Republican Party.”

Unlike many neoconservatives who were mistakenly called Straussians, Kristol was actually schooled in Straussian theory, having studied under Straussian political scientist Harvey Mansfield at Harvard. Occasionally the influence of Strauss and Mansfield upon him showed through. Strauss taught that ancient philosophy contains esoteric meanings that are comprehensible only to a learned few; following Plato, he instructed that philosophers have to tell noble lies to the people and those in power; more important, he believed in the immutability of moral values, which he conceptualized through the classic idea of natural right. In his view, a human being was natural “if he is guided by nature rather than by convention, or by inherited opinion, or by tradition, to say nothing of mere whims.” Unlike modern notions of natural right, which he disdained as nihilistic, Strauss upheld the classical idea of a natural, hierarchic order. Modern rights theory viewed desires as bundles of urges; classical theory believed in a natural order of desires. Strauss’s signature work, *Natural Right and History*, lamented that the classical idea gave way in Western culture to that of unlimited tolerance, which led to nihilism, which led to the acceptance of intolerance “as a value equal in dignity to tolerance.”

Neocons liked that Straussian theory provided a language of moral absolutism not deriving from any particular religious tradition. Kristol’s language of the good was implicitly Straussian, and sometimes explicitly so. Reflecting on the 1999 schoolhouse massacre in Littleton, Colorado, he quoted a diary entry of one of the mass murderers: “My belief is that if I say something, it goes. I am the law…Z Feel no remorse, no sense of shame.” Kristol remarked: “There you have
it: the culmination, the end, of modernity.” For Kristol, as for Strauss, modernity was about the denial of truth, including moral truth, which led to the worship of power/intolerance. He believed, like Strauss, that modern people could ascend from the nihilistic abyss of modernity only by returning “to an earlier notion of ‘the primacy of the good.’”

In politics, the work of returning to the good was exasperating, repetitious, and indispensable. Political leaders who stood for the good “must defend verities so long accepted that they are no longer fully understood,” Kristol observed. “They must routinely explain why certain ideas are right or wrong, and why the distinctions matter. They must sometimes pursue projects that are at once wholly right and widely unpopular—like the impeachment of a president.” He was less clear about Strauss’s specific influence on his thinking: “It’s an opaque and difficult question. Strauss’s kind of conservatism is public-spirited. He taught a great respect for politics and the pursuit of the common good.”

Kristol and Kagan had a wildly unpopular cause for the next Republican standard bearer: repudiating America’s friendly relationship with China. Clinton’s “engagement” policy with China was basically the Bush 41 policy at a higher level of intensity, they judged, and both political parties were deeply subservient to the American business class, which opposed any word or deed that dampened commerce with China. American corporations were mesmerized by their dreams of huge profits in China’s potential market of 1.2 billion people, and “the dreams alone are enough to keep this trade-happy administration on the path of appeasement.” Kristol and Kagan countered that appeasing China was corrupt and misguided. They dismissed the argument that trading with China would make it more democratic and responsible; in the past year alone China had cracked down against democratic dissidents, stolen nuclear secrets, deployed missiles across the straights from Taiwan, and orchestrated strident anti-American protests: “All we can see are burned American flags, imprisoned democrats, an intimidated Taiwan, and a vastly more dangerous Chinese nuclear arsenal aimed at the United States and our East Asian allies.”

China was an adversary of the United States, not a friend, they urged. A serious American government would prevent China from obtaining American nuclear secrets, prevent the transfer of missile-launch technologies to China, punish China for proliferating weapons of mass destruction, demand respect from China, punish China for abusing human rights, and stand up for Taiwan. Kagan warned that a major conflict over Taiwan was looming because Jiang Zemin wanted reunification of the motherland as his legacy. He and Kristol wanted the United States to sell guided missile destroyers equipped with the Aegis radar system to Taiwan; more importantly, they wanted American leaders to declare unequivocally that the United States would not tolerate a Chinese invasion or missile attack against Taiwan: “What Republicans need to do in 2000 is take on frontally the premises and practice of a failed policy that has heretofore had support, unfortunately, from the mainstream of both parties.” As always, what
Republicans needed was the aggressively nationalistic spirit of Reagan: “The Republican candidate in 2000 should make this his model.”

Pat Buchanan claimed the mantle of Reaganite nationalism, which heightened Kristol’s contempt for him. When Buchanan indicated in September 1999 that he might switch to the Reform Party and its $13 million of public funds, Kristol bid him good riddance. Republican leaders begged Buchanan not to leave the party; in Kristol’s characterization, they pleaded “stupidly and cravenly” that the party needed him. Kristol urged them to give Buchanan the same kind of farewell that President Truman granted Henry Wallace in 1948. Wallace was a one-world, left-wing kook who had dangerously climbed to the vice presidency; Buchanan was “Pat the Bunny, hopping around on the fringes of American politics, wiggling his nose in the air and nibbling away at whatever carrots our political system offers up for his purposes.” Buchanan was blinded by vanity, Kristol believed. Imagining himself as the messiah of the old right, he eyed the Reform Party instead of Howard Phillips’s Constitution Party because the former had public money. Like Wallace, he was an embarrassment. Kristol recalled that Truman didn’t blather about Wallace’s swell personality or his past contributions to the Democratic Party; he redefined his party by repudiating Wallace. That was what Kristol wanted from the Republicans, instead of “cower[ing] before Pat the Bunny.”

Heading into the campaign year 2000, Norman Podhoretz remarked that in light of the Republican Congress’s is olationism, Buchanan’s significant following among conservatives, and the sometimes “bloodthirsty” interventionism of the new-style liberal hawks, he could only conclude that foreign policy debates no longer made sense. It made him uncomfortable to have “strange bedfellows” yet there they were. Kristol replied that there were no strangers in his bed: “So far as I can tell, it has been pretty much the same old band of monogamous bedfellows hanging around the neo-Reaganite camp for the last few years. Perhaps that will change when prospective recruits learn from Norman Podhoretz how ‘ardent’ Robert Kagan and I have been in advancing our cause; we can only hope.” From his vantage point, there were three bedrooms in American foreign policy politics. One contained the liberals who conceived America as being first among the United Nations; the second consisted of various kinds of realists, from Buchanan’s isolationism to the modest nationalism of Owen Harries to the harder-edged realpolitik of Henry Kissinger to Krauthammer’s unipolarism; the third was his group of idealistic neo-imperialists, which resisted the prevailing tendency to “reduce the business of America to business.” Kristol pleaded for more company: “We neo-Reaganites try to make the case for freedom and greatness. We could use a few more bedfellows in that endeavor.”

Kagan told Podhoretz that one good election might cure Republicans of their isolationism. Clinton had driven conservatives crazy, he explained. They were so frustrated by Clinton that they leaped, in desperation, to bad ways of attacking him. Instead of opposing Clinton’s internationalism, they turned against
internationalism itself, identifying conservatism with “no ‘humanitarianism,’ no ‘nation-building,’ no exporting of democracy.” Kagan believed that if John McCain or George W. Bush were president, conservatives would recover their senses and liberals would go back to being anti-interventionists. The test would come in 2001, when Bush or McCain led the country into a war in some marginal country “out of the same uncertain mixture of principle and interest that led his predecessors into Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.”

In the spirit of Podhoretz’s *The Present Danger*, which in the election year 1980 called Americans to fight for a victory in the Cold War, in 2000 Kristol and Kagan published an election year reader titled *Present Dangers*. Essentially the book amplified their 1996 manifesto for global hegemony, containing chapters by Wolfowitz, Perle, Elliott Abrams, William Bennett, James W. Ceasar, Nicholas Eberstadt, Aaron L. Friedberg, Jeffrey Gedmin, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Donald Kagan, Frederick Kagan, Ross H. Munro, Peter Rodman, and William Schneider. Kristol and Kagan warned that there was “a present danger” in 2000, although it had no name. The great danger to America was not any particular country or threat. “In fact, the ubiquitous post-Cold War question—where is the threat?—is misconceived.” Lacking a great identifiable threat, Americans had become spoiled, twice electing a liberal president who indulged their complacency. This complacency was the greatest danger to America: “Our present danger is one of declining military strength, flagging will and confusion about our role in the world. It is a danger, to be sure, of our own devising. Yet, if neglected, it is likely to yield very real external dangers, as threatening in their way as the Soviet Union was a quarter century ago.”

Ross Munro charged that Clinton’s appeasement of China weakened America’s standing in Asia and emboldened China to bid for world-class power. Peter Rodman charged that Clinton’s “unwavering embrace” of Boris Yeltsin and general coddling of Russia exacerbated the corruption of Russian politics and fueled reactionary forces there. Richard Perle charged that Clinton “displayed more resolve and ingenuity in denying support to the Iraqi National Congress than in trying to get rid of Saddam.” Reuel Marc Gerecht charged that Clinton failed to take “strong action” against Iran, despite its sponsorship of terrorism, support of Islamic militants, opposition to Israel, violations of human rights, and attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. Nicholas Eberstadt charged that Clinton’s policy toward North Korea lurched between containment and coaxing, while failing to stop North Korea from stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. Paul Wolfowitz, republishing an earlier essay, defended his Defense Policy Guidance of 1992 and envisioned the United States as “the leader and the dominant member” of a world alliance of democracies. Donald Kagan admonished that wars are started by nations that detect weakness in their enemies and that the costs of maintaining America’s preeminence were small “compared with the costs of failure to bear them forthrightly.”

*Present Dangers* was a campaign book in more than one sense, espousing positions on election year issues that showcased Kristol’s appointable friends.
Many of them pictured themselves as McCain appointees, in whom they saw Reaganesque potential. Kristol’s group admired McCain for his courage as a soldier in Vietnam, his maverick eagerness to take on the establishment, and his pledge to extend “the unipolar moment... for as long as we possibly can.” George W. Bush, by contrast, had no inspiring biography and rarely spoke about foreign policy. He pledged to sustain America’s global preeminence, but zigzagged between the party’s isolationist and neo-Reaganite wings, ridiculing Clinton’s nation-building ventures. It troubled Kristol that despite Clinton’s “soaring federal budget surpluses” neither Bush nor McCain advocated steep increases in defense spending. But he and David Brooks implied that in one respect, McCain was better than Reagan: “McCain doesn’t say that government is oppressive and just needs to get out of the way. He says he wants to reform government to make us proud.” That was the Teddy Roosevelt attitude, which they preferred: “Far from calling government an evil that needs to be dismantled, he says that public service is the noblest calling.”

Kagan believed that McCain embodied and expressed the very thing that America needed most: a “sense of renewed national purpose in world affairs.” Bush’s foreign policy speeches were a bit more coherent than McCain’s, Kagan allowed, but McCain’s wartime heroism gave him a huge leadership advantage over Bush, and his campaign had an insurgent character that Bush’s completely lacked. During the debate over Kosovo, while Republican politicians and conservative pundits denounced “Clinton’s war,” McCain advocated a stronger intervention using ground troops. “He not only bucked his own party leadership; he was far ahead of public opinion,” Kagan enthused. Bush supported the war as well, but his support “was hedged, careful and late.” Kagan worried that Bush lacked the requisite knowledge base to be an effective leader; McCain was the real thing. Still, Kagan had questions for both of them. Bush promised to “take out” Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction, but how would he do it? McCain promised to maintain America’s global preeminence, but how would he do it without raising defense spending? Would either candidate intervene against the Colombian narco-guerrillas or an attack on Montenegro by Slobodan Milosevic?

The meaningful primaries ended too soon for the neo-Reaganite unipolarists, after which they tried to influence Bush. They were lucky that Wolfowitz was close to Bush and that Bush trusted Dick Cheney; otherwise, the realists had better access to him than Kristol’s group. Bush listened to George Shultz and Colin Powell, and his closest advisor was Condoleezza Rice, a Scowcroft protégé who steered him between the party’s factions. Foreign policy was rarely mentioned in the campaign anyway, although Kagan advised otherwise: “Call me crazy, but I think it actually would serve the national interest if George W. Bush spent more time talking about foreign policy in this campaign.” Although Bush didn’t know much about foreign affairs, Kagan acknowledged, and he needed to stop talking about withdrawing U.S. troops from the Balkans, it did not require much expertise to ask whether the world was safer after eight years of Clinton.
Kagan offered talking points: Saddam Hussein was getting stronger each month, Slobodan Milosevic still ruled in Belgrade, China was preparing to devour Taiwan, India and Pakistan were new nuclear powers, North Korea and Iran were close to joining the nuclear club, Haiti was a pitiful mess, Colombia was ravaged by narco-guerrillas, and Vladimir Putin’s election in Russia “could be an ominous development.” Kagan gave Clinton credit for expanding NATO and, maybe, getting a peace deal in Northern Ireland; otherwise the world was getting increasingly dangerous and America was not sufficiently using its power to make the world safer.\(^30\)

Kristol and Kagan persistently hammered on the dangers of appeasing China, giving more than twice as much attention to this issue than any other. Shortly before the House of Representatives voted to grant permanent most-favored-nation status to China—“the overwhelming majority of pro-China votes, we are sad to say, will be cast by Republicans”—Kristol and Kagan found one consolation: “If a majority of the House are determined to do the wrong thing, then the proponents of engagement will have gotten everything they wanted. And when their misguided and dangerous policy fails, we will at least have the consolation of clarity.” Detente had to fail before Americans could be persuaded to challenge the Soviets, they analogized; apparently China would have to be the same way.\(^31\)

But that was not much of a consolation, being a variation on the call to patience that Kristol and Kagan repeatedly denounced. Condoleezza Rice called for patience with China, which made the neo-Reaganites wary of her. “Rice thinks we cannot afford four more years of Clinton and Gore coddling China,” Kagan observed. “Her alternative: four years of Republicans coddling China.” Rice assured Bush that economic reform in China would lead to political reform; Kagan remarked, “In other words, eventually everything is going to be fine.” Although Rice viewed China as a rising power that resented American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, Kagan worried that she shared Clinton’s complacency about Chinese ambitions. Rice opposed any change in America’s policy toward Taiwan, and her candidate’s budget plan called for a $45 billion increase in defense spending over the next decade. Meanwhile Democratic candidate Al Gore proposed to increase defense spending by $100 billion. Kagan observed: “Now, to the untrained eye that looks like Bush is proposing to spend less. Maybe we’re just supposed to have faith that a Republican president will spend more on defense than a Democrat, even if the Republican candidate refuses to come out and say so during the campaign.”\(^32\)

In September the Project for the New American Century ambitiously intervened in the presidential campaign, and, it hoped, the Republican appointment process, by issuing a seventy-six-page position paper titled \textit{Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century}. By then the PNAC was a fullfledged think tank with a chairman (Kristol), four directors (Robert Kagan, Devon Gaffney Cross, Bruce P. Jackson, and John R. Bolton), and an executive director (Gary Schmitt). It also had new associates
from the U.S. Naval War College (Roger Barnett, Phil Meilinger, and Mackubin Owens) and National Defense University (Alvin Bernstein and Stephen Cambone). In a collective voice, PNAC spelled out the particulars of a global empire strategy: terminate the ABM Treaty; build a global missile defense system; increase active-duty troops from 1.4 million to 1.6 million; develop a strategic dominance of space; increase defense spending by $20 billion per year to 3.8 percent of GDP; establish permanent new forces in southern Europe, Southeast Asia and the Middle East; increase mobility and the use of technology in force projection; and reinvent the U.S. military to be able to “fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars.” It also warned that it might take “a new Pearl Harbor” for Americans to wake up to the necessity of dramatically expanding America’s military reach.

Essentially, the next defense department had to fulfill four missions: defend the homeland, prepare to fight and win multiple large wars at the same time, perform the “constabulary duties” of a global superpower, and transform the U.S. armed forces. “The United States must retain sufficient forces able to rapidly deploy and win multiple simultaneous large-scale wars and also to be able to respond to unanticipated contingencies in regions where it does not maintain forward-based forces” the PNAC argued. “This resembles the ‘two-war’ standard that has been the basis of U.S. force planning over the past decade. Yet this standard needs to be updated to account for new realities and potential new conflicts.” Moreover, the so-called revolution in military affairs—employing advanced technologies—was a mission in itself, on a par with defending the homeland, fighting major wars, and maintaining the global order.

The unipolarists pressed hard for a major increase in America’s East Asian military presence. The existing force plan stationed 100,000 American troops in Asia, “but this level reflects Pentagon inertia and the legacy of the Cold War more than serious thinking about current strategic requirements or defense needs.” The force posture of America’s thirty-seven thousand troops in South Korea had to be changed to perform numerous tasks, not merely protect against an invasion by North Korea, and America’s overall force projection in the region had to be increased dramatically, mainly to deter China: “Raising U.S. military strength is the key to coping with the rise of China to great-power status Control of key sea lines of communication, ensuring access to rapidly growing economies, maintaining regional stability while fostering closer ties to fledgling democracies and, perhaps most important, supporting the nascent trends toward political liberty are all enduring security interests for America.”

Rebuilding America’s Defenses charged that the Army was not prepared to perform any of its three missions—fighting major theater wars, maintaining the global order, and “transforming for the future”—and that it desperately needed a funding increase from $70 billion to $95 billion per year, improved combat readiness, selective modernization of weaponry, and a permanent force in the Persian Gulf: “American landpower remains the essential link in the chain that translates U.S. military supremacy into American geopolitical preeminence.”
The Air Force was a mixed picture. Its supremacy was a thing of beauty and awe; it had stealth aircraft, precision-guided accuracy, and “virtual impunity.” American air power was more sophisticated and commanding than ever. But it was also overused in a diffuse variety of new missions by the same administration that cut Air Force spending. In addition to the exciting missions, like bombing Kosovo, the Air Force had to conduct punitive strikes, “monotonous no-fly-zone operations” and various low-risk air campaigns. The Air Force’s Air Expeditionary Force concept turned the classic big-war air campaign “largely on its head.” The PNAC wanted to increase Air Force spending from $83 billion to $115 billion; it also called for more Air Force personnel, realignments of U.S. units in Europe, Asia, and the United States to prepare for multiple large-scale air campaigns, and large-scale modernization for greater capability and reach, including the dominance of space. Space was still an Air Force domain, but perhaps not for long. The dominance of space was so crucial to the preservation of American military preeminence that a separate service was conceivable.36

The Navy situation was similarly ironic. The U.S. Navy dominated the high seas like no other power in history, yet it was doing so with an aging force structure and little investment in modernization. The PNAC warned that the current level of shipbuilding was insufficient to maintain a fleet of three hundred ships, and that slipping below that number was unacceptable. It wanted a majority of the U.S. fleet and two-thirds of all carrier battle groups to be stationed in the Pacific, along with a permanent new forward base in Southeast Asia. Instead of concentrating on carrier operations in Cold War fashion, it wanted the Navy to increase its fleets of current-generation surface fighters and attack submarines, increase the number of surface action missions, and make new investments in countermine warfare. The Marine Corps, by contrast, was something of a niche operation. Unlike the Navy it had little firepower; unlike the Air Force it had little high-performance capability; unlike the Army it had little sustainable land-power capability. As a niche operation it was not as affected by post-Cold War reductions as the other services, but like the other services, the Marine Corps suffered “from more missions that it can handle and a shortage of resources.” Kristol’s group called for an increase in the combined Navy-Marine budget from $91 billion to $110 billion.37

The PNAC reflected that its vision of American dominance and greatness had a political history: “In broad terms, we saw the project as building upon the defense strategy outlined by the Cheney Defense Department in the waning days of the Bush Administration. The Defense Policy Guidance (DPG) drafted in the early months of 1992 provided a blueprint for maintaining U.S. preeminence, precluding the rise of a great power rival, and shaping the international security order in line with American principles and interests.” Because Wolfowitz’s plan was leaked before it could be formally approved, the PNAC recalled, it was criticized prematurely and unfairly. The plan was ahead of its time, but eight years later, it was merely the starting point of a serious defense policy. Serious
thinking about American security spelled out the particular policies and actions that would sustain America’s unipolar dominance for the foreseeable future. The PNAC unipolarists lamented that the Bush campaign failed this political and pedagogical test. They cheered Bush’s commitment to missile defense—Kristol and Kagan proudly noted that he announced it at the Reagan Library—and liked his occasional words on behalf of American preeminence. But Bush’s positions didn’t add up to an aggressive global empire policy. He did not advocate the increases in defense spending or reconfigurations of force structure that the PNAC detailed. Kagan reported that Bush campaign officials occasionally assured people like himself that a George W. Bush administration would significantly increase defense spending beyond Clinton’s 2001 budget increase, but Kagan and Kristol were not assured. Rice was fond of saying that when Bush became president, the United States would no longer be the world’s “911.” Kagan surmised that the United States would be the world’s busy signal. Rice assured reporters that it didn’t matter if Bush didn’t know much about foreign affairs, because “it’s a whole team of people who are going to get things done.” Kagan replied that Bush’s father had advisors who were much like Clinton’s advisors—in some cases they were the same people, such as Dennis Ross, who masterminded Middle East policy for both presidents—and now some of them were the younger Bush’s advisors. “We know that on a number of big issues most of Bush’s vaunted advisors agree with Clinton and Gore. On the biggest issue where they don’t agree, American intervention abroad, Gore is probably more right than they are. So remind us again why Bush would make the better commander in chief?”

Kristol never went that far in questioning the difference between Bush and Gore. He peppered the Weekly Standard with reminders that Republicans were the good party on everything that mattered, from winning the Cold War to winning the Gulf War to opposing abortion. Right up to the election, however, Kristol and Kagan complained that Bush downplayed America’s military crisis and distastefully trolled for isolationist votes. After Milosevic lost the Serbian election on September 24, Bush clung to his position that perhaps American troops should be withdrawn from the Balkans. Kristol sharply warned that Bush’s comments might embolden Milosevic not to accept the election verdict.

After Milosevic stepped down, Cheney and other Republicans groused that the election outcome did not vindicate Clinton’s decision to fight Milosevic in Kosovo. Kristol and Kagan countered that it most certainly did, hailing the outcome as Clinton’s greatest foreign policy victory. “The triumph of democracy in Serbia last week may well rank as the most important international event of the post-Cold War era,” they declared. “For the United States and its democratic allies, this is a strategic triumph of the first order.” They criticized Cheney for sticking to a bad position on the Balkans, noting that the previous week, Democratic vice presidential candidate Joseph Lieberman expressed his pride in America’s resistance to Serb aggression in Bosnia and Kosovo. “We wish that spirit were also conspicuous among conservatives and Republicans, including the
GOP standard bearers,” they remarked, less than a month before the U.S. election.42

Kristol later recalled that he felt “moderately unhappy” about the Bush/Cheney team throughout the 2000 campaign. Although Wolfowitz and other neocons wrote some of Bush’s speeches, “he gave other speeches in which he said, We have to be humble. We’re over-extended. We don’t need to spend much more on the military/” Besides Bush’s advocacy of missile defense and his rhetorical commitment to American supremacy, he didn’t seem like a good unipolarist to Kristol: “I wouldn’t say that if you read Wolfowitz’s Defense Planning Guidance from 1992, and read most of Bush’s campaign speeches and his statements in the debates, you would say, ‘Hey, Bush has really adopted Wolfowitz’s worldview,” Kristol recalled that Rice kept her distance from his group: “She was skeptical about a lot of these claims that the U.S. really had to shape a new world order, that we had to engage in nation-building, that we might have to intervene in several places at once.” Speaking sixteen months after 9/11, he concluded: “She was much more, I think, kind of a cautious realist than she is today.”43

Bush 43 before 9/11

As the election drew near, Kristol believed that whoever won would have to concentrate on foreign policy issues that he ignored during the campaign, especially “America’s relations with China, our role in Colombia’s drug wars, our acceptance or rejection of a neo-imperial role in the world.” Kagan was ready to feel sorry for Bush, who inherited Clinton’s “ticking bombs.” He judged that Clinton was not as bad as Dwight Eisenhower, who stuck John Kennedy with Fidel Castro, the Bay of Pigs operation, and Vietnam, and it was too soon to say whether Clinton was worse than Bush 41, who stuck Clinton with Iraq, the Balkans, Haiti, and Somalia. Kagan recalled that Ronald Reagan made the mistake of handing George H.W.Bush a successful foreign policy; his reward was to be portrayed by the Bush 41 team as an “amiable goof” who didn’t have much to do with their victory in the Cold War. By Kagan’s account, the younger Bush, if elected, would inherit ticking bombs in Iraq, North Korea, Israel-Palestine, India-Pakistan, and China-Taiwan. Clinton hadn’t known what to do about Iraq, so for eight years he kicked the can down the road. To Kagan there was “a kind of perverse justice” in the prospect of Bush inheriting the Iraq problem: “Dick Cheney to this day insists that leaving Saddam in power at the end of the Gulf War was the right thing to do. Well, great. If W. is elected, Cheney and the gang can enjoy their decision all over again.”44

For weeks, while the election verdict passed back and forth between the Florida Supreme Court and the U.S.Supreme Court, the Weekly Standard fiercely contended that Bush should be president. Kristol vowed to acknowledge that President Gore was right when he happened to be right, but never to accept that Gore was a legitimate president.45 Meanwhile, the neocons did stunningly well in
the Bush appointment derby, thanks to Cheney and Rumsfeld. Although Kristol’s group had criticized Cheney about the Balkans and chided that he offered no solution to the Iraq problem, it had strong personal and ideological ties with him. Cheney respected Wolfowitz immensely and felt a kinship with Kristol’s neo-imperialists. He had hatched the original unipolarist blueprint in 1992, was a charter member of the Project for the Next American Century, and embraced its vision of “our security and our greatness.” In the 1990s he had solidified his contacts with neocons at the American Enterprise Institute. Rumsfeld was also a charter PNAC participant, and unlike Cheney, had signed its letter to Clinton in 1998 that called for Saddam Hussein’s overthrow. Bush’s advocacy of a missile defense system was directly influenced by a 1998 commission on missile defense that Rumsfeld directed. Bowing to Rumsfeld’s report, Clinton agreed that some kind of missile defense was necessary, but sought to devise one that required minimal revision to the ABM Treaty. Bush took Rumsfeld’s recommendations a step farther, discarding the ABM Treaty; after the campaign he leaned on Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz to clarify his defense policy.

Cheney was the key to Bush’s appointments. He had been asked to select a vice president for Bush, but eventually he and Bush settled on himself. Powell was too important not to get a top position, and Rice was the obvious choice for national security advisor, but Bush and Cheney didn’t want Powell to determine their administration’s foreign policy. Someone of equal stature and forcefulness to Powell was needed; thus Cheney reached out to his former mentor Rumsfeld, bypassing Wolfowitz, who was notoriously slow at moving paper and not regarded as a top administrator. Having missed the top Pentagon job, Wolfowitz sought the number two position at State, but Powell didn’t want him. Powell offered him a cabinet position as Ambassador to the United Nations, but that would have put Wolfowitz in New York, out of the power loop. Number two at the Pentagon suited him better. Thus, the vice president, defense secretary, and deputy defense secretary were all associates of the Project for the New American Century, as was Powell’s number two at State, Dick Armitage.

From there the unipolarist appointments went all the way down. Of the eighteen figures who signed the PNAC’s 1998 letter to Clinton calling for regime change in Iraq, eleven took positions in the Bush administration. In addition to Armitage, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz, they were Elliott Abrams (Senior Director for Near East, Southwest Asian and North African Affairs on the National Security Council); John Bolton (Undersecretary, Arms Control and International Security); Paula Dobriansky (Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs); Zalmay Khalilzad (President’s Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Ambassador-at-Large for Free Iraqis); Richard Perle (chair of the Defense Policy Board); Peter W. Rodman (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs); William Schneider, Jr. (chair of the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board); and Robert B. Zoellick (U.S. Trade Representative). Other PNAC associates and/or prominent unipolarists who landed positions included Kenneth Adelman (Defense Policy Board), Stephen Cambone (Director of the Pentagon Office of
Program, Analysis and Evaluation); Eliot Cohen (Defense Policy Board); Devon Gaffney Cross (Defense Policy Board); Douglas Feith (Undersecretary of Defense), I.Lewis Libby (Vice President’s Chief of Staff); William Luti and Abram Shulsky (eventually, directors of the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans); James Woolsey (Defense Policy Board); and David Wurmser (Special Assistant to the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control). Cheney’s influence was amplified by the fact that his chief staff, Scooter Libby, also served as assistant to the president and national security adviser to the vice president.46

By all appearances, this extraordinary harvest of appointments put the neocons in the driver’s seat of the new administration. But, for eight months, until 9/11, they didn’t feel that way. They worried about Powell’s influence over the president; Cheney was hard to read; Bush had other priorities; and Rice wasn’t one of them. The complaining began very early. Shortly before Bush’s inauguration, Kagan declared that the incoming administration had an obvious split between its leading hawks (Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz) and leading doves (Powell and Rice), and that even Bush’s commitment to missile defense was jeopardized by it. Powell was a longtime skeptic about missile defense, Kagan noted, and he had wanted the defense post to go to his friend and longtime opponent of missile defense, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge. Rice’s viewpoint was not well defined, or at least not known, but she probably shared the skepticism of her former boss and mentor, Scowcroft. Kagan warned: “Whether the hawks or the doves prevail depends on the president, of course, but the president’s judgment will depend on whom he’s listening to. So far Bush’s missile defense briefings would seem to have come exclusively from the doves.”47

On the latter issue, he was in a position to know. Bulging with connections to the new administration, he and Kristol doled out inside dope that reflected the frustrations of their friends, and their own. Bush campaigned as an Eisenhower, they judged, not a Reagan, but America desperately needed a Reaganite president who fought for American interests and scared people: “Bush’s campaign from the beginning was designed not to scare anyone, anywhere, on any issue.” Kristol and Kagan declared that the first six months of Bush’s presidency would reveal whether he was a Reagan-style fighter; their chief consolation was that Bush appointed Rumsfeld and Rumsfeld appointed Wolfowitz.48 In the early going, Rumsfeld gave a bravura performance before Congress on missile defense while Bush gave a stumbling and incoherent account of his position to the New York Times. Responding to a White House advisor who assured him that Rumsfeld, not Bush, represented Bush’s position, Kristol replied: “I hope and trust that’s so, but at the end of the day we will need a president, not simply a team, that is up to governing.”49

The neocons did not fail to celebrate their return to power and, especially, Clinton’s loss of it. The Weekly Standard had trouble letting go of Clinton-bashing. In February the magazine ran a cover photo of Clinton with Hillary Clinton, Michael Jackson, and Denise Rich, the former wife of Marc Rich, whom
Clinton pardoned in a parting scandal; beneath the photo, the editors asked, “Why Move On? This is too much fun.” They also ran sprightly articles about Bush’s domestic policies, defending him from what David Brooks called “deranged” liberal criticism: “They’ve portrayed his tax plan as dangerously radical, some of his nominees as Confederacy-loving loons, and his voucher plan as a menace to the future of public education.”

But on the mother of all issues, the Pentagon budget, the early Bush administration stunned its supporters by announcing that it would live with Clinton’s defense budgets for 2001 and 2002. Informed by a “well-placed administration official” that Rumsfeld was blindsided by this decision, Kagan fumed at Bush’s “first broken campaign promise.” He and Kristol emphasized that Americans had been led to expect something very different: “In speech after speech on the campaign trail, Bush and Cheney had sounded the alarm about declining military strength, planes that could not fly, army divisions operating well below acceptable levels of readiness, severe shortages of spare parts, low troop morale, and a defense budget lower as a percentage of GNP than at any time since before Pearl Harbor.” On the stump, they recalled, Bush pledged to increase the budget by only $4.5 billion per year, but that was only because he didn’t want to “unnerve the soccer moms.” His aides had promised bigger defense hikes. Moreover, Bush promised to raise the research and development budget by $20 billion. Kagan caustically added that he certainly never said, “If elected, I promise to enact Bill Clinton’s defense budget.”

Having ridiculed Clinton’s defense budget day after day, how could Bush and Cheney now claim that it was good enough? After promising for months that “help is on the way” how could they dare to say, “never mind?” Kristol and Kagan didn’t buy the White House’s explanations, which ranged “from the silly to the offensive.” It was “ridiculous” to claim that the administration had to wait for Rumsfeld to complete his review of America’s security strategy; the military’s readiness problems couldn’t wait, and America needed military deployments around the globe no matter what Rumsfeld came up with. In the offensive category, White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer explained that instead of throwing money at the Joint Chiefs, the Pentagon’s new civilian bosses had to make them shape up; Kristol and Kagan told the White House to stop insulting the military: “We don’t believe the chiefs are lying about their need for more resources. If anything, they have been too timid for the past eight years.”

Kagan judged that Bush cared more about his tax cut than national security; repeatedly he and Kristol observed that the budget decision was made by political aides and Office of Management and Budget bean counters, not those who knew the military situation. At the time that Bush told Rumsfeld not to bother, Rumsfeld was drafting a supplemental appropriations bill for 2001 and working on a big defense increase for 2002. Kagan bitterly commented, “Now Rumsfeld’s plans are in disarray, and so are Bush’s vaunted proposals to revamp the military.”
On the two most important trouble spots, Iraq and China, Kristol and Kagan complained that Bush continued or even weakened Clinton’s foreign policy. Although Bush’s first National Security Council meeting put Iraq at the top of its agenda, and the second meeting featured Rumsfeld’s declaration that “what we really want to think about is going after Saddam,” “the Weekly Standard betrayed no hint of knowing that Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and CIA Director George Tenet were already building a case for regime change. Kristol and Kagan bitterly complained that in place of Clinton’s broad economic sanctions against Iraq, Bush retreated to a dumb and spineless idea of Powell’s “smart sanctions,” which targeted materials that might be used for weapons construction. Worse yet, instead of aggressively supporting the Iraqi opposition, the Bush team, “led by Powell” backed away from revolutionary action. Bush gave piddling donations to Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress, “just as the Clinton administration did,” and at the State Department, National Security Council, and CIA, there was no support for Chalabi at all. In short, the Bush policy was a weak version of the Clinton policy.

In the spirit of “let Reagan be Reagan,” Kristol and Kagan detected a fateful pattern in the early Bush administration. Bush would offer a strong immediate reaction to a problem, then back down after Powell, Rice, the bean counters, or political guru Karl Rove prevailed upon him. Upon learning that a huge Chinese telecommunications firm was helping Iraq improve its ability to shoot down American planes, Bush angrily vowed to “send a message” to China. But in Kagan’s telling, Rice “hastened to correct the president” admonishing him not to antagonize Chinese leaders or exaggerate the problem. “Then began the kowtowing,” “Kristol and Kagan lamented. Rice told reporters that the White House didn’t accuse the Chinese government of anything, and Bush asked Beijing to “investigate” its military assistance to Iraq. He also declared that he wanted a trusting relationship with Chinese leaders; Kristol and Kagan bitterly replied: “Trust Syria. Trust Jordan. Trust China. We wonder how far this trust will go.”

On April 1, an American surveillance plane flying over international waters in the South China Sea collided with a Chinese fighter; the Chinese pilot crashed and the crippled American plane was forced to land in Chinese territory. Angered by the reckless tactics of the Chinese pilot, Bush demanded the “prompt and safe” return of the crew, but Powell changed the message to “regrets” over a “tragic accident.” Kagan and Kristol said that “in the real world, and in Beijing’s world, Powell’s statements represented a partial capitulation, with real-world consequences.” Bush retreated to a vague regret of his own, then caved all the way to declaring that the United States was “very sorry” for violating Chinese airspace during the landing. Kagan and Kristol exploded at “the profound national humiliation that President Bush has brought upon the United States.” The accident was caused by the aggressive and dangerous maneuvers of the Chinese pilot, they argued; increasingly, these interception tactics were China’s policy. Chinese leaders wanted the United States out of the South China Sea.
They were “increasingly bold” in flexing their military prowess, they tested the mettle of the new president, and Bush failed the test: “This defeat and humiliation, as another president once said, must not stand. We have glimpsed the future. The only question now is whether we have the wisdom and the strength to meet it.”

This attack infuriated Cheney and Powell. Cheney called it “one of the more disreputable commentaries I’ve seen in a long time,” charging that Kristol abused the administration to sell magazines. Powell called the column “absurd.” Kristol, having supported McCain, was far from Bush’s favorite neocon; now he teetered on the edge of becoming a pariah at the White House. Two weeks later he and Kagan stridently campaigned to make one of Bush’s “gaffes” stand up. Asked if he would defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack, Bush eschewed the standard doubletalk and bluntly replied, “Yes. Whatever it takes.” Kristol and Kagan glimpsed the dawn of a new era in these four words. Kagan announced that Bush’s reply destroyed the pretense behind America’s “One China” policy, even if Bush claimed otherwise: “No matter how often Bush repeats the ‘One China’ mantra, as a practical matter American policy will be based on the principle of two Chinas, not one. And before long, as the pressures of this confrontation grow, other revered China policy shibboleths will begin to topple, such as the myth that the United States can engage the Beijing oligarchs as an economic friend while it confronts them as a military adversary.” America was finished with Kissinger’s Machiavellian China policy. It no longer needed a policy of strategic ambiguity, no matter what the corporate executives and old China hands pleaded, because the Soviet threat no longer existed: “With a few words Bush has dragged the United States across the threshold from the era of illusions into the era of reality. That can never be a bad thing. And it was not a mistake.”

In May, Kristol and Kagan defended Rumsfeld again against the White House, this time over the status of the United States’ military exchange program with China. Rumsfeld suspended the program; Rice “went ballistic,” according to Kristol and Kagan; and the White House revoked Rumsfeld’s decision, thus inflicting upon him “a second public humiliation in less than three months.” These “screw ups” were piling up, they admonished; having touted their superior skill and maturity over the Clinton administration, perhaps it was time for Bush officials to apologize to Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, and William Cohen. Off the record, White House and State Department officials told reporters that Bush had erred in asserting that America would defend Taiwan against China; publicly they assured that Bush’s statement implied no change in U.S. policy; Kristol and Kagan replied that these claims were “preposterous” and “insulting to the president.” Bush was wrong to humiliate Rumsfeld, but it was just as wrong for his advisors to make him look too “ill-informed to determine American foreign policy.” Among administration officials, only Cheney affirmed that Bush had changed America’s China policy to a position of unambiguous commitment to the defense of Taiwan. Kristol and Kagan hoped that Cheney was right, but
held their doubts: “Every apparent move in the direction of a tougher and more realistic policy toward Beijing is followed almost instantaneously by a hedge or a retreat back toward the policies of the Clinton administration.”

The *Weekly Standard* gave praise where it was due, from a neocon perspective. Although Bush’s unipolarism was half-baked, he had its unilateralist spirit. Defying most of Europe and much of the United States foreign policy establishment, he rejected the ABM Treaty; daring to offend most of the world, he repudiated the Kyoto Protocol on global climate change. Kristol appreciated that Bush did not shrink from scaring people. In June the *Weekly Standard* celebrated what it called “the new American unilateralism “running a cover story by Krauthammer on the Bush Doctrine. According to Krauthammer, Bush accepted that the first and foremost purpose of American foreign policy was to maintain America’s preeminence. Although many Americans strangely desired “a diminished America and a world reverted to multipolarity,” Bush understood that the best and most peaceful world order was likely to occur “under a single hegemon” and that America was a new kind of imperial power, one that promoted democracy and freedom.

But unipolarism on the cheap was a contradiction in terms. Writing in the *Weekly Standard*, PNAC deputy director Tom Donnelly reported knowingly that the White House blindsided even Cheney when it stuck with Clinton’s defense budgets. In June the White House sought a supplemental $5.6 billion for defense, but that was pocket change by PNAC standards. Donnelly added that Rumsfeld’s heralded strategic review “shows every sign of becoming a fiasco.” Dozens of panels were working more or less on their own, the review had no overarching guidance, and Rumsfeld had begun to downplay expectations for it. Donnelly came close to charging betrayal. Bush and Cheney had repeatedly condemned Clinton for neglecting the military, he observed, but if they did not dramatically change direction very soon, the same thing would be true of them.

So many members of the Project for the New American Century had taken positions in the Bush administration that the PNAC had to recruit a whole new group of luminaries. Yet the Bush administration was hardly any better than the derided Clinton liberals, because the bean counters and political spinmasters were running the Bush administration. By July Kristol and Kagan were so exasperated that they advised “two old friends,” Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, to resign in protest: “Right now that may be the best service they could perform for their country, for it may be the only way to focus the attention of the American people—and the Bush administration—on the impending evisceration of the American military.” According to the vice chiefs of staff, the services needed an extra $32.4 billion over Clinton’s budget just to cover the cost of current maintenance, never mind new weapons or military transformation. The Army needed $9.5 billion, the Navy $12.4 billion, the Air Force $9.1 billion, and the Marines $1.4 billion. Rumsfeld requested an additional $35 billion for fiscal year 2002, but for the third time in six months, Kristol and Kagan reported, he “had his head handed to him by the White House.”
The campaign promises of 2000 were long forgotten, and “retreat and retrenchment” were on. Kristol and Kagan warned that Bush’s proposed defense budget of $329 billion (which represented 3 percent of GDP) would require military pullbacks from Europe and an abandonment of the two-war strategy. Bush officials were sure to give “whiz-kid” reasons for abandoning the two-war standard, they predicted, but the truth was that they simply couldn’t afford it. Kristol and Kagan protested that a global hegemon has to be able to win full-scale wars against different aggressors in different parts of the world at the same time. Retreating to a one-war strategy really meant retreating to a no-war strategy, because a one-war America would not want to make itself defenseless against a second enemy. In 1991 the United States used eight of the Army’s eighteen divisions to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. But ten years later the Army was down to ten divisions, which cast doubt on America’s capacity to overthrow Saddam while retaining hegemonic force projection elsewhere: “In practice, assembling a heavy armored force of even 4 divisions to defeat Saddam’s army and then occupy Iraq would require every heavy unit based in Korea, Europe, and the United States.” Bush invested in missile defense, they acknowledged, but a missile shield was not likely to deter anyone if America lost its capacity to project force abroad.62

In mid-July Wolfowitz gutsily told Congress that it was “reckless” for the administration to “press our luck or gamble with our children’s future” by spending only 3 percent of the gross domestic product on defense. Kristol and Kagan replied, “All honor to Wolfowitz for telling the truth about his own administration’s ‘reckless’ defense budget.” Asking Cheney to intervene, they warned that “if the president does not reverse course now, he may go down in history as the man who let American power atrophy and America’s post-Cold War preeminence slip away—the president who fiddled with tax cuts while the military burned.” Kagan added that Bush’s Clintonesque approach to the military probably explained his Clintonesque Iraq policy. Bush feared that he couldn’t afford to fight Saddam, “or, to be more precise, he doesn’t want to afford it.”63

Right up to 9/11, the Weekly Standard blasted Bush’s “soft” positions on China, Iraq, the Middle East in general, and defense spending. Not coincidentally it confirmed popular suspicions that Karl Rove, a campaign consultant by profession, was running the country. National Review and The American Enterprise resisted the common media tendency to view Bush as a product of his handlers, but before 9/11, the Weekly Standard displayed less concern for his image. In late August Fred Barnes observed that Rove was cocksure, aggressive, widely feared, and “first among supposed equals in advising Bush, cabinet members included.” Bush’s entire agenda was driven by Rove’s political maneuvering, Barnes reported: “Rarely has a president’s success depended so much on the skill of a single advisor. It’s only a slight exaggeration to say: As Rove goes, so goes Bush.” But Kristol and Kagan protested that Bush was going in the wrong direction on the things that mattered most. As long as Bush had to worry about soccer mom anti-interventionism and the political tradeoffs between
cutting taxes and hiking the military budget, the *Weekly Standard* had one cheer for Karl Rove.\(^{64}\)

Eight days before 9/11, the *Weekly Standard* spelled out its solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict: a devastating war of invasion, seizure, destruction, separation, and evacuation. Setting up Krauthammer’s cover story, Kristol and Kagan implored the Bush administration to “give Israel a green light” to settle the Israeli/Palestine dispute. Krauthammer explained that the green light was for a fullscale war: “The Israeli strike will have to be massive and overwhelming. And it will have to be quick.” Israel could not expect more than a week’s forebearance by the United States, he advised. The Arab nations would immediately call for world action through the U.N. Security Council, and “the pressure on the United States will be enormous. But it must give Israel the few days it needs to disarm and defeat Arafat.”\(^{65}\)

Krauthammer assured that Israel had no desire to occupy the Palestinian territories. Upon smashing Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Palestinian Authority, Israel would leave Palestinian chaos behind, build a wall between it and Israel, abandon Israel’s most far-flung settlements, and hope that Palestinian chaos might yield something better: “Chaos will yield new leadership. That leadership, having seen the devastation and destruction wrought by Israel in response to Arafat’s unyielding belligerence, might be inclined to eschew belligerence.” Israel would build a wall that suited its security needs and permit a livable situation for the Palestinians, he explained. And if a decent Palestinian leadership emerged, Israel could always remove the wall. In the meantime there were only two choices: the guerrilla war of the status quo, or Israel’s war to destroy Palestinian terrorism. Sooner or later, he argued, Israel had to take its only real choice: “strike, expel, separate, and evacuate.”\(^{66}\)

**Wanted: Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein**

Paul Wolfowitz and the *Weekly Standard* were on the same wavelength before 9/11. After the terrorists struck on 9/11, Wolfowitz pressed President Bush to see the world as they did. In his national address on the evening of 9/11, Bush declared that the United States would make “no distinction between those who planned these acts and those who harbor them.” The following day, Bush startled counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke and Clarke’s assistant Lisa Gordon-Hagerty by pressing them to find a connection between Saddam and the attacks. Clarke was incredulous: “But Mr. President, al Qaeda did this.” Al Qaeda had state sponsors, Clarke acknowledged, but Iraq was not one of them. Bush was adamant; he wanted Clarke to “go back over everything, everything. See if Saddam did this. See if he’s linked in any way.” After Bush departed, Gordon-Hagerty shook her head and remarked, “Wolfowitz got to him.” Wolfowitz wanted the U.S. to wage a global war against terrorism that began with Iraq and Afghanistan. On September 13 he declared at a press conference that the United States was committed not merely to capturing terrorists and holding them
accountable, “but removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems, ending states who sponsor terrorism. It will be a campaign, not a single action. And we’re going to keep after these people and the people who support them until it stops.” That announcement earned a public rebuke from Colin Powell, who countered that America’s goal was to “end terrorism,” not launch wars upon sovereign states, and that Wolfowitz spoke for himself, not the administration.67

But the developing Bush Doctrine led to Wolfowitz’s position, not Powell’s. Bush, Rice, Powell, and Wolfowitz all worried that the United States might get bogged down for months in Afghanistan; to Wolfowitz, this was another reason to attack Iraq immediately. On September 15 he argued at a war planning meeting at Camp David that Iraq was a brittle desert dictatorship that might break in a few weeks; overthrowing Saddam would give the United States an inspiring victory while American troops slogged through the mountains of Afghanistan. Rumsfeld supported Wolfowitz; Powell countered that attacking Iraq without any evidence of Iraqi involvement in the September 11 attack would alienate America’s allies; later Powell shared an eye-roll with Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Hugh Shelton, exclaiming, “What the hell…what are these guys thinking about? Can’t you get these guys back in the box?” Bush sided with Powell for the moment, but he told Perle that after the U.S. disposed of Afghanistan it would be Iraq’s turn. Perle later reflected that Wolfowitz planted the seed. It helped, however, that talking about overthrowing Iraq was far from new in the Bush administration.68

With a tin ear for connotations, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld wanted to call the war “Operation Infinite Justice”, a name that suggested permanent war and the terrorists’ conceit of a holy war between religions. They lost the argument about attacking Iraq but not the larger argument about the scope and meaning of the war against terrorism.

Wolfowitz apologized for raising a public fuss about “ending states” but on September 16 Cheney declared, “If you provide sanctuary to terrorists, you face the full wrath of the United States of America.” Four days later, speaking to Congress, Bush declared war against all terrorist groups and “every government that supports them.” The war against terrorism began with al-Qaeda, he asserted, but “it does not end there.” It targeted “every terrorist group of global reach.” Although he made no specific vow to overthrow Saddam, Bush embraced the Wolfowitz/Rumsfeld conception of the war against terrorism, including Wolfowitz’s contention that Saddam had to be overthrown, sooner or later, whether or not he had a direct connection to 9/11. Bush didn’t know what to call the war—the Pentagon soon dropped “Operation Infinite Justice”—but he was very clear that it would not be merely Desert Storm II.69

Kristol’s group seized the moment, plugging hard for a global crusade against terrorism, lifting Saddam above al-Qaeda as an immediate threat to America, and supporting Wolfowitz against a barrage of Powell-favoring commentary in the prestige media. Characterizing the battle between Powell and Wolfowitz as a “brutal, take-no-prisoners affair” Kagan protested that Powell was always
described by the elite press as careful, commanding, pragmatic, deliberate, and reassuring, while Wolfowitz was routinely described as ideological, emotional, conservative, and “just a tad unbalanced.” The Washington Post called Wolfowitz “an interventionist by nature”; Kagan replied that the scholarly Wolfowitz thus didn’t get credit for thinking. Wolfowitz intervened out of impulse, unlike Powell, who used careful thought. From the press coverage, Kagan objected, one would never know that Wolfowitz was “an immensely accomplished public servant” or that Powell was “profoundly wrong” the last time they fought over a huge policy issue. In 1990 Powell wanted to impose economic sanctions on Iraq and draw the line at Saudi Arabia.70

The Weekly Standard made no pretense of concentrating on the terrorists who actually attacked America, which smacked of mere police action. Even liberals were eager to destroy al-Qaeda; from the beginning Kristol and Kagan hunted bigger game, urging that al-Qaeda was just the beginning of the war against terrorism and not its most important part. Addressing the NATO ministers meeting in Brussels on September 26, Wolfowitz declared that “while we’ll try to find every snake in the swamp, the essence of the strategy is draining the swamp.” There was an “alarming coincidence” between the states that sheltered terrorists and those that sought weapons of mass destruction, he warned. Wolfowitz eschewed specifics, but the Weekly Standard adorned its October 1 issue with a poster reading: “Wanted: Osama bin Laden [and] Saddam Hussein.” Even that suggested more symmetry than they had in mind, however. Citing the president’s vow to destroy “every terrorist group of global reach” Kristol and Kagan declared: “We trust these words will reverberate far beyond Kabul, in Tehran, Damascus, Khartoum, and above all, in Baghdad.”71

Iraq was the prize. Afghanistan was a wasteland and geopolitical nothing, they argued, but Iraq was the key to the Middle East: “Saddam Hussein, because of his strategic position in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, surely represents a more potent challenge to the United States and its interests and principles than the weak, isolated, and we trust, soon-to-be crushed Taliban.” Al-Qaeda had no weapons of mass destruction and was about to lose its sanctuary in Afghanistan, but Saddam had chemical and biological weapons, wanted nuclear weapons, and had a powerful state apparatus at his disposal. To Kristol and Kagan, it was inconceivable that the United States would destroy al-Qaeda’s Taliban base without overthrowing Saddam. They lauded Bush’s September 20th address to Congress for establishing “that taking decisive action against Saddam does not require absolute proof linking Iraq to last week’s attack.” That was absolutely crucial, they contended; 9/11 opened the door to a worldwide American war against terrorism, not merely a police-action response to 9/11: “The war on anti-American terrorism must target Hezbollah, the terrorist group backed by Iran and Syria, as well as the Taliban. And it must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power.”72

Kristol and Kagan admonished their neo-imperialist friends in the Bush administration to remember who they were. In 1998 they had urged Clinton to
remove Saddam from power; now it was their job to do it: “The signatories of that 1998 letter are today a Who’s Who of senior ranking officials in this administration: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of State John Bolton, Undersecretary of State Paula Dobriansky, Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman, and National Security Council senior officials Elliott Abrams and Zalmay Khalilzad. If those Bush administration officials believed it was essential to bring about a change of regime in Iraq three years ago, they must believe it is even more essential today. Last week we lost more than 6,000 Americans to terrorism. How many more could we lose in a world where Saddam Hussein continues to thrive and continues his quest for weapons of mass destruction?”

Recycling Kristol’s talking points, the Project for the New American Century sent a new letter to the president on September 20. Like the Weekly Standard, PNAC took a two-sentence pass at al-Qaeda, emphasized Iraq, and called for antiterrorist action against Hezbollah and the Palestinian Authority. In addition to providing “full military and financial support to the Iraqi opposition” it urged, American forces had to be ready “to back up our commitment to the Iraqi opposition by all necessary means” a euphemism for invasion. The PNAC also admonished Bush that global war is expensive: “A serious and victorious war on terrorism will require a large increase in defense spending. Fighting this war may well require the United States to engage a well-armed foe, and will also require that we remain capable of defending our interests elsewhere in the world. We urge that there be no hesitation in requesting whatever funds for defense are needed to allow us to win this war.” New PNAC signatories included Jeane Kirkpatrick, Charles Krauthammer, New Republic publisher Martin Peretz, and New Republic literary critic Leon Wieseltier.

Just days before 9/11, Time magazine asked where Powell had gone; he had seemed to disappear during the administration’s first eight months. Kristol and Kagan never felt that Powell was invisible; they detected his influence over the cautious, underfunded, and overly diplomatic foreign policy they disliked. But after 9/11 they ardently wished that he had disappeared. Powell spoke constantly on television, tried to steer Bush away from crusading rhetoric, and assembled a pro-American coalition for the war on terrorism. He ranged widely in his efforts to enlist antiterrorist cooperation with the United States, seeking help from Iran and Syria. Kristol and Kagan were appalled. Iran had been “the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism” for over two decades, they protested. Iran sponsored Hezbollah, which specialized in massacres of Israelis and Americans. Powell couldn’t sweet talk the Iranian government and fight Hezbollah at the same time, and thus, “incredibly” the Bush administration declined to fight Hezbollah or even freeze its bank accounts: “Can one plausibly claim to be fighting a war against terrorism if Hezbollah is off the target list?”
Worse yet, Powell’s coalition-building led straight to U.N. nonsense about the existence of a “peace process” between Israel and the Palestinians. In October Bush declared that he favored a Palestinian state. Kristol and Kagan noted that Bush had previously said nothing about a Palestinian state; his newfound conviction on the subject was obviously a ploy “to appease the so-called ‘Arab street.’” This ploy was pathetic in every way, they admonished. Osama bin Laden cared nothing about the peace process and, in fact, Arab leaders cared next to nothing about it. More important, Bush’s pandering sent a terrible message that the Arab street was sure to get: “Just think for a moment about the message the president, at the secretary of state’s direction, was really (if inadvertently) sending: Terrorism works.” Kristol and Kagan protested that to the Palestinians and Arabs who cheered the terrorist assault on America, “Bush’s statement told them they were right to celebrate. Kill enough Americans, and the Americans give ground. Bush’s statement last week was thus not a blow against terrorism. It was a reward for terrorism.” Bush heightened bin Laden’s heroism to the Arab masses by certifying that Israel could be damaged by waging terrorism against Americans.

How could Bush have blundered so disastrously? Kristol and Kagan pointed to Powell: “We fear that his understandable admiration for Secretary of State Powell, the man, has clouded his judgment about Powell the strategist.” It was time to bring Powell down, at least as a policy maker. Powell tried to avoid the Gulf War in 1990, he insisted on leaving Saddam in power in 1991, and he prized coalitional politics. Put more sharply, he hadn’t changed between 1990 and 2001; Powell was still “preoccupied with coalitions, resistant to the use of American military might, and hostile to regime change.” His failings had done minimal damage in the past, because America had not been attacked, but the war against terrorism was a world war: “We must severely punish the aggression against America, and we must either deter or destroy other enemies considering or planning such acts.” Kristol and Kagan doubted that Powell was up to it, and they knew that his strategy was a loser. To a selfrespecting, hegemonic America, coalitional allies were helpful; to Powell, the coalition itself was the strategy. Powell’s assistant, Dick Armitage, said that the “coalition” would decide which terrorist groups to attack; Kagan replied, “Well, thanks. Maybe when ‘the coalition’ finishes discussing the matter, someone will let us Americans know what they decide.”

In a coalition, Kagan reasoned, “you’re either leading them or they’re leading you.” Disastrously, Powell was willing to be led; even worse, he was eager to make alliances with terrorists to destroy other terrorists. Kristol and Kagan warned that if the United States made Phase One deals with Hezbollah and the Iranian govern ment it would never get to the Phase Two work of destroying them. They worried that Powell was sapping Bush’s self-respect. How else to explain Bush’s inane statement that the United States wanted to work with Israel and the Palestinian Authority “to bring the level of terror down to an acceptable level for both?” In pursuit of an acceptable level of terror for the terrorists and
their victims, Bush pressured Israel not to give up on the peace process, despite Palestinian terrorism; otherwise the war on terrorism would be undermined. Kristol and Kagan bitterly explained the logic: “One of our allies must turn a blind eye to terror for the sake of a coalition with terror-supporting states in the pursuit of the war on terrorism. This is the level of incoherence to which the secretary of state has led the president.” If Powell’s approach prevailed, they warned, the war on terrorism would be brief, compromised, and futile, for Powell offered “timidity disguised as prudence.”

Max Boot and the American Empire

A month after 9/11, the Weekly Standard featured a cover photo of a flag-raising aboard a Navy ship, accompanied by the bold title of its main article, “The Case for American Empire,” by Max Boot. In essence, Boot argued that imperialist realism was America’s most realistic option; 9/11 was a wake-up call for the United States to unambiguously embrace its imperial responsibilities.

A 1991 graduate of the University of California at Berkeley and holder of a master’s degree in European history from Yale, Boot joined the Wall Street Journal staff in 1994, wrote on business, finance, and legal reform, and was promoted to editorial features editor in 1997. Later he took a senior fellowship at the Council on Foreign Relations. In October 2001 he was just beginning to make a name as a foreign policy writer. His book, The Savage Wars of Peace: The Forgotten History of Americas Small Wars (2002) was in press, and a few months earlier he had reviewed Henry Kissinger’s new book for the Weekly Standard. “The Case for American Empire” made a case against the post-9/11 suggestion that perhaps America was too aggressive in the world, making too many enemies along the way. Boot argued that the truth was the exact opposite. America’s problem was that it felt conflicted in its imperial role and thus emboldened its enemies: “The September 11 attack was a result of insufficient American involvement and ambition; the solution is to be more expansive in our goals and more assertive in their implementation.”

Did America err by arming the mujahideen in Afghanistan, some of whom later turned against the United States? This species of self-criticism was nonsense, Boot argued; America had to support the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan. The United States had erred only by withdrawing from Afghanistan after 1989. George H.W.Bush thought it didn’t matter who ruled remote and worthless Afghanistan, as long as it wasn’t the Soviets. If modernity-hating “homicidal mullahs” filled the vacuum, so what? Now we know the answer, Boot replied: “The answer lies in the rubble of the World Trade Center and Pentagon.”

Boot judged that the Clinton administration did much better in Bosnia and Kosovo, which could have turned into an Afghanistan-type nightmare: “U.S. imperialism—a liberal and humanitarian imperialism, to be sure, but imperialism all the same—appears to have paid off in the Balkans.” But in other cases
Clinton was “scandalously irresolute in the assertion of U.S. power.” He bailed out of Somalia after eighteen soldiers were killed, just like Reagan cut and ran from Lebanon; in 1998 Clinton responded to the attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by hitting bin Laden’s training camps with cruise missiles, not ground troops. “Those attacks were indeed symbolic, though not in the way Clinton intended,” Boot wrote. “They symbolized not U.S. determination but rather passivity in the face of terrorism.” A month before the presidential election of 2000, al-Qaeda attacked the USS Cole, but neither Clinton nor his successor retaliated. “All these displays of weakness emboldened our enemies to commit greater and more outrageous acts of aggression” he charged. Just as the West encouraged Japan to become more aggressive by failing to contest its occupation of Manchuria in the 1930s, and the Western democracies encouraged the Axis powers by failing to contest Mussolini’s incursion into Abyssinia, America gave radical Islamists the impression that they could commit mass murder with impunity: “The question is whether, having now been attacked, we will act as a great power should.”

Boot recalled that, in the nineteenth century, Western armies had to stabilize vast areas that the crumbling Ottoman, Mughal, and Safavid imperial authorities could no longer control. Generations of British soldiers imposed order on parts of the world that had since become American problems: Afghanistan, Sudan, Libya, Egypt, Arabia, Mesopotamia (Iraq), Palestine, Persia, the Northwest Frontier (Pakistan). Although usually described as “nation building” he argued, the imperial burden of creating order out of anarchy and civil war is better described as “state building,” for the tasks of nation building, although not impossible (England did it in India) are very arduous, long term, and slippery. State building is more practical and concrete, as the United States showed in Haiti from 1915 to 1933, the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924, Cuba from 1899 to 1902 and 1906 to 1909, Nicaragua from 1926 to 1933, and the Philippines from 1899 to 1935, “to say nothing of the achievements of generals Lucius Clay in Germany and Douglas MacArthur in Japan.” In The Savage Wars of Peace, Boot observed that in small imperial wars the role of the military is often akin to that of a police department: “It is expected to keep the criminals at bay, not to stamp out criminality altogether. The armed forces do not necessarily have to win a counterinsurgency; sometimes it is enough not to lose.” By that standard even the United States’ imperial flops in Latin America—such as Nicaragua—were not failures.

Shortly before the bombs fell in Afghanistan, Boot argued that the United States needed to stay in Afghanistan after it destroyed the Taliban. The United States and its allies would need to feed people, manage hospitals, and impose the rule of law: “This is what we did for the defeated peoples of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and it is a service that we should extend to the oppressed people of Afghanistan as well.” Unlike the nineteenth-century European imperialists, the United States had no interest in colonizing anybody, but its imperial responsibilities were otherwise not much different. Boot predicted that after the
Taliban no longer existed, the United States would turn to Iraq. It didn’t matter whether Saddam had anything to do with 9/11. He earned a death sentence long before that, and his determination to acquire weapons of mass destruction made his regime intolerable. A fairly large invasion force would be needed to get rid of Saddam, Boot judged, and he hoped that once it was done, Americans would have a new maturity about their imperial role in the world.83

He recalled that on August 14, 1941, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt met on a battleship in the North Atlantic to decide what the world should be like after World War II. Their Atlantic Charter was a vision of a liberal, postcolonial world order. Boot wanted American leaders and their Western allies to give similar thought to the kind of world order that they wanted. Once they did so, they would see “that ambitious goals—such as ‘regime change’—are also the most realistic.”84 The British Empire collapsed because it exhausted itself fighting two world wars, but both wars might have been prevented if England had invested sufficiently in its military. During England’s imperial heyday from 1870 to 1913, Boot observed, its defense spending averaged only 3.1 percent of gross domestic product and barely 1 percent of its population served in the armed forces—“hardly a crippling burden.” In the United States, the current figures were 2.9 percent of GDP and 0.5 percent of the population. America’s military was incomparably more powerful than Queen Victoria’s, of course, but America needed to spend more to police its empire and put down its enemies.85

**Entering Phase Two**

Kristol and Kagan used their columns, television appearances, and the Project for the New American Century to make the case for extending the war to Iraq, Iran, and Hezbollah, usually in that order. “This war will not end in Afghanistan “they vowed in late October. “It could well require the use of American military power in multiple places simultaneously. It is going to resemble the clash of civilizations that everyone has hoped to avoid. And it is going to put enormous and perhaps unbearable strain on parts of an international coalition that today basks in contented consensus.”86 They fretted over Powell’s popular standing and influence. Rumsfeld had assured that the Pentagon, not Powell, would be driving America’s defense policy by the time the war started. Kristol and Kagan expressed relief when that turned out to be true, and noted with delight that Rice had turned into a hawk, throwing her support behind Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz; they refrained from noting that several months before 9/11, Rice had begun meeting with Kristol, and let on that she was becoming less of a realpolitiker. Still, they worried about Powell’s ability to sandbag Phase Two after the easy part, Afghanistan, was over. Kristol observed incredulously that Powell still believed that Iraq could be contained: “If it were up to him, he’d keep pressing to implement his ‘smart sanctions.’” Kagan and Kristol warned that Powell might wreck the Iraqi part of Phase Two by getting the U.N. weapons inspectors back into Iraq.87
In his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush clarified the nature of the war on terrorism, and hammered the last plank of the Bush Doctrine, by condemning Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an “axis of evil.” Many State Department officials were stunned by the speech and tried to play it down. Powell, however, made a public show of solidarity with the president, even as he worked to slow down Bush’s march to war. On February 6th, Powell told the House International Relations Committee that Bush was committed to “regime change” in Iraq, that he firmly supported Bush’s position, and that overthrowing Saddam was something the United States “might have to do alone.” On the “axis of evil” formulation, he reported that “all of us had seen [it] beforehand” and that “we will not shrink back from that early clarity of purpose.” Diplomatic dialogue with Iraq had become pointless, he argued, though he still wanted the U.N. weapons inspectors to return to Iraq without conditions. Speaking directly to Iraq, he declared: “We don’t trust you, and that’s why we need inspectors, and that’s why they have to be free to do it any way that they think is appropriate to establish that you are not conducting the activities that we suspect you of, which you claim you are not doing.” The situation in Iran was almost equally grim, he judged, although at least there were some progressive elements in Iran with whom dialogue might be possible; as for North Korea, which was too dangerous not to be dealt with diplomatically, the United States was ready to talk “anytime, anyplace, anywhere, under any set of conditions and with no previously set agenda.”

Kagan rejoiced that Powell had “veered sharply to the hard line,” comparing his performance to George Shultz’s dramatic defense of Reagan’s controversial policies in Central America at a congressional hearing in February 1985. Shultz was known as the Reagan administration’s reasonable moderate, and his surprisingly fiery performance knocked opponents on their heels. Kagan hoped that Powell would do the same thing for Bush 43’s overthrow of Saddam. “The driving forces behind Bush’s revolutionary global strategy with the administration—Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz—are not always its most effective salesmen on the outside,” he acknowledged. “Their evident disdain for the NATO allies, and for world opinion in general, has unnecessarily hurt Bush’s cause abroad, which may in turn strengthen Bush’s opponents in Washington.” Powell had the stature and skill to deliver the political goods. Even a stridently unipolarist administration needed diplomats, and Powell was still a unipolarist of sorts. He could “bend international opinion in Bush’s direction” on the need for regime change in Iraq and make America’s nervous allies less nervous: “He actually cares about the allies and has experience working with them, both as a diplomat and, a decade ago, as a commanding general.” For a while, the PNAC unipolarists reasoned that perhaps they needed Powell after all.

In January Kristol and Kagan reported that “respectable” types at the State Department got embarrassed if one asked about extending the war on terrorism to Iraq. To them it was too soon to ask, because they were still mopping up in Afghanistan. To Kristol and Kagan the war against Iraq was far overdue. It was
true that the United States needed to capture bin Laden, destroy al-Qaeda, and build a functional government in Afghanistan, they acknowledged, but none of this precluded invading Iraq. The Iraqi threat got bigger every day “and it can’t wait until we finish tying up all the ‘loose ends.’” Al-Qaeda was important, but not nearly as important as Iraq, for Iraq was the supreme test of America’s benevolent global hegemony. “Whether or not we remove Saddam Hussein from power will shape the contours of the emerging world order, perhaps for decades to come,” “they explained. The new world order would either tolerate tyrants or not. To merely contain Saddam would ensure that terrorist thugs of his kind “will be a constant—and growing—feature of our world.” Thus, the question of Iraq was “the supreme test of whether we as a nation have learned the lesson of September 11.”

Democratic Senator Tom Daschle opposed unilateral invasions on principle and objected that invading Iraq would divert attention from destroying al-Qaeda; others claimed that the cure of war and occupation would be worse than the disease. Kristol and Kagan replied that all of this was complete nonsense. “It is almost impossible to imagine any outcome for the world both plausible and worse than the disease of Saddam with weapons of mass destruction,” they argued. “A fractured Iraq? An unsettled Kurdish situation? A difficult transition in Baghdad? These may be problems, but they are far preferable to leaving Saddam in power with his nukes, VX, and anthrax.” The diversion argument was a red herring. America fought Japan and Germany at the same time, and America was far more powerful in 2002 than it was in 1941. As for unilateralism versus multilateralism, Kristol and Kagan hoped that other countries would support the United States and share its burdens, but that was up to them. There was too much at stake to be slowed or deterred by the objections “of, say, Saudi Arabia or France.”

They cautioned in January 2002 that this would be a big job, certainly too big to be handled by precision bombing, U.S. Special Forces, and the Iraqi National Congress. America would have to use substantial ground forces to destroy Saddam’s regime and occupy the country. Once the United States controlled Iraq, it would have to maintain control for a significant period, keeping Iran in line, quelling Turkey’s fears about a Kurdish nation, and building a stable, pro-Western Iraqi state that moved toward democratic governance. Kristol and Kagan acknowledged that many Americans lacked the “stomach” for this prescription of war, occupation, nation-building, Westernization, and democratization. Wouldn’t more containment be preferable? Or failing that, couldn’t the United States settle for bombing runs and letting the Iraqis fight it out? They answered that September 11 was the answer. The Bush 41 and Clinton administrations had shied away from the responsibility of a global power to fight and occupy in a huge, risky, ambitious way. Now Americans had to grow up and face their responsibilities. Kristol and Kagan believed that Bush 43 got the picture: “We expect the president will courageously decide to destroy Saddam’s
regime. No step would contribute more toward shaping a world order in which our people and our liberal civilization can survive and flourish.”92

Although the PNAC unipolarists said that Bush became one of them on 9/11, they only trusted that it was true after his 2002 State of the Union address focused on the war against terrorism and the “axis of evil.” Kristol and Kagan enthused: “By declaring a new ‘Axis of Evil’ comprising brutal dictatorships with far-advanced programs to build weapons of mass destruction, Bush has charted the course of an expansive new American foreign policy, a paradigm shift equal to the inauguration of anti-Communist containment more than a half century ago.” They cheered that he dismissed every rule in the foreign policy establishment book, ignoring the United Nations, the Israeli/Palestinian peace process, and nervous State Department objections to labeling the Iranian regime “evil.” Fred Barnes added that Bush did not hold dialogues with foreign allies about strategy or negotiate with them, as Clinton routinely did: “He informs them of what he’s planning to do and invites them to come along.” His budget for fiscal year 2003 boosted defense spending by $38 billion, added another $10 billion as a war reserve, and planned for bigger increases to come. This was not as much as Kristol’s group wanted, but it was a start. The disappointments and harsh assessments of merely six months past now seemed remote. The Weekly Standard wished that Bush would get around to saying that China was evil, too; otherwise, it enthused that he had become “a full-blown war president” who surprisingly fulfilled the dreams of his unipolarist appointees.93

Traveling through northern Asia, Bush affirmed his solidarity with Taiwan, lectured the Chinese about the rights of individuals, and declared that he would not change his view of North Korean dictator Kim Jong II “until he frees his people.” “September 11 really did change everything” Kagan and Kristol observed. “George W. Bush is now a man with a mission. As it happens, it is America’s historic mission.”94

For months the Weekly Standard had hoped that Bush would absorb Cheney’s PNAC worldview; now it editorialized that Bush was more trustworthy than Cheney on foreign policy. In January Bush resolved to have no further dealings with Yasser Arafat after Arafat lied to him about a shipment of arms from Iran that was captured aboard the Palestinian freighter Karine A. Two months later, while touring the Middle East to drum up support for an American invasion of Iraq, Cheney agreed to meet with Arafat as a favor to the Saudi royal family and other Arab leaders. Cheney wanted the meeting to take place in Cairo, which would have delivered Arafat from virtual house arrest in Ramallah. Although the meeting was subsequently canceled, Kristol and Kagan blasted Cheney for rehabilitating Arafat and coddling the Saudis. Cheney praised Crown Prince Abdullah for receiving him warmly; Kristol and Kagan replied that what was needed was “a frosty session with the Saudi royal family.” The Saudi government funded the Taliban, supported radical Islamism, recycled the Jewish blood libel, and played dumb when fifteen of the 9/11 hijackers turned out to be Saudis. Kristol and Kagan admonished that the Bush Doctrine applied to Arafat and that
the time for coddling the Saudis was long past: “We trust the damage done in the past two weeks can be repaired and that the administration can find its way back to the straight route President Bush had charted.”

But on March 28 Israel invaded the West Bank, battered its cities with tanks, bulldozers, and ground troops, smashed the Palestinian security forces, and stormed Arafat’s compound in Ramallah. It was not the total war against Al Aksa, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Authority that Krauthammer and the *Weekly Standard* called for, but it was not designed to last only a few days, either. On March 30, Bush sided with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, pointedly blaming Arafat for bringing Israel’s retaliatory violence upon himself: “Yasir Arafat should have done more three weeks ago, and should do more today.” On the same day, however, the United States supported U.N. Resolution 1402, which called Sharon to remove his forces from West Bank cities; five days later Bush declared that “enough is enough,” which sickened his neocon supporters. While condemning the terrorism of Al Aksa, Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, “and all the groups which oppose the peace process and seek the destruction of Israel” Bush told Sharon to halt Israel’s incursions and withdraw from the cities it occupied: “I expect better leadership and I expect results. The storms of violence cannot go on. Enough is enough.” But Sharon kept the incursion going until April 21, continued to occupy Ramallah afterward, and admonished Bush that “negotiating before terror is subdued will only lead to its continuation.”

Kristol and Kagan tried to console *Weekly Standard* readers that Bush’s reaction could have been worse. He didn’t call for an immediate end to all military operations, and Powell would not get to Israel for another week, which gave Israeli forces extra time to capture terrorists. But overall, Bush’s intervention was a disaster. Kristol and Kagan despaired that “the Bush administration seems to be lost in the wilderness without a moral or strategic compass.” How could Bush ravage Afghanistan with air power while refusing Israel the right to do half as much to the Palestinians? How could he plan to invade Iraq, a country that had not attacked the United States, but criticize the Israelis for retaliating against Palestinian terrorists who had attacked them? If Bush was tough enough to ignore the howling from Europeans and American foreign policy establishment types over his “Axis of Evil” speech, why was he not tough enough to withstand their howling against Ariel Sharon?

Kristol and Kagan usually answered their own rhetorical questions, but in this area they abstained. It was more effective to keep working on Bush than alienate him with an answer.Persistently they contended that the Bush Doctrine applied to Palestinian terrorism and that Sharon had barely begun to apply it: “How would the president have liked it—how would the American people have liked it —had someone stepped in after two weeks of the war in Afghanistan and said, ‘Enough is enough’?”

On his way to the Middle East, Powell declared that the solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict would not be found “by terror or the response to terror.”
Kagan and Kristol replied that aside from Powell’s unbelievable suggestion of moral equivalence and his mistaken suggestion that Israeli retaliation did no good, his statement was alarming for what it implied about America’s war on terrorism. He repeated the liberal cliché that violence is not the answer and that the root causes of alienation and terrorism must be addressed. Kristol and Kagan countered that the war on terrorism was not about adjudicating the legitimacy of Arab or Muslim grievances. The Palestinians had legitimate grievances, and so did Islamic fundamentalists: “They think their countries should be run according to Islamic law. They think the West is poisoning their culture. They wish the Saudi royal family were out of power.”

The war on terrorism was about the things that alienated people did, not what they wanted. If they committed acts of terrorism, they had to be eliminated, no matter their grievances. Kristol and Kagan worried that someone had convinced Bush that he needed to get a peace settlement in the Middle East before he attacked Iraq. “If President Bush wants to find his way out of the wilderness, he will have to drop this line of thinking “they advised. Bush did best when he kept it simple, applying a single standard across the board. By the end of April they judged that Bush had gone back to “his own instincts” and the Bush Doctrine. Fortunately for Bush, they explained, Sharon ignored Bush’s plea to abort the Israeli incursion, thus saving the president from his advisors: “We’d love to know which of the president’s top foreign policy advisors assured him that Sharon would obey a command to withdraw, and thereby set up Bush for his weakest moment since September 11.” But Bush’s wilderness crisis had passed. He went back to saying that the war on terrorism was very simple and that Ariel Sharon was “a man of peace.”

European Kantians and American Hobbesians

The Weekly Standard offered a running commentary on how American unipolarism went down in Europe, nearly all of it acerbic. Routinely it blasted European complaints about American arrogance and unilaterality, calling Europe the “axis of rudeness.” Often it noted that the ungrateful Europeans lived under the protective umbrella of American power. Duke University political scientist Peter D. Feaver complained that Bush’s “axis of evil” speech “provoked an extraordinary degree of vitriol from our European allies.” In his account, much of the howling merely resumed Europe’s pre-9/11 tendency to look down on its American superiors: “The yowling from the press and intellectuals is predictable and returns those cosseted elites to their familiar habit.” But there was something new in the European attacks on the Bush Doctrine, he observed. Senior government officials were “willing to be shrill on the record, with apparently little thought and less care to the diplomatic repercussions.” Feaver detected a “desperate intensity” in recent European complaints about America-the-bully. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw derided Bush’s State of the Union address as election-year pandering; French Foreign Minister Alain
Richard had an “impolitic hissy fit,” claiming that France felt threatened by Bush’s bullying; European Union Director of International Affairs Chris Patten declared that Bush couldn’t possibly have thought through the implications of the Bush Doctrine. Feaver judged that although European leaders prided themselves on their cultivated manners and civility, they showed none to Americans.103

University of Virginia political scientist James W. Ceaser explained that Europeans were jealous of American success and power, and that when Europeans spoke of the American “hegemon” or “imperium” or “hyperpower” they usually weren’t being merely descriptive. America’s global domination set them on edge. Former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine, for example, claimed that “hyperpower” was simply a factual description for the American colossus, “The United States is not the sole country convinced of being endowed with a universal mission, but it is the only one that has the means for doing so and that considers itself entirely legitimate in carrying out this role.” Ceasar remarked, “One does not know whether to be flattered or insulted.”104

Kristol puzzled over European resentments at a distance, but living in Brussels, Kagan dealt with them constantly. Every day he heard Europeans say things about international affairs that were truly foreign to his American friends. Attending an “endless merry-go-round of highbrow European conferences,” he reported that “the settings couldn’t be nicer; the food and wine couldn’t be better; the conversations couldn’t be more polite. And the suspicion, fear and loathing of the United States couldn’t be thicker.” His American friends tried to remind him that America had its anti-American pacifists, anti-interventionists, and America Firsters, too, but what they didn’t comprehend was that in Europe, “this paranoid, conspiratorial antiAmericanism is not a far-left or far-right phenomenon. It’s the mainstream view.” Anti-Americanism was the norm in Europe, Kagan observed; it was strong, pervasive, and cut across all social groups. During the Cold War European anti-Americanism was counterbalanced by anticommunism, but now it wasn’t counterbalanced by anything. When German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder campaigned on an anti-American platform, he wasn’t mobilizing a left base or reaching out to fringe voters: “He’s talking to the man and woman on the street, left, right and center.”105

This phenomenon of nearly universal anti-Americanism in Europe cried out for an explanation. Appropriating the language of a recent self-help bestseller, Kagan explained that Americans were from Mars and Europeans from Venus. Europeans lived in a “post-historical paradise” of international law and cooperation. They believed that power is not the determinative reality in higher forms of civilization. To a considerable extent they lived in the self-contained, social contractual world of “perpetual peace” that Immanuel Kant envisioned for Enlightened societies. But Americans lived in the Hobbesian world of history and power, where international rules were unreliable and social order depended upon and was shaped by military might.
“They agree on little and understand one another less and less” Kagan observed. In the nineteenth century Americans claimed an exemption from history and international power politics while Europeans gloried in their great-power capacity to remake the world; now the roles were reversed. Kagan pointed to the growing power gap between the United States and Europe that began during World War II. “America’s unparalleled military strength has predictably given it a greater propensity to use force and a more confident belief in the moral legitimacy of power” he explained. The Europeans, by contrast, with little power to discharge, no longer believed in it. After World War II they became increasingly averse to employing military force as a tool of statecraft. Modern Europeans sought a world “where strength doesn’t matter so much, where unilateral action by powerful nations is forbidden, where all nations regardless of their strength are protected by commonly agreed rules of behavior.” Europeans were repelled by the Hobbesian real world, Kagan reflected; for them it was more important to sustain their own progress toward the Kantian world of perpetual peace than to slay an outside tyrant like Saddam Hussein.106

But Americans had enough power not to be frightened by the Hobbesian state of nature. Because they had the power to use unilateral force, they were not repelled by it. The disparity of power between Americans and Europeans also made them respond differently to threats. In May 2000, more than 70 percent of Americans favored overthrowing Saddam; Kagan observed that Europeans found this prospect “unimaginable and frightening.” Having little power, the Europeans had a strong interest in building a world that prized cooperation, international law, and collective security over “hard power” and unilateral force. Having no prospect of acquiring hard power, Europeans sought to eradicate “the brutal laws of an anarchic Hobbesian world where power is the ultimate determinant of national security and success.” Kagan explained that he did not say this as a “reproach” to the Europeans: “It is what weaker powers have wanted from time immemorial.” In the Hobbesian real world, weak nations always seek security through rules, fearing that they will be victims, whereas great powers rely on their power to provide security, fearing constraint more than anarchy.107

“The facile assertion that the United States cannot ‘go it alone’ is more a hopeful platitude than a description of reality” Kagan asserted. America liked to have allies, but it was precisely because America often did go it alone that American unilateralism was fiercely debated. For Europeans, interests and ideals converged on the principle of multilateralism; for Americans, there was much less convergence. Europeans didn’t have to give up anything to accept the ethic of multilateralism, but for Americans it meant losing power. Kagan judged that the European attitude was reasonable, but so was the American attitude. Those who lack the power to act unilaterally naturally want to restrain those who have it, and those who have it naturally want to keep it: “From the European perspective, the United States may be a relatively benign hegemon, but insofar as its actions delay the arrival of a world order more conducive to the safety of weaker powers, it is objectively dangerous.”108
Unlike China, which sought to counterbalance American power by acquiring some world-class military power of its own, the Europeans sought to contain American power without wielding any of their own. Kagan explained that America’s European allies were chastened by the cultural memory of a militaristic past. Having suffered much from their own power politics, they internalized a Kantian perspective on the value and function of power in international relations, but the American experience was entirely different. Both of the world wars and the cold war of the twentieth century enhanced America’s standing in the world. Most Americans simply do not feel the revulsion for unilateral force that most Europeans feel. And because the United States remained in the Hobbesian historical world of power, Kagan argued, the Europeans were able to pass into post-historical moralism after World War II. While priding themselves on their refined moral sensibility and reserving the right to criticize American power, they enjoyed the safety of the American security umbrella, protected by American power from the vast world that “has yet to accept the rule of ‘moral consciousness.’”

Kagan cautioned that the recent upsurge of American unipolarism was not the cause of the estrangement between Europeans and Americans. By 2002, European leaders and intellectuals across the Continent were desperately nostalgic for Clinton, but during the 1990s they cursed Clinton and especially Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as imperialists. “It was during the 1990s that Europeans began to view the United States as a ‘hectoring hegemon,’” he recalled; Védrine coined the term “hyperpower” to describe the bullying American colossus of the Clinton years.

Kagan wanted the Europeans to return to history, significantly increasing their military capability. At the same time, he counseled American leaders to stop worrying about European criticism. The Europeans had their own reasons for fleeing from history, and having done so, they had little to say that made any sense outside their post-historical paradise. More important, they had no power to threaten the United States. Rather than worry about Europe’s designs to tie down the American hyperpower, “American leaders should realize that they are hardly constrained at all, that Europe is not really capable of constraining the United States.” America is so powerful that it can afford to be understanding of the European perspective, Kagan counseled. When America had to defy Europe, it could do so with impunity; the rest of the time America was well advised to show some respect for the opinion of its European friends.

Kagan’s description of Europe’s Kantian peace was overdrawn and German-centered. He ignored that England and France still regarded themselves as great powers, that both countries were far from unwilling to use military force, and that most European nations had supported America’s numerous military interventions of the past twenty years. His oversimplistic dichotomizing irritated foreign policy specialists, partly because the book made a huge success. Of Paradise and Power found a wide audience in the United States and Europe. It helped that the book was not only interesting, perceptive, and brief, but untypically irenic;
Kagan usually didn’t appeal to American sensitivity or commend the reasonableness of European multilateralists.\footnote{112}

More typically he complained elsewhere that European leaders flunked the test of mutual respect when they discussed the International Criminal Court (ICC). The treaty establishing the court went into effect on July 1, 2002, but the Bush administration revoked Clinton’s endorsement of it, claiming that Americans serving as peacekeepers had to be immune from prosecution. European leaders contended that the court would not be credible if it did not operate by a single standard of justice. Kagan defended Bush’s position, arguing that the United States was not like any other country, and that the United States could participate in the International Criminal Court only if ultimate authority was vested in the U.N. Security Council, where the United States had a veto. The United States deserved the special protection of a double standard, because only the United States is constantly called upon to stabilize countries in turmoil: “America’s entire global strategy is built around projecting military power anywhere at any time, which means the United States is always going to have far more soldiers vulnerable to some misguided ICC prosecutor than any other nation.” Moreover, as the world’s dominant power, the United States is resented by countries around the world; everywhere people are jealous of America. Kagan observed: “Even those who believe the ICC is a good idea have to admit, if they’re honest, that the United States is going to be more vulnerable than other powers.” Thus, the United States had no business submitting to the ICC if it could not get an exemption from it.\footnote{113}

Throughout the buildup to the war against Iraq, Kristol and Kagan closely monitored Bush’s statements for signs of going wobbly, called for an independent investigation of the government’s ‘s performance leading up to 9/11, and blasted Brent Scowcroft, Republican Senator Chuck Hagel, and the \textit{New York Times} for trying to derail America’s march to war. Knowingly, they criticized Powell for slowing down the march to war from the inside. On August 5, 2002 Powell warned Bush that he would be “the proud owner of 25 million people” if he invaded Iraq; privately Powell and Armitage called it The Pottery Barn rule: “You break it, you own it.” Powell wasn’t convinced that invading Iraq was necessary; his friends found him troubled, and he warned that occupying Iraq could prove to be very ugly. When Bush told reporters that invading Iraq was not the only way to deal with Iraq, Kristol and Kagan fretted that Powell was getting to him. Responding to a \textit{New York Times} story of August 16, 2002, which reported that leading Republicans in the State Department had “begun to break ranks” with Bush’s Iraq policy, Kristol replied, “Isn’t the State Department part of the Bush administration?” How could its leading Republicans—Powell and Armitage—break ranks with the president they served? It was bad enough that Scowcroft and Hagel encouraged the antiwar opposition, but Powell’s background aside to reporters were much worse. Powell told the \textit{Washington Post}’s Jim Hoagland that Bush couldn’t sustain a discussion of foreign policy beyond five minutes; Kristol replied that Powell should either help
Bush carry out his policy or step aside. Powell and Armitage were entitled to their foreign policy views, “but they will soon have to decide whom they wish to serve—the president, or his opponents.” Kristol and Kagan also demanded to know whether the government might have prevented or better prepared for the terrorist attacks of September 11, which earned a sharp rebuke from Cheney; the Bush administration had no intention of allowing an investigation on that subject.114

By mid-September the *Weekly Standard* was convinced that Bush had turned the corner toward regime change in Iraq; the president’s forceful speech at the United Nations heightened the pressure on Powell to support the war or resign. Fred Barnes enthused that the days of muddling along and debating the return of arms inspectors were over. Two months later Bush had a congressional authorization for war and a midterm election victory that gave Republicans control of the Senate and six more House seats; Kristol and Kagan observed: “All that remains is to go through the motions of U.N. inspections before the president orders military action.” Or so they hoped, while fuming that Powell had “eroded the president’s position” by insisting on seeking United Nations approval. Thanks to Powell, they protested, Bush had shifted his focus to the disarmament of Saddam’s regime, as though America could live with a disarmed and fully inspected Baathist regime in Iraq.115

Kagan allowed elsewhere that Bush’s strongest ally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, had political problems that Bush was obliged to accommodate. If the United States had to go to the U.N. to save Blair’s political skin, perhaps it had to go to the U.N. In the *Weekly Standard*, however, he and Kristol emphasized that settling for a disarmed Saddam was unacceptable. The entire inspections process was a trap set by Powell, French President Jacques Chirac, and others who wanted to avoid a war, they protested. The threat of Saddam’s regime to the civilized world could not be eliminated without eliminating the regime itself. Even if Saddam destroyed some weapons, he could hide others; even if he disarmed completely, he could rearm later. On the depressing side, Bush overindulged Powell and the State Department; on the bright side, Bush was “powerful and determined.” Hopefully, he was just playing along with the U.N., using it for whatever propaganda value it might bring him and Blair, while taking for granted that he would not be handcuffed by the Security Council.116

The United States had to overthrow Iraq to make the world safer, but the same thing was true of North Korea. Kristol and Kagan wanted the Bush administration to treat Kim Jong II the same way it treated Saddam Hussein. Instead of stalling on North Korea, they argued in January 2003, the United States had to confront Pyongyang about its drive for nuclear weapons. If the North Koreans did not back down, the United States would have to go to war, even if it was already at war in Iraq. “One can’t start brandishing the use of force without ultimately being prepared to carry it out,” they admonished. To Kristol and Kagan, the Korean crisis proved the necessity of the two-war doctrine. The United States could not afford to wait for the war against Iraq to begin and end,
for a North Korean government armed with nuclear weapons would be a dangerous and proliferating nightmare. They feared that Bush lacked the “desire” to fight two wars at once; with an exasperated tone, they allowed that he probably lacked the military capability as well.117

This was exactly the scenario that the Project for the New American Century had warned against. The Clinton administration gave lip service to the two-war standard, but didn’t take it seriously, and even Bush cared more about tax cuts than rebuilding force structure. Liberals had demanded a peace dividend; Bush’s 2003 defense budget was still “pitiful”; and the RMA crowd thought that technical wizardry was more important than maintaining high force levels. Aside from the PNAC unipolarists, everyone had believed that the United States could get by without increasing its number of Army divisions. Now the United States was paying for the neglect of its regular warfighting military. America needed to invade and occupy Iraq and North Korea simultaneously, but it probably had only enough Army force structure to do the job in Iraq. That did not stop Kristol and Kagan from urging Bush to threaten war against North Korea. “There’s a big difference between having one or two nuclear weapons, and having a nuclear assembly line up and running,” they warned. Fighting with an overstretched military had its dangers, but they paled before the consequences of allowing one-third of the axis of evil to become a nuclear power.118

By the end of January the Bush administration spoke with one voice on Iraq and the neocons were eager to start fighting. On January 13, without asking for Powell’s opinion, Bush told Powell to “put your war uniform on”; he asked only if Powell would support him. To Powell, being a good soldier had never been in question; moreover, he had bitterly concluded that the French were determined to prevent the United States from gaining U.N. authorization. Kagan and Kristol celebrated that “the faux-hawkish multilateralists will not be able to hide behind Colin Powell anymore.” Senator Hagel urged Bush not to give up on the U.N. and the weapons inspections process; Kagan and Kristol retorted that the remaining fauxhawkish multilateralists should give up the pretense of supporting Iraqi disarmament: “For them, as for the French, it isn’t about disarming Saddam. They just oppose the war.”119

With no suspicion of campaign hype, the *Weekly Standard* accepted all the administration’s claims about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and links to international terrorism. In his 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush claimed that Saddam possessed thirty thousand munitions, five hundred tons of chemical weapons, twenty-five thousand liters of anthrax, and thirty-eight thousand liters of botulinum toxin; in his February 5 address to the U.N. Security Council, Powell claimed that Saddam possessed at least seven mobile biological-agent factories and between one hundred and five hundred tons of chemical weapons agents and that he had connections to al-Qaeda terrorists; editorializing on these indictments, the *Weekly Standard* called them “irrefutable.” There was nothing left to talk about, Fred Barnes asserted: “The time for wooing those
predisposed to distrust the president and America is over. The unpersuaded are beside the point now.”

**Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s Mission**

Kristol and Kagan were a seamless writing team, sharing the same causes and ideology. Kagan’s bestseller was a solo effort, however, and in 2003 Kristol teamed with *New Republic* senior editor Lawrence F. Kaplan to produce a popular book, *The War Over Iraq*. Like Max Boot, Kaplan was too young to remember the war in Vietnam. A graduate of Columbia University, Oxford University, and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, he worked as an editor for the *National Interest* magazine, a neoconservative foreign policy journal founded by Irving Kristol, before moving to the mostly Democratic *New Republic*. There was a bit of symbolism in their collaboration, but less than some of their press coverage imagined, since he and Kristol had essentially the same foreign policy politics. Kaplan and Kristol complained that the “mainstream press” was awful on Iraq, especially the *New York Times*, and that American liberals and realpolitikers absorbed the wrong lessons from Vietnam.

The war in Vietnam sowed a “reflexive suspicion of American power” into the souls of American liberals and realists that outlasted the Cold War, they explained. Liberals worried that America had become a bad country; realists judged that Vietnam showed the folly of intervening for ideological reasons; Kaplan and Kristol urged that there was a healthy, interventionist, self-respecting alternative to liberalism and realism. In the Democratic Party its iconic figure was Scoop Jackson; in the Republican Party it was Ronald Reagan. Though George W. Bush had to overcome the influence of his father’s advisors to find his way to the Jackson/Reagan alternative, by June 1, 2002 he had clearly done so, spelling out the Bush Doctrine in an address at West Point. Kaplan and Kristol enthused that under the foreign policy vision of Bush 43, America no longer relied on the Cold War doctrines of containment and deterrence; the Bush administration reserved the right to wage preemptive wars, promoted American principles throughout the world, and pledged to do whatever was necessary to retain its unipolar predominance.

*The War Over Iraq* rehearsed the usual *Weekly Standard* and *New Republic* talking points on regime change, without Kristol’s usual polemical edge; he and Kaplan were seeking to persuade politically uninigrated readers. Although they barely mentioned the Iraqi National Congress and never mentioned Ahmed Chalabi, they took a straightforwardly democratic globalist line on the future of Iraq. So-called realists warned that Iraq had no democratic traditions or civil society, that invading Iraq could inflame the entire region, and that Iraq’s ethnic conflicts could explode into a civil war. Kristol and Kaplan replied that vigorous American internationalists eschewed such “hand-wringing.” Colin Powell worried that Iraq’s Sunni establishment might plunge the country into chaos if
America invaded, but Powell made the same warning about Afghanistan, where the ethnic Pashtuns played the Iraqi Sunni role. Kristol and Kaplan assured that Iraq’s Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish populations all wanted to maintain a unified nation and that the best way to do it was to build a federated system consisting of a central government in Baghdad and limited powers of self-government for each ethnic community.123

More important than the precise model of the next Iraqi government was America’s commitment to Iraq. Kagan worried that the Bush team seemed reluctant to plan for a long occupation or even think about what came after the war; Kristol and Kaplan, filling the vacuum, gently explained that Americans had to prepare for a lengthy occupation of Iraq, an occupation force of seventy-five thousand troops, and a cost of about $16 billion per year. Against the objection that democracy cannot be imposed by military force, they replied: “Really? What about Japan, Germany, Austria, Italy, Grenada, the Dominican Republic, and Panama? These are only a few of the nations whose democratic systems were at first ‘imposed’ by American arms.” Against the objection that Iraq in particular made a poor candidate for American-style democracy, they countered that Iraq’s high literacy rates and urbanized middle class made the country “ripe for democracy.” If Iraq became a pro-American democracy, they argued, America would be able to stop coddling Saudi Arabia and other miserable Arab regimes. Iraq was the key to the political transformation of the Middle East. Realism was about coping with problems, but aggressive American internationalism was about solving problems. Realists believed that Islam and American-style democracy don’t go together; Kristol and Kaplan countered that Morocco and Jordan were already on the path to democracy and that it was self-fulfilling defeatism to believe that the Islamic world was immune to the appeal of Western democracy.124

It was possible, they allowed, that an aggressively interventionist America might create new problems by making enemies unnecessarily. Foreign policy theorist Charles Kupchan warned that Bush-style neo-imperialism could foster the very countervailing threat that it was designed to thwart. Kristol and Kaplan advised that America had to cope with this possibility no matter what it did: “Those who suggest that these international resentments could somehow be eliminated by a more restrained American foreign policy are deluding themselves. Even a United States that never again intervened in a place like Iraq would still find itself the target of jealousy, resentment, and in some cases even fear.” Even a polite America would still be resented because of its power, but if America became too polite, it would lose its preeminent power and the world would be much the worse.125

Shortly before the United States invaded Iraq, Kaplan charged that the State Department was planning to betray Iraqi democracy. “On the question of how, or even whether, democracy should be established in Iraq, no two members of the Bush team seem to agree,” he observed. Rumsfeld wanted a brief occupation, opposed the deployment of American armed forces for nation-building, and told
his aides to speak of “representative government” in Iraq, not democracy. Wolfowitz and Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith envisioned a brief occupation that led to the prompt establishment of a “democratic” government led by Chalabi and other members of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), with representation from other groups. Powell and the State Department were opposed to Iraqi federalism, took a dim view of Iraq’s democratic prospects, took a very dim view of Chalabi and the INC, wanted a unitary central government in Baghdad, sought a Sunni replacement for Saddam, and projected a two-year occupation. The State Department had settled on Adnan Pachachi, an eighty-year-old former Iraqi foreign minister whom it tracked down in the United Arab Emirates, to head up the new government, which offended Chalabi’s ardent supporters in the Pentagon.126

Kaplan was offended, too: “Rather than allowing Iraqis to create a federal state—which is to say, a democratic one—Foggy Bottom, which lost the argument over whether to topple an authoritarian central government in Baghdad, has settled for the next best thing: an authoritarian central government under U.S. control.” The State Department looked down on the INC refugees, he explained; moreover, Powell and his aides were obsessed with stability and creating a centralized government. By contrast, the State Department was right about the occupation. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz had deluded themselves that putting a new government in place and withdrawing American forces could be done quickly. Kaplan wanted the United States to establish a constitution and national assembly as soon as possible, move toward municipal and national elections sometime afterward, and occupy the country militarily for up to two years. “The battle over federalism versus unitary central government and an American military occupation combined with Iraqi democratic rule versus an all-out American occupation is a conflict about whether, not when, to democratize Iraq,” he wrote. If the State Department got its way, the whole world would end up believing that the war was really a power grab for oil and political control. “This would amount to a betrayal of the Iraqi people, the avowed purpose of the war, and this country’s most cherished ideals,” Kaplan warned. If the democratic globalists did not prevail in the making of a new Iraq, the war could bring shame on America: “The president says the coming war in Iraq is about much more than just Iraq. But, if some of his advisors get their way, it may end up being about even less.”127

The End of the Beginning

Kristol enjoyed the personal victory that the invasion of Iraq represented: “Obviously, we are gratified that the Iraq strategy we have long advocated…has become the policy of the U.S. government.” Elsewhere he put it a bit more jocularly: “I’m a little amused, but pleased and happy that the bus has become more crowded and that it is heading in the right direction.”128 Lecturing at UC Berkeley just before the war began, Max Boot expected to attract protesters, only
to find that his alma mater had changed. Boot made a straightforward case for liberal imperialism, heard no protests, and evoked hardly any criticism. He argued that because the U.N. was a bad joke and NATO was too unwieldy to be effective, the United States had to “play Globo-Cop.” In response he received polite questions from a friendly audience of students, faculty, and locals. “I haven’t changed much, but Berkeley certainly has,” he observed. Even at Berkeley the tide of American opinion seemed to be shifting.

Nearly halfway into the war, Kristol announced that the American people were in fine shape, the mainstream media was ridiculous, and American liberalism was truly destructive. The idiotic mood swings of the mainstream media didn’t do any real damage, he counseled, because the public understood that the media was stupid. American liberalism, by contrast, did real damage every day. Kristol acknowledged that there was such a thing as patriotic liberalism, which included war supporters such as Democratic Senators Dick Gephardt, Joseph Lieberman, and Hillary Rodham Clinton, and the editorial page editors of the *Washington Post*. But most American liberalism lacked any patriotic feeling, he charged. Led by Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy, Democratic House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, most liberal columnists, the editorial page of the *New York Times*, and Hollywood, mainstream American liberalism hated conservatives so much that they couldn’t bring themselves to support their country’s war in Iraq: “These liberals… hate George W. Bush so much they can barely bring themselves to hope America wins the war. They hate Don Rumsfeld so much they can’t bear to see his military strategy vindicated. They hate John Ashcroft so much they relish the thought of his Justice Department flubbing the war on terrorism.” Although bad liberalism was easier to beat at the polls, Kristol called for a resurgence of patriotic liberalism.

The *Weekly Standard* had a clear line on the inside politics of the war: Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz were right, Powell and Armitage were wrong. Kristol told NewsMax.com that while he had previously considered the U.N. “kind of pointless” now he found it truly harmful; the time had come to seriously talk about withdrawing from the United Nations. Fred Barnes editorialized that Powell had disastrously dragged the United States to the United Nations, though his team “didn’t have a clue what France, Russia, China, and Kofi Annan were up to.” Having botched a trip to the U.N. that the United States should not have taken, the State Department botched America’s diplomacy with Turkey and thus lost the right to open a northern front against Saddam. The *Standard* reported that Powell’s next bad idea was to turn postwar Iraq over to the United Nations. As usual, the State Department was full of “bum advice,” Barnes judged. The Cheney/Pentagon team had a better record. Cheney opposed Powell’s humiliating trip to the United Nations, Rumsfeld’s war plan defeated Saddam in a month, and now the Cheney/Pentagon group was right to install an interim government that planted the seeds of a pro-American democracy in Iraq.

That was the course that Kristol, Kagan, Boot, and Kaplan advocated, while cautioning that Iraq was just the beginning of the struggle “to preserve and
extend the Pax Americana.” Noting that the Army was already deployed in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai, South Korea, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Boot called for a return to 1990 levels of military strength, boosting the number of active-duty soldiers from 1.4 million to 2 million, the Army from 10 divisions to 18, the Navy from 315 ships to 550, and the Air Force from 13 fighter wings to 25. He estimated that this would require an increase in defense spending of more than $100 billion per year. “Victory is almost in sight,” he declared, speaking of the world, not Iraq. “We ought not return to passivity now.”

Sustaining his two-wars-at-a-time theme, Kristol announced that Iran had to be next, along with North Korea. Just after American forces marched into Baghdad, he declared that the battle of Iraq was “the end of the beginning” of a larger war for the world and that “the next great battle” was for Iran: “We are already in a death struggle with Iran over the future of Iraq. The theocrats ruling Iran understand that the stakes are now double or nothing.” If the Shiite leaders of Iran did not subvert America’s victory in Iraq, their own regime would die; conversely, if the United States did not get a change of regime in Iran, its victory in Iraq would be lost. The United States could not afford to choose between Iran and North Korea, or delay on both while cleaning up in Iraq. The fate of Iraq was inextricably bound up with that of Iran, North Korea couldn’t wait, and Syria was a major problem, too. America needed to turn Iraq into a “decent, democratic” society, but, more important, Americans had to understand that there were other battles to fight, some of which affected Iraq. Kristol observed: “President Bush understands that we are engaged in a larger war. His opponents, on the whole, do not, and this accounts in large measure for the yawning gulf between the supporters and critics of the Bush Doctrine.”

But the aftermath of the war against Iraq proved more absorbing than Kristol and the Bush administration had counted on, and the administration was deeply conflicted about how to manage the occupation. Violent street crime exploded in Baghdad after the war, looters ransacked the country’s electrical substations and destroyed transmission lines, gas lines clogged the roads from Kirkuk to Karbala, thousands of Iraqis were left with no power or clean water, and huge throngs of Shiites staged anti-American demonstrations. The State Department and Pentagon feared that each other’s strategy would plunge Iraq into a civil war and/or a radical Shiite government. Both fears were amply founded, and thus the Bush administration lurched back and forth between the two strategies.

Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz wanted to establish a provisional government before the war began. As soon as the war ended, they pressed for the establishment of a handpicked, pro-American transitional regime, and after attacks on American forces began in the Sunni triangle of Baghdad-Tikrit-Ramadi, they urged that political relief could not come soon enough. The first American overseer, retired Lt. General Jay Garner, pushed for a transitional regime that would assume some governing authority as soon as possible while not giving the appearance of having been made in America. But Bush and Cheney quickly lost confidence in Garner, replacing him with counterterrorism expert L.Paul Bremer, who stunned
America’s hand-picked Iraqi leaders on May 16 by suspending plans for an interim government.

The essential conflict between the Pentagon and State Department (and often, the National Security Council) over postwar policy in Iraq was long-standing. Pentagon leaders and Dick Cheney backed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress, arguing that these former exiles had the requisite skills and pro-American beliefs to organize a successful government. In early April the Pentagon airlifted Chalabi and seven hundred troops to the Iraqi air base at Tallil, from which they proceeded on April 15 to a political assembly organized by the United States. American military lawyers maintained that the Pentagon could arm Chalabi’s troops without Congressional approval because it was not a fighting force for a foreign government but, rather, a special force attached to the American military.

Two months earlier Wolfowitz and Pfizer engineer Emad Dhia organized a group of exiled Iraqi administrators called the Iraqi Reconstruction and Redevelopment Council. Consisting mostly of engineers, scientists, and lawyers, this group was funded by the U.S. government and was hurriedly trained in combat skills at American military bases. Most of its members were secularists and all were staunchly pro-American; Wolfowitz said of them: “It’s an enormously valuable asset to have people who share our values, understand what we’re about as a country, and are in most cases citizens of this country, but who also speak the language, share the culture and know their way around Iraq.”

Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Cheney wanted a secular, pro-American transitional government that would eventually give way to a secular, pro-American government. They believed it was more important to quickly get the right people in place than to worry about the appearance of American imperialism, and they opposed any substantive role for the United Nations besides humanitarian missions. The Pentagon and White House, like the State Department, were very nervous about the rise of a vocally anti-American, Islamic movement in Iraq; Rumsfeld was emphatic that the Bush administration would not tolerate a government that was led or shaped by Shiite clerics.

But Powell and other State Department officials worried that the Pentagon strategy was paving the way to this outcome or a civil war. State Department officials in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs warned that national elections could establish a Shiite theocracy and that America’s rush to install a pro-American government could backfire on the United States. The State Department wanted the United Nations to play a larger role in the occupation, partly to assuage Arab fears of American imperialism, and also because the U.N. was the only institution in the world that had substantial recent experience in peacemaking. The Pentagon strategy blended selected “internals” with the council of Iraqi exile leaders elected at a March conference in the northern Iraqi city of Salahuddin; the State Department, although wary of “democracy” rhetoric, wanted to create a broader Iraqi coalition. It envisioned a series of town meetings that built toward a national conference in Baghdad. The Bush administration could not decide whether it favored a leadership council model or a single head of state, although,
in either case, the State Department was adamant about preserving a strong Sunni presence at or near the top of the government.

In late April, the National Security Council judged that anti-American feeling in Iraq was running too high for the town meeting strategy to be feasible. Radical Shiites would dominate the town meetings, officials reasoned, and the political crisis was too urgent to allow time for them. On April 29, a hand-picked group of Iraqi delegates meeting in Baghdad bowed to American demands that a transitional government be named quickly. Key players in the Iraqi leadership council included Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress; Baath Party defector Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National Accord, which wanted a national secular democracy; Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which wanted a federal system with Kurdish autonomy; Abdul Aziz al-Hakim of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which wanted an Islamic government; the Dawa Party, a long persecuted Shiite group; and Baghdad lawyer Nasir al-Chadirchy, a Sunni Muslim whose father Kamel cofounded the National Democratic Party of Iraq in the 1950s. 

Administration officials boasted of their ability to get their way with the leadership council. On May 16, however, Iraqi leaders exploded after a meeting with Bremer. “They retracted what they said before,” one Iraqi leader protested, claiming that the plan for a provisional government leading to a national assembly was gone: “There is no such thing anymore.” Already distressed by the slow pace of de-Arabization in the Kurdish territories, Barzani stormed out of Baghdad, and Talabani charged that Bremer had pushed aside America’s best Iraqi allies. Bremer replied that U.S. policy had not changed; America had to delay its transfer of power to Iraqis until Iraq was not in disarray.

A State Department official assured Kaplan that the United States had matters in hand: “The bottom line is we control the purse strings, the appointments, and anything else of political value. Not just anyone is going to get access to this.” But Kaplan worried that Pentagon leaders were still overeager to get out of Iraq and that they had banked too heavily on Chalabi. Inexplicably, the Pentagon hadn’t begun its postwar planning until the end of January, he observed: “Assurances from Iraqi exiles, such as INC leader Ahmed Chalabi, that Iraq would reconstitute itself quickly and in a manner congenial to the United States led Pentagon planners to underestimate the enormity of the task ahead of them.”

In February, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki told a Senate hearing that the occupation would require several hundred thousand troops, which earned a prompt rebuke from Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld insisted that the job could be done with one hundred thousand troops, and Wolfowitz assured the House Budget Committee that Shinseki’s figure was “wildly off the mark.” Four weeks into an occupation that had gone very badly, Kaplan judged that Shinseki had been right and the Pentagon was sticking to its script. Worse yet, the State Department was eager to accommodate a Pentagon drawdown, reasoning that the occupation would go better if it became less American and more multilateral.
Kaplan admonished the Pentagon and State Department to face up to their imperial responsibilities. It was too late to evade the “taint of imperialism,” and the Bush administration was embarrassing itself by squirming to avoid it. “The United States is an occupying power,” he exhorted. It was unconscionable to be looking for an exit just after destroying much of the country in a war of regime change. Scratching for a hopeful sign, Kaplan looked past the Pentagon and State Department to the White House. He observed that in mid-May, Bush and Cheney suddenly realized they were in danger of forfeiting an “historic achievement.” They didn’t have a plan for winning the peace, the Pentagon and State Department had contrasting rationales for getting out, and the occupation was floundering.¹³⁹

Bush responded by replacing Garner with Bremer, who wasn’t afraid to take charge and offend the locals. Upon assuming the post of overseer, Bremer swept away much of Garner’s team and informed Iraqi leaders that they would have to wait at least a year to form a government. He also banned up to thirty thousand former Baath Party leaders from employment in the public sector, reversing the Pentagon’s policy of appointing select officials of Saddam’s regime to key positions. More controversially, he disbanded the Iraqi army and called for a sweeping disarmament of all militias and private citizens in the country except the Kurdish militias, angering Shiite leaders. But Kaplan worried that even Bremer was just a band-aid on a feckless occupation. The Pentagon fought the war with a light force, and now it wanted to go home. To win the peace it needed a heavy force and a long-term commitment to nation-building. “He is being superimposed on a plan for withdrawing troops that, if implemented, would leave him waving goodbye to the very forces on which he will depend,” Kaplan protested. “And, if that happens, the United States may have to wave goodbye to its vision of liberalism in the Arab world as well.”¹⁴⁰

Kristol agreed that America had to stay heavy in Iraq, making a strong show of benevolent and interested imperial force. At the same time he demanded aggressive military action in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere. When asked how an already overstretched American military could fight all these battles at once, especially without leaning on NATO or the U.N., he replied that this was exactly what his group had been screaming about for years. America lacked the force structure that it needed to be itself. Although the United States outspent the next fifteen nations on defense, it wasn’t enough to fulfill America’s global policing responsibilities. If America didn’t have a big enough military to police the world, it had to get a bigger military, not cut back its role in the world. On Fox News, he urged: “We need to err on the side of being strong. And if people want to say we’re an imperial power, fine. If three years from now, we have beaten back these threats and have a decent regime there, it’ll be worth it.”¹⁴¹

Kristol prized his influence on the Bush administration, while playing it down when asked about it. Before the election he predicted that Gore would win, prompting a call from Bush campaign spokesman Ari Fleischer that his words had been “duly noted.” Two years later Kristol was still not invited to White
House schmoozes with conservative journalists. “The Bush people aren’t big on constructive criticism “he explained. At the same time, the administration was loaded with his friends, he counted Cheney and Rumsfeld as ideological allies, he met regularly with Rice to talk policy, and Bush made a fence-mending speech in honor of Kristol’s father. “Look, these guys made up their own minds,” Kristol reflected. “I would hope that we have induced some of them to think about these things in a new way.”

During the Iraq War, a White House official remarked of Kristol: “People appreciate what he’s doing. But there’s still hesitation and trepidation about where Bill would stand if our interests weren’t mutual.” When Kristol founded the *Standard* and the PNAC, his causes were on the fringe of the Republican Party. He made them respectable, and then politically powerful, in remarkably little time, though he pointedly recalled that when he and Kagan published *Present Dangers* in 2000, the book seemed alarmist to most foreign policy specialists: “The world didn’t seem that dangerous.”

Just as his father’s generation of neoconservatives believed that they could do great things if they advocated the right ideas, and the New York intellectuals of the 1930s believed it before them, Kristol exuded the neocon belief in the power of ideas, backed by the Right’s mighty Wurlitzer of foundations, think tanks, magazines, and media networks. Richard Perle aptly observed that Kristol offered “an example of opinion leadership—formulating ideas in a way that would eventually connect with a much broader audience.” Kristol took pride that his ideas about global supremacy, regime change, preemptive war, democratic globalism, and weapons of mass destruction became the causes of a popular Republican administration. “We at the *Weekly Standard* and the Project for the New American Century—and many other people, Wolfowitz way back in 1992—had articulated chunks and parts of what later became the Bush Doctrine,” he observed. “Certainly there was a lot out there that could be stitched together into the Bush Doctrine. But certainly, even people like me were kind of amazed by the speed and decisiveness with which the Bush administration, post-9/11, moved to pull these different arguments together.”

Kristol loved Bush’s line from his September 20, 2001, address to Congress, that “in our anger and in our grief, we have found our mission and our moment.” That was exactly right, he believed; Bush spoke for America and himself in claiming the war on terrorism as the cause of the present age. Although Bush and his top officials resented criticism of any kind, they paid attention to it. They didn’t like it when Kristol blasted them on China, the U.N., or anything else, but every Monday Dick Cheney sent a courier to pick up thirty copies of the *Weekly Standard*. 
The main reason that America invaded Iraq and became its occupier was not the reason that Bush officials emphasized in selling the war, and the latter reason did not pan out. The Bush administration said that the war was necessary to eliminate the danger that Saddam posed to the United States and other nations because of his weapons of mass destruction and links to al-Qaeda. But the deeper reason that America invaded Iraq was to consolidate American power in the Middle East and change the political culture of the region.

The Bush administration realized that Saudi Arabia did not provide a secure basis for American influence in the Middle East or ensure a stable oil supply for the West. Fifteen of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudis; the Saudi people despised the ruling regime of their country; and they deeply resented the presence of American troops there. Bush officials wanted to change the Middle East, creating a pro-American Iraq that gave the United States a direct power base, ensured the oil supply, set off a wave of political reform in the region, gave relief to Israel, and got rid of a thuggish enemy.

The visions of a new American power base and the political/cultural transformation of the region were tightly intertwined. Although Bush was not eager to discuss these matters with the American public, he wanted very much for Arab leaders to get the picture. They kept their heads down while America bombed Afghanistan; afterward they carried on as though the world had not changed. Bush wanted to smash into their terrorist-breeding world at its center.

Some of his key advisors were long committed to overthrowing Iraq, and by the time that Bush took office, he agreed with them. His early National Security Council meetings took for granted that Saddam had to go; the only question was finding a way to do it. Rumsfeld told the National Security Council that replacing Saddam with a pro-American regime would change everything in the region. Saddam was a nettlesome tyrant who had tried to assassinate Bush’s father, his nation had a vast oil supply, it was under U.N. sanctions, it was a warm-water port with seventy-two airfields, and it was in the middle of the Middle East. Finding a way to do it was the hard part, which exasperated the neocons before September 11, 2001, but the war on terrorism solved that problem. Bush’s advisors convinced him that Iraq would break without much of a fight and a pro-American government could be readily imposed.
But the war could not be sold by calling for a new American power base and the transformation of the Middle East, and it would not have been credible to suddenly claim a humanitarian ground. The transformationist argument smacked of naked imperialism and grandiose fantasy, and the U.S. had known for 15 years that Saddam held the country together by sheer thuggery. That hadn’t stopped the Reagan and the first Bush administrations from favoring him as a region-balancing strongman, and both of Saddam’s mass killing rampages were long past when the second Bush claimed it was an urgent necessity to invade Iraq. On occasion Bush amplified his case for war; in his 2002 State of the Union address, he implied that smashing Iraq would be the best way to strike a blow against the backward politics and culture of terrorism in the Middle East. But that was a complex and inherently contestable argument that might not have inspired Americans to fight an offensive war in the Middle East. It involved hidden costs and far-fetched projections that Bush officials didn’t want to talk about. The president’s neoconservative advisors were fond of saying that “the road to Jerusalem runs through Baghdad,” but remaking the Middle East was a dubious rationale for a war.1

To secure popular support, the Bush administration told Americans that Saddam Hussein threatened their safety. The Clinton administration and U.N. Security Council had contended that significant stocks of Iraq’s anthrax and VX nerve gas were unaccounted for. No one knew how much might be missing; the typically cited figures were inferences based on conjectures, and Saddam claimed to have no remaining stockpiles or programs. In the 1990s U.N. inspectors destroyed most of Saddam’s arsenal and production facilities, but didn’t know whether they eliminated 75, 85, or 95 percent of it. In 1998 the Clinton administration bombed suspected Iraqi weapons facilities for four days in Operation Desert Fox, but Saddam responded by expelling the weapons inspectors, and thus the United States never learned how successful the operation had been. In the wake of 9/11 the Bush administration told Americans that Saddam’s threat to their security was far greater and more certain than they realized. It claimed to know that Saddam possessed huge stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, a nuclear weapons program, and operational links to al-Qaeda, and that all of this posed an immediate threat that could be removed only by a full-scale war of aggression.

These claims were based on bad intelligence that the Bush administration made worse through manipulation, exaggeration, and alarmism. The CIA could not prove the existence of mass destruction weapons that did not exist, and on ten separate occasions Rumsfeld asked the CIA to prove that Saddam’s regime and al-Qaeda were operationally linked. Every time the CIA reported that it was trying to do so. The CIA shot down the main piece of evidence that was adduced for a connection—James Woolsey’s report of a meeting in Prague in April 2001 between hijacker Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence official; it claimed in a classified 90-page National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Saddam had a large supply of chemical and biological weapons; and it was skeptical (along with the
Defense Intelligence Agency) about Iraq’s nuclear program. The condensed version of the NIE that the CIA made public, however, cherry picked its pro-war material and discarded its qualifications, caveats, and dissenting material. Florida Senator Bob Graham, who chaired the Senate Intelligence Committee, knew what that meant, bureaucratically speaking: CIA Director George Tenet had wilted under pressure from the White House and Pentagon. While intelligence analysts confided to reporters and friends that they were pressured to make claims not supported by the evidence, Rumsfeld announced that he had “bulletproof” evidence of Saddam’s ties to al-Qaeda; Cheney declared that Saddam had already “reconstituted nuclear weapons”; Cheney assured there was “no doubt” that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction for use against Americans; Condoleezza Rice claimed that the only possible use of Saddam’s aluminum tubes was to enrich uranium through a gas-centrifuge system; and Rice declared five days before Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address that Iraq tried to buy uranium yellowcake from abroad. 

Cheney later corrected his misstatement about Iraq’s nuclear weapons, but continued to insist, against the verdict of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that Saddam had an advanced nuclear program. The claim that Iraq tried to buy uranium yellowcake and high-strength aluminum tubes from Niger government officials was discredited in March 2002 by prominent diplomat Joseph C. Wilson IV. In September a British dossier used the story; however, Bush officials began using it too, and by January it was featured in Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address. The following month the IAEA judged that Saddam’s aluminum tubes were for 9.6-mile-range conventional artillery rockets, the Niger story was an amateurish fraud, and Iraq’s attempt to buy magnets was for telephones and short-range missiles, not centrifuge enrichment; Cheney replied on Meet the Press that the IAEA didn’t know what it was talking about.

Preparing for his dramatic February 5, 2003, presentation to the Security Council, Powell realized that his colleagues were selling the war with bad information. He spurned several pages of a draft that Cheney’s chief of staff Scooter Libby wrote for him. Cheney wanted the speech to focus on Saddam’s ostensible link to terrorism; Powell, protesting that the draft was “over the top” and marred by “unsubstantiated assertions” angrily declared that he wasn’t going to read that “bullshit.” He resolved to make a fresh case that didn’t rely on dubious claims, studying the CIA’s raw data for four days.

But Powell’s galvanizing case retained the outline of Libby’s speech, recycled CIA conjectures that he called “facts” and injected new exaggerations. He gave the first airing of the magnets-for-nukes argument, which the IAEA shot down. He claimed that “classified documents” discovered at the home of a Baghdad nuclear scientist offered “dramatic confirmation” of administration claims about concealment, but U.N. nuclear inspectors later judged that the documents were old and worthless. Powell presented satellite photos of industrial buildings, bunkers, and trucks that he described as chemical and biological weapons facilities and decontamination vehicles, but these very sites had been inspected
more than four hundred times in recent months by Hans Blix’s U.N. inspections team, which found no sign of contraband. Powell claimed that the Tariq State Establishment in Falluja was a chemical weapons facility, but this facility, inspected six times between December 2002 and January 2003, turned out to be an inoperative chlorine plant. Powell warned that Iraq produced four tons of the nerve agent VX, but most of it was destroyed under U.N. supervision in the 1990s.5

Powell charged that Saddam was linked to al-Qaeda through al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, director of a training camp in Iraq, but the camp turned out to be located in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, where Saddam had no access. Citing testimonies by defectors, especially the fraudulent testimony of a defector given the code name “Curveball,” Powell charged that Iraq had mobile biological weapons factories. After the invasion, the United States found two truck trailers that the CIA judged to be part of a bioweapons production line, but the CIA’s report was rushed and politicized, no trace of biological agents was found, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Institute for Science and International Security, and the intelligence bureau of the State Department all judged that the trailers were used to inflate weather balloons for Iraqi artillery. Powell claimed that Iraq had a stockpile of up to five hundred tons of chemical weapons agent and that “key portions” of Iraq’s chemical weapons infrastructure were embedded in its civilian industries, but no such agents or facilities were found. He warned that the 122mm chemical warheads found by U.N. inspectors in January might be the “tip of an iceberg,” but the warheads were empty, and on June 16 Blix reported that the stray rocket warheads were uncrated “debris” from the 1980s. Powell alleged that Iraqi field commanders had been recently authorized to use chemical weapons, but seven months later the CIA’s Iraq Survey Group, co-chaired by David Kay, acknowledged that there was no evidence to support this accusation.6

Most of the problem was that Powell relied on the same bad information from the intelligence agencies as the rest of his administration. Part of the problem was that he used some raw data that hadn’t been analyzed. He was forced to build his own case because he knew better than to rely on the hyped intelligence that the White House and Pentagon were demanding from the CIA. The politicization of intelligence began at the outset of the war on terrorism, after the CIA failed to deliver the kind of intelligence that Bush officials demanded. Perle declared that the CIA’s analysis of Iraq wasn’t worth the paper it was written on; Cheney and his top aides vented their disdain for the intelligence agencies, intimidating analysts at the CIA, DIA, and National Security Agency; Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld, needing “better” intelligence, created their own intelligence unit, the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group.7

Launched in October 2001 as a small operation in Feith’s office, the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group was originally headed by Perle protegé David Wurmser, who wrote a book in 1999 advocating the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Wurmser contended that the doctrinal differences among Middle
Eastern terrorist groups were increasingly irrelevant and that Iraq was the best place to fight terrorism. In 2002 he was replaced by DIA reservist Chris Carney, who convinced Feith and Tenet that there was an evidentiary basis for alleging an operational link between Saddam and al Qaeda, though most CIA analysts found the Carney/Feith evidence (which was based on old reports) not to be credible. Later in 2002, while the Pentagon’s intelligence unit grew into the Office of Special Plans, concentrating on policy planning for the war, it was headed by Perle protegé Abram Shulsky and Feith’s deputy for Near East and South Asia, William Luti. The venture as a whole, especially in its first phase, was a throwback to the Team B episode of 1976 and Rumsfeld’s 1998 committee on missile defense, both of which Wolfowitz worked on. Formally it focused on relationships between and among terrorist organizations and state sponsors; more important, it politicized the transmission of intelligence and stood as a bureaucratic rebuke to the intelligence agencies. From October 2001 to August 2002, while burgeoning into an eighteen-member nerve center, the unit fed politically useful intelligence to Pentagon officials and Cheney, much of it derived from information provided by Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress (INC). Cheney was the key administrative supporter of the INC and the intelligence unit. In 2002 he intervened in a feud between the State Department and Pentagon over funding increases for the INC, contending that it was providing “unique intelligence” on the Iraq situation.8

Former Defense Intelligence Agency chief W. Patrick Lang observed: “The Pentagon has banded together to dominate the government’s foreign policy, and they’ve pulled it off. They’re running Chalabi. The D.I.A. has been intimidated and beaten to a pulp. And there’s no guts at all at the C.I.A.” Just as Team B had argued that the CIA overlooked the evil character of the Soviet regime in its preoccupation with factual details, the Pentagon neocons argued that the CIA overemphasized what Saddam could do instead of stressing what he would do if he could. The CIA weighed the evidence about the status of Saddam’s nuclear program; to Wolfowitz, Feith, and their deputies it was more important that he wanted one. Jocularly calling themselves “the Cabal,” the Pentagon neocons portrayed their operation as a tougher outfit than the fuddy-duddies at the CIA and DIA. Highly skilled at bureaucratic warfare, they charged that the CIA and DIA were overly skeptical of information yielded from defectors and exiles. Although professional analysts groused to reporters that Wolfowitz’s group was arrogant, relentless, and not to be trusted, the head of the CIA scrambled not to be left behind by the winning team. Tenet accommodated the Pentagon and vice president’s office, even as a classified DIA assessment concluded that “there is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons.”9

New York Times editor Bill Keller rightly observed that the war against Iraq was not a matter of “flimflam intelligence [driving] us to war.” It was the other way around; a determination to smash Saddam’s regime drove the intelligence. Although Keller supported the war, he worried that the way it was sold was bad
for American democracy. “What the Bush administration did was gild the lily—
disseminating information that ranged from selective to preposterous,” he
remarked. Reasoning that Bush either believed what he wanted or was given a
stacked deck of information, Keller couldn’t decide which possibility was worse
for an interventionist democracy that needed to trust its government.10

Prominent New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman took a similar line.
Friedman believed that Bush was right to overthrow Saddam’s regime for the real
reason that he did so: to pursue a policy of creative destruction in the Middle East.
Smashing Syria would have worked just as well, he judged, “but we hit Saddam
for one simple reason: because we could, and because he deserved it and because
he was right in the heart of that world.” Friedman believed that the war
accomplished this purpose. After the war, every Middle Eastern government
scrambled to avoid the wrath of the United States, and the prospect of creating
democratic, pro-American regimes in the region seemed much brighter. Bush
had a right reason for invading Iraq, creative destruction, and he had a moral
reason, delivering the Iraqi people from a vicious tyranny. But instead of
appealing to these reasons, Friedman lamented, Bush took the United States to
war “on the wings of a lie.” He sparked a stampede to war by scaring the
American people with baseless threats. Friedman hoped that Bush hadn’t known
that his speeches were based on cooked information, because if it turned out that
he did, “that would badly damage America and be a very serious matter.”11

Intelligence analysts lashed back at the administration; New York Times
columnist Nicholas Kristof reported that some were “spitting mad” at the
manipulation of their work. One of them angrily told Kristof, “As an employee
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, I know how this administration has lied to
the public to get support for its attack on Iraq.” Another analyst remarked of
Rumsfeld: “He’s an ideologist. He doesn’t start with facts, even though he’s
quite brainy. He has a bottom line, and then he gathers facts to support the
bottom line.” An Army intelligence officer told Time magazine more bluntly:
“Rumsfeld was deeply, almost pathologically, distorting the intelligence.” Others
described Cheney, Libby, Feith, Wolfowitz, and Luti as a virtual tag-team of
intimidators who demanded pro-war intelligence; Cheney visited the CIA
headquarters at Langley approximately ten times, often demanding to know why
the CIA was not confirming what he knew (from the Pentagon) to be true.12

In England the Blair administration was staggered by public outrage over the
intelligence scandal and the Anglo/American failure to find weapons of mass
destruction. In America public reaction, and the opposition party, were more
tepid, but Bush officials played hardball in responding to a growing scandal. The
White House defended Bush’s Niger uranium story, but in July 2003 Joseph
Wilson revealed that he was the expert who discredited the story a year before
Bush featured it in his State of the Union address. Previous accounts had
identified him as an unnamed former ambassador; Wilson was the United States’
last ambassador to Iraq and a former ambassador to three African nations. The
White House grudgingly acknowledged that Wilson’s account was correct, made
a clumsy attempt to pin the blame on Tenet, and finally admitted that Bush had erred in using the story. The same week Bush officials struck back in a stunningly ugly way, outing Wilson’s wife as a covert CIA operative. Senior administration officials leaked the story to several journalists, including conservative columnist Robert Novak, ignoring that government officials are barred by law from disclosing the identities of undercover agents. Wilson’s wife, Valerie Plame, was a “Noc” in CIA parlance, working without official cover as an overseas specialist in nonconventional weapons. Having operated at a high level of danger, her exposure endangered those with whom she had worked. Her friends and relatives understood her to be an energy industry analyst, as did the governments on which she spied. After Novak disclosed Plame’s identity, Wilson bitterly observed that his wife had nothing to do with the Niger story and that her career was destroyed by an administration that pledged “to restore dignity and honor to the White House.” He judged that Bush officials did it to intimidate intelligence analysts from telling what they knew; three months later the story raised a brief media furor.13

The Office of Special Plans was a key institutional link between the weapons of mass destruction fiasco and the Bush administration’s disastrously poor planning for the postwar occupation. In both cases it relied on the Iraqi National Congress. Although Rumsfeld acknowledged after the war that the Pentagon had no new evidence that compelled going to war, Chalabi and the INC supplied the Pentagon with defector anecdotes about Saddam’s nuclear program and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. The same sources assured that they were the answer to the postwar governance problem. Chalabi’s group claimed that Saddam was involved in the 9/11 attacks, that American troops would be welcomed by Iraqis, and that Iraqis would welcome a government led by the Iraqi National Congress.14

Although the State Department’s prewar “Future of Iraq” project assembled extensive information on the problems that American occupiers could expect to face, the Pentagon ignored it. Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld had a privileged vision of the postwar transfer of power and didn’t allow it to be challenged. Incredibly, the Pentagon conducted no intelligence roundtables with Iraq experts from the CIA and DIA, refused to project the costs of the occupation, and didn’t begin planning for the occupation until late January. Former CIA official Raymond McGovern remarked, “Back in the old days, there would have been an estimate. In their arrogance, they didn’t worry about it.” A former U.S. official remarked of retired General Jay Garner’s group, which belatedly got the job of running the occupation: “They were scared shitless. They were making it up as they went along. There was a great deal of ignorance. They didn’t know the names of the tribes, much less how they relate to each other. They didn’t have the expertise, and they didn’t have enough time to assemble the expertise.” Six months after the war, the DIA reported that most of the intelligence provided by Chalabi’s group was worthless and that the defectors it provided to the Pentagon either
fabricated or exaggerated their claims to direct knowledge of the Iraqi government.\textsuperscript{15}

During the months leading up to the war a very different picture of the Iraqi situation was offered by former U.N. weapons inspector Scott Ritter, who contended that 90 to 95 percent of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction were destroyed in the 1990s. “We had an incineration plant operating full-time for years, burning tons of the stuff every day,” he recalled, adding that the chemical agents that Iraq produced in the 1980s were of poor quality. The missing-munitions problem was academic, and even if Iraq managed to hide some of its Sarin or Tabun, the shelf life of these nerve agents was only five years, the shelf life of liquid bulk form anthrax was three years, and Iraq lacked the complex aerosol dispensing systems to deliver biological toxins such as anthrax beyond artillery range. Moreover, the U.N. blew up Iraq’s anthrax factory in 1996. Against an onslaught of misinformation about the status of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, Ritter insisted that Iraq could not have reconstituted its nuclear program without setting off detectable heat and gamma radiation. The U.N.’s exacting inspections made nuclear progress doubly impossible. But Ritter destroyed his credibility with the Pentagon after he joined the antiwar opposition; Wolfowitz dismissed his arguments as “simply amazing.”\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Neocons Respond}

The neocons wanted to celebrate America’s victory in Iraq and resume the war in Iran or Syria. The occupation mess was frustrating to them on both counts, and they resented the media flap over Saddam’s missing weapons of mass destruction. At the same time they assured that Bush, unlike Tony Blair, was not really hurt by the missing weapons controversy. The neocons stuck to Rumsfeld’s line that sooner or later Americans would find Saddam’s nuclear program and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. In the meantime they struck back at critics of how the war was sold. Krauthammer charged that the critics weren’t really concerned about America’s moral or political credibility; they just wanted to tarnish Bush’s war prestige and reputation for integrity. In a slow summer, the media obliged their desperation to cut Bush down to size by turning a “molehill” into a mountain.\textsuperscript{17}

If the intelligence on Iraq’s missing weapons was so poor, why did the U.N. Security Council support Resolution 1441? Why did France, Germany, and Russia charge that Saddam failed to account for his chemical and biological agents? If he got rid of them between 1998 and 2002, when the inspectors were gone, why didn’t he save his regime by showing what he had done? Neocons argued that these questions exposed the stupidity of the controversy over Bush’s case for invading Iraq. Every nation on the Security Council including Syria signed onto it when they voted for Resolution 1441. Krauthammer observed that Clinton believed it, too; the only difference between Clinton and Bush was that “Bush did something about it.”\textsuperscript{18}
But didn’t Bush rush to war on bad information? Remarkably, Krauthammer denied that Bush portrayed Iraq as an imminent danger. The case for overthrowing Saddam did not need any arguments about an immediate threat and the Bush administration didn’t make any, he claimed. Thus, the media fuss about America’s twisted intelligence was ridiculous and irrelevant. A month after Krauthammer introduced this argument, the White House began to use it. In mid-August Rice contended that Bush had never claimed that Saddam was close to getting nuclear weapons; later the White House maintained that it had never warned of an imminent danger of any kind.

Both denials were ridiculous. In his speech on the eve of Congress’s vote to authorize the war, Bush declared: “Some ask how urgent this danger is to America and the world. The danger is already significant.” In the same speech he warned that if Saddam’s regime obtained enriched uranium “it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year.” That was why Bush officials were so determined to use the Niger story, to make it appear that Saddam was very close to getting the bomb. America could not wait for more inspections or other measures short of war because Saddam posed an “urgent” threat. Americans got the message. According to a September 2002 Newsweek poll, two thirds of Americans believed that Iraq posed an “imminent threat” to them. The Bush administration told them repeatedly that the danger was urgent, Saddam was ready to use chemical and biological weapons, he had an advanced nuclear program, he had operational ties with al-Qaeda, his unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could spread terror anywhere at any moment, and America stood in danger of a catastrophic attack if it waited to find a smoking gun.

Kagan maintained that the entire controversy over Saddam’s missing weapons was “surreal” and “absurd.” The case for overthrowing Saddam was firmly established before Bush took office, he explained; no serious observer doubted that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. In Kagan’s rendering, this left only two options: Either Saddam’s vast arsenal of illegitimate weapons was yet to be discovered (or perhaps, their fate), or the conspiracy to convince the world of their existence included Blair, Clinton, former defense secretary William Cohen, and French president Chirac. “The answer depends on how broad and pervasive you like your conspiracies to be,” “Kagan wrote, devoting an entire column to the sweep of a wild conspiracy: “So if you like a good conspiracy, this one’s a doozy. And the best thing about it is that if all these people are lying, there’s only one person who ever told the truth: Saddam Hussein.” Of course, that was absurd; the point wasn’t that “all these people are lying.” For the neocons, “we’re sure to find them” gradually morphed into “what’s the big deal?” The following February, shortly after Chalabi sat with Laura Bush at the president’s 2004 State of the Union address, Chalabi told London’s Daily Telegraph that he and his friends were “heroes in error. As far as we’re concerned, we’ve been entirely successful. What was said before is not important.” That was too brazen even for some of Chalabi’s supporters; he replied that the Telegraph misquoted him, and by then the administration was
perturbed with Chalabi for complaining that the White House bungled the occupation.21

Why didn’t Saddam show that he had no weapons of mass destruction? He apparently held the disastrously mistaken idea that keeping the world guessing about whether he had them would be a deterrent against being invaded. He couldn’t stand not being feared in the Middle East and Pentagon, and he miscalculated the deterrent effect of possessing dangerous weapons. He apparently kept some of his own generals guessing about whether he had them. They lied to him about the state of their missile program, and U.N. inspectors had reasons to believe that he retained some forbidden weapons. In 1995 they found ballistic missile gyroscopes at the bottom of the Tigris River; three years later they discovered an Iraqi document indicating that Iraq may have dropped six thousand fewer chemical bombs during the Iran-Iraq War than it claimed. But chemical and nuclear weapons cannot be produced without large-scale facilities, and Saddam’s capacity to produce or even hide mass destruction weapons was destroyed by the combined effects of the Gulf War, nine years of U.N. inspections, thirteen years of U.N. sanctions, and the 1998 Desert Fox air strikes.22

Bill Kristol, as usual, preferred to play offense. At the height of the Niger controversy, he declared that it was much ado about nothing because the story itself didn’t matter. “The votes to authorize war had taken place months before,” he explained. Because the decision to invade Iraq had already been made when Bush made his charge about Niger yellowcake, his sixteen words about it had no importance. Nothing changed because of them. By contrast, Kristol observed, Democratic leader Dick Gephardt had recently spoken sixteen words that mattered very much. Gephardt, a centrist Democrat who supported the war, doubted that America was safer in 2003 than it had been in 1999. Kristol was eager to hang that statement on a leftward-moving Democratic Party. The Bush administration had smashed the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, made Pakistan toe the line, and at least partly straightened out Saudi Arabia’s bad behavior, he observed: “Gephardt has made a claim that will come back to haunt him and his fellow Democrats.” In Kristol’s view, the controversy over Saddam’s weapons helped Bush by suckering Democrats into criticizing him. Unlike the Brits, Americans weren’t fazed by whatever exaggerations Bush may have committed in defense of their safety, which drove the Democrats “stark, raving mad.” The media fuss over war propaganda simply reminded most Americans that it was the Bush administration and Republican Party that stood up for them.23

To the end of 2003 neocons hoped very much for a 2004 campaign that focused on national security. The politics of national security strongly favored them, even after the Iraq occupation turned into a very expensive and deadly mess. Running against the war of an incumbent Republican was extremely perilous, if not suicidal; Democrats were crushed the last time they tried it, in 1972, and that was near the end of an unpopular war. Among the party’s major presidential candidates, only Howard Dean and Wesley Clark opposed the war,
and the party’s eventual nominee, John Kerry, weakly offered that he didn’t like the Lone Ranger way that it was fought. But the occupation proved so disastrous in the Sunni triangle of Baghdad-Tikrit-Ramadi that even pro-war Democrats found ample ground to criticize the administration’s policy.

The politics of security were ironic and vicious. The very monster that the Bush team conjured to scare Americans into supporting an offensive war in Iraq came into being as a result of the war. Contrary to the alarmist spinning of Bush officials, Iraq was not a haven for terrorists before America invaded and occupied the country, but it quickly became one after American troops entered Baghdad. The war created a perfect breeding ground for terrorists and a magnet for foreign terrorists by creating a broken state unable to control its borders or meet the essential needs of its people for food, employment, and safety. And it offered 139,000 American troops as targets.

In the early weeks of the occupation American troops were attacked six times per day; by late summer the average was nearly twenty per day; by November it was thirty-five per day, in addition to major attacks on the Jordanian embassy, U.N. headquarters, Turkish embassy, International Red Cross, and Italian military police headquarters. Bush officials were slow to acknowledge the trend, insisting that things were going remarkably well. In August, the White House issued a report giving one hundred reasons why the first one hundred days of the occupation had been a great success. There were “10 Signs of Democracy,” “10 Signs of Better Security” “10 Signs of Economic Renewal” and “10 Ways the Liberation of Iraq Supports the War on Terror.” The White House claimed that America was making “progress on the road to democracy” in Iraq and that “only in isolated areas are there still attacks.” The Weekly Standard was equally perky and optimistic. “You have no idea how well things are going,” it announced in May, claiming that contrary impressions were the fault of “bad reporting in Baghdad.” By July the magazine conceded that “Baathist diehards” and thugs were causing problems for the occupation but, overall, America was winning the peace.

Rumsfeld contended that the security problems were caused by “Baathist dead enders” that American troops were rooting out; the American commander in Iraq, General John Abizaid, generally echoed this claim, although in July he irritated the White House by calling the fighting a guerrilla war. On July 2, Bush declared that if America’s enemies wanted to turn Iraq into a battleground, “My answer is bring ’em on. We got the force necessary to deal with the security situation.” It was not until the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad was destroyed on August 19, killing twenty people, that the Bush administration began to admit that it had a major problem with an infusion of terrorists into the country, in addition to its problems with Baathists, Sunni insurgents, scattered thugs, imported terrorists, radical Shiites and others who resented being occupied. Cheney tried to turn this development to the administration’s political advantage, picturing Iraq as the central battleground of the world war against terrorism. Bush insisted that the escalating attacks on occupation forces were signs of
America’s success; the violence showed that the anti-American groups were desperate.25

Having rebuked Army General Eric Shinseki for contending that the occupation would require several hundred thousand troops, Bush officials were loathe to admit they were wrong. Having excluded the United Nations from playing a major role in the occupation, Bush officials were unable to get other countries to help occupy Iraq under American military authority. After the devastating attack on the U.N. headquarters, which chased international aid groups out of the country, American administrator L.Paul Bremer told his handpicked Iraqi support group to take more governing responsibility. Bush officials wanted the Governing Council to deflect some of the anger and violence directed at American troops; it also insisted that Iraq had to have a proper constitution before it could hold national elections. The twenty-five (later twenty-four) member Governing Council sharply replied that it would not take responsibility as long as it lacked governing authority. Three months later it added that the Bush plan for a constitutional convention was unrealistic and that a “basic law” of governance as a bridge to elections was the best Iraq could do.

Negotiations over the constitutional convention were paralyzed by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s ruling that any such convention would have to be elected, not appointed. That raised the prospect of an Islamic constitution and a democratically elected Shia government. The Shia and Kurds had deep grievances about their persecution under the Sunni governments, and the Kurds and Sunni feared a Shia government. Moreover, the terrorist killing of Ayatollah Bakr al-Hakim created a huge political vacuum in the Shia community, eliminating the only Shia with both religious and political standing. In this context, the Governing Council agreed in mid-November that the Bush plan was a nonstarter and a transfer of political authority was overdue. Working with the Bush administration, the Governing Council adopted a quasi-democracy model resembling Afghanistan. Delegates for a National Assembly would be selected by tribal leaders and other notables from Iraq’s eighteen provinces; that body would form a provisional caucus-style government of Iraqi elites; and arrangements for a constitutional convention, referendum, and lastly, national elections would come later.26

Two weeks later the council announced that that wouldn’t work either, because Ayatollah Sistani wouldn’t accept anything less than a democratically elected government. The Bush administration replied that the Shites would have to live with the Afghanistan model; Iraq had no registry for a national voting process anyway. The political landscape of really exiting Iraq proved daunting for Pentagon planners who had banked on the Iraqi National Congress. According to Zogby polling data, 49 percent of Iraqis wanted a democracy based on Islamic law, 24 percent wanted a cleric-ruled Islamic theocracy, and 21 percent wanted a secular democracy. Over 60 percent of Iraqis wanted the American and British troops to leave within a year. In November Bush declared that his policy was “a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East.”
Exporting democracy was the positive side of the war against terrorism. But the Bush administration was caught between its claim to stand for democracy and its determination to prevent a democratic outcome in Iraq. From mid-November to mid-February it persisted with its caucus plan, but the plan was universally rejected by Iraqis, the handpicked Governing Council had no support either, and Ayatollah Sistani refused to have direct dealings with the U.S. The Bush administration was reduced to begging the U.N. to broker a transfer of power to an interim semi-sovereign Iraqi government in time for the election-year end of America’s formal occupation on June 30, 2004.27

In general, Bush officials put the best face on bad news and insisted that the occupation was on track. Neocons outside the White House urged Bush to put more troops in Iraq; in August 2003 the administration’s former special envoy to Afghanistan, James F.Dobbins, called for three hundred thousand to five hundred thousand troops; in Congress, John McCain led the charge for a similar escalation, reminding Americans that the occupation of Germany was long and expensive. But no American troops were killed during the occupation of Germany, and America was not a radioactive presence in Europe. By contrast, America provoked revulsion throughout the Muslim world as the occupier of Iraq. Ordinary Muslims and Arabs experienced the occupation as an unbearable humiliation, even while expressing relief that Saddam Hussein had been overthrown. In May 2004 the entire Middle East was convulsed by pictures of Iraqi prisoners being tortured and sexually violated by American troops. Although for the most part American troops behaved with remarkable civility in Iraq, the pictures of grotesquely violated Iraqi prisoners were powerful symbols of the brutal humiliation of occupation. For the vengefully minded, America’s presence in Iraq was a realized fantasy, providing an opportunity to fight the American intruders on Arab terrain where Americans didn’t know the language or understand the cultural signals. Six months after Bush celebrated America’s victory in Iraq, the CIA issued a grim assessment of the situation, warning that large numbers of ordinary Iraqis had turned against the United States. The Weekly Standard bitterly observed that many Iraqis had “tripped upon a new national pastime: whining like little girls.”28

Having failed to enlist significant relief from international troops, Bush was desperate to cut America’s losses in an ugly occupation. He opted for Iraqification, despite furious protests from neocons that Iraqis were not ready to govern themselves and that Iraqification was a species of surrender. On May 17, 2004 the Pentagon finally gave up on Chalabi and the INC, cutting off its $335,000 monthly payments from the Defense Intelligence Agency; three days later American and Iraqi forces raided Chalabi’s Baghdad headquarters on charges of possible corruption, fraud, espionage, and kidnapping. The Bush administration was remarkably unprepared to occupy a Muslim country in the heart of the Arab world, but even a well-organized occupation would have encountered terrible problems.
The neoconservatives took pride in their closeness to Bush and the Republican Party mainstream, as well as the fact that they had not changed in getting there. Rather, they had changed the Republican Party. Many of them were sufficiently comfortable in the Republican establishment that they dropped the “neo.” As late as the early 1990s the old right conservatives had hoped that the neoconservatives would fade away, but the neocons did not fade away. Extremely adept at creating think tanks, getting money from conservative foundations, and founding new magazines, they got a tremendous boost in the mid-1990s from Rupert Murdoch, who created the Fox Network and *Weekly Standard* magazine. By the late 1990s even the venerable *National Review* belonged to the neocons, who boasted that they had created or taken over nearly all of the main ideological institutions of the American Right.

In domestic politics the neocons played leading roles in the culture wars of the 1990s; on immigration they blasted the “new nativism” on the right; in international politics they led the fight for an aggressively interventionist policy. Immigration was a flashpoint issue. In the mid-1990s, under John O’Sullivan’s editorship, *National Review* took a strongly old right position that sparked a prolonged controversy. Peter Brimelow led the fight, contending that America had to return to the immigration statutes of the 1920s or become an “alien nation” of displaced blacks and Asians.29

For five years, *National Review* rode a wave of controversy over Brimelow’s position, featuring his cheeky replies to liberal and neocon critics. Brimelow rounded up his favorite accusations: “hateful, racist, gentrified racism, openly racialist, narrowminded, deliberately misleading, an ugly jeremiad, tirade, diatribe, a fervent and obsessive polemic,” and, five lines later, “in-your-face vileness.” Former New York Mayor Ed Koch observed that under Brimelow’s immigration policy, Albert Einstein, Arturo Toscanini, Madeleine Albright, Patrick Ewing, and Henry Kissinger wouldn’t have made it into the United States; Brimelow, completely unfazed, rattled off a list of gangsters who wouldn’t have made it either. Neoconservative economist and Murdoch pal Irwin Steltzer campaigned against Brimelow, protesting that he had a terrible effect on conservatism and that *National Review* had become offensive. The magazine published more temperate anti-immigrationist articles by O’Sullivan, Fred Iklé, and Scott McConnell, but by 1997 William Buckley had second thoughts about being identified with old right racialism. He eased O’Connor out of the editorship and hired Rich Lowry, who promptly fired Brimelow. The flagship magazine of the American right, so recently alien to the neocons, took a neoconservative turn.30

By the mid-1990s, the neoconservative movement had a third generation that called the founding neocons “the grandpas.” Those who came to the movement by inheritance, not conversion, felt little need to qualify their relation to the conservative establishment. Irving Kristol epitomized the formerly Marxist...
neoconservatives who surprised themselves by joining the Republicans; Bill Kristol was a lifelong Republican who sought to complete the neoconservative transformation of the Republican Party. But the paleoconservatives took no interest in being transformed by newcomers who, from their standpoint, were too ideological, secular, modernist, and ethnic. The old right did not appreciate being told that it was reactionary, not conservative, or that it was too infected by racism, xenophobia, and nativism to play a leading role in American politics, or that its foreign policy was too isolationist and non-Zionist to be good for America. The conflicts over immigration and democratic globalism remained staples of the debate between neocons and paleocons, but the Zionist issue carried the heaviest weight of all.

In theory, unipolarist ideology did not have to be linked to hardline Zionism, but in fact, it nearly always was. Most unipolarist leaders were Jewish neoconservatives who took for granted that a militantly pro-Israel policy was in America’s interest. Wolfowitz, Perle, Podhoretz, Krauthammer, Wattenberg, Muravchik, both Kristols, Kagan, Boot, and Kaplan fit that description, as did dozens of neocons at all levels of the Bush administration from Pentagon desk officers to State Department deputy secretaries and advisors in the vice president’s office. Some were active in the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), founded in 1976, which took a very hard line against the Palestinians and U.S. diplomatic relations with Syria, and which sometimes outflanked Israel’s Likud Party to the right. JINSA’s board of advisors before 2001 included Richard Perle, James Woolsey, Dick Cheney, John Bolton, and Douglas Feith, until the last three resigned to take positions in the Bush administration. The Center for Security Policy, directed by Perle protégé Frank Gaffney, was another hardline Zionist organization that called for wars of regime-changing transformation throughout the Middle East. Gaffney, a staunch right-winger, stridently defended Israel’s settlements policy.

In 1996 Perle, Feith, and David Wurmser authored a classic neocon tract in the form of a policy advice letter to incoming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Written under the auspices of the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies and titled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm” the paper called for the use of proxy armies to destabilize and overthrow Arab governments. It advocated Israeli attacks on Syrian military targets in Lebanon, and, if necessary, Syria, “establishing the precedent that Syrian territory is not immune to attacks emanating from Lebanon by Israeli proxy forces.” Strengthening Israel’s ties with Turkey and Jordan would help to destabilize or overthrow Syria, the authors advised. Because Iraq was an enemy of Israel, they also wanted Netanyahu to support the Jordanian Hashemites in their challenge to Iraq’s borders.

Netanyahu had close personal and ideological ties to American neocons, who told him that Americans would support a hard line against the Palestinians. Perle, Feith, and Wurmser assured that Americans would support a policy of “hot pursuit into Palestinian-controlled areas.” More important, Israel was under
no obligation to honor the Oslo agreements if the Palestine Liberation Organization did not fulfill its obligations of compliance and accountability. The time had come to find alternatives to Arafat and Israel’s dependence on the United States, they urged. Instead of asking the United States to help Israel trade land for peace, Israel needed to “make a clean break from the past and establish a new vision for the U.S.-Israeli partnership,” one based on a shared policy of “peace through strength.” The key to dealing with the Palestinians was for Israel to break its dependence on America and assert its own interests. The authors promised that the United States would accept both sides of that bargain.33

For many critics, the hardline Zionist commitments of the neocons reduced unipolarism to something less than it seemed. It was really a rationalization for solving Israel’s problems. Former CIA analysts Kathleen and Bill Christison judged that the Jewish unipolarists were “so wrapped up in the concern for the fate of Israel that they honestly do not know whether their own passion about advancing the U.S. imperium is motivated primarily by America-first patriotism or is governed first and foremost by a desire to secure Israel’s safety and predominance in the Middle East through the advancement of the U.S. imperium.” In either case, they urged, it was important to call the neocons what they were: dual loyalists who could not be trusted to give highest place to America’s interest. In Counterpunch and the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, the Christisons explained that the neocons were zealots with a far-right vision of a victorious Israel: “Zealotry produces blindness: the zealous effort to pursue Israel’s right-wing agenda has blinded the dual loyalists in the administration to the true face of Israel as occupier, to any concern for justice or equity and any consideration that interests other than Israel’s are involved, and indeed to any pragmatic consideration that continued unquestioning accommodation of Israel, far from bringing an end to violence, will actually lead to its tragic escalation and to increased terrorism against both the United States and Israel.”34

The Christisons lamented that liberals tended to be delicate in approaching this issue; they believed that hammering was more appropriate. On right, however, sledgehammer accusation had a long history. Long before unipolarism had a name, old right conservatives charged that the neoconservatives had an Israel-first agenda, whereas neoconservatives countered that their critics were anti-Semites who resurrected the dual loyalty smears of the 1940s. This cycle of charge and countercharge intensified during the debate over the first war against Iraq. Critics claimed that the war’s neoconservative architects were driven by a hawkish calculation of Israel’s national interest, not by America’s security or economic interests. Neoconservatives countered that America and Israel stood together against tyranny and terrorism, and that there was a close relation or identity between American and Israeli interests.
Republic or Empire?

The friction between the old right and neoconservatism went back to the early days of the Reagan administration, when neoconservatives won numerous positions that old style conservatives coveted. Old right conservatives such as M.E.Bradford, Pat Buchanan, Thomas Fleming, Samuel Francis, Paul Gottfried, Russell Kirk, and Joseph Sobran complained that the neocons were aggressive ideologues who acted like they invented conservatism; less frequently, but with a sharper edge, they also charged that the neocons cared more about Israel than America. Sobran, a syndicated columnist and senior editor of National Review, peppered his articles with attacks on Zionism and “the Jewish lobby.”35 The dean of American conservatism, Kirk, contended that “what really animates the neoconservatives, especially Irving Kristol, is the preservation of Israel. That lies in back of everything.” To him the neocons were a baleful influence on American politics who pursued “a fanciful democratic globalism rather than the national interest of the United States.” Often it seemed to him “as if some eminent Neoconservatives mistook Tel Aviv for the capital of the United States.”36

Near the end of the Cold War, Buchanan exhorted that neoconservative interventionism was not in the tradition or spirit of true American conservatism. “Conservative principles do not sanction democracy worship,” he urged. “It is liberal idolatry masquerading as conservative orthodoxy.” Wattenberg’s neo-manifest destinarianism was, to him, a dreadful case in point: “Mr. Wattenberg’s Mission Democracy is a prescription for endless and seditious meddling in the affairs of nations whose institutions are shaped by their own history, culture, traditions and values, not ours.” When the first Bush administration intervened against Iraq, Buchanan protested that America was stampeded into war by Israel and its neoconservative “amen corner.” What was needed instead of neoconservative empire-building was “a new nationalism, a new patriotism, a new foreign policy that puts America first, and, not only first, but second and third as well.”37

Repeatedly, Buchanan, Kirk, Gottfried, and Fleming protested that the neocons stole the money from the Scaife, Olin, Smith Richardson, and Bradley Foundations that had previously sustained the old right. Kirk complained that when conservatives applied to their customary sources for money, neocons told the foundation directors that the conservatives were fascists. Neoconservatives replied that their critics were anti-Semitic bigots who blamed Jews for their failures. Midge Decter called Kirk’s Tel Aviv remark “a bloody piece of anti-Semitism”; Norman Podhoretz blasted the “nativist bigotry” of Fleming’s Chronicles magazine; reluctantly, Buckley entered the controversy, testifying that while Sobran was not an anti-Semite, his writings made him seem like one.38 Conservatives noted that when Sobran attacked feminists, gays, and blacks, Buckley felt no need to apologize for him. Increasingly they vented their resentment at the difference, while National Review drifted toward
neoconservatism. For a while, Sobran stifled his anti-Zionist opinions and submitted to Buckley’s authority, but after he charged that America fought the Gulf War as a favor to Israel he lost his position as senior editor of *National Review*.  

Commenting on the faction fight between neoconservatives and what were then called “paleoconservatives” old right English Professor Stephen J. Tonsor reflected, “It has always struck me as odd, even perverse, that former Marxists have been permitted, yes invited, to play such a leading role in the Conservative movement of the twentieth century.” The old right charged that the neocons were secular ideologues who made a religion out of Zionism and democratic globalism. Their aggressive and opportunistic style was hard to take; Kirk called them “clever creatures, glib, committed to an ideology, and devious at attaining their objects.” With typical hyperbole Gottfried explained the old right’s resentments: “The neoconservatives created an enemy on the right by vilification and exclusion. The enemy lives increasingly for revenge and is trying to subvert the neoconservative empire. Few old rightists believe the foundations now run by neoconservatives will become theirs as soon as their enemies fall. Far more likely such resources will go to opera houses and other civic charities than to supporting old right scholars. It is burning hate, not uncomplicated greed, that fuels the old right war against the neoconservatives.”

In addition to the old right conservatives and neocons, right libertarians had a tradition and infrastructure of their own, establishment realists claimed the conservative mainstream, the Christian Right blended fundamentalism and hardline Zionism, and scattered others yearned for another Reagan who held the various conservatisms together. But most of the public fighting on the right occurred between neocons and the old right, while both groups groused about the convictionless sterility of the Bush 41 administration. Buchanan’s first campaign for the presidency, against Bush in 1992, seriously damaged Bush’s standing in the Republican Party. It also made the old right’s themes and resentments familiar to millions of voters.

Buchanan never tired of baiting neocons, who weren’t good conservatives because they weren’t America-firsters or Christians. Some paleocons were more blatant than Buchanan in implying that “neoconservative” really meant “Jewish conservative”; neocons like Michael Novak, George Weigel, William Bennett, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Richard John Neuhaus had to be something else. Buchanan often noted that the neocons were opportunistic think tankers who rode to power by attaching themselves to politicians, not by succeeding in business, or serving in the military, or actually running for office. In 1992 he believed that the old right had a chance to gain control of the Republican Party, if not the presidency, and that his neoconservative opponents were finished. Eight years later the neoconservatives were the stronger party, controlling conservative think tanks, foundations, and magazines. For neocons, the 2000 election offered a second chance to redeem Ronald Reagan’s vision of American greatness.
Having seized that opportunity, they were well positioned to reap a mighty political windfall from the events of September 11, 2001. But they could not do so without confronting their old foes on the right, who for the first time forged (temporary) links with the peace movement left. At the outset of the war against Iraq, Buchanan observed that, although the war party had gotten its war, it also had gotten something it had not bargained for: uncowed exposure. Articles appeared on the agenda and influence of the Project for the New American Century, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs. Television journalist Tim Russert asked Richard Perle if the war was really about America’s national interests. Buchanan remarked: “Suddenly, the Israeli connection is on the table, and the War Party is not amused. Finding themselves in an unanticipated firefight, our neoconservative friends are doing what comes naturally, seeking student deferments from political combat by claiming the status of a persecuted minority group.” The neocons were chicken hawks who avoided combat duty for themselves, Buchanan chided; more to the point, as soon as they were questioned about the Zionist influence on their war-boosting, they claimed to be victims of anti-Semitism. Citing Max Boot, David Brooks, Robert Kagan, and Lawrence Kaplan on this theme, Buchanan replied: “People who claim to be writing the foreign policy of a world superpower, one would think, would be a little more manly in the schoolyard of politics. Not so.”

But to him, the important thing was that this time it wasn’t working; the neocons had cried wolf too often. Kaplan protested that the charge of Zionist influence was a toxic lie, impossible to disprove, that polluted public discourse; Buchanan countered that it was the neocons who specialized in toxic accusation. The charge of anti-Semitism was a slander “designed to nullify public discourse by smearing and intimidating foes and censoring and blacklisting them and any who would publish them.” The question of Zionist influence was too obvious not to raise, he argued: “Neocons say we attack them because they are Jewish. We do not. We attack them because their warmongering threatens our country, even as it finds a reliable echo in Ariel Sharon.” For Buchanan, the paleoconservatives, and an antiwar left that partly overcame its embarrassment at being on the same side as Buchanan and the old right, the war against Iraq was a watershed. Buchanan explained: “America is about to make a momentous decision: whether to launch a series of wars in the Middle East that could ignite the Clash of Civilizations against which Harvard professor Samuel Huntington has warned, a war we believe would be a tragedy and a disaster for this Republic.”

Because the neoconservatives plainly advocated the policies of the Likud Party, Buchanan reasoned, how could it be illegitimate to say they were overinfluenced by their hardline Zionism? He cited the appeals of Kristol, Kagan, Krauthammer, and others for an all-out war against Hezbollah, strongly suggesting that they targeted Hezbollah only because it “humiliated Israel by driving its army out of Lebanon.” He recalled that in 1970 Richard Perle
narrowly averted an espionage charge after a federal wiretap caught him giving classified National Security Council information to the Israeli embassy. He recalled that in 1996 Perle advised Netanyahu to repudiate the Oslo Accords and fight for regime change in Syria and Iraq. By 2003 the neocons had moved all the way to conscripting American blood “to make the world safe for Israel.” Buchanan bitterly remarked: “They want the peace of the sword imposed on Islam and American soldiers to die if necessary to impose it.”

Neoconservatives repudiated the 1993 Oslo Accords, demanded a Likud-style policy of hostility toward the Palestinians, and openly hoped that America’s war in Iraq would lead to the downfall of the governments in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Buchanan was appalled: “We charge that a cabal of polemicists and public officials seek to ensnare our country in a series of wars that are not in America’s interests. We charge them with colluding with Israel to ignite those wars and destroy the Oslo Accords. We charge them with deliberately damaging U.S. relations with every state in the Arab world that defies Israel or supports the Palestinian people’s right to a homeland of their own. We charge that they have alienated friends and allies all over the Islamic and Western world through their arrogance, hubris, and bellicosity.” Because George W. Bush was the president who proposed a policy of perpetual war, Buchanan had to explain how he got that way. He subscribed to a conspiracy theory: “President Bush is being lured into a trap baited for him by these neocons that could cost him his office and cause America to forfeit years of peace won for us by the sacrifices of two generations in the Cold War.” He explained that when Bush struggled to conceptualize what it would mean to fight a war against terrorism, the neoconservatives “put their precooked meal in front of him. Bush dug into it.”

Buchanan summarized the meaning of it all: “The neocons seek American empire, and Sharonites seek hegemony over the Middle East. The two agendas coincide precisely. And though neocons insist that it was Sept. 11 that made the case for war on Iraq and militant Islam, the origins of their war plans go back far before.” In his rendering, the open letter that Kristol, Perle, Podhoretz, and other PNAC members sent to Bush on September 20, 2001, was an “ultimatum.” If Bush wanted to retain their support, he had to attack Hezbollah and Iraq; moreover, if Syria and Iran refused to break with Hezbollah, they had to be attacked also: “Here was a cabal of intellectuals telling the Commander-in-Chief, nine days after an attack on America, that if he did not follow their war plans, he would be charged with surrendering to terror.” Buchanan protested that Hezbollah had nothing to do with 9/11; it was merely Israel’s enemy: “President Bush had been warned. He was to exploit the attack of 9/11 to launch a series of wars on Arab regimes, none of which had attacked us. All, however, were enemies of Israel.”

This explanation overdramatized the political power of the neocons and implicitly exaggerated Bush’s inability to think for himself. It also overlooked the role of the chief influence on Bush—his vice president—who was connected to the neocons but not one of them. It was true, however, that the neocons had
targeted Iraq long before 9/11 and that their lists of targets resembled Netanyahu’s “empire of terror.” Shortly after the 9/11 attacks Netanyahu implored the United States to smash Iraq, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian resistance. Neocons variously added Syria, North Korea, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Sudan, and Algeria to this list. Podhoretz, who was keen to smash them all, lamented that Bush was slow to recognize that there was “not a smidgen of difference” between America’s war in Afghanistan and Sharon’s invasion of the West Bank. Both wars were waged “for exactly the same reason,” he contended: to kill terrorists and destroy their infrastructure.48

Podhoretz believed that the Bush Doctrine was incomplete and not quite coherent without a fourth pillar that tied America and Israel together; by September 2002 he believed that Bush was ready to add it. In addition to rejecting moral relativism, holding governments responsible for the terrorists they harbored, and asserting America’s right to preemptive war, Podhoretz explained, the Bush Doctrine needed to assimilate Israel’s war against terrorism “into our own.” That was the answer to Buchanan and others who charged that neoconservatives tuned America’s foreign policy to Israel’s security interests. The neocons were Americans first, but on the things that mattered most, there was no meaningful difference between the aims of American and Israeli policy. Israel’s long-standing mortal enemies had become America’s chief enemies by virtue of their connections to world terrorism.49

Long before September 11, 2001, neoconservatives such as Podhoretz, Wolfowitz, and Perle asserted the near-identity of interests between Israel and the United States. They argued that America and Israel valued the same things and that Israel was America’s most reliable ally. Buchanan disputed both claims. Israel was a friend and ally, he allowed, but far from the best on either count. In the 1950s the Israeli intelligence service Mossad conspired to blow up American installations in Egypt in order to destroy America’s relationship with the Nasser government. During the Six-Day War, Israeli attacks on the USS Liberty killed 34 American sailors and wounded 171; Buchanan called America’s nonresponse “an act of national craveness.” Although America showered Israel with $20,000 per citizen, he observed, that didn’t stop Israel from building new settlements that provoked the Palestinian intifada, or from dragging the good name of the United States “through the mud and blood of Ramallah,” “ignoring Bush’s appeal to stop the incursion of 2002. Neither did it stop Israel from selling U.S. weapons technology to China, including the Patriot and Phoenix missiles and the Lavi fighter, or from trying to sell the AWACS system to China. And Israel dispatched Jonathan Pollard—“this treasonous snake”—to spy on the United States and loot its secrets.50

This was the country that Bush’s neocon policy makers favored over their own, Buchanan protested. Fortunately, America had no such history with its actual best friend, England. Buchanan claimed that American neocons harbored “a ‘passionate attachment’ to a nation not our own that causes them to subordinate the interests of their own country.” But he had not proven Zionist
subordination or priority. The neocons were American nationalists who believed it was always in America’s interest to help Israel succeed over its enemies. They never claimed that the United States needed to sacrifice some interest of its own for the sake of Israel’s well-being. To them, the assertion of closely related interests and identical values was an article of faith that secured Israel’s protection and provided the United States with its only democratic ally in the Middle East. While lurching to the incendiary accusation that neoconservative policy makers cared more about Israel than their own country, Buchanan simply waved off their claim to a virtual identity of interests and values. He and others who pushed the Zionist conspiracy line insinuated that neoconservatives moved to the right in the first place to advance their hardline Zionism.51

The latter charge misconstrued early neocon history, for Zionism was still a liberal cause when Podhoretz and Irving Kristol moved to the right in the early 1960s. The American left turned anti-Zionist only after the Six-Day War of 1967, and by then Podhoretz and Kristol were well practiced at blasting old friends on the left. Kristol’s turn to the right began in the 1950s; Podhoretz’s coincided with the rise of the new left in the early 1960s. In Podhoretz’s case especially, the motivating cause was his revulsion at the anti-Americanism of the new left. He exploded at hearing that America was racist and imperialist. In the mid-1960s he fumed at acquaintances who compared America to Nazi Germany. Later, Podhoretz recalled that the experience of hearing Americans bitterly criticize their own country was more than he could stand. Far from subordinating America’s interests to anything else, his political conversion began with an intense feeling of American nationalism. For years he blasted everyone who did not share his militant faith in America’s exceptional moral standing and global destiny; only later did he warm to the theme that many of his political enemies were anti-Semites, too.52

By the 1980s Podhoretz had three interlocking subjects that fueled nearly all his work: anti-Americanism, anticommunism, and hardline Zionism. He condemned intellectuals who were hard on America, soft on communism, or sympathetic to the Palestinians. Those who called for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state reminded him of the pragmatists who rationalized Nazi aggression against Czechoslovakia in 1938. Just as Czechoslovakia was accused of mistreating its German minority in the Sudeten regions, Podhoretz analogized, Israel was accused of mistreating the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Just as Czechoslovakia was forced at Munich to cede the Sudetenland to Germany, Israel was constantly told to trade land for peace. But Nazi Germany could not be appeased with territorial concessions, and neither could Israel’s enemies. Creating a Palestinian state would simply create a new staging ground “for a new round of aggression against a more vulnerable military target.”53

He allowed that, at least in theory, one could be an anti-Zionist without being anti-Semitic, although examples were rare. In Podhoretz’s view, the dividing line between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism was the double standard. All nations
had a right to defend themselves, including Israel. Even if one believed (like the founders of *Commentary* magazine) that establishing the state of Israel had not been a good idea, the state of Israel existed nonetheless; thus it possessed the same right of self-defense as other nations. Anti-Zionists crossed the line into anti-Semitism whenever they denied to Israel this right of self-defense. To accuse Israel of aggression when it defended itself was plainly anti-Semitic, Podhoretz argued, because it judged the Jewish nation by a double standard.

On that basis, Podhoretz bent over backward to absolve Pat Robertson and other Christian right leaders of anti-Semitism. Robertson was a far-right Zionist who supported the Israeli settlements movement and denounced peace negotiations with the Palestinians. His position was based on the Bible’s geography of the promised land and, especially, fundamentalist premillennialism, according to which the gathering of Jews in modern Israel was a prelude to Christ’s second coming at which Jews would be converted to Christianity or condemned to hell. Podhoretz didn’t care why the Christian right supported Israel, and he indulged Robertson’s attacks on “cosmopolitan, liberal, secular Jews” for undermining the “public strength of Christianity.” Robertson had paranoid, even “demented” views about Jewish bankers, the Trilateral Commission, and the Council on Foreign Relations, Podhoretz allowed, but his hardline support of Israel trumped the anti-Semitic pedigree of his beliefs about the new world order.

Podhoretz judged that anti-Americanism was like anti-Semitism. One could oppose some of America’s policies without being anti-American, but speaking ill of the American idea, giving aid to America’s enemies, or refusing to support America during wartime crossed the line into anti-Americanism. Like anti-Semitism, he argued, anti-Americanism was a vile form of bigotry that despised a group for what they were, not for what they did. In April 2002 Podhoretz, Kagan, Muravchik, and Kristol signed a PNAC letter exhorting Bush to strengthen America’s commitment to Israel, “a liberal democracy under repeated attack by murderers who target civilians.” Israel was besieged for two reasons, they contended: It was America’s friend, and it was “an island of liberal, democratic principles—American principles—in a sea of tyranny, intolerance, and hatred.” For the neoconservatives, even the identity of American and Israeli interests was not, ultimately, the point. They believed that the United States and Israel were spiritually bonded.

When asked why most neoconservative and unipolarist leaders were Jews, neocons aptly replied that most left-wing leaders were Jews, too. When asked if they pushed for a war against Iraq to help Israel, Bill Kristol retorted that the question was really about the fact that they were Jews. One might have wished for a more reflective response than that, but the principle was right. It was a species of prejudice to treat the neoconservative unipolarism of Michael Novak and George Weigel as ideological but attribute ulterior motives to Jewish neocons. If the neocons’ commitment to Israel lay in back of everything they did, why did they devote themselves so zealously to domestic culture wars? If
Pax Americanism was merely a cover for a Zionist-centered politics, why were the neocons so absorbed by China, North Korea, and NATO expansion? The neocons were consistently right wing and frank about their hardline Zionism. If they were wrong, they deserved to be contended with on the basis of what they argued, not who they were.

Scott McConnell, in his memoir of his movement from the neoconservative to paleoconservative camps, recalled that for years he idolized Podhoretz and was thrilled to write for him in *Commentary*. He revealed at being invited to the Podhoretzes’ home. But during the 1990s he drifted to the paleoconservatives. It disturbed him that, whereas his supposedly racist friends in the old right rarely made racist remarks, a typical dinner among neocons was loaded “with snickers and winks about the behavior of people of color.” At a Christmas service, it struck him to hear the mother of Jesus described as a poor Palestinian woman, for in McConnell’s world “the word ‘Palestinian’ was rarely uttered without a sneer implying a congenital predilection for murder and mayhem.” Increasingly, it troubled him that conservatives were not allowed to question any aspect of America’s tie to Israel without being seen “as dangerous anti-Semites, ripe for smearing.” Upon converting to the old right camp, McConnell recoiled at Podhoretz’s demand that America wage offensive wars against “six or seven Muslim countries.” He wrote that Podhoretz was “quite clearly driven by a concern for Israel’s needs, not America’s.”

But Podhoretz had not changed; only McConnell had changed. During his *Commentary* years McConnell believed in the approximate equivalence of the interests and values of America and Israel; otherwise he couldn’t have written for *Commentary*. Later he believed that Israel’s repression of the Palestinians was disastrous for American interests in the Middle East and that America’s good name was being “trashed” by the “incessant warmongering” of the neoconservatives. These were plausible verdicts, but upon arriving at them, McConnell seemed to forget that neocons genuinely believed otherwise about what was good for America. He judged that Podhoretz lifted Israel’s needs above those of the United States, but that was not the only plausible understanding of Podhoretz’s ideology.

The neocons found their motives routinely called into question, as they treated their critics harshly and espoused extreme positions on a notoriously volatile subject. The imperial ambitions of unipolarism combined with the Zionist factor inspired reductionist accusations. But the new Pax Americanism was a serious and plausible perspective on its own terms. It did not have to be connected to hardline Zionism, and one could be a Pax Americanist while reserving passionate concern for Israel, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, East Timor, or, for that matter, France. By contrast, if one believed that America should base its foreign policy on the objective of attaining global supremacy, or that the war on terrorism should be a regime-changing global crusade, there was a high probability that one also believed that no peace process would solve the Palestinian problem. With notable exceptions, the neocons were short on personal religion, but long
on giving meaning to their lives through political causes. The loss of the Cold War was deflating to them; some were quite frank in expressing the feeling. It was the unipolarist vision of American global dominance that gave them a new cause and fueled their political comeback. Hardline Zionism was a major component of their ideology but not the key to everything else.

Road Map to Nowhere?

Neoconservatives played up the region-transforming potential of the Iraq War as a boon to America, Israel, and the whole world. By their accounting, the war had many beneficial repercussions. It sent a sharp warning to Iran and Syria, secured the futures of Kuwait and Jordan, allowed U.S. troops to leave Saudi Arabia, and frightened Hezbollah into silence. But the war affected Israel in a way that the neocons greatly disliked. Right up to the liberation of Baghdad, the Pentagon bristled with warnings to Syria and Iran that they could be next. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz had no plans to govern Iraq for an extended period of time, and they believed, like Ariel Sharon, that replacing Saddam with a pro-American Iraqi leader would force the Palestinians to accept Sharon’s version of a settlement. Upon glimpsing the ugliness of America’s occupation of Iraq, however, Bush trimmed the sails of the Pax Americanists and Ariel Sharon. The Pentagon was told to stifle its threats against Syria, Powell was dispatched to Damascus to negotiate with President Bashar Assad, and Bush stopped equivocating about his commitment to the new “road map” to peace between the Israelis and Palestinians.

The road map was a seven-page document produced by representatives of the Bush administration, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations, which called themselves the “quartet.” It laid out a scheme of parallel concessions by the Israelis and Palestinians that were grouped into three phases. Unlike the 1993 Oslo Accords, the new strategy eschewed sequential compliance schemes, ostensibly preventing either side from delaying or resisting compliance. It made Palestinian statehood an explicit goal of the process and authorized international observers to monitor compliance, envisioning parallel moves that occurred concurrently. The first phase, to be accomplished within a few months, directed the Palestinians to stop all violent attacks on Israel, draft a constitution, conduct free and open elections, and resume security cooperation with Israel. At the same time, it directed Israel to withdraw from all Palestinian territories that it entered since the beginning of the intifada, freeze all settlement activity, dismantle the new settlement outposts, and take “all necessary steps” to create a normal existence for Palestinians. In the second phase, which was to last six months, the plan called for the creation of a provisional and independent Palestinian state that, under the supervision of an international conference convened by the quartet, restored “pre-intifada links to Israel.” The third phase, lasting two years and requiring a second international conference, consisted of a “final and comprehensive settlement” between the two parties that ended the Israeli
occupation of the pre-1967 Palestinian territories and established two sovereign states living side by side.\textsuperscript{59}

For nearly a year Bush split the differences between the State Department, which coauthored the road map, and the Pentagon, which shared the Sharon government’s opposition to it. Pressured by European and Arab governments whose support he wanted for the war against Saddam, Bush gave lip service to the road map and its goal of a Palestinian state; at the same time he supported the Sharon government’s position that it could not risk any substantial concessions until the Palestinians eradicated their terrorist network. On June 24, 2002, Bush gave a strongly pro-Israel speech that demanded new Palestinian leaders. If the Palestinians replaced Yasser Arafat and built a “practicing democracy” he announced, the United States would support the road map.\textsuperscript{60}

Palestinian officials were stunned by the speech, having hoped that Bush would call for Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories; a senior Israeli official enthused that instead of getting the usual carrot and stick, Israel got only the carrot. Powell told reporters that he considered Bush’s speech a victory for the peace process and that he had warned Arafat to change his ways or be left behind.\textsuperscript{61} European leaders welcomed Bush’s announcement that he planned to become more involved in the Palestinian problem; by contrast, they didn’t believe it was the Bush administration’s place to decide who would not represent the Palestinians. Arafat was not a good leader, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw affirmed, but that would not stop England from dealing with him, especially because he was an elected leader.\textsuperscript{62}

Bush stuck to his position that America was finished with Arafat; at the same time, to secure support for the Iraq War, he brandished his support of the road map. On March 14, 2003, three days before Bush announced that the United States would no longer deal with Saddam diplomatically, he told a hastily organized gathering in the Rose Garden that the United States would proceed with the road map as soon as the Palestinians had a new prime minister. This announcement set off alarms among American neoconservatives and the Sharon government. Was Bush serious about the road map? Did he really support the State Department’s goal of creating a Palestinian state by 2005? On several occasions Bush seemed to give a wink and nod that he was not, suggesting that Israel and the United States would be able to revise the plan along the way.\textsuperscript{63}

The Palestinians, reeling from 2,500 casualties since September 2000, 50 percent unemployment in the West Bank, and nearly 80 percent unemployment in the Gaza Strip, supported the road map. On April 30, Mahmoud Abbas was sworn in as prime minister by the Palestinian Legislative Council. A longtime associate of Arafat’s also known as Abu Mazen, Abbas had wanted to accept the Camp David deal of 2000, although he described it publicly as a “trap” that Arafat managed to escape. More important, he believed that the intifada was a disaster for the Palestinian cause and had spoken against it. He and Arafat had the same stated goals: a Palestinian state in the entire West Bank and Gaza strip with its capital in Jerusalem. Both of them wanted all Israeli settlements to be
removed from the occupied territories and the right of return for Palestinian families who lost their homes in the 1948 war. But Abbas was an organizational operator and diplomat, not a skilled politician like Arafat, and he had little popular following. He was supposed to take control of Arafat’s seven security organizations while remaining under Arafat’s authority.

Was that a good enough start for the road map? American neoconservatives and the Sharon government insisted it was not, contending that any peace process was worthless as long as Arafat was in power. Sharon demanded that the Palestinians had to make the first concessions and eliminate all terrorist organizations before the peace process began. But the first three weeks of hellish occupation in Iraq gave Bush second thoughts about Iraq and the road map. In mid-May he made two abrupt changes, replacing Jay Garner with L. Paul Bremer in Iraq and declaring himself a believer in the road map. Bush accepted that Arafat was Abbass’s superior and that the elimination of Palestinian military organizations was part of the peace process, not a precondition for it. He forced the road map down Sharon’s throat, who rammed it through his reluctant cabinet.

Iraq and the road map were connected, although not in the way that the neocons had hoped. The disastrous occupation put Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz on the spot for poor planning, and Feith for appointing Garner. A huge media controversy over America’s failure to find weapons of mass destruction cast a harsh spotlight on the administration’s war hype and special intelligence unit. Having kept his distance from the Israeli-Palestinian issue throughout his presidency, it seemed odd for Bush to plunge into this notoriously troubled area at the very moment that Iraq turned into a major long-term drain on American resources. But Bush had never dismissed the State Department’s claim that resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was crucial to creating stability in the Middle East, and by mid-May, he and Rice realized they could not rely on a policy of creative destruction. They already had all the creative destruction they could handle in Iraq.

To Kristol, Kagan, and Krauthammer, Bush’s support for a Palestinian state was pathetic and dangerous, because it rewarded terrorism. The Weekly Standard inveighed against the road map, editorializing that “forging ahead” would be disastrous because the map was seriously flawed, Arafat was still in power, and the timing was way off. Tony Blair called for “even-handedness” in the Middle East; the Standard replied that “we know what that means: pressure Israel.” There had to be another way to reward Blair for bravely supporting the war. Speaking for the Weekly Standard editors, Fred Barnes observed that Bush faced four serious temptations and one easy one. The easy one was the U.N.’s request to play an important role in the occupation of Iraq; Bush had no trouble saying no to that. The hard ones were the temptations to leave Iraq too soon, back off from regime-changing interventions in other countries, show too much generosity toward antiwar critics and opponents, and hardest of all, try for a peace settlement with the Palestinians. The Standard urged Bush to finish the job
in Iraq, extend the war on terrorism to other countries, keep his magnanimity in check toward the likes of Jacques Chirac, and hold off on the peace process until Arafat and Palestinian terrorism were gone.  

Muravchik agreed that peace planning was premature; he also emphasized that the plan in question was ridiculously optimistic. The pace of the road map had not even a passing relationship with reality, he observed. How were the Palestinians supposed to manage a new constitution and free elections in just a few months? The plan’s “breakneck” pace was undemocratic, allowing too little time for politics. More important, Muravchik deeply resented the map’s “indecent” parallelism, which told each side to stop its violence against the other. It was repulsive to imply any sort of moral equivalence between Palestinian terrorism and Israeli counterterrorism, he protested. The road map’s designers bent over backward not to insult the Palestinians, but Palestinian violence and incitement of violence were the heart of the problem. Israel had no business negotiating with the Palestinians if it could not be sure that the Palestinians had retired from terrorism, and it could not get this assurance if the Palestinians did not acknowledge the dramatic nonequivalence of evil in the present situation. The problem of the Palestinian leadership’s incitement of violence had to be specifically acknowledged and renounced.

Like all neoconservatives, Muravchik wanted nothing to do with the quartet. Russia was reasonably even-handed in its treatment of Israel, he allowed, but it had long-standing oil interests in the Arab world. The European Union was not remotely even-handed, often approximating U.N.-level favoritism toward the Palestinians. It bankrolled the Palestinian Authority and, during the 2002 Israeli incursion into the West Bank, voted for economic sanctions against Israel. As for the United Nations, obsessive and indecent condemnation of Israel was the normal state of affairs. Forty percent of the General Assembly’s resolutions in 2002 denounced Israel, the U.N. Human Rights Commission blasted it repeatedly while giving a pass to vicious dictatorships, and the U.N. maintained three permanent bodies that were devoted exclusively to bashing Israel. “A less suitable intermediary would be hard to invent” Muravchik remarked.

Even the United States often sided with the Arabs against Israel. Muravchik recalled that America forced Israel to forfeit its gains from the 1956 Sinai war, allowed Egypt to blockade Israeli shipping in 1967, impeded Israel’s advances in the Yom Kippur and Lebanon wars, came to Arafat’s rescue in Beirut, opposed Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, kept its embassy in Tel Aviv, voted for numerous Security Council resolutions against Israel, and welcomed Arafat at the White House. America was basically pro-Israel, Muravchik acknowledged, but no country in the world was consistently pro-Israel, and the United States made the most credible claim of any nation to be a fair judge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, if the road map was to have a worthy future, the quartet had to get lost. Only the United States could supervise the plan. Muravchik doubted that that would work either, but it was the plan’s only chance of success, and he believed that the road map had to be a negotiable process that...
the parties improvised along the way. Ultimately, what mattered was the attitude of the Palestinians, not the mechanics of the road map. If Abbas gained real authority and turned the Palestinians against violence, the road map was worth talking about. “There are some Palestinians who want peace, and he seems to represent them,” Muravchik remarked in August 2003. “But elevating him above Arafat, who after all appointed him, seems a very long shot.”

Muravchik described himself as deeply pessimistic, not exactly oppositionist; to Krauthammer the map was pointless as long as Arafat retained power. Arafat still controlled five of the seven Palestinian security organizations, including the aggressive Force 17; Krauthammer insisted that the road map had to be frozen until Abbas gained total control. It was disastrous that the Europeans, including England, continued to deal with Arafat: “Nothing could be worse for peace.” A few weeks later, he warned that the road map was sowing the seeds of another disastrous “peace,” just like Oslo. Besides persuading Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Brigades to accept a temporary ceasefire, Abbas had accomplished nothing. The terrorist organizations remained in operation, the culture of violence and martyrdom was unchanged, the Palestinian Authority’s official newspaper still lauded suicide bombers, and it described Israel as “occupied” territory. Krauthammer urged that a phony ceasefire with terrorism was the worst option of all. It enabled the terrorists to regroup and rearm for the next round of terrorist slaughter. Any American government that brokered such a peace would betray Israel and the American interest.

Bush’s trip to the Middle East in June 2003 confirmed for Krauthammer that he was heading straight back to Oslo, this time with the promise of a Palestinian state. At the Arab summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, Krauthammer observed, Bush begged Arab leaders for help and got nothing for his abasement of himself and the United States, “not even a gesture.” Arab leaders, having threatened to boycott the summit if Israel was invited, refused to endorse Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state. They also refused to endorse Bush’s shunning of Arafat and insisted that Palestinian violence against Israel was rightly called resistance to an oppressive occupier, not terrorism. From that “abject failure” Bush moved to a summit in Aqaba, Jordan, where he extracted “enormous concessions” all from Israel. Sharon endorsed the goal of a contiguous Palestinian state and accepted that no “unilateral actions” could predetermine the boundaries between Israel and Palestine. Meanwhile, Abbas offered only an end to terrorism and the incitement of hatred against Israel, which was the same pledge that Arafat made in 1993. Krauthammer bitterly remarked that, for Israel and the United States, this amounted to buying the same rug a second time. The first sale delivered Arafat and his terrorists to Palestine from their exile in Tunis, giving them an army and legitimacy; the second gave them a state with contiguous borders as a reward for terrorism. “The unilateral surrender of Israel continues” Krauthammer protested. Israel’s only hope was that Bush, “having taken his friend Sharon to the cleaners,” would make things come out right.
Neocons took a similar line on the politics and construction of the wall—a 225-mile security barrier separating Israel from the West Bank. Consisting of fencing, electrified wire, guard towers, trenches, and in two stretches, concrete walls, the barrier cut into the West Bank (rather than adhere to the “Green Line” boundary between Israel and the West Bank that was recognized from 1949 to 1967) and surrounded several towns close to the Green Line. The Sharon government argued that it needed a barrier in the West Bank because that was where the suicide bombings came from; Israel already had a fence separating itself from Gaza. New Republic editor Martin Peretz observed that Israel had to build “the elaborate and psychologically depressing fence” because it had to protect Israelis from being randomly murdered.73

Critics, including the State Department, protested that the fence made an ugly statement to Palestinians and threatened to wreck the peace process. It also undermined the possibility of a two-state solution. Powell objected that the barrier cut off entire towns such as Qalqilya; Krauthammer replied that at least Israel had begun to withdraw from Qalqilya and Jericho, while the Palestinians did nothing besides take a breather from terrorism. Yet the State Department threatened to cancel Israel’s loan guarantees if it didn’t stop building the fence; Krauthammer protested: “This kind of amnesia and one-sidedness is not new. We have been here before. It was called Oslo. And we know how it ended.”74

“Oslo” acquired the status of an epithet in neoconservative usage, much like “Finlandization” and “McGovernism” in the 1970s. Always it was employed as a metaphor for appeasement and naive stupidity. If only Israel hadn’t fallen for the dream of a negotiated settlement at Oslo, where Ahmed Qurei cut a deal with Israeli negotiators in clandestine meetings, the West might have received an instructive example of how to fight the world war on terrorism. The neocons were right that Arafat was not to be trusted and that he betrayed the interests of Palestinians at Camp David, spurning the best deal they would ever get. But they ignored the oppressive Israeli policies and culture of vilification that engendered bitterness, hatred, and martyrdom among ordinary Palestinians. They looked away from the desperation of the dominated, where extended curfews and deadly sniper attacks confined Palestinians to their homes for weeks or months at a time. Neocons depicted Sharon as making dangerously sweeping concessions, ignoring that he spent his entire term in office creating a gerrymandered West Bank that resembled the old bantustan system in South Africa.75

By September 2003 construction of the wall was stalled, with four-fifths to go. Sharon seemed paralyzed between building along the Green Line or cutting deep into the West Bank. The former option offended the Israeli right and the settler movement; the latter option offended the Israeli left, the American government, and the Palestinians; the third option was the Clinton boundary of 2000, which would have allowed Israel to annex land just across the Green Line from Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Seventy-five percent of the settlers lived on 5 percent of the West Bank, in the suburbs of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.76
The neocons believed that the Clinton plan conceded too much to the Palestinians, and like Oslo, it was a disaster for Israel. They were right that for Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the ceasefire was a pause for rearming. On August 19, a Hamas suicide bomber, Raed Abdul Hamid Misk, the father of a two-year-old girl and three-year-old boy, blew up a Jerusalem bus filled with families, killing twenty Israelis and putting an end to the latest ceasefire. Israel promptly retaliated by killing prominent Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab, firing six missiles from a helicopter into his station wagon. Asked in 1999 why so many Palestinians became suicide bombers, Shanab had replied that all of them witnessed “something terrible, some kind of atrocity” and that suicide bombing required only one thing: “A moment of courage.” Islam taught the principle of an eye for an eye, he explained: “We believe in retaliation. When someone is killed in jihad, it is a joyful day.”

That sentiment prevailed over Abbas’s attempt to launch the road map. On September 6, he resigned as Palestinian prime minister, admitting that he lacked the popular or government support to revive the peace plan. He was replaced by Ahmed Ali, another longtime Arafat comrade, who announced that he would not abide by the Israeli/American policy of not recognizing Arafat. The policy had backfired anyway; Arafat’s popularity rebounded after the United States tried to ostracize him. Many neocons and Israeli hardliners wanted Bush to apply the same policy to the Palestinian Authority that it took to the Taliban, contending that there was no difference between the terrorism of Hamas and al-Qaeda. Although Bush’s rhetoric suggested that he saw no difference, his administration pleaded with Israel to stop killing Hamas leaders.

Powell explained that Israel’s firebombing and repression had terrible long-term consequences, “creating more Hamas killers in the future.” To the neocons this counsel was infuriating; it judged Israel by a standard that Bush officials didn’t dream of applying to themselves. Bush was the hardest-line Zionist ever to occupy the presidency, yet even he did not use “Oslo” as an epithet in neocon fashion. He needed Oslo’s example of cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security forces. Rice exhorted Israeli leaders to be “always thinking about building a Palestinian partner.” Faced with an occupation debacle of his own in Iraq and a resurgence of violence in Afghanistan, Bush asked the Sharon government to build the security barrier as closely as possible to the Green Line. On October 1, 2003, however, the Sharon government took the option of sure disaster, resolving to cut deeply into the West Bank to protect Ariel and other settlements. The following April Sharon vowed to retain the major West Bank settlements of Ariel, Givet Zeev, Gush Etzion, Kiryat Arba, Maale Adumim, and several smaller settlements, while withdrawing from the Gaza Strip. The Bush administration approved this unilateral “solution” and disavowed the Palestinian right of return. Another line was crossed in the politics of occupation and humiliation. Israel didn’t have to deal with the Palestinians; the fate of the Palestinians could be negotiated with the United States alone. Though Sharon
claimed to accept the goal of a two-state solution, its settlement policy sabotaged the possibility of a tolerable Palestinian state.\textsuperscript{78}

\textit{Renewing the Conflict of Conservatisms}

Meanwhile the war between the conservatisms intensified. The neocons felt that their early battles with the old right had not been fair fights. During the Reagan administration they complained about the pains of working with reactionaries, but usually off the record; as newcomers to the conservative movement they felt vulnerable within it. When the Cold War ended, they called for a new Pax Americana and bristled in self-defense as the paleocons called them cultural imperialists and warmongers. In interviews the neocons expressed bewilderment that Kirk, Buchanan, and other old right luminaries found it necessary to blast them as fake conservatives. But as the neocons gained strength and position in the 1990s, they took the offensive, renewing the question of who were the real conservatives. The original neocons had revolted against the anti-Americanism of the new left, but, a generation later, youthful neocons who had never been leftists were more intrigued and unsettled by the anti-Americanism of the right.

Lawrence Kaplan was prominent among them. His analysis of who was not a good conservative cut deeper into the field that the old neocons had dared, blasting conservative realists.

Kaplan was surprised to discover that many conservatives harbored “a casual animus against American power.” It was one thing to be lectured about imperialism by the likes of Pat Buchanan, but how was one to comprehend the attitude of former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, “a pillar of the GOP foreign-policy establishment” or Samuel Huntington, “perhaps the most accomplished American political scientist of the postwar era,” or Walter McDougall, “a Pulitzer-prize-winning historian and editor of the conservative foreign-policy journal \textit{Orbis},” or Alan Tonelson, a prominent realist? All were distinguished conservatives who wanted nothing to do with neoconservative interventionism. Schlesinger admonished against “our little conceit that once other nations have learned how we feel, they will mend their ways.” Huntington argued that the United States, having ceased to be a truly Western nation because of its moral decay and multiculturalism, had no business imposing its way of life on the rest of the world. McDougall found it pathetically laughable that decadent America considered itself a model for Confucians and Muslims. Tonelson groused that much of American foreign policy consisted of affluent internationalists looking for ways to risk the lives and expend the resources of their fellow citizens. There also was the libertarian version of conservatism, represented by the Cato Institute, supply-side economics guru Jude Wanniski, and columnist Robert Novak; they were always blasting American interventionism.\textsuperscript{79}

Kaplan felt a bit chastened while reading these figures, but not much. He dismissed the libertarians, replying that the U.S. government was not nearly as
brutish as the problems it confronted in the international sphere. The cultural pessimism of Schlesinger, Huntington, and McDougall seemed more weighty to him but also confused. America’s cultural decay was real, he acknowledged, but it was largely a product of Hollywood and New York, not the American government. Moreover, if one believed in democracy, one should believe in promoting and exporting it. Just because democratic principles and values offended the authoritarian sensibilities of other civilizations was no reason to retreat from advocating democracy. The latter principle corrected Tonelson’s realism as well, which overemphasized the distinction between interests and ideals; Kaplan argued that in the real world interests and ideals overlapped. Realists derided the promotion of democracy as social work, but exporting democracy wasn’t only for the benefit of others; it served American interests. Peace and freedom were self-interested aims. Kaplan quoted Muravchik that “the more democratic the world becomes, the more likely it is to be both peaceful and friendly to America.”

That was a warm-up; two years later, in 2000, Kaplan returned to the phenomenon of “conservatives who hate America.” He observed that in the category of spectacularly mistaken arguments it was hard to beat the liberal “declinist” school of the late 1980s, which claimed that American power was unavoidably declining. Paul Kennedy, Walter Russell Mead, and David Calleo made prescriptions for American military policy that were based on a remarkably wrong diagnosis. Yet, ten years later, the language of imperial overstretch and American exhaustion was back in fashion, this time as a form of conservative realism. Even worse, Kaplan noted, conservative declinism had no redemptive principle or spirit. The liberal declinists hated the Cold War, not America, but the conservative declinists hated “the American idea itself.”

Huntington was example A. In 1988 he blasted declinism as the wishful thinking of liberals who wanted America to reduce its military spending, countering that America was the major power least likely to decline. In 1991 he celebrated the global advance of the American creed in a book titled The Third Wave, contending that Americans had a special interest in fostering world democracy. The democratic globalists enthused that he was moving in their direction. But in the mid-1990s Huntington began to refute himself. Taking aim at universalist ideologies, he condemned democratic globalism as a false, immoral, and dangerous movement. His theme became the priority of culture. In 1996 he published a major work, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, which quickly attained scriptural status for conservative pessimists. Huntington exalted the centrality of culture in civilizations, played up the dangers of civilizational conflict, and cautioned that high immigration is bad for national unity. He wanted America to dismantle its global military empire, warning that Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations is perhaps the most dangerous source of conflict in the world.

Huntington’s emphasis on the primacy of culture and the problems of cultural pluralism boosted an already powerful conservative realist school. In addition to
Huntington, Kaplan listed Robert D. Kaplan, Chalmers Johnson, James Schlesinger, Richard Haass, Brent Scowcroft, James Kurth, George Kennan, and Kenneth Waltz as prominent exponents of this view. All of them scorned democratic globalism as naive and obnoxious. Robert D. Kaplan, an author of bestselling travel books, played up the similarities between the decadent Roman and American empires; Johnson, a former CIA consultant, emphasized the dangers of popular and terrorist blowback against American intervention; Schlesinger, a member of the U.S. Commission on National Security, cautioned against America’s combination of internal weakness and international aggressiveness; Haass, an advisor to George W. Bush and a protégé of Scowcroft, touted a strategy of smooth decline; Kurth, a prolific foreign policy scholar, contended that the American empire fostered an adolescent ideal; Kennan, the “arch-declinist of his time,” famously compared American democracy to a large prehistoric monster with a pin-sized brain; Waltz, a leading academic realist, welcomed the coming of a multipolar world order.83

Kurth’s description of “the adolescent empire” was especially provocative. He observed that the best empires provided peace, prosperity, and culture, and that every empire exalted some model of its way of life. The Roman Empire set the gold standard, achieving peace, prosperity, and cultural distinction, and the British Empire provided all three elements during the nineteenth century. The Habsburg and French empires were both stronger on prosperity than peace, and strongest on cultural prestige. At the other end of the scale, the Nazi empire had nothing going for it—it was almost too brief, extreme, and perverse to be called an empire—and the Soviet empire wasn’t much better. The Roman imperial idea was expressed in Roman law, Latin, classical architecture, the Roman family, and eventually, the Roman Catholic Church. The Habsburgs of modern Austria and Spain viewed themselves as bringing about the restoration of the Roman Catholic imperial idea, especially in its government, law, public architecture, and idealization of the saint. The British Empire derived its imperial idea from Anglican Christianity, conceiving itself as the world’s engine of freedom, especially freedom of trade. To the British imperialists, the ideal human types were the Crown-serving soldier and civil administrator. The French imperial idea was the French nation-state, which served the principle of Reason; the Nazi ideal was the SS officer who served the German people and Aryan race; the Soviet ideal was the strong, loyal, industrial-working “new Soviet man.”84

It was instructive to Kurth that the Nazi and Soviet empires, besides seeking to rule the same East-Central European territory and legitimizing their rule with a secular ideology, both offered poor role models. The Nazi ideal was an immature bigot who gloried in his loyalty and endurance, whereas the new Soviet hero never amounted to much. The Soviets offered the “rare and perverse” example of an empire that was less advanced than the people it subjugated. All of this was the background for Kurth’s warning that the American empire compared poorly to the Roman, Habsburg, British, and French empires, and that its cultural ideal was down at the degraded Soviet and Nazi end of the scale. The architects of the
American empire—Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, George Marshall, Dean Acheson, and George Kennan—were men of considerable character and judgment, he judged, but the United States had long ceased to produce leaders of their quality. The American empire was strong on peace, prosperity, and cultural power, but even to speak of cultural prestige was laughable. American culture was essentially adolescent, self-centered, and aggressive, Kurth observed. It had no virtues worth mentioning; its ideals were the talents of entertainers and sports stars. Even adults paraded the attitudes of the dominant youth culture, spurning authority and self-discipline. Kurth judged that the rot was deepest in business, politics, law, and academia. The peace and prosperity of the American empire rested on its military and productive economy, but both were undermined by a “an empire of the adolescents, by the adolescents, and for the adolescents.” As long as it allowed its youth culture to define itself, the American empire had no chance of lasting and didn’t deserve to do so.85

That was a grumpy example of the defeatist conservatism that Lawrence Kaplan hated. He observed that Kurth, Huntington, and company were highly respected in Republican policy circles and likely to influence the next Republican president. To him, the latter prospect was both depressing and alarming. The original liberal declinists, at least, had a vision of a regenerated America, but the new conservative declinists “do not enjoin their countrymen to improve themselves, either spiritually or materially.” They combined the inherent fatalism of realist thought with a snobbish despair about American culture, yielding “an enfeebling mindset that condemns exhortation as ‘futile’ and ‘naive.’” The pessimists offered bad news with no hope of salvation, Kaplan judged; their idea of a good foreign policy was to cope with bad news. They wanted America to come home, but not because they believed America could become good in the process. They just believed that America would do less damage to itself and others by coming home.86

The pessimists believed that American civilization was too deeply polluted to be redeemed by policy changes or a new presidential administration. Kaplan hoped that the next Republican president would spurn them. The next president needed to take guidance, instead, from thinkers such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, who believed in the redeeming possibilities of American power. “The caustic denigration of America the ‘rogue superpower’ and the contempt for the ideological substance of the ‘American empire’ all betray a yearning to see U.S. power erode” Kaplan warned. “Today, as before, the most formidable challenge to that power comes not from Europe, imperial overstretch, or rock and roll but from false prophets in our midst.”87

If the greatest threat to American greatness was the existence of false prophets on the American right, nothing could be more important than the somewhat disagreeable work of discrediting these figures. Kaplan aimed high, naming the most intellectually distinguished figures in the group. After America invaded Iraq, National Review aimed low, excommunicating the old right opponents of
the war in a cover story titled “Unpatriotic Conservatives: A War on America.” David Frum, a contributing editor for National Review and former speechwriter for Bush 43, assumed the chair of judgment. Frum gave a pass to high-flying intellectuals, who tended to be realists and whom only academics knew about. He refrained from mentioning Brent Scowcroft, although Scowcroft’s outspoken opposition to the war caused pain in the Bush administration. In a brief aside Frum allowed that there was such a thing as legitimate dissent about the best way to fight the war on terrorism. That covered Scowcroft, who was much too ensconced in the Republican establishment to be excommunicated by a fired speechwriter or even National Review. Frum was fired by the White House after his wife boasted that he authored Bush’s “axis of evil” phrase. Focusing on people like himself, outspoken journalists and pundits, he dared to get personal.88

The leading anti-American conservatives were Pat Buchanan and Robert Novak, he observed. The others were less famous, but not without influence: Thomas Fleming, Samuel Francis, Scott McConnell, Eric Margolis, Justin Raimondo, Charley Reese, Llewellyn Rockwell, Joseph Sobran, Taki Theodoracopulos, and Jude Wanniski. These figures had gone “far, far beyond” legitimate dissent about the best way to fight terrorism, Frum charged: “They have made common cause with the left-wing and Islamist antiwar movements in this country and in Europe. They deny and excuse terror. They espouse a potentially self-fulfilling defeatism. They publicize wild conspiracy theories. And some of them explicitly yearn for the victory of their nation’s enemies.”89

In the category of terror denial, Novak was the leading offender, having criticized Condoleezza Rice for citing Hezbollah, not al-Qaeda, as the world’s most dangerous terrorist group. Novak maintained that Hezbollah deserved the highest ranking only from Israel’s standpoint. In the category of espousing defeatism, Novak and Buchanan were the leading offenders. Novak charged that the Bush administration pulverized Afghanistan because the CIA was too incompetent to target al-Qaeda; Buchanan compared America to the British Empire striking vengefully in wildernesses it didn’t understand. Buchanan was also the leading excuser of terror, warning that Americans had become a prime target of terrorism because America bullied and offended Middle Eastern countries. In the category of conspiracy-theorizing, Frum introduced readers to Raimondo, an Internet journalist and self-styled pagan reactionary who claimed that Israel had “significant foreknowledge” of events that led to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In the category of yearning for defeat, Frum cited Margolis, foreign editor of the Toronto Sun, who called for a pan-Arab revolt against the United States.90

The latter two items might have been shocking if Frum hadn’t reached so far to get them; longtime National Review readers asked who these people were. For the benefit of uninitiated readers, Frum offered a tour of the old right’s recent history and personalities. There was Paul Gottfried, an eccentric antineoconservative who published “an endless series of articles about his...
professional rebuffs.” There was Chronicles editor Thomas Fleming, described as “a jumpy, wrathful man so prone to abrupt intellectual reversals that even some of his friends and supporters question his equilibrium.” In the 1990s, Fleming flummoxed his readers and nearly destroyed the magazine by defending Serb nationalism. Frum described Chronicles columnist Samuel Francis as an advocate of “uninhibited racial nationalism” that prized America’s “Euro-American cultural core.” In a 1994 speech Francis declared that “the civilization that we as whites created in Europe and America could not have developed apart from the genetic endowments of the creating people.” These figures and others like them kept alive the provincial, racialist, anti-interventionist parts of the old right that mainstream conservatism had left behind, Frum explained. Now it was time to leave the old rightists behind.91

Buchanan’s antiwar screed against the neocons had settled the matter for Frum. Asking who would benefit from a war of civilizations between the West and Islam, Buchanan had answered: “One nation, one leader, one party. Israel, Sharon, Likud.” Frum replied that this was surely an echo of the Nazi slogan, “Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer.” The paleoconservatives might have usefully devoted their energies after 9/11 to their concerns about immigration and national cohesion, he observed; National Review conservatism still had plenty of concern about those issues. Instead the old right indulged its obsessions against the Pax Americana and the Zionist lobby.92

“And now it is time to be very frank about the paleos,” Frum advised. The paleos were sour, provincial, prejudiced, and amazingly anti-American. The conservatism that was needed was optimistic, internationalist, universalist, and roaringly proAmerican. Mainstream conservatism had borne the embarrassment of its association with the old right for long enough, he urged. People like Buchanan, whatever their contributions to past Republican administrations, were too alienated to be redeemable: “The resentments are too intense, the bitterness too unappeasable.” Only a few of the old rightists admitted that they wanted to see their country defeated, but Frum assured that the paleocons were thinking about it, “and wishing for it” and ready to take pleasure in it: “They began by hating the neoconservatives. They came to hate their party and this president. They have finished by hating their country.” The war had clarified who was on which side. The paleoconservatives had turned their backs on America: “Now we turn our backs on them.”93

Frum’s article was adorned with page-breaking quotes by Fleming, Francis, Sobran, and others. The Fleming quote was from 2003: “I respect and admire the French, who have been a far greater nation than we shall ever be, that is, if greatness means anything loftier than money and bombs.” One of the Francis quotes, from 2002, advised that neocons such as Podhoretz and Michael Ledeen should perhaps be placed under surveillance “as possible agents of a foreign power.” The Sobran quote, from 1992, observed that “the U.S. government has probably killed more people outside its own borders than any other.” These quotes did not illustrate quite what the editors had in mind. The first quote,
though exaggerated, might have evoked a wry smile; the second was reprehensible; the third was a useful reminder.\textsuperscript{94}

Unlike most of the American political spectrum, especially after 9/11, the paleocons were stubbornly capable of sharp judgments that punctured their country’s jingoism. They were tough on the self-pitying meanness that masqueraded as love of country. They were tough on the oblivious arrogance of Americans who couldn’t fathom why other nations resented America’s imperial designs. But this moral stubbornness was mixed up with a self-pitying meanness of its own that, as Frum aptly observed, seemed unappeasable. The old right was ugly in its racism and anti-Semitism, which vitiated the good of its moral stubbornness and negated its attempts to be taken seriously. At the same time, although the neocon right was too powerful not to be taken seriously, it could not stop with two wars and occupations.
Conclusion: An Empire in Denial

In a broad sense of the term the United States has been on an imperial trajectory since its founding. Imperialism does not apply only to overseas possessions: Native American reservations amount to colonies, and for almost ninety years America was a slave state whose political leaders in the South wanted to create a Western empire based on the extension of slavery throughout the Caribbean. From the Monroe Doctrine onward, American presidents have issued doctrines about what a country has to do to deserve an invasion from the United States. Theodore Roosevelt, who viewed his imperial ambition as a natural outgrowth of the American story, was fond of saying that America’s entire national history was one of expansion. His corollary to the Monroe Doctrine declared that the United States reserved the right to invade any Latin American country that engaged in “flagrant wrongdoing.”

Long before TR added the clarifying Roosevelt Corollary of 1906, the United States had a record of intervening in Latin America. Afterward, up to World War II, it added notable interventions in Colombia, Panama, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, Mexico, and Guatemala; China was another frequent destination of American forces. In the sense of the term that applies only to the colonization of overseas territories, America’s formal dance with empire began in 1898, when it annexed and occupied Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, and the Hawaiian islands. In the sense of the term that applies to global military networks, the United States became a world empire after World War II, beginning with its new military bases in western Germany, Japan, Korea, and the eastern Mediterranean.

In the dictionary sense of the term, setting aside the Native American reservations, the United States is not an imperial power. It does not exercise direct dominion over conquered peoples; it does not formally rule an extensive group of countries under a single sovereign authority. America’s official colonies have been few and scattered, most of its occupations have been brief, the largest of its fourteen dependent entities is Puerto Rico, and its domination of Latin America has been mostly indirect. But since 1989 the United States has forged a new kind of world empire that outstrips all colonizing empires of the past.

The United States is the most awesome world power that the world has ever seen. Its economy outproduces the next eleven nations combined, accounting for
31 percent of the world’s output. It floods the world with its culture and technology. It spends as much on defense as the next twenty nations combined. It employs five global military commands to police the world; it has 750 military bases in 130 countries, covering two-thirds of the world; it has formal military base rights in forty countries; each branch of the armed services has its own air force; the U.S. Special Forces conducts thousands of operations per year in nearly 170 countries; the U.S. Air Force operates on six continents; and the United States deploys carrier battleships in every ocean.

Moreover, the United States is not merely dominant; it assumes imperial responsibilities and reaps the benefits that derive from them. It is imperial in the sense that it enforces its own idea of world order in America’s interest. It presumes the right to lay down the rules of trade, commerce, security, and political legitimacy. It assumes the burdens of global maintenance in areas that derive from the Spanish, Ottoman, British, French, Russian, and Soviet empires. It rewards or punishes countries on the basis of their willingness to create open markets, support American military policies, and establish democratic governments. In Iraq, the United States has erased longstanding national laws that restrict foreign investment, showing little regard for international laws that restrict the powers of occupiers. Waging an offensive war to change the government and economic system of a sovereign country is obviously an imperial enterprise. Doing it to consolidate one’s hegemonic position and change the political culture of a sprawling, explosive, multinational region halfway around the globe requires imperial ambition of a very high order.

The central problem of American foreign policy today is to modulate the natural tendency of an unrivaled power to regard the entire world as its geopolitical neighborhood. This would have been a defining challenge for the Bush administration even if terrorists had not struck the United States on 9/11, and it would have been so even if Democrats had won the 2000 election. America at the turn of the twenty-first century was overdue for a moral and political reckoning with the compulsive expansionism of unrivaled power. But the problem of world empire increased by several orders of magnitude with the election of George W. Bush, his selection of a unipolarist foreign policy team, and the administration’s decisions to invade Iraq and pursue the struggle against terrorism as a world war. Thus the reckoning must grapple with the fact that the problem is both old and new.

Throughout the 1990s neoconservatives condemned the Clinton administration for maintaining an essentially European foreign policy, but that was not how Europeans viewed Clinton’s foreign policy. Robert Kagan rightly observed that European nostalgia for the Clinton administration was ironic, because throughout the 1990s European policy makers chafed at the Clinton/Albright mantra that America is the indispensable country. To Europeans, the American colossus had become a “hectoring hegemon.” They were appalled in 1997 when the Clinton administration contended that the economic sanctions placed on Iraq after the Gulf War had to remain in effect as long as Saddam remained in power.
To European diplomats, the purpose of the sanctions was to make Saddam behave better; only imperial bullies thought in terms of overthrowing governments. Later that year Clinton wanted to punish Saddam for failing to cooperate with U.N. arms inspectors, but France, Russia, and China blocked him in the Security Council. In 1998 Clinton resorted to bombing Iraq, with no Security Council authorization, and only England supported the United States. The Clinton administration insisted that without a change of regime, Iraq could not be reintegrated into the community of nations. That smacked of outright imperialism to the Europeans; Kagan noted that European policy makers never bought Clinton’s demand that Saddam had to go. They believed that the whole point of punishing Saddam’s regime was to reform it and restore its integration into the community of nations.1

Although Clinton believed in multilateral cooperation and avoided what international relations scholar Andrew Bacevich calls “the Wolfowitz Indiscretion” of explicitly advocating a policy of global preeminence, he practiced a liberal form of it. Wolfowitz later complained that for all of Clinton’s mistakes—overreaching in Somalia, wasting American resources in Haiti, following a “delusional” policy toward North Korea—his grand strategy appropriated Wolfowitz’s vision of sustained global superiority “without acknowledgement.” European policy makers noticed the resemblance and complained about it. Clinton’s economic and military policies, especially his constant boosterism for globalization and open markets, were devoted to sustaining America’s global predominance. He was an apostle of the liberal internationalist belief that international commerce leads to peace, prosperity, and democracy. Although wary of full-fledged wars, he used military force quite frequently to stabilize far-flung trouble spots and serve humanitarian ends. Colin Powell, chastened by Vietnam, believed in using military force only sparingly, and then overwhelmingly; Clinton’s secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, infuriated Powell by retorting: “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?” Powell later recalled, “I thought I would have an aneurysm. American GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board.”2

In the 2000 presidential campaign Bush blasted Clinton’s policies on Iraq, China, the Balkans, and the military budget, claiming that Clinton wasted America’s preeminent power. Soon after taking office he said “never mind” on all four, while neoconservatives shrieked in protest. Even Bush’s early unilateralism was not the radical departure from recent policy that neocons, Democratic critics, and the press tended to portray. Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions, but Clinton refrained from submitting it to the Senate after realizing that it had no chance of ratification. Bush advocated missile defense and rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but Clinton advocated a beginning version of missile defense and the Senate voted against the test ban treaty during Clinton’s presidency. Bush rejected a compliance protocol on biological weapons, but Albright allowed the protocol to languish for
years. Bush denounced the International Criminal Court, insisting that Americans had to be immune from prosecution, but in 1998 Clinton and Defense Secretary William Cohen made the same argument. Clinton refused to sign the court authorization until December 31, 2000, which passed the ratification problem to Bush. Thus, there was more continuity between Clinton and the early Bush administration than either party cared to admit; both parties magnified their differences for political reasons. Bacevich later explained that stories about continuity do not sell newspapers; Kagan recalled that in any case, “even Clinton was not as ‘European’ as he would later be depicted.”

But neocons like Kagan, Kristol, and Wolfowitz found Clinton incorrigibly Venuslike for eight years, and after he was finally gone, they experienced seven months of anguish with Bush. The PNAC unipolarists were rich beyond their dreams in highranking appointments, yet frustrated, carrying out Clinton’s policies. To them, foreign policy arguments were not mere debating points for electoral advantage. It was nice to have powerful positions, but what was the point if the policies and Pentagon budget didn’t change? Their frustration was heightened by the fact that they dominated the foreign policy posts. So many unipolarists swept into office that some who would have been hardliners in other administrations seemed like pragmatic realists. The most moderate policy maker on the second Bush administration team, State Department Director of Policy Planning Richard Haass, served in the first Bush administration as Senior Director on the National Security Council staff and Special Assistant. Haass described the United States as a posse-organizing “reluctant sheriff” that dealt with international crises as they emerged; America’s most important leadership role was to rally and hold together coalitions of the willing. His model example was the Gulf War, for which his administrative service won the Presidential Citizens Medal. Haass argued that America needed allies, if not alliances, because America’s ability to get its own way was sure to diminish in the foreseeable future. The neocons were too ideological for his taste; they regarded his appointment as a sop to the conservative realists in Poppy’s circle. But even Haass believed, as he put it in a speech shortly before the 2000 election, that Americans needed to “re-conceive their global role from one of a traditional nation-state to an imperial power.”

Haass represented the realist, and in his case, softer-edged Pax Americanism. Through the 19908 the unipolarist democratizers and realists played up their philosophical differences. Lawrence Kaplan counted Haas and Robert D.Kaplan among the unrepentant realists that had to be converted or overcome; realists such as Haass, Krauthammer, and Robert D.Kaplan returned the favor, spurning democratic globalism as another mistaken idealism. The case for a liberal imperialism that bridged these positions was a bit slow to develop, but in the aftermath of 9/11 unipolarists such as Stanley Kurtz and Max Boot were spurred by policy debates over Bush’s global agenda to emphasize the common goal of an American empire.
Liberal Imperialism: Stanley Kurtz and Max Boot

Writing just before American troops poured into Iraq, Kurtz declared that it was time for America to deal with “the imperial question.” A research fellow at the Hoover Institution, he agreed with Bush that America had a vital interest in spreading democratic values, because democracies “do not breed the ideologies of murder” and that Arab nations could be converted to democracy. But he worried about the rising influence of an overreaching, culturally oblivious democratic globalism. The Pentagon strategists and think tank ideologists were wrong to imagine that Iraq could be democratized without a profound cultural change, Kurtz warned. Moreover, they were kidding themselves if they thought Iraq could become a cultural and political candidate for democracy without a long American occupation. The real questions of the moment were: “Could such a venture in democratic imperialism be harmonized with our liberal principles? Even if so, would it work? Is it possible to bring liberalism to a society so long at odds with the values of the West?”

Kurtz took his answers from the icons of English political conservatism and liberalism, political philosophers Edmund Burke and John Stuart Mill. Both were keen observers of Britain’s imperial rule of India; in fact, Mill succeeded his father James Mill as the Chief Examiner of the British East India Company in London. Burke’s conservative colonialism was respectful of indigenous elites, traditions, and cultural practices. He advocated gradual reform, respect for indigenous cultural norms, ruling through an indigenous elite, and going slow on modernization. By contrast, Mill’s liberal colonialism, like that of his father, was contemptuous of indigenous elites, traditions, and cultural practices. James Mill believed in democracy for all males and sweeping away all traditional and “irrational” influences. His high-pressure diet of utilitarian rationalism drove his son to a nervous breakdown; eventually, John Stuart Mill found his way to a compromise between his father’s dogmatic reformism and Burke’s conservative Orientalism.

That was what Kurtz advocated, with situational adjustments. He counseled that culture is the crucial problem for imperial modernizers. The lesson of Britain’s occupation of India was twofold: Liberal imperialism was not impossible, but there was no single correct way to pull it off. The Brits zigged and zagged on land reforms, indirect rule, and limited democracy, and the Bush administration would undoubtedly do the same in Iraq. It would be necessary to work with traditional Arab elites, although some Bush officials were committed to rapid democratization. A modern state had to have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, but disarming riflebearing tribesmen was probably out of the question for a while. Realists and democratizers routinely squared off on these issues, but Kurtz counseled that liberal imperialism, wisely administered, tacked back and forth between realism and democratic idealism. Just as Mill warned against premature elections in societies lacking the cultural preconditions of democracy, Kurtz cautioned against conceiving democracy in universalist and
rights-based terms. Democracy was the right goal in Iraq and the Arab world as a whole, he assured, but the entire Arab world was very far from the liberal, individualistic cultural milieu that gave birth to democracy in the United States. It was not illiberal to go slow on democracy; rather, liberal imperialism had to respect that democracy is a prolonged and difficult cultural achievement. Kurtz waved off the Japanese exception, because Japan was culturally homogeneous and already substantially modernized when America imposed democracy there. Iraq would be more like India, he reasoned, and in such cases, democratic gradualism was both realistic and liberal.7

Kurtz acknowledged that imperial England was often racist and contemptuous of Indian culture and that America’s new venture in liberal imperialism would have to be more respectful of its subject populations. He further acknowledged that even the most liberal form of imperialism was likely to be experienced by the occupied as a humiliation. But, bigoted as it was, English imperialism yielded good fruit, because “imperialism as the midwife of democratic self-rule is an undeniable good.” It was not merely a rationalization to say that British rule made Indian democracy possible, for the rationalization was true. Now it was America’s turn to become the servant of this difficult, conflicted, and profound truth. Occupation is morally ambiguous, Kurtz allowed, “yet the argument for a venture in democratic imperialism is also strong. In the long term, it may be our best insurance against the deadly and ever-spreading combination of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.”8

Max Boot showed little interest in the cultural variables, but he took a clear position on the politics of occupation and democratization, arguing that the United States needed to establish liberal institutions in Iraq before it established democracy there. Like Kurtz, he urged that this did not imply any backing away from the goal of democratic globalism; it was the way to prevent a disastrous illiberal democracy. “The administration must—must—carry out President Bush’s plainly stated policy of democratizing Iraq,” Boot wrote in May 2003, just after American troops took Baghdad. “It must do this not just to secure its own credibility but also to vindicate American actions and American principles.” Having defied the U.N. Security Council and “much world opinion” by overthrowing the Iraqi government, America had to show the world that liberal imperialism was the best way to combat the “fascist regimes” of the Middle East. Unfortunately, he lamented, “this viewpoint is not popular within the State Department, the CIA, or even among many at the Pentagon—the very people who will have to implement the policy on the ground.” The professional bureaucrats always opted for stability over the “hard work of making democracy flourish in barren soil.” If they had gotten their way, the United States would still be playing containment games with Saddam; now that Saddam was overthrown, the United States couldn’t settle for another stabilizing dictator. Neither could it settle for a tripartite partition or a Shiite theocracy. Iraq would either become a relatively well-functioning unitary democracy or a disaster.9
Boot urged that there was no alternative to American imperial force. Iraq was too important and the United States paid too dearly for it to allow the United Nations and European Union to take over, as they did in Kosovo and Bosnia. At the outset of the occupation, he thought that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz had enough troops in place and that the long-term occupation could be handled by sixty thousand to seventy-five thousand soldiers, although he cautioned against any hope of an early exit. America had to purge the Baathists, implement the rule of law, and establish liberal safeguards against majoritarian tyranny, beginning with freedom of speech and property rights. Then it had to build a functioning democracy, beginning with the elections of representative local leaders. Boot took for granted that a tripartite federation was unacceptable and that the United States had to stay in Iraq at least long enough to ensure that the country’s democratization did not lead to a Shiite theocracy. Having invaded and occupied Iraq, the United States had to establish a liberal democracy there, but establishing liberal democracy was not the purpose of invading. Otherwise, America would have to invade every Arab country with a bad government, which was nearly all of them, as well as Iran.

Boot thought it was “not likely” that America would invade any Middle Eastern country simply for the sake of its freedom. He hedged because the lack of democratic modernization was the underlying problem in the Middle East. To him it was obnoxious when foreign policy types treated Israel as part of the problem in the Middle East, because Israel was the region’s only democracy. (Jordan and Turkey were trying.) There was an argument to be made for wars of straightforward imperial liberation, which Boot didn’t rule out. But he judged that America probably would not go that far: “To avoid a visit from the 3rd Infantry Division, Iran and Syria do not have to democratize.” They only had to stop crossing certain “red lines” that were plainly drawn out in the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy. If they continued to acquire weapons of mass destruction and support Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, al-Qaeda, and similar groups, they would have to be invaded and occupied. If they facilitated attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq, turning Iraq into “Lebanon redux,” “America would have no choice; that would be double or nothing. If Iran developed a nuclear weapon, that would be intolerable too. The prospect of having to fight more wars in the Middle East was real enough that Boot didn’t want to overstated the importance of democratization as a rationale for war. It would be enough if America’s smashing of the Baathist regime scared neighboring countries into behaving properly.

Boot worried that North Korea was probably too powerful to attack; the United States might have to settle for geopolitical pressure and a Cuba-like quarantine. He had no animus against alliances, but thought their time had passed. New alliances were likely to prove no more useful than the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), “those 1950s curiosities.” He thought that NATO was still worth supporting, but didn’t share the emotional fervor of older PNAC types for an
expanded and American-led NATO. He reasoned that in the late 1940s the Western democracies were threatened by a single nation, the Soviet Union. NATO worked reasonably well as an anti-Soviet alliance, but in the twenty-first century America faced many threats across the globe. Each one was distinct, requiring a distinct correlation of forces. The United States needed help from one set of countries in dealing with Iran, another set in dealing with North Korea, and so on. Haass’s “posses” would have to do for a newly imperial America in an increasingly fragmented world.12

Boot reasoned that having allies was much less important for America than it had been before America was an unrivaled power. He urged that “our primary goal should be to preserve and extend what Charles Krauthammer called ‘the unipolar moment.’” Foreign policy theorists cautioned that a hegemon always frightens into being some opposing coalition; Boot replied that the experiences of previous empires didn’t apply to America: “The reason should be obvious to anyone without a Ph.D.: America isn’t like the empires of old.” America invaded only for peace and the well being of nations. It took no interest in formal empire, took leave of occupation as soon as possible, and spread freedom and opportunity wherever it went. The rest of the world knew that America was not like the great powers of the past, even when it complained otherwise, and the civilized nations knew that American power posed no threat to their security. They depended on American power for their safety and opportunity. Boot didn’t worry about “soft power” resistance, such as the opposition of France, Germany, Russia, and China to America’s war against Iraq. Soft power gave academics something to talk about, but it was no threat to the real thing, which America possessed in abundance.13

Boot realized that America would need a great deal more of the real thing to do all the global policing that lay ahead; he didn’t realize that the future would arrive in Iraq. “To preserve and extend the Pax Americana, we will need to increase our defense spending,” he contended. Boot wanted to increase defense spending by more than $100 billion per year, raising the armed services across the board to Cold War levels of force structure. America could easily afford “to police the globe”; moreover, the goal of global police work was to create a global democracy that required less war and occupation: “Sophisticates may laugh at Woodrow Wilson’s objective, but it was the right one; the problem was that he was unable to mobilize American society to achieve it.” Boot believed that George W. Bush had taken the path of redeeming Wilson’s global vision while dispensing with Wilson’s fuzzyminded multilateralism. When Rumsfeld denied that America was an imperial power, Boot replied that his statement was “a fine answer for public consumption” but factually challenged. The United States was obviously an imperial colossus of a liberal type, and Americans were overdue to accept the responsibilities that came with being one.14
Boot was a movement-type who tried to establish what neocons believed and didn’t believe; some liberal imperialists had much less interest in movement politics and none in world democracy. Robert D. Kaplan was prominent among the latter. A journalist and policy analyst, he specialized in travel commentary on the dark side of globalization, writing about poor, overpopulated, environmentally ravaged countries that he considered portents of a coming global anarchy. Kaplan’s terrain was the arc of the two-thirds world that extended from West Africa to the Middle East, Central Asia, and East Asia. His early books reported on the politics of African famine (*Surrender or Starve*, 1988), the mujahideen guerrilla war against Soviet invaders in Afghanistan (*Soldiers of God*, 1990), ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia (*Balkan Ghosts*, 1993), and patterns of poverty, overpopulation, environmental destruction, and national fragmentation in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia (*The Ends of the Earth*, 1996). Always he pictured the world as slouching toward barbarism; his breakthrough book was *Balkan Ghosts*, which offered a haunting picture of impacted hatreds among Serbs, Croats, and Albanians that spooked many readers. One of them was President Bill Clinton, who balked on sending troops to Bosnia.15

Perfectly timed, *Balkan Ghosts* brought Kaplan wide attention, which stunned him. “The Balkans were like Ethiopia, an obscure country” he later recalled. “The idea that any policymaker would read it, I didn’t even consider. I saw it purely as an entertaining journalistic travel book about my experiences in the 1980s.” Opinionated, darkly ruminative, sometimes lyrical, and often described as mesmerizing, the book’s thematization of “ancient hatreds” and its free-floating authorial subjectivity made it a powerful read. Kaplan later suggested that he might have provided a more comprehensive account had he known that policy makers would read it to find out why Yugoslavia was falling apart. He made little mention of Bosnia and downplayed the cosmopolitanism that characterized much of Tito’s Yugoslavia.16

But downplaying the force of Western liberalism was a staple of his later books, too. Much of his writing reflected and reinforced the tourist’s revulsion at the misery, ugliness, and squalor of poor countries; Michael Ignatieff described Kaplan’s genre as “travel writing from hell.” Kaplan believed that the hellish disarray of the two-thirds world was spreading to the rest of the world. His depictions of poor countries were selective, focusing on the ravages, with occasional glimpses of beauty, because the ravages were more revealing. They foreshadowed a wider anarchy. Kaplan shuddered at the Wilsonian idealists of the 1920s and 1930s, who failed to see that democracy and freedom heightened ethnic tensions in places like the Balkans and Near East. Contemporary democratic globalists were equally clueless, believing that the West’s victory in the Cold War engendered a new world order of democratic capitalism. Whereas democratic globalists complained that America never really celebrated the fall of
communism, Kaplan shook his head at their triumphalism: “The victors naturally assume that their struggle carries deep significance, of a kind that cannot fail to redeem the world. Indeed, the harder and longer the struggle, the greater its meaning in the mind of the winning side, and the greater the benefits it sees for humanity.”

Kaplan wanted nothing to do with movement idealism. Fixating on the untold stories of the underside, he offered “an unrelenting record of uncomfortable truths.” His favorite contemporary political theorist, Samuel Huntington, taught that the story of the twentieth century was about the movement from nationalist conflict to ideological conflict to cultural conflict. Kaplan judged that even Huntington didn’t quite perceive the demise of the state, because he didn’t focus on the world wide flows of refugees and peasant migrations. One of Kaplan’s main themes was that national borders become meaningless when cities become sprawling villages of foreigners. Postmodernism was not a philosophical fashion to him; it was the reality of the world coming into being, “an epoch of themeless juxtapositions, in which the classificatory grid of nation-states is going to be replaced by a jaggedglass pattern of city-states, shanty-states, nebulous and anarchic regionalisms.” In 1994 he cautioned that already there was no such thing as national politics in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, the Balkans, and the Caucasus; failing states were growing rapidly. At the other end of the economic scale, the United States, a classic nation-state in the early 1950s, was barely a country by the end of the century. The U.S. nation-state was based on a mass conscription army and a standardized public school system that forged a national consciousness in which citizens identified with leaders of the national political class. But contemporary America was a collection of cultures in which people identified with entertainment figures, the upper and middle classes fled the public schools, and the army consisted of volunteers. Kaplan thought that Francophone Quebec had the best chance of any North American city of sustaining a cohesive, low-crime existence.

He wished that policy theorists spent more time thinking about the environment as an essential national security issue and less time dreaming about democracy in undemocratic cultures. “Mention ‘the environment’ or ‘diminishing natural resources’ in foreign-policy circles and you meet a brick wall of skepticism or boredom,” he lamented. “To conservatives especially, the very terms seem flaky.” Kaplan urged that surging populations and disease had everything to do with national security; that ideology was less destabilizing than deforestation, soil erosion, water depletion, and air pollution; and that democracy was the last thing that Americans should want in most of the Middle East. A democratic Saudi Arabia would be ferociously anti-American, turning America’s oil-driven economy on its head. Had Egypt’s Anwar Sadat or Jordan’s King Hussein lacked the tools of dictatorship, neither would have been able to make peace with Israel. Chinese autocracy was more productive in the 1990s than either Russian or Indian democracy, democratic South Africa was extremely violent, and none of the East Asian capitalist dynamos—South Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong—would have taken off as democracies. In the mid-1990s Kaplan thought that Pakistan, Turkey, and Peru offered the best models of governance for countries outside the privileged West. All were “hybrid regimes” that featured partial democratic legitimation and strong-handed government rule.19

“Things are coming apart,” he warned in 2001. “And when this happens where there are weak institutions, no middle class, and where big issues of society are unsettled, such as which ethnic group has control, you have a real breakdown.” Although Kaplan’s later writings retained his hyperbolic generalizations about collapsing civilizations, he cut back on the lyricism. Increasingly he wrote for military officers, defense analysts, and government policy makers, combining the experience of a backpacker with the disciplined analysis of a policy expert. Policy specialists often had no sense of the culture that they analyzed, he explained, while “backpacker types” had the experiences to get it.20

Kaplan wished that Bush had the nerve to talk about his ultimate reason for invading Iraq, to consolidate America’s power in the region, and he wished that Bush would drop the nonsense about turning Middle Eastern nations into democracies. The Iraq War was a necessary campaign for neo-imperial control and safety, he believed. Iraq was a weapons-hungry menace that had to be stopped by the guardian of the world order, and it was “the most logical place to relocate Middle Eastern U.S. bases in the twenty-first century.” That was the serious reason for invading Iraq, not a tangle of fantasies about democratizing the government and transforming Middle Eastern cultures: “We should forswear any evangelical lust to implement democracy overnight in a country with no tradition of it.” His model for Iraq was “a secular dictatorship that unites the merchant lines.” Democracy needed to wait in Iraq while a decent dictatorship built a new society. Kaplan urged that this goal was worth American blood and treasure: “The real question is not whether the American military can topple Saddam’s regime but whether the American public has the stomach for imperial involvement of a kind we have not known since the United States occupied Germany and Japan.”21

He worried that the West’s Christian heritage did not provide the right stuff for the neo-imperial militancy that was needed. Kaplan’s heroes were intellectuals and warrior leaders who championed a “pagan ethic” of results: Thucydides, Sun-Tzu, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz, and Winston Churchill. Christianity prized moral purity as defined by its ethic of sacrificial love, but pagan warriors prized self-preservation over any conflicting notion of virtue. To Kaplan, former Israeli Defense Minister and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was a model pagan warrior. As defense minister during the Palestinian intifada of 1988, Rabin told Israeli soldiers to break the bones of Palestinian protesters. Less violent means had failed to stop the street anarchy, and killing protesters ignited more riots. Rabin found just the right level of brutality to stop the protests, after which he was elected prime minister and used his power to make peace with the
Palestinians and Jordanians. Kaplan remarked, “Rabin’s Western admirers prefer
to forget his ruthlessness against the Palestinians, but Machiavelli would have
understood that such tactics were central to Rabin’s ‘Virtue.’” In a social world,
the political result was always more important than the cultivation or practice of
individual virtue: “Good men bent on doing good must know how to be bad.”

Kaplan wearied of reviewers who found him morbidly preoccupied with
terrible deeds and tragic choices. His sky-is-falling description of America in The
Coming Anarchy caused some to question whether his descriptions of the two-
thirds world were equally skewed. In Warrior Politics he offered a caveat on the
bad future of everything: “I focus on the dark side of every development not
because the future will necessarily be bad, but because that is what foreign policy
crises have always been about.” The Atlantic Monthly, introducing a series of
articles by Kaplan, observed that he uniquely documented the era of America’s
global predominance. The United States possessed “a global empire—different
from Britain’s and Rome’s—but an empire nonetheless.” So what were the rules
and tools of America’s venture in liberal imperialism?

Kaplan argued that the Iraq War, though amply warranted, was too big and
attention-getting to be a good model of global Americanism. It exposed the
contradictions between the democratic principles that America professed and the
imperial necessities of the Pax Americana, producing an inevitable farce at the
United Nations by giving France and Germany a world stage to show up the
American colossus. Fortunately, Kaplan observed, America’s imperial
operations were usually not so visible. Most of them took place “in the shadows
and behind closed doors, using means far less obvious than the august array of
power displayed in the air and ground war against Iraq.” On a week-to-week
basis, the key agents of American intervention were the CIA and Special Forces.
In July 2003 the U.S. Army Special Operations Command was deployed in sixty-
five countries, and most of the time Special Forces officers were more or less on
their own, with little interference from Washington. A Marine lieutenant told
Kaplan, “We want an empire not of colonies or protectorates but of personal
relationships. We back into deployments. There doesn’t need to be a policy
directive from the Pentagon—half the time we don’t know what the policy is.”
Army Major General Sidney Shachnow put it more personally: “A Special
Forces guy has to be a lethal killer one moment and a humanitarian the next. He
has to know how to get strangers who speak another language to do things for
him We need people who are cultural quick studies.”

Kaplan was eager to make Special Forces bigger and less constrained. Before
the Vietnam War, teams of “quiet professionals” (the Army jargon for Special
Forces) had ample freedom to stabilize or destabilize regimes, fight alongside the
forces they supported, and carry out assassinations. Kaplan wanted to bring back
the preVietnam rules of engagement using twenty-first-century technology.
Impending technologies such as warhead-like bullets and neurobiological
signature-tracking satellites would make it easier to assassinate bad rulers, he
noted. Bunkered with a few dozen Green Berets at an Army base in Colombia,
he sympathized with one who told him, “I wish people in Washington would totally get Vietnam out of their system.” In Colombia, Kaplan sympathized with Green Berets who wanted to fight alongside the soldiers they trained, although he acknowledged that training missions were important; the fifty-five Special Forces trainers that the United States dispatched to El Salvador in the mid-1980s accomplished more than the 550,000 troops that America sent to Vietnam. Kaplan stressed that covert warfare evaded most of the politics of intervention and imperialism: “Bringing back the old rules could help to circumvent the U.N. Security Council, which in any case represents an antiquated power arrangement unreflective of the latest wave of U.S. military modernization in both tactics and weaponry.” The objective was to handle America’s global management problems “long before they get to the Security Council.” The way to do it was to emphasize Special Forces and the CIA’s military wing. Kaplan wanted the CIA to be “greener” (increasing its uniformed military wing) and the Special Forces to be “blacker” (emphasizing super-clandestine operations). Thechronicler of harsh truths and dark vistas emoted with romantic feeling in assuring that America’s quiet professionals “will find the right hinge in a given situation to change history.”

Kaplan’s rules for ruling the world were (1) produce more top-rate civil affairs officers; (2) don’t get bogged down; (3) emulate the second-century Roman example of not fighting in too many areas at once; (4) use the military to train foreign militaries and thus promote democracy; (5) “be light and lethal” relying on Special Forces and Marines; (6) “bring back the old rules”; (7) remember America’s first counterinsurgency campaign, in the Philippines, which deserved a better reputation; (8) “the mission is everything,” so don’t let diplomacy and public opinion get in the way; (9) constantly fight the media war; and (10) “speak Victorian, think Pagan.” He ridiculed the huge worldwide demonstrations against the Iraq War, which showed that modern comforts had made people stupid. America had to get better at fighting the media war, Kaplan urged. If American corporations could sell tons of junk that nobody needed, the American government could surely figure out how to sell a foreign policy that protected America’s way of life.

His last rule made a reluctant concession to reality. To sell an imperial foreign policy, Kaplan allowed, the American government had to speak the Victorian language of democracy, rights, and the good; by contrast, America needed to become more pagan in its thinking. The best thing it could do for the world was to make itself stronger, serve its own interests, and become more frank about doing so. America’s global dominance would not last forever, but it could be made to last for a few decades: “For a limited period the United States has the power to write the terms for international society, in hopes that when the country’s imperial hour has passed, new international institutions and stable regional powers will have begun to flourish, creating a new kind of civil society for the world.”
Kaplan could imagine that a decent system of collective security might emerge in the distant future; he just couldn’t see any reason to build one as long as America was globally dominant. Although his blatant militarism was a bit strong, rhetorically, for American tastes, he correctly claimed that his strategy of “supremacy by stealth” was grounded in existing American policies. He did not call for pathbreaking changes in the Pentagon or spin fantasies about transforming foreign cultures. He described what America was already doing and how its power could be deployed more effectively. Like Krauthammer, Kaplan spoke the language of imperialism more comfortably than some democratic globalists—notably Muravchik and Kagan—and he counted this difference as a strength of the realist perspective.

But the difference narrowed as democratic globalists increasingly embraced the language of empire. Immersed in the real-life politics of occupying Iraq and urging new interventions elsewhere, democratic globalists such as Boot, Kurtz, Kristol, and Podhoretz found common ground with Krauthammer and Kaplan in explicitly espousing a politics of liberal imperialism. Like Kaplan, they wanted huge increases in American military spending and aggressive thrusts of American force in trouble spots across the globe. They differed from him chiefly in doubting that the main burden of American global maintenance could be handled by beefed-up Special Forces, Marines, and CIA forces.

Empire in Denial: Niall Ferguson

Boot, Kurtz, Kristol, Krauthammer, and Kaplan represented a significant trend in speaking of the American empire, but most neocons remained more comfortable with its euphemisms. Three months after the Iraq War the American Enterprise Institute sponsored a debate between Kagan and British historian Niall Ferguson on whether unipolarists like themselves should explicitly employ the language of empire. Ferguson, the author of a new history of the British Empire, had recently joined the faculty of New York University; a few months later he switched to Harvard. He and Kagan shared the same concern, that America was too quick to come home from its wars and did not have the stomach to be a good occupier. Ferguson complained that America pursued nation-building “on the Wal-Mart principle of low prices always” and in two-year time frames, the electoral cycle. Would it help if Americans relinquished their innocence about not being an imperial power? Ferguson used the quacking duck argument, observing that America walked and quacked exactly like an empire and the whole world thought so; only Americans believed that America wasn’t an empire. It was time for Americans to overcome their preciousness and do a better job of imperial maintenance. Kagan countered that Americans would intervene in the name of ideals or interests, but not empire; as for himself, he preferred to describe America as a global hegemon, not an empire, because America invaded only to do good.
That was exactly what Ferguson expected him to say: “Do you really think the British didn’t make exactly this argument throughout the 19th century? The whole characteristic of 19th century British imperialism was its self-proclaimed altruism.” Quoting Bush’s mantra, “We come not as conquerors, but as liberators,” he remarked: “I wonder who said that? It does sound awfully familiar, doesn’t it? It was General F.S.Maude in March 1917, following the British occupation of Baghdad.” Ferguson explained that Americans got their sincere belief in their own righteousness from their British forerunners: “Ladies and gentlemen, it is a distinguishing feature of both the great Anglophone Empires that they insist they are acting in the best interests of the people that they subjugate. It is part of our charm. It is our share of culture.” The difference was that the Brits wrote songs and poetry about their imperial generosity, whereas Americans denied they had an empire.29

Near the end of the debate, Ferguson admitted that he didn’t really care what Americans called it: “Call it nation-building, call it hegemony, call it Wal-Mart as far as I’m concerned.” And he didn’t really think that administration officials should speak of an American empire: “I applaud their ability to disclaim imperial ambitions in all of their public pronouncements. That is precisely the right way to play it. The United States should constantly deny that it’s an empire, should consistently promise that its troops will be withdrawn. This seems to me almost inherently part of the new American Empire. The key thing is not to mean these things.” He wasn’t kidding; the key thing was to do it right while claiming not to do it. Academics could call things by their right names, he reasoned, but politicians had to play to the public. Ferguson was deadly serious about what American politicians had to start doing right. It was an American myth that empires are based on coercion, he instructed. Empires are based on collaboration, especially the willingness of indigenous elites to collaborate with the occupying power to build something better. But an empire in denial can’t be trusted to complete the mission: “Why would you collaborate with an occupying power that says it’s about to leave?” Ferguson gave the United States low marks on Afghanistan, and he worried that Iraq would be even worse.30

*Never Enough Power*

In August 2003 the United States had 139,000 troops bogged down in a miserable occupation of Iraq, another 34,000 stationed in Kuwait, 10,000 in Afghanistan, 5,000 in the Balkans, and 37,000 in South Korea. The U.S. Army was not supposed to exceed 482,400 troops, but by January 2004 the Army had 11,000 additional troops and planned to have 30,000 extra by the summer. The Bush administration confronted double-or-nothing dilemmas in Iran and Syria, which it suspected of aiding the anti-American turmoil in Iraq, and it faced the question of what it meant to say, as the administration did repeatedly, that the United States would not tolerate a nuclear Iran or North Korea. What would it take to strip North Korea of its nuclear capacity or repel an invasion of South Korea?
The neocons agreed that these questions pointed to the necessity of upgrading the military. They disagreed about force structure, and the scope of imperial maintenance. The realists worried that America was breaking Kaplan’s second and third rules and that it had to get out of the peacekeeping business. The democratic globalists countered that if the American empire was overstretched, it had to get more military capacity; peacekeeping was built into the idea of the Pax Americana. To Boot it was simply “unacceptable to say that peacekeeping is not a job for the U.S. military.” To Krauthammer it was crucial to say exactly that. The Swedes and Canadians were good at peacekeeping, he argued, but with the partial exception of England, only the United States had the military capacity to win the wars that preserved the world order. By August 2003, despite the nation-building efforts of an able proconsul, Paul Bremer, the situation in Iraq was so bad that Krauthammer appealed for help from the United Nations. Ignoring the Bush administration’s marginalization of the U.N. and his own history of calling for its demise, Krauthammer called upon the U.N. to authorize peacekeeping missions in Iraq under the authority of the United States. “If the world will not help us in Iraq, we should ostentatiously announce a global reconsideration of all U.S. military commitments in humanitarian ventures,” he declared. “Why are thousands of U.S. troops sitting in the Balkans, doing a job the French and Germans and others who won’t lift a finger for us in Iraq can very well do themselves?”

Krauthammer ended on a bitter note. “If the world wants us to play God, especially in godforsaken places, it had better help.” By contrast, Kristol and Kagan implored Bush not to crawl back to the U.N. Fixing Iraq was America’s highest priority, for the cause of American greatness and Middle East transformation would either flourish or die there: “The future course of American foreign policy, American world leadership, and American security is at stake. Failure in Iraq would be a devastating blow to everything the United States hopes to accomplish, and must accomplish, in the decades ahead.” So why was the Bush administration holding back? Kristol and Kagan no longer believed that the occupation was going well. It was “painfully obvious” that America didn’t have enough troops in the country, they charged; even worse, the Pentagon was committed to force reductions. And it was pointless to hope for an international or Iraqi bailout. Europe had very few troops to spare, the Iraqi army had to be rebuilt from scratch, and the success of the war was too important to leave to “a patchwork of ill-prepared forces from elsewhere in the world.” Kristol and Kagan allowed that America didn’t have many troops to spare, but that was the fault of the Bush, Clinton, and Bush administrations: “We should have begun rebuilding our military two years ago.” As it was, America simply had to pay the price, whatever it was.

That led to their second complaint, that Bush refused to break the bank over Iraq. By September the United States was spending over $1 billion per week on the occupation, but Kristol and Kagan protested that it obviously wasn’t enough: “It is simply unconscionable that debilitating power shortages persist in Iraq,
Turning Iraqi public opinion against the United States. This is one of those problems that can be solved with enough money.” They wanted Bush to get an extra $60 billion from Congress; the following month Bush asked Congress for $87 billion. Elsewhere Kristol complained of the administration that “until about two weeks ago they believed their own propaganda that all was well in Iraq.” The Weekly Standard, however, was only two weeks ahead of the Bush curve.33

Having derided the United Nations for years, the neocons were dead opposed to granting the U.N. formal authority over the reconstruction of Iraq. They also ruled out NATO command of the military forces, although they had swallowed NATO command in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Neither did they believe in accelerating the timetable for elections or the training of Iraqi troops; Iraqification couldn’t be rushed. Vietnamization had been a disaster, and the turmoil in Iraq traced directly to England’s unhappy experiment with Iraqification in the 1920s. Faced with a rebellion by Sunni nationalists in 1920, the British occupiers invented Iraq as a quasi-independent entity. They rigged a plebiscite and phony parliament, installed a Hashemite puppet regime that the Shiites, Kurds, and various tribes never accepted, and thus paved the way to Sunni tyranny. Eighty-four years later the same dynamics were still in place, this time with a Shiite majority that expected to gain power. Neocons inside and outside the Bush administration had ample reason to fear that only American power stood between Iraq and a civil war. But this grim situation was the consequence of having invaded the Arab world’s Yugoslavia despite the cultural variables. To the neocons, the Bush/Bremer resort to accelerated Iraqification smelled of surrender and the British debacle. Only American power could be trusted to prevent a catastrophe in Iraq. The cultural variables mattered chiefly as reasons not to back away from applying overwhelming force.

The occupation mess forced the neocons to muffle their demands for more regime-changing interventions. The heady days of magazine covers and “Wolfowitz of Arabia” quickly fell behind them. Three years before the neocons whisked into power, Orbis editor Walter McDougall offered a prescient critique of Kristol/Kagan-style neo-imperialism that pressed hard on the problem of unipolarist overreaching. A prominent conservative realist and professor of international relations and history at the University of Pennsylvania, McDougall admired Ronald Reagan. More than once he confessed that he missed the glory days of the 1980s when Reagan led the fight against communism. But he was appalled by the new movement for a neo-Reaganite benevolent hegemony. “Benevolent hegemony” was an oxymoron, he admonished, and it had nothing to do with Reagan.34

The first problem with the Kristol/Kagan scheme was that it distorted recent history. Kristol and Kagan derided Nixon and Kissinger for draining the Republican Party of ideological conviction; McDougall countered that the Reagan coalition would not have been possible if Nixon had not reached out to disaffected Democrats and pulled off “a tough-minded geopolitical strategy of detente” in a turbulent time. Kissinger-style realpolitik was the best that
Republicans could manage after the Vietnam War turned into a disaster. More important, McDougall argued, America at its best was an anti-imperialist force for freedom and diversity, but Kristol/Kagan neo-imperialism was about remaking the world in America’s image. It was one thing to promote democracy for the purpose of undermining a tyrannical enemy; that was Reagan’s strategy. It was something else to turn an authoritarian country into an enemy because it failed to embrace American values; that was the Kristol/Kagan idea. McDougall urged Republicans not to buy it.\(^\text{35}\)

The Reagan team was much too tough-minded to fall for the dream of “a U.S.-policed Wilsonian New World Order,” he insisted. McDougall chortled at the thought of Richard Allen, Bill Casey, Alexander Haig, Fred Iklé, Richard Perle, Richard Pipes, or Caspar Weinberger indulging the fantasies of contemporary democratic globalists; apparently he had not kept up with Perle’s plans for the Middle East. The Reagan administration employed the rhetoric of freedom as a weapon against tyranny, McDougall recalled, but it had no concept of supplanting Soviet imperialism with an American version. Reagan frontally challenged the Soviets, but made very few overseas interventions; he supported the Afghan \textit{mujahideen} without imagining that they supported democracy. Finally, McDougall got to the heart of the matter. Kristol and Kagan had asked, contra John Quincy Adams, why conservatives should not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy; to them it was cowardly and dishonorable not to do so. McDougall replied: “Here’s why not: because if you go abroad in search of monsters, you will invariably find them even if you have to create them. You will then fight them, whether or not you need to, and you will either come home defeated, or else so bloodied that the American people will lose their tolerance for engagement altogether, or else so victorious and full of yourself that the rest of the world will hate you and fear that you’ll name them the next monster.”\(^\text{36}\)

That put it very well, but McDougall gave the last word to Adams, who warned that if the American government were to search abroad for monsters, it would “involve the United States beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, avarice, envy, and ambition America might become the dictatress of the world, but she would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit.” McDougall wanted America to play a leading role in the world, boost its defense spending, and proclaim its values. He didn’t want his country to regard the entire planet as its geopolitical neighborhood. He argued that Kristol, Kagan, Podhoretz, and the entire neo-imperialist movement failed to perceive that Wilsonian interventionism was “the flip side of isolationist moral disarmament.” To McDougall, this was the key to the shipwreck of Democratic foreign policy liberalism. From Wilson to Lyndon Johnson, liberal Democrats sang the song of universal democracy. Then they created a disaster in Vietnam, lost faith in their moral superiority, and flipped over to McGovernesque anti-interventionism. McDougall preferred the “businesslike internationalism” of his favorite twentieth-century Republicans—Theodore Roosevelt, Charles Evans Hughes, Dwight Eisenhower, and Richard Nixon—who did not bathe their foreign
endeavors in moralistic hubris. To him and other conservative realists it was a sad spectacle to see militaristic Wilsonians gain power in the Republican Party.  

After the unipolarists gained a great deal of power in the second Bush administration, McDougall cautioned observers to pay attention to the difference between neoconservatism and conservatism. The neocons were a significant faction in the Republican Party, he allowed. They talked about sustaining America’s unipolar dominance, imposing a “benevolent hegemony on the whole world,” and remoralizing American society, and the Pentagon was loaded with them. But McDougall assured that Rumsfeld and Cheney, though they hung out with neocons and hired them, were still “rock-ribbed” Republicans of an older school. They could be trusted to stop with Iraq, for they were not ideologues like their lieutenants, believing they could remake the world. As for Iraq, McDougall hoped for the best while expecting much less, He wanted American occupiers to go easy on democracy-building; they would do better to build a decently ordered society. “What the United States hopes to achieve in Iraq has never been done before,” he cautioned. “Nor does history provide cause to believe Americans are the people to do it.” Those who believed they were saving the world would have to get used to a draining job of nation-building.  

The Pax Americana and the Perpetual War

The neocons had no intention of stopping with Iraq, however. From 9/11 to the invasion of Iraq they earnestly compared lists of the governments and groups that had to be smashed, sometimes debating the sequence. Krauthammer’s initial target list of Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, and Iraq served as a template for much of the early discussion, as did Bibi Netanyahu’s call to attack Iraq, Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Kristol and Kagan wanted to begin with Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Hezbollah. During the buildup to the Iraq War, Boston University political scientist Angelo Codevilla argued that the second phase of the war on terrorism had to include the overthrow of Iraq, Syria, and the Palestinian Authority. Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan wanted to begin with Iraq, Iran, and Hezbollah. Center for Security Policy director Frank Gaffney believed that Iraq, Iran, and the Palestinian Authority headed the list. Former Lyndon LaRouche aide Laurent Murawiec told the Defense Policy Board that Iraq was the “tactical pivot” of America’s war in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia was the “strategic pivot,” and Egypt was the “prize.” Addressing the Pentagon’s advisory board, Murawiec contended that Saudi Arabia was the “kernel of evil” and number one enemy of the United States. American Enterprise Institute scholar and former Pentagon official Michael Ledeen wanted America to overthrow Iran first, then Iraq and Syria, then Saudi Arabia. “The radical transformation of several Middle Eastern countries from oppressive tyrannies to freer societies is entirely in keeping with American character and the American tradition,” he declared. “Creative destruction is our middle name, both within our own society and abroad.”
After the United States brought down the Taliban, Norman Podhoretz argued that the United States had to continue by killing the regimes in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea; that Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and the Palestinian Authority had to be overthrown as soon as possible; and that Egypt and Saudi Arabia belonged on the list of enemy regimes. Podhoretz allowed that disastrous victories were quite possible in each case. “There is no denying that the alternative to these regimes could easily turn out to be worse, even (or especially) if it comes to power through democratic elections,” he wrote. For that reason, the United States had to find “the stomach to impose a new political culture on the defeated parties.” America had to find the will and means to remake its defeated enemies from top to bottom as pro-American social, cultural, and political entities. Following Eliot Cohen, Podhoretz described the Cold War as World War III and the war on terrorism as World War IV. Several months after the U.S. invaded Iraq, Richard Perle and David Frum called for the overthrow of Iran, Syria, and the Palestinian Authority, declaring: “We should toss dictators aside with no more compunction than a police sharpshooter feels when he downs a hostage-taker… Really, there is only one question to ask about Syria—Why have we put up with it as long as we have?”

Perle was forced to resign from chairing the Defense Policy Board after his lucrative contract with a Pentagon client, Global Crossings, was exposed; later he stepped down from the board after his book caused campaign stress for the Bush administration. But Bush officials envisioned creative destruction on a similar scale, while making exceptions of certain allies. Nine days after the 9/11 attacks, former NATO Supreme Commander Wesley Clark was told by a three-star general who had previously served under him that Bush officials were determined to invade Iraq even if Saddam had nothing to do with the attacks: “We’re going to get him anyway.” Two months later Clark returned to the Pentagon, where the same general informed him that the administration had a five-year plan to overthrow the governments of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, Somalia, and Sudan. “We’re not that good at fighting terrorists, so we’re going after states” the general explained. Clark noted that the worst state harborers of terrorists—Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia—weren’t on the hit list. The Bush administration exempted its allies from the Bush Doctrine, he reflected, while trusting that the blowback from overthrowing Iraq would be manageable; Clark countered that in the Muslim world, the only thing worse than invading Iraq would be to invade Saudi Arabia and capture Mecca. Shortly before launching his presidential campaign he recalled, “But I couldn’t get anyone to listen, so I started to speak out.” He believed that committing half the U.S. Army to Iraq and providing a “supercharger” to terrorist recruiters was not the way to fight terrorism.

The neoconservatives were relentless in pressing their extraordinary agenda of global warfare and cultural engineering. They made a plausible claim to carrying through the implications of the Bush Doctrine, though most of them had a version of this agenda before Bush was elected. Although often dismissed as
ideologues and overreachers, they had a track record of pushing American policy in their direction. They “overreached” on Iraq for years, when preventive intervention on such a scale was unprecedented. The Iraq War set a huge precedent that created double or nothing dilemmas before American troops entered Baghdad. Wolfowitz declared that change had to come in Syria, which harbored terrorists, built chemical weapons, supported Hezbollah, and allowed anti-American guerrillas to pass into Iraq. The stakes were higher yet in Iran, which had an advanced nuclear program, ballistic missiles superior to Syria’s, strong connections to Hezbollah, and religious ties to Iraq’s radical Shiite constituency.

At the same time neoconservatives called for a policy of isolation and confrontation with North Korea. Like other debates of its kind in the Bush administration, the argument over North Korea pitted hardliners in the Pentagon against conservative realists in the State Department, but with a key difference. Having planted one of their own, John Bolton, in the State Department, the hardliners dominated the Bush administration’s public discussion of the Korean crisis. Bolton was strident, fiercely ideological, and a personal favorite of the president. He broke into politics as a protégé of Senator Jesse Helms, opposing voter registration campaigns that enrolled African American voters; in the 1990s he served as Senior Vice President of the American Enterprise Institute while partnering a prominent Washington law firm; in December 2000 he counted dimples and chads for Bush in Florida. In the State Department he was known for spurning diplomacy and as Bush’s counterweight to Powell; Jeane Kirkpatrick observed: “I don’t think the president intended to turn over the State Department to the secretary of state.” Bolton was an architect of the administration’s policy of refusing to negotiate with North Korea. He blasted North Korea as a “hellish nightmare” that had to be brought to its knees by economic and military pressure. The United States would not conduct any negotiations about trade relations, economic support, security, or a nonaggression pact until North Korea unilaterally dismantled its entire nuclear program, he insisted. Invoking the words of Bush 41—“This will not stand”—Bolton assured that Bush 43 would never tolerate the existence of nuclear weapons on the peninsula.

But during the same week that the Bush administration reversed its position on the U.N.’s involvement in Iraq, it backed away from Bolton’s absolutism on North Korea. Powell argued for a step-by-step approach that eased economic sanctions on North Korea. When his view prevailed, neocons protested that Bush retreated to Clintonism. To the neocons, refusing to negotiate with adversaries was a litmus test of toughness. The point of issuing target lists of enemies was to establish which nations were beyond the pale of diplomatic recognition. Virtually every State Department initiative with Syria, Iran, and North Korea evoked howls of protest. Neocons specialized in calls to toughness, lists of things that America would not tolerate, and appeals to American greatness.
But just below the surface of the customary claim to toughness lurked persistent anxiety. This anxiety was inherent in the problem of empire and, in the case of the neocons, heightened by ideological ardor. Normal countries worry about their own neighborhoods, but a global hegemon is not a normal country. For the empire, every conflict is a local concern that threatens its control. However secure it may be, it never feels secure enough. The unipolarists had an advanced case of this anxiety. For them it was never enough to piece out a difficult problem, reduce the key threat, and cope with what remained. They believed in abolishing problems entirely, not coping with them. If America had overwhelming power at its disposal, how could it not use that power to wipe out regimes that opposed the United States? If the smashing approach required top-to-bottom assaults on foreign civilizations, so be it. And if America lacked the military means to fight two or three wars at once, it had to acquire the means.

The anxiety was unquenchable. In the 1990s the *Weekly Standard* rang the alarm constantly about North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, China, and the Palestinians, piling one crisis upon another. None could wait and all were related. Even the unipolarist realists had an arsenal of insults for Clinton-types who kicked the can down the road. It galled them that Clinton used the military for “social work” but didn’t overthrow Saddam, shake up the Middle East, stop North Korea from arming, or launch a cold war against China. If America was not at perpetual war, its enemies had to be gaining. In the name of sustaining America’s preeminence and making Americans safe, the unipolarists vowed to wage a great deal of creative destruction when they gained power.

But this preoccupation with sustaining America’s dominance and waging creative destruction was self-defeating. It undermined the structure of international trust that allowed America to flourish in the first place. America got to be an unrivaled power largely by escaping the downward drag of rival power blocs. Throughout the twentieth century, the United States was the strongest power in the world, and it stirred its share of resentments by supporting dictatorships, exploiting its economic leverage, and boasting about its greatness. Yet the United States was remarkably free of rivals. It was not afflicted with great power antagonists in the manner of imperial England, France, Germany, or Japan, and it had to be dragged into both world wars. After World War II the United States finally acquired a great power rival, the Soviet Union, but it never faced a united challenge from a rival coalition, even in the Soviet bloc countries. Despite its support of dictatorships and neocolonial exploitation, and despite “ugly Americanism” many interventions, military bases around the globe, the Vietnam War, and a hard-to-take rhetoric of superiority and self-righteousness, the United States was not challenged by rival powers, mainly because it was not viewed as an external threat. America’s reputation for not being a threatening, colonizing, aggressive power was its most precious attribute. The underlying reservoir of good will that America enjoyed among the nations saved it from having to struggle against rival power blocs.
But that was precisely what the new imperialism threatened to destroy. The United States received an enormous windfall of sympathy and good will after 9/11, and had the United States responded to the fiendish attacks of that day by joining with NATO, sending the Marines after al-Qaeda, and building new structures of international resistance to terrorism, it would have gained the world’s gratitude. Instead it spurned a NATO role in Afghanistan, let al-Qaeda get away, obsessed over Iraq, and took a unilateralist path that frightened much of the world into believing that America had become a threat to world peace and stability. In mid-February massive demonstrations against the war took place in over sixty nations and six hundred cities, prompting the New York Times to observe that “the fracturing of the Western alliance over Iraq and the huge antiwar demonstrations around the world this weekend are reminders that there may still be two superpowers on the planet: the United States and world public opinion.” President Bush shrugged off his role in igniting the first world peace movement: “Size of protest—it’s like deciding, well, I’m going to decide policy based upon a focus group.”

The ambitious studies of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press gave a chilling picture of a world turning against the United States. In the fall of 2002, negative feelings by majority populations toward the United States were confined to the Middle East and Pakistan, but by March 2003 dislike of the United States increased dramatically throughout the world. “Criticisms of U.S. foreign policy are almost universal” the Pew Center observed. In Europe favorable views of the United States fell by steep margins across the board: Britain from 75 percent to 48 percent, France 63 percent to 31 percent, Germany 61 percent to 25 percent, Italy 70 percent to 34 percent, Spain 50 percent to 14 percent, Poland 79 percent to 50 percent, Russia 61 percent to 28 percent, and Turkey 30 percent to 12 percent. Popular opposition to the war was stronger yet, even in European nations that supported the war effort; majorities in Britain (51 percent), Italy (81 percent), Spain (81 percent), and Poland (73 percent) opposed the war, as did majorities in France (75 percent), Germany (69 percent), Russia (87 percent), and Turkey (86 percent).

The United States banked its hope for better relations between America and the Muslim world on the world’s largest Muslim nation, Indonesia, but in that nation unfavorable views of the United States skyrocketed from 39 percent to 85 percent. Among Muslims in Nigeria, the figure rose from 38 percent to 71 percent. In the Muslim world as a whole, the bottom fell out. Asked to name their favorite world leader, 58 percent of Indonesians selected Osama bin Laden, as did 55 percent of Jordanians, 49 percent of Moroccans, 45 percent of Pakistanis, and 71 percent of Palestinians. In every country surveyed except the United States, a majority or plurality said that the United States excessively favored Israel over the Palestinians. Even 47 percent of Israelis supported this view, compared with 38 percent who said that American policy was evenhanded. A special advisory panel selected by the Bush administration gave a similar picture of America’s image in the Muslim world, reporting that “hostility toward
America has reached shocking levels. What is required is not merely tactical adaptation but strategic, and radical, transformation.”

The newest and perhaps most ominous development for the United States was the rise of large popular majorities that reported feeling threatened by the United States. According to the Pew Center, huge majorities in Indonesia (74 percent), Nigeria (72 percent), Pakistan (72 percent), Russia (71 percent), and Turkey (71 percent) stated that the United States had become a threat to their country. Smaller majorities in Lebanon (58 percent), Jordan (56 percent), and Kuwait (53 percent) also reported that they felt threatened by the United States. Commenting on the Pew Center findings, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who chaired the survey project, remarked: “Something that I never thought I’d see and something that is of great concern to me is that people now fear American power.”

By the fall of 2003, new studies by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, the German Marshall Fund, and Compagnia de Sao Paulo showed that hostility toward the United States had hardened virtually throughout the world. The New York Times observed: “In the two years since Sept. 11, 2001, the view of the United States as a victim of terrorism that deserved the world’s sympathy and support has given way to a widespread vision of America as an imperial power that has defied world opinion through unjustified and unilateral use of military force.” Large majorities in every region perceived the United States as “a classically imperialist power bent on controlling global oil supplies and on military domination.” Eberhard Sandschneider, director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, raised the specter of a permanent parting of ways between the United States and Europe. Indonesian political observer Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo reflected that if America wanted to be a global hegemon, the other nations could not stop it; but if it wanted to be a trusted and respected empire, it had to return to a foreign policy that did not cause “a reaction of hate or fear among other nations.” A year after the war, Pew Center director Andrew Kohut observed that “the wounds have not healed among the allied publics since the end of the war and, in fact, things are a little worse.” Two months later, with the revelation of the grotesque abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American troops, things got terribly worse for America’s image. Thomas Friedman sadly observed, “I have never known a time in my life when America and its president were more hated around the world than today.”

Besides learning to fear the United States, hundreds of millions of people were disillusioned by the failure of the United Nations to prevent the war. Public confidence in the peacemaking power of the United Nations plummeted throughout the world after the United States invaded Iraq. Large majorities ranging from Israel and South Korea (72 and 71 percent) to Australia and Morocco (57 and 56 percent) stated that the war had shown that the U.N. had little ability to mitigate a world crisis. Thus, it was a badly weakened United Nations to which the Bush administration appealed for relief from the expense and military burden of occupying Iraq.
Having ridiculed the U.N. for years as hopelessly inept, useless, anti-American, and in the way, neoconservatives were appalled to see Bush crawl back to it. Kristol and Kagan blasted the administration for failing “to shoulder the necessary military burden.” The U.N. could not save Iraq and should not have been asked to do so, they admonished; only America had the power to win the peace. There was no third option. Either America would prevail or there would be hell to pay; Kristol and Kagan described the latter as an abyss of “radicalism and chaos, a haven for terrorists, and a perception of American weakness and lack of resolve in the Middle East and reckless blundering in the world.” They feared that the “veiled McGovernism” of the Democratic Party had overtaken the Bush administration.50

Reuel Marc Gerecht agreed that the administration and armed services were stacked with officials who cared more about bringing the troops home than prevailing in Iraq. Powell and the military brass didn’t want to fight in the first place, he observed, and now they were backing away from finishing the job. Gerecht expected this from Powell, who shared the “generally Eurocentric liberal disposition” of the foreign policy elite. More alarming was that even the administration’s right wing was going wobbly, sending a signal “to all but the blind and deaf that the United States can’t take the heat.” Bush officials sought peacekeeping relief from Muslim countries; Gerecht pleaded with them to stop. Iraqis felt safer with Western infidels than with foreign Muslims, he explained; the last thing that Iraq needed was troops from Morocco, Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, or Bangladesh: “The sheikhs and the intellectuals may hate us in their hearts; but they absolutely don’t want to entrust their property, wives, and daughters to foreign Arab Muslims.” Because the Bush administration was bent on making a disastrous situation worse, Gerecht found himself cheering for Jacques Chirac to stop the whole U.N. business.51

But the Bush administration was desperate for relief; pride and ideology had to be swallowed. The United States had never planned to keep 139,000 troops in Iraq and did not have enough troops to sustain rotations. In addition to the $45 billion cost of the invasion and an estimated $5 billion in initial humanitarian aid, the summer bill for the war included $8 billion in Iraqi government salaries, $7 billion for repairs to public utilities, $3 billion of refugee resettlement costs, and $20 billion for the occupation. Because these costs were all paid with borrowed funds, they incurred interest charges immediately. In addition, the United States inherited Iraq’s $350 billion foreign debt and faced future reconstruction costs of over $200 billion. When the administration made its first supplemental appropriations request in March, for $79 billion, it pegged the reconstruction cost at $2.5 billion. Wolfowitz assured that reconstruction costs to the United States would be minimal, partly because of Iraqi oil revenue. Six months later the administration asked for another $87 billion, ten times the budget of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).52

Having fought without U.N. backing was very costly. The Gulf War cost American taxpayers only $6.4 billion (in 2003 dollars), because the rest of the
$84 billion bill was paid by America’s allies. The combined total of the administration’s first two supplemental bills for the Iraq War—$166 billion—was more than twenty-five times that of the American share in the Gulf War. Some European officials found it unseemly for the United States to ask nations that opposed the war to clean up America’s mess; most responded with wary resignation. Eberhard Sandschneider, director of the German Institute for Foreign Affairs, remarked that “we are doomed to cooperate with the United States.” All would have to contribute money, and some would have to contribute troops. But the Bush administration’s insistence on owning and controlling the occupation repelled even its allies from contributing very much. Several nations were willing to send troops under the authority of the United Nations, but not the United States, and they protested that the United States monopolized Iraq’s oil and rebuilding contracts.53

The Bush administration’s favors to oil-services company Halliburton alone were enormous, beginning with a no-bid federal contract for Iraqi reconstruction projects that was signed six months before the invasion. By the time that American troops entered Baghdad, Cheney’s former company held $425 million in work orders for troop support projects in Kuwait, Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq; $28 million for POW camps in Iraq; $50 million to fight oil-well fires in Iraq; and $70 million for Iraqi reconstruction projects. That was just the beginning. By the end of the year, contracts for upcoming oil infrastructure repairs exceeded $6 billion, and Wolfowitz publicly told France and Germany not to bother applying.54

The military command issue was equally controversial. After the United Nations headquarters in Iraq was destroyed, killing the brilliant U.N.diplomat Vieira de Mello, Bush told Condoleezza Rice that the tragedy of the bombing might be turned into an opportunity to change the administration’s policy toward the U.N. and obtain more economic and military relief. U.N.diplomats were gratified by the administration’s overture to them, but outraged by its position on the structure of command. Several of them bitterly told American former U.N.Ambassador Richard C.Holbrooke that it was insulting to de Mello’s memory. Holbrooke campaigned for a multinational force model (not a blue beret U.N. peacekeeping force, which took months to assemble) like the forces that served in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and East Timor.55

The Bush administration opted instead for accelerated Iraqification. Having begun with a plan for a quick pro-American democracy and brief occupation, which gave way to a plan for a constitutional process and longer occupation, which morphed into a plea for international troops and money under American command, which gave way to a quasi-democratic caucus proposal that all Iraqis rejected, which was abandoned for an interim semi-government arranged by the U.N., the Bush administration was reduced to praying for a political/cultural miracle and planning for a long American military stay. It wanted to claim the mantle of democracy, but felt obligated to prevent a democratic result, fearing a Shiite theocracy or a civil war. By December 2003, the unipolarists who had worked closely with the Iraqi National Congress and touted the Chalabi-
government solution—notably Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, and Perle—argued that accelerated Iraqification was the answer. Their view became the new U.S. policy, while the unipolarists who had emphasized the necessity of pacifying Iraq with overwhelming American force—notably Kagan, Bill Kristol, and Lawrence Kaplan—inveighed against the new plan.

Kaplan, citing John McCain to the same effect, implored that the United States would reap a disaster in Iraq if it withdrew the Army before defeating the anti-American resistance. The Weekly Standard protested that Bush substituted an exit strategy for a victory strategy. “The Pentagon wants to get out,” Kristol and Kagan observed. “The stunning victory in the war to remove Saddam has been followed by an almost equally stunning lack of seriousness about winning the peace, despite the vital importance of creating a stable, secure, and democratic Iraq.” To them, it appeared that Bush officials had learned nothing from the occupation; eight months after abandoning its original fantasy of a rapid regime change it was banking again on a rapid regime change. The illusion of quickie nation-building was even more pathetic and dangerous than that of internationalist cooperation, they implored. American Greatness required something else: “Not blowing out the bad regime and then leaving others to pick up the pieces, but staying long enough to ensure that a good regime can take its place.” It was absurd for the Pentagon to deny that America needed a major escalation of troops in Iraq; it was doubly absurd to reduce American troops in the face of escalating violence. Kristol and Kagan admonished Bush to face up to America’s imperial responsibility in Iraq, where failure would be “a strategic calamity worse than America’s retreat from Vietnam 30 years ago.”

Progressive Realism and the Logic of War

Two months before the United States invaded Iraq, Pope John Paul II declared that the future of humanity depended in large measure on the courage of the earth’s peoples and their leaders to reject “the logic of war.” The pontiff asked: “And what are we to say of the threat of a war which could strike the people of Iraq, the land of the prophets, a people already sorely tried by more than 12 years of embargo? War is never just another means that one can choose to employ for settling differences between nations.” Appealing to just war theory, international law, and the U.N. charter, he admonished that “war cannot be decided upon, even when it is a matter of ensuring the common good, except as the last option and in accordance with very strict conditions.” During the military buildup he exhorted diplomats to stop the march to war, urging that resorting to war had to be “the very last option.”

Two weeks after the United States took Baghdad, the Italian Jesuit journal Civiltà Cattolica, a mouthpiece of the Vatican, addressed the specifics of the Iraq War. In an editorial vetted by the Vatican, the journal declared that the war was “a wound and a humiliation for the entire Islamic world that, sooner or later, could be revenged through terrorist acts.” It lamented that “with the Iraqi war the
preceding world order has gone to pieces.” It protested that the United States had deprived the United Nations of its rightful function and disputed the Bush administration’s presumed right “to act ‘alone’ in every part of the world, even resorting to ‘overwhelming force’” against its enemies.58

_Civita Cattolica_ contended that Iraq posed no real danger to the United States and that many Muslims would never accept “the Western invasion of a Muslim country.” It referred several times to the “wounding” and “humiliating” impact of the war on the Muslim world. With a tone of perplexed incredulity, it wondered how Western leaders managed to believe they could invade a Muslim country without causing a great convulsion in the Muslim world. Muslim leaders feared the United States, it observed, but they also feared fundamentalist movements in their own countries: “The Iraqi conflict did not end with the Anglo-American military but likely will continue to nourish, especially among Islamic fundamentalists, hatred against the West and proposals of revenge and vendetta that may be translated into acts of terrorism.”59

Other church leaders and institutions condemned the war on similar grounds. The Central Committee of the World Council of Churches deplored the invasion and occupation as a violation of international law and the U.N. Charter, condemned the Bush Doctrine’s policy of preemptive war for the same reasons, and opposed the occupying powers “taking advantage of their military force to establish military bases in Iraq for their own use, and from benefiting from rebuilding Iraq or from sale of its resources.” The (U.S.) Global Ministries office of the World Council of Churches, representing nine denominations and three Catholic religious orders, emphasized that the war was illegal under international law and it jeopardized the struggle against terrorism. The Collegium of Officers of the United Church of Christ (USA) declared that attacking Iraq “will not serve to prevent terrorism or defend our nation’s interests. We fear that war would only provoke greater regional instability and lead to the mass destruction it is intended to prevent.”60

The opposition of church leaders to the war was rooted in the gospel ethic of sacrificial love and the scriptural command not to kill. Some opposed the war on pacifist or realist lesser-evil grounds; most, like the pope, held that the tests of just war were to be stringently applied, containing as they did the gospel presumption against war. In both cases church leaders emphasized international law and realworld consequences, not utopian ideals. They did not sentimentalize morality, minimize the evil of Saddam’s regime, or picture the United Nations as the bearer of the world’s hope. Ecumenical statements on the war took seriously the pervasive reality of evil in individuals and society and the realist maxim that all nations are self-interested and power-seeking.

Though derided by neocons as an idea beneath American greatness and not in America’s interest, the idea of collective security has a realistic basis, that the benefits of multilateralist cooperation outweigh the costs and risks of not working together. All parties are better off when the most powerful nations agree not to do everything that is in their power and nations work together to create
new forms of collective security. In an increasingly interdependent world, single
nation-states have to cooperate with each other to address security issues that
exist primarily in the interstices between states. Political philosopher Benjamin
Barber observes that terrorism is a feature of an interdependent world; it cannot
be smashed on the model of nineteenth-century warfare between states, because
it has no address or nationality. The United States destroyed the Taliban, but al-
Qaeda moved on; the United States destroyed the Baathist regime in Iraq, and
drew terrorists to Iraq. Terrorism can be curtailed only by new forms of
collective security that understand and reflect the interdependence of the real
world.61

It is true that nations do not subordinate their national interests to the common
good of an abstract international community. Even the multilateralist social
democracies of northern Europe calculate their own interests when they make
decisions about war and trade policy. In the buildup to the Iraq War, France and
Germany sought to balance American power, while Spain and Italy viewed the
United States as a check on the regional ambitions of France and Germany. For
much of Europe, the key calculation was what it would cost to oppose the United
States. This is the same kind of calculation that Western nations make every year
when they impose import fees on agricultural goods that condemn African
farmers to misery. The reality of these calculations makes international
community of the ideal type unattainable, but does not preclude the possibility
and necessity of a realistic collective security. Reinhold Niebuhr’s argument
about democracy applies to multilateralism. Collective security is valuable not so
much as an ideal to be realized, but as a brake on human greed and will-to-
power.

What passes for democracy in the twenty-first century is often very thin, as is
the internationalist system. But it is better to have thin democracy and collective
security than none at all, and it is not unrealistic to imagine a more effective
international community. The U.N. could be significantly strengthened by
reforming structures that have gone unchanged since 1945. The Security Council
could abolish the veto power for permanent members and make its decisions by a
majority or two-thirds majority vote, thus preventing a single member from
paralyzing the U.N. in a crisis. The Security Council could increase the number
of rotating seats and double its permanent membership to include Germany,
India, Brazil, Japan, and South Africa. In the 1990s the United States supported
permanent membership status for Germany and Japan and expanding the council
to twenty-one members, but assorted rivalries got in the way of making the
Security Council reflect the world of the present. Nations such as Pakistan and
Italy couldn’t stand to be left out if India and Germany got in.

Besides the structural reforms on Security Council membership and veto
power that the U.N. would do well to make, the U.N. will be forced by historical
necessity, including the weight of its own ambiguous record, to reconsider the
priority of human rights relative to national sovereignty. The U.N. Charter
identifies threshold exceptions to the sovereignty of nations, but the U.N. is better
at preventing wars between states than at coming to the rescue of people trapped in bad states. Taking aim at this problem, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty proposed that intervention is justified against nation-states that perpetrate or allow occurring or imminent large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing. Liberal leaning political writer Michael Ignatieff goes much farther, contending that regime-changing intervention is justified when it (1) stops mass killing and ethnic cleansing; or (2) restores an overthrown democracy; or (3) overthrows a state that violates nonproliferation protocols regarding chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; or (4) stops terrorist attacks; or (5) expels invaders.\(^62\)

Ignatieff goes too far, and even modest attempts to expand emergency thresholds are fraught with peril. If the United States intervened every time that a nation violated the massacre/ethnic cleansing standard, the United States would currently occupy or recently have occupied Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, China, Colombia, Congo, East Timor, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. The candidates for invasion would double or triple if Ignatieff’s aggressive vision of humanitarian interventionism were adopted. To wage war as an instrument of policy rather than as a last resort in a supreme emergency is to render meaningless the last resort criterion. The murderous violence of war is a greater evil than failing at democracy or seeking the same murderous weapons that every nation on the Security Council possesses in ample supply. Ignatieff’s proposal is a prescription for perpetual war, this time waged by a U.S.-led United Nations; tellingly, he supported America’s invasion of Iraq.

Ignatieff stands for a liberal version of the Pax Americana, except that, like the PNAC unipolarists, he commits the Wolfowitz Indiscretion. America needs to acknowledge that it is a global hegemon, he argues. And being an imperial power “is more than being the most powerful nation in the world or just the most hated one. It means enforcing such order as there is in the world and doing so in the American interest. It means laying down the rules America wants (on everything from markets to weapons of mass destruction) while exempting itself from other rules (the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the International Criminal Court) that go against its interest.” Unlike the neocons, Ignatieff realizes that the United States would lose its soul if it did all this enforcing and laying down unilaterally. He urges that the new Pax Americana has to be multilateral or it will fail: “Without clear principles for intervention, without friends, without dreams to serve, the soldiers sweating in their body armor in Iraq are defending nothing more than power.”\(^63\)

Madeleine Albright and Richard Holbrooke advance milder versions of the argument that a strengthened United Nations would strengthen the Pax Americana: Ignatieff says it plainly to provoke fellow liberals. In his rendering, it is a good thing that America is so powerful, but power does not endure if it lacks legitimacy and support. Ignatieff wants his country to once again imagine
the possibility of sustaining global preeminence while cooperating with others and through doing so. The alternative to building a new international community, he cautions, is the imperialism of the unilateralists, “a muddled, lurching America policing an ever more resistant world alone, with former allies sabotaging it at every turn.”

While Ignatieff imagines a muscular United Nations that relieves the United States of many imperial burdens, the neocons denigrate the U.N. as a hopeless chatterbox that is merely useless when it is not harmful to American interests. In September 2003 Bush told the U.N. that he was right to invade Iraq, and got a chilly response. Afterward a senior Bush advisor observed that for Bush the concept of collective security was not worth debating and for Cheney it was not worth discussing. But even Bush found himself asking the U.N. for assistance and seeking legitimacy from it. While keeping alive the principle of collective security, the U.N. leads the world in humanitarian relief on an annual budget of $1.25 billion—approximately what the Pentagon spends in a day. It feeds more than seventy million people each year through the World Food Programme, leads the fight against AIDS through the Joint U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS, coordinates the global response to SARS through the World Health Organization, and rescues the international homeless through the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. It plays a leading role in the world resistance to nuclear proliferation through the International Atomic Energy Agency and has led successful peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Cyprus, East Timor, Haiti, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and eastern Slavonia. Above all, the U.N. is the world’s most important source of international legitimacy. As Albright aptly remarks, nothing else comes close in this area, and “legitimacy still has meaning, even for empires.” Thus, Bush and Powell took their case for invading Iraq to the U.N., and crawled back after the occupation proved overwhelming.

Six months later the Bush administration relied so heavily on the U.N. for political deliverance from Iraq that it played down evidence of corruption in the U.N.’s oil-for-food program. From 1996 to 2003, this program allowed Iraq to sell oil for the purchase of food and other goods, easing the sanctions imposed after the 1991 Gulf War. The U.N.’s oversight was weak at best, and the program turned into a racket of kickbacks and payoffs that netted more than $10 billion for Saddam Hussein’s government. Though Powell urged U.N. Secretary Kofi Annan not to back away from offending France and Russia, which made big profits off the program, the Bush administration found itself in the awkward and ironic situation of needing to bolster the U.N.’s prestige. Without the U.N., the U.S. couldn’t deal with Ayatollah Sistani, internationalize the occupation, or arrange a transfer of political sovereignty.

The liberal internationalist commitments to democracy, cooperative problem solving, and universalistic human rights are indispensable to a constructive foreign policy, as is the liberal internationalist commitment to create structures that transcend nationalism and provide collective security. These commitments are compatible with a realist perspective on the will-to-power of political
entities. Although some states are more evil than others, all are self-interested and powerseeking. Progressive realism distinguishes between international police action and preventive wars against nations; it recognizes that there will always be bad leaders that have to be contained; it rejects the fantasy of beneficial transformations flowing from wars of aggression; it comprehends that terrorism can only be minimized, not eliminated; and it recognizes that a superpower that demands absolute security for itself makes all other nations insecure.

Woodrow Wilson, campaigning for the League of Nations, grasped the causative relation between imperial rivalry and world war—that imperialism itself was the primary cause of world wars. The victors of World War II, especially Franklin Roosevelt, recognized that Wilson was right. As long as there were imperial powers that dreamed of conquering Africa, Asia, and Europe, world wars would continue. The victors established the United Nations; the British, Dutch, French, Germans, and Italians gave up their empires; the European Union was formed; and a host of international economic and security institutions was founded. The progressive internationalist idea of collective security to which Wilson gave historic expression has more than a century of advocacy behind it and nearly sixty years of institutional practice. It is not a dispensable distraction from the goal of world democracy, as the neocons contend. It is the anti-imperialist heart of good international politics, on which the hope of world democracy depends. International institutions are the fallible, indispensable means by which democratic principles are advanced in the international field.

Democracy has to do with the character of relationships that are constructed on the principles of freedom and equality. Robust liberal and social democracies are pluralistic, egalitarian, peaceable, and cooperative; they seek to maximize freedom and equality for all people and to build effective structures of collective security. They develop from within, not from the top down by external aggression. The neocons lay claim to the language of democracy, but spurn its essential values of equality, cooperation, and diversity. They wrongly imagine that American bullying and bashing leads to world democracy. They ignore the contradiction between advocating American unipolar dominance and upholding the United States as the model for other nations. President Bush’s National Security Strategy of 2002 declared in its opening sentence that there exists “a single sustainable model for national success.” Leaving aside that actually there is no single model of national success, the president and his neocon supporters ignore that the United States cannot be a unipolar hegemon and a model for other nations at the same time. The American colossus zealously protects its dominant position in the global capitalist system; thus, it is not the exemplar of a way that encourages or yields to imitators.

To pursue a better way in the Middle East, the United States could stop supporting undemocratic regimes that repress and extinguish popular movements for self-determination, freedom, and equality. It could develop new structures of
collective security and work on making the U.S. less hated in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Heightening American militarism is not the solution to rising anti-Americanism. It is rather a perfectly self-fulfilling prescription for perpetual war.

The presumption that America invades and fights only to liberate, never to conquer, is deeply woven into the American consciousness. It was a staple of July 4th orations long before Woodrow Wilson, and it is a large part of Wilson’s national legacy. American presidents trade on this partly true, partly ridiculous national self-image whenever they take their country to war. The United States was founded on a genocidal conquest, but unlike most countries, the United States itself has never been occupied, and most Americans truly believe that their soldiers should be welcomed as liberators whenever they invade another country. The American denial of the inevitable brutality and humiliation of occupation is linked to America’s innocent self-image. For decades, Americans felt safe from the problems and dangers of other nations, often while being oblivious to the harm that their country’s economic and foreign policies caused to vulnerable nations. On September 11, 2001, Americans lost the former illusion, but their political leaders in both parties invoked that experience to reinforce American hubris and obliviousness.

The Bush administration’s obsession with overthrowing Iraq began with its neoconservative advisors, who were committed to doing so long before there was a second Bush administration. By the time there was a second Bush administration, Bush had joined them and Rumsfeld was looking for a way to do it. On September 12, 2001, Wolfowitz urged that it didn’t matter if Saddam had any connection to the previous day’s horror; under the cover of a world war against terrorism, the abortive ending of the Gulf War could be rectified. Bush hit Afghanistan first, but fixated on Iraq. To the neocons, although not for Bush, overthrowing Iraq was not such a big deal. It was merely the next step, the beginning of Phase Two. What it became was a symbol of how not to pursue a world order worth having.
Notes

Introduction

2. In addition to Wolfowitz and Rice, the Vulcans group included Stephen Hadley, a former Pentagon aide to Wolfowitz; Richard Perle, a prominent neocon; Dov Zakheim, a former Pentagon specialist recruited to the Vulcans by Wolfowitz; Dick Armitage, a realist-leaning Vietnam veteran and former Pentagon official; Robert Blackwill, a former colleague of Rice’s on the National Security Council; and Robert Zoellick, a former aide to Secretary of State James Baker. Dick Cheney also took part in some of the Vulcans’ deliberations. For discussions of this group see Ivo H.Daalder and James M.Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 17–34 and James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2004), 248–260.
Chapter 1


17. Ibid.


32. This discussion of Burnham summarizes material from my detailed analysis in *The Neoconservative Mind*, 19–67.


Chapter 2


5. Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee (on Defense Policy), March 20, 1992 (Federal News Service), “that this place,” “it was” quotes, 19–20; Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, March 14, 1990 (Federal News Service); Powell, My American Journey, 436; Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Defense Authorization, February 1, 1990, “there is,” “we also must” quotes, 6.


16. Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Renomination of General Colin Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 27, 1991, “we abandoned” quotes, 3; Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the START Treaty and the US-Russia Joint Understanding on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms, July 28, 1992, air forces quote, 19.

17. Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 27, 1991, quotes, 1,2, 12.

18. Ibid., quote, 3; Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 30, 1991, 5.


31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.


53. Ibid., quotes, 9, 10–11.

54. Ibid., quotes, 11–15, quotes, 14, 15.

55. Ibid., quotes, 26, 27.

56. Ibid., quotes, 44, 45, 46.


61. Ibid., 26–31.

62. Ibid., 30–34.


75. West, “Paul Wolfowitz: Superpower Strategist,” quote, 60.


85. Ibid., 31–33.


89. Wolfowitz, “Clinton’s Bay of Pigs.”

90. Ibid.


Chapter 3

2. Ibid., 24.


11. Ibid., 196.

12. Ibid.


20. Ibid., 220, 237.


22. “CA Interview with Charles Krauthammer,” quote, 259.


24. Ibid., 10.

25. Ibid., 10–11.

26. Ibid.


37. Ibid., 49.
43. Ibid., 27–33.
47. Ibid., 534–535.
58. Ibid.
71. Charles Krauthammer, “The Second American Century?: The U.S. Stands Supreme. The Struggle to Overthrow it is the Story of Tomorrow,” Time (December 27, 1999), 186.
73. Ibid., 35.
74. Charles Krauthammer, “The Bush Doctrine: In American Foreign Policy, a New Motto: Don’t Ask. Tell,” Time (March 5, 2001), 42.
75. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Charles Krauthammer, “To War, Not to Court,” Washington Post (September 12, 2001), A29.
79. Ibid.
82. Charles Krauthammer, “The Greater the Evil, the More it Disarms,” Time (September 24, 2001), 78–79.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
91. Charles Krauthammer, “Wars of Choice, Wars of Necessity: Total War Has Been Declared on Us, But We Have Forgot How to Fight It,” Time (November 5, 2001), 112.
94. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Charles Krauthammer, “The Terrible Logic of Nukes: Saddam is Not Crazy to Want Them; That’s the Reason He Must Go,” Time (September 2, 2002), 84.
103. Charles Krauthammer, “Coming Ashore: The War is Not Just to Disarm Saddam. It is to Reform a Whole Part of the World,” Time (February 17, 2003), 37.
106. Ibid., quotes, 8, 10.
107. Ibid., quotes, 10, 13.
111. Ibid., 17.
113. Peter Brimelow, Alien Nation: Common Sense About America’s Immigration Disaster (New York: Random House, 1995); Patrick J.Buchanan, “Immigration: Cause or Solution for Today’s
121. Trosky, Contemporary Authors, 292.


127. Ibid., 173–175.


132. Ibid., quotes, 138, 151.


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3. Ibid., quotes, 20.

4. Ibid., 21–22, quotes, 22.

34. Ibid., quote, 6.
35. Ibid., quotes, 18, 19.
37. Ibid., 39–49, quotes, 39, 48.
38. Ibid., iii.

43. Interview with William Kristol, Frontline: The War Behind Closed Doors, 5, 6.


72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., 9–10.
77. Ibid., 11–12; Kagan, “Coalition of the Unwilling,” A35.
81. Ibid., 28; see Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, 325–327.
84. Ibid., 30.
91. Ibid., 25.
92. Ibid., 26.


100. Ibid., 10.


108. Ibid., quotes, 39, 40.

109. Ibid., quote, 73.

110. Ibid., quote, 43.

111. Ibid., quote, 102.


123. Ibid., 95–98, quote, 96.


127. Ibid., quotes, 19.


139. Ibid., 19.


144. Ibid., 8; Perle quoted in Kurtz, “Bill Kristol, Keeping Iraq in the Cross Hairs,” Cl.

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33. Ibid., 3.


44. Ibid., quotes, 8.


46. Buchanan, “Whose War?” quotes, 8; see Patrick J. Buchanan, “To Baghdad and Beyond,” The American Conservative 2 (April 21, 2003), 12–14.

49. Ibid., 28.
51. Ibid., quote, 8; see Patrick J. Buchanan, “America’s Brezhnev Doctrine,” The American Conservative 2 (June 2, 2003), 7; Buchanan, “Is Bush a Neoconservative?,” The American Conservative 2 (May 5, 2003).
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68. Ibid., 30.

69. Ibid.; Joshua Muravchik to author, August 11, 2003, quote.


75. See Gershom Gorenberg, “Road Map to Grand Apartheid?,” The American Prospect 14 (July/August 2003), 15–17; Gorenberg, “At What Price?,” Mother Jones 28 (July/August 2003), 42–49; Daoud Kuttab, “Road Map to Nowhere?,” Foreign Policy (July/August 2003), 88–89; M.J. Rosenberg, “Follow the Road Map,” The American Conservative (June 16, 2003), 12–14; Colin Gilbert Chapman, Whose Promised Land? The Continuing Crisis over Israel and Palestine (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2002).


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6. Ibid., quote 10–11.


8. Ibid., quotes, 18, 19.


10. Ibid., 28–30.

11. Ibid., quotes, 30.

12. Ibid., quote, 32.

13. Ibid., 32–33, quotes, 32; see Max Boot, “Continental Divide,” _Weekly Standard_ 8 (June 9, 2003), 11–12.


25. Ibid., quotes, 68, 79.

26. Ibid., quotes, 77, 80, 83.
27. Ibid., 83.
30. Ibid., quotes 14, 21, 6.
36. Ibid., 6.


64. Ignatieff, “Why Are We in Iraq? (And Liberia? And Afghanistan?),” 85.


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