Dilemmas of Internationalism
The American Association for the United Nations and US Foreign Policy, 1941-1948

Andrew Johnstone
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a bbreviations

aa Un a merican a ssociation for the United n ations
a Uwo a mericans United for w orld o rganisation
CDaaa Committee to Defend a merica by a iding the a llies
Cso P Commission to s tudy the o rganisation of Peace
ilo international l abour o rganisation
Ina l eague of n ations a ssociation
n PCw P n on-Partisan Council to w in the Peace
OCD Office of Civilian Defence
OFF Office of Facts and Figures
OWI Office of War Information
Un United n ations
Una United n ations a ssociation
Unrra United n ations r elief and r ehabilitation a dministration
Us United s tates of a merica
Ussr Union of s oviet s ocialist r epublics
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introduction

The creation of the United Nations in 1945 appeared to mark a turning point in the history of the United States. It was genuinely hoped that the United States would shake off the fear of entangling alliances that had characterised the nation’s history. Non-interventionism and unilateralism were dead. In their place would come a new, involved and multilateral approach to foreign affairs, moving away from the isolationist approach that had characterised the interwar years. Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who had done so much to create the UN Charter, described it as ‘one of the milestones in man’s upward climb toward a truly civilised existence’. Upon ratification of the UN Charter by the US Senate, President Harry Truman announced that the decision ‘substantially advances the cause of world peace’.1

Alongside the US Government, a number of private individuals and organisations were at the forefront of the fight to change the nature of US foreign policy. This book analyses the role of one of those organisations – the League of Nations Association (LNA), later the American Association for the United Nations (AAUN) – in that fight. For two decades, it was the sole citizens’ organisation in the US devoted solely to US involvement in an international organisation.

Yet, despite swimming against a tide of non-interventionist opinion, it had had surprisingly deep roots. Evolving out of the remains of the World War I-era League to Enforce Peace, the organisation was founded in 1923 as the League of Nations Non-Partisan Association, before shortening its name to the League of Nations Association in 1929. Throughout the 1930s, it fought to educate the public about the activities of the League of Nations, promoting maximum American interaction with the international organisation whenever possible.

The LNA promoted a brand of US internationalism that was profoundly unpopular during the interwar years. The Association urged that US take the lead in world affairs through the promotion of collective security, international justice, democracy and freedom, and world peace, ideally through the League of Nations. In doing so it built upon the ideals and proposals promoted during World War I by President Woodrow Wilson. This was a particularly political or institutional brand of internationalism, as it advocated the use of multilateral political and legal machinery to bring peace and order to the world. In addition to supporting closer links with the League of Nations throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the LNA also supported the unsuccessful attempts to bring the US into the World Court in 1935. When World War II broke out in Europe in 1939, its members set up the Non-Partisan Committee for Peace through Revision of the Neutrality Law, so that

the US could support anti-fascist forces in Europe. His committee evolved into the more famous Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA), which spent most of 1940 and 1941 locked in rhetorical battle with the non-interventionist America First Committee. These ad hoc committees were set up to deal with immediate and specific dangers but, with an eye on the future, the association set up the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (Cso P). The Cso P acted as the research arm of the LNA, and was set up with the purpose of studying the best way to organise the international society that would follow the war. In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor the internationalist focus shifted to the consideration of the postwar peace. Together the LNA and Cso P spent the war years promoting an American foreign policy that was engaged in world affairs through a new international organisation. The mistake of 1919–1920 – rejection of the League of Nations – was not to be repeated.2

Any analysis of the association, its policies, and its structure during the 1940s must inevitably focus on its director, Clark Eichelberger. This is less to do with his position as director than the way he used that position to dominate the association, and to a lesser extent the internationalist movement as a whole. Born in 1896 in Freeport, Illinois, Eichelberger was the foremost American private citizen working to influence attitudes toward international organisation and redefine US internationalism. As the director and leader of the League of Nations Association, Eichelberger had devoted most of his adult life to promoting internationalism. He was so devoted to the cause that he postponed his own wedding at a day’s notice to speak about the League of Nations at a Latin American Trade Conference. His interest in the League of Nations had been stirred during his time in the army during World War I, and it never dissipated. Following a visit to the League of Nations in Geneva in 1923, he began speaking on behalf of the League of Nations Non-Partisan Association. In 1927, he became director of the association’s Chicago office, before becoming national director in early 1934. From this position he was in charge of the day-to-day running of the association, and he was the main individual responsible for keeping the organisation alive through the 1930s. Eichelberger then led the private internationalist movement through World War II.3

While Eichelberger was the Association’s director and leader, he worked closely with Cso P chairman James T. Shotwell. Born in Canada, Shotwell was a history professor at Columbia University whose interest in international affairs had been stirred by time in Europe in 1905. During World War I, Shotwell was one of a number of citizens who helped US President Woodrow Wilson prepare for the Paris Peace Conference. Wilson’s moral leadership and internationalism inspired Shotwell to continue to work for peace, and the League of Nations in particular, throughout the interwar years. While Shotwell had a higher profile among the

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2 ibid., pp. 101–85.
government and the east coast establishment, he was far less visible in organisational activities than Eichelberger. Nevertheless, Shotwell and Eichelberger made a successful leadership duo, with clearly defined spheres of responsibility. Shotwell was the ideas man, a scholar who focused on policy and securing financial support, while Eichelberger looked after the details and bureaucratic issues.\(^4\)

Eichelberger and Shotwell were the most prominent of the internationalist leadership, but they were supported in their organisations by a number of key individuals who represented a cross-section of the eastern establishment elite of business and academia. Although better-known individuals would occasionally be members (for example, Thomas Lamont of J.P. Morgan would initially play a part in the CSOP), movement stalwarts included Hugh Moore of the Dixie Cup Company; Frederick McKee of the West Pennsylvania Cement Company; Frank Boudreau of the Milbank Memorial Fund; Clyde Eagleton of New York University; and William Allan Neilson of Smith College. Though hardly household names, these men believed that the US needed to play a greater role in world affairs, though an international organisation such as the League of Nations. As a result, they would play a key supporting role to Eichelberger in particular in driving the internationalist movement through the war years and beyond.

Nevertheless, while it was not the original intention of this study to reduce the association to two individuals, it is undeniable that Eichelberger and Shotwell dominated the LNA, which in turn led the non-governmental internationalist movement. Their organisational experience and connections — both men were members of the Council on Foreign Relations — coupled with the organisational structure and facilities of the LNA, placed them in the strongest possible position to promote a new form of US internationalism when the US was drawn into World War II following the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was clear that the US Government was again open to the possibilities of international organisation, and Eichelberger and Shotwell were ready to help the Roosevelt Administration define a new internationalism.

These themes represent the two broad issues raised in this book: the question of defining American internationalism, and the development of a state–private network between private organisations and the US Government. These concepts have been either neglected or ignored during this period, but this book brings them together through the individual actions and organisational activity of the LNA, and the individual involvement of Eichelberger and Shotwell. This book does not explicitly attempt to assess the impact of the Association on public opinion. Instead it aims to analyse the function of the Association in the policy making and policy promotion process. Although the Association was a mass membership organisation with hundreds of branches across the nation, any analysis of its attempts to redefine internationalism and its connections to the government requires a focus on its leadership. This book also uses the Association as a signifier

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\(^4\) Divine, *Second Chance*, pp. 26–7. Shotwell had also been President of the LNA until 1940.
for US internationalism more broadly to assess the difficulties and dilemmas faced by the movement.

With regard to conceptions of American internationalism, a traditional interpretation argues that the US shrugged off the shackles of non-interventionism (or what used to be referred to more simplistically as isolationism) during World War II to emerge after 1945 with a global, internationalist foreign policy. This interpretation is reinforced by works that focus on the isolationism of the 1930s and the unquestioning use of the term ‘internationalism’ by many historians and political scientists to describe US foreign policy since 1945. Yet this usage of internationalism is only useful when compared to isolationism – it is hard to disagree that the US was internationalist after World War II compared with its relative isolation prior to 1941. However, this definition of internationalism simply refers to worldwide interest and involvement overseas. It does not refer to the nature of that involvement.5

The internationalism that Eichelberger, Shotwell, and their colleagues in the LNA called for was a specifically multilateral internationalism. This was internationalism as opposed to pre-war unilateralism and was based on concepts of international law, collective security, international cooperation and free trade. Bringing all of these elements together was support for a new international organisation: what eventually became the United Nations.

Throughout World War II, Eichelberger and Shotwell lobbied hard for this new multilateral internationalism. Through the LNA and a number of other organisations and committees, they continually promoted US entry into the UN. Retrospectively, there seemed to be little debate over the creation of the UN, yet Eichelberger and his colleagues remembered the failure of the US to join the League of Nations in 1920 and were determined not to repeat the same mistake. To ensure the creation of the new international organisation, Eichelberger in particular worked tirelessly to drive the movement forward, and to mobilise public support behind the ideas generated by Shotwell’s CSO P, and the Roosevelt administration.

Although Eichelberger was by no means the only individual promoting a new kind of US internationalism, personal and structural issues meant that he played a prominent role in the movement during the war, dominating it to a large degree. While Shotwell remained focused on questions of policy, Eichelberger’s focus on bureaucracy and his strong day-to-day personal control of the LNA affected the broader internationalist movement to the extent that any other efforts to organise behind internationalism were seen by him as a threat. He became increasingly protective and, on two occasions during the war, attempts to create umbrella organisations to unite the movement were viewed by Eichelberger as invasions.

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of his turf. A fellow internationalist argued that after two decades of carrying the internationalist torch alone, he ‘had become constitutionally incapable of working with anybody else’. Yet those two decades gave Eichelberger the history, connections and organisational base that new organisations failed to compete with. Throughout World War II and beyond, Eichelberger and his organisations remained the pre-eminent supporters of US involvement in the UN. Unfortunately, the bureaucratic and organisational disagreements during World War II obscured a lack of real debate over what defined US internationalism and how it would work in practice.

However, while the fight to create the UN had masked tensions within the movement, real difficulties for the internationalists came after the creation of the UN. With the onset of the Cold War, the US increasingly occupied a more prominent role overseas, but not in the multilateral manner expected by the internationalists of the renamed American Association for the United Nations. Suddenly, almost all Americans were internationalists in the sense of overseas interest, but this meant that ‘the term was in danger of losing its meaning’. Unfortunately for the AA UN, this is exactly what happened. They were then faced with a choice: to continue to support multilateral internationalism, or to support the new US internationalism that promoted the national interest and focused on national security. Through Eichelberger’s leadership, they chose to do both. Believing that the US national interest represented the closest approximation of UN values to be found, the AA UN supported the Truman administration on major policy issues regarding the Soviet Union, while continuing to urge that the UN be used as the moral basis for US policy. While it can be (and indeed was) argued that this was a compromised vision of internationalism, Eichelberger argued that the reality of international events had to be faced, and there was little use in promoting idealistic concepts of world government.

One reason why Eichelberger and Shotwell were seen to compromise their vision of internationalism was that they were too close to the US Government, and there is no doubt that both became a key part of a wartime network of state officials and private citizens. Eichelberger in particular had sought links to President Roosevelt and the State Department since the 1930s, but only with the coming of World War II did he develop increasingly close ties to the Roosevelt administration, for three main reasons. Firstly, and most obviously, Eichelberger and the Roosevelt administration held a shared objective during the war: the desire to create the UN.

Secondly, Eichelberger developed a personal relationship with Franklin Roosevelt and close links to the State Department. Eichelberger’s relationship with the President, through continued correspondence and a number of personal

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6 Ernest Hopkins to Raymond Fosdick, 18 December 1944, Box 4, Folder 18, Hugh Moore Fund Collection, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University (hereafter hmf C).

meetings, drew him closer to the point where Eichelberger asked Roosevelt for advice on the running of his organisations and discussed ways to promote Roosevelt’s policies. For the State Department, Eichelberger’s organisations also offered a significant force to mobilise public opinion behind the concept of an international organisation, particularly during the latter months of 1944 and early 1945. In many respects, during the war Eichelberger’s organisations can be viewed as informal agencies of the Roosevelt administration.

Finally, Eichelberger and Shotwell worked hard to promote the Roosevelt administration’s UN policies because they had played a part in creating them. For almost a year in 1942 and 1943, both men were invited by Under-secretary of State Sumner Welles to join a State Department committee to plan an outline for a new international organisation. Even though they played only a minor role in the planning process, both subsequently felt they had a personal stake in bringing the UN to fruition.

As a result of these connections to the Government, some fellow internationalists asked on a number of occasions, both during the war and after, if the Association had lost its critical distance from the Government, suggesting that it was little more than a ‘front’ for the State Department. This was not the case, and Eichelberger and the Association was not a front in the sense that it was a mouthpiece for the State Department, that it was funded by it, that its policy decisions were made within the State Department, or that it followed the official line on all policy matters. Government officials were not pulling the internationalist strings. However, Eichelberger, Shotwell, and the Association certainly acted in a way that would encourage such suspicions. A close analysis of the internationalist policies of the numerous groups led by Eichelberger, during and immediately after the war, reveals a network of organisations willing to go no further than official Government policy. While there were areas of disagreement, these were the rare exception rather than the rule, especially during World War II.

The situation changed with the end of the war and the creation of the UN, as all three reasons drawing the Association close to the Government had passed. The UN existed, Roosevelt had passed away, and Eichelberger was unable to gain close access to President Truman or his administration, who were increasingly occupied with other matters. Yet even as the AAUN became increasingly critical of the Truman’s administration’s by-passing of the UN, Eichelberger originated a new ad hoc committee in the Committee for the Marshall Plan. Again, believing that US values were the closest approximation of the values expressed in the UN Charter, Eichelberger and other AAUN members cooperated closely with officials in the State Department to promote the US plan for European recovery.

Why is this significant? Would it have made any difference to US policy if the INA had been more critical of the Roosevelt administration and pushed for a stronger United Nations organisation? Or if the AAUN had been more critical of the Truman’s administration’s handling of the events of 1946 and 1947? Such questions are impossible to answer. In many respects during the war years, the answer is probably no, but this is no great surprise. After all, with regard to the
creation of the United Nations, the association’s ambitions were realised. In addition, the personal involvement of both Eichelberger and Shotwell in both official postwar planning and also the promotion of the United Nations could hardly have been more successful.

Yet as we shall see, it certainly did matter to many within the internationalist movement who felt that Eichelberger in particular was too close to the Government and that private individuals and organisations needed to maintain a critical distance from the state. It has been argued that Eichelberger and his organisation sought to ‘maintain a supportive, collaborative relationship’ with American officials ‘without sacrificing critical detachment’. Yet Eichelberger’s relationship with the US Government did affect his critical detachment during the war years and into the early years of the Cold War. His unwillingness to criticise the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations certainly contributed to the ill-feeling and lack of unity within the movement.8

Eichelberger’s connections to the US Government were just one of the ways in which he was open to criticism during this period. If he was unfairly seen as a ‘stooge’ in his relationship with the Government, he was more justly criticised for his attitudes towards other internationalist groups. It has already been noted that Eichelberger’s domineering personality made him ‘constitutionally incapable’ of ceding power to fellow individuals or organisations, and his continued obsession with trivial bureaucratic details did nothing to advance discussion of US internationalism. Yet the relationships between Eichelberger’s groups and other internationalist organisations were also affected by his dominant position regarding access to the US Government. Other, more critical, internationalists objected to the close links between Eichelberger and the Government, arguing that private internationalists should take a more oppositional approach in promoting their agenda. Yet this was never Eichelberger’s method. Eichelberger’s chosen approach was consistently one of cooperation rather than opposition. This was the case not only during World War II, but even after, when Eichelberger’s connections to the Government were increasingly limited. Accurately gauging the political climate, he made the conscious decision that it was better to work with the Truman Administration for limited gains, than to confront it with proposals to strengthen the UN Charter or utopian ideas about world federalism.

While Eichelberger clearly felt that a close, cooperative relationship with the Government was the best way his organisations could contribute to the creation of the United Nations, there is no doubt that they lost credibility as a result, leaving him open to further accusations of being a Government front. Eichelberger took a long term, gradual approach, and as a pragmatic political activist first, internationalist ideologue second, he was willing to compromise his principles on details in order to support proposals that were more politically viable. But it is still

difficult to overlook the ease with which he lent his almost unquestioning support to the Government.

Perhaps it comes down to the question of what we expect from private, non-Governmental organisations. **the lna and aaUn were private organisations**, and with the exception of their year with the State Department, Eichelberger and Shotwell were private citizens. **Private organisations are expected to maintain** their independent status and their critical detachment. However, historians have recently unveiled a number of supposedly independent organisations who really were fronts for the Us Government. While eichelberger and shotwell are innocent of the charge of front or Government stooge, they can certainly be accused of losing their critical awareness during the war years and of sacrificing principle for political power. Even though they shared the larger aim of the creation of the UN, they held back comment and criticism in other respects in return for influence.9

However, this influence would pass as US interests shifted in the early years of the Cold War. The fact that their influence did pass acknowledges the Government’s dominant role in this state–private relationship. Political scientist nderjeet Parmar has recently argued that the relationship between another private organisation, the Council on foreign r elations, and the Us Government is best understood during World War ii using a Gramscian theoretical model. This model offers a theoretical middle way between the extremes of both corporatist and statist models (in the former, private interests are dominant; in the latter it is the state). The key that brings the state and private spheres together here is the Gramscian concept of ‘state spirit’, or a ‘feeling among certain leading private figures and organisations that they bear a grave responsibility to promote a historical process through positive political and intellectual activity’. This allows private groups to work with the state because they believe that they are as one: that they are ‘the embodiment and makers of the state’.10

Eichelberger, shotwell and many of their lna colleagues certainly appeared to be imbued with ‘state spirit’. Yet the changing nature of the state–private relationship between eichelberger and the truman administration following the creation of the UN makes it impossible to view the US Government as anything other than a strong state, even if they truly were filled with ‘state spirit’. The shared aim of creating the United n ations and the close personal contact between the association leadership and the Government ends in 1945, as does any pretence of equality in the relationship. While Us foreign policy may have been successfully reoriented away from isolationism or non-intervention, the resulting internationalism was certainly not the multilateral ideal of the private internationalist movement.

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There is no question that the Government took full advantage of the Association’s eager willingness to support its proposals during the war. Yet it should also be noted that Eichelberger and his private internationalist organisations willingly cooperated with the Government; it was not a case of state infiltration into the private sphere. Franklin Roosevelt was happy to use the organisations as an informal test of public opinion, safe in the knowledge that the Association was right behind him on the big picture – creating the United Nations. Similarly, the State Department took great advantage of Eichelberger’s organisational capabilities, his contacts within the internationalist movement, and the ability of his organisations to mobilise public opinion. However, it was the Government that ultimately dictated the terms, and the relationship was close for only as long as the state desired it to be. While there is clearly close cooperation during this period, there is little doubt that the state is firmly in charge of this particular state–private relationship, and that a distinctly American internationalism resulted.

Yet it is no surprise that ultimately the conception of internationalism that followed World War II was bound up in American values and ideals. Despite their belief in international organisation, it is clear that even the internationalists of the Association were unable to separate themselves from their national identity, and that American values of democracy and freedom – as defined by the United States – were seen as the best basis for the new United Nations organisation. This is partly what kept individuals like Eichelberger and Shotwell so close to the US Government and its official policy line during the war years. It is also responsible for tempering their criticism of the Truman administration from 1945 onwards, and what led to the UN’s eventual incorporation into the Cold War consensus. They firmly believed that Franklin Roosevelt shared their ideals, and the same was true – though to a lesser extent – of Harry Truman.

Indeed, it has recently been argued that US foreign policy in the early Cold War was driven by an ideology defined as ‘American nationalist globalism’, which aimed to spread the seemingly universal values of freedom, equality and justice across the globe. True, the Association leaders were rather more able than most to separate out the ideals and values from the nationalism, and to persuade and gently criticise the US government when it failed to live up to those ideals or to utilise the machinery of the United Nations. Yet they still believed that the United Nations should be led by American values, and as a result, a more limited conception of internationalism was accepted.11

While the analysis of the Association presented here may seem critical, it aims to highlight the limits to a truly multilateral US foreign policy and the difficulties faced by those attempting to create it. The creation of the United Nations did not fully represent the triumph of internationalism, at least not in the sense of the word understood by Eichelberger and Shotwell. Having devoted their lives to seeing American involvement in an international organisation, it quickly became

clear that the work for the internationalist movement was not over. What was also clear was that the tensions within the movement revealed by the war had only been heightened further. A truly internationalist foreign policy – in nature as well as scope – was still to be developed for the United States. World War II and its aftermath only created new dilemmas for internationalist leaders who sought to redefine the world order, and America’s place within it.

Yet the historiography of US foreign relations still generally supports the view that 1945 represents the ‘triumph of internationalism’. This is largely based on the subtitle of Robert Divine’s highly influential Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II, though the book’s argument is more subtle than the subtitle suggests. More recently, David Schmitz has suggested that the triumph occurred as early as 1941. Elizabeth Borgwardt’s recent study reflects a degree of scepticism about the translation of internationalist ideals into reality but is generally supportive of the ‘triumph’ thesis. Few historians have openly questioned it. A notable exception is H.W. Brands, who describes the ‘last days of American internationalism’ in the immediate postwar period, arguing that ‘by using the United Nations as a hammer against the communists, the Truman Administration simultaneously finished off the dream of American internationalism’.12

In addition, most previous works on wartime internationalism neglect considerations of state–private interaction, or fail to significantly develop them. The classic work on World War II internationalism, Divine’s Second Chance, considers the role of internationalist groups during the public debate over US entry into the United Nations at length, but only mentions connections between the Government and internationalist organisations in passing. Dorothy Robbins’ Experiment In Democracy looks at the role of internationalist organisations and their relationship to the State Department, but from a personal perspective, and within an extremely limited time-frame: from Dumbarton Oaks to San Francisco. Indeed, both of these works end with the ‘triumph of internationalism’ in 1945, giving the misleading impression that with its primary aim accomplished, the movement ceased to exist practically overnight with the creation of the United Nations.13

Clark Eichelberger’s memoir Organizing for Peace also ends in 1945 with the creation of the United Nations, having stressed the independence of private internationalist groups and downplaying any organisational connections to the Government. James Shotwell’s autobiography is even more limited in its references to his work with the Association and the Government during World War II, and

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Harold Josephson’s biography is far more revealing. In contrast to most works that end in 1945, Robert Accinelli’s work on the American Association for the United Nations only begins in 1947. This book recognises the need to go beyond World War ii and the creation of the Un, bridging the gap to the early years of the Cold war, and analysing how the internationalist movement dealt with the changing international circumstances.\footnote{eichelberger, Organizing for Peace; James shotwell, The Autobiography of James T. Shotwell (indianapolis: Bobbs-merrill, 1961); Harold Josephson, James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1975); accinelli, ‘Pro-Un internationalists and the early Cold war’.
}

With regard to relationships between the Us government and private organisations in the development of US foreign policy, there is a rapidly expanding literature, yet almost all of it focuses on the Cold War. Much of this work takes a broader view of the study of Us foreign policy than traditional diplomatic history. In doing so it goes beyond the traditional focus on state leaders, officials, and diplomats to consider the role of private individuals and organisations from across American society. While a number of significant works have analysed the significance of relationships between the state and private spheres – including complex issues of autonomy and independence, cooptation and cooperation – almost all of them focus on the postwar era. study of the wartime dynamic between the state and private spheres is long overdue.\footnote{For examples see Laville and Wilford (eds), The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War; Saunders, Who Paid the Piper?: Helen Laville, Cold War Women (manchester: manchester University Press, 2002); Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War (New York: New York University Press, 1999).}

One of the few studies of the wartime period that consider state–private interaction, Michael Leigh’s Mobilizing Consent briefly discusses the development of the State Department’s Office of Public Affairs, but does not raise the issue of the consistent interaction of that Office with private organisations. Michael Wala has studied the relationships between the state and both the Committee to Defend America in 1941 and the Committee for the Marshall Plan in 1947–48, but overstates the argument that private organisations such as the Ina were created purely to sell government policies. the only consideration of the period in between is Parmar’s study of the Council on Foreign Relations, which rather overstates the hand of the Council in controlling such groups – after all, eichelberger was promoting an internationalist foreign policy through the League of Nations for a decade and a half before he became a Council member, and shotwell for even longer.\footnote{Michael Leigh, Mobilizing Consent (westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976); Michael Wala, The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War (Providence, Ri: Berghahn, 1994); Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy.}
The core of this book focuses on the League of Nations Association, which became the American Association for the United Nations in February 1945. The Association’s history is analysed on two main levels. Firstly, there is examination of the state–private relationship between the association and the Government, as the organisation attempted to both influence and promote Government policy. Secondly, there is examination of the often difficult relationship between the Association and other internationalist organisations. Indeed, chapter five specifically analyses the relationship between the Association and other private organisations, the Non-Partisan Council to Win the Peace and Americans United for World Organisation. The book also considers other extracurricular projects beyond the association. It begins with the failed attempt to capitalise on the pre-war momentum of the Committee to Defend America by aiding the Allies by assessing the long overlooked Citizens for Victory. Chapter three specifically examines Eichelberger and Shotwell’s role in the State Department’s postwar planning process. Chapter nine analyses Eichelberger’s role in creating the Committee for the Marshall Plan.

As a result, this analysis begins with Pearl Harbor and US entry into World War II at the end of 1941, and continues through the onset of the Cold War to early 1948, ending with the passing of the Marshall Plan. By 1948, the path of US internationalism appeared firmly fixed by a Cold War framework. Back at the end of 1941 however, US entry into World War II offered the opportunity to develop a more multilateral approach to foreign affairs, and create a more just and peaceful world. This book is a history of the attempt to seize that opportunity.
t he United s tates’ entry into w orld w ar ii brought an end to over two years of debate across the nation. With the attack on Pearl Harbor, American anti-war sentiment dissolved almost overnight not only in Congress but also amongst the general public. t he ‘great debate’ between the isolationists and interventionists was over, and isolationist sentiment disappeared. in the eyes of the internationalist movement, the purpose of an american involvement in the war was clear. f or them, the war represented a second chance for the United States to play a significant role in an international organisation, which had been the primary aim of most internationalists since the Us rejection of the l eague of n ations in 1920 and the setting up of the l eague of n ations n on-Partisan a ssociation in 1923. it was clear that a great deal of research and education would be necessary to ensure that any future international organisation would be acceptable to the american people.

Yet although isolationist sentiment appeared to have dissolved, Pearl Harbor did not signify an immediate shift to a more multilateral outlook for the United States. Understandably, the immediate focus of both the Government and the people was on preparing for and fighting the war, not distant or abstract peace aims. a lthough the war would provide an opportunity to shape the future world, thoughts of a new international organisation were not high on the public agenda. o rganisations such as the l eague of n ations a ssociation recognised this, but still hoped to build on the previous success of the Committee to Defend a merica by Aiding the Allies by creating a new organisation to reflect new wartime concerns.

t he creation of Citizens for Victory from the remains of the CDaaa aimed to help educate a mericans regarding the effects of the war at home and the wider aims for peace, but other questions quickly came to the fore. First was the significant question of what role there would be during wartime for such a private organisation, especially with regard to its relationship with the Government. The second key issue concerned the aims of any such organisation. While it was understandable that the internationalist leaders would want to capitalise on the successes of the CDaaa, any new organisation would need a strong and well-defined aim to rally around, as the passage of the Lend-Lease Act or the question of intervention had provided in 1941.

Despite initial enthusiasm for Citizens for Victory, it was quickly clear that little idea had been given to specific aims for the new organisation. While it was a laudable objective to support mobilisation, protect democracy at home, and to win the peace to make the world safe for democracy abroad, these were vast objectives
that provided little direct focus for a private organisation. Even the CDaaa had the relatively defined aim of aid to the Allies, which could be specifically focused on individual measures. The concerns of the CDaaa had been the immediate concerns of the American Government and the American public. The lofty ideals of Citizens for Victory, however, could not be easily translated into achievable aims and reachable targets. The country was more involved with the practical concerns of mobilising for war than the abstract future concerns of a democratic peace.

The creation of Citizens for Victory revealed tensions within the broader internationalist movement just weeks into the war. Some leaders of the organisation emphasised the need for a new league of nations, while others promoted the idea of democracy with no consensus as to which was more important. The failure to clearly elaborate specific and manageable war aims severely limited the potential of Citizens for Victory, preventing internationalist leaders from successfully building on the foundations of the previous two years. Indeed, compared to the CDaaa and the interventionist group fight for freedom, the new organisation barely got off the ground at all. Citizens for Victory represented a false start for the internationalist movement.

The lack of a specific focus on a new international organisation led to an eventual lack of interest from the one man whose support was essential for success: Clark Eichelberger. As director of the LNA and chairman of the CDaaa, Eichelberger had the organisational experience, support and structures to make Citizens for Victory work. However, by the middle of 1942 he had withdrawn his support to focus solely on his league of nations association and the promotion of a new international organisation. Given Eichelberger’s dominant personal position in the LNA, his personal lack of interest doomed Citizens for Victory to failure. Indeed, his unwillingness to work effectively with other internationalist figures or to focus in detail on anything but a new international organisation were first seen with Citizens for Victory and set a pattern that would be repeated throughout the war.

Eichelberger also lost interest in Citizens for Victory as it became clear that the new organisation had little to offer the Government. From the outbreak of war, Eichelberger chose to continue in a largely supportive role for the Roosevelt administration, following the pattern of the previous two years. However, there was little immediate public debate for the new organisation to influence and no obvious way to assist the Government through Citizens for Victory. The more controversial questions on the horizon surrounding the future peace were not only of more importance and personal interest to Eichelberger, but they would clearly be of great importance to the Roosevelt administration. The coincidence of Eichelberger’s passion and Government planning for a new international organisation meant an inevitable shift of focus to questions of international organisation.

Indeed, for internationalist leaders at the beginning of the war, the most immediate concern was establishing the nature of the relationship between the US Government and private organisations in wartime. Just three days after the
bombing of Pearl Harbor, Eichelberger wrote to President Roosevelt’s secretary Marvin McIntyre regarding future plans. While acknowledging that Roosevelt would be far too busy to see private citizens at that time, he pointed out that over the course of the previous two years both he and former chairman William Allen White had conferred with the president and that he was interested in the work of the CDAAA. His established relationship with the White House clearly convinced Eichelberger that he was in a position to ask the Administration for advice, which he proceeded to do:

The problem is this. Now that we are in the war, do the private organisations that have been developing public opinion in support of the President’s policy have any place in American life? … One could argue that now we are in the war the job of morale is entirely the job of the Government and that the private organisations should fold up. On the other hand, one could well argue, and this is my firm conviction, that in a democracy, even in wartime, the Government should use the private agencies just as much as possible.

Eichelberger’s suggestion that the Government should use private agencies did not suggest that they were merely the unwitting tools of the Government. Rather, the internationalists believed in cooperation in the hope of achieving wider goals. Eichelberger’s conviction was that the internationalist organisations had a separate but complementary role to play with regard to the education of public opinion. They genuinely believed that the Roosevelt administration shared their internationalist aims and objectives: in this case, ‘the organisation of the world for peace and justice along the basis of the Atlantic Charter…’.

Issued in August 1941, the Atlantic Charter represented a joint statement of war aims from the United States and the United Kingdom. Rejecting territorial aggrandisement and opposing enforced territorial changes, the Charter called for national self-determination, equal access to trade and raw materials, international economic cooperation, freedom from fear and want for all, freedom of the seas, and a new system of general international security. In doing so, it carried echoes of Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen Points, and Eichelberger later described it as ‘a glimpse of a vision of a better world’ which ‘opened the door to a long period of planning for the postwar period’. As a result, the internationalists were more than willing to throw their own private efforts behind the Government.

In addition, there was the belief that private organisations could contribute to the war effort in ways that added to, rather than overlapped with the work of the Government. In his letter to McIntyre, Eichelberger highlighted the fact that in the three days following Pearl Harbor, he received more requests for speakers than in the weeks before the attack. He went on to highlight the eight hundred CDAAA

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1 Eichelberger to McIntyre, 10 December 1941, OF 4230, Box 2, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York (hereafter FDRL).
chapters, including its strong labour division, speakers’ and radio departments, and seventy-five staff in New York and Washington, who still had a great deal to contribute.

The CDAAA had been the largest and most significant internationalist group to develop between the outbreak of war in Europe and Pearl Harbor. Formed in May 1940 following the German blitzkrieg across Western Europe, the Committee had been run out of the same offices as the LNA, with similar staffs, and with Eichelberger in charge of the day-to-day running. (This was overlooked at the time as the figurehead of the CDAAA was renowned *Emporia Gazette* editor William Allen White, yet it was clearly Eichelberger’s operation.) The CDAAA played a significant role in ensuring the arrangement of the destroyer bases exchange in 1940, and it was at the forefront of the debates over the successful passage of the Lend-Lease bill in 1941. Although its influence waned slightly as 1941 progressed, it still represented a national citizens’ organisation, with a significant support base and organisational structure. The question was how best to utilise that existing structure.3

Eichelberger elaborated his views on voluntary organisations in a December press release. Describing voluntary efforts by citizens as an essential part of a democratic society, he argued that Government should not be expected to undertake every task for its citizenry. Not only were there some tasks that only voluntary organisations could perform, there were some that only voluntary organisations should perform. Only voluntary organisations, like the LNA or CDAAA, could ‘speed the effort, enrich morale, both civilian and military, and eradicate any remnants of the only spirit that could bring defeat – the spirit of “business as usual”’.4

Fishing for a formal Government endorsement, Eichelberger added in his letter to McIntyre that ‘citizens will not finance the Committee to Defend America unless it is known that the Government has an important function for it to perform’. While the LNA had continued through the 1930s with little or no administration approval, it was certainly true that it had become dormant with the approach of war and had been overshadowed from 1939 by calls for neutrality revision and aid for Britain. However, the internationalist movement’s support for US entry into a new international organisation had clearly been revitalised by the war effort and the Atlantic Charter.5

Nonetheless, the comment reflected Eichelberger’s uncertainty as to exactly what function any new internationalist organisation should perform. Eichelberger

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4 Citizens for Victory press release, 21 December 1941, Lowell Mellett Papers, FDRL.

5 Eichelberger to McIntyre, December 10, 1941, OF 4230, Box 2, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
concluded that the most effective approach for private organisations would be an educational campaign promoting the kind of world that the United States should be fighting for. This, however, sounded very much like the work of the LNA, and the question as to where this would leave any new political action organisation remained unanswered. The immediate job of building wartime morale would merely duplicate the Government’s own efforts. This lack of short-term direction hindered the attempts of the internationalists to build upon the momentum of the CDaaa.

McIntyre forwarded Eichelberger’s letter to Archibald MacLeish at the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), who met with Eichelberger and Lewis Douglas of the CDaaa, along with Ernest Angell of the Council for Democracy, and William Gar of Fight for Freedom. MacLeish informed them that ‘in the opinion of the Government there was most important work to be done by committees like theirs, who could carry the story of the war effort to the people in ways which would not be available to the Government and which could supplement the Government’s efforts most effectively’. More significantly, he informed them that the OFF would provide ‘a universal joint between the Government and any organisations engaged in aiding in the war effort’, maintaining a close and personal relationship between the organisations and the administration, and providing them with all possible assistance. Roosevelt commented that MacLeish was taking ‘just the right line’.

Eichelberger was clearly not the only internationalist keen on immediately informing the Government of future plans. Indeed, a number of other organisations looked to build on the momentum that came with the outbreak of war. The Council for Democracy, headed by Ernest Angell, had been set up by Henry Luce and C.D. Jackson of Time/Life in order to promote democratic ideals threatened by the world crisis. Although it refused to promote specific policies, it worked with the CDaaa through 1940 and 1941 to mobilise opinion and educate the public about both domestic freedoms and world affairs. Unlike the CDAAA, it was a small, elite organisation that chose not to develop a membership or national chapters.

Fight for Freedom, however, formed in April 1941, was more like the CDAAA in that it had a mass membership, national chapters, and that it promoted specific policies – but in its case, the policy was an immediate declaration of war. Fight for Freedom was therefore more hawkish than the short-of-war CDAAA, and with Lend-Lease representing a vast amount of aid to the UK, the more interventionist organisation had largely superseded the CDaaa by Pearl Harbor. However, the

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6 A distinction was made between educational organisations on the one hand, and political action committees on the other, if only for the purposes of taxation. Educational organisations, such as the LNA, were tax-exempt. Political action committees, such as the CDaaa, were not.

7 MacLeish to McIntyre, 22 December 1941, OF 4230, Box 2, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

two groups did interact and attempt to reconcile their positions, given that many individuals supported both the CDaaa and fight for freedom, including some of the committee members. As a result, it was no great surprise that the two organisations were looking for ways to move and capitalise on their pre-war support base.

One such individual was lawyer Grenville Clark, leader of the Plattsburg movement and lifelong friend of Henry Stimson, who informed the secretary of war of his plans to dissolve the old CDaaa and fight for freedom into a new organisation. While Clark added ‘I think there are many important things such an organisation could do that the Government cannot’ there were no hints as to what these things might include. Nevertheless, Stimson was a useful administration ally to the internationalists, having been an early member of the CDaaa, and also as a republican, given the non-partisan nature of the private internationalists.

While Clark Eichelberger was not the only internationalist developing ideas at this point, the fact remains that he was at the heart of the movement. While Eichelberger did not manage the INA and the CDaaa alone, there is little doubt that without him they would not have existed at all, and they certainly would not have retained their national focus. In fact, with the outbreak of war, Eichelberger’s prominence within the movement grew, as numerous key internationalists and figures that had played significant private roles in the CDAAA and Fight for freedom, such as Lewis Douglas, James Warburg, James Conant, and Ulric Bell, took up Government posts.

Eichelberger united the internationalist movement, certainly in organisational terms, from the offices of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation at 8 West 40th Street in New York, which was also home to the CDAAA, the League of Nations association, and the Commission to study the organisation of Peace. However, this meant that Eichelberger wielded a great deal of power among the internationalist community, not only in terms of policy but also in determining the very existence of internationalist organisations. As would become clear, any new organisation would need the continued backing of Eichelberger and his support staff in order to survive and achieve a national profile.

In the first weeks of the war, that backing clearly existed. A mere ten days after Eichelberger’s initial letter to the White House, as a result of the hurried consultation both within the movement and also between the internationalists and the Government, a telegram was sent to the President informing him of the new organisation’s existence:

we are proud to inform you that a group of citizens have organized ‘Citizens for Victory’, with a sub-title ‘in the war – in the Peace’, which was the closing keynote of your great address to the American people on the outbreak of war with the Axis powers. … We assure you of our devoted support of your leadership.

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9 Clark to Stimson, 18 December 1941, Henry L. Stimson Papers, reel 105 (microfilm edition), Roosevelt study Centre, middelburg.
The telegram highlighted three objectives for the new committee. The first was to win the war completely, with the total defeat of the Axis powers and no consideration of a compromise peace settlement. The second highlighted the long-held internationalist aim of winning the peace, expressing the hope that any future peace would be ‘based on the principles which you and Winston Churchill have expressed in the Atlantic Charter’. This future peace would, in the words of the Charter, include a ‘wider and permanent system of general security’. The final objective was to retain democratic processes at home during the stresses of war.10

Of these aims, the second was the primary concern of Eichelberger and the remnants of the CDaaa, and the last was of greater interest to the Council for Democracy. Response from the White House came from Roosevelt’s secretary McIntyre, who thanked the organizing committee for its message: ‘The avowed purpose of your crusade, that of winning the war and winning the peace, is one which will find an echo in the hearts of all men and women of good will who hate aggression and love freedom’.11

The following day saw the announcement of the new organisation in the press. According to the New York Times, Citizens for Victory aimed to have a thousand local chapters across the United States dedicated to the ‘preservation of the democratic processes in the prosecution of the war and winning of the peace’. The new organisation was set up jointly by the CDaaa and the Council for Democracy, and would initially be based at the latter’s headquarters at 285 Madison Avenue in New York. The sponsoring committee was a ‘who’s who’ of prominent internationalists. These included LNA president Frank Boudreau; Dixie Cup Company President Hugh Moore; former American minister to Norway Florence Harriman; Fortune editor Russell Davenport; industrialist Frederick McKee; Church Peace Union leader Henry A. Atkinson; publisher Cass Canfield; Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt; Grenville Clark; and Eichelberger.12

The organisation’s initial press release included a statement of aims and purposes, which restated the need to win the war and win the peace, without losing democracy at home. In addition, the statement emphasised seven points to keep in

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11 Reprinted in Citizens for Victory press release, 26 January 1942, Box 54, CEP.

12 *New York Times*, 21 December 1941, p. 31; Citizens for Victory press release, 21 December 1941, Iowell Mellelt Papers, f Drl. For all intents and purposes, the CDaaa evolved into Citizens for Victory, and ceased to exist from then on – even though the group had already been made redundant by events at Pearl Harbor. In early 1942, Citizens for Victory would move to the woodrow Wilson foundation, 8 west 40th Street, New York, which was the location of all of Eichelberger’s committees until 1945.
These included the need to win the war, to continue voluntary organisations, to mobilise the entire nation, to fight those slowing the mobilisation process, to educate the public on wartime economic matters, to support equal rights in wartime industry, and to win a just and lasting peace. However, only the stated objective of fighting industrial discrimination on the grounds of race appeared a reasonable target for a political action group. The remainder lacked a strong focus, and while they were clearly legitimate aims to be promoted, they were simply too broad for a citizens’ organisation to achieve.13

Eichelberger reiterated the somewhat vague aims of Citizens for Victory in a letter to CDAAA committee members. After pointing out that consultations had led to the ‘unanimous’ feeling that private organisations still had a role to play in wartime, he argued that the role included ‘continuing to point out to the American people the menace that we are fighting against and also pointing out what we are fighting for’. As director of Citizens for Victory, Eichelberger sent a similarly worded telegram to President Roosevelt following his state of the Union address. In response to Roosevelt’s enormous production goals, Eichelberger proclaimed we shall meet with courage and initiative whatever sacrifices and dislocations your programme may engender, and we shall back whatever administrative reorganisation may be necessary to carry it out. We give you the pledge of victory. And we give you the pledge of a future world big enough for modern men to live in, at peace with one another, and in possession of their inalienable rights.14

Despite the creation of the new organisation, the Council for Democracy appeared to be having more success on its own than under the new Citizens for Victory banner. Working through different media, the Council focused on smaller and more achievable goals. President Ernest Angell boasted of the influence of organisation pamphlets: ‘Freedom of Assembly’ provided the basis for an Orson Welles radio dramatisation, ‘Negro and Defence’ helped to formulate the administration’s policy on industrial discrimination, and ‘Defence on Main Street’ was used by the Office of Civilian Defence (OCD). Angell did see Citizens for Victory as an opportunity to reach ‘the common people of every community’, providing an extra eight hundred outlets for distribution. As Angell somewhat patronisingly admitted, ‘our programmes have been too damn high-brow. We’ve got to select some mythical Joe Zilch, a taxi driver in Des Moines, and aim our programmes for him. And there have got to be more programmes, because there are over a hundred million Joe Zilches in this country’.15

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13 Citizens for Victory press release, 21 December 1941, Lowell Mellett Papers, FDRL.
14 Eichelberger to CDAAA National Committee, 22 December 1941, Box 54, CEP; Eichelberger to Roosevelt, 6 January 1942, OF 4230, Box 2, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
15 Angell to Sachs, 17 January 1942, Box 17, Alexander Sachs Papers, FDRL; Angell to Council for Democracy staff, 16 January 1942, Box 17 Alexander Sachs Papers, FDRL.
However, of more immediate concern for the Council were financial matters. In the middle of January, a ngell desperately appealed to directors and friends of the Council for funds to cover expenses over the following month, while efforts were concentrated on establishing Citizens for Victory. A further appeal at the end of the month revealed that although the immediate crisis was over, the Council’s medium term financial situation was by no means secure. Appealing for further support, a ngell declared his belief in the importance of private organisations: ‘i assume you realize the Government cannot do this job alone. t his is total war … unless we use all our resources, public and private, we are courting disaster’.16

Despite its clear recognition of the need for private organisations, the role of the Council for Democracy in Citizens for Victory was marginalised from the outset. With the announcement that the Council would act as the research arm of Citizens for Victory, the Council was effectively pushed to one side. Given the Council’s financial concerns and a ngell’s desire to retain the distinct identity of the organisation, this appeared to present few problems. While clearly concerned with the maintenance of democracy at home, the Council lacked the enthusiasm of Eichelberger and other internationalists regarding the distant future peace. This would continue to be the primary focus of the internationalists, reflecting a divide within Citizens for Victory along both organisational lines and in terms of policy priorities.

A second press release at the end of January effectively amounted to a re-launch for Citizens for Victory. The officers of the organisation were announced, all familiar internationalists, including the naming of r ussell Davenport, former managing editor of Fortune magazine, as president. r adio commentator r aymond Gram s wing was announced as chairman, eichelberger and a ngell as vice-chairmen, Hugh Moore as Chairman of the executive committee, and Frederick McKee as treasurer. Significantly, the choice of leader came from the original sponsoring committee, rather than a big name such as w illiam a llen w hite, or even Wendell Willkie. A big, national name might have brought greater prestige and prominence to the organisation from the start, carrying greater weight both with the general public and in Washington. With regard to existing internationalist organisations, Davenport stated that Citizens for Victory had ‘liquidated’ the CDaaa , that it would have the Council for Democracy as a research arm, and that it had the backing of Fight for Freedom. Predictably, Eichelberger’s League of n ations a ssociation and Commission to study the o rganisation of Peace also agreed to cooperate with Citizens for Victory.17

Davenport described the new organisation as ‘an experiment to determine whether people in a democracy can take care of themselves in wartime and take the responsibility for their own morale and not have it made for them’. h e also stressed the non-partisan nature of Citizens for Victory; while it would work with

16  Angell to Sachs, 17 January 1942, Box 17, Alexander Sachs Papers, FDRL; Angell to Sachs, 27 January 1942, Box 17, Alexander Sachs Papers, FDRL.
17  New York Times, 26 January 1942, p. 10; Citizens for Victory press release, 26 January 1942, Box 54, CEP.
‘the men who are running the war’, the organisation reserved ‘the right of using our own judgement to the fullest extent’.18

A list of possible projects revealed the scattershot approach of Citizens for Victory and the lack of a well-defined issue to rally around. These included surveying Government facilities, enlisting volunteers for the Office of Civilian Defence, working with semi-official organisations such as the Red Cross, arranging speakers for public meetings and demonstrations, helping to avoid the rubber shortage and collecting scrap metals, promoting balanced diets, assisting the treasury in the sale of defence bonds, and helping to prevent panic buying, hoarding, and ‘panic in air raids’.19

Angell recognized that the new organisation was having difficulty in finding a role for itself. In a letter to executive committee member Alexander Sachs, Angell claimed that

the problem of working out the functions of Citizens for Victory and how they can be implemented is one of incredible and really discouraging difficulty. I am not sure we have yet found the answer to either of these basic questions, but we are keeping at it, and in the meantime the Council is trying to move ahead, not stand still.

Angell was increasingly more concerned with the problems of keeping the Council for Democracy distinct and alive than he was with establishing Citizens for Victory from the ground up. With the Council for Democracy ever more uninterested, the burden of Citizens for Victory fell more heavily than ever on the offices of Clark Eichelberger and his colleagues at 8 West 40th street.20

Eichelberger, for his part, tried to define a role for the new organisation. He attempted to arrange a meeting in February with Under-secretary of state Sumner Welles to discuss public opinion and the situation within internationalist organisations. A letter from Eichelberger to Citizens for Victory and CDAAA chapters largely repeated earlier statements on the three primary aims of the group, but it also identified one key area where an organisation such as Citizens for Victory could have influence. Eichelberger urged members to investigate the pattern of isolationism across the nation, in order to counter any isolationist resurgence from America’s first sympathisers in terms of wartime morale. Claiming that the Government could not concern itself with measuring isolationist sentiment across the United States, Citizens for Victory could act by ‘either preventing its development by meeting it in advance or answering it as quickly as possible’.21

19 Citizens for Victory press release, 26 January 1942, Box 54, CEP.
20 Angell to Sachs, 11 February 1942, Box 17, Alexander Sachs Papers, FDRL.
21 Eichelberger to Welles, 13 February 1942, Box 78, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL; Eichelberger to Citizens for Victory and CDAAA chapters, 19 February, 1942, Box 54, CEP.
A second issue seized upon by Citizens for Victory was the question of civilian mobilisation. Spurred on by criticism of the Office of Civilian Defence in Congress and the press, new organisation director Thomas L. Power urged public support for the Office in order to assist the passage of Congressional appropriations for the OCD. Power urged letters and telegrams to Congress and Roosevelt, public meetings, radio talks, and letters to newspapers to back the OCD. The issue was put in the context of the organisation’s wider aims, arguing that the OCD was essential to a total war, and to fighting the forces of reaction and isolationism at home. Power reiterated that the job of private organisations had not ended with Pearl Harbor, arguing that ‘the fight for the means of carrying on an effective civilian war effort is basically the same as the fight for the Lend-Lease Act and for neutrality revision’.

The response to the OCD debate, however, showed that Citizens for Victory, with few closely defined aims, was an inherently reactive organisation. In terms of political action, the organisation could not mould the political debate but only respond to action in Washington. What made the situation even more difficult was the fact that compared with the two years prior to Pearl Harbor, there was very little debate to affect. The lack of opposition, from both Congressmen in Washington and from the America First Committee across the nation, left Citizens for Victory with a considerably reduced role compared with the CDAAA and Fight for Freedom. The lack of isolationist opposition also reduced the impact of Eichelberger’s requests for Citizens for Victory to delineate the isolationist pattern across the nation.

The fact that assessing isolationist patterns and fighting for the OCD were not high profile events only compounded the organisation’s difficulties, as the lack of media coverage hindered its development. Citizens for Victory never captured the attention of the press in the way that had significantly boosted the national profile of the CDAAA or Fight for Freedom. Without clearly defined aims, or a controversial issue that could attract the public’s attention, the organisation was never likely to generate a significant amount of press coverage. The continuing low profile of Citizens for Victory placed increasingly greater pressure on Eichelberger’s office to work to raise the organisations’ standing, a task made more difficult by Eichelberger’s greater personal interest in the continuing development of the INA.

The limited impact of early initiatives was compounded at the beginning of March by the resignation of Russell Davenport as president of Citizens for Victory. Although it was for health reasons rather than policy differences, the loss of the organisation leader at such an early stage did little to help consolidate the image of Citizens for Victory. It also placed even greater responsibility for the new organisation on Eichelberger’s office. The lack of a big name president or national chairman, such as William Allen White had been for the CDAAA, clearly

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22 Power to Citizens for Victory chapter representatives, 19 March 1942, Box 15, Alexander Sachs Papers, FDRL.
did not help the national image of the organisation from the beginning. While there is no guarantee that a prominent figure as leader would have brought greater influence, such an immediate change in personnel certainly helped to undermine an organisation that was still getting off the ground. In an additional blow, executive committee member C.D. Jackson also resigned in March, unable to give time to the committee due to his regular business commitments.

Citizens for Victory continued with its crusade against isolationist Congressmen despite the increasing realisation that the organisation would not even come close to achieving the status of previous internationalist organisations. Treasurer Frederick McKee wrote to executive committee members in April informing them of the group’s financial difficulties. Although Citizens for Victory had received calls for help in districts with isolationist Congressmen, McKee urged that ‘the extent of such action depends almost entirely on the financial support which we can secure’. More significantly, McKee highlighted that the response to the organisations’ pleas for public support had dropped off to the point where the best option he could recommend was for committee members to arrange luncheons and dinners for friends to call for donations. Without popular national appeal, the organisation appeared increasingly restricted by financial constraints.

With the effectiveness of the new organisation in serious doubt, executive committee chairman Hugh Moore wrote to Eichelberger, McKee, Power, and the executive committee’s Emmett Corrigan, expressing grave concerns and effectively withdrawing from the organisation. Moore highlighted four key problems. Firstly, and most tellingly, he argued that Citizens for Victory had failed from the outset to define a realistic programme: ‘We never have had and do not have an effective programme’. Secondly, he highlighted the significant fact that what little programme the organisation had been able to outline was having little effect outside of New York. With regard to the nation as a whole, ‘only a small percentage of the Chapters have any interest in our programme’. Thirdly, he was critical of activist Fred Cullen, who had been dealing with political leaders in New York and Washington, for no longer working effectively on behalf of the organisation. Finally, emphasising both the bureaucratic arrangements of Citizens for Victory and the inability of the organisation to exert any influence beyond New York, Moore noted that the majority of recently collected funds had been spent on office staff rather than field work.

In acknowledging the lack of an effective programme, Moore hit upon the principal problem faced by Citizens for Victory. The new organisation had never successfully been able to define its objectives in more than general terms. This lack of detail provided little or no focus for regional chapters, resulting in a lack of

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23 Davenport to Moore, 8 March 1942, Folder 14, Box 5, HMFC; Jackson to Moore, 9 March 1942, Folder 14, Box 24, HMFC.

24 McKee to Sachs, 26 April 1942, Box 15, Alexander Sachs Papers, FDRL.

25 Moore to McKee, Eichelberger, Power and Corrigan, 27 April 1942, Folder 14, Box 5, HMFC.
interest and a dearth of financial contributions. While some areas saw continued interest in Citizens for Victory, such as in Colorado, where efforts were spearheaded by Denver lawyer William West Grant, these tended to be down to local initiative rather than national direction. Without the active support of Eichelberger’s New York offices, the organisation was slowly grinding to a halt.

While Moore acknowledged that there was a great deal of work to be done, ‘after the period of time we have spent, I am convinced that we are not able to do it’. Despite spending approximately seven hundred dollars a week, the organisation had only two thousand dollars available to spend. Moore urged that the organisation be immediately reduced to a skeleton staff of national director Power and his secretary in order to conserve finances. Somewhat ironically, Moore also proposed that the organisation cease its solicitation of funds, as he felt it was inappropriate for ‘a programme which has not demonstrated its value’.

With regard to the wider internationalist movement, Moore commented on the difficulties of successfully founding a new organisation when so many other similar organisations already existed. He admitted that he had gone along with his colleagues, despite his own personal reservations, only out of loyalty and friendship. He claimed he had no time to spare for Citizens for Victory, arguing

> it seems pathetic to me with the crying needs of the free world association, the magazine, and the league of nations association, where there is every evidence that we could work effectively, that anyone of you should be wasting your time, as I consider it, on these abortive efforts in behalf of C.V.

While Moore understood the desire of others to carry on, he felt the internationalists would have greater success and effectiveness by devoting their energies to existing organisations with specific aims. Confirming his views, Moore tendered his resignation at the beginning of June.

Despite the increasing realisation that the organisation had failed to successfully establish itself amongst the American public, Citizens for Victory did continue through 1942 under the leadership of executive committee chairman Frederick McKee. In July, the organisation released a list of forty-three isolationist candidates to be opposed in the Congressional elections of 1942. A further letter from McKee in October urged members to ‘call your friends together at once to discuss ways and means, arrange for committees to interview editors and officials of organisations, ask the candidates for definite expressions on the prosecution of the war and international organisation to preserve the peace, and provide for

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26 ibid.
27 ibid., Moore to Citizens for Victory, 2 June 1942, Folder 16, Box 5, HMFC. The free world association was formed in June 1941 as the successor to the American Union for Concerted Peace efforts. It was also located at the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, with Moore as chairman, Eichelberger as director and McKee as treasurer. The magazine referred to is the league of nations association’s monthly publication Changing World.
publicity of all kinds’. McKee was eventually reduced to the limited boast that a radio campaign orchestrated by Citizens for Victory had been the single most important factor in securing the nomination of an internationalist Congressman. Significantly, McKee highlighted the ‘inherited tradition of foresight’ from the CDAAA, continually invoking Citizens for Victory’s predecessor and highlighting the new group’s inability to establish an identity of its own.28

A similar comment could be found in a September letter from McKee to Roosevelt, with which McKee included a petition supporting the recommendations made by the President in his Labour Day speech. In it, McKee felt it necessary to remind the President that Citizens for Victory ‘is the successor to, and outgrowth of the Committee to Defend America by Leading the Allies’. The letter, although acknowledged by Roosevelt’s Secretary Marvin McIntyre, did not receive a reply from the President himself. Indeed, despite initial enthusiasm, there was no great subsequent interest from the White House in Citizens for Victory.29

By the end of 1942, it was clear that Citizens for Victory would never be the successful national organisation that internationalists had hoped for in the wake of Pearl Harbor. While continuing in name through 1943 and the first half of 1944, it achieved little more than the sponsoring and arranging of luncheon meetings attended by Congressmen and former administration members. These meetings, held at exclusive venues such as the Waldorf Astoria, did little to spread the internationalist word beyond existing members. What little the national organisation could muster in terms of publicity largely involved preaching to the converted. Compounding the problem, Citizens for Victory never received the press coverage that the CDAAA and Fight for Freedom enjoyed, and remained strong only in select regions such as Denver and Pittsburgh, McKee’s hometown.30

Perhaps the closest Citizens for Victory came to national attention was at the beginning of 1943 when Chairman Martin Dies of the Committee on Un-American Activities suggested in the House of Representatives that Citizens for Victory was indeed, un-American. Responding to Citizens for Victory’s campaign against isolationist Congressmen, Dies argued that the organisation had attacked the majority of Congressmen, was subversive, and possibly communist. Representative James Wright of Pennsylvania defended the group in Congress, arguing that the committee ‘is in no sense an organisation devoted to the destruction of the legislative body of our Government’ and that it ‘is as free of communism as the American Legion and the Daughters of the American Revolution’. Wright

28 Power to Citizens for Victory executive committee, 11 July 1942, Box 15, Alexander Sachs Papers, FDRL; McKee to Citizens for Victory members, 7 October 1942, Box 47, Henry Wallace Papers, FDRL.

29 McKee to Roosevelt, 10 September 1942, OF 4230, Box 2, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; McIntyre to McKee, 15 September 1942, OF 4230, Box 2, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

described McKee’s ‘unselfish devotion to his country’, and also maintained that ‘Eichelberger is not the directing genius of any purge groups as is charged’.

In early 1943, Eichelberger wrote to Moore and McKee, noting that ‘our effort to find a new face for national chairman so paralyzed Citizens for Victory that it never got off to good start’. Citizens for Victory was indeed paralysed from the start, but the lack of a prominent chairman was just one of the problems it faced. Despite the momentum brought to the organisation by the success of the CDaaa, the inability to enunciate clearly attainable aims meant that the organisation stalled from the start. While the lofty ideals of the organisation were commendable, they were not easily translated into practical policies. As Hugh Moore so tellingly argued, the organisation had no effective programme. With regard to educating the public on issues such as conserving materials, Citizens for Victory did little more than reiterate the work of the Office of Civilian Defence.

Citizens for Victory was also merely the first internationalist organisation during the war to suffer from the lack of opposition. The group was not a victim of its own success, but rather the success of war mobilisation in general. While the 1942 elections provided isolationist Congressmen as targets, there was no significant political opposition, such as the America First Committee, for the organisation to attack, which would have provided greater focus. The initial intention, to play more of a political action role, led to a reactive stance on policy issues emanating from Washington. In any case, the organisation had little mandate as a political action group, as it failed to garner significant public support. This exacerbated the lack of funds that further limited the organisation’s potential.

Another reason for the organisation’s failure was the work and preoccupation of many internationalists with existing organisations. As Hugh Moore highlighted, groups that had existed prior to Pearl Harbor were in a stronger position to play an educational role with their established bureaucracy and wide memberships. Yet it was organisations that had existed prior to 1939 that really needed to step forward and seize the opportunity. The ad hoc nature of the CDaaa and fight for freedom, alongside their focus on aid and intervention, had overshadowed broader considerations of US foreign policy. Considerations of intervention were not the same as developing a multilateral internationalism, and these issues finally returned to the fore as 1942 progressed. Within weeks, as it became clear that Citizens

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31 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 4 February 1943, copy at 611.0031/5249, Decimal file, r G 59, Department of State Records, National Archives at College Park, Maryland (hereafter NACP). On a similar note, a State Department report on Groups Attacking the Department included a critical summary of the activities of Citizens for Victory. It described the group’s role in the ‘purge campaign’ of Congressmen in 1942. It also compared the demands of Citizens for Victory for a second front to those of American Communists, and it strongly questioned the appointment of Jay Lovestone as a labour advisor. See Groups Attacking the Department of state, reel 55, container 95, Cordell Hull Papers, Library of Congress, Washington DC.

32 Eichelberger to Moore and McKee, 27 January 1943, Folder 16, Box 24, HMFC.
Dilemmas of Internationalism

for Victory would not firmly establish itself, prominent internationalists such as Moore and Eichelberger began to shift their focus elsewhere, with Moore focusing on the fledgling Free World Association, and Eichelberger on re-establishing the League of Nations Association.

Eichelberger’s lack of interest was perhaps the most damaging loss to the efforts of Citizens for Victory, as de facto leader of the internationalist movement, Eichelberger’s decision to focus on the LNA, which had been largely on hold for the previous two years, greatly reduced the potential of the organisation. By the end of 1942, although still listed as being on the executive committee, Eichelberger was no longer vice-chairman of Citizens for Victory. Without the organisational support of 8 West 40th Street, the new organisation had no real chance of success.

At a November meeting with President Roosevelt, Eichelberger made no mention of Citizens for Victory. Instead, he concentrated on his own League of Nations Association and, significantly, his involvement in official State Department postwar planning. Citizens for Victory rapidly faded into the background as internationalists were given an opportunity they had long hoped for, to exert real influence on the structure of international organisation.

The shift in focus merely reflected the sense of internationalist priorities. After fighting for international organisation through the thirties with little reward, it was unsurprising that internationalists chose to return to those issues after the United States’ entry into the war. In these terms, the work of the CDAAA and Fight for Freedom, though popular, significant, and subsequently well documented, was almost an aside for the internationalists. Entry into the war enabled them to focus on the main priority: the creation of, and United States entry into, a new international organisation. Citizens for Victory was little more than an attempt to capitalise on the CDAAA’s success, and with no real threat to democratic institutions at home, and no possibility of influence over the prosecution of the war, it was no real surprise that internationalists would return to the issue that they not only were most concerned with, but also the one that they felt they could do the most about.

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33 Eichelberger interview with Roosevelt notes, 16 November 1942, Box 198, CEP.
Chapter 2
Gearing our Programme with that of the Government

The United States’ entry into World War II ended the interventionist concerns that had dominated the internationalist movement for the previous two years. Almost immediately, with the exception of the distraction of Citizens for Victory, the movement turned its attention to the future and to planning for the postwar world. At the forefront of the movement was the League of Nations Association. Inevitably damaged by the political turmoil of the League of Nations, and overshadowed by the CDaaa during 1940 and 1941, the LNA still had the advantage of an established structure and support base. It had continued its (albeit reduced) efforts during through the 1930s, augmented from 1939 by its research arm, the Commission to Study the Organisation of Peace. With the United States now at war, these organisations resurfaced with renewed vigour, with the aim of rectifying the mistakes of 1919 and 1920, and promoting a renewed US internationalism, defined by US involvement in a new international organisation.

However, the opportunity to promote a more international outlook on foreign affairs was not seized immediately. Rather than using its established position to call for a new American internationalism, the LNA’s public profile was limited during 1942. The LNA remained a primarily reactive organisation during the first year of the war because it was concerned first and foremost with courting influence within the Roosevelt Administration.

From the beginning of the war, Clark Eichelberger made the decision to play a supportive role behind the Roosevelt Administration, cultivating links with the Government rather than simply attempting to educate the general public. Although informing the public was clearly an important concern, the quest for legitimacy and official approval would become the most significant part of Eichelberger’s internationalist agenda.

Admittedly, close links to the Government were seen to benefit the internationalist cause in a number of ways. In the case of initiatives to educate the public, the Association would frequently seek official approval from the expanded executive branch to lend extra authority to its actions. More importantly, maintaining close contact with the Government in recognition of common goals could lead to internationalist input in future Governmental postwar planning. With Eichelberger in favour of establishing closer personal and organisational links to the Government, an informal state–private partnership began to develop. Eichelberger frequently corresponded with the President and with Under-secretary of State Sumner Welles throughout 1942, and his efforts begin to bear
fruit as the year progressed with increased ties to the Office of Facts and Figures. Significantly, in July 1942, Eichelberger was formally invited to be a consultant to the state Department on postwar planning issues. While there is no doubt that the internationalists had specific aims of their own, they constantly sought to have them legitimised and approved by the Government.

Yet there were also disadvantages in building such a close relationship with the Government. The Roosevelt administration had no intention of issuing definite plans for the postwar world in 1942. The immediate emphasis on winning the war far outweighed questions concerning the future peace and Roosevelt had no intention of committing to a specific plan so early in the war. Despite internationalist desires for Government initiatives in 1942, no detailed proposals were forthcoming, leaving internationalist organisations to base their actions around the few official references to the United Nations, still seen by the Government primarily as a military alliance. This reactive stance taken by the internationalists rendered them a marginal force in 1942. Even in the sphere of public education, few projects were undertaken that did more than reiterate the general desire for a postwar international organisation and the need to create it before the end of the war. While an unwillingness to move too far ahead of public opinion might have been deemed politically necessary, the internationalists moved too far in the opposite direction, barely stepping out beyond the shadow of official policy.

As a result, the LNA departed from the traditional role of independent interest groups, becoming dependent on the Government for initiatives instead of promoting its own views and policies to Washington. Only with the creation of their own independent proposals for the postwar world did the internationalists display real initiative. The research arm of the LNA, the CSOP, took on an increasingly important role as 1942 progressed. Focusing on the realm of postwar planning, the internationalists publicly took the initiative where the Government was understandably cautious. Yet even here, as with the LNA, official approval and endorsement was sought as the CSOP’s studies on the postwar world were quickly dispatched to Washington. In addition, the CSOP would initially move little faster than the Government, issuing no specific proposals for the postwar peace until 1943. After twenty years of waiting, the internationalists were not about to miss the opportunity to play a role in the promotion of a new international organisation. However, the Government’s unwillingness to commit to any specific programme at such an early stage of the war left the internationalists without any solid proposals to throw their support behind.

The reactive stance of the internationalists led to tough decisions regarding their attitude toward the League of Nations. While it was difficult to turn their backs on an organisation they had supported for over twenty years, it soon became clear that any new international organisation would distance itself from the old League. The failure to cope with the events of the 1930s had thoroughly discredited the League, although not the idea of an international organisation. The issue of whether to continue to fight for the old League or to look forward to a new ‘United Nations’ would concern the internationalists throughout the year. Either way, they hoped to
retain as much of the old league machinery as possible, especially autonomous agencies of proven worth such as the international labour organisation. As a result of the uncertainty, trivial bureaucratic issues such as the question of changing the LNA’s name would continue to arise, and again internationalist leaders looked to the white house for guidance. This dependency characterised the role of the internationalist movement throughout 1942. Yet while the internationalists were heavily reliant on the Government, the Government had little need, if any, for the internationalists at this stage. While the internationalists took the opportunity to be visible, they were unable to turn participation into influence.

In fact, Eichelberger’s and James Shotwell’s role in official postwar planning was the most constructive input from the movement during the year, and this was in a personal rather than an organisational capacity. The broader internationalist movement spent most of 1942 searching for a meaningful place in the planning and promotional process for a new international organisation. Although it would have difficulty finding such a role, that did not deter the movement from searching; a process that began in the hours following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Reacting quickly to the declaration of war, the leaders of the internationalist movement wasted no time in turning to postwar issues. Within days of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the CSOP’s Clyde Eagleton issued a memorandum to Commission leaders considering how best to respond to the dramatically altered situation that the United States and the internationalists found themselves in. While it acknowledged that many people felt that discussion of postwar aims was premature and that all emphasis should be placed on winning the war, eagleton argued that ‘vast as is the task of winning the war from a military or economic standpoint, the decision and announcement of American postwar aims must be included in it’. In taking this approach, the internationalists were building on the small reference that President Roosevelt had made in his fireside chat three days earlier when he had stated ‘we are going to win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows’. In taking this initial lead from Roosevelt, Eagleton set the standard that the LNA would follow throughout 1942 and, indeed, most of the war. If they could base their policies and proclamations around the words and statements of Roosevelt and State Department officials, then that could only lend authority and weight to the independent internationalist viewpoints.

Eagleton backed up his opinions by arguing that war now had psychological and propaganda considerations, and that a number of points needed to be considered, most important of which was the effect that a statement of war aims would have in uniting national morale. Overseas, he continued, such a statement would have a positive effect in small democratic nations, and also in enemy countries, where

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a weakened nation would be more willing to consider a just peace. As a result, it was deemed essential for democratic peoples to come up with a coherent plan for a new international organisation, and the CSOP were just the people to undertake such a task.²

The need to educate the public about the need for a new international organisation was deemed to offer the CSOP a great opportunity, and ‘it should reshape its programme and expand its activity to meet this opportunity’. Suggestions for ways to capitalise on the ‘opportunity’ war had brought included a congratulatory message for the President following his speech, urging him to set up a commission immediately to look into the question of postwar organisation. The memo also suggested meeting with Secretary of State Hull and Under-secretary Welles to ‘push the idea of immediate action’, although there was no clear idea of what such action would entail.³

At this point, the internationalists were in clear need of specific direction, of which the most likely source was the Government. Indeed, no action was taken until the highly encouraging issue of the Declaration of the United Nations, signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China on 1 January 1942, and by the representatives of twenty-two smaller allies on the following day. While the Declaration was essentially formalising the military alliance against the Axis powers and ensuring that none would conclude a separate peace, it also committed the signatories to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Even if Roosevelt did not, internationalist leaders saw in the Declaration a base upon which future organisation could be built.⁴

Yet at the same time Roosevelt was inadvertently coining the name of the next international organisation, the INA was celebrating the twenty-second anniversary of the League of Nations at a conference in Washington. Eichelberger later stated that while ‘there were those who thought the association was, in a sense, attempting to turn the clock back’, it was clear from the conference that those present ‘had no desire to return to the past’. He looked forward to the opportunity to create a new international organisation, building on the experience of the last 22 years. It was clear that the INA was beginning to turn its attention towards the future. Nevertheless, the tension between the desire to keep at least some aspects of the old, discredited League, and the need to create a new organisation would continue throughout the following year.⁵

This was highlighted by the obvious and immediate attraction of the newly conceived ‘United Nations’ title. Eichelberger wrote to Roosevelt’s aide Marvin McIntyre on 15 January stating he believed that ‘when the President originated the phrase “United Nations” he was naming the society of nations that will grow out

² Eagleton Memorandum, 12 December 1941, 123380, Box 564, CEA.
³ ibid.
⁴ Divine, Second Chance, pp. 48–9
of victory and the peace conference’. Within weeks of entering the war, it appeared that the future organisation not only had a name, but also, in the Atlantic Charter, a set of basic principles. Eichelberger was not about to forget the League of Nations, however, and was also keen to mention the International Labour Conference held in November, highlighting a part of the League machinery that could be retained by the new organisation. He concluded by asking for White House approval to substitute ‘United Nations’ for ‘allies’ wherever possible and to openly stress that ‘United Nations’ would be the name of any future international organisation. ‘The White House, unwilling to commit to any rigid course of action just a month into the war, did not respond.’

Despite an official unwillingness to come forward with specific proposals for the future peace, the CSOP decided that that was exactly what was necessary. Clyde Eagleton, head of the CSOP’s studies committee, urged that the Commission outline a plan of study for the imminent blueprint stage of its work. Despite the concerns of many internationalists with retaining elements of the old League, the CSOP had no qualms with concentrating solely on the future. It was hoped that a conference of organisations working in the field of postwar planning could quickly be arranged. A subsequent CSOP memo considered ways to approach the planning and educational stages, acknowledging that ‘more dissemination from the top down of the “gospel” (i.e. the CSOP reports) no matter how properly set up, will not alone change the basic thinking of the American people or “convert” them’. It was recognized that the American public must be involved in the creation of the ‘gospel’, but also that the Commission should ‘keep in constant touch with the Government agencies concerned in postwar planning; publicise their work, invite interchange of personnel etc.’. While it was acknowledged that this was primarily to avoid duplication, it assumed even at this early stage that the Government’s position on postwar planning would be at the very least close to their own. His faith in the harmony of private and public viewpoints was demonstrated by Eichelberger’s February meeting with Sumner Welles to discuss both developments in public opinion and ‘plans for the world of the future’.

On 14 February, over one thousand people attended the CSOP’s meeting at the Hotel Biltmore which saw the presentation of the Commission’s second report on the ‘transitional Period’ that would follow the war’s end until a new international organisation could be formed. As Harold Josephson has pointed out, the report prophetically predicted that dissension among the allies and an unwillingness to surrender power to the new international organisation could prove the greatest threat to a secure peace. Yet aside from the detail of the report, the main message

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6 Eichelberger to McIntyre, 15 January 1942, Roosevelt file, Box 20, CEP.
7 Eagleton to the Studies Committee, 19 January 1942, 123395, Box 564, CEA; CSOP memorandum, 11 February 1942, 123401, Box 564, CEA (emphasis in original); Eichelberger to Welles, 13 February 1942, Box 78, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
of the meeting was Eichelberger’s reiteration of Roosevelt’s message that ‘winning the war and winning the peace were part of the same operation’.

Despite the enthusiastic reception for the report, it provided no significant direction for the internationalist movement. While it expressed a general intention to create a postwar international organisation, it provided no specific details to base an educational campaign upon. Aside from recognising the need for the allies to continue to work together and the problems of postwar reconstruction, the report also failed to consider any issues beyond the question of international organisation. The narrow focus of internationalist interests limited potential influence within Washington, which had to consider wider issues relating to postwar planning beyond questions of international organisation.

Displaying some degree of independence and initiative, the Commission met to consider its next stage the day after the Biltmore meeting, and it was clear that future work would involve more specific and detailed planning. In a memorandum adopted by the Commission as a plan for future work, Eichelberger reiterated that the third phase of Commission work would be devoted to a blueprint for future peace. He also repeated the points he had made to Marvin McIntyre a month previously regarding the use of United Nations name and the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The Commission’s belief was that ‘if the phrase United Nations now becomes a household word and the organisation of the United Nations wins the war and is carried over into the reconstruction without the formal break of armistice and peace treaties, the United States will continue to be a member of it’. Increasingly, the internationalists threw their support for future peace behind a term which official Government sources still saw primarily as describing a military alliance. The first serious consideration of an internationalist organisational name change to reflect the new interest in ‘United Nations’ came at an LNA board meeting at the end of March. The option of changing the group’s name to the more contemporary ‘United Nations Association’ was put forward, although it was decided that no change was made at this stage.

Eichelberger expanded his views further in a memorandum sent to Sumner Welles, who was deemed to be the most powerful sympathetic ear in the State Department. He urged that the debate should be focused on the gains to be made from joining an international organisation, not the question of whether or not to join. The promotion of such an organisation to the American public should be a combination of idealism and self-interest, highlighting the long-term practical gains of multilateral involvement. Eichelberger also emphasised the number of private organisations and sections of the population, such as ‘labour,

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business, professional and housewives’, that could be appealed to for assistance in an educational campaign. It became increasingly clear that with or without Government approval, the internationalists were ready to begin a campaign behind the future ‘United nations’. However, it was also clear that beyond the broad concept of a United Nations organisation, there was still no detailed plan that could be put before either the Government or the public.\(^\text{10}\)

They would, however, continue to seek Administration endorsement. As Eichelberger boasted to Herbert Hines of Rotary International, ‘confidentially, for some time I have been in consultation with friends in the State Department to keep them informed of a long-range programme of education we hope to inspire on the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations for the long-range planning for the future’. He was also in touch with the Office of Facts and Figures, who, in Eichelberger’s words, were ‘anxious’ for an immediate education programme throughout the country.\(^\text{11}\)

In April, Eichelberger again tried the White House for support. He informed McIntyre of the internationalist plan to devote the month of May to discussion of the United Nations. A number of organisations had united to form the United Nations Committee, conveniently based alongside the Ina and Cso P at 40th Street, New York, and therefore effectively overseen by Eichelberger. The Committee’s first initiative was the idea of United Nations month, to promote the idea of the United Nations as allies to win the war and the peace on the basis of the Atlantic Charter. He argued that while Roosevelt was planning the future of the world, internationalists and private organisations ‘must develop all possible public opinion to support this plan’. The month was seen as the beginning of a long-range educational programme and Eichelberger again reaffirmed his connections with the State Department and the Office of Facts and Figures. He ended with a desperate plea for a letter from the President saying that he thought it ‘a fine idea to urge people to be aware of the United Nations dedicated to winning the war and winning the peace’.\(^\text{12}\)

Eichelberger also called Welles at the State Department informing him of the plan. He asked if Welles could write him a note expressing appreciation of his efforts, preferably the same day, in order to speed up preparations. Welles clearly expressed an interest, and on behalf of the CSOP, Eichelberger sent the Undersecretary a 42-page list of private organisations that might prove helpful in the coming educational campaign.\(^\text{13}\)

Eichelberger and the internationalists were especially encouraged by the announcement that 14 June, Flag Day, would be designated United Nations Day by the Government. While the Government saw this solely as an attempt to

\(^\text{10}\) Eichelberger memo, 18 March 1942, Box 78, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
\(^\text{11}\) Eichelberger to Hines, 30 March 1942, Box 56, CEP.
\(^\text{12}\) Eichelberger to McIntyre, 11 April 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Changing World, April 1942, p. 15.
\(^\text{13}\) Memo to Welles, 11 April 1942, Box 78, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL; Eichelberger to Welles, 13 April 1942, Box 191, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
rally support for the military alliance, the internationalists believed that winning the war and winning the peace were two halves of the same whole, and the creation of a United Nations Day provided a clear indication that the Roosevelt Administration was thinking along parallel lines. Leaping at the opportunity for enhanced credibility, Eichelberger urged that the LNA ‘should like to gear our programme more closely with that of the Government’. Taking full advantage of Government resources, he added that the LNA ‘should like to able to distribute liberally all the material that off and o CD prepare for United n ations Day’. in return, Eichelberger asking for nothing but a letter ‘stating that the OFF looks with favour upon United n ations meetings through every facility possible during may and the first two weeks of June as an educational preparation to the United Nations Day’. Significantly, the internationalists extended their United Nations month into June to capitalise on the official Government approved UN day.14

a t the same time, off director a rchibald macl eish contacted e ichelberger expressing the need for the greatest possible understanding between the United n ations. a s a result, it was desirable that ‘as many civic organisations and other bodies as possible will during may and June of this year and also during the months that follow, stage celebrations which will heighten the understanding among the United n ations’. h owever limited the Government’s intentions were, the letter provided an official stamp of approval for all of the recent internationalist efforts.15

e ven more encouraging was the letter from the President to e ichelberger in April. After consulting with the State Department, Roosevelt expressed his interest in the ‘plan to inform our people of the United n ations’ aspect of the struggle. n othing could be more important than that the people of the United s tates and of the world should fully realise the magnitude of the united effort required in this fight’. however, as Robert Divine has highlighted, despite r oosevelt’s encouraging words, there was no mention of postwar planning, and the United n ations again referred solely to a military alliance. t his did not appear to discourage the internationalists, and Eichelberger hoped to make maximum use of the endorsement, writing to McIntyre requesting permission to make ‘liberal use’ of the letter in the press and in United n ations Committee literature. much to internationalist satisfaction, the White House agreed to the request. Other than providing a morale boost for the internationalists, however, the positive response from r oosevelt changed nothing. t he Government still saw the United n ations as a military alliance, and as long as the work of the LNA continued to boost public backing for the war, the Government would happily support it.16

14 Eichelberger memo, 28 April 1942, Box 56, CEP.
15 MacLeish to Eichelberger, 28 April 1942, Box 56 CEP.
16 Early to MacLeish, 14 April 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Roosevelt to Eichelberger, 30 April 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL (t he letter was actually drafted by the off ); Divine, Second Chance, p. 49; e ichelberger to McIntyre, 2 May 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
Nevertheless, Eichelberger continued to boast about his connections to the Roosevelt Administration. At the beginning of May he took the liberty of writing to Welles urging him to meet with Herbert Hines while he was briefly in Washington. Welles declined, but suggested that Hines met with Macleish. He also informed New York Governor Herbert Lehman of the White House suggestion to coordinate internationalist efforts with the off. The correspondence was not all one way, however, as David Bernstein from the off in Washington wrote to Eichelberger interested in information on the various United Nations projects that the LNA was working on. Further correspondence expressed an interest in getting the United Nations Committee – now concerned solely with promoting May 1 to June 14 as a time to promote the United Nations and the Atlantic Charter – to distribute official material. Bernstein argued ‘your committee could be most helpful in this connection, by undertaking to supplement this already planned distribution in communities where you have representatives or affiliates’. Yet despite the formal interest, the LNA was still seen by the Government primarily as an outlet for official material, maintaining the one-way nature of the association’s relationship with Government.17

Regarding the internationalists’ own material, Clyde Eagleton reported in the LNA magazine about the wide use of CsoP reports. In addition to use by the LNA, the League of Women Voters, the YWCA, and college courses, the First and Second reports of the CsoP appeared to have attracted the attention of the Government. It was also noted with some satisfaction that Sumner Welles, Secretary of State Hull, and Vice-President Wallace had all delivered speeches suggesting that the Commission and the Government were thinking along similar lines. Their recent pronouncements only encouraged the Commission to continue with their Third report on the development of the United Nations. Eagleton continued to go considerably further than the Government was prepared to, suggesting that the United States ‘is actually already obligated as a member of an international organisation – the United Nations, based upon treaty – and having a constitution – the Atlantic Charter’.18

Later in May, Eichelberger again wrote to McIntyre with further information regarding internationalist plans in the hope of further advice and approval. More than before, however, this letter concerned postwar planning rather than immediate military concerns. He argued that in developing public opinion in support of a new international organisation he was not neglecting the war effort ‘because we must constantly think of what we are fighting for and that vision will make men fight that much harder’.19

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17 Eichelberger to Welles, 2 May 1942, Box 78, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL; Welles to Eichelberger, 4 May 1942, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL; Eichelberger to Lehman, 5 May 1942, Box 56, CEP; Bernstein to Eichelberger, 21 May 1942, Box 56, CEP; Bernstein to Eichelberger, 30 May 1942, Box 56, CEP.
19 Eichelberger to McIntyre, 21 May 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
Eichelberger informed the White House about the work of the CSOP and how its third report would deal with the implementation of the Atlantic Charter. He also mentioned the possibility of changing the name of the INA to the United Nations Association. He claimed that despite the need to talk in the ‘symbols of today’, such as the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations, the association refused to change the name and provide ammunition for the isolationist press. Clearly Eichelberger was hoping for Presidential approval on both issues. Had Roosevelt strongly encouraged Eichelberger to change the name of the INA at this point, it is difficult to imagine Eichelberger disagreeing. The fact that the organisation’s name was not changed at this point reflected the lack of a clear and positive response from the President.20

Eichelberger also brought up the development of international Centres. Organised through James Shotwell and the CSOP, these centres were funded primarily by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and were set up to promote internationalism across the nation. Thirteen centres were set up throughout 1942, in locations as diverse as Chicago, San Francisco, Denver, Des Moines and Dallas. They were designed to house not only Eichelberger organisations such as the CSOP, the INA, and Citizens for Victory, but also ideologically similar groups such as the Church Peace Union, the Institute of Pacific Relations and World Alliance. The centres aimed to maximise the impact of various organisations by locating them in one place. His gave internationalist leaders from different groups the opportunity to join together and become more aware of each other’s work. The new centres would enable internationalist groups to set up discussion groups with labour, farm, business and women’s organisations, educating the nation about the need for immediate postwar planning. They also clearly provided the Government with the opportunity to widely distribute official material to receptive audiences. By the autumn, the CSOP had set up regional commissions in most of the same cities to study, debate, and publicise postwar issues.21

Eichelberger concluded with a comment about how ‘in the old days before military strategy naturally became his first concern, I had some rare moments with the President when I could talk over organisation problems with him’. While he acknowledged that it would be impossible at the moment, he requested any advice McIntyre, or even the President, could give. The President understood Eichelberger’s real message, agreeing that he would like to see him some day, but the only advice he offered was almost certainly not what the internationalist wanted to hear. With regard to future plans, the President urged that McIntyre tell him ‘for heaven’s sake not to do anything specific at this time – as things are changing every day’. This lack of leadership from the White House greatly

20 ibid.
21 Ibid., ReQua to Shotwell, 2 May 1942, 120183, Box 548, CEA; Eichelberger memo, 7/8 July 1942, 120210, Box 548, CEA; Mrs Harrison Thomas to CSOP Regional Committees, 2 September 1942, 123495, Box 564, CEA; Eichelberger memo, 1 October 1942, 123505, Box 564, CEA.
frustrated the internationalists, who wanted concrete proposals to promote to the public. While they continued with their own research through the CsoP, they were reluctant to issue any proclamations that might not meet with official approval. Yet at such an early stage in the war, the successful prosecution of the war was Roosevelt’s first priority. Indeed, there was no possibility of any statement from the White House on the shape of the postwar world at this time.22

Eichelberger reacted to Roosevelt’s unwillingness to provide direction by continuing to keep in close contact with Sumner Welles. Within days, Eichelberger had written to Welles for another favour, requesting copies of the weekly Federal Communications Commission analysis of official foreign broadcasts, which would include the comments of various Governments on postwar aims and objectives. With circulation of the analysis highly restricted, Eichelberger hoped that a word from the Under-secretary would win him access. Unfortunately, the State Department’s Division of Current Information, while acknowledging that ‘Mr. Eichelberger is very helpful in many ways’, argued that the weekly analysis should remain confidential. While Eichelberger had friends within the State Department and was in regular contact with Welles, that was still no guarantee that he would receive preferential treatment ahead of other non-Governmental sources, particularly, as in this case, the press.23

Welles did however receive a glowing telegram from Eichelberger in response to his memorial Day speech from a rlington Cemetery, in which Welles criticised the ‘unenlightened selfishness’ of the United States for not joining the League of Nations. Welles also claimed that the United Nations would become the basis of a new international organisation, responsible for postwar reconstruction and the creation of a just and lasting peace. ‘I cannot find language adequate to describe the significance of your address’, Eichelberger proclaimed, adding that ‘the main points of your speech could become the basis of the programme of education in this country which we have anticipated on previous talks’. Of course, the views of Welles did not necessarily represent the official line from the State Department, but the speech was widely reported, largely in a positive light.24

Eichelberger continued his correspondence with the Office in the run-up to UN Day, and the Government office seemed more than happy with the efforts of the private organisations. Office campaign coordinator Anthony Hyde complimented Eichelberger on ‘a swell job – you’ve covered a lot of fertile ground’. Not only were

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22 Eichelberger to McIntyre, 21 May 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Roosevelt memo to McIntyre, 25 May 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
23 Roosevelt memo to McIntyre, 25 May 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Eichelberger to Welles, 28 May 1942, Box 78, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL; M.J. McDermott to Welles, 3 June 1942, Box 78, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
24 Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 333; Eichelberger to Welles, 31 May 1942, Box 78, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
the internationalists publicising their own material, the off used them to send out printed copies of Vice-President Henry Wallace’s ‘Century of the Common man’ speech. The internationalists were playing exactly the role that they were hoping to play: working in cooperation with the Government with similar goals in mind. The internationalists retained autonomy at all times, but were more than willing to help an administration they felt was moving in the right direction. Nevertheless, the role remained a limited one, as no precise plans for the future were being publicised.25

Despite the increased role of the internationalists, concern resurfaced during the summer over the name of the League of Nations association. With the increasing use of the phrase United Nations, especially after UN Day, the old League of Nations title seemed ever more passé. Mrs. Emmons Blaine, a key figure in the internationalist movement, announced she was withdrawing support from the LNA in order to fully support the United Nations. In June, CSO P Midwest director John Van de Water suggested changing the name of the organisation to the United Nations association. Van de Water felt that ‘as far as the Midwest and probably the national psychology is concerned, we can best serve Woodrow Wilson’s objectives under a banner which, to the public mind, holds much greater virility’. LNA executive committee chairman Hugh Moore spoke to polling expert Dr George Gallup regarding the subject and Gallup advised against the change of name. He argued that it was unlikely to be the name of any future organisation as the Axis powers would be unwilling to join the collection of nations that had defeated them.26

With the LNA still reluctant to give up on the League, and with no real certainty that ‘United Nations’ would become the name of the postwar international organisation, the League of Nations association name remained. However, Eichelberger was clearly concerned about the popularity of the term, and, as he later put it, ‘it seemed necessary to protect it from commercialisation’ and ‘exploiters’. In order to do this, Eichelberger, along with Melvin Hildreth (director of the LNA’s Washington chapter), secured a charter in Washington DC, incorporating the United Nations association. Even if the LNA was not yet prepared to use the ‘United Nations’ name, they ensured that no one else would be able to either.27

The developments within the LNA since the beginning of the war were distilled into a new July policy statement reflecting the organisation’s vision for the future, as well as its ties to the past. Apart from the need for complete military victory, it stated that the United Nations must ‘guide the world during the period of reconstruction and become the nucleus of a universal society of nations. The United

25 Litchfield to Eichelberger, 3 June 1942, Box 56, CEP; Hyde to Eichelberger, 8 June 1942, Box 56, CEP; Pringle to Eichelberger, 17 June 1942, Box 56, CEP.

26 Divine, Second Chance, p. 55; Van de Water to Eichelberger, 17 June 1942, 120199, Box 548, CEA; Moore to Shotwell, 22 June 1942, Box 34, JSP.

27 Eichelberger, Organizing for Peace, pp. 209–10, 241; Leting to Moore, 20 May 1943, Folder 24, Box 24, HMFC.
nations should be organized now to plan every phase of postwar reconstruction’.
the peace was to be based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and the United
States would be required to contribute fully.28
However, the LNA’s ties to the past and refusal to give up on the League meant
that the policy statement also contained the hope that the League of Nations, the
international labour organisation, and the World Court ‘should be utilized by the
United Nations to every extent practicable’. While it was acknowledged that the
machinery of the League was by no means perfect, it represented a beginning and
offered valuable experience that could be utilised by the new society of nations.
However, despite this call for the creation of the new international organisation,
LNA policy remained vague, and contained little beyond the call to replace the
League with a new organisation. Specific proposals for the future were still nowhere
to be seen, and the internationalism offered was little more than a general vision.
Yet again the LNA refused to go further than the Government, and its conception
of internationalism remained vague and lacking in detail.29
With no concrete proposals to build upon, the LNA statement closed with a
four-point programme for the future. Firstly, the LNA would work with the CSOP
to inform and strengthen public discussion and debate. In addition, it would
work with other like-minded organisations to form committees in support of the
United Nations. The association would also continue its educational programme,
and asked for cooperation from all Americans; effectively appealing for new
members. At no point did the policy or programme mention the aim of making
connections within the Government, or the LNA’s frequent tactic of asking the
Roosevelt administration for advice and direction. His was almost certainly to
avoid criticism from the isolationist press that the organisation was merely a front
for the administration. Although the association retained its independence at all
times, the appearance of a close relationship with the White House would have
dented the group’s credibility.30
Nevertheless, the LNA continued to court interest from within the
administration. In one of its last meetings before an inactive summer, Hugh
Moore wrote to the off’s Arthur Sweetser to invite him to an LNA meeting at
the end of July where there would be discussion of any potential name change and
committee re-organisation. In an example of the constant internationalist quest
for credibility, Moore informed Sweetser that Ben Gerig from the Department of
State would also be in attendance. Not only were Government contacts important
for the internationalists, it was deemed to make them more important to other
Government officials.31
Yet the most significant aspect of the summer did not relate to organisational
links with the Government, but specifically to Eichelberger’s personal links

29 ibid.
30 ibid.
31 Moore to Sweetser, 13 July 1942, Folder 23, Box 24, HMFC.
with the Roosevelt administration. In July, he was invited by Sumner Welles to become a consultant to the State Department with regard to postwar planning for an international organisation. For almost a year, Eichelberger and the CSO’s James Shotwell played a part in the postwar planning for the United Nations, giving them a personal stake in the success of the future plans. This strengthened Eichelberger’s personal support for the Roosevelt administration’s plans, but this support increasingly limited his private organisational work, as the LNA continued to go no further than the Government; nor did it promote alternative blueprints for international organisation.32

By October, the LNA had regrouped and begun preparations for an active winter, with Eichelberger setting out proposals for the coming months. Reminding the LNA board of the UN Committee set up in the spring, it was put forward that existing groups such as the LNA, the CSOP, the Church Peace Union and the Free World Association could supply local UN committees with information and literature regarding the United Nations and the Atlantic Charter. There was a suggestion to create yet another committee to coordinate these activities, but it was initially rejected. However, the idea of such an umbrella committee would immediately resurface.33

A coordinating committee was quickly deemed necessary because Eichelberger saw the UN Committee as not only an additional outlet for LNA and CSO P material, but also as adding to the LNA’s claim to the name ‘United Nations Association’. The cooperation would promote greater understanding of the United States’ contribution to the war effort, develop public opinion behind an international organisation, and commit the US public and Congress to support such an organisation before the end of the war.34

In the hope of finally moving beyond such broad aims, the meeting was followed up by Eichelberger’s request to Roosevelt for the meeting that the President had agreed to in principle back in May. The internationalist leader hoped for further direction not just on the state of plans for the future peace and international organisation, but also on the private internationalist campaign. Referring to Roosevelt’s recent address, Eichelberger argued that there were ‘many ways in which we could help now in the urgent task of preventing the rise of isolationism’. Requesting Roosevelt’s ‘advice and counsel’, Eichelberger arranged to meet with the President for half an hour in the first week of November.35

32 Eichelberger’s and Shotwell’s State Department role will be discussed at length in Chapter 3.
33 LNA Board meeting minutes, 17 October 1942, Box 34, JSP.
34 Ibid.
35 Eichelberger to Roosevelt, 19 October 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Edwin Watson to Eichelberger, 22 October 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Eichelberger to Watson, 24 October, 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
the appointment was unfortunately, though understandably, cancelled due to preparations for the allied landings in north africa on 8 november (about which Eichelberger enthused that ‘the word “magnificent” is not strong enough to describe the grand strategy of our military initiative’). Eichelberger spoke instead to Vice-President wallace, and argued that the opening of the second front made it all the more important for him to meet with the President, as postwar issues were more vital than ever. Wallace in turn asked Eichelberger to write him five pages of material on the United nations that he could use in a forthcoming speech celebrating woodrow wilson’s birthday.36

eichelberger’s meeting with the President was rearranged and he returned to washington to meet with roosevelt on 13 november. for eichelberger the meeting was a great success. not only was he able to outline his intentions for the Ina, but he also heard in considerable detail the President’s provisional plans for a future international organisation. For the first time in three years, Eichelberger had the ear of the President, and he took full advantage of the opportunity. In eichelberger’s own words, ‘the comprehensiveness of his outline of plans for the future and the fact that he saw me when he was so busy, all indicate that he wanted me to be fully informed and was counting on our support’.38

Perhaps the most important revelation during the meeting came when roosevelt outlined his plan for the ‘four policemen’ – the US, the United Kingdom, the soviet Union and China – that would patrol and disarm the rest of the world. eichelberger was surprised, but roosevelt reassured him that machinery would be set up for a new international organisation to support the four policemen, and that the machinery would come before the end of the war in order to avoid the mistakes of 1919 and 1920. Eichelberger, as ever, was keen not to underestimate the task

36 Eichelberger to Watson, 9 November 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, f Drl.
37 Notes of meeting with Wallace, 7 November 1942, Welles Committee folder, Box 198, Ce P.
38 eichelberger report on 13 november 1942 meeting with roosevelt, 16 november 1942, Interviews with FDR folder, Box 198, CEP.
ahead, claiming that the job ahead for internationalist organisations was ten times greater than that facing the League to Enforce Peace at the end of World War i.39

Unsurprisingly, Eichelberger was equally interested in Roosevelt’s plans for the League of Nations. Much to his relief, Roosevelt suggested keeping the successful autonomous organisations, such as the International Labour Organisation and the League’s health organisation, and incorporating them into the new organisation. Nevertheless, Eichelberger was still concerned that the President had not given sufficient thought to the future of the World Court; in addition, he later considered the need for an international economic organisation and the need for a further executive council to tie all the autonomous agencies together.40

As well as listening to the President’s ideas on postwar planning, Eichelberger took the opportunity to ask how he and the internationalists could immediately set about winning the peace in the minds of the people. Roosevelt commented that in 1920 when promoting the League, he never spoke to the unconverted, spending most of his time speaking to women’s groups, churches, and internationalists. Eichelberger agreed that the internationalists spent too much time talking to each other, and that he was especially keen to speak with interest group leaders such as the Congress of Industrial Organisations’ John L. Lewis, the American Federation of Labour’s William Green, and also to James Patton of the National Farmers Union. By building up a close network of interest groups, such as they had during the debates prior to Pearl Harbor, the internationalists could spearhead efforts to mobilise public opinion, providing the appearance of a broad spectrum of support at the very least. At best, they could make a significant difference to the state of public opinion.41

Roosevelt agreed that the internationalists should make a special effort to mobilise support among groups not traditionally aligned behind internationalist policies, and take advantage of all meetings to emphasise the importance of the United States’ place in a future world organisation. Roosevelt even suggested that he didn’t mind some trial balloons to test the winds of public opinion, providing they were not attributed to him. Eichelberger eagerly replied that this was what the internationalists wanted to do.42

Indeed, this was the ultimate approval for Eichelberger. Arguably in agreement with the President on provisional ideas regarding international organisation, the internationalists could go out and promote those ideas to the public, knowing that they were the thoughts of the President and no longer abstract notions for a distant future. After almost a year of silence, Eichelberger knew he and the internationalists

39 ibid.
40 ibid.
42 Eichelberger report on 13 November 1942 meeting with Roosevelt, 16 November 1942, Interviews with FDR folder, Box 198, CEP.
were working in the right direction. No longer confined to such vague statements, the internationalists could begin to make a difference to public opinion.\footnote{ibid.}

At the end of his conversation, having been given more time than he expected, Eichelberger brought up the question of his organisations and the name of any future international organisation. \footnote{ibid.} Although Roosevelt was noncommittal when Eichelberger hinted that ‘the United Nations’ might be the name of the new world body, he accepted that the old LNA name might no longer prove effective in mobilising opinion. He also agreed that Eichelberger should recommend to the LNA Board that the LNA and CSOP work together under the new name ‘United Nations association’. Eichelberger’s decision to secure the United Nations association name had paid off.\footnote{ibid.}

The most peculiar aspect of the meeting with Roosevelt was the nature of the exchange. Where you might expect the leader of a private organisation to take advantage of such a meeting to pursue that organisation’s objectives, Eichelberger primarily used the appointment to listen, and to absorb the official line from the President. For Roosevelt to approve of LNA policies was one thing, for him to have the casting vote was another altogether, and it appeared that with regard to the name at least, the President had the final say. While Eichelberger did have opinions on issues such as the world Court, he declined to raise them in person. His passivity suggests that instead of counting on the LNA for support, Roosevelt could afford to take the LNA for granted. The Association was willing to support any White House initiatives, quibbling only over details that were still open for discussion. The LNA relied on the Government for legitimacy, while the Government still had very little specific need for the LNA.

Nevertheless, for the first time since Pearl Harbor, the movement had direction, and the internationalists moved swiftly to capitalise upon it. The end of October saw the announcement of a Coordinating Council of United Nations Committees to promote the formation of United Nations Committees throughout the country. The Council consisted of five existing internationalist committees, including the LNA, the CsoP, Citizens for Victory, the Free World Association, and the Church Peace Union. All were located at 8 West 40th Street in New York, and Eichelberger played a key role in all bar the latter. Membership of the Council consisted of established internationalist leaders such as Eichelberger, Shotwell, Frank Boudreau, Dr. Henry Atkinson, Hugh Moore, Frederick McKee, W.W. Waymack, and chairman Florence Harriman. The aim of the committees was to educate the public about the issues behind the war, war aims, and ‘the means for removing causes of future wars’. It was argued that the United Nations must become more than simply a wartime alliance in order to win the peace as well as the war. The committees would spread the message through meetings, radio programmes, and publications, including copies of Welles’ Memorial Day speech. The Council hoped to work with other interest groups (as suggested by Eichelberger to Roosevelt) initially
including the national federation of Business and Professional women’s Clubs, the YWCA, and the International Students Service. None of these, however, represented the unconverted.45

Eichelberger also utilised a conference of the Progressive education association in New York to hint at some of the details he had received from the President. In addition to the usual pleas to avoid the mistakes of 1919 and 1920 by creating a new organisation before the end of hostilities, he commented on the serious problems of reconstruction that would face the world after the war, and argued that a ‘tremendous job of policing’ would be necessary. Following up on the United Nations Committees, he urged teachers to conduct forums and discussions on the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the future of the United Nations.46

Eichelberger kept James Shotwell informed of the role of the CSOP in the growing educational campaign. It was noted that the CSOP now had thirteen national centres for education and research, which serviced some nine hundred study groups, and sixty national organisations, from the American Federation of Labour to the American association of University women. The Commission was continually expanding its reach and the network of private groups that had now distributed over two million pieces of literature. It was also noted with satisfaction that CSOP material was now being used by forty Government agencies. It appeared that the Commission was having an effect on both the shape of the future peace and the popular opinion that was necessary to support it.47

The internationalists were particularly enthused when news reports suggested Roosevelt would raise the question of international organisation in his State of the Union address at the beginning of January. Eichelberger immediately wrote to the President, claiming that the public would ‘be receptive if you outline with characteristic boldness your plans for international machinery’. He argued that the announcement of a detailed plan would not only silence the isolationists but also that specific proposals would make it easier for the internationalists to mobilise public opinion. This comment in particular displayed Eichelberger’s strategy of waiting for official proposals from the Government and taking a reactive stance rather than pushing forward with independent ideas.48

At the same time, the news of Roosevelt’s intentions provided Eichelberger with a dilemma. With the intention of widening the internationalist reach and the private network as he had discussed with Roosevelt, the internationalists had arranged for labour, business and farm representatives to attend a private conference on 3 January in New York. The intention was to anticipate isolationist economic arguments that might arise within those sectors of society and to discuss plans...
for future organisation. Now, however, it seemed like a good idea to postpone the meeting until after Roosevelt’s speech to make more specific plans and build on the President’s hopefully inspirational words. Eichelberger, showing an excessive reliance on the Government, asked both Marvin McIntyre and Sumner Welles for advice on how to proceed, clearly hoping that the former would ask Roosevelt himself.\textsuperscript{49}

Welles responded on 26 December, suggesting that the meeting be postponed until after Roosevelt’s message. Similarly, Roosevelt advised McIntyre on 30 December that the meeting should probably be put off until the beginning of February. Despite the President’s advice, it was too late to delay the conference, as some of the invited leaders were already en route from the West Coast. As a result, the nature of the meeting was to be altered so that it would focus on public opinion rather than specific blueprints for the future. It was to be a private meeting and Eichelberger informed McIntyre that no statement would be issued until after Roosevelt’s speech and until he had had an opportunity to discuss the conference with the White House. He also hoped to be able to discuss the details of the conference with Welles during a trip to Washington.\textsuperscript{50}

At the close of 1942, the internationalists of the LNA could look back on a year of limited success. Overall, they had spent most of the year reacting to Government announcements and seeking official endorsements and in doing so had become dependent on the Roosevelt Administration. To a large extent, the internationalists had been left to reiterate the same limited and vague points regarding the creation of a new international organisation as soon as possible and basing it upon the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The lack of direction from the White House, although unsurprising at such an early stage in the war, had limited the internationalist programme. While the internationalists privately supported specific proposals and held strong views on issues such as the future of the World Court, they appeared all too willing to compromise them in anticipation of formal plans from the Government to promote. Surprisingly for a private organisation and individuals, the LNA, and Eichelberger in particular, spent an exceptional amount of time listening to the Government rather than attempting to impress its own plans upon the Government. Yet the Government did not announce any specific (or even general) proposals for an international organisation in 1942, and the internationalists did not press for such plans. As a result, the concept of

\textsuperscript{49} Eichelberger to McIntyre, 22 December 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Eichelberger to Welles, 22 December 1942, Box 78, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.

\textsuperscript{50} Welles to Eichelberger, 26 December 1942, Box 78, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL; Roosevelt to McIntyre, 30 December 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Eichelberger to McIntyre, 31 December 1942, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Eichelberger to Welles, 31 December 1942, Box 78, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
Internationalism remained extremely vague. There were no policies or initiatives to build upon; merely the promise of international cooperation.

This was just how Roosevelt wanted it, as he was unwilling to push public opinion too far. Yet the LNA was also reluctant to push too far ahead of public opinion, even though the Government was happy to use such private organisations to mobilise public opinion on its behalf. Unwilling to put forward concrete alternatives, the organisation spent 1942 operating as little more than an informal information agency of the Roosevelt administration.

Here were, however, a number of reasons for optimism going into 1943, even if all had caveats attached. Firstly, in bureaucratic terms, the private organisations promoting the broad United Nations were no longer limited to those concerned solely with foreign policy. As in the debates prior to Pearl Harbor, internationalists in 1942 had begun to develop a network of private organisations to reach all sectors of society. In the mobilisation of public opinion, interest groups across the United States were being targeted by the internationalists with meetings, speeches and literature, with the aim, as Roosevelt had put it, of reaching and preaching to the unconverted. As 1943 began, this network was set to expand behind the policies of the internationalists and the White House. With a growing base of support, the educational campaign that had started so slowly in 1942 would gain momentum, and at last have specific policies to support, even if most of those policies were emanating from the Government. In addition, despite Eichelberger’s early fears of the job ahead, the end of 1942 saw both the educational campaign and general postwar planning far ahead of any comparable position during World War I. However, it remained to be seen if the private internationalist organisations could work together, or whether egos, personalities, and organisational rivalries would get in the way of effective cooperation, shifting the focus from conceptions of internationalism to bureaucratic questions of organisation in the process.

Secondly, by the end of 1942, the internationalist movement was committed to the United Nations concept. Even though it was still seen primarily as a military alliance by many, internationalist leaders had realised the potential of the new collection of nations, and the willingness of the public to support it. Despite strong attachments to the League of Nations, stretching in most cases over two decades, there was growing confidence that the successful aspects of the League would be incorporated into the new organisation. Although the LNA name remained, internationalists were wise not to hold too tightly to the past. The beginning of 1943 would see even greater commitment to the United Nations concept from the internationalists as they fought to ensure the creation of an international organisation. However, the specific details of that organisation still remained painfully unclear.

Finally, with regard to the course of the war, events were now moving favourably for the United States. As the war would progress, postwar planning would develop, and the internationalists could expand on the relationships they had made in both the White House and the State Department during the first year of the war. Government agencies, while reluctant to give extensive access to the
internationalists, clearly began to realise that the private groups were a useful ally for the future, even if only as a promotional tool. Admittedly, the question of whether the private organisations would prove able to influence the Government’s thinking remained unanswered. But the involvement of Clark Eichelberger and James Shotwell as individuals in State Department postwar planning was unquestionable, and it would shape their attitudes towards international organisation.
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Chapter 3

shared aims:

Eichelberger, Shotwell and the State Department

Given their life-long commitment to addressing problems of world peace and security, and their desire for an international organisation, it was no surprise that both James Shotwell and Clark Eichelberger were given the opportunity to contribute to the official Government postwar planning process in 1942. It is also unsurprising that they seized the opportunity with both hands, invited to join the State Department’s expanding attempts at postwar planning by Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles, the private internationalist leaders joined forces with the state for almost a year to develop the outline of a future international organisation. During this time, they became closely entwined with the Government’s line of thinking. At the same time, Eichelberger retained his role with private organisations, particularly the LNA, and Shotwell continued his work with the CSOP.

The State Department’s postwar planning process actually began in 1939, but it was only with US entry into the war that considerations moved into high gear with Secretary of State Cordell Hull establishing an advisory committee on postwar foreign policy. In addition to including a handful of State Department officials, including Leo Pasvolsky, a number of members from outside the government were chosen, mostly members of the Council on Foreign Relations. It was a privilege to be asked to participate in the advisory committee and its numerous sub-committees, which is where Shotwell and Eichelberger contributed.

In many respects, Shotwell was an obvious choice. Having worked with the Inquiry – the group of scholars who advised Woodrow Wilson on the peace preparations of World War I – it was no great surprise to be asked again, especially given the desire to avoid the failures of 1919–20. Indeed, Shotwell compared the experience to that of World War I, claiming that he felt closer to the decision-making process second time around. Eichelberger was included for a number of reasons. The Roosevelt administration was fully aware of his decade and a half of knowledge and expertise gained in supporting the League of Nations, and this experience was deemed essential in helping to avoid the mistakes of that organisation. As an internationalist, sympathetic to the Government’s aims, he was an ideal candidate to join the administration’s postwar planning bureaucracy. His loyalty was such that despite the privileged information Eichelberger worked with, he never abused his position within the official planning sphere. Even in his numerous speeches, press releases and radio addresses as LNA director, he
rarely even hinted at the secret details being worked out in the State Department. Eichelberger’s loyalty to the Government was complete.¹

It is here, however, that the line between state and private spheres begins to blur. The closeness of the relationship between both men and the Government affected their actions, and those of the private organisations they led, during their time with the State Department and throughout the remainder of the war. The relationship clearly affected the autonomy of Eichelberger’s organisations in particular. His intimate connections to the Government, created during 1942 and 1943, limited the critical output of his organisations throughout the remainder of the war. The autonomy of his private organisations was restricted in two ways.

Firstly, they were affected by the tremendous access they received within the official planning process. After being so closely involved with that process, Eichelberger hoped to remain close to the State Department for a number of reasons. The primary reason was that it remained the best way to influence official policy. After all, Eichelberger learned during his year with the State Department that it was possible to play a significant role in the postwar planning process, even if it was on a personal rather than an organisational basis. If he remained close to the Government, similar opportunities could arise. In addition, he believed that White House and State Department connections would enhance the credibility of his organisations; it never crossed his mind that they might be perceived as Government stooges. As a result, he made every effort to maintain close and friendly connections with the Government.

The second reason related to personal involvement and interest. Neither man was likely to criticise proposals they had personally played a part in drafting. While they might have been willing to do so if the postwar planning strategy had shifted following his departure, the plans remained agreeable. While there were some minor issues that could be raised with the Government’s proposals, the official planning process went a considerable way to creating both men’s dream: United States involvement in an international organisation. This coincidence of views kept both Shotwell and Eichelberger close to, and uncritical of, the Roosevelt administration for the remainder of the war.

There is no doubt that Eichelberger in particular looked to Roosevelt and the State Department for direction and advice on a number of occasions during the war, a pattern that continued even after the war finished and the United Nations was created. Yet this does not automatically mean that he was a Government stooge, or that his organisations were merely fronts for the State Department. He supported Government policies because he believed they were the best way to bring the United States into a world organisation. He shared mutual aims of the state and the private internationalists created an unusually close and cooperative partnership, one that was seen as suspiciously subservient by other more critical

private activists. It was during their time working with State Department that this relationship became exceptionally close.

Eichelberger was understandably excited to join in the official postwar planning process, as he had been urging the Government to plan for peace since before it was even involved in the war. As early as April 1941, less than a month after the passage of the Lend-Lease Act and before the Atlantic Charter, Eichelberger urged President Roosevelt to begin planning a New Deal for the world. Noting the rapid movement of global events and the discussion of peace plans in the press, Eichelberger urged that the President begin preparation of peace plans before the isolationist elements in Congress took the initiative. More important for Eichelberger was that the statement of peace aims would alert American opinion to the need to participate in the creation of the future peace. Not for the first time, Eichelberger invoked the events of 1919 and 1920: ‘This time the American people must be prepared in advance for the responsibilities of peace’. The United States’ failure to join the League of Nations provided the example that must not be repeated. To avoid a similar fate, Eichelberger urged that an official advisory committee be set up immediately.²

Roosevelt’s response noted that work was already in progress on future plans, and that work was strengthened by the support of private citizens, as individuals or in groups. His clearly suggested to Eichelberger that interested and knowledgeable private individuals would enhance the official postwar planning effort. He received a similar message after Pearl Harbor from Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, who strongly hinted that Eichelberger would be invited to participate in postwar planning.³

Of course, Eichelberger was already involved in private efforts at postwar planning through the work of the CSOP, headed by Shotwell since it began in 1939. The CSOP had already issued a Preliminary Report on the need to establish a new world order in 1941, and its second report was issued in February 1942. Meeting once a month, the CSOP continued its work through 1942 as Shotwell and Eichelberger were brought into the planning process. Indeed, Shotwell retired from Columbia University in June 1942 to focus more exclusively on the postwar planning process.⁴

When the pace of the planning process increased following US entry into the war, Welles reiterated his suggestion to Eichelberger at a January 1942 meeting where he explained the official machinery for postwar planning. Welles outlined the State Department’s proposed committee, of which Secretary of State Cordell Hull would be chairman and Welles would be vice-chairman. He overall

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² Eichelberger to Roosevelt, 6 April 1941, Welles Committee ‘42 folder, Box 152, CEP; Roosevelt to Eichelberger, 12 May 1941, Welles Committee ‘42 folder, Box 152, CEP.
committee contained a number of sub-committees, including one on international organisation that would be headed by Welles.5

Welles stated that when the committee was functioning, he wanted Eichelberger to work in ‘the closest, most intimate relationship to it’, a suggestion that delighted Eichelberger. Although Welles was about to leave for South America, he told Eichelberger to contact Hull if he needed to get in touch with the Department, a suggestion that pleased him further as he expected to be dealing with a minor official. The fact that the State Department was clearly firmly in charge of postwar planning, and that the process was being led by Hull and Welles, pleased Eichelberger greatly. He felt that only the full, centralised authority of the State Department could prevent a ‘Colonel House’ situation developing as in 1919. Far more pleasing though was Eichelberger’s personal involvement in the planning process. After years of promoting the League of Nations and initiatives such as the World Court through private organisations, he was finally involved in state planning for an international organisation. Shotwell was also invited onto the international organisation committee, but given his expertise and experience, he also participated in three other subcommittees dealing with political, legal and security problems. Although being brought into formal Government planning was less of a novelty for Shotwell, it was no less of a privilege.6

It was at this January meeting when Welles first raised the issue of the relationship between the official planning process and the private organisations led by Eichelberger and Shotwell, a relationship that would blur traditional lines between state and private. Welles was impressed by the continued work of the INA and the CSO P, and even the development of Citizens for Victory, all of which focused on postwar planning. Welles then noted that by bringing Eichelberger into the official planning process, he could direct the educational programmes of his organisations along the lines of State Department thinking. Even at this early stage, Welles clearly saw Eichelberger’s organisations as allies in the battle to educate American public opinion.

Where some private organisational leaders might have avoided such close links to the Government for fear of being labelled as fronts or stooges, Eichelberger took great encouragement and direction from them. In fact, one of the most impressive points from his meeting with Welles was that he ‘was given as clear a mandate as I could under the circumstances to go ahead and start the educational programme’. Where most private organisations throughout history have sought to impose their agenda upon the Government, Eichelberger looked to the state to confirm his private agenda.7

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5 Eichelberger, Organizing for Peace, pp. 195–7; notes from interview with Sumner Welles, 7 January 1942, Welles Committee ’42 folder, Box 152, CEP.

6 ibid., Josephson, James T. Shotwell and the rise of internationalism in America, p. 246.

7 notes from interview with Sumner Welles, 7 January 1942, Welles Committee ’42 folder, Box 152, CEP.
in July 1942, Eichelberger and Shotwell were formally invited to become consultants to the State Department. They served together on the subcommittee on international organisation, which also included Welles as chairman; Isaiah Bowman, president of Johns Hopkins University; Ben Gerig, formerly of the League of Nations Secretariat; Green Hackworth and Breckenridge Long of the State Department; and Ben Cohen of the White House staff. Between July 1942 and June 1943, the subcommittee met forty-five times, with Eichelberger missing only two of those meetings. During that time, he played a significant role in the development of what became the first draft of the United Nations. Shotwell, whose attendance was more limited due to both health reasons and other commitments, nevertheless played a key role in the discussions. Added to his experience, his involvement in four subcommittees meant he held greater influence than Eichelberger. Shotwell also had a decade-long and positive relationship with Cordell Hull. On occasion the advisory Committee consisted of little more than Shotwell lecturing to the rest of the group.8

Nevertheless, it quickly became apparent that Eichelberger’s role in the subcommittee was not simply to be a passive observer. He took full advantage of his opportunity within the State Department to play an active and actual role in the drafting process. One of the first issues addressed was the question of trusteeship. In an attempt to improve the mandate system of the League of Nations, the subcommittee spent a considerable amount of time on the issue. Eichelberger drafted the final version of the plan, which was adopted by the larger overall political committee led by Hull with very few suggestions for revision. His early success greatly encouraged Eichelberger as he took the opportunity to contribute to the working draft of the new charter. Especially pleasing was Senator Warren Austin’s comment that the draft was ‘a work of genius’.9

Other issues deemed integral to the draft charter included the relationship between the new organisation and autonomous bodies such as the International Labour Organisation, and the question of membership in the new organisation. On the latter issue, it was decided to give the council of the new organisation the authority to determine membership, rather than to make membership automatic. This issue would clearly prove to be a major flaw in the United Nations for decades, keeping some European nations and China out for years. Nevertheless, it reveals how plans drafted during this early planning period remained as significant elements of what became the United Nations Charter.10

Progress on a first draft continued apace through 1942, and Eichelberger felt privileged to play a role in such an important committee and participate in official Government planning. The project was so important and the task so large that a

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8 Pasvolsky to Eichelberger, 8 July 1942, Welles Committee ’42 folder, Box 152, Ce P; Eichelberger, Organizing for Peace, p. 199; PIO Minutes, Box 85, Records of Harley Otter, r G59, na CP.
9 eichelberger, Organizing for Peace, pp. 200-203.
10 ibid.
suggestion was put forward to hold two meetings of the subcommittee a week. By
November, Eichelberger expressed disbelief that they were ‘so far along the road
on the writing of our Government’s views on what the next covenant should be.’
By the end of March 1943, the committee had a complete rough draft of a charter
for a new organisation.11

Through his membership of the subcommittee, Eichelberger became aware
of the differing shades of opinion within the Roosevelt administration regarding
international organisation, and how best to promote it to the public. By the end of
1942, Roosevelt was polling opinion within his administration and in Congress
about how far to move forward in speaking out on postwar issues. Secretary of
State Hull was seen as the most cautious advisor with regard to moving ahead of
public opinion. This was to Eichelberger’s despair, as he saw two drawbacks to
Hull’s timidity. The first was that an all-out offensive was seen as the best way to
defeat the isolationist opposition: ‘when in doubt about public opinion, present
the boldest plan’. Secondly, he was concerned that the public was not being made
aware of the detailed planning of the State Department, especially liberals who
were criticising the Department’s lack of action. While Eichelberger did not
suggest that the exact details be given away, he argued that

the knowledge that the plans are being formulated and that they were liberal and
far-reaching would silence much of the criticism of the Department. The liberals
do not think the Department is doing anything, and the isolationists think the
plans are being formulated in deep dark secrecy. Neither of course is correct.12

While Eichelberger was correct in stating that the Department’s plans were
well underway, there was a large degree of secrecy. In addition to Hull’s reluctance
to publicise the plans, Roosevelt also remained cautious about releasing details at
this point, so the public remained largely unaware of the State Department plans.
Although Eichelberger was the leader of the LNA, even he could not promote the
Department’s confidential efforts through his organisations. This limitation blurred
the state–private divide still further. At the same time that Eichelberger worked for
the State Department, he still represented a number of private organisations not
only working to educate the public but also to pressure the Government. Yet during
Eichelberger’s time with the Government, there was almost no criticism of it from
the supposedly private organisations that he led. The autonomy of his organisations
was clearly affected by his access to and relationship with the Government.

These concerns were rather less of an issue for Shotwell, as the COSP was
much more of an elite collection of individuals than the mass membership
organisation of the LNA. The Commission had always been more about using
elites to influence elites in government than educating the public, which was a key
part of the LNA’s raison d’etre. As director of the association, Eichelberger was

11 Notes of meeting, 7 November 1942, Welles Committee folder, Box 198, CEP.
12 Notes of meeting, 22 December 1942, Welles Committee folder, Box 198, CEP.
more concerned than Shotwell with mobilising public opinion, and in order to do that some initial plans were necessary.

By 26 March 1943 a full draft constitution was complete, prepared by the international subcommittee with the exception of an Article on police powers written by the security committee and the article on the Bill of Rights composed by the legal committee. The former was of the greatest concern to both Welles and Eichelberger, who both felt that it set up a dictatorship of the four great powers: the US, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and China. Eichelberger, with his personal interest in trusteeship questions, was disappointed that the document contained nothing regarding the international control of strategic locations, such as the Suez and Panama canals. He also expressed concern, as he did throughout the war, that the security committee had not considered an international army. He argued that if smaller nations were to be deprived of some sovereignty in return for security, then they must be compensated by being given a role in that security system. Eichelberger also raised the question of an international air force, as he did throughout the war, but this issue was not taken further. These questions revealed the fact that Eichelberger was prepared to concede more national sovereignty, especially in the military sphere, than many others in the postwar planning process. It also revealed his more limited role within the committee. While his opinion was valued on all issues of international organisation, he was unable to significantly alter the agenda of his fellow State Department planners. Indeed, at this point in the discussions, Eichelberger was the only member of the subcommittee who was not on the main Saturday political committee on postwar planning.13

In comparison, although Shotwell argued for a strong international organisation, he was much more accepting of the four policemen idea. In fact, Shotwell had begun 1942 questioning the viability of a new world organisation, believing in something closer to a temporary ‘Anglo-American directorate’, but his confidence in the idea evolved as planning progressed. Shotwell was particularly impressed that despite deliberate efforts to avoid echoing the League of Nations Covenant, the blueprints that emerged were very similar. As Shotwell described it, ‘it was simply a statement of fundamental realities’.14

By June, personal animosity that had been growing privately between Hull and Welles became increasingly apparent to both Eichelberger and Shotwell, as it was clearly affecting postwar planning in a negative fashion. They became aware that Welles was being largely ignored in the Saturday meetings, as Hull would ask everyone present bar Welles for their opinions. In addition, Welles became even more frustrated with Hull’s emphasis on the broad principles of international organisation rather than specific details. Eichelberger saw Hull as ‘a force of resistance that must be overcome for any progressive action except in the field of

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13 Notes of meeting, 28 March 1943, Welles Committee folder, Box 153, CEP.
trade agreements’. As divisions between the two men grew, Eichelberger stood firmly in the Welles camp. This was hardly surprising given his relationship with Welles, their shared attitudes on the plans for the new international organisation, and their desire to promote those plans publicly, forcefully and immediately. However, if the relationship between Hull and Welles soured, Eichelberger’s position within the planning process would be under threat. Shotwell, who was close to both men, found the whole situation embarrassing, particularly the fact that Welles was clearly much closer to the President than his superior.\(^\text{15}\)

Nevertheless, both men remained confident that the work of the subcommittees was of the utmost importance, particularly the subcommittee on international organisation. Not only were they convinced that Welles saw it as the most important committee, but they knew that the President was fully aware of the subcommittee’s proposals. It became clear that Welles was taking the drafts of the subcommittee directly to Roosevelt, a fact that only increased the personal tension between Welles and Hull. For Eichelberger, this signified that for all of Hull’s vagueness, the subcommittee was not ‘working in a vacuum’ and that its ideas were being heard outside of Welles’ office. The fact that the President was aware of the subcommittee’s plans was of the utmost importance, and goes some way to explaining the loyalty of both Eichelberger and Shotwell to the Administration even after they left the planning committees. With the knowledge that Roosevelt supported the draft proposal, it seemed clear that an international organisation would emerge that built upon that draft, a proposal to which both internationalist leaders contributed. At one meeting, Welles confidentially informed the subcommittee that Roosevelt was in agreement with them, particularly on the division of power among the ‘Big Four’ great powers. Despite some reservations, from Eichelberger in particular, progress was being made towards a new international organisation, and there was no desire to impede that progress with private criticisms over relatively minor details.\(^\text{16}\)

Unfortunately for both men, the meeting of 26 June would be the last for the subcommittee on international organisation, and indeed it would be the end of postwar planning under the existing structure. Anxious to wrest control of postwar planning from Welles, Hull suspended the subcommittees at the beginning of July, supposedly to look over the results of the past year. Over the following weeks, Eichelberger received letters from the State Department informing him that no meetings were scheduled for the five weeks between 5 July and 3 August, and he visited Welles on 10 August to find out when the meetings would resume. Welles replied that the committees would restart in September, when they could continue the good work that had created a solid basis for an international organisation along the lines of the four-power pact. Eichelberger thanked Welles again for the


\(^{16}\) ibid.
opportunity that he had been given; Welles replied that ‘no one has been of more help to us’.  

Unfortunately, the meetings did not resume, as Welles resigned in mid-August. In the end, Hull forced Roosevelt to choose between them due to their personal differences. Stories in the press suggested the State Department was crippled by a feud between the two and, as both Eichelberger and Shotwell had seen, there was a degree of truth to the accusation. Hull resented Welles’ close relationship with the President, and the way that Welles continually went behind Hull’s back on policy issues. Presenting the President with the working draft of the charter for international organisation in early 1943 was just one example of Welles by-passing his superior.

Eichelberger was devastated on two levels by the resignation of Welles. Firstly, on a personal level, Welles had become a trusted friend, one whose views he had grown to value greatly over the past year. Welles was also Eichelberger’s closest ally in the State Department. Upon hearing of his resignation, he wrote to Welles to express his regret: ‘I simply cannot find words to tell you how deeply I regret your leaving. I hope you will continue to speak out as a private citizen, because your pronouncements on the postwar world have been listened to with more respect than any except those of the President himself’.

Of greater significance, though, was the effect of Welles’ resignation on the postwar planning process. The subcommittees of the previous year were wound up and Hull took firm control of the process from them on. This immediately and directly affected Eichelberger’s and Shotwell’s relationship with the Government, as neither was asked to return to the official postwar planning structure. As both men were close to Welles, Hull’s decision was hardly surprising. Never again would they play such a direct role in the creation of US policy.

Yet their close relationship with Welles was not the main reason for their departure from the official planning process. Under Hull’s leadership, all private citizens were removed from the planning process. As Eichelberger later recalled, one of the most remarkable things about the committees of 1942 and 1943 was that ‘official participation had been reduced to a minimum and instead private citizens had contributed their ideas’. While this exaggerated the openness of the State Department’s planning, some other private individuals had been involved in the committees; these included Issiah Bowman, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs; and Anne O’Hare McCormick of the New York Times. Yet this made Eichelberger no less proud of his involvement and achievement. As Shotwell later put it, the subcommittee created ‘the first blueprint … of a Charter for the United Nations’.

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17 Notes of meeting with Welles, 13 August 1943, Welles Committee folder, Box 153, CeP.
18 Eichelberger to Welles, August 23, 1943, Welles Committee folder, Box 153, CeP.
in the longer term, Eichelberger’s time with the State Department greatly affected his relationship – and that of his organisations – with the Government. Eichelberger returned to the private sphere as the director of numerous educational and political action groups, organisations whose sole purpose was to promote the United States’ entry into the new United Nations. As leader of those organisations, however, Eichelberger found himself unwilling to criticise the Government, because of his involvement in the considerable planning efforts of the previous year. Eichelberger was not one of the liberals openly and urgently calling for postwar planning, because he had seen it was already taking place, and had even participated in it. Not only was it taking place, but it was taking place to his satisfaction. While he still hoped for proposals on issues such as an international police force, he was largely satisfied with the progress of the plans for the new organisation.

The same was true of Shotwell. He too had vested a tremendous amount of time and effort in developing postwar plans, and he also saw them proceeding as well as could be expected. While some issues still needed clarification – and Shotwell was particularly concerned about the idea of veto power among the four policemen, as well as about plans to dismember Germany – he was largely satisfied with the progress made so far. Yet even Shotwell’s CSOP would go little further than the government in promoting a blueprint for the new organisation. However, as the CSOP was focused on research and had little public profile bar the press coverage that came with the issue of its reports, Shotwell did not feel as limited by his governmental connections. The sense of restriction was felt more clearly by Eichelberger, who had spent his life working to influence public opinion, and who was also more frustrated by the slow pace of the government’s planning process.20

Although Eichelberger was largely uncritical of the Government, he and his organisations could not be overly supportive either due to the confidential nature of the planning discussions. While Eichelberger was keen to promote the planned international organisation, he could not reveal any of the details he had been working with. The best that could be done within the private internationalist movement was to continue developing their own proposals, as Eichelberger and Shotwell would continue to do through the CSOP. However, the focus there was still very much on elite opinion, rather than mobilising mass public opinion. Even the release of a ‘trial balloon’ for public opinion purposes might be seen as a leak from official sources.

Such a release was unlikely, however, as the close relationship that had developed between Eichelberger and the Government made him extremely deferential to the Roosevelt administration. Following his spell with the State Department, Eichelberger became increasingly eager to clear the plans of his private organisations with the Government, and the White House in particular, especially following the departure of Welles. By the end of 1943, Eichelberger

asked Roosevelt whether a trial balloon on the issue of an international police force would assist the planning process. Roosevelt’s response was negative, so Eichelberger did not go ahead with the trial balloon despite his own personal support for the idea. Eichelberger also refused to criticise the administration in public, choosing instead to pass comments directly to the Government. Indeed, after his period with the Government, Eichelberger continued to act as if he was still working with it, in a state–private partnership.

This close connection would also affect the relationship between his organisations and other private internationalist groups. As attempts to unite internationalist organisations came and went in 1943 (as they would again in 1944), Eichelberger refused to join forces with individuals and organisations more critical of the Roosevelt administration. He also refused to support plans for an international organisation that differed radically from the plans he had seen created. For the remainder of the war, Eichelberger and his organisations would always support the Government’s plans against the criticisms of fellow internationalists.

Due to their shared aims, Eichelberger left the State Department having built up a close relationship with the Government and with a personal stake in the Government’s plans. For the remainder of the war, until the creation of the United Nations, Eichelberger’s behaviour, and therefore that of his organisations, was one of deference to the Roosevelt administration. For as long as both the state and the private organisations were working towards the same aim – creation of the United Nations – Eichelberger led his organisations in a willing state–private partnership in which the internationalists acted as an informal information agency for the Government.

However, in the short term, given the secret nature of the postwar planning process, there was no real information to promote in the first half of 1943. Eichelberger’s unwillingness to move ahead of Government proposals or discuss alternatives left little room for discussion of specific details in the private sphere. Internationalism would remain a vague and nebulous concept through 1943 and long into 1944.
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Chapter 4

Slow Progress: Selling Internationalism to the Public

By the beginning of 1943 internationalist leaders had cause to be optimistic about the future. With American troops making advances in North Africa and the Pacific, they could be increasingly confident that the postwar peace would be on Allied terms, and that the United States would have the opportunity to play a significant role in the creation of that peace. Throughout 1943 and the first half of 1944, however, the internationalist movement failed to gain any significant political influence and had only limited success in mobilising a mass public movement. Despite evidence from polls suggesting that public opinion was moving towards general support for international organisation, the internationalist movement seemed unable to translate that support into a significant popular force.

While internationalist leaders continued to develop closer links with the Government, those links continued to limit their output. The closer internationalists got to the Government, the less critical they became of the Government approach. Internationalist leaders continued to follow a remarkably cautious line, barely going further than the Government in educating public opinion, unwilling to risk an isolationist backlash to any substantial new proposals. While the promotional efforts of private organisations would increase dramatically over the following year and a half, internationalist leaders still reacted to initiatives from Washington rather than taking a strong public lead. As in the first year of the war, official approval and the potential of Government influence appeared all important.

Yet the most significant factor restricting the development of the internationalist programme at the beginning of 1943 was disagreement among movement leaders over how best to organise. The organisations of West 40th Street underwent a number of name changes as attempts were made to find the best way to educate public opinion and influence the Government. Yet none of these name changes made a significant difference to the movement, only serving to confuse the public and movement supporters alike. With numerous overlapping organisations and frequent name changes, it was often difficult to know exactly which organisation existed for what reason, leading to public confusion. Many bureaucratic issues remained unresolved throughout 1943, including the questions of whether to create one powerful coordinating organisation, or even whether to adopt the United Nations name. As a result, the movement became characterised by a lack of cohesion that would remain a distinctive feature of the movement for years to come.

This was a result of the one man at the heart of almost every organisation and dispute: Clark Eichelberger. Eichelberger’s influence over the internationalist
movement became increasingly powerful in 1943, as the issue that he had worked so resolutely for over twenty years – international organisation – became increasingly relevant. Eichelberger’s connections to the state Department and the President left him unwilling to move ahead too quickly, restraining the movement just as it should have been forging ahead. As the leader of the LNA and a member of numerous other organisations, Eichelberger was in the strongest position to unite the internationalist movement. Yet, it became clear during 1943 that when it came to his organisations, regardless of bureaucratic overlap or inefficiency, things would either be run his way, or not at all.

The year began with the recognition that organisational questions were paramount. The internationalist conference planned for the beginning of 1943 offered a real opportunity for the movement to develop a coherent strategy for the coming year. Although 1942 had been a relatively quiet year for the movement, it was clear that United Nations was becoming an increasingly powerful slogan to rally around. The January meeting offered the chance for internationalists and organisational leaders to discuss how best to mobilise public opinion behind the new concept, although movement leaders already held clear ideas about how this could be done. Unsurprisingly, the plan was to adapt an existing organisation. This would keep matters firmly under the watchful and dominant eye of Clark Eichelberger.

The internationalist leaders decided that a new organisation was required, as although the Coordinating Council for United Nations Committees had only been announced in October, it was almost immediately deemed to be inadequate. The Coordinating Council was deemed inappropriate for the job in hand, and both the LNA and the CSOP resolved in mid-November that the Coordinating Council reconstitute itself ‘into an independent national committee with its own independent national board’. Yet another internationalist organisation was to be created.

The meeting on 3 January included fifty prominent Americans, most of who were well acquainted with the internationalist movement, including Thomas Lamont, Dr. Henry Atkinson, Chester Rowell, and numerous members of the LNA and CSOP, including Eichelberger, Shotwell, Moore and McKee. Eichelberger saw the aim of the meeting as deciding on ‘the best means of reaching the majority of the people with the necessity of the United States’ taking its place in the United Nations of the world to provide security from fear of war and security from fear of want’. In order to achieve this, the decision was made to create another coordinating group, this time to be called the Citizens Council for the United Nations.

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2 Eichelberger to McIntyre, 8 January 1943, OF 4725-A, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, f Drl.
Selling Internationalism to the Public

The meeting was completely off the record, but although no mention was made of the meeting to the public, the Roosevelt administration was immediately informed of the proceedings. This was not just because of the presence at the meeting of the Office of War Information’s (OWI) Gardner Cowles, but Roosevelt aide Marvin McIntyre was quickly informed of the meeting by lobbyist Herbert Houston. Houston had been impressed by the unity of the internationalists on the need to support the United Nations, not just to win the war but to win the peace that would follow. Eichelberger also contacted McIntyre, by phone and letter, requesting all possible advice and suggestions, particularly over the question of honorary chairman. As would so often be the case for the internationalists, there was a strong desire to find a charismatic chairman who could take the issues to the public, as William Allen White had done for the CDaaa. The initial suggestion from Eichelberger and the new executive committee was Bernard Baruch, yet Eichelberger requested approval from the White House. McIntyre responded that if they could get Baruch, it would be acceptable to Roosevelt.3

The decision to create yet another coordinating group seemed unusual given the recent creation of the Coordinating Council for United Nations Committees. Yet unlike the Coordinating Council, the new Citizens Council looked like a public membership organisation rather than a small coordinating body, with plans for a small executive committee, an advisory policy committee, a council of heads of contributing organisations and a council of interested individuals, in addition to local citizens committees throughout the country. The details of the new Citizens Council were to be worked out over the following weeks; those present at the meeting would be informed of the decisions, and a public announcement would then be made.4

Despite Herbert Houston’s astonishment over the unity of the internationalists at the meeting, the development of the Citizens Council behind the scenes was anything but united. Even among the usually like-minded leaders of the organisations of 8 west 40th street, there was serious disagreement over how best to organise. A meeting on 24 January left Eichelberger feeling extremely shocked and disappointed by his generally loyal lieutenants. Hugh Moore in particular expressed a number of familiar reservations, to which Eichelberger responded in a memorandum.5

Moore’s first reservation was that the new Council had no national chairman, following the failure of attempts to secure the services of Baruch. While he agreed with Moore that a chairman was essential, as proven by the success of William Allen White and the failure of Citizens for Victory, Eichelberger insisted that they waste no further valuable time in organising. Moore also argued that the internationalists did not have sufficient funds to support a programme of action.

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3 Ibid., Houston memo for McIntyre, 6 January 1943, OF 4725-A, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, f Drl .
4 Ibid.
5 Eichelberger memorandum, 27 January 1943, Folder 16, Box 24, HMFC.
to which Eichelberger responded that funds would follow the announcement of
the programme. To this, Moore argued that they did not even have a programme.
Eichelberger countered that the long-range objective was United States entry in a
new world organisation, and that the immediate objective was the creation of the
United Nations. While this was undoubtedly true, Moore was correct in that there
was little coming forward in terms of specific proposals.6

Moore also took issue with what he claimed was an inadequate public statement
drafted at the 3 January meeting. While Eichelberger agreed it was not a good
statement, he argued that it was ‘immaterial whether this statement is ever given wide
publicity or not. The key to this whole situation is the advisory policy committee.
Our previous experience has been that as events develop repeated statements of
policy are necessary.’ Moore’s final complaint was with the committee’s name, a
point with which Eichelberger strongly disagreed. Moore favoured ‘Committee to
Prevent the Third World War’, while Eichelberger insisted on the inclusion of the
phrase ‘United Nations’ based on his conversations with Roosevelt.7

After taking issue with each of Moore’s points, Eichelberger expressed his
disappointment with those who had questioned the Citizens Council’s beginnings.
‘I could not help but feel that no attention or appreciation has been given to what is
already being done to push the United Nations programme throughout the country
either by the staff at 8 West 40th Street or through Dr Atkinson’s programme.’
Despite the fact that ‘a very valuable week’ was lost which meant that letters could
not be sent to prospective members of the advisory policy committee, Eichelberger
admitted he had personally invited a number of people to serve on the committee.
Indeed, this was just one hint of Eichelberger’s control of the internationalist
committees. In closing, he made it clear that things would be run his way, or not
at all: ‘I must state emphatically that as long as I have anything to do with the
organisation personally, our present beginnings must not be destroyed’.8

Moore reiterated his reservations a few days later, still concerned that
insufficient thought had been given to the programme of the new Citizens Council,
which would lead to difficulties in raising money. He also remained unconvincing
by the name, worried in particular that Republicans would not support it, preferring
to focus on bringing an end to war (‘in the War Forever, Committee to Prevent a
Third World War, etc.’) rather than the specific focus on international organisation.
Moore concluded ‘we might rather risk being too late than to start off from an ill-
advised base which would cost us victory in the end’.9

Moore was also impressed by a statement from publicist Fred Smith of Young
and Rubicam, who had put together a report including professional techniques for

6 ibid.
7 ibid.
8 Ibid. Atkinson’s programme was the Church Peace Union, also based at 8 West 40th
street.
9 Moore to Harriman, 1 February 1943, Free World Association, 1942–44 folder, Box
13, fJh P.
influencing public opinion. Moore argued that Roosevelt should be made aware of the report, claiming

techniques for influencing public opinion developed by the great advertising agencies and public relations counsel in this country are as much a part of the American way of life as mass production and I doubt that if ever before there has been a plan developed that proposes to use these techniques to win world cooperation.

Despite approving of the report, Eichelberger clearly resented the outside influence and refused to consider it, claiming that the report could only be adopted once the new organisation was up and running. ‘A movement uses the services of publicity experts. Publicity experts do not create a movement’.10

Despite Moore’s reservations, Eichelberger sent executive and advisory committee members a draft memorandum describing the new organisation just two weeks later, with a covering letter printed on rapidly produced Citizens Council headed paper. Building on the general agreements of the January meeting, the memo contained a considerable amount of detail as to how the new organisation would function. The preamble noted how the nation was on the road to military victory, and that the key questions now were ‘how the world shall be organised to translate this victory into permanent peace and to prevent a third world war, and what shall be the responsibilities of the United States’.11

In order to avoid a return to isolationism, a united front would be required from all groups interested in creating a new international organisation. The new Council would be at the heart of the private network of organisations.

Labour, church, women’s groups, business groups, all have committees on postwar planning, but these plans could come to naught unless discussion is even more widely extended and parallel policies agreed upon. Because it seems clear that there must be greater cooperation among the organisations engaged in postwar planning, it has been decided to create the Citizens Council for the United Nations.

To consolidate support, Eichelberger wrote to old CDAAA members requesting their support, and McKee sent the same request to Citizens for Victory chapters.12

10 ibid., Eichelberger memorandum, 27 January 1943, Folder 16, Box 24, HMFC.
11 Eichelberger to Executive and Advisory committees, 15 February 1943, UN Charter 1942–46 folder, Box 20, FJHP; Citizens Council for the United Nations – Purpose and Programme, 15 February 1943, UN Charter 1942–46 folder, Box 20, FJHP.
12 Citizens Council for the United Nations – Purpose and Programme, 15 February 1943, UN Charter 1942–46 folder, Box 20, FJHP; Eichelberger to friends of the CDAAA, 10 March 1943, Box 57, CEP; McKee to Citizens for Victory chapter heads, 11 March 1943, Box 57, CEP.
Beyond supporting military victory, the Council’s purpose was to create a public opinion that would support an American entry into any new postwar international organisation, and to urge immediate creation of such an organisation by the United Nations. The provisional executive committee consisted of those who had been at the 3 January meeting, including all the usual names: Eichelberger, Hotwell, McKee, Florence Harriman and the seemingly outvoted Hugh Moore. The Citizens Council was especially concerned with the setting up of local United Nations Committees. These were to represent as many local organisations as possible to create convictions that would be ‘hammered out on the anvil of public discussion’. The Cso P was promoted as a source of educational material.

In addition to the broad aims of the Council, it was suggested that local programmes emphasise the need for an international police force, the utilisation of League of Nations machinery whenever possible, and the need for an immediate commission to look into postwar reconstruction. This was as far as the Council went in terms of specifics, and it went no further than the League of Nations Association’s policy statement of the previous July. Yet even this was further than Roosevelt had been prepared to go. In the President’s annual message to Congress, less than a week after the internationalists’ 3 January meeting, Roosevelt insisted that the nation must not become ‘bogged down in argument over methods and details’. The most important thing was still the overall objective of winning the war and ensuring future peace, by whatever means. Roosevelt kept his options open just at the time when the internationalist movement needed direction. If direction were to be provided by the Government, it would have to come from elsewhere and, surprisingly, it came from Capitol Hill.

Congress was perhaps the last place the internationalists expected to find support. Eichelberger warned that isolationist sentiment in Congress was ‘perhaps the outstanding obstacle to agreement among the United Nations’. Yet at the presentation of the third report of the Commission to study the organisation of Peace, Representative J. William Fulbright claimed that the majority of House members ‘are already eager to create a world organisation to prevent war’. While acknowledging the continued presence of isolationists in the House, he argued that the United States ‘must decide to take the lead now in the formation of a system of collective security’.

The Commission’s report was unsurprisingly vague on specific details. It called for the immediate creation of a United Nations ‘continuing conference’ to plan for the future peace, and specifically consider questions of economic and agricultural reconstruction. Much to the delight of the internationalists, Under-secretary of

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13 Ibid., Eichelberger to Executive and Advisory committees, 15 February 1943, UN Charter 1942–46 folder, Box 20, FJHP.
State Sumner Welles also expressed similar views. In a speech made in Toronto in February, Welles suggested that the United States should begin discussions with the other United Nations in order to consider postwar problems before the end of the war. Recognising a growing interest, the Commission forwarded a copy of the Third Report to the State Department. Even if Roosevelt refused to consider specific details, it was clear that there was support from Washington over international organisation. His support spurred the internationalists to greater efforts.\footnote{Changing World, March 1943, pp. 2, 5, 6; Eichelberger to Department of State, 26 April 1943, 740.00119 E.W. 1939/1460, Decimal File, RG59, National Archives and Records Administration.}

Eichelberger was so enthused by the possibility of an international conference on food that he wrote to Roosevelt in the hope that if it were to occur, it could lead to an autonomous international organisation for agriculture. Subsequent conferences could then be held on issues such as economic reconstruction and education that would create further international machinery. As always, Eichelberger was quick to highlight that the ILO already existed at the League of Nations to deal with labour issues. He argued that autonomous agencies such as these would develop support within the United States for international organisation. Such ‘divisions of the United Nations of the world’ would ‘meet the needs and fears of the people and will have overwhelming support’. Eichelberger was no doubt extremely satisfied to hear Roosevelt not only confirm that the International Food Conference would take place in May, but also his comment at the beginning of April that this would be just the first of a number of United Nations meetings that would consider postwar problems.\footnote{Eichelberger to Roosevelt, 3 March 1943, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 12, p. 133.}

Following Fulbright’s declaration of support from the House, the internationalists found further encouragement from the B2H2 or Ball resolution, introduced in the Senate by four senators led by Joseph H. Ball of Minnesota. The resolution called for the creation of an international organisation during the war: one that would continue fighting the war, provide relief in liberated nations, and rule out future aggression through a United Nations police force. Despite reservations regarding the timing of the initiative from the White House, the senators went ahead with their resolution in March. After his initial response to the resolution was deemed ‘cool’ by the press, Roosevelt made it clear that he supported the broad principle of the resolution. Intended to be ‘out in front of public opinion’, the measure showed that public opinion was coming around to the idea of international organisation. The question remained as to how the private internationalists could best build upon the direction and leadership from Washington.\footnote{Robert Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II (New York: Atheneum, 1967), pp. 91–4. The B2H2 resolution, or Ball resolution, was so called because of the initials of its bi-partisan co-sponsors: Joseph Ball (R-Minn), Harold Burton (R-Ohio), Carl Hatch (D-New Mexico) and Lister Hill (D-Alabama).}
Eichelberger immediately supported the resolution, informing local organisations of the overwhelming trend of opinion behind it. Local members were urged to express their approval of the resolution to both their Senators and their representatives. The Citizens Council for the United Nations planned to make available thirty thousand copies of Ball’s speech introducing the proposal. At a League of Nations Association meeting, the task of creating support for the resolution to ensure United States entry into a future world organisation was seen as a top priority.

However, of at least equal priority to Eichelberger at this point was his concern with his own organisational structures and arrangements. While it was noted at a LNA board meeting in March that the Association had dwindled over the years, the CDaaa, Citizens for Victory, and various new United Nations committees had ensured that the potential influence of 8 West 40th Street was greater than ever. Yet it was clearly recognised that the existing organisations were not living up to their full promise, as there was considerable discussion of how best to pool the assets of the numerous groups. A change in name was again considered, and it was to be left up to the executive committee to decide on when best to alter the Association name to reflect the increasing interest in the United Nations.

Eichelberger then wrote to the executive committee, informing them of the need to fulfil a three-fold task: to support the B2H2 resolution, to study how best to utilise the machinery of the League of Nations, and to continue the work of the CSOP. The next step was to consider a number of possible ways to move forward, and members were given two alternatives. The first option was to simply change the name of the League of Nations Association to the United Nations Association. In doing this however, the LNA would become a political action committee, and lose its tax-exempt status.

The second plan, which Eichelberger admitted would have its advantages, would be to create a new United Nations Association, using the Washington incorporation of the name from the previous year. It would have effectively the same staff and committees as the League of Nations Association, which would continue to study the best way to utilise the existing League structure in an educational capacity only. The two groups would continue to work closely with the CSOP. Either way, the new organisation would affiliate to the International Free World Association. Over the following weeks, executive committee meetings decided that the latter option was the most promising for the movement. It was decided that the new organisation would be nationwide, with an unlimited number of branches. It proposed to issue publications and literature of various kinds, organise a speaker’s bureau, develop its membership, develop its objectives and

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19 Eichelberger to United Nations Committees, 3 April 1943, 63011, Cea; Minutes of League of Nations Association Board of Directors Meeting, 27 March 1943, 63017, Cea.

20 Minutes of LNA Board of Directors Meeting, 27 March 1943, 63017, Cea.

21 Eichelberger to the LNA Executive Committee, 2 April 1943, Folder 24, Box 24, hmf C.
determine its public relations’. The structure of the new United Nations association would be developed over the following months.22

Despite clarifying the situation within 8 West 40th Street, the decision only added to potential public confusion regarding the internationalist movement. Just four months after the Citizens Council for the United Nations had been created to replace the Coordinating Council for United Nations Committees, it too was being replaced by the United Nations Association. Yet for Eichelberger it represented a positive step forward, and he stepped up his activities accordingly. He again focused his attention on the prestige of Washington with the development of a thirteen-week radio series ‘The World We Fight For’. Under the auspices of the Cso P and the national Broadcasting Company, the series was to be opened by Cordell Hull, who was forced to withdraw, but other speakers included Sumner Welles, Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, and Senators Claude Pepper and Warren Austin. An estimated one hundred stations carried the series, with various private organisations from the American federation of Labour to the rotary Club helping to promote it across the country.23

Eichelberger also continued his efforts to influence the President. Writing in May, he urged Roosevelt and Churchill to make a joint declaration stating that the Allies would throw their full support behind ‘the establishment of democratic Governments wherever we assist in reconstruction’. This was necessary, he argued, as some Americans were confusing military expedients such as the Darlan deal in North Africa (where the US had negotiated with leaders of Nazi-collaborating Vichy France) with long-term policies. The President was evidently impressed, replying that the suggestion was ‘excellent’, and that despite there being no chance of a joint declaration, he would use it in his next radio speech.24

Eichelberger also continued with the development of the United Nations association. By the end of June, the embryonic organisation had a Purpose and Programme statement, advocating the entrance of the United States into a permanent world organisation and the creation of such an organisation as soon as possible. Arguing that uncertainty over the future course of action by the United States was a significant obstacle to the development of a world organisation, the United Nations association supported a positive indication from Congress and the Executive that the United States would join such an organisation.25

Although it was not an official declaration from Congress, the new United Nations association received the opportunity to assist Congressional support for

22 Ibid., Elting to Moore, 20 May 1943, Folder 24, Box 24, HMFC.
24 Eichelberger to Roosevelt, 17 May 1943, PPF 1820, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Roosevelt to Eichelberger, 21 May 1943, PPF 1820, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
international organisation when it was given the opportunity to co-sponsor eight Congressional speaking tours across the nation, focusing on the Midwest. The eight bi-partisan pairs aimed to create support for the B2h 2 resolution, as well as the recently introduced Fulbright resolution. The latter, introduced in the House of Representatives on 15 June, urged Congress to declare itself ‘as favouring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and maintain a just and lasting peace among the nations of the world, and as favouring participation of the United States therein’. With pro-international organisation resolutions pending in both the House and the Senate, the new Association appeared to be making a real contribution to public debate and to American opinion.26

The United Nations Association (UNA) formally announced itself and its programme to the nation on 30 July when permanent officers were announced, including Melvin Hildreth as president, James Shotwell as chairman of the board, Hugh Moore as executive committee chairman, and Eichelberger as executive chairman. It was announced that in addition to sponsoring the speaking tour, nationwide branches would be established.27

Yet despite the establishment of the UNA, the first half of 1943 had proven to be an extremely limited period for the internationalist movement, as the focus on questions of bureaucracy and organisation pushed the discussion of internationalist ideas to the background. True, there was some limited Governmental push from Congress in the realm of ideas, and there was clearly an opportunity for a new, dynamic internationalist organisation to seize the ideas from Washington and run with them. However, the immediate focus on questions of organisation led back to Clark Eichelberger. His endless focus on trivial bureaucratic issues further delayed serious consideration of the nature of the proposed international organisation. Defining the new internationalism had to wait.

The final months of 1943 and the first half of 1944 saw the internationalist organisations of Clark Eichelberger continuing to drift in the absence of strong policy direction from the Government. With no firm plans for a new international organisation to promote, they settled for promoting broad Congressional proposals to retain some kind of momentum. Despite his time working with the State Department, Eichelberger was both unable and unwilling to use any information from that experience to assist his cause. He stuck to his decision not to move ahead of the Government. With the postwar planning both confidential and provisional, there was little to do but wait for the Roosevelt administration’s proposals. The wait dragged on for a further year, much to Eichelberger’s frustration. Nevertheless, he never openly criticised the Government in public, continuing his personal policy of staying loyal.

The lack of policy detail meant that attention turned yet again to organisational matters. Financial issues, concerns about a figurehead, internal criticisms and a

need to rationalise the organisations of 8 west 40th Street kept Eichelberger busy in the absence of any news about international organisation. Yet the continued concentration on these bureaucratic details postponed a detailed discussion of internationalism still further. Questions about how a new international organisation would work in theory remained unclear; considerations of how it would work in practice remained untouched. Conceptualising and defining internationalism yet again took second place to more mundane and trivial concerns.

The immediate organisational concern in the autumn of 1943 was financial, as sponsoring the Congressional speaking tours was proving costly. In July, Hugh Moore (who had already contributed $2,500 of his own money) wrote to a number of prominent internationalists requesting financial assistance to put more senators and representatives out amongst the public. Moore and Eichelberger also appealed to the Carnegie endowment for funds. Moore argued that the United Nations association had made an impressive beginning in co-sponsoring the Congressional speaking tours, but that the effort had required a considerable amount of money. Eichelberger argued that with Congress slashing appropriations for the Office of Civilian Defence and the Office of War Information (OWI), the Roosevelt administration was limited in its machinery for reaching the public. ‘it is all the more important, therefore, that this voluntary effort of forward looking Senators and Congressmen should reach and affect the public mind.’ The requests however, were denied.

Eichelberger also requested the advice of the John Price Jones Corporation, a fund-raising organisation. The comments of the Corporation’s Robert Duncan highlighted problems with the internationalist movement that had existed since the outbreak of the war, and that would continue to exist for years to come. Firstly, it was argued that ‘The Case’ was not specific enough, and that a definite issue was needed, such as the destroyer-bases promotion of 1940. In addition, having a specific target would help the drive of the programme: ‘What or whom are you attacking?’ Without a strong opposition there could be no real public debate, and the lack of opposing viewpoints left internationalist arguments sounding hollow. Only when a specific case had been made should fund-raising begin, but at this point Duncan argued that the case had ‘not yet been made sufficiently convincing and compelling’.

A second problem facing the internationalist organisations at this time was one of leadership. Duncan argued that the UNA was ‘handicapped by lack of a well-known leader, such as Mr White was in 1941, to personify the movement’. This was a point long recognised by Eichelberger and others, although no steps appeared to have been taken to find a prominent public figure since the failure to secure Bernard Baruch at the beginning of the year. For Duncan, both issues were equally important and his response to Eichelberger was not optimistic, arguing that

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28 Moore to Blaine, 19 July 1943, Folder 12, Box 25, HMFC; Moore to Davis, 30 August 1943, 63024, Cea; Eichelberger to Butler, 18 August 1943, 63019, Cea.
29 Duncan to Eichelberger, 23 July 1943, Folder 12, Box 25, HMFC.
'the Committee’s position is weak in both these respects and we doubt whether much progress in fund raising can be made until these points are strengthened'.30

Eichelberger’s response was to go to the very top, requesting a meeting with Roosevelt in July to discuss ‘important developments both in the organisation of the United Nations and in the movement of American public opinion’. The President agreed in principle to the meeting, but it would have to wait until his appointment book was less full. A meeting would eventually be arranged for October. Eichelberger also took advantage of Roosevelt’s forthcoming fireside chat to remind him to reiterate United States support for democratic regimes in liberated countries. The President clearly did not need reminding, and Eichelberger would have been thrilled to hear Roosevelt announce ‘it is our determination to restore these conquered peoples to the dignity of human beings, masters of their own fate, entitled to freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. We have started to make good on that promise’. Yet the internationalists would have been less impressed with Roosevelt’s comment that ‘this is not the time to engage in an international discussion of all the terms of peace and all the details of the future. Let us win the war first’. To the White House, the United Nations remained first and foremost a military alliance, and the President clearly had no plans to alter that fact in the immediate future.31

Yet the worst news coming out of Washington for the internationalists, and for Eichelberger in particular, was the resignation of Sumner Welles in August. Welles, as one of the most eloquent and committed internationalists in the State Department, was a great loss to the movement. Also, with Eichelberger’s closest ally gone, the chance of influence in Washington appeared to diminish. It was Welles who had brought Eichelberger in to the State Department’s postwar planning subcommittee meetings, and Eichelberger would not return to Washington as a consultant.32

Without the possibility of discussions in Washington, the following months saw the internationalists set about solving their own problems, with limited degrees of success. Responding to the advice from the John Price Jones Corporation, various names were put forward for the position of national chairman, including Ambassador Joseph Davies, industrialist Henry Kaiser and Justice Owen J. Roberts. Despite continued discussion and the recognition that the lack of chairman was a setback, no decision was made, and no individuals were approached, mainly due to the failure to find a candidate that was both ideologically suitable and sufficiently well known. Organisational questions were also considered, as the relationship between the United Nations Association and the almost dormant Citizens for Victory was raised for discussion. As neither was tax-exempt, consideration of

30 ibid.
31 Eichelberger to Edwin Watson, 24 July 1943, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Watson to Eichelberger, 9 August 1943, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Eichelberger to Roosevelt, 27 July, 1943, Box 21, CEP; Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 12, pp. 328, 333.
32 Eichelberger to Welles, 23 August 1943, Box 152, CEP.
a merger was foremost, although again, no action was taken. This left a certain
degree of competition even within the 8 west 40th street family of organisations, a
point that would arise again in the future.\textsuperscript{33}

The primary efforts of the United Nations association at this point continued
to be directed at the B2h2 resolution in the senate. With the Fulbright resolution
passed in the house 360 to 29, the internationalists were eager to get the senate
on the record. The association issued a pamphlet describing the activities of the
committee, the bi-partisan congressional tours, and urging immediate passage
of the resolution. A further pamphlet reprinted the Ball resolution, describing it
as ‘the most clear, definite, and effective proposal yet introduced in the Senate
for the furtherance of collaboration among the United Nations’. It also suggested
ways the public could help, including contacting their senator and representative,
contacting members of the foreign relations Committee, and holding local
meetings to discuss the future peace with every possible local organisation. The
link to Washington was retained as the Office of War Information was provided
with copies of most of the association’s releases, along with information on events
originated and sponsored by the group. The own’s r. edgar moore reassured the
UNA’s acting director Robert Lee Gulick that the material was being put ‘to wide
and effective use’.\textsuperscript{34}

More important was eichelberger’s 25 October meeting with Roosevelt.
Roosevelt asked ‘Clark, what can you tell me,’ to which Eichelberger tellingly
responded that he had come to see what the President could tell him. Top of
the agenda was the debate that had just begun in the senate over the Connally
Resolution, which was weaker than the long-delayed Ball resolution, and asked
for an ‘international authority’ with power to preserve the peace. Roosevelt argued
that he supported both the Ball resolution and the Connally resolution, though the
latter could benefit from strengthening. Eichelberger asked if a Senate Resolution
would not be highly effective now, given the ongoing foreign ministers’ conference
taking place in Moscow. Roosevelt agreed that it would.\textsuperscript{35}

Eichelberger went on to inform the President of the organisational efforts of
8 west 40th Street, highlighting that the Congressional speaking tours had been
arranged and co-sponsored by the United Nations association, a fact of which
Roosevelt had been unaware. He also admitted that the current effort was ‘not
as dramatic’ as the CDaaa had been because of timing, and the fact that people
were preoccupied with the war. However, the time had now come, following

\textsuperscript{33} Minutes of United Nations Association executive committee, 27 August 1943,
63021, Cea and 9 October 1943, 63028, Cea.

\textsuperscript{34} Divine, Second Chance, p. 144; Changing World, September 1943, p. 5; Changing
World, October 1943, pp. 1–2; Unite for lasting Victory, September 1943, and Where will
the United States Stand?, 1943, both Box 32, Marshall Dimock Papers, FDRL; Moore to
Gulick, 19 October 1943, Box 55, CEP.

\textsuperscript{35} Notes on conference, 25 October 1943, Interviews with FDR folder, Box 198, CEP;
eichelberger, Organizing for Peace, pp. 242–4.
Congressional impetus, to make a more dramatic appeal to the nation. He openly admitted to the President that the organisations needed more money, but he also asked the President’s advice on the two-year-old question of finding ‘another William a llen w hite’. r oosevelt dismissed eichelberger’s suggestions, which included Joseph Davies, s umner w elles, and Bernard Baruch, arguing that it needed to be a midwesterner to appeal to the more isolationist heartland. h is suggestion, Jimmie l awrence of the Lincoln Star (Kansas) did not impress Eichelberger, who was clearly looking for a more prominent name. Roosevelt’s suggestion that he could be built up, and that e ichelberger could inform him of their conversation, did little to satisfy the internationalist leader who did not follow up the suggestion. indeed, this was perhaps the only instance during the war where e ichelberger did not follow r oosevelt’s advice. The movement would continue without a prominent figurehead.36

The fact that the United Nations had now firmly replaced the old concept of the l eague of n ations was highlighted when e ichelberger raised the issue of recent advertisements run by David l awrence of the US News and World Report. t he adverts, which advocated a return to the l eague idea, even suggested that the United s tates ratify the l eague Covenant. w hile admitting that some of his old l eague a ssociation colleagues would agree, he argued that the vast majority would follow him and support a new United n ations. w hile some of the old l eague machinery could be salvaged, the movement must now only look forward.37

With regard to moving ahead of public opinion, Eichelberger asked if a trial balloon on the issue of an international police force would help. r oosevelt’s response was negative, not only because it was too soon, but also because the idea did not fit in with his future plans. Roosevelt was still thinking along the lines of the four policemen: the four great powers who would settle disputes with the help of smaller powers. w hat r oosevelt did highlight was the need to organise committees in small towns of 10,000 or less, and to focus on ordinary a mericans, not just ‘wealth or highbrows’.38

Compared with the previous year, e ichelberger’s meeting with r oosevelt provided little in terms of direction for the internationalist movement. w hile the President was prepared to discuss some aspects of a future organisation, such as where it might be located or how often it might meet, no concrete future plans were discussed. e ichelberger later admitted this himself, commenting that he thought it was Roosevelt’s ‘habit to think something through and try it out on someone in whose views he had confidence’, a method of which that meeting had been a classic example.39

Nevertheless, following the meeting, Eichelberger looked to build upon it in whatever way possible. t he Una focused its attention on the moscow declaration made on 1 n ovember, point four of which recognised the need for ‘the

36 ibid.
37 ibid.
38 ibid.
39 ibid.
establishment at the earliest practicable date a general international organisation … for the maintenance of peace and security’. As the debate over the Connally resolution continued in the Senate, Eichelberger suggested to Senator Elbert Thomas that point four of the declaration be added to the resolution, a suggestion actually acted upon, and later approved by the Senate, adding further weight to the Connally resolution.40

Also moving forward, the Commission to Study the Organisation of Peace presented its fourth report on 20 November, urging that immediate action be taken to implement the Moscow agreement, which was seen as the first step on the road to the creation of an international organisation. Although it was completed before the conference, the timing of the announcement allowed James Shotwell to declare that Cordell Hull’s achievement in Moscow was ‘the most unique exploit in American history’. The Commission’s report listed eleven essential points for the creation of a new world organisation, and while an international air force was advocated, there was no further mention of an international police force.41

In December, any suggestion of reviving the League was put to rest as even its strongest supporters in the League of Nations Association agreed that a new body would take its place. Building on the research of LNA President Frank Boudreau, a three day conference at Princeton proposed recommendations on how to incorporate successful League of Nations agencies into the new organisation. Nevertheless, the majority of the resolutions adopted at Princeton supported forward-looking statements such as the Moscow declaration and the Connally resolution. The conference led to a marked reduction in subsequent activity under the LNA banner, and the emphasis in 1944 would be placed fully behind the more appropriately named United Nations Association.42

Given Roosevelt’s comments on local organisations it was perhaps predictable that Eichelberger would take the opportunity to highlight the growth of UNA branches across the country as quickly as possible following the meeting. In an article in Changing World the emphasis was placed firmly on smaller cities and towns in West Virginia, where Donald Craig had made an organising trip on behalf of the national headquarters. Yet all was not well behind the scenes, as Craig soon took the opportunity to offer his resignation from the United Nations Association.43

Craig resigned with a scathing attack on the organisation, and the state of the internationalist movement as a whole. In the three months with which he had worked with the Association, he had become aware of ‘serious weaknesses of organisation and practice’ which have ‘seriously weakened and held up the development of the Association in the country as a whole’. Indeed, Craig’s criticisms summed up the problems of the movement with striking accuracy.

40 Changing World, November, 1943, p. 3; Divine, Second Chance, p. 151.
42 The League of Nations and Postwar Settlement (no date), FO 371/39296/C3629/560/98, PRO.
Lack of leadership, lack of any apparent long-term or coherent policy of action, the absence of regular liaison between headquarters and the field, the apparent lack of cooperation between the Association and the other groups at 8 West 40th Street, and between them all and the other national groups working in the same or in other fields – these and other things, perhaps, have made me feel at times as if the whole effort were rotten from skin to core.”

Craig’s criticisms about the leadership and lack of coordination reflected points recognised throughout the year, but the criticism regarding lack of policy seemed timelier than ever. With the success of the Moscow Declaration and the passage of the Connally Resolution, the primary aims of the internationalist organisations in 1943 had been achieved. While this clearly represented success to a certain degree, there was little consensus over the next step. The internationalist programme was still limited, with no specific immediate aims. While the Fourth Report of the Commission to study the organisation of Peace offered a blueprint for the future organisation, it was ironically deemed to be too detailed to promote to the public at this stage, and only time would tell if the State Department chose to utilise it. The movement remained primarily a reactive one, awaiting both Governmental proposals and an isolationist resurgence.

While there was every confidence that there would be proposals forthcoming from Washington, there was little idea of when, or what shape such proposals might take. Indeed, the internationalist relationship with the Roosevelt Administration appeared to have stalled by the end of 1943. Contact with the White House offered little direction, and neither Eichelberger nor Shotwell was directly involved with the State Department. Only with Congress did state–private relations develop, but Congress would not be directly responsible for the development of the new international organisation. The Roosevelt Administration still had little need for the internationalists, and the internationalists appeared to lack the initiative to take a firm lead in directing public opinion as a result.

The lack of unity among the organisations did nothing to help the situation. Inter-organisational rivalry appeared to have hit a new low. In the words of historian Robert Divine, ‘the result was an incoherent movement, split into too many competing units, which failed to take full advantage of the favourable wartime climate and the impetus provided by Senator Ball and his associates’. At the heart of that incoherence was Clark Eichelberger, who seemed determined that his existing organisations would be the pre-eminent groups in the fight for a new international organisation. Yet not only did that determination create divisions within the movement, it also created a sense of competition between internationalists who were fighting for the same goal. At this early stage, those divisions were based on pride rather than policy, and they would continue into 1944.

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44 Craig to Moore, 29 November 1943, Folder 12, Box 25, HMFC.
45 Divine, Second Chance, p. 103.
With the New Year came the need for reassessment. Looking ahead, the December 1943 issue of Changing World considered ‘the job for 1944’. UNA executive director Pennington outlined the political and educational efforts that would be necessary for the coming year. While there was clearly a great deal of enthusiasm for the months ahead, the article revealed how much of the internationalists’ activity was beyond their control. When considering the political dimension of the immediate future, he recognised that ‘many unfortunate crises may arise’. The association was to fully support any Government legislation promoting the development of the United Nations. With regard to educational responsibilities, the association divided its efforts between the vague call for support for unity among nations, and the reactive fear of countering a resurgent isolationism. With no specific policies to support, the movement had very little to build an educational campaign upon. What it could do, however, was be prepared for any eventuality.46

However, after months of discussion on the general principles of an international organisation, the beginning of 1944 saw Clark Eichelberger attempt to take the debate a step further. Throughout the first two years of the war, consideration of international organisation had been along extremely broad lines, concentrating simply on whether such an organisation should be created at all. Eichelberger took the New Year as an opportunity to inform the President of his outline of the new organisation. Arguing that public opinion had developed ‘about as far as possible on general principles’, it was now time to focus on specifics.47

The proposal put forward by Eichelberger was remarkably similar to those being considered by Roosevelt and the State Department in the aftermath of Roosevelt’s Tehran conference with Churchill and Stalin. Eichelberger envisaged the organisation consisting of two bodies: a general assembly, and an executive council that would include the four great powers and representatives from smaller powers. The primary function of the organisation would be collective security, but it would also contain a world Court, a trusteeship system, and autonomous agencies such as the United Nations relief and rehabilitation administration (Unr-ra) and the Ilo. While the amount of detail was still limited, the outline consisted of principles that formed the basis of the subsequent educational programme. Yet as always, Eichelberger craved official approval, and White House aide Jonathan Daniels recognised that what the internationalist leader wanted was some indication that his thinking was in line with the official proposals.48

Roosevelt’s response was positive, with the reassurance that Eichelberger was ‘moving distinctly along the right lines’. The President had just two minor reservations, the first being the idea of a central headquarters for the new

47 Eichelberger to Roosevelt, 7 January 1944, OF 4725, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
48 Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the UN (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) pp. 110–20; Daniels to Roosevelt, 11 January 1944, OF 4725, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
organisation, which Roosevelt referred to as the United Nations. He believed the United Nations could and should meet in a different location, and preferably a different continent, every year. The second reservation was directed at one of Eichelberger’s favourite ideas, the idea of an international air force. The President argued that it might follow in later years – ‘especially if everybody spoke basic English!’ The response represented a small victory for Eichelberger. He had a basis for an educational campaign that had approval from the highest authority.49

Yet despite Roosevelt’s encouraging remarks, the first months of 1944 saw little discussion of international organisation or the future peace from the Roosevelt Administration. This left the Administration open to attacks from critics on all sides. Even Eichelberger became privately frustrated with the delay in concrete proposals. On a speaking tour in the West, he urged that the United Nations be created immediately, as promised at the Moscow conference. Although he reserved his criticism for those who were calling for a cooling-off period between the end of the war and the peace conference, he was clearly frustrated by the limited development of the United Nations. He expressed his frustration further to Sumner Welles in March. Public opinion, he argued, was firmly behind the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of the United Nations, and the Moscow Declaration, but it urgently required specific plans, and it needed them immediately. He argued that a public statement from Roosevelt outlining the provisional detail of United Nations ‘would have a public impact that cannot be overstated’.50

With no public statement from the administration by the beginning of April, Eichelberger felt it necessary go straight to the White House. Through a letter to Jonathan Daniels, he again expressed his confidence in public opinion and urged that Roosevelt move forward and outline his plans for the United Nations to the public. Without such detailed proposals, momentum would be lost, and public support could disappear. While Eichelberger looked forward to Cordell Hull’s coming speech on the matter, he insisted that ‘only the President can make the speech on the organisation of the United Nations’ and that ‘the time for such a speech is now’. He added that he urged immediate action not only because of his interest in international organisation, but because of his ‘personal support’ for Roosevelt. This comment reflected Eichelberger’s attitudes toward the administration on both a personal and a practical level. He was clearly frustrated with Hull’s unwillingness to discuss specific details of the future peace, but it also highlighted his continuing desire to maintain a close personal relationship with the President. With Welles out of the State Department, the best remaining opportunity for influence lay in the White House.51

49 Roosevelt to Eichelberger, 11 January 1944, OF 4725, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, f Drl .
50 New York Times, 4 March 1944, p. 8; Eichelberger to Welles, 29 March 1944, Box 98, Sumner Welles Papers, f Drl .
51 Eichelberger to Daniels, 8 April 1944, Reel 25 Cordell Hull Papers (microfilm edition), Roosevelt Study Center, Middleburg.
Breaking the Administration’s silence, 9 April saw Hull deliver his long-awaited policy address. He emphasised that cooperation between the great powers remained crucial to the development of an international organisation. More notably, he announced that he had asked Senator Tom Connally to appoint a bipartisan Congressional committee to work with the State Department on developing the details of the organisation. By bringing in Congressional leaders, Hull ensured that the mistakes of Woodrow Wilson would not be repeated. Yet although the speech was well received by the press, Hull did not provide the detailed discussion of policy blueprints that Eichelberger called for, arguing that excessive detail could lead to controversy. With little specific policy to build upon, the internationalist movement stalled again in early 1944. Although it was clear that plans for the United Nations were at an advanced stage, the Roosevelt administration was still unwilling to reveal its plans to the public before Congress had been consulted. Eichelberger’s plea for specifics was in vain. Reactive as ever, the movement was left to wait for the Government.52

All the internationalists could do was prepare for the campaigns to come, so the focus shifted yet again to the question of organisation. It quickly became clear that the United Nations association would be the vehicle for renewed activity. With the increased use of ‘United Nations’ as the provisional name for any new international organisation, the League of Nations association appeared increasingly outdated. Despite a January policy statement issued by the League of Nations association, a Board meeting in February discussed ways to reduce confusion created by the overlapping organisations and eventually wind down the LNA. Eichelberger outlined plans for ‘a more unified set up’ to integrate the work of the UNA, the LNA, and the CSOP. Although the intention was admirable, initial proposals merely promoted further bureaucracy. Representatives from the three organisations were to meet monthly as an internal coordinating committee, and representatives from Citizens for Victory, the Church Peace Union and the Free World association would eventually be invited to contribute to an expanded version of the committee. From the public’s perspective, however, confusion would be reduced as LNA members would be informed that they would henceforth also be members of the UNA, with the intention of creating a mass membership for the UNA and slowly dissolving the LNA. The publication of Changing World would shift to the UNA, and the popular education and research work of the CSOP would be identified with the UNA.53

In April, Eichelberger laid out suggestions for the UNA programme. The first of these reiterated the internationalist commitment to the immediate creation of the United Nations. In order to facilitate this, the UNA considered urging a Congressional resolution calling for a conference to create the international organisation. Indeed, all possible efforts to ensure the Congressional ratification

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52 Hoopes and Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the UN, p. 124; Divine, Second Chance, pp. 194–5.
53 LNA Policy statement, 21 January 1944, 63050, CEA; LNA Board minutes, 11 February 1944, 63054, CEA; Eichelberger to LNA membership, 1 February 1944, Box 56, CEP.
of the United Nations were to be undertaken. The UNA also set about preparing a foreign policy programme to present to both political parties.\(^{54}\)

Yet in addition to the obvious support for the United Nations concept, the most significant considerations at this point concerned the bureaucratic structure of the internationalist movement. Again, the work of the LNA, CSOP and the UNA was to be integrated as much as possible under the Una banner to reduce duplication. The idea of internal coordinating committees was also promoted, and the Una was to maintain closer links with the Carnegie Endowment. There was also the suggestion of a coordinated budget for the Una, Ina and Cso P, organisations whose support, members and staff were, in eichelberger’s own words ‘to a certain extent, identical’. This statement not only acknowledged the need to coordinate the different organisations more effectively, but it questioned their very existence. With the groups similar in so many respects, it was increasingly difficult to justify retaining them all. Throughout the first half of 1944, Eichelberger and other internationalists looked for ways to both expand and rationalise the movement.\(^{55}\)

In an April memorandum on the job ahead, eichelberger divided all private interest groups into three categories. Firstly, there were established groups that considered foreign policy but not exclusively, such as labour organisations, the league of women Voters, and the Chamber of Commerce. eichelberger recommended that these organisations should put out a statement of common objectives, and that key names from committee level should be encouraged as spokesmen for the movement. Secondly, educational groups such as the CSOP and Ina should continue their own programmes while intensifying connections with business and labour groups.

Finally, and most significantly, were political action groups such as the UNA and Citizens for Victory, along with newer organisations developed independently from 8 west 40th street, including freedom house and the women’s action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace. As their aim – working toward Congressional passage of the United nations – was the same, eichelberger argued that they should combine forces in an effective merger to reduce duplication: ‘once coordinated, their combined activities should be multiplied a thousand-fold through the creation of many new local committees’. Such thinking would lead to the creation of a mericans United for world organisation through the summer of 1944. One characteristic these organisations shared was their tax status. Unlike the CSOP and LNA which were categorised as educational groups, the political action groups were not tax-exempt. Eichelberger saw this as a notable difference, although it was a difference few other internationalists were prepared to acknowledge. Eichelberger was almost alone in believing that it was possible to separate the educational from the political, a fact that would provide the basis for future disagreement.\(^{56}\)

\(^{54}\) Eichelberger memorandum, 7 April 1944, Box 56, CEP.

\(^{55}\) ibid.

\(^{56}\) Eichelberger memorandum, 17 April 1944, Box 55, CEP.
a t a U n a Board meeting in May, the development of a americans United was discussed, with Eichelberger stressing the fact that the new group should exist solely in the political sphere, leaving the job of educating the public to groups such as the Cso P and the I n a. F ormer a mbassador to n orway f lorence h arriman informed the President of the development of the new committee, arguing that it amounted to ‘an effective unification of all the groups which have branches out in the country’. Roosevelt responded that he was ‘very happy’ to hear of the merger plans, but he warned that all organisations needed to focus upon grass roots support among ‘those who are opposed or those who have not made up their minds’. merely discussing policy amongst the internationalist leadership would achieve nothing. When Roosevelt spoke across the country in support of the League of Nations in 1920, his audiences were Democrats or internationalist intellectuals. a s he admitted, ‘they were all with me 100%, but I do not think I made a single vote’.57

Unbeknownst to Eichelberger, one of his letters to the President spurred Roosevelt into action in May, some six weeks after it had been sent. His April letter to Jonathan Daniels had finally reached the President’s desk, and Roosevelt forwarded it on to Hull, requesting a meeting with him about it as soon as possible. Eichelberger had requested specific plans and while no blueprints were forthcoming, Roosevelt did offer information on Unrra and the coming Bretton Woods meeting as proof that postwar preparations were underway. Yet these remarks were not enough for Eichelberger who remained frustrated with the Government’s refusal to publicise specific plans.58

in May, eichelberger and s hotwell became involved with yet another small collective to discuss postwar planning, though on a relatively intimate and informal basis. The ‘New York Group’, as it was known, also included LNA president Frank Boudreau, malcolm Davis of the Carnegie e ndowment for international Peace, and manley h udson of the Permanent Court of international Justice, who chaired the group. t he group issued its ‘Design for a Charter’ in May 1944, which urged the creation of an international organisation for collective security. n otably, the proposal urged that although great powers in the Council would hold a veto, they would not be able to use it in disputes to which they were a party.59

The Design for a Charter represented the most detailed private proposals for international organisation to date. It offered a genuine attempt at defining how internationalism would work, in theory at least. Yet despite the best efforts of those involved with the Design, attempts to secure a meeting with Roosevelt to discuss it proved unsuccessful. It is also extremely difficult to assess how much impact the

57 United Nations Association Board minutes, 19 May 1944, Box 55, CEP; Harriman to Roosevelt, 19 May 1944, PPF 1082, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Roosevelt to Harriman, 12 June 1944, PPF 1082, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
Design had on State Department officials. What is clear, however, is that the group did meet informally with representatives from the State Department, many of whom worked with Eichelberger and Shotwell during 1942 and 1943. Government officials who sat in with the group included Leo Pasvolsky, head of the special political section studying international organisation in the Department of State; Ben Gerig, a member of Pasvolsky’s staff; Green Hackworth, who was a legal counsellor to the State Department; and Ben Cohen, an advisor to Roosevelt. ⁶⁰

While there is no evidence that the State Department was using the New York Group as a front to promote its plans, there was an informal partnership between private citizens and Government officials. In the words of Malcolm Davis, the officials ‘assumed no responsibility for the group’s conclusions but there was at least a direct exchange of ideas’. While it is clear from the group’s plans regarding the veto that they only held limited influence within official planning circles, they were certainly not State Department dupes. indeed, the group had no real worth as a promotional tool for the Department as they exerted no influence on public opinion, with the ‘Design for a Charter’ circulated in only a limited way beyond publication in International Conciliation. Yet due to their shared aims, the influence between the Government and this elite internationalist group flowed more than one way. Group member Malcolm Davis argued that the group could ‘somewhat influence’ the State Department, and that their materials were included in the confidential papers taken to the San Francisco conference by United States delegates. ⁶¹

Despite the connections created between the New York Group and the Government, discussion of postwar planning was still moving forward far too slowly for Eichelberger. He expressed his continued disappointment to Roosevelt, arguing again that the organisation be created as soon as negotiations are concluded in order to be operational before the end of the war. He even urged, somewhat optimistically, that the proposed plan be submitted to the sitting Congressional session. Despite his continued pressure and numerous letters and statements, no amount of appealing was going to force the Government’s hand, and no reply to his appeal was forthcoming. As had been the case on numerous previous occasions, the Roosevelt administration chose to ignore internationalist suggestions. ⁶²

Despite Eichelberger’s continued disappointment with the Government’s slow progress, a request in June highlighted his deferential attitude to the Roosevelt administration. Eichelberger was concerned that ideas on international organisation being put forward by the press were misleading. Yet instead of speaking out independently against such pieces, Eichelberger requested Roosevelt’s permission

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⁶² Eichelberger to Roosevelt, 19 June 1944, OF 4725, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, f Drl.
to do so. Based on his long-standing position as head of the INA, he was clearly in a position to counter such misleading articles, but because of his relationship with both the White House and the State Department, he would not go ahead without the President’s authority. He also assured Roosevelt that official views had been kept in confidence. Eichelberger was not prepared to speak out as head of the Una or INA, despite the fact he could have done so without revealing privileged information. There was no need for him to cite official meetings or classified information, yet he insisted on receiving clearance from the State first. This instance showed how much Eichelberger was prepared to restrain his output, and that of his organisations, to avoid offending those in Government.63

The events of 1943 and the first half of 1944 saw frustratingly slow progress for the internationalist movement. Official Government postwar planning moved forward but only behind closed doors. The deference Eichelberger and his organisations showed to the Roosevelt administration left them unable to introduce broad educational programmes promoting postwar plans that had not yet been made public. Eichelberger’s decision to wait for official proposals severely restricted the output of his organisations, despite his desire to educate public opinion behind the broad principles and intricate details of a future international organisation.

Yet despite the internationalists’ frustrations, the events of the spring of 1944 pointed at more positive trends that would continue over the following twelve months. Firstly, in the private sphere, the internationalists increasingly recognised the need to rationalise the movement. Eichelberger’s attempts to restructure his organisations provided little clarity. However, with official proposals on the horizon, Eichelberger showed a willingness to rationalise and unite the movement, even if this meant working together with internationalists from outside of his organisations.

Secondly, the connections between the New York Group and the internationalists, though limited, provided another example of a state–private relationship. At the same time, the first months of 1944 saw the creation of State Department bureaucracy that would expand and develop even closer relationships between the Government and private organisations with regard to foreign affairs. The subject that the state–private relationship would first build upon was the question of international organisation.

Finally, in July, Cordell Hull announced that discussions would be held in August between the great powers regarding the creation of a new organisation. The Dumbarton Oaks conference would finally provide a reactive and deferential internationalist movement with a focal point and concrete proposals to promote. They would also see the formal implementation of a state–private network to support and promote the new international organisation. But first, they would provide the opportunity for a new internationalist umbrella organisation to attempt to unify the movement.

63 ibid.
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During World War II the organisations of 8 West 40th Street led by Clark Eichelberger were not the only internationalists concerned with the state of public opinion and the attitudes of the Government. Adding to the confusion caused by the number of organisations led by Eichelberger were two wartime attempts to unite the internationalist movement under one banner. The first, the Non-Partisan Council to Win the Peace (NPCWP) was formed in 1943. The second, more significant group, Americans United for World Organisation (AUWO), was formed in 1944. Both aimed to unite the internationalist movement under one banner in order to educate the public, and mobilise public opinion in order to lobby Washington. However, both merely added to public confusion and caused as much division within the movement as unity.

It was already clear that one of the most significant factors restricting the development of the internationalist programme of the groups of 8 West 40th Street in 1943 was disagreement among movement leaders over how best to organise. Yet just as the name changes were adding to public confusion, the Non-Partisan Council to Win the Peace was created in a similar vein with the aim of coordinating the movement. Of course, Eichelberger did not have the monopoly on internationalist ideas, and given his life-long desire to promote these ideas, it might have been expected that he would welcome the assistance. However, having spearheaded the movement for so long, Eichelberger resented any form of outside influence in his sphere. If he could not control the way the new international organisation would be promoted to the American people, then he would withdraw the support of his organisations. As a result, the new organisation would struggle to get off the ground. A similar situation would apply in 1944 when Americans United for World Organisation made a more successful but ultimately limited attempt to establish itself in the public and the government’s consciousness.

One of the most distinctive aspects of the organisational rivalry that developed between Eichelberger’s INA and the NPCWP was that hardly any of the disagreements were down to policy issues. At a time when the movement might have been expected to unite behind its ultimate goal, with comparatively little opposition, it was in fact spending an excessively large amount of time and resources quibbling amongst itself. Initially this was because there was little specific policy to disagree over, just the general support for a new international
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organisation, and for the United States to play a leading role in it. Even by late 1944, with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for international organisation on the table, bureaucratic issues continued to cause insurmountable trouble.

Yet, in addition to bureaucratic squabbles, the debates over Dumbarton Oaks also revealed significant policy differences within the internationalist movement. Although previous academic works on internationalism during the war acknowledge minor differences in opinion over Dumbarton Oaks, most emphasise the unanimity of internationalist groups during the debates over the creation of the UN. Given the primary goal of the creation of the UN, discussion on specific points was postponed or muted until after the San Francisco conference to finalise the new UN. The internationalist consensus held that establishing the organisation was the key; perfecting it would follow.¹

However, it has also been highlighted that differences between more limited, ‘realistic’ or gradual internationalists led by Eichelberger, and ‘idealistic’ or radical world government advocates developed during WWII. Indeed, conflict within internationalist organisations began even before the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were announced. These conflicts centred on whether the proposals for international organisation should receive unquestioning support, or whether they needed further strengthening through additional amendments. In addition, differences between those who wished to focus on the primary aim of world organisation and those who wished to support wider social causes would lead to further conflict between the ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ wings of the movement through 1945.²

By late 1944, the internationalist movement clearly displayed bureaucratic tensions and policy differences that had been hiding under a consensus of support for a new international organisation. The debate moved from how internationalism was promoted to how it was defined. The publication of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals meant that those debates finally had to occur, and no group illustrated the resulting tensions as perfectly as the ironically titled Americans United for World Organisation. A UWO proved that even such a clear focus for policy as the creation of the UN could not completely unite the internationalist movement.

In 1941, Eichelberger’s CDAAA had primarily been in competition with the isolationist America First Committee, but to a lesser extent it was also in competition with Fight for Freedom. Fight for Freedom had urged a declaration of war from April 1941, taking a more interventionist stance than the CDAAA.


immediately prior to Pearl Harbor, a new organisation named Freedom House had evolved out of Fight for Freedom, and many of its members had experience of supporting internationalist aims. Its first president, Herbert Agar, had taken leave from the organisation in late 1942 to join the Navy, but expressed his views on the need to educate the American public about international organisation on a visit home in early February. Following his remarks and further meetings in New York, it was suggested that a new coordinating agency be set up ‘in order to bring the full force of all existing organisations on our side behind an acceptable programme’. W.W. Waymack, editor of the Des Moines Register and Tribune and also a member of Freedom House, put together a memorandum in March regarding peace organisations at the request of Executive Secretary George Field. Waymack’s memo outlined the job ahead for those who were determined to win the peace.3

The proposal from Freedom House for another coordinating organisation to support an internationalist outlook revealed that the desire for the United States to play a role in a new international organisation, and a wider role in world affairs, was permeating the broader political culture. It was no longer simply the INA who were interested in postwar planning for a new United Nations. The question remained as to whether the INA, and Eichelberger in particular, would welcome this broader interest or be threatened by it. Given the history of competition in 1941 between Fight for Freedom and the CDaaa, the omens were not good.

Waymack certainly believed that a new coordinating group was required; in fact it was essential. Despite the assumption that the majority of Americans were generally in favour of participation in an international organisation, Waymack argued that the American public still needed mobilising against potential isolationist forces. In order to achieve ‘dynamic unity’ private organisations would have to overcome ‘fragmentation’. Waymack argued that only a non-partisan organisation, above petty political struggles, could provide such unity, invoking the example of the League to Enforce Peace during World War I. Tellingly, the groups of 8 West 40th Street were not seen as the answer. ‘While we have a hundred and one committees, commissions, associations and what not, all seeing the need and all trying to help fill it, the answer has not been found’.4

Waymack was clearly not impressed by Eichelberger’s coordinating efforts. Although no direct reference was made to Eichelberger’s committees, Waymack’s passage on the need for existing non-governmental bodies to cooperate was almost certainly aimed at them: ‘There is no place now for petty rivalries and ambitions. Every possible care should be taken to avoid being plagued by them. The clear, major lack now is a truly nationwide base, not subject to the often idiotic but nevertheless important antipathy toward “New York” or toward “the intelligentsia”. The emphasis was firmly on a nationwide and non-partisan

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3 Confidential memo, 12 March 1943, Box 57, CEP; Aaron Levenstein, Freedom’s Advocate (New York: Viking Press, 1965), pp. 26, 54; Waymack memorandum, 11 March 1943, Non-Partisan Council for Peace 1942–44 folder, Box 16, FJHP.
4 ibid.
movement, factors that the new Citizens Council for the United Nations could apparently not provide.\(^5\)

Waymack presented his memo at a meeting in New York on 11 March. The primary aim of a new coordinating group would be to build up public support to get the United States into any new system of collective security. In bureaucratic terms, it was agreed that the new committee would be a coordinating agency, not a membership organisation. ‘The purpose of this agency is to work out with leaders of existing organisations common strategic aims which these organisations will then attempt to realise – each according to its own methods.’ His would hopefully reduce duplication and make existing groups more effective.\(^6\)

This was by far the most significant issue for Eichelberger, who contacted former Chicago Daily News correspondent Edgar Ansel Mowrer, who was developing the new coordinating group. He expressed his concerns over bringing his organisations into the new coordinating agency. He claimed that the primary concern of each committee member he had spoken to was whether or not it would lead to the creation of yet another organisation. Once he had convinced them it was not their purpose to create local committees or do research, and it was not threatening to the INA, the CSO, P, or the Citizens Council for the United Nations, it was agreed that they would join. All Eichelberger’s organisations agreed to collaborate, but it was significant that Eichelberger highlighted his concerns so markedly at the beginning. Not only was there fear of duplication, but Eichelberger was clearly concerned with other internationalist leaders encroaching upon his turf.\(^7\)

The new coordinating organisation, officially called the Non-Partisan Council to Win the Peace, was launched in Chicago on 16 April 1943 by Waymack and Mowrer. Reiterating that it ‘in no sense seeks to replace other organisations with the same kindred aims’, the Council aimed to formulate a common strategy that could lead to the United States’ ‘participation in a postwar system of collective security backed by force’. Like the Eichelberger groups, the Council urged the immediate establishment of a United Nations council, and it also urged the adoption by the Senate of the Ball resolution or ‘adequate equivalent’.\(^8\)

Adding to the flurry of internationalist activity at the beginning of 1943 was the creation of the women’s action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace in March. Headed by Carrie Chapman Catt, the organisation replaced the National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War. The group was described as the beginning of a movement by American women to support ‘the effort to achieve a world based on the United Nations ideal’. The following month, Catt attempted to justify the new group’s existence: ‘Another organisation in the midst of dozens,

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\(^5\) ibid.

\(^6\) Minutes of first Non-Partisan Council meeting, 11 March 1943, 63759, Box 354, CEA.

\(^7\) Eichelberger to Mowrer, 15 April 1943, Box 57, CEP.

\(^8\) New York Times, 17 April 1943, p. 5.

The new private groups represented a positive trend in public opinion, reflecting a growing belief in the need for an international organisation. But as Robert Divine has argued, the new groups ‘probably bewildered as many Americans as they enlightened’, and they risked overselling the Ball resolution. But within the organisations themselves, there grew mutual suspicion due to their overlapping efforts. The Carnegie Endowment, which funded so many of the organisations, failed to supply the leadership and coordination that only it was in a position to provide. The movement was in desperate need of an effective coordinating agency, and the question remained as to whether the new NPCWP would prove successful. It would only work if Clark Eichelberger led his numerous organisations into effective cooperation.\footnote{Divine, Second Chance, pp. 102–3.}

These constant changes, in addition to the creation of new committees, such as the NPCWP, presented the public with a variety of alternatives, and little to go on regarding the potential effectiveness of any of them. The question remained as to whether the groups of 8 west 40th Street would join and participate fully in the NPCWP, which, theoretically, held the best chance of uniting all interested organisations.

Eichelberger’s initial reaction was positive, if only because he felt that joining would ensure pre-eminence in the field for his organisations. With reference to the NPCWP, he told the LNA executive committee in April that he had offered the services and collaboration of both the LNA and the Citizens Council for the United Nations. He argued that ‘he did not see how the organisations could very well refuse to cooperate and that he believed by cooperating it would be easier to prevent another membership organisation springing up’. Such a membership organisation would divide supporters of international organisation further, and a united front was essential for such an important public debate.\footnote{Minutes of the LNA executive committee, 21 April 1943, Folder 1, Box 25, HMFC.}

Colleagues of Eichelberger were not quite as certain about the Non-Partisan Council, and LNA treasurer Frederick McKee expressed his disapproval to Florence Harriman over Mowrer’s personal views. In the same edition of the New York Post that announced the NPCWP, Mowrer penned a highly critical article entitled ‘The Dr-Churchill Plan to Dismember France’. The article contained a reference to the creation of the NPCWP, and McKee was concerned about any suggestion that collaborating organisations shared Mowrer’s critical view of Allied diplomacy.\footnote{McKee to Harriman, 27 April 1943, Non-Partisan Council for Peace 1942–44 Folder, Box 16, FJHP.}

In addition, McKee expressed concerns over an organisational remit of the kind normally associated with Eichelberger. He expressed unease over the fact that NPCWP communications were on Freedom House paper, and that Freedom...
House was generally taking too much credit for the group. More significantly, as treasurer of the INA, he was especially aware of the potential confusion for financial supporters of the movement: ‘If a financial appeal is to be made, is there not the possibility that this will [be] interpreted that, when it comes to a choice by contributors, the money should go to either Freedom House or the NPCWP to the detriment of other organisations which joined to found the Council’.13

There were also concerns over the potential for duplication. Hugh Moore’s statement that the newly created United Nations Association’s chief work would be ‘to coordinate on a national basis the work of local United Nations committees as well as other organisations in the field to prevent duplication of effort,’ was a statement which itself suggested duplication of the purpose of the NPCWP. Relations between the Council and the organisations of West 40th Street were clearly not as close as had been hoped.14

Indeed, the relationship between the INA and the NPCWP went rapidly downhill. By July, the tension was increasingly apparent as the fears of Eichelberger, McKee and Moore surfaced and organisational rivalry reared its ugly head. Eichelberger expressed his bureaucratic frustrations with the Council.

The United Nations Association and the League of Nations Association joined the Non-Partisan Council because we believed that an effort should be made to bring together representatives of ten or fifteen or more really national organisations to work out common strategy and policies…. But there really has not been a meeting of minds of the heads of national organisations on common strategy.

Compounding the problem was the suggestion that local UNA and INA branches should affiliate to the Council, a suggestion Eichelberger was firmly against. He believed that his organisations should not be so closely linked with the NPCWP and that the only representatives the Council would have in each state would be one prominent Democrat and one prominent Republican. Increasingly, he regretted the formal expansion of the Council: ‘As I look back over it, I think it was a mistake to incorporate. Incorporation prevents flexibility and cannot help but make the Non-Partisan Council appear to be another organisation’.15

Eichelberger became increasingly critical of the Council, explaining his views on organisational responsibilities in greater detail the following month. While acknowledging that all organisations were suffering financial limitations, ‘it will not assist them if the Non-Partisan Council duplicates their work. The purpose of the Council is to assist the participating organisations and magnify their efforts rather than present the member organisations with competing plans or duplicate field organisation’. He suggested playing down the NPCWP so that it did not add to

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13 ibid.
15 Eichelberger to Mowrer, 13 July 1943 and 27 July 1943, Box 56, CEP.
confusion, even arguing that meetings planned by the Council at the beginning of September should be under the auspices of other local organisations. ‘The Council should be self-effacing and devote itself to developing the common strategy of the participating organisations, adding to their prestige and strength.’ While it can be argued that Eichelberger’s groups lacked a coherent strategy for the Council to develop, his suggestions were clearly designed to preserve the sovereign status of the groups of West 40th Street.16

However, by this point, Edgar Mowrer was clearly considering expanding the responsibilities of the Non-Partisan Council. By September he was asking Malcolm Davis of the Carnegie Endowment whether the Council should act as ‘an agency for the direct operation of programmes with the purpose of mobilising sentiment’. Frederick McKee responded immediately with a reminder that the Council was a coordinating body only, and individual organisations had joined on that basis: ‘any attempt to turn it into a mass membership organisation would destroy its effectiveness, create much wasted effort and competition among agencies and divide our forces at this critical time’.17

Although the NPCWP subsequently resolved that it was not a membership organisation and that it existed ‘for the purpose of exchanging information and developing a common strategy’, the damage had been done. While Eichelberger had convinced Mowrer and the Council that it should not become a membership organisation, the organisations of West 40th Street never came close to ceding decisions over their policies and programmes. Mowrer also continued to lead the NPCWP towards publicity, giving the impression of a membership organisation which Eichelberger so strenuously hoped to avoid.18

Yet with the exception of a few months in mid-1943, the NPCWP failed to capture the public’s imagination. While it would continue for two years, the failure of Eichelberger and his organisations at West 40th Street to fully throw their weight behind the Council doomed it from the beginning. It failed to establish itself with the public and the Government, and never reached a significant audience. The Eichelberger organisations had such a strong existing base that any new coordinating agency needed their cooperation. As it was, the NPCWP was just the first internationalist organisation of the war to highlight the turf wars and personality clashes that would hamper the movement, only adding to the confusion it was created to prevent.

By the autumn of 1943, Eichelberger had demonstrated his dominant position at the heart of the internationalist movement. Even the British had noticed the ubiquity and dominance of Eichelberger in internationalist organisations. Kathleen Courtney, Vice-Chairman of the Executive Council of the League of

16 Eichelberger memo to non-Partisan Council members (no date), 63829, Cea.
17 Mowrer to Davis, 3 September 1943, 63836, CEA; McKee to Mowrer, 7 September 1943, 63837, CEA.
18 non-Partisan Council minutes, 24 September 1943, 63841, Cea.; non-Partisan Council minutes, 8 October 1943, 63845, Cea.
Nations Union reported back to the Foreign Office whilst lecturing in the United States. She claimed to be ‘decidedly confused’ about the set-up of the various internationalist organisations, and blamed the confusion on the ‘opportunism’ of the leaders, specifically Eichelberger. Unsure as to the purpose of the United Nations Committees, Courtney noted ‘Eichelberger has buried the League of Nations association beneath a number of other organisations which are run by him from the same office, and many League of Nations supporters are dissatisfied’. Courtney’s comments on Eichelberger were surprisingly accurate, particularly for an outside observer. Whatever his views on international organisation, his attitudes towards internationalist organisations preceded him.19

Nevertheless, with Eichelberger’s focus on supporting Government plans and his decision to keep his groups separate from other interested internationalists, the chance to unite the internationalist movement was lost for the moment. The failure of internationalist organisations to come together in the summer of 1943 was significant for the bearing of movement as a whole. The inability to establish a new popular organisation or advance a new conception of internationalism meant there was no real alternative to the LNA of Clark Eichelberger, who continued to dominate the movement.

This remained the case through the winter of 1943–44, but by the spring of 1944, plans were again afoot to unite the growing internationalist consensus. By the time of Cordell Hull’s July announcement of the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks to design the new international organisation, a new organisation was almost in place. This represented an opportunity to bring disparate organisations together, and appeared to offer a real chance to create a significant national organisation to create political support for the proposed United Nations.

Americans United for World Organisation, an amalgamation of six political action committees, with links to over a dozen other internationalist organisations, represented the entire spectrum of American internationalism. It was the most prominent internationalist organisation at a time when American internationalism was at its peak. The intention was to bring as many private internationalist groups as possible together under the same umbrella, to create a national focus for public opinion, and to establish a powerful lobby to direct at the Senate. In assembling such a broad church of opinion, however, it was perhaps inevitable that disagreements over structure, approach, policy and personality would lead to divisions. These were so significant that they came close to paralysing the organisation.

As debates over the PCWP had already shown, there were clear personal and bureaucratic divisions within the internationalist movement, and these resurfaced with a UWO. Differing ideas about the objectives, approach, and scope of the organisation were never resolved, leading to conflict with existing internationalist groups, especially those of Clark Eichelberger. Despite appearing to work towards the same final objective, personality and ego would deprive Americans United...

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of the goodwill of leading internationalist figures, and the expected cooperation of fellow internationalist organisations. In particular, Eichelberger’s attempts to dominate the field ultimately led to his withdrawal from active involvement in a mericans United.

However, in the spring of 1944, a number of individuals saw the need for a new political action committee similar to pre-war groups such as the Committee to Defend a merica by a iding the a llies and f ight for f reedom. The war had turned in favour of the allies and postwar planning was a growing concern, even though many internationalists had been considering such questions since Pearl Harbor. The key issue for the internationalists was no longer victory, but the question of the postwar settlement and international organisation – which had of course been the key issue for most internationalists before 1940. Any new internationalist organisation would have to be focused on postwar issues, and discussions began in the spring of 1944 to consider possible ways to organise. Although the eventual entry into the United n ations appears to have been relatively certain in retrospect, the fear of a repeat of the rejection of the l eague of n ations loomed large in the minds of the internationalist leaders. Similarly, there was still a great deal of concern over the potential re-emergence of the isolationist opposition that proved so powerful in determining public opinion in 1940 and 1941.

The financial situation of existing internationalist groups pointed to the need to rationalise the movement. In March, Nicholas Murray Butler of the Carnegie Endowment finally urged internationalists to merge their activities in some way so as to avoid duplication of efforts. April saw a series of luncheons arranged by Hugh Moore to discuss ways of uniting the different groups and creating something ‘really active’. Ulric Bell, who had been the Office of War Information’s overseas representative in Hollywood, was also looking to the postwar situation as he prepared to return to New York. In March, Bell wrote to President Roosevelt, through Grace Tully, regarding internationalist interest in Hollywood, noting that ‘a very strong group out here has got together with the idea of trying to round up all the scattered efforts now being made and develop a national movement for unity and sanity’. In the spring, Bell arranged a dinner in Hollywood attended by Vice President Henry Wallace. Bell would continue to keep Wallace updated as he moved back into the private sphere and the internationalists organised through the autumn, when he would describe that dinner as ‘one of the stimuli which finally brought about the organisation which I believe represents the only chance we have for a truly national movement in favour of effective world organisation’.20

The organisation in question, Americans United for World Organisation consisted of six political action groups. AUWO consolidated the activities of the a merican f ree w orld a ssociation, Citizens for Victory, the Committee to

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20 Divine, Second Chance, p. 166; Moore to Smith, 21 March 1944, Folder 17, Box 4, HMFC; Bell to Tully, 18 March 1944, PPF 2409, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Bell to Wallace, 20 September 1944, Henry Wallace Papers at FDR, reel 3 (microfilm edition), r oosevelt s tudy Centre, middelburg.
Defend America, fight for freedom, the United Nations Association and the United Nations Committee for Greater New York. In addition, it was announced that the new group would collaborate with a number of research and educational organisations. By the middle of September there were 12 such groups, and these included the INA, the Cso P, the Committee for National Morale, Federal Union and Freedom House. The advantage to those who remained autonomous was that they could remain tax-exempt through their educational status.21

The membership of the new group contained few surprises. Hugh Moore, who had been chairman of the executive committees of both the CDAAA and the LNA, was to be chairman of the organising committee. Ulric Bell, active in fight for freedom and the OWI, became the group’s director. Former American minister to Norway Florence Harriman was both a vice-president and the chairman of the speakers committee. Eichelberger was chairman of the policy committee and industrialist Frederick McKee became chairman of the group’s political action committee.

Familiar names from previous internationalist groups could be found in the lengthy list that constituted the organizing and sponsoring committee. Many had been involved with one or both of the main pre-Pearl Harbor committees and most of those had retained links to at least one internationalist committee since 1942. As with previous internationalist organisations, academia, big business and the press – the eastern establishment elite – figured strongly. Significant names included: William A. Gar, formerly of fight for freedom and Vice-President of Freedom House; L.M. Birkhead of Friends of Democracy; lawyer Grenville Clark (Fight for Freedom); Fortune editor Russell Davenport (also Council for Democracy); George Field (Freedom House); P.M. owner Marshall Field; Edgar Ansel Mowrer; the Cso P’s James Shotwell; Herbert Bayard Swope (CDAAA, Freedom House); and banker James Warburg (Fight for Freedom and OWI).

From the outset, however, there was never a unified concept of internationalism within a UWO. The organisations led by Eichelberger – the INA, the Cso P, the UNA, the CDAAA, Citizens for Victory – contained a significant number of the more gradual or ‘realistic’ political internationalists. While many of these had great expectations for the new world organisation, their priority was to create an organisation that could be perfected gradually from within, with the help of educational efforts demonstrating its potential to the public. They also recognised that the success of the organisation would depend greatly on the US Government’s willingness to utilise it.

Ulric Bell and other more radical or ‘idealistic’ internationalists on the other hand, held the more optimistic belief that the new organisation would be

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21 Eichelberger, Organizing for Peace, p. 245. incredibly, or perhaps inevitably, this is the sole reference to a mericans United in Eichelberger’s account. Other names considered for the new organisation included United Americans for World Security, United Americans for Freedom and World Security, and United America Inc. See a UWO organising committee minutes, 10, 12 and 18 May 1944, Folder 28, Box 4, HMFC.
perfect upon creation. It also quickly became clear that their dissatisfaction with
the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would lead to calls for a form of federal world
government, despite political realities. This followed a similar pattern to that set in
1941 when Eichelberger ran the CDAAA, with its more limited aims that followed
the Government line, and Bell was executive chairman of the more extreme
and openly interventionist fight for freedom. Different conceptions of the aim
of a UWO would fundamentally undermine all attempts at unity, revealing the
problems inherent in referring to internationalism as a cohesive movement.

Anticipating a strong Congressional debate over international organisation,
Eichelberger set out his ideas for a merger of internationalist forces in a pril.
He believed that political action groups (such as the UNA, the women’s action
Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace, Citizens for Victory and Freedom
House) should combine forces to reduce duplication. His opinion of their aim,
however, was very narrow: ‘what is needed ... is a virtual merger of the four of
two organisations that are thinking almost exclusively in terms of Congressional
action’. Elaborating his opinion at a UNA board meeting the following month,
Eichelberger ‘stressed the danger of letting the new group wander afield from its
original purpose of political action and enter into the educational field’.

This view was repeated when it came to bringing Eichelberger’s organisations
into AUWO. McKee noted that the UNA board had misgivings about the creation
of another organisation at the following meeting, and set certain conditions for
joining. As well as specifying a UWO’s political action role – lobbying Congress,
highlighting isolationist Senators, etc. – these reiterated that the educational, tax-
exempt committees (the LNA and CSOP) would continue to function as before
without fear of overlap, and they would also retain links to local committees.
Eichelberger, Henry Atkinson and Mrs Dana C. Backus wrote to Moore following
the meeting, acknowledging the UNA’s merger with AUWO, convinced it would
be a success as it intended to focus on political action and that there would be no
duplication of material.

Eichelberger highlighted the issue to Bell in June over a draft AUWO press
release. He advised Bell to remove the phrase ‘as having suspended their own
activities’ with regard to the collaborating organisations, as he had no intention of
suspending the educational and research work of the LNA and the CSOP. While he
admitted that the coming together of existing groups would be of vital importance
in attracting public support, Eichelberger was again keen to highlight that only

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22 Eichelberger memo, 17 April 1944, Box 55, CEP; Minutes of the UNA Board of
Directors, 19 May 1944, Box 55, CEP. Eichelberger still made the distinction between
political and educational for tax reasons as much as anything else. Political groups, such as
the CDAAA, the UNA, and AUWO were not tax-exempt, whereas educational groups such
as the LNA and the CSOP were. Needless to say, the boundaries between the groups were
rarely so neatly defined.

23 McKee to Hopkins, 28 May 1944, Box 54, CEP; Atkinson, Eichelberger and Backus
to Moore, 26 May 1944, Box 54, CEP.
the political action groups would be formally merging and that the collaborating
groups would do no more than fully cooperate.24

A nother concern of Eichelberger’s was Bell’s emphasis on democracy. In May,
a report on the purpose of AUWO highlighted three key points. Alongside the
establishment of a just peace and the immediate creation of a world organisation, the
final point was ‘to combat the subversive activities and propaganda of the defeatist
reactionary and imperialist minority at home’. While Eichelberger conceded that
‘we don’t want to neglect democracy in our programme, and that you have a point
in wanting to make it strong to please our friends in Hollywood’, he suggested
playing it down as it sounded more like the rhetoric of the Council for Democracy.
The subsequent statement followed Eichelberger’s line regarding collaborating
organisations, although it retained a reference not only to isolationists and
nationalists, but also to the ‘subversive’. Failure to resolve these early differences
would later resurface and restrict all efforts to fully unite a Uwo. 25

A fter three months of organising committee meetings, and lengthy discussion
over the group’s name and the unresolved issue of national chairman, a Uwo
finally announced itself to the public on 8 August. Initial reaction was positive, as
the press were quick to get behind the new organisation. Such enthusiastic coverage
closely followed the lines of the AUWO press release, revealing nothing of the
tension behind the scenes. The New York Post highlighted the group’s three main
aims, describing it as ‘a non-partisan movement designed to keep isolationists out
of Congress, promote world peace organisation and oppose home front reaction’.
It also noted that the group would open headquarters at 5 West 54th Street, New
York, in offices loaned by Freedom House, and that the search was underway for
a prominent political figure to stand as national chairman. The New York Times
highlighted the group’s ‘fight for the establishment of a world organisation with
power to enforce peace and to oppose isolationist candidates for office’, as well as
including a lengthy list of committee members.26

The New York Herald-Tribune added that one of the initial aims of the new
group was ‘to combat those organisations now propagandising for a negotiated
peace’. Its editorial described the development of a Uwo as ‘praiseworthy – in
principle, at least, it is vital’. The paper agreed that the amalgam of groups would
prove greater than the sum of its parts, and took its anti-isolationist stance as a
cause to ‘rejoice’, as well as praising the quality of the personnel involved. The
fact that no specific blueprint for world organisation had been promoted was
deemed to be a wise option. With the Dumbarton Oaks conference due to start
in a matter of days, it was deemed more important to promote the principle of

24 Eichelberger to Bell, 19 June 1944, Box 54, CEP.
25 Report on Special Committee on Purpose, aims and Programme of American
United for World Organisation, 22 May 1944, Box 54, CEP; Eichelberger to Bell, 19 June
1944, Box 54, CEP; Americans United statement, 11 July 1944, Box 54, CEP.
26 New York Post, 8 August 1944 (copies seen at fo 371/38601, a 3749/116/45, Pro );
international organisation, than push forward a detailed programme that could be obsolete in weeks.  

The final administrative hurdle faced by the new organisation was the question of who would lead it. In searching for a chairman, the group hoped to secure a significant public figure, one who would bring as much prestige and national renown to the organisation as William Allen White had brought to the CDaaa in 1940. This had been a recurring problem for the movement during the war years. Even if the leader were only effectively a figurehead, leaving the day-to-day running to Bell or possibly Eichelberger (as White had done in the CDaaa), the extra publicity generated by a prominent public figure would be significant, if not essential, to a public opinion campaign. To that end, the group’s first choice was former Under-secretary of state Sumner Welles, who provisionally accepted but quickly withdrew. In the end, after consulting with Wendell Willkie (who also declined the position), Bell and Hugh Moore were left to choose from the sponsoring committee list that they had already assembled.

The eventual choice of chairman of the board was Dr Ernest Hopkins, President of Dartmouth College since 1916, whose appointment was announced to the press on 3 September. Hopkins was a known supporter of international organisation, a Republican (as White had been), and he had served briefly during the war as a director in the Office of Production Management. While there was no denying Hopkins’ internationalist credentials, he did not have the national profile that White had provided in 1940 or that Welles would have brought to the group. In accepting the chairmanship, Hopkins highlighted three immediate objectives for the group:

1. First, that we should give every possible help to movements intelligently devised for world organisation upon some basis of decency analogous to principles assumed to be essential among human beings in their dealings with one another. Second, that we should seek by every means at our command to ensure the election of a Congress intelligent enough and purposeful enough to give expression to the popular will on these matters. Third, that we should make available to an eager public the knowledge by which they can identify and classify those individuals and agencies among us whose acquisitiveness for power, pride of position, or glorification of race lead them to positions and efforts which head straight to fascism and all of the hideous attributes of that cult.

Hopkins’ statement revealed little of his personal views regarding the specifics of world organisation, merely rephrasing the aims of a Uwo as initially stated in August. The appointment of Dr Hopkins was supported in a letter released to the

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27 New York Herald-Tribune, 10 August 1944 (copies seen at fo 371/38601, a 3749/116/45, Pro).
28 Bell to Wallace, 20 September 1944, Henry Wallace Papers at FDR, reel 3 (microfilm edition), Roosevelt study Centre, Middelburg; see May–July organising committee minutes for discussion of possible names for national chairman, Folder 28, Box 4, HMFC.
press from Wendell Willkie, who had captured the imagination of the American public with his million-selling 1943 book, *One World*. Willkie, who called for the creation of some form of international organisation, claimed the current world situation was the last chance for a democratic world, and expressed fear that ‘the same kind of cabal might form that scuttled peace efforts 25 years ago’.29

The new organisation moved quickly to promote its stated objectives. Just two days after Hopkins’ appointment was announced, the group urged immediate acceptance of a plan for world organisation in a statement addressed to the Dumbarton Oaks delegates. This statement, the group’s first since the conference opened, urged the continuation of great power collaboration and approved the announcement of the structure of the planned organisation. Significantly, the group clearly hoped that it would be the Assembly, not the Executive, that would determine world security policy, and also that there would be no veto held by the great powers over executive decisions: ‘The great powers should not be above the law’. Eichelberger’s influence also appeared, as the statement advocated an international air force and neutral strategic bases, which the Cso P had been promoting since late 1943.30

Yet despite the united front displayed to the public as the group was launched, discussion of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would see the first signs of a serious divide within the organisation. Just two weeks into the conference, Eichelberger expressed concern over the more idealistic internationalist influences coming to the fore. In a letter to Sumner Welles, he noted that Grenville Clark had proposed that AUWO take a position opposed to the international organisation being proposed at the conference. Clark proposed that the Assembly should be the most significant body of the new organisation, not the Council, and that votes in the Assembly should be based on population. Eichelberger noted that such a plan was ‘fantastic and it disturbs me that a person of so much influence as he has at times should be campaigning against the Dumbarton Oaks conference in such a way’. He also reiterated his views on the responsibilities of AUWO, arguing, ‘I do not think that Americans United should be doing too much detail blue-printing. That should be left to the Commission and to other groups with which Americans United is collaborating. It should concentrate its main effort on the political action level ....’31

It was clear that Eichelberger saw Americans United primarily as a vehicle to ensure Congressional ratification of the proposed international organisation, and that the specific details of the new organisation were beyond the AUWO remit. Discussion of those details was the preserve of Shotwell and Eichelberger’s Cso P, as public consideration of alternatives by a Uwo might cause confusion among the general public. During the following month, Eichelberger headed

29 americans United press release, 3 September 1944, fo 371/38601, a 3749/116/45, Pro.
31 Eichelberger to Welles, 4 September 1944, Box 98, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
the a Uwo policy committee, and after the close of the conference, he put the policy committee proposals to the executive committee. It was recommended that ‘a mericans United enthusiastically endorse the preliminary agreements reached at Dumbarton Oaks and urge the early completion and ratification of the United nations Plan’. Although the policy committee did have suggestions on issues such as voting in the assembly, strengthening the military staff Committee, and references to human rights, it was suggested that these be transmitted privately to the state Department, so that an unconditional endorsement of the proposals could be released.32

It was soon obvious, however, that Eichelberger was in a minority on the Board of Directors. At a board meeting on 24 October, Eichelberger again suggested that ‘too many qualifications incorporated in a statement of approval of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals issued publicly by Americans United would confuse the public’. He urged that the organisation issue a simple endorsement of the proposals and that further suggestions be sent to the state Department privately. When voted upon by the Board, Eichelberger’s suggestion was defeated ten to four, with only Victor Elting, Mrs C. Rienold Noyes, and Mrs Kermit Roosevelt voting with him, all of whom were long serving members of the committees of 8 west 40th street.33

Eichelberger was clearly under pressure from the rest of the Board to issue a partly critical statement regarding the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The remainder of the Board, including Bell, Ernest Hopkins, Edgar Mowrer, George Field and Thomas Finletter among others, urged that Americans United should follow up on the suggestion of Under-Secretary of State Stettinius to ‘ask for the maximum’. As Stettinius would later tell Mowrer, he believed that the American delegation at the San Francisco conference to create the UN would do better if it was ‘backed by an American public that is yelling for the strongest, most perfect organisation conceivable’. With apparent Government support for a critical statement, Eichelberger was clearly in the minority. As treasurer and Board member J.a. Miguel argued, a mericans United would be ‘remiss in its duty if it did not act accordingly’.34

In response, Mrs Roosevelt backed up Eichelberger’s position with a letter to the Executive Committee and Board members on 26 October, stating that:

I do believe that we should fight in every way possible for the most perfect instrument – but – I believe that our first objective is to get the public ready and willing to accept – and demand – an instrument of world organisation as the preventative of future wars. I believe that we cannot and must not begin our fight against Isolationism by criticising the preliminary pattern. To my mind the

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32 Minutes of AUWO Executive Committee meeting, 20 October 1944, Box 54, CEP.
33 Minutes of AUWO Board meeting, 24 October 1944, Box 4, Folder 25, HMFC.
34 Minutes of AUWO Board meeting, 24 October 1944, Box 4, Folder 25, HMFC; Mowrer to Non-Partisan Council to Work in the Peace members, 18 December 1944, 64062, Ce a.
result would be disastrous to our primary objective. I believe the result would be confusion in the public mind – and ammunition for the isolationists.

Elting drafted a statement to the executive committee in a similar vein, arguing against releasing a statement loaded ‘with objections and criticisms’ which would ‘chill the entusiasms of the rank and file of our organisation throughout the country’. Elting also argued that the details of international organisation should be left to the CSOP and that Americans United should ‘back up the State Department in its effort to move toward the ultimate goal with the enthusiastic support of public opinion’.

Despite these protestations, Americans United’s statement regarding Dumbarton Oaks, released on 21 November, was, in the words of Robert Divine, ‘lukewarm’. While it expressed ‘deep appreciation of the efforts involved’, the agreements were described merely as ‘a progressive step on the long road to making wars impossible’. It also highlighted a number of points of contention, most notably the belief that Congress should give the President authorisation to deploy US forces without further consultation, and that no veto should be allowed in the Security Council. For those who saw the primary function of the group as working to establish the new organisation as soon as possible, the radical slant of the statement was seen as counterproductive. After lengthy committee discussion of voting procedure, James Warburg wrote to Bell arguing that you cannot be for the plan and question one of its basic elements. Presciently, Warburg noted that ‘what I think is at the root of all this is that a certain number of members of the Board have their hearts set on a super-state or world government’. Even though he sympathised with that viewpoint, the first step was an organisation of sovereign nations.

During the Dumbarton Oaks conference, AUWO successfully prepared a background information session with the State Department at which approximately one hundred organisations, internationalist or otherwise, were represented. The group also campaigned against the re-election of isolationist Congressmen, and were more than pleased to see the likes of Congressman Hamilton Fish and Senator Gerald P. Nye retired at the November elections. However, the growing split between the realistic and idealistic internationalists would continue to grow through the winter, leaving the realistic internationalists, led by the Eichelberger...
organisations, to step back from AUWO. It became increasingly clear that the group would never achieve its full potential as envisaged in early 1944.\(^{37}\)

Chairman Ernest Hopkins became increasingly aware of the divide. In a letter to the Rockefeller Foundation’s Raymond Fosdick, he was especially critical of Eichelberger, dismissing him as ‘a professional propagandist’ who was clearly at odds with the rest of the Board. He was also pessimistic as to whether any accommodation could be reached between a Uwo and Eichelberger’s other organisations. Fosdick replied that he felt, as Eichelberger did, that there needed to be greater definition between the organisations, as AUWO continued to consider the finer points of policy and expand into the educational sphere. He also defended Eichelberger personally, arguing that ‘almost unaided over long, bleak years, when there were few people who cared, he kept a group together which today represents a national organisation’.\(^{38}\)

In reply, Hopkins made it quite clear that he was unhappy with Eichelberger’s personal methods as much as his policy decisions and organisational politics. He argued that Eichelberger interfered with the work of office staff, made excessive demands of State Department officials in Washington, dragged out committee meetings and, most significantly, had created the general impression that after two decades of carrying the internationalist torch alone, he ‘had become constitutionally incapable of working with anybody else’. Other Board members with experience from other organisations claimed that Eichelberger had ‘undertaken to sabotage every single one of these successively as it has been organised and drifted away in the slightest degree from his own supervision and management’. In addition to these complaints, Hopkins was in sharp disagreement with Eichelberger over the division of organisational duties. Hopkins felt that it was impossible to make such a clear differentiation between the political and the educational spheres – in order to convince people to vote a certain way, you had to give them sufficient reason. When confronted about the situation, Eichelberger replied that he felt a Uwo was ‘invading his field’. As a result of the situation, Hopkins held little hope for the future of a Uwo, stating ‘I am not willing to argue for a moment that it has the best possible organisation for doing the important work at the present time’, and that it functioned best when Eichelberger was not around.\(^{39}\)

Eichelberger was not alone, however, in believing that a Uwo was encroaching unnecessarily onto the turf of existing organisations. Chester Rowell, editor of the San Francisco Chronicle and long-time supporter of the activities of West 40th Street, argued that he had agreed to serve as a Vice-President of a Uwo on the condition that it would be engaged solely in the sphere of political action. However, he saw the activities of a Uwo as duplicating and even threatening the work of the LNA, the CSOP, and the Church Peace Union. Rowell made the

\(^{37}\) Robbins, Experiment in Democracy, pp. 42–6; Bell statement for press release, 9 November, 1944, Box 54, CEP.

\(^{38}\) Fosdick to Hopkins, 8 December 1944, Folder 18, Box 4, HMFC.

\(^{39}\) Hopkins to Fosdick, 18 December 1944, Folder 18, Box 4, HMFC.
comparison with the years before the outbreak of war: ‘It would be fatal to have again in the field of Dumbarton Oaks the folly of two parallel and competing organisations such as we had before Pearl Harbor with the Committee to Defend America and Fight for Freedom’.  

Despite such support, Eichelberger offered his resignation as chairman of the policy committee to Hopkins on 21 December. Eichelberger had set up and chosen the policy committee himself, so when the committee’s recommendations were rejected, Eichelberger realised that policy was actually in the hands of the Executive Committee and the Board. As a result of being placed in such an unnecessary and embarrassing position, he felt he had no choice but to resign. Yet despite, or perhaps because of the controversy that still existed over the responsibilities of the AUWO in relation to the organisations based at 8 West 40th Street, he did not resign from the Executive Committee. As he informed Hopkins, ‘I shall not hesitate to express my views on questions of policy when they arise at Executive Committee meetings’.

Hopkins agreed to forward Eichelberger’s letter to the Board, agreeing that no one would have a problem with his submitting his views to the Executive Committee, and that ‘no one has any misunderstanding in regard to the consecration to the cause of an adequate security organisation which had been yours now for these many years ever since the last war’. In a letter to Moore, however, Hopkins expressed his relief that Eichelberger had resigned, and for the sake of the smooth running of AUWO he was clearly frustrated by Eichelberger’s insistence on retaining a say on the Executive Committee. He hoped that his reply to Eichelberger’s resignation letter had been a tactful one.

With Eichelberger taking less responsibility within AUWO, his supporters felt increasingly free at the beginning of 1945 to criticise the group and express concern about the man who was effectively controlling AUWO: Ulric Bell. It was clear that a number of Eichelberger’s long-term supporters shared his views regarding AUWO and that they were ready to support his actions, even if it reduced the strength of AUWO. LNA treasurer Frederick McKee expressed concern to Moore that Bell was unwilling to cooperate with existing organisations, making their efforts all the more difficult.

For example... Ulric’s concern lest some of the plans and ideas discussed at the Board meetings might be used by some other organisation. I am totally at variance with such a point of view and would like to see Americans United used as an idea factory. ... I also feel that he has over-concentrated on the question of organisation prestige – witness the attempts to force various organisations to adopt the name – and has not given sufficient attention to some of the more vital problems of field relations.

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40 Rowell to Frederick McKee, 20 December 1944, Box 54, CEP.
41 Eichelberger to Hopkins, 21 December 1944, Box 54, CEP.
42 Hopkins to Eichelberger, 27 December 1944, Box 54, CEP; Hopkins to Moore, 28 December 1944, Folder 18, Box 4, HMFC.
43 McKee to Moore, 2 January 1945, Box 54, CEP.
In February, Eichelberger decided to express his concerns directly to Ulric Bell and Sidney Hayward. He reiterated his belief that AUWO was set up to do political action work, but asked 'have all of us ever sat down together to consider what the political action job is?' As far as Eichelberger was concerned, the job was simply counting heads in the Senate and ensuring passage of the Charter. As he saw it, there were twenty isolationist senators and twenty-one doubtful senators:

If I had my way, and I suppose the majority of the Board are thankful I don’t, I would have Americans United concentrate exclusively upon bringing pressure to bear upon those doubtful senators... I would not have Americans United do much of anything else but that job, and believe me, if it could do that effectively it would earn for itself a place in history.44

Eichelberger took the opportunity to defend his own corner, arguing that the groups of West 40th Street should produce the bulk of the educational material. He made it clear that if AUWO avoided the educational field, it would receive more support from his organisations. He also felt that AUWO was wasting its time on its new mass membership drive, as it was unnecessary given the aims of the group, and the Women’s Action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace had just begun a similar drive. Despite these criticisms, Eichelberger concluded by saying that if AUWO ‘concentrated in the doubtful states on the one job of corralling the doubtful senators it would have the cooperation and support of a vast number of organisations and would certainly play a historic role’.45

Despite Eichelberger’s effort at conciliation, his suggestions made no discernible impact on the actions of AUWO, and Bell continued to run the organisation as he saw fit. In addition to issuing a statement in support of the Yalta proposals and arranging a further off-the-record discussion with State Department officials regarding the Bretton Woods agreement, the group’s membership drive continued. This made Americans United less like a coordinating body and increasingly more like another mass membership pressure group. Also, in February, AUWO released a Bill of essential human rights, consisting of eighteen principles, encroaching more than ever before into the sphere of the CsoP. Eichelberger increasingly withdrew from the day-to-day activities of Americans United, describing his situation as early as mid-January as ‘pretty much out of touch’ with the organisation. He turned his attention towards the long-established (though renamed) American Association for the United Nations (AA Un), and its own separate educational campaign.46

44 Eichelberger to Bell and Hayward, 9 February 1945, Box 54, CEP. At the AUWO annual Board meeting on 14 February 1945, Bell became executive vice-president and Hayward became director of the organisation. Hopkins remained chairman of the Board, Moore was elected president.

45 Ibid.

46 AUWO press release on Yalta, 15 February 1945, Box 54, CEP; Hopkins to Eichelberger, 17 February 1945, Box 54, CEP; New York Times, 12 February 1945, p. 21;
Over the next couple of months, communication and cooperation did occur between a Uwo and the aa Un, but relations were never close. Attempts to produce a joint a Uwo /aa Un statement announcing that there was no competition between the groups failed. In May, Hopkins expressed his frustration to George Rublee that delineation of the responsibilities of the respective organisations had not been achieved, and he reserved most of his bile for Eichelberger, claiming that Eichelberger’s actions ‘represent an attitude that if the world cannot be saved under his auspices it is not worth saving at all’. Hopkins went on to argue that following Wendell Willkie’s death, Eichelberger felt he had been absolved of all responsibility for cooperation, and that with the renaming of the League of Nations a ssociation, the new aa Un was not bound to follow the Ln a ‘s commitments. Hopkins even claimed that Eichelberger had undertaken in a number of states to discredit AUWO: ‘I do not question Clark’s intentions in the slightest degree, but I honestly think that he feels that guardianship of the idea of a postwar organisation for peace is his exclusive responsibility’. Hopkins made it quite clear that he backed Bell over Eichelberger, and had done ‘loyally’ since joining the organisation. Rublee urged that the whole peace movement should not degenerate into a private feud between Bell and Eichelberger.47

Eichelberger decided at this point to resign from the Board and the Executive Committee, expressing his disappointment that things had not worked out as originally planned. However, the resignation letter was shelved, and Eichelberger’s long-term associates Frederick McKee, Victor Elting and William Emerson wrote to Hopkins, defending Eichelberger and urging greater communication between the groups. Although meetings had taken place between Eichelberger and Bell, ‘without a joint statement and a clear-cut definition by the Executive Committee of relations with other organisations, national and local, such conferences between the directors could only be of limited value’. Four suggestions were made to heal the rift: a joint statement should be issued immediately; Bell and Eichelberger should meet on a weekly basis; Executive meetings of AUWO should be held at regular times; and that a conference be arranged between representatives of both organisations. As they astutely observed, ‘surely organisations preaching the conference method for settling international problems should practice the same method in settling their local problems’.48

The McKee-Elting-Emerson letter, in addition to his conversation with Rublee, spurred Hopkins to bring matters to a head with Bell. Although Hopkins had previously been frustrated by Eichelberger, by June he was increasingly unsettled

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47 Hopkins to George Rublee, 15 May 1945, Box 54, CEP; Hopkins to Walter Wanger, 7 June 1945, Folder 19, Box 4, HMFC.
48 Eichelberger to Moore (never sent), 29 May 1945, Box 54, CEP; McKee, Emerson and Elting to Hopkins, 1 June 1945, Box 54, CEP.
with Bell, he was particularly concerned that Bell was spending too much time on ‘liberal issues other than the primary aim of supporting the new international organisation’. Hopkins reported that ‘people who had an initial interest in us and might have contributed to the cause are instead contributing to Clark Eichelberger’s outfits in the belief that they are better set up and administratively more efficient in the single aim of getting the treaty ratified than are we’. He claimed that a number of those who had joined the Board at his request were apprehensive about those who represented the ‘do-gooder’ element – a reference particularly aimed at Bell – who would be attracted to every worthy cause that arose at the expense of the primary aim of world organisation.49

Bell took the matter extremely seriously, seeing the issue as a conflict between liberal and reactionary conservative elements in the group, with Hopkins placed in with the conservatives. Hopkins responded by claiming that the difference between them was not ideological, but the difference ‘between one who believes that our main purpose for the time being should not be sacrificed for any supplementary causes and one who temperamentally and emotionally responds to the call for help and assistance to any good cause’. Nevertheless, Hopkins insisted that AUWO needed to focus on the sole issue of ratification.50

Furthermore, he was concerned that his name, and those of others with similar views, was being used to support positions with which they simply did not agree. Bell had released an AUWO bulletin which attacked all groups that asked for even minor revisions of the Bretton woods agreements, arguing that the agreements should be backed without qualification. This move was seen by Hopkins as excessively harsh, especially considering that AUWO had been qualified in its support of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The American Bankers Association came under particular attack, as it was suggested that their reservations were motivated by financial self-interest. Hopkins felt that Bell was going too far in questioning the motives of the Bankers Association, many of whom were connected to a Uwo. He described the organisation’s name as a ‘travesty’, as the group was neither united nor solely for world organisation, and he threatened to withdraw from his position unless changes occurred. As he told Walter Wanger, ‘I cannot work effectively excepting within an organisation in which people are capable, cooperative and devoted to the major cause for which the organisation has been set up’.51

49 Hopkins to Bell, 7 June 1945, Folder 19, Box 4, HMFC; Hopkins to Wanger, 7 June 1945, Folder 19, Box 4, HMFC. As an example of alternative liberal causes supported by Americans United, Bell went before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee in August urging support for the full employment Bill. See AU newsletter, 21 August 1945, Box 54, CEP.

50 Hopkins to Bell, 7 June 1945, Folder 19, Box 4, HMFC.

51 Hopkins to Bell, 11 June 1945, Folder 19, Box 4, HMFC; Hopkins to Wanger, 7 June 1945, Folder 19, Box 4, HMFC; Moore memo on AU-Treasury Department meeting, 6 March 1945, Folder 19, Box 4, HMFC.
Further division came from what Hopkins described as ‘Ulric’s developing phobia against Hugh Moore’. This dislike came despite Moore’s generous donations of time and money, and the possible alienation he faced as a result of sticking with a UWO instead of withdrawing to the Eichelberger organisations. As Moore had long been connected to Eichelberger’s organisations, he risked personal friendships to remain as AUWO President. Hopkins saw Moore as the more valuable member, and Bell was now the prime cause for concern. While he refused to concede, as many did, that Bell ‘was more interested in creating a new organisation for himself than he was in the ultimate goal of securing the widespread support which would guarantee the treaty’s passage through the Senate’, he felt ‘the whole trouble is in Ulric’s thinking of himself as an administrative genius when actually all of his instincts and all of his practices are those of artistic temperament’. Bell’s inability to deal with the issues impersonally only compounded the divisions within the organisation.52

Despite the growing discord, efforts were still made to create a working agreement between a UWO and the AAUN. Moore informed Eichelberger that Bell was preparing a statement to the effect that a UWO would play no further part in the sphere of international relations following the ratification of the new organisation, leaving that field solely to the AAUN, and backing Eichelberger’s conviction that a UWO had been created solely as a temporary emergency committee with the aim of ensuring ratification. Weekly meetings were also to be arranged in order to facilitate means of collaboration between the organisations. The statement appeared to represent an enormous compromise on Bell’s behalf, effectively accepting the triumph of Eichelberger’s vision for the group.53

Eichelberger produced a draft of a joint statement which merely reiterated his views on the subject yet again, with no sign of compromise on his part. The AAUN was to work in the field of education, explaining Dumbarton Oaks and the proposed UN Charter to develop public support. It would continue after ratification, informing the public of UN activities. AUWO on the other hand, was formed to cope with the present emergency only, to oppose isolationist candidates for Congress, to mobilise public opinion in favour of ratification and to urge the expression of that opinion on the Senate. ‘There is no competition or rivalry between the American Association for the United Nations and Americans United for World Organisation. They do not duplicate but compliment [sic] each other, one functioning in the educational field, and the other in the political field’. While the sentiments expressed clearly attempted to create an image of unity for the sake of the internationalist cause, antagonism between the groups remained. The educational and political spheres could never be truly separated (as Hopkins had realised), and the statement was never issued.54

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52 Hopkins to Wanger, 7 June 1945, Folder 19, Box 4, HMFC.
53 Moore to Eichelberger, 21 July 1945, Box 54, CEP.
54 Draft AUWO–AAUN statement (no date), 1945, Box 54, CEP.
The final unresolved issue for AUWO related to the gradual/radical divide that had existed from the outset. With the ratification of the United Nations imminent, Eichelberger and the more gradual realists strongly backed the planned organisation, and proposed to continue to educate the public about the UN and to consider ways to expand and improve the UN from within. For the radical idealists, however, the proposed UN was not enough, and there was dissatisfaction with the final proposals for the UN. It was also believed that a political action committee would continue to be necessary after ratification to work towards the strengthening of the UN. The realists hoped to influence the UN from a generally supportive viewpoint. The idealists, on the other hand, supported the ideal of international organisation, but held no great respect for the proposed UN. The divide would finally split AUWO, revealing the pattern that organised internationalism would follow in the postwar years.55

Despite their differences, Eichelberger, Bell and Moore met in June to discuss the future of AUWO. Unsurprisingly, the main figures held differing views as to what should be done. Four alternatives were initially under consideration: winding up Americans United completely; continuing the organisation along the lines of a domestic pro-democratic organisation (as Bell desired); asking Bell to form a new organisation (possibly merging with the Union for Democratic Action); or continuing a UWO solely through the organisation’s political committee (which would roughly meet Eichelberger’s original intention for a UWO). Moore initially preferred the last option, although anything seemed preferable to the second option, especially as Bell appeared intent on keeping the ‘Americans United’ part of the name. This was despite the fact that, as Moore was keen to point out, ‘Americans are anything but united on most of the pro-democratic issues’.56

Further discussion of alternatives took place at an AUWO Board meeting on 11 July. A new pro-democratic organisation – Americans United for World Freedom – was proposed, to focus primarily on domestic affairs with an emphasis on social and economic problems. However, most of the idealistic internationalists, including Arthur Goldsmith, William Gar, Edgar Mowrer and Florence Harriman, argued in favour of the continuation of a UWO in order to promote a stronger international organisation. It was believed that the AU UN, with its emphasis on education, would not place sufficient pressure on Congress over future issues. While it was recognised that there would soon come a point, with ratification practically guaranteed, when those who wished to withdraw from the organisation could easily do so, it was clear that a large proportion of the Board wished to continue dealing with international issues.57

On 16 July, Moore requested the views of the Board, the National Committee, Chapter and State Organisations, and the New York Committee of Americans

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55 *Changing World*, March 1945, p. 5; Sidney Hayward to Hopkins (no date), 1945, Folder 20, Box 4, HMFC.
56 Moore to Hopkins, 3 July 1945, Folder 20, Box 4 HMFC.
57 Hayward to Hopkins (no date), 1945, Folder 20, Box 4, HMFC.
United with regard to options for the future. The final options were: continuation with the present name and objectives; to function as a pro-democracy group (such as the Union for Democratic action) under the title ‘Americans United for World Freedom’; or to cease all activities. Moore made it clear that he, Ernest Hopkins, and treasurer J.A. Migel would retire upon ratification regardless of the outcome of the decision.58

The decision was surprisingly clear. Within days, it was clear that the overwhelming majority desired continuation in some form, with 119 voting for continuation, and only 36 for dissolution. Of the 119, only 34 supported change to a pro-democracy organisation; leaving 85 members, including 24 of the Board, who wished to continue with the same name and objectives. Interestingly, over half of those with connections to the AA UN and CSOP opted for continuation in some form, suggesting that the issues creating friction between the organisations reflected the opinions of the leadership – particularly Eichelberger – more closely than the general membership.59

On 30 July, Bell announced in the AUWO newsletter that, despite senate ratification of the UN, AUWO would carry on, noting that ‘a large majority’ of the Board voted to continue under the existing conditions: ‘Now is the time to redeploy our forces, just as our victorious forces are being redeployed to the Pacific, for the last hard battles’. Those battles were expected to include defining the powers of the US delegation and providing American troops for the Security Council.60

Hopkins formally resigned on the day of ratification, 28 July 1945, along with Moore, Migel and Elting. Eichelberger confirmed his resignation on 30 July. Hopkins’ resignation letter expressed relief that the primary objective had been attained and that the emergency period that created the group was now over. He also expressed the feeling that future work should ‘be left to long-established, well-equipped groups, such as, for instance, the American Association for the United Nations, devoted to public education’. He expressed concern that the organisation might continue with the old name but with a shift in emphasis, arguing that it would be confusing to AUWO chapters and the general public alike. Hopkins’ resignation was announced to the press on 19 August, when it was also announced that Florence Harriman would be the group’s new acting president. The same press release called for ‘action to further the aims of the United Nations Charter

58 Moore to AUWO, 16 July 1945, Folder 20, Box 4, HMFC.
59 Voting statistics included with Moore, 16 July 1945, Folder 20, Box 4, HMFC. Voting on the AUWO proposals by those named on the AA UN letterhead in the autumn of 1945 revealed that thirteen of the thirty-one AUWO Board and National Committee members who voted in favour of dissolution were connected to the AA UN (through the AA UN, the CSOP, or the United Nations Emergency Educational Campaign). However, sixteen of the eighty who voted for continuance in some form were also connected to the AA UN.
60 AUWO News for Chairmen No. 6, 30 July 1945, Box 54, CEP.
concerning employment, economic opportunity, and political and religious freedom’, issues that had previously been the remit of the Cso P.61

AUWO also moved quickly to express its reaction to the atomic bomb, and it took the first actual step towards promoting a world government. The United Nations, which the organisation had spent over a year promoting, was now recognised solely as ‘a logical first step’ which needed to be strengthened. As the atomic bomb was seen to prove that there could be no more war, and while national sovereignty created the risk of war, it was resolved that ‘Americans United urge the inevitable necessity of pooling national sovereignties to prevent war and that every effort be made to develop progressively the world organisation into a world government’.62

By the end of September, the executive committee shifted even further towards world government: ‘a n international sovereignty must be created with all nations contributing .... World organisation cannot turn back. Those who advocate it cannot arrest its development without arguing against it; they cannot argue for its further development without arguing for world government’. o n 15 n ovember, AUWO adopted the policy ‘to work for the development of the United Nations organisation into a world government to preserve the peace’.63

The new policy put clear water between a mericans United and the aa Un. e ichelberger’s group urged the immediate physical establishment of the Un while providing maximum support for the Charter. It also urged the US Government to utilise the new organisation as its primary organ of diplomacy, to show faith and give life to the new organisation. w hen thirty prominent internationalists, including Grenville Clark and AUWO’s Thomas Finletter, met in New Hampshire in o ctober to suggest scrapping the Un and replacing it with a form of federal world government, the AAUN responded with shock. A statement urged that internationalists should be working to get public opinion behind the UN, which was still in the process of establishment. n o world government alternative could offer the immediate relief promised by the UN. While it was acknowledged that a stronger organisation would be needed and that revisions were desirable, the call for such revisions should wait until after the Un had been established, thus avoiding weakening the new organisation’s authority.64

The divide would continue to grow over the following year. w hile the aa Un broadly supported the Un as it was, a mericans United continued to urge the creation of a world government. in f ebruary of 1946, the Board voted to change the name of the organisation to keep it consistent with policy. Americans United for World

61 Hopkins to AUWO Board, 27 July 1945, Folder 20, Box 4, HMFC; Elting to AUWO Board, 28 July 1945, Box 54, CEP; Eichelberger to Moore, 30 July 1945, Box 54, CEP; New York Times, 20 August 1945, p. 14.
62 AUWO resolution, 14 August 1945, Box 54, CEP.
63 AUWO statement of principles, 27 September 1945, Box 54, CEP; AUWO Board minutes, 21 February 1946, Box 54, CEP.
64 Changing World, September 1945, p. 2; Changing World, December 1945, pp. 6, 12.
Government became the official title from the end of March 1946. In February 1947, it merged with four other like-minded groups to form United World Federalists.65

While attempting to estimate AUWO's influence on Congressional and public opinion is an impossible task, there is little doubt that internal difficulties greatly reduced its potential influence. Even its successes (such as organising off-the-record meetings with the state Department and sending a consultant to the Us delegation at the san francisco conference) were shared with other organisations, representing its failure to achieve pre-eminence in the field. As Divine has written, a Uwo was intended to 'unify the internationalist movement,' and it arguably did represent the highpoint of a collective private approach during the war.66

Yet AUWO never did truly unite or integrate the different elements of US internationalism. The failure to collaborate fully with existing organisations led by eichelberger reduced its impact and only added to the confusion that it was intended to reduce. Nor was AUWO able to create a unified conception of internationalism. in the end, a Uwo became a microcosm of the movement as a whole. While the lack of a strong isolationist opposition failed to re-create the great debate of 1940 and 1941, there is little doubt that a strong, united organisation could have created a greater impact, perhaps continuing beyond 1945. Instead, there was nothing to unite behind except the organisation’s name.

A Uwo proved that even the creation of the United nations could not bring internationalists together. For world government supporters, the Un was just the first step to an ideal world organisation, a realisation that many had reached building on their early criticism of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The dawn of the atomic age only exacerbated existing disillusionment. For realistic internationalists, the disillusionment would come not primarily from the new world body, but from the US Government’s lack of willingness to use it. Regardless, those divisions, whether idealist or realist, liberal or conservative, world government or world organisation, all developed within and led to the downfall of a Uwo.

Perhaps the greatest irony of the situation is that the very individuals who were promoting international cooperation resolutely failed to cooperate with each other. Given that they shared a common language, background, and even similar worldviews, it remains a curious mystery as to why their conviction for world organisation in various forms never waned in the face of such antagonism. Not all internationalists were so blind to the situation however. As the aa Un’s Chester lar oche observed,

doesn’t it seem rather peculiar that we ask for unity and one world organisation when somehow or other our two organisations can’t seem to get along. I think

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66 Divine, Second Chance, p. 249.
we both ought to give a good demonstration of how we can get along together before we start asking the rest of the world to get along together.

eichelberger, with the desire for a controlling hand, was never content unless he either ran the organisation himself or considerably reduced its remit. Bell, the weaker administrator, insisted on ideological control and the latitude to follow unrelated issues. In the middle, Ernest Hopkins never truly held the prestige or even the desire to take a firmer stand on organisational issues. The sovereign organisations of eichelberger and Bell were not only unable but unwilling to come together in an internationalist federation, and Eichelberger quickly returned to focus on his own organisation, the IMA.

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67 LaRoche to Bell, 14 November 1945, Box 54, CEP.
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Chapter 6

Dumbarton Oaks: Exposition or Endorsement?

As the Dumbarton Oaks conference approached, planning for the postwar peace finally began in earnest. The meeting was eagerly anticipated by the internationalist movement as a whole, as once the outline of the United Nations was created, there would finally be specific proposals for an international organisation to support. Clark Eichelberger had long been waiting for official proposals to be announced, and the work of his organisations had largely stalled in their absence by the middle of 1944. With the publication of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, private debates over internationalism inevitably related to Government planning, and with the Roosevelt Administration finally taking the lead, an intense period of internationalist activity began. The proposals initiated a promotional campaign behind the United Nations by the Government and private organisations that lasted almost a year until the ratification of the UN Charter by the US Senate in July 1945.

During this campaign, the traditional division between the state and private organisations became more blurred than ever before. With the Government and the internationalists fighting for the same goal – the creation of the United Nations – it is hardly surprising that links between the two were strengthened. Nor was there anything conspiratorial involved, as the relationship was a highly public one. Eichelberger and his organisations did not simply work in parallel with the Roosevelt Administration, but a specific link – the Office of Public Information, later the Office of Public Affairs – was created between them that made the state–private interaction closer than ever, to the satisfaction of both sides.

The creation of this state–private link was important to the internationalists for a number of reasons. Firstly, it offered the opportunity for the movement to play a significant part in the promotion of the United Nations. The whole purpose of the Eichelberger organisations, if not the entire internationalist movement, was to bring about the creation of a new international organisation with United States involvement. The private organisations had spent two decades supporting involvement in an international organisation without Government support, so to be able to work alongside the Government to promote the United Nations to the American people represented the culmination of twenty-five years work.

Adding to the significance of these links was the fact that the organisations of Clark Eichelberger would be pivotal in promoting the United Nations to the American public. The Government utilised both the renamed American Association for the United Nations and the newly created Americans United for World Organisation as clearing houses for information. These organisations
coordinated meetings and rallies, distributed pamphlets and information, and worked in conjunction with scores of other organisations not normally interested with foreign affairs.

While the Eichelberger organisations were by no means the only ones with links to the state Department, they were the principal groups in the new state–private interaction to promote the United Nations. This was hardly surprising, given their direct focus on the question of international organisation. However, Eichelberger in particular enjoyed the close interaction and influence with the Government, and throughout this period he sought a privileged position in the eyes of the state Department. In the field of private internationalist leaders and organisations, he wanted to be number one, at least in the eyes of the state Department.

Yet the State Department was not his only link to the Government. Despite the creation of a formal structure within the state Department for relationships between the state and private spheres, Eichelberger continued to develop older, more individual and personal ties to the Roosevelt administration, particularly to the President himself. Indeed, Eichelberger’s efforts during the final push for the United Nations would work on two levels. In terms of promoting policy to the general public, his organisations would play a leading role in the development of formal private links to the State Department’s new Office of Public Information. Yet, on the other, more personal level, his efforts to influence policy would continue as they had throughout the war – through direct connections to the White House.

The debate over the Dumbarton Oaks proposals offered Eichelberger an opportunity to reinforce his individual and personal relationship with both the State Department and with Franklin Roosevelt. Eichelberger had closely followed the administration line on postwar planning through his correspondence with Washington officials and his meetings with Roosevelt. Despite two and half years of effort from numerous different internationalist organisations, Eichelberger never pushed far ahead of the rhetoric emanating from the Roosevelt administration. Despite private frustration with the slow development of official planning for the United Nations, Eichelberger remained loyal to the Government, and with that came the support of the organisations he led.

This close personal relationship that had developed between Eichelberger and the Roosevelt administration determined how Eichelberger would direct his organisations through this critical period. Even with specific proposals to discuss, his focus remained on the discussion of broad principles and the immediate creation of the United Nations. Any debate about conceptions of US internationalism would have to wait until after the creation of the United Nations, as Eichelberger remained loyal to the Roosevelt administration and his conception of internationalism remained as broad as ever. This inevitably brought him into conflict with fellow internationalists in Americans United who were more critical of the Government’s proposals.

As a result of these differences, Eichelberger retreated into his own, older organisational structure – the LNA – and worked tirelessly to support the Government’s proposals. Given Eichelberger’s feeling that the best way to influence
the Government was from a position of cooperation, his previous involvement in state Department planning, and his personal relationship with Roosevelt, any criticisms were put aside for the duration of the debate. Where some favoured frank discussion and exposition of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, Eichelberger favoured simple endorsement. As had been the case throughout the war, Eichelberger and the INA would act less as an independent private organisation, but more as an informal promotional arm of the Government.

The creation of a formal link between the state and private came in 1944 with the creation of the Office of Public Information and its Division of Public Liaison, both of which were a new departure for the Department of State. The aim of the new Division was to inform the public about the inner workings of the state Department as a whole, and also to get closer to public opinion on foreign policy issues: ‘in effect, more fully making the Department of State an instrument of the people’. The Department of State memorandum announcing the intentions of the group included a lengthy section on ‘relations with Private Groups and organisations’, opening with the following statement:

A major force in the field of public opinion is made up by the many and varied organised groups, fraternal, educational, labour, business, religious, etc. Many of these groups are entirely or to a large degree interested in the field of foreign affairs. Their total membership runs into the millions and their influence reaches the general public and has a definite effect on general public opinion.¹

The state Department had long been aware of such organisations, but the new attitude offered the promise of formal cooperation between private groups and the Government, instead of the informal system that the CDaaa and fight for freedom followed before Pearl Harbor. It established a channel that internationalist leaders could follow either to pass their views on to the Government, or receive official support. The memo concluded with confirmation that the private groups had a part to play in the promotion and development of US foreign policy ‘in the interest of building up a fully informed public as a prerequisite to the successful conducting of a democratic foreign policy’. While it was clear from the beginning that the Division was not solely set up to promote the United Nations organisation, it quickly became the obvious and most immediate cause to support.²

For the US Government, the advantages of a state–private partnership were clear. By working with independent private organisations, the Roosevelt Administration added a democratic sheen to its efforts to create an international organisation.


² Ibid., pp. 176–7.
the promotion of the United Nations coming from the private sphere rather than simply from the Government, it appeared to have the broad support of a cross-section of the nation, from industry to agriculture, from women to veterans groups, crossing religious and geographical boundaries. The promotion avoided the whiff of propaganda and coercion that a purely governmental undertaking would have had. Instead, it appeared that the American people were independently organising efforts to get behind the proposed international organisation, as indeed they were. After all, the internationalist organisations existed long before the Division of Public Liaison.

The State Department's interest in the potential of private organisations as promotional committees began in earnest during the Dumbarton Oaks conference. Edwin C. Wilson, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs of the Department of State, was appointed in August to report on what was being done by the State Department towards informing interested groups about and gaining popular support for a new international organisation. Wilson worked on the issue through September with Office of Public Information Director John Dickey, who visited a number of organisations on a trip to New York, including the CSOP, the Women's Action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace, and AUWO. Dickey's eventual report concluded that of all of the groups considered, a UWO had the greatest potential for mobilising public opinion.

A UWO, as we have seen, was announced to the public on 8 August 1944, and it consolidated the activities of six political action committees, including Eichelberger's Una and the dormant Citizens for Victory and CDaaa. In addition, it was announced that the new group would collaborate with a number of research and educational organisations, including Eichelberger's LNA. Eichelberger himself was initially chairman of AUWO's policy committee. Yet despite this seemingly significant involvement, Eichelberger strongly believed that AUWO would not hinder the work of his existing organisations, and he would not be tied to one committee. Only the political action committee, the United Nations Association, lost its identity as it was merged into AUWO. Yet Eichelberger had always distinguished between the political action committees on the one hand and the educational and research committees on the other (if only because of the latter's tax-free status). The work of the LNA and its research arm, the CSOP, would continue. In addition, these older organisations offered Eichelberger a direct link to the Division of Public Liaison at the State Department. As director of the LNA, Eichelberger became a frequent representative at State Department meetings; in Americans United, where Eichelberger was merely chairman of the policy committee, chairman Ernest Hopkins was the organisational figurehead at state–private meetings. Beyond the organisations though, Eichelberger would even continue to make statements and radio addresses as an individual, further indicating his refusal to be tied to one organisation, and his insistence on operating on his own terms.

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Indeed, just as a Uwo was establishing itself, Eichelberger continued to lobby the State Department through the CSOP. Just before the Dumbarton Oaks talks began, Eichelberger presented Under-secretary of state Stettinius with a statement proposing six points for consideration at the talks. In addition to urging the immediate creation of the new world organisation, the statement called for the United Nations to be democratic and universal, also arguing that it must have a mechanism for settlement of disputes, that it use the ILO and Unrra to bring about social and economic justice, and that it follow the principles laid out in the Atlantic Charter.4

More controversially, the presentation of the statement allowed Eichelberger to raise his long-held personal support for an international air force with Stettinius. The statement itself did not refer to an international air force, merely arguing that ‘security was the crux’ of the world’s problems and that a joint military force would be needed to prevent aggression. Nevertheless, Eichelberger capitalised on the Soviet Government’s request for discussion of an international air force at Dumbarton Oaks, arguing that a ‘truly international police force … might be begun as an air force’. Understandably, Stettinius refused to comment on any specifics at this point, merely receiving the statement with ‘interest and appreciation’. Yet the statement release showed how Eichelberger was determined to work through different channels to reach the Government, and also how he personally utilised and indeed dominated the CSOP.5

Much of the material sent to the State Department at the time was passed down by Stettinius to the new Division of Public Liaison. Yet at the same time Eichelberger was being passed down the hierarchy of the State Department, he decided to go straight to the top and meet privately with the President. He had not met with Roosevelt since the previous October, but the situation had changed dramatically in the intervening months. If the previous meeting had lacked direction, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were clearly about to provide the specific proposals that Eichelberger and the internationalists had been waiting for.

Significantly though, Eichelberger appeared to have made up his mind about supporting the administration’s proposals before he had even seen them. In his telegram to the White House, he noted that ‘the President has been good enough to see me whenever it seemed necessary in the task of developing public opinion in support of his foreign policy’. Going beyond the type of flattery necessary to arrange a meeting with the President, he appeared to be offering to run a promotional campaign for the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, stating that it was ‘necessary for me to see him on behalf of the strong educational campaign necessary in support of the administrations [sic] peace aims’. The meeting, however, would have to wait until after the Dumbarton Oaks conference.6

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4 Draft telegram 1 August (revised 15 August) 1944, Box 54, CEP; New York Times, 16 August, 1944.
5 Ibid., Eichelberger letter to AUWO members, 28 September 1944, Box 54, CEP.
6 Eichelberger to Edwin Watson, 25 August 1944, PPF 3833, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.
Although Eichelberger had waited and worked for years for the creation of a new international organisation, it was clear that from this point his support for the Government would be unquestioning. This set him apart from many fellow internationalists, who waited to see the results of the Dumbarton Oaks conference. A significant number, especially within AUWO, were less than satisfied with the results. Eichelberger, however, committed his support, and the support of his organisations, to the Roosevelt administration from the beginning of the Dumbarton Oaks conference.

Although Eichelberger did not get his meeting with the President until October, he didn’t wait that long to get the promotional drive for the new international organisation underway. Even before the end of the Dumbarton Oaks conference, the CSOP and LNA released a promotional booklet in September entitled ‘Our Second Chance’. It set out the reasons why the new United Nations was necessary, asking for contributions towards an educational programme to assist during the ‘most crucial months’ ahead. The document outlined the broad range of support among Americans for the proposed organisation, particularly from business, labour and rural communities.

In addition to working with the State Department, the White House, and his own organisations at 8 West 40th Street, Eichelberger also began working with AUWO during September in his position as chairman of the policy committee. However, it was clear from the outset that he saw AUWO primarily as a conduit for the ideas developed in the LNA and CSOP, arguing that AUWO had no place discussing specific policy details. As he informed Sumner Welles, ‘the policy which we had worked out so carefully in the Commission and in the League of Nations Association could have important influence in the policy of Americans United’. He also expressed concerns even at this early stage over the conditional support being expressed in AUWO over the ongoing Dumbarton Oaks proposals. In Eichelberger’s view, AUWO was to work solely as a political action committee, promoting the Dumbarton Oaks proposals to avoid a repeat of the rejection of the League of Nations.

With that aim in mind, the LNA’s promotional activity began in earnest with the release of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The LNA pledged its full support to the proposed United Nations organisation on 10 October. Unsurprisingly, its ‘wholehearted support’ was complete and without qualification. It was proposed that the LNA and CSOP devoted all of their energies to a promotional programme of public education and discussion. It was also confirmed that the LNA would be changing its name ‘to embody the name of the United Nations organisation’. Discussion of the proposed name change also took place within days, and it was decided that the name United Nations Association could not be used, as it was already used by the political action committee that had merged into Americans United.

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7 ‘Our Second Chance’, September 1944, 63096, CEA.
8 Eichelberger to Welles, 4 September 1944, Box 98, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
United. As a result, a brand-new name would have to be found, regardless of the confusing effect this might have on public opinion.\(^9\)

At a meeting of the LNA Board of Directors on 13 October, it was clear that the leadership did have some reservations behind the scenes, but Eichelberger’s decision to show a united front with the administration had won out. The unresolved question of the extent of veto power in the Security Council loomed especially large for some members, especially James Shotwell. However, Eichelberger suggested that while gaps in the Charter could be highlighted, no criticism of the existing proposals was to occur.\(^10\)

He elaborated his viewpoint in the LNA journal *Changing World*. While noting that the state Department was urging free and open discussion, LNA policy was to support the proposals as they stood because any necessary changes would be minor and the proposals were ‘basically good and sound’. While supposedly smaller issues such as veto power, questions regarding trusteeships, and the location of the United Nations were still unresolved, these were matters that could be raised ‘without taking our eyes off the ball, without distracting attention’ from supporting the existing proposals.\(^11\)

Unsurprisingly, the CSOP quickly followed the LNA in endorsing the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. In a public speech, Chairman Shotwell stressed the improvements in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals compared to the League Covenant, while also highlighting the proposed economic and social Council. At a private meeting at the State Department, Executive Committee chairman William Allan Neilson led a CSOP delegation to discuss how human rights would be dealt with in the proposed United Nations. Eichelberger did, however, write to Commission members at the end of October noting how gratified they should be that the Dumbarton Oaks agreements ‘run so parallel to the Framework of the Commission’.\(^12\)

In the week following the conclusion of the Dumbarton Oaks conference, Eichelberger finally met with Franklin Roosevelt for the third and last time during the war. He had been looking forward to the meeting for weeks in order to discuss the public opinion campaigns, but also to ensure he was on the administration’s wavelength with regard to peace aims. However, with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals already on the table, he got little from the President that was not already in the public domain.

Roosevelt did express an interest in the internationalist movement, asking how the groups were being organised, and how the fundraising was going. Eichelberger explained that because of taxes, there were two sets – the political

\(^9\) *League of Nations Association* press release, 10 October 1944, 63110, Cea; minutes of the LNA Board of Directors meeting, 13 October 1944, 63112, Cea.

\(^10\) Minutes of the LNA Board of Directors meeting, 13 October 1944, 63112, Cea.


\(^12\) *New York Times*, 13 October 1944, p. 5; notes on CSOP meeting, 17 October 1944, 500.CC/10-1744, Decimal file, r G 59, na CP; Eichelberger to CSOP membership, 25 October 1944, 123882, Cea.
action as now being done by AUWO, and the educational work by the CSOP and the association, which would soon be changing its name. As for the budget, the groups were hoping for some big cheques from the Rockefellers and the Baruchs, but despite his interest, Roosevelt was noncommittal about providing a letter of commendation.\(^{13}\)

In fact, Roosevelt was noncommittal about most issues, giving Eichelberger very little in terms of inside news – apart from his gossipy comment that Churchill was ‘very meagrely prepared’ on the issue of international organisation. When asked if he had a solution to the veto question, Roosevelt weakly stated that he wanted to include an agreement in the Charter so that no nation could change its frontiers at the expense of another. As for when the final conference would be held, Roosevelt conceded that it would not be held before January, but he could be no more specific (though he did admit that it would be called a preliminary conference in case the discussion ran into difficulty). Even the subject Eichelberger had been involved in the planning for, trusteeship, was glossed over quickly. Despite a subsequent letter urging Roosevelt to reiterate his views on trusteeships at a foreign Policy Association speech, Eichelberger’s pleas for a statement were ignored.\(^{14}\)

While Eichelberger could come away from the thirty-minute meeting with a strong sense of friendship with the President, he gained little of significance for the coming promotional campaign. Admittedly, the bulk of the direction for the campaign had already been provided by the release of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Yet Eichelberger neglected to ask the President’s advice regarding the debates within the internationalist movement over whether or not to support the proposals as they stood. However, the broader significance of the meeting was that Eichelberger remained close to the President, and that he retained his confidence.

The discussion had been friendly, longer than scheduled and had even veered away from the topic of the United Nations to discuss the imminent election. It was as if Roosevelt knew that he could count on Eichelberger for his solid and continued support, which would prove to be the case over the coming months.\(^{15}\)

While the President offered little in terms of concrete assistance to Eichelberger, the State Department was eager to mobilise support behind the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as quickly as possible. In fact, in preparation for the promotional campaign, Eichelberger invited the Division of Public Liaison’s Richard Morin to attend a meeting in New York on 6 October, before the end of the Dumbarton Oaks conference. The purpose of the meeting was to provide background material on the proposals and to discuss how best to utilise such material. The meeting took place under the auspices of the CSOP, but all organisations were welcome, with the aim of planning ‘a tremendous coordinated campaign of popular education on the purport of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreements’. Morin expressed the Department’s

\(^{13}\) Notes on appointment with Roosevelt, 12 October 1944, Box 198, CEP.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., Eichelberger to Roosevelt, 17 October 1944, PPF 1820, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

\(^{15}\) Notes on appointment with Roosevelt, 12 October 1944, Box 198, CEP.
pleasure at the support the groups were offering to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, and offered all possible help to all interested organisations. From this point on, the Division of Public Liaison would maintain close links with all interested internationalist organisations.\textsuperscript{16}

Significant State Department support for the private internationalist promotional campaigns truly began on 16 October with an unofficial background information session for interested private groups, internationalist or otherwise, arranged by the State Department through the Cso P and a Uwo. Despite the fact that the idea originated in the State Department, AUWO Chairman Ernest Hopkins officially requested the meeting on 7 October. Press reports subsequently reported the meeting as having been initiated by AUWO, and Hopkins said nothing at the Washington meeting to dispute this.\textsuperscript{17}

Unfortunately, in terms of prestige, it was Under-secretary Stettinius, not Cordell Hull, who led the discussion, but he and Leo Pasvolsky answered questions relating to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals from organisation representatives for over two hours. In his opening remarks, Stettinius expressed support for the private groups backing the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, and the need for a full and open public debate on the issues of international organisation.

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\text{only as there develops in this country a substantial and informed body of public opinion, can the Government go forward successfully in the task of participation in the further steps needed for the establishment of an international organisation. Only against the background of such a body of public opinion, can the organisation itself, once established, function effectively, for no institution, however perfect, can live and fulfil its purposes unless it is continuously animated and supported by strong public will and determination. I devoutly hope that in the work which lies ahead we shall have the same cooperation and support from the organisations represented here which they gave so generously during the many months of planning and consultation which preceded the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.}^{18}
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The network of private organisations invited to the meeting included such varying groups as the American Bankers Association, the American Federation of Labour, the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Federal Union, the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, the American Jewish Committee, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and the American Library Association. The broad educational reach of these organisations offered a potentially vast amount of assistance to a State Department determined not to repeat the mistakes of 1919 and 1920, and for the internationalist movement to be able to bring, and indeed unite all of these groups together represented a

\textsuperscript{16} Robins, Experiment in Democracy, pp. 40–42, 179.
\textsuperscript{17} Robins, Experiment in Democracy, p. 44; New York Times, 17 October 1944, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{18} Washington press summary, 16 October 1944, fo 371/40721, U7977/180/70, Pro.
tremendously successful start to their campaign. The question remained as to how the campaign would progress, how closely the internationalist movement would continue to work with the Roosevelt Administration, and whether the various organisations would throw their unquestioning support behind the Government’s proposals.19

The promotional campaign continued through October with a three-day conference at Lafayette College beginning on 25 October. The LNA and the CSO P were two of twelve sponsoring committees of the Lafayette College institute alongside such familiar names as Americans United, the Council for Democracy and Freedom House. Called ‘in support of a world organised for security and peace’, speakers such as Eichelberger, William Agar of Freedom House and the Church Peace Union’s Henry Atkinson asked for immediate creation of an international organisation before the peace was declared. Eichelberger’s attitude towards the promotion of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals came through in his speech, as he warned not only against ‘isolationists’ but also ‘perfectionists’ who might try to scuttle the recommendations. The ‘perfectionists’ were clearly the more radical element of a UWO who wished to hold an open debate on a number of unresolved issues.20

The issue came to a head at the end of October, shortly after Eichelberger had been outvoted within AUWO over the issue of an unqualified message of support. However, the dispute went beyond the private organisations, as Eichelberger and AUWO’s Ernest Hopkins took the issue directly to the State Department. The divisions within a UWO that followed the State Department meeting on 16 October led Hopkins to ask the advice of Stettinius. Hopkins informed the Under-secretary of Eichelberger’s argument that ‘any attitude on the part of the Policy Committee excepting one of complete endorsement of the proposals would be considered ungrateful by the Department and subversive of the best interests of the country’. In Hopkins’ eyes, it was ‘far from subversive to express the hope that more might be done’. Indeed, it might lead to an improvement in the proposals, as the ‘very fact of a pressure group urging more might be an asset to the American representatives in the final discussions’.21

More significant to Hopkins, however, was the wider meaning of a private organisation providing unconditional support to the Government. He argued that ‘the difference of opinion between the great majority of the Policy Committee and the minority is a very genuine one in feeling that a UWO will lose their whole reason for being if they become simply a rubber stamp for anything that is

19 Department of State press release, fo 371/40721, U7978/180/70, Pro; also see Robins, Experiment in Democracy, pp. 182–8.
proposed without any reservation or discussion’. For Hopkins, the possibility of a Uwo being perceived as a Government front organisation was unacceptable.22

Adding to this fear was the perception within a Uwo that Eichelberger was perhaps too close to the State Department. While Hopkins acknowledged the years of loyalty Eichelberger had shown to the internationalist cause, he also noted that Eichelberger irritated a number of members through ‘the omniscience with which he speaks and the categorical assertion on his part of knowing the mind of the State Department at all times in regard to all matters’. In further correspondence, Hopkins noted that Eichelberger had become ‘pretty possessive in his attitude toward the principles which should govern international relations’, and that the internal controversy threatened to render a Uwo useless. While there was undoubtedly a degree of personal friction here, it was also clear that Hopkins did not want a Uwo to become a State Department mouthpiece.23

At exactly the same time, Eichelberger was also privately in contact with the State Department expressing his reservations with Hopkins and his opponents in a Uwo. When Eichelberger met with Stettinius and the Division of Public Liaison’s Richard Morin on 31 October, he left two draft Uwo resolutions voted on by the Policy Committee. Resolution A was drafted by Eichelberger as a compromise between his views on an unconditional endorsement and the more equivocal views of his colleagues. Resolution B was much more qualified in its endorsement of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, and it was this resolution that won the vote. However, the committee decided to take no further action until Hopkins met with Stettinius on 3 November, and it was because of this meeting that Eichelberger left the resolutions with the State Department.

Eichelberger clearly believed that an unequivocal statement of support was the best way to promote the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, but the way in which he informed the State Department of the divisions within a Uwo further eroded his independent status. He clearly hoped that the State Department would put pressure on Hopkins to issue a strong statement in support of the proposals. Had Hopkins been aware of this action, he would have been justified in believing that Eichelberger was attempting to turn Americans United into a rubber stamp for the Government. However, Eichelberger ensured that his actions remained private. He made it clear to Morin that he was not to be seen to ‘circumvent the officers of Americans United’, and that Hopkins was not to know that he had left the resolutions with the Government. Morin noted that ‘Eichelberger’s position might be seriously prejudiced if it were to appear that the Department had any knowledge of the action of AUWO in advance of Dr Hopkins’ Friday meeting’.24

22 ibid.
23 Ibid., Hopkins to Dickey, 31 October 1944, Folder: Dumbarton Oaks general, records relating to Public Affairs activities 1944–65, RG 59 na CP.
24 Morin memorandum, 1 November 1944, Folder: Dumbarton Oaks general, Records relating to Public Affairs activities 1944–65, RG 59 na CP.
Eichelberger reiterated his concerns over the promotion of Dumbarton Oaks and the specific organisational difficulties to Stettinius after their meeting. On the broad issue, Eichelberger was concerned that there was a lack of positive statements about the proposals emanating from the State Department. This lack of leadership from the top was causing the misinterpretation among ‘commentators and organisation heads’ that the proposals were only tentative ‘and that therefore there should be public discussion as to how the agreements should be changed rather than why the public should support them’. This could then lead to the United States entering the final United Nations conference facing ‘a highly critical public opinion in which the isolationists would naturally oppose and the perfectionists demand changes’.25

In his call for the Government to speak up on behalf of Dumbarton Oaks, and in his response to the divisions within the internationalist movement, it was clear that Eichelberger no longer simply feared an isolationist backlash against the United Nations. He now held a genuine concern that an overly critical group of internationally-minded Americans might also work against the United Nations, albeit inadvertently. Yet again, fears were raised of a repeat of 1919 and 1920, when the League of Nations was attacked from both political sides. It also appeared that Eichelberger was not alone in having such fears, as State Department officials moved to include elements of Eichelberger’s broader argument into Stettinius’ next speech. Similarly, at a CsoP meeting in early November, Ben Gerig of the State Department reiterated to representatives from numerous organisations that Dumbarton Oaks, ‘although labelled tentative is as nearly as possible the result of the widest possible consultation of the public, Congress, and other Governments’. He concluded his talk by asking the assembled group to work for the adoption of the proposals.26

Given the growing tension within AUWO, it was no surprise that Eichelberger slowly began retreating into his older, established organisations. At the beginning of November, he wrote to LNA Executive Committee chairman Hugh Moore, forcefully spelling out the division of labour between AUWO and the educational organisations with which it collaborated. ‘At no time’, he wrote, ‘was there any suggestion that these educational groups were to be limited in their programme because of such cooperative arrangement’. AUWO, he argued, should stick to its task of polling and bringing pressure on isolationist Congressmen.

it was not created to engage in detailed discussions of various phases of the United Nations organisation. It is not the job of Americans United to duplicate the work of other organisations. The other organisations, by the most militant educational campaign possible, should set the climate in which Americans United can operate as the political spearhead.27

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25 Eichelberger to Stettinius, 1 November 1944, 500.CC/11-144, Decimal file, R G 59, n a CP; Raunor to Notter, 7 November 1944, 500.CC/11-144, Decimal file, R G 59, n a CP.
26 Ibid., CsoP memorandum, 4 November 1944, 123895, Cea.
27 Eichelberger to Moore, 2 November 1944, Folder 18, Box 4, HMFC.
By attempting to narrow the remit of AUWO, Eichelberger was of course making more room for his own organisations. He was also trying to reshape the internationalist movement to suit his own ideas regarding the promotion of Dumbarton Oaks. If AUWO was unable to undertake any promotional or educational activity among the general public, then that task would be left to organisations such as the Cso P and the INA, who would promote the United Nations without qualification. It represented his desire to monopolise and control the private promotion of the United Nations to the American people.

It was significant that the next major conference on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals did not involve AUWO. Instead, the INA and Cso P organised a New York meeting with groups at the pacifist end of the internationalist spectrum: the Church Peace Union, the National Peace Conference and the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches. Again, Eichelberger highlighted the danger of ‘perfectionists’ who could kill the proposals with reservations, and it was clear that this comment was aimed not only at AUWO, but at some of the more idealistic pacifists in the audience.

The conference also revealed that although Eichelberger resented AUWO working in the educational sphere, he was happy for the LNA to continue applying pressure in the political sphere. LNA treasurer Frederick McKee highlighted the presence of thirty-two ‘doubtful’ senators in the new Congress who could threaten the proposals. Suggestions were then made as to the type of political campaign that could put pressure on these ‘doubtful’ senators. Despite his continual insistence on the separation of the political and educational spheres, Eichelberger had his own personal and flexible definitions of how those spheres should operate.

Despite the increased desire to retreat into his own organisations, Eichelberger was still part of the Policy Committee of AUWO and he was not going to pass up the opportunity for a second off-the-record meeting between AUWO and State Department officials, this time on a much more intimate scale. At Blair House in Washington on 14 November, select members of the organisation including Eichelberger, Hopkins, Ulric Bell, Hugh Moore and James Warburg, met with Stettinius, Pasvolsky, Dickey, Morin, Harley Notter, and other State Department officials. The informally conducted meeting enabled the internationalists to hear in greater detail than before the specifics of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. In a pre-emptive remark aimed at any perfectionists in the room, Under-secretary Stettinius began by highlighting that although some issues were still open to consideration, the proposals represented a coherent plan that limited the possibility of further changes.

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29 Ibid.
30 Opening remarks by the Under Secretary of State, 14 November 1944, Folder: Meetings with representatives of AUWO, Records relating to the Dumbarton Oaks conversations ’44, Papers of Harley Notter, rG59, na CP; Robins, Experiment in Democracy, pp. 49–51.
The most significant point of discussion arose over the approach that Americans United would take in promoting the proposals. As John Dickey made clear, the state Department’s priority was to get the proposals out to the public for consideration, a task that would require support from private organisations, of which a Uwo was at the top of the list. However, there was clearly disagreement amongst the group members as to whether or not support for the proposals would be unquestioning, and how much debate there should be. As Harley Notter put it, the decision needed to be made ‘as to what degree exposition had to precede endorsement’.31

A number of members of a Uwo clearly felt strongly about the need to publicly and openly consider details of the proposals. Florence Harriman argued that it should be the function of a Uwo to ‘run ahead of public opinion’, pushing for the strongest and most democratic United Nations possible. Ernest Hopkins repeated his concern that a Uwo should not be seen as a mere ‘stooge’ of the State Department. He did however, ask the officials how AUWO could be most effective and provide the greatest support to the Government.32

Stettinius and his fellow officials were reluctant to answer Hopkins’ question directly, primarily because they were reluctant to ask private organisations to unequivocally support the proposals. However, the State Department line was clearly to focus on the creation of the new organisation, realising the potentially divisive effect that squabbling over individual issues could have before it even came into existence. Leo Pasvolsky argued that suggestions could be put forward, but only if they would not come to be seen as essential to final agreements. Otherwise, the American people could be disillusioned if an issue that was strongly promoted by a Uwo – such as an international police force – was rejected at the final conference.33

Ichelberger had long recognised the potential confusion he believed could come with presenting too many alternative options to the public. He supported the State Department line that it was risky to suggest too many alterations to the proposals. He feared the consequences of ‘creating the impression that these changes could be made, when in fact a number of them could not be made’. The broad pattern of the proposed United Nations would not be changed, and he, like Pasvolsky, was afraid that an emphasis on changes would put the public in the position of supporting Dumbarton Oaks only if those changes were then adopted. For him, the most important issue was securing Congressional support for the Charter. Creating the United Nations was the priority. Any changes and additions could follow later.34

31 Minutes of meeting with representatives of AUWO, 14 November 1944, folder: Meetings with representatives of AUWO, Records relating to the Dumbarton Oaks conversations ’44, Papers of Harley Notter, RG59, NA CP.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
Eichelberger was also happy to hear about State Department proposals for promoting the United Nations. The Department was now at the stage where it was seeking to get the proposals before the public ‘in cooperation with private agencies’, of which his organisations would clearly be in the vanguard. More importantly, the meeting proved to Eichelberger that he, more than any other internationalist present, was on the same wavelength as the State Department. Due to his involvement in postwar planning, his relationships with the State Department and the President, and a coincidence of interest over the United Nations, Eichelberger felt a strong connection to the Roosevelt Administration. Other internationalists had connections in the State Department and had worked long and hard for an international organisation. Yet few, if any, aligned themselves as closely to the Government as Eichelberger did. He did not share Hopkins’ concerns over being seen as a stooge or a front. He was simply interested in ensuring that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals led to a United Nations with American involvement. If that meant playing down alternative viewpoints during the debate, so be it. The stakes were too high.

In a further move to dominate the educational process and move away from AUWO, Eichelberger moved in November to create another new organisation, the United Nations Educational Campaign Committee. Despite the new name, it was in fact an extension of the LNA and CSOP. The new committee proposed to have citizens – ‘ten-minute victory speakers’ – across the nation who could talk about the United Nations to local organisations ‘from Chamber of Commerce to bridge clubs’. Information, speakers’ notes, and promotional literature would be available from 8 West 40th Street. Yet again Eichelberger explained that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals had the ‘wholehearted support’ of the LNA and CSOP: ‘Peace will be made on Main Street this time’, he said, ‘and this time it will be carried through to a successful conclusion’.

It was clear by this point that Eichelberger’s position within Americans United had become untenable. His disagreements over whether or not to issue an unconditional statement of support for the Dumbarton Oaks proposals turned out to be just one of a number of problems in his dealings with AUWO. Hopkins’ comment that Eichelberger ‘had become constitutionally incapable of working with anybody else’ was entirely believable given his actions in the final months of 1944. While Hopkins recognised that Eichelberger was doing work of vital importance, it was clear that he insisted on having things his own way to the detriment of the organisation and the wider movement. As soon as he recognised that he would not be the dominant voice within AUWO, he slowly began to withdraw his support. In order to continue to do things his way, he would have to emphasise his own organisations.

35 Ibid.
37 Hopkins to Fosdick, 18 December 1944, Folder 18, Box 4, HMFC.
There is no doubt that Eichelberger’s actions related to his personal desire to retain a preferred position in the new state–private network. He wanted to be the pre-eminent private internationalist in the eyes of the Government, and he pursued that position aggressively. It was clear that AUWO was on an increasingly divergent path to the Roosevelt administration, and Eichelberger wanted to remain with the Government. In joining with AUWO, Eichelberger had kept his options open, but its direction left him with a clear choice.

As a result, Eichelberger offered his resignation as chairman of the policy committee to Hopkins on 21 December. He remained as a member of the executive committee, but his significant interest in AUWO was over. From then on, his interest in AUWO was restricted to managing the limited promotional cooperation between it and his organisations at 8 West 40th Street. Heading into 1945, Eichelberger would throw his efforts behind the promotion of the United Nations, but he would do it through the organisations he directed. The main vehicle would be the League of Nations Association, soon to be renamed the American Association for the United Nations.38

Yet there also remained the question of Eichelberger’s relationship with the State Department. One member of the Seattle public who attended an Americans United meeting asked whether private organisations should be associated with Government agencies such as the State Department. ‘Has Americans United lost its freedom of status?’ he asked, ‘Has it tended to become associated with official diplomacy or not?’ Admittedly, this anonymous individual did hope for stronger proposals than those set out at Dumbarton Oaks. Yet he urged that internationalist organisations ‘be extremely careful in their relations with official bodies’. After all, how could they be certain the State Department was telling them the whole truth? Could the members of peace organisations be certain of future policy? Should they not keep a little more critical distance, be a little wary of the official line?39

If these questions were being asked of AUWO, they were certainly being asked of the LNA and Clark Eichelberger. AUWO was at least mildly critical of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Eichelberger and his organisations were not. Ernest Hopkins had feared being seen as a stooge or a front for the Roosevelt Administration. Eichelberger had no such qualms. His trust in the Administration was unyielding, and entering the crucial year of 1945, his priority was theirs—the establishment of the United Nations.

38 Eichelberger to Hopkins, 21 December 1944, Box 54, CEP.
39 Anonymous to Bell, 15 December 1944, 111.12 macleish, arcbald/1-2045, Decimal file, r G 59, na CP.
With discussion of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals well underway, the internationalist movement entered 1945 in optimistic mood. The State Department’s campaign to promote the proposals was in full swing, and the campaigns of private organisations were also well underway. Nevertheless, there was still a great deal of educational work to be done, as opinion polls suggested varying degrees of public ignorance or indifference to the proposals. If a repeat of 1919 and 1920 were to be avoided, the internationalist campaign had to continue at full speed.\footnote{For polling figures, see H. Schuyler Foster, Activism Replaces Isolationism (Washington: Foxhall Press, 1983), p. 28, and Robert Divine, Second Chance: the Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II (New York: Atheneum, 1967), pp. 252–3.}

As always, Clark Eichelberger was at the heart of the struggle. With internal disunity affecting a UWO, he led the INA into 1945 as the hub of the internationalist movement. Despite the fact that a UWO had been set up as the coordinating group for the campaign, Eichelberger was personally arranging separate fortnightly inter-organisation meetings from October 1944. The meetings, which took place at 8 West 40th Street in New York, attracted representatives from the Women’s Action Committee for Victory and Lasting Peace, the Church Peace Union, the Free World Association, and many others.\footnote{Divine, Second Chance, p. 248.}

Eichelberger moved away from Americans United because he remained devoted to supporting the Roosevelt administration’s plans for the United Nations, despite dissent from more radical idealists who claimed the new organisation was limited. However, the separate meetings did more than reflect the differences of opinion on the concept of internationalism within AUWO. They also reflected Eichelberger’s personal style, particularly the fact he was used to organising things his own way. Although this was seen by some as a failing, it was largely due to the fact that he had ‘carried the torch alone’ for so many years. After the failure of the I PCAW and a UWO, it was no great surprise that Eichelberger entered the crucial final stages of the campaign for the United Nations on his own terms. His organisation, finally renamed the American Association for the United Nations in early 1945, would be in the vanguard of private efforts to ensure the public support and Congressional ratification of the United Nations organisation.

Eichelberger’s own terms, however, were not entirely independent, and the division between his private organisations and the state was not clear cut.
eichelberger aimed to be the pre-eminent private internationalist in the eyes of the US Government, with the AAU as the pre-eminent organisation, and he spent most of the crucial period of debate over the UN manoeuvring himself into that position. In doing so, he attempted to be in a position to both support and influence Government policy on the UN, and he did it in two ways.

Firstly, throughout this vital period, his organisations retained a close relationship with the State Department. This included both a historic personal link and a newer bureaucratic connection. In part, it dated back to his involvement in the State Department planning for the international organisation in 1942 and 1943. He had a personal stake in the UN, and was determined to do what it took to ensure its creation. It also related to the new State Department apparatus to work with private organisations. Through the first half of 1945, the campaign of the AAU and official State Department promotion of the UN were inextricably linked, particularly during Dumbarton Oaks Week and the United Nations Conference on international organisation in San Francisco.

Secondly, on a more personal and individual level, eichelberger had a close relationship with President Roosevelt. The nature of their meetings and the volume of correspondence that flowed from Eichelberger to the White House indicated the value he placed on his relationship with the President. He was willing to ask Roosevelt for advice about educational campaigns, organisational strategy, and the United Nations generally. While eichelberger clearly placed far more value on the relationship than the President did, he developed a tremendous amount of respect for Roosevelt, and in doing so he created an almost indelible link with the Administration.

With the death of Franklin Roosevelt in 1945, this close link was severed. The connection to the White House, which eichelberger perceived to be so close, was lost. Even though incoming President Harry Truman expressed strong support for the new United Nations, there was no guarantee that any relationship with Truman would be established. In fact, eichelberger did not develop a close relationship with Truman. His relationship with the White House, which had been growing since 1936, began to decline.

Nevertheless, the significance of the changes in Eichelberger’s state–private relationship was not obvious in the vital months of 1945 as the United Nations was debated and successfully created. Both the Government and the private internationalist movement still shared the same overall goal. The joint state–private focus on the promotion of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, the San Francisco conference, and Congressional ratification of the United Nations all pointed to a more internationalist future for US foreign policy.

Yet the focus on creation of the UN obscured another key question, this time about the wider nature of internationalism. Although the broad principle of international organisation was supported by the American people, there had been very little discussion of specific policies and how the UN would be used. The Yalta conference discussed the structure of the UN rather than policy details. These structural concerns resurfaced at the San Francisco conference over issues such
as UN membership, but did little to dent internationalist optimism. However, such confrontations hinted at problems ahead, highlighting the difficulties in moving from internationalism in principle to internationalism in practice. Even at this late stage there were significant issues to face, yet the sense of triumph surrounding the creation of the UN temporarily overshadowed all other concerns.

The significance of 1945 for the internationalist movement was reflected in the organisational changes facing the League of Nations association as it began the year. January 1945 marked both the twenty-fifth anniversary of the League of Nations and the twenty-second anniversary of the association, occasions which the organisation aimed to highlight going into the New Year. A special dinner, with guest speaker Sumner Welles, was arranged for the beginning of February. In acknowledging the shift from Covenant to Charter, from League to UN, it would celebrate ‘the bridge between the past and the future’.

Symbolising the crossing of the bridge, it was announced that the association would finally be changing its name to recognise the new international organisation. At the anniversary dinner on 1 February, the American association for the United Nations was announced to the public, taking its structure, facilities and personnel from the LNA, which thereafter ceased to exist. It was no surprise to find that Franklin Roosevelt’s approval had finally inspired the name change after two years of wavering. Eichelberger finally received word from the President in 1944 that the name of the association should include the words ‘United Nations’, and the name change was then implemented as quickly as possible. Yet the name was the only thing to change. The CSOP became the AAUN’s research affiliate. The occasion was acknowledged by the Roosevelt Administration, as new Secretary of State Edward Stettinius sent a message of support to the dinner, in which he praised both past and present efforts of the association to maintain international peace and security through an international organisation.

Eichelberger took the opportunity to announce that the new AAUN would have a short- and a long-range programme to mobilise and educate public opinion. In the short term, it was to continue to devote itself to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and the creation of the United Nations. In the long term, the organisation was to continue beyond the creation of the UN to educate the American people about its benefits. Once again, Eichelberger claimed ‘this is our second chance’, arguing that ‘victory in war was essential, but not enough’ – the United Nations must be secured, and the United States must play a critical part in it.

3 Eichelberger to Welles, 11 January 1945, Box 108, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL. On a more practical level, it was also agreed that Eichelberger and his organisations would be leaving 8 West 40th Street, moving with the Woodrow Wilson Foundation to new quarters at 45 East 65th Street in New York.


5 Changing World, March 1945, p. 5.
In order to strengthen the existing proposals to secure the peace, the CSOP called for two additions in early February. Firstly, it called for a Commission on human rights and fundamental freedoms to ensure ‘the development by men and women everywhere of the institutions of a free and democratic way of life, in accordance with their own customs and desires’. Secondly, it called for the creation of a permanent trusteeship Council to ensure the welfare and advancement of non-self-governing peoples. These additions were justified by the CSOP because the Dumbarton Oaks proposals neglected such issues. Therefore they did not view the suggestions as criticisms, merely as improvements that built on the existing plans. This was in contrast to the type of alterations to the proposals being put forward by members of a Uwo.

The relationship with the more ‘perfectionist’ a Uwo continued to deteriorate through the first months of 1945, as Eichelberger continued to be frustrated with what he saw as unnecessary overlap between them. He suggested to Ulric Bell that ‘if, without duplication, a Uwo were functioned as the political action spearhead, it would have the backing and cooperation of many organisations’. However, little came of his efforts to restrict Americans United to a purely political action role, and the organisations grew further apart, with Eichelberger merely throwing his efforts entirely behind his own promotional efforts.

The next stage in those promotional efforts was an emergency nationwide campaign on behalf of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The campaign, sponsored by the AAUn, was chaired by Huntington Gilchrist, formerly of the international secretariat of the League of Nations. While it initially appeared to be yet another separate organisation, it simply consisted of the usual familiar AAUn Board members, including William Emerson, Frederick McKee, and of course, Eichelberger. Indeed, it duplicated the short-term and long-term objectives of the AAUn as set out by Eichelberger at the beginning of February, merely emphasising the need for further study on strategic bases, trusteeship, and human rights.

By the end of February the campaign was moving along rapidly, as the Yalta conference went as well as could have been hoped, and the date of the San Francisco conference to create the United Nations was announced as 25 April. As Eichelberger put it, the results from Yalta ‘surpassed the hopes of the idealists and to a great extent confounded the cynics’. He was particularly satisfied with the compromise on the issue of voting in the Security Council, and he was even pleased with the choice of San Francisco as location of the United Nations conference. Nevertheless, two months remained for ‘the most vigorous campaign of public education and for the mobilisation of an overwhelming public opinion. Never were two months charged with greater responsibility and opportunity’. Significantly, that campaign would focus on the broad idea of the UN, rather than

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7 Eichelberger to Bell, 9 February 1945, Box 54, CEP.
8 New York Times, 6 February 1945, p. 13; minutes of the emergency Campaign of the AAUN, 2 March 1945, Box 242, JSP.
the specifics of how it would work in terms of policy. However, there was still a lingering fear of public rejection of the UN, so the campaign had to concentrate first and foremost on its creation.9

Of course, the responsibility for promotion did not lie solely with Eichelberger and the AAUN. During the first months of 1945, the State Department continued its own promotional and educational campaign behind Dumbarton Oaks. As a result, the links between the two, the state and the private, remained strong as the year progressed. State Department officials kept in close contact with the internationalist leadership. Francis Russell of the State Department met with cooperating organisations at the end of February to talk about the best ways to promote the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and the functions of the Division of Public Liaison. John Dickey, the Director of the Office of Public Affairs, explained to Changing World readers how the Office was cultivating a two-way relationship between the Government and the American people.10

Given the success of the relationship the State Department was having with the public, the Treasury Department followed their example, organising a meeting for representatives of over one hundred national organisations to discuss the Bretton Woods financial agreements. On a smaller scale, Treasury officials visited a march meeting of cooperating organisations to discuss Bretton Woods in greater detail, where they were happy to find that numerous organisations already had promotional leaflets on it. This was particularly useful to the Government, as a State Department official noted that material sent out from Washington was rarely well received and often viewed as partisan propaganda. Material produced or sent out by private organisations, however, was a different matter.11

Although there were numerous meetings, telegrams, and exchanges of correspondence between the Roosevelt administration and private leaders, two events in particular brought about close state–private cooperation during the debates over the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The first, in late April, was the creation of Dumbarton Oaks Week. The second, and more significant, was the involvement of private organisations at the San Francisco conference.

Dumbarton Oaks Week (16–22 April) was conceived entirely by private organisations, led by Eichelberger and the AAUN. Planning for the week began in February with a telegram sent by Eichelberger on behalf of a number of private organisations to all state governors urging that they proclaim their support for the proposals. The message also implored the American people to join in discussions about the proposals to create a full understanding prior to the opening of the San Francisco conference just days later. While the State Department was sympathetic to the idea of Dumbarton Oaks Week, they would have preferred a ‘United Nations Week’ in June,

10 Meeting of cooperating organisation minutes, 27 February 1945, Box 56, CEP; Changing World, March 1945, p. 3.
11 New York Times, 1 March 1945, p. 11; meeting of cooperating organisation minutes, 2 March 1945, Box 56, CEP.
as it would have been more effective in terms of Congressional ratification. However, as it had already been announced, there was no going back, and it was clear that the Secretary of State and even the President should express their approval.\textsuperscript{12}

Roosevelt’s response to Dumbarton Oaks Week was in fact drafted by Eichelberger himself. sent to the White House on 21 March, it was returned four days later, with minor revisions, as a letter from the President. The AAUN made great use of the letter in promoting the week, which included conferences, mass meetings, luncheons and lectures from New York to San Francisco. Even the divisions between the AAUN and Americans United were overlooked for a week, with the two groups co-sponsoring one of the biggest events of the week, a meeting in New York with speakers including Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson and mayor Fiorello LaGuardia.\textsuperscript{13}

Despite the strong support for Dumbarton Oaks Week, the proposals themselves, and the enthusiasm for the forthcoming San Francisco conference, Eichelberger was taking nothing for granted. Even at this late stage, he still feared that the creation of the United Nations could be halted. At the beginning of April, he noted four points that had arisen to threaten the United Nations: the Soviet Union’s continued request for Assembly votes for three autonomous Republics; the delay in constituting the Polish Government as agreed at Yalta; the announcement that Soviet foreign minister Molotov would not be coming to San Francisco; and increasingly widespread suggestions that the conference be postponed. Nevertheless, he called for ‘courage and a sense of perspective’ from AAUN members: ‘We are going to take a deep breath, close our eyes and start meeting the greater obstacles to the success of the task of building a world organisation – a task in which we dare not fail’.\textsuperscript{14}

The death of Franklin Roosevelt on 12 April 1945 represented another potential obstacle to both the United Nations and the AAUN, but for Eichelberger in particular it was much more than that. He had built a relationship with the President since 1936, and it had grown during the war years. Although it was a rather one-sided relationship, meaning more to Eichelberger than it did to Roosevelt, it was still of great significance to the internationalist leader. Throughout the war years, he had gone to the White House for information and advice, and he always felt that he was working toward the same goals. Though he occasionally expressed frustration with the State Department, Eichelberger never uttered a word against Roosevelt. They developed a personal connection that was one of the key reasons behind Eichelberger’s continued and unquestioning support for the Government’s proposals. Now, on the eve of the creation of the United Nations, that connection was gone.

\textsuperscript{12} Eichelberger to MacLeish, 21 February 1945, Folder: Dumbarton Oaks general, records relating to Public Affairs activities 1944–65, RG 59 na CP.
\textsuperscript{13} Eichelberger to Daniels, 21 March 1945, OF 5557, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Changing World, April 1945, pp. 1, 5; New York Times, 17 April 1945, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{14} Eichelberger letter to AAU chapters, 2 April 1945, 63135, Cea.
n evertheless, r oosevelt’s death initially acted as a spur to the internationalist movement generally, and eichelberger in particular. h e responded immediately to the tragic event by urging the creation of the United n ations as a memorial to the President. h e wrote to all of the cooperating organisations insisting that ‘the only tribute we can pay worthy of him is to see to it that the world organisation is created with American membership just as quickly as possible’. By continuing the campaign for the United n ations, all of r oosevelt’s efforts to create it would be remembered. Dumbarton Oaks Week ‘should be in the nature of a memorial to President Roosevelt and should mark our determination to carry forward his ideals in the structure of permanent peace’.15

With Dumbarton Oaks Week and the San Francisco conference imminent, Roosevelt’s death encouraged Eichelberger to ‘redouble’ his efforts. The question remained though whether eichelberger could continue his relationship with the White House at this critical time. One of the first questions asked of Harry Truman after his oath of office was whether or not the San Francisco conference would go ahead as planned. He affirmed that it would, beginning on 25 April, the date set by Roosevelt. It remained to be seen if Eichelberger’s access to the Oval Office would continue.16

Just four days into the new Presidency, Eichelberger wrote to Truman asking for an appointment before the s an f rancisco conference. h e argued that he was due to have an appointment with r oosevelt prior to the conference, and that he was only asking for a brief meeting due to the importance of the issues at hand. t ruman’s secretary, matthew Connelly, regretted that an appointment had been impossible to arrange given the busy nature of the first days in office. Eichelberger understood, and looked forward to a meeting with the new President on his return from s an f rancisco. t he beginning of a new relationship would have to wait until after the conference. A subsequent press release pledged the AAUN’s ‘best efforts’ and support to t ruman at such a critical time, though it remained focused on the need to create the new international organisation as soon as possible.17

Roosevelt’s death only added to Eichelberger’s anxieties about the San Francisco conference. t hough much had already been arranged and agreed at Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta, there were still no guarantees regarding the creation of the United n ations organisation. Questions concerning voting rights and membership lingered, as did external issues such as the nature of the new Polish Government. a s a result, e ichelberger believed that there was still a huge promotional job to be done. t he a merican people needed a full understanding of the Un , and to have faith in it from the beginning.

15 eichelber ger, Organizing for Peace, p. 259.
16 ibid.
17 e ichelberger to Connelly, 16 a pril 1945, of 421, h arry s . t ruman Papers, h arry s . t ruman l ibrary, independence, missouri (hereafter hstl ); Connelly to e ichelberger, 26 a pril 1945, of 421, h arry s . t ruman Papers, hstl ; e ichelberger to Connelly, 8 may 1945, OF 421, Harry S. Truman Papers, HSTL; AAUN press release, 1 May 1945, Box 61, CEP.
The fact that the State Department clearly felt the same way led to the next major period of state–private interaction, when Eichelberger was yet again at the heart. Back in March, the idea had been put forward by Eichelberger and other internationalists in New York for private organisations to ask the State Department for representation at San Francisco, in a similar manner to the press. The idea quickly developed through collaboration with the State Department, with the aim of close cooperation between the official US delegation at San Francisco and the private organisations.18

Immediately before the conference, after consultation with Eichelberger and Malcolm Davis of the Carnegie Endowment, the State Department announced that national organisations would be permitted to send consultants to the US delegation at San Francisco. There was no chance for Eichelberger of a place on the official US delegation, as the State Department argued that it must be kept to ‘the smallest possible number’. However, the Government made it clear that the consultants would be ‘available for consultation at the request of the delegation and would be kept as closely informed of the work of the Conference as possible’. Much to the satisfaction of organisation leaders this suggested a two-way relationship between the delegation and the consultants.19

In the end, 42 organisations sent official consultants to the San Francisco conference, formally known as the United Nations Conference on International Organisation, which began on 25 April. It was no surprise that Eichelberger was the designated consultant for the AAUN. The cooperation between the consultants and the State Department was extensive. The Government went so far as to arrange transportation and hotel reservations for the consultants, and blue pins allowed them access to meetings. Indeed, they had ‘almost complete freedom of movement’ in all conference areas. However, the consultants were clearly on the lowest rung of the official ladder, as they were not listed in the official directory of delegations.20

Although Eichelberger was the consultant for the AAUN, he was not satisfied to be merely one of many consultants at San Francisco. This dissatisfaction led to the creation of the ‘core committee’ of consultants, set up by Eichelberger as a focal point for the national organisations and their consultants. Yet again, Eichelberger took it upon himself to lead the many private organisations interested in the United Nations. The self-appointed core committee provided an opportunity to coordinate the mobilization of public opinion, and it was, in Eichelberger’s own words ‘the headquarters of non-Governmental organisation activities in San Francisco’. Although the amount of time devoted to the core committee was limited by his primary role as a consultant, Eichelberger’s effort to spearhead the private

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18 Meeting of cooperating organisation minutes, 13 March 1945, Box 56, CEP; Meeting of cooperating organisation minutes, 23 March 1945, Box 56, CEP.
organisations continued the pattern set throughout the war: he was determined to
lead, and do things his way.21

With regard to the proceedings of the conference, some of the consultants
expressed reservations about their actual purpose, believing that the State
Department had invited them purely for propaganda purposes. They felt that
their main function was to pass on the official State Department line in order to
mobilise public opinion behind the Charter, ‘regardless of the kind of document
it turned out to be’. This reflected the divisions between organisations such as
a mericans United, who were also represented at san francisco, and eichelberger’s
organisations, who were far less cynical about the Department’s motives. Yet even
eichelberger was unsure how much of his role would be consultation, and how
much would be merely observation.22

Of greater significance and concern to all consultants was the question of influence
over policy and the nature of their meetings with the official US delegation. Despite
the fact that secretary of state stettinius had promised a two-way relationship
between the official delegation and the consultants, the actual relationship was
considerably less of a two-way street than had been initially expected. Although the
consultants were briefed daily, there was not always an opportunity for them to put
their views to the delegation. Indeed, the state Department line was put by a rchibald
macl eish, who insisted that the priority was the creation of the United nations, and
that organisations must not attempt to further their own agendas.23

The lack of a procedure for presenting proposals to the Government failed
to deter eichelberger and his allies in the core committee from attempting to
influence the official delegation in order to have a genuine effect on the creation
of the Un Charter. There was a certain irony to this, given that eichelberger had
spent most of the past year attempting to convince fellow internationalists not to
question the initial proposals. However, the areas in which Eichelberger and his
colleagues pushed for change were not on questions of international security, but
on issues such as human rights, economic and social issues, trusteeship, and the
need for an interim UN committee to begin as soon as the Charter was ratified.
Eichelberger had recognised that these were lesser areas where the consultants
could nevertheless make a difference at such a late stage.24

The CSOP had long promoted the issue of human rights, but initial attempts
to influence the State Department were less than encouraging. The CSOP wrote
to the secretary of state at the end of March urging the creation of a Commission
on Human Rights within the new UN framework, and suggesting additions to the
Charter to promote human rights. With no reply, the proposals were announced

21 Divine, Second Chance, pp. 291–2; robins, Experiment in Democracy, pp. 111–13;
eichelberger, Organizing for Peace, p. 273.
22 robins, Experiment in Democracy, p. 105; eichelberger, Organizing for Peace,
p. 268.
23 robins, Experiment in Democracy, pp. 107–8.
24 eichelberger, Organizing for Peace, p. 269.
to the press two days before the conference opened. Disappointingly, the delayed and cursory response from Washington came a week later, after the San Francisco conference had begun, with no indication as to whether the US delegation had seen it. By that time, a further petition had been sent to Stettinius by the Un urging a number of suggestions, including the establishment of a human rights Commission at San Francisco.25

Despite all the private efforts, Eichelberger was informed by US delegation (and CSOP) member Virginia Gildersleeve that in order to keep the Charter as short as possible, many details would be omitted, and that the intention to set up a Commission on human rights was to be left out. His fear was that without explicit reference to such a Commission in the Charter, it would never materialise. A n emergency meeting of consultants was called, and a meeting with Stettinius was rapidly arranged for the afternoon of 2 May: the deadline for proposed Charter amendments. The Secretary of State took the hastily prepared proposals to the US delegation, who subsequently decided to include the specific references to a Human rights Commission, which eventually made it into the Charter in Article 68. When Stettinius announced the amendments, he specifically highlighted the role of the consultants, noting that the inclusion of the proposal was a direct result of their meeting. This was a significant victory for Eichelberger and the consultants.26

Consultants also played a key role in highlighting economic and social issues. As with the issue of human rights, James Shotwell stepped forward to represent the consultants. Having spent much of the previous year in the background while Eichelberger was consumed with bureaucratic issues, Shotwell now used his influence and experience to great effect. He fought most strongly to broaden the power of the Economic and Social Council, and to get the word ‘education’ into the Charter. These efforts, made through a number of meetings with the US delegation, also helped lead to Article 71, which formally allowed for consultation between the Economic and Social Council and private organisations.27

As the conference progressed, numerous other issues were settled to the satisfaction of Eichelberger, Shotwell, and their fellow consultants. One of the most significant for Eichelberger was the question of trusteeship, which had been of particular interest to him since his involvement in the Welles committee. Eichelberger and Shotwell were invited by US delegation member Harold Stassen to advise him on trusteeship issues and discuss CSO reports on the matter. While the consultants made no real changes to the Charter on trusteeship, they felt no real need to and were perfectly satisfied with the outcome of the Charter.28

26 Eichelberger, Organizing for Peace, pp. 269–70.
the decision of the state Department to invite consultants from private organisations was deemed to be a considerable success. Despite some initial grumbling, both sides seemed satisfied with the arrangement. The private organisations, especially those of Eichelberger, managed some direct, albeit limited policy input. More significantly, they were openly brought into the conference proceedings, and were able to play a broader role in the diplomacy of the conference. As Stettinius wrote in his conference report to Truman,

the consultants were largely instrumental in the introduction into the final Charter of certain important provisions. Their presence in San Francisco meant that a very large body of American opinion which had been applying itself to the problems of international organisation played a direct and material part in drafting the constitution of the United Nations.29

For the leaders of private organisations, it was hoped that the success of state–private interaction during the San Francisco conference would set a precedent for cooperation that would be followed in the postwar years. In the Office of Public Affairs, the state Department appeared to have created the necessary bureaucratic structure for continued cooperation, but only time would tell if such cordial relations and two-way interaction would continue. At the time, the state Department appeared equally enthusiastic. After the conference, Office of Public Affairs Director John Dickey told Eichelberger ‘I have never felt a deeper personal gratitude to any group than I do to the men and women who made that experiment work’. Chester Williams, also from the Office of Public Affairs, noted that during the war ‘the cooperation between Government and private organisations touched almost every phase of the struggle’, so it was only natural that representatives of private organisations were invited to San Francisco. He also expressed the state Department’s conviction that such interaction was necessary because ‘no policy can be made to work well in the modern world unless it comes from and has the understanding support of the people’. This promised much for future collaboration.30

Despite the success of the state–private interaction at San Francisco, the creation and future of the new United Nations organisation appeared to be the more pressing issue. Even with the conference proceeding more smoothly than anticipated, concerns about the creation of the UN continued. Eichelberger’s greatest fear now concerned the possibility of a delay between the end of the conference and the creation of the UN organisation. As he saw it, any delay might lead to a cooling of enthusiasm for the UN, potentially threatening its existence. He led a group urging

29 Excerpt from Stettinius Report to the President (no date), Folder: Consultants-Letters-San Francisco Conference, Box 155, CEP.
30 Dickey to Eichelberger, 2 July 1945, Folder: San Francisco Conference, Box 155, CEP; Democratic Process at San Francisco, Department of State Bulletin, 24 June 1945, pp. 1163–6.
the creation of an interim committee not only to perform ‘immediate tasks’, but for its ‘psychological effect’. In the end, a UN executive committee was created to begin working from the adjournment at San Francisco.\(^\text{31}\)

Although ratification now appeared inevitable, the Charter still needed to get through the senate, and the United states had to be willing to use it. in the may edition of *Changing World*, written during the san francisco conference, Eichelberger confidently predicted that an effective Charter would be produced. ‘f rom now on’, he noted, ‘the job is one of courageous statesmanship, and alert public opinion, and a vigorous process of world education.’ h e refused to oversell the United n ations, recognising that the Charter alone would not secure world peace, but that it opened the door to political security, provided nations were willing to walk through it. With an eye to Americans United, he noted that the Charter would not please the ‘perfectionists’, and that it would ‘not be the constitution of a world government’. Instead, it was ‘the most workable plan’ possible. He concluded by acknowledging that public opinion in support of the United Nations had to be developed in all nations, and that the aa Un and Cso P already had plans for their educational programmes.\(^\text{32}\)

the following month, e ichelberger elaborated on the job ahead. with the Charter successfully created ‘the programme of the association will be based around it’. a two-phase programme was outlined: ‘f irst, the educational campaign which we must undertake between now and the time the organisation is set up…; second, how the organisation can be made to work – how the United States, the most important factor in the picture shall exercise its responsibilities’. The first step in that educational campaign was to rally support in the Us to ratify the Charter.\(^\text{33}\)

It was immediately clear that Eichelberger intended to undertake the educational campaign through the aa Un , and that he had all but given up on Americans United. Long tired of AUWO’s equivocating over the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and its interest in issues beyond international organisation, e ichelberger believed that his organisation, the aa Un , was the best way forward. w hile this attitude was hardly a surprise from e ichelberger, he was not alone in his belief. As AUWO’s Chairman Ernest Hopkins noted, ‘people who had an initial interest in us and might have contributed to the cause are instead contributing to Clark Eichelberger’s outfits in the belief that they are better set up and administratively more efficient in the single aim of getting the treaty ratified than we are’.\(^\text{34}\)

there was some limited collaboration following the san francisco conference between e ichelberger and a Uwo , but most of it related to the future of a Uwo , and the question of what would happen to that organisation once its original raison d’etre had passed. e ichelberger was particularly pleased that Ulric Bell prepared a resolution for AUWO which explicitly proposed leaving the job of


\(^{32}\) *Changing World*, may 1945, pp. 1–2, 4.

\(^{33}\) *Changing World*, June 1945, pp. 2, 4.

\(^{34}\) Hopkins to Bell, 7 June 1945, Folder 19, Box 4, HMFC.
promoting the new world organisation to the aa Un. But his involvement was essentially damage limitation – eichelberger wanted a Uwo out of what he saw as his field as quickly as possible. When AUWO announced its qualified support for the Charter in June, eichelberger’s concerns about the group again came to the fore. Although the Charter was held by a Uwo to be superior to Dumbarton Oaks, other more extreme proposals for the new UN were put forward, including restraint of national sovereignty, enforced disarmament, and the creation of an international armed force.35

While eichelberger was certainly interested in the future evolution of the new organisation, his immediate priority was to ratify the Charter as it stood, without reservations. He urged his fellow aa Un members to support him in ‘the most important job we have ever undertaken’, a job that involved the ‘development of the educated, informed, vigorous and alert public opinion’. Although there seemed to be a clear consensus behind the Charter, eichelberger still feared the possibility of a long debate. As a result, the educational campaign behind the Charter had begun before the document had even been completed.36

State–private interaction continued into this final phase, with State Department officials attending an inter-organisational meeting on 13 June. Chester Williams outlined the promotional and educational literature being produced by the Government, much of which would be available for distribution by private organisations. The conference resulted in a telegram of support to Truman, endorsing his recommendation that the Senate consider the Charter immediately following the adjournment at San Francisco. The telegram promised ‘public opinion solidly behind you urging full steam ahead’. Similar state–private conferences were organised by the AAUN on 23 June and 5 July, the first of which attracted some seven hundred people and led to yet another telegram of support to the President.37

Only at the beginning of July did Eichelberger finally seem confident that the Charter would be ratified. The fear of a repeat of 1919 and 1920 had finally passed. On 2 July, the same day Truman presented the Charter to the Senate, eichelberger wrote to AAUN members reiterating four key suggestions for the ratification fight. Firstly, he urged that all possible influence be put upon the Senate to ratify the treaty as quickly as possible and to create the new organisation immediately. A quick debate, he argued, would strengthen Truman’s hand at the Potsdam conference and help to solve the ‘grave problems of reconstruction’ confronting the world. Secondly, he supported a campaign of information to understand the details of the Charter. Thirdly, he urged an alert public opinion, again recognising that ‘the Charter will not of itself guarantee security, freedom and prosperity’.

36 eichelberger to aaUn members, 11 June 1945, 124004, Cea.
37 inter-organisation meeting memorandum, 14 June 1945, 63155, Cea.; eichelberger to Truman, 14 June 1945, Box 61, CEP; Robins, Experiment in Democracy, pp. 142–3.
Finally, he reminded members that the fight would not end with ratification, and that a long-range educational programme was necessary ‘so that the American people will fulfil their responsibilities and when the first test comes, if it comes, it will be met’.38

Eichelberger’s own personal effort to influence the Senate came on 12 July, in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that had begun its hearings three days earlier. He argued that the AAU supported the UN Charter because it offered ‘a workable, practical means for the achievement of political security, justice, and economic and social cooperation’. In a detailed testimony, Eichelberger enthused at length about the Charter, and although he admitted that there were parts that could be strengthened, he argued that it was still an excellent document that should be passed without reservation. He argued that public opinion was ‘almost unanimously’ in favour of ratification and that the Foreign Relations Committee consider the Charter with urgency. In fact, much to his satisfaction, the Committee approved the Charter after just five days on 14 July. The only negative element of Eichelberger’s appearance at the hearings came when he and James Shotwell were accused of being communists by Mrs Agnes Waters of the National Blue Star Mothers of America, though it was not the first time the charge had been thrown at Eichelberger, nor would it be the last.39

Approval by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was just the first step in the ratification process, so Eichelberger continued his educational quest. An inter-organisational meeting took place in New York on July 16 to discuss strategy and organisational activity, though this meeting had been arranged for a week, and it seems that Eichelberger, along with most internationalists, was genuinely surprised by the speed of events. Nevertheless, he continued to speak out in favour of the Charter, appearing at a public meeting of service men’s wives for the United Nations on 17 July.40

When the Senate began debating ratification on 23 July, there was no real doubt that the Charter would be passed, and consideration of the future of the AAUN became a priority. Eichelberger refined his future plans for the AAUN in correspondence with honorary president Sumner Welles, highlighting a two-fold strategy that reflected a cautious yet optimistic outlook for the new UN. The first element was purely educational, with the need for ‘a militant educational programme on behalf of the United Nations’ to remind the American people of the ‘obligations’ and ‘opportunities’ that came with membership. The second element related to policy-making, stressing the research affiliate role of the CSOP, and the need to continuously explore how to expand and improve the UN ‘to meet the ever great responsibilities thrust upon it’. Both elements assumed that the United States would utilise the UN as an essential diplomatic tool, and that the responsibilities

38 Eichelberger to AAU members, 2 July 1945, 124014, CEA.
40 Robin, Experiment in Democracy, pp. 147–8; New York Times, 27 July 1945, p. 11.
of the international organisation would only increase. Welles’ response expressed a similar outlook.\(^{41}\)

In addition to the AAUN’s long-term plans, Eichelberger looked to capitalise on the successful ratification in the short term, and an executive committee meeting on 26 July considered how best to take advantage of the favourable situation in Washington. He outlined plans for a press conference to be called immediately after ratification, at which statements endorsing the programme of the AAUN would be released, such as those of Sumner Welles. With the debate showing a vast majority of the Senate for ratification, the future for both the UN and the AAUN looked optimistic.\(^{42}\)

On 28 July 1945, the UN Charter was ratified in the US Senate by a near-unanimous vote of 89–2. The fears of the internationalist movement had not been realised. After spending much of the war anticipating a debate of weeks, if not months, the Charter was passed in just six days. Eichelberger was there to witness the vote, and he later recalled a sense of anti-climax. However, his mood soon changed ‘at the thought of the formidable task ahead. The realisation came to me that those of us who had helped to bring into being the United Nations were surely morally responsible for helping to make the new international machinery function’.\(^{43}\)

In helping to create the United Nations, Eichelberger had worked closely with other private organisations, but he had also worked closely with the state. His relationship with the Roosevelt administration had been a close and effective one. He had developed a personal relationship with President Roosevelt, and he had been directly involved in the State Department’s postwar planning and promotional activities. The passage of the UN Charter and creation of the international organisation, however, represented the end of a chapter with regard to his relationship with the State Department. It remained to be seen whether a new chapter would be written. The same applied to his relationship with the President.

Eichelberger had attempted to arrange a meeting with Truman within days of his assuming office, but had been unsuccessful. However, following his return from San Francisco he had been able to arrange a meeting with the new President on June 8. Truman’s files record the appointment as a fifteen minute meeting from 10.30, but beyond that nothing is known of the meeting. Unlike Eichelberger’s meetings with Roosevelt, there is no mention of the meeting with Truman in Eichelberger’s papers, and no written notes or typed memoranda. Where Eichelberger’s personal history of the founding of the United Nations, *Organizing for Peace*, has an entire chapter devoted to his talks with President Roosevelt, there is not one mention of his first meeting with Truman. Eichelberger made no reference of his meeting with the new president in subsequent AAUN and CSOP meetings, or at least none that were

\(^{41}\) Eichelberger to Welles, 26 July 1945, Box 114, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL; Welles to Eichelberger, 27 July 1945, Box 114, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.

\(^{42}\) Minutes of AAUN Executive Committee Meeting, 26 July 1945, 63142, CEA.

\(^{43}\) Eichelberger, *Organizing for Peace*, p. 282.
recorded in the minutes. While none of this proves that the meeting was unsuccessful, or that the two did not get on, it certainly suggests that they did not immediately strike up the kind of relationship that Eichelberger had held with Roosevelt.44

Given the immense significance of his relationship with Roosevelt, it must have been a disappointment to Eichelberger, even if it was not necessarily a surprise. For years, certainly since the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, Eichelberger had developed a bond with Roosevelt, a personal affection, and a sense that they were working together towards the same goals. Although most of their written correspondence was initiated by Eichelberger, it was not entirely one way, as Roosevelt and his administration did adopt some of Eichelberger’s ideas. Eichelberger’s proximity to the White House and his shared goals allowed him to play a part in achieving those goals. Only time would now tell if Truman shared Eichelberger’s goal of utilising the United Nations as the primary tool for US diplomacy.

Regardless of the nature of the personal meeting between Eichelberger and Truman, the relationship between the AAUN and the White House remained strong, on paper at least, for the remainder of the ratification debate. In recognition of the AAUN’s contribution to the mobilisation and education of public opinion, a telegram from Truman to Eichelberger on 30 July thanked both him and the AAUN for their efforts, while also highlighting that the ratification was ‘not so much an end as a beginning’. Eichelberger would certainly have been pleased to read Truman’s hope that ‘the peoples of the United Nations will inform themselves of the possibilities which the Charter opens to them and will make the organisations of the United Nations their common instrument to achieve their common purpose’.45

Eichelberger revealed Truman’s telegram to the public at the planned post-ratification press conference on July 30. Speaking out of the offices of Senator Claude Pepper, brandishing the President’s endorsement, Eichelberger was certainly doing his best to capitalise on the internationalist fervour in Washington. Yet despite the creation of the UN, Eichelberger reiterated that the long-term job of the AAUN was to keep the UN and its Charter in the public mind. ‘The great danger’, he argued, ‘is that the public, now that the Charter has been ratified, will feel that the peace has been automatically safeguarded, and will not realise that a constant effort must be made to make and keep the new organisation an effective one’. In arguing for sustained vigilance, not only did he make a very realistic job of selling the UN, but he also made a very good case for the continued existence of his own organisation. The AAUN was essential to remind the public of both the virtues and limitations of the Charter.46

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44 Engagements list, 8 June 1945, Folder: Memorandum re: Appointment File, Desk Calendars, June, President’s appointments file, Psf, Harry S. Truman Papers, hstl.
However, Eichelberger underestimated how soon the United Nations would be tested, and how soon the US public and its policy-makers would face the practical realities of the new internationalism. ‘Many decisions will have to be made and the great test will not come immediately. The world at the end of the war will be too tired to start war again. The test will come after three, five or ten years, and its outcome will depend on whether in the meantime the organisation has taken the economic, social and political measures provided for in the Charter which will make for continued peace.’ Unfortunately, for Eichelberger, the first tests would come far sooner, before the United Nations was even in place.\textsuperscript{47}
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Chapter 8

Start with the Charter

With the ratification of the United Nations Charter, the long campaign for US involvement in an international organisation was over. It had been both quicker and easier than the internationalists had ever expected. It appeared to represent a victory for the internationalist movement, who finally achieved what they had spent years fighting for. Ratification represented a turning point for the United States, showing a willingness to join an international organisation and reject the unilateralism that had characterised the inter-war years, if not the nation’s entire history.

Another apparent victory came in the private sphere, where Clark Eichelberger’s vision of internationalism had triumphed over the more idealistic wing of the movement. By the end of 1945, the AAU was the principal private organisation promoting US involvement in the UN. A UWO had become increasingly critical of both the Government and the UN Charter. That critical stance, combined with a sense that the organisation had achieved what it set out to do, led to numerous notable citizens leaving a UWO, and its credibility never recovered. The AAU increasingly had the field to itself, just as Eichelberger wanted it.

Unfortunately, the sense of victory for Eichelberger and the AAU would be short lived. From August 1945, it was clear that the creation of the United Nations had only been the end of the beginning. This was due to the convergence of a number of factors that faced the internationalists in the new and very different postwar world. Firstly, with their main aim achieved the movement lacked a clear programme. The AAU needed a new sense of direction, but where that direction would come from was unclear. The new challenge for the AAU was to help the United Nations to develop and function successfully, and to ensure that the US played a key role; but it was unclear exactly how that could be achieved.

Secondly, any direction was unlikely to come from Washington as the AAUN could no longer rely upon a sympathetic Government to provide it. During the war, much of the organisation’s direction had come from the Roosevelt administration. Due to Eichelberger’s connections to Franklin Roosevelt and the State Department, the AAU had strongly and loyally supported the Government’s proposals on international organisation. However, with the UN in place it gradually became clear that the AAU and the new Truman administration had differing attitudes towards it. It was apparent that the Truman administration did not intend to use the UN as the primary tool of US diplomacy as Eichelberger had hoped.

Compounding this disconnection on policy issues was the lack of a personal connection within the Government. Unlike the war years, Eichelberger now had no personal relationship with the President. Unlike the periods when he worked
with the State Department on postwar planning, on promoting the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, and at the San Francisco conference, new figures at the State Department had different priorities. As the Office of Public Affairs developed through 1945, it focused solely on the promotion and explanation of US foreign policy, with little opportunity for two-way exchange of ideas. Lack of access and differences in policy made life increasingly difficult for the AAUN throughout the latter half of 1945 and 1946.

Finally, the shifting attitude of the US Government was largely due to the developing Cold War with the Soviet Union. It was increasingly clear, even as the Charter was being ratified by the US Senate, that the Cold War would have a serious impact on the effectiveness of the new United Nations. The new international climate clearly made it impossible for the UN Charter to function as intended, limiting its effectiveness from the outset. This left the AAUN to fight an uphill battle from the beginning, working against a number of factors combining to constrain the UN before it even had a chance to start.

Given the changing domestic and international circumstances, attitudes towards internationalism in the US quickly shifted. Contrary to AAUN hopes, US internationalism was not simply defined by showing support for the UN. Within months of the triumphant creation of the United Nations, it was clear the US Government wanted less internationalism than the UN offered and than the AAUN hoped for. Yet from the other political extreme, the selective interest in the UN from the Truman Administration led to calls for UN reform from the more idealistic wing of the internationalist movement. By the end of 1945, calls for what became known as world federalism were increasingly vocal. Exponents of world federalism wanted to expand the remit of the UN, and limit national sovereignty in the process. Eichelberger and the AAUN were caught in the middle.

Just months after being part of a triumphant state–private coalition that had successfully brought US entry into the UN, Eichelberger and the AAUN found themselves isolated. While it was true that Eichelberger’s AAUN was finally established as the most important pro-UN group, this was increasingly because they had the field to themselves. More internationalist than the Truman Administration, they called for greater faith in the fledgling UN; less extreme than the growing world federalist movement, they refused immediate calls to reform the UN. While Eichelberger was never likely to be drawn to the latter view, he was still left in a difficult position. His decision to continue fighting for a more multilateral world based around the principles of the UN Charter was easy, a tempting to convince the Truman Administration to consistently support those principles would prove to be far more difficult.

Once the campaign for Charter ratification was over, discussions within the AAUN immediately turned to future planning. Within days, Eichelberger contacted his fellow members to arrange a meeting to celebrate ratification and to discuss the future programme. He enclosed a copy of President Truman’s telegram of 30 July, arguing that it ‘could very well be the policy statement of the Commission and the
American Association for the United Nations’. Eichelberger was never likely to 
pass up the opportunity of a Presidential endorsement, especially one that urged 
the people of the United Nations to use the new organisation as their ‘common 
instrument to achieve their common purpose’.¹

Beyond the general support for the new United Nations, Eichelberger also 
addressed more specific issues that needed attention from the CSOP. These 
included wider study of the way the UN functioned and consideration of the need 
for new UN agencies. He also urged continued support for two issues that had 
become key elements of the AAUN/CSOP definition of internationalism. The first 
was the proposed UN Commission on human rights; the second was the issue of 
trusteeship. Continued contact with State Department officials was urged in order 
to influence US policy on both matters. Eichelberger’s final suggestion was the 
need to look a decade ahead and consider recommendations for Charter revision, 
an issue for the agenda of the UN Assembly after ten years.²

Despite Eichelberger’s consideration of immediate and long-term issues, he 
could not have foreseen that on the day that he wrote to his fellow internationalists, 
the US would drop an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Three days 
later, a second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. The new issue of atomic 
energy was not only a major addition to the internationalist agenda, but in some 
eyes it threatened to kill the new UN before it really began. In the words of one 
radio commentator, the ‘the United Nations Charter is out the window’. Calls for 
Charter revision began immediately. The more extreme internationalist wing of 
Americans United dramatically increased their calls for world government.³

Eichelberger moved quickly to address such concerns. He conceded that the 
bombs had ushered in a new ‘atomic age’ but countered that the Charter was most 
certainly not ‘out the window’. Although the atomic age would lead to greater 
centralisation of power and loss of sovereignty, he argued for ‘beginning with 
what we have’, as ‘any effort to present mankind with the alternative of complete 
world government or chaos, will be very harmful. We are going to start with the 
Charter’. Eichelberger reminded his supporters that the AAUN and CSOP had 
made many practical suggestions over the previous years that had solved the 
problems of world organisation and now would be no exception. Under James 
Shotwell’s continued leadership, the CSOP was already looking into ways to bring 
atomic energy under UN control. The bigger long-term question was whether the 
US Government was willing to listen.⁴

Eichelberger hoped to develop a similar personal relationship with President 
Truman to the one he had held with Roosevelt, and his efforts to influence the new

¹ eichelberger to CSOP members, 6 August 1945, folder: San Francisco memoranda, 
Box 155, CEP.
² ibid.
³ Unknown radio commentator, quoted by Eichelberger in letter to cooperating 
group, 21 August 1945, Box 198, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
a dministration began immediately. h owever, it was the issue of trusteeship that provided the first opportunity to ingratiate himself with Truman. Upon hearing that t ruman was to meet with f rench leader Charles de Gaulle, e ichelberger informed t ruman of his meeting with r oosevelt in o ctober 1944. in that meeting, Roosevelt had recounted how de Gaulle expressed a willingness to consider UN trusteeship for former French colonial possessions in the Pacific. Eichelberger hoped de Gaulle was still willing to consider the possibility, rather than have the f rench and other nations return to old-fashioned imperialism. t ruman personally thanked Eichelberger for the information, particularly for getting the message to him before his meeting with de Gaulle.5

The question of UN trusteeships was just one of the key issues Eichelberger aimed to discuss with the President at their meeting on 27 a ugust 1945. a tomic energy, human rights, and the promotion of the Un to a domestic and international public were the other issues at the top of e ichelberger’s agenda. e ichelberger’s desire to meet with the President was noted in his daily appointment book, which acknowledged that he had been asking for the appointment ‘for some weeks’.6

Sadly, little is known of the fifteen minute meeting, as Eichelberger’s papers contain no report of the conversation. Again, this is in stark contrast to the detailed comments that he wrote up following his meetings with r oosevelt. a nd again, Eichelberger’s book Organizing for Peace includes no details of this second meeting with t ruman. h is sole reference to the meeting came in a letter to s umner Welles, where he claimed that Truman had expressed personal agreement with the policies of internationalisation of atomic energy and Un trusteeships for Pacific islands, but was restrained by Congress, public opinion, and divisions between Government departments. in retrospect, it appears clear that t ruman was either unwilling or simply unable to provide specific direction to Eichelberger at this point. h owever, it also seems clear that t ruman did little to discourage the continued promotion of the Un as a tool of Us diplomacy.7

The immediate result was two of the most independent statements from the aa Un in years. a long-term policy statement, announced in a ugust, and an immediate programme, announced in s eptember, were based on numerous existing policy concerns. The immediate programme in particular was one of the most detailed policy statements from the aa Un, despite the fact that it did not have the rubber stamp of Government approval. it called for immediate Un control of atomic power, trusteeships in the Pacific, and the need for US troops to remain in e urope to help with rebuilding. more controversially, it also urged

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5 eichelberger to t ruman, 19 august 1945, of 203 misc. (1945), harr y s. t ruman Papers, hstl ; t ruman to e ichelberger, 24 a ugust 1945, of 203 misc. (1945), h arry s. t ruman Papers, hstl .
6 eichelberger to t ruman, 19 august 1945, of 203 misc. (1945), h arry s. t ruman Papers, HSTL; Daily Presidential Appointments, Box 1, Folder, Daily Presidential appointments a ugust 1945, matthew Connelly f iles, hstl .
7 Eichelberger to Welles, 26 September 1945, Box 198, Sunner Welles Papers, FDRL.
that the US use the UN as a tool of diplomacy by granting adequate power to the US delegate on the Security Council, raising adequate appropriations for the new organisation, and even earmarking US military contingents for use by the Security Council for police purposes. Finally, it looked forward to an expanded UN with increased economic and social activities, effective human rights provisions, and international regulation of armaments.8

The statements went far beyond policies emanating from the Truman administration, and in doing so they went much further than almost all association statements since 1941. During the war, Eichelberger would not even issue a trial balloon without Roosevelt’s approval. However, with the war over and the UN created, Eichelberger was increasingly willing to promote and support controversial policy issues. Needless to say, few of these issues attracted the full support of the Truman administration, let alone US public opinion. Even the issues of atomic energy and trusteeships were being hotly debated in Washington, and questions regarding an international police force were barely up for discussion. Nevertheless, the statements were Eichelberger’s reaction to the rapidly changing world around him. Having worked so hard to create the UN, he was not going to let the organisation die before it had even had its first meeting or established permanent headquarters. For him, the statements represented the best way forward within the framework of the UN Charter.

This was a crucial point. It was increasingly clear that the question of supporting the UN Charter was dividing the wider internationalist movement, and that more idealistic internationalists had already given up on the UN in favour of some form of world government. Eichelberger was particularly concerned with the ‘so-called Liberals’ who were looking to scrap the Charter and replace it with a world government constitution. However, in correspondence with Sumner Welles, he argued that while world government appealed to a minority, the majority of the public would prefer practical proposals using the existing UN Charter. Welles was even more worried than Eichelberger, comparing the views of world government supporters to the views of the ‘perfectionists’ who helped to defeat US participation in the League of Nations. Given that the issue of atomic energy was at the heart of calls for world government, he even went to the extreme of arguing that ‘the atomic bomb seems to have done almost as much harm in this way as in the physical sense’. As Eichelberger’s concerns grew, he contacted both Under-secretary of State Dean Acheson and US Delegate to the United Nations Edward Stettinius, but neither offered any practical suggestions or, indeed, any real interest.9

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8 10-Year AAUN programme, August 1945, 63143, CEA; Programme and Policy of aa Un and Cso P, September 1945, 63145, Cea.
9 Eichelberger to Welles, 16 September 1945, Box 114, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL; Welles to Eichelberger, 10 September 1945, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL; Eichelberger to Acheson, 27 September 1945, 811.2423/9-2745, Decimal file, RG 59, NA CP; Eichelberger to Stettinius, 18 September 1945, Box 60, CEP.
The most significant threat to the internationalist consensus on the UN Charter came from a meeting held in Dublin, New Hampshire from 11-16 October to consider how to remedy its weaknesses. The meeting, organised by Justice Owen J. Roberts and Grenville Clark, was, in Eichelberger’s eyes, bound to lead to ‘drastic proposals for converting the United Nations into a world government’. In the end, thirty prominent citizens, including Edgar A. Mowrer, issued a declaration calling for exactly that, arguing that the UN Charter was already ‘inadequate and behind the times as a means to promote peace and world order’.

Eichelberger moved quickly against the Dublin statement, arguing that the effect of the statement could be ‘most disastrous’ both at home and abroad. He again urged that the United Nations be created as quickly as possible, and he also urged that the US announce policies supporting international control of atomic energy and support for UN trusteeships in order to strengthen the UN. He criticised the Dublin proposals for offering no practical details or machinery to deal with the immediate problems facing the world.

In appealing for support for the UN, Eichelberger acknowledged that the more ‘liberal’ wing of the internationalist movement was not the sole source of criticism against the UN. From the other extreme, it was clear that there were those who felt the UN had already excessively eroded US sovereignty. Recognising that the wartime grand alliance was fast dissolving, and that ‘the compelling necessity of unity’ had been removed, Eichelberger argued that the UN was needed more than ever to bring nations together. In addition, the reaction that had set in against the new international organisation made it highly unlikely that anything stronger than the existing UN could be agreed upon in the near future.

That was a message with which President Truman clearly agreed. At an internationalist meeting on 30 October that included a number of atomic scientists and Senator J. William Fulbright, it was announced that Truman had recently described world government as a possibility ‘within 1000 years’. In the end, the AAU released a counter declaration with nineteen prominent signatories, denouncing the ‘shocking’ Dublin declaration. It was unsurprisingly clear that despite the Dublin criticisms, Eichelberger and the AAU continued to give their full support to the UN.

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10 Eichelberger to Welles, 16 September, 1945, Box 114, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL; Clark to Stimson, 2 October 1945, 0019, reel 114, Henry Stimson Papers (microfilm edition), Cambridge University Library; Eichelberger to AAU chapters, 17 October 1945, Box 114, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
11 Eichelberger to AAU chapters, 17 October 1945, Box 114, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
However, it was also clear that the internationalist movement was splitting firmly in two. Although it had never been united, even during the war years, this was often due to issues of personality as much as issues of policy, or smaller questions of emphasis and timing. The question of world government, however, was an issue that clearly divided the internationalists beyond repair. To use Eichelberger’s phrase, the compelling necessity of unity had passed with the creation of the UN. Those who supported a stronger world government pressed ahead with what seemed to be extreme and unworkable proposals. This left the mainstream internationalist movement to support the existing UN, and at the forefront of that support was the AAUN and Clark Eichelberger. The AAUN was now the sole organisation existing to support an international role for the United States through the United Nations.

While the atomic energy issue was causing irreparable divisions within the internationalist movement, Eichelberger still had to focus on how the issue was being dealt with in Washington, and both he and the AAUN set about promoting the need for the UN to deal with it. In a strongly worded statement at the end of September, the AAUN publicly urged the US Government to declare the terms upon which it was willing to share atomic energy. At the beginning of October, Eichelberger argued that the question of atomic energy should be dealt with by the UN General Assembly. In front of the annual encampment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, he even urged that a special UN committee be set up to decide ‘what sovereignty should be sacrificed’ to prevent any more atomic bombs.

At the end of October, a further statement from the CSOP signed by 16 internationalists and scientists again urged UN control of atomic energy. The signatories called for the creation of a UN special committee to consider all aspects of atomic energy and power, and especially urged that the US play a lead role in creating such a committee as ‘such leadership would dispel any suspicion that having the atomic bomb, the United States is no longer depending upon the United Nations as before’. An advance copy of the statement was sent to Truman, but although his secretary William Hassett replied that the AAUN’s continued interest in the matter was deeply appreciated, it was clear that Truman was not going to commit to anything at this stage.

This lack of commitment did not deter Eichelberger in his attempts to win over the President, or to develop a closer relationship with him. At the end of October, Eichelberger went as far as to invite Truman to speak at an AAUN dinner in New York to celebrate the first meeting of the UN General Assembly and to inaugurate ‘United Nations Assembly Week’. The promotion was to be along the lines of April’s Dumbarton Oaks Week, to focus public attention on the UN in a positive

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15 New York Times, 29 October 1945, p. 4; Eichelberger to Truman, 24 October 1945, of 692-a, folder: misc. a prl–o October ’45, Harry S. Truman Papers, hstl; Hasset to Eichelberger, 26 October 1945, of 692-a, folder: misc. a prl–o October ’45, Harry S. Truman Papers, hstl.
manner. Eichelberger argued that opinion polls showed a public more concerned with the issues raised by demobilisation than international issues, and with the negative publicity raised by the issue of atomic energy, it was crucial to reaffirm that ‘American foreign policy will be based on our United Nations obligations’.

Unfortunately, in a significant blow for Eichelberger and the AAUN, Truman politely refused the invitation to speak. If Eichelberger had hoped that an address from Truman would ‘hearten other members of the United Nations and revitalise American public opinion’, then Truman’s refusal must have planted doubts in Eichelberger’s head about Truman’s commitment to the United Nations cause, regardless of whether he simply could not add to his future commitments due to pressure of work.

However, Eichelberger’s disappointment was tempered in mid-November when Truman appeared to move towards an international energy policy, albeit with one very small step. At a press conference on 20 November, Truman announced that the UN General Assembly was to set up a commission to formulate safeguards against the use of atomic weapons. Although this was a very vague and tentative step into exploring international control, Eichelberger moved to show the breadth of support for the announcement through his network of private organisations and connections. A message of support was quickly despatched to Truman signed by forty-five prominent individuals and representatives of national organisations. As the establishment of a UN committee on atomic energy had been urged by Eichelberger and the CSOP the previous month, this was certainly a step in the right direction for US policy.

There was such satisfaction with the international progress of US atomic energy policy that by the beginning of December the focus had shifted to other matters. Human rights was also seen as a crucial issue, and the CSOP issued a call in November for the UN General Assembly to set up a human rights commission as soon as possible in January, to begin drafting a declaration on human rights. However, this would have to wait until the Assembly met in January, so there was little that could be done immediately short of reiterating the human rights provisions of the UN Charter.

The area of most urgent concern for Eichelberger was the question of US policy on UN trusteeships in the Pacific. Back in September, the CSOP had openly urged that any Japanese islands or strategic bases seized in the Pacific be placed under a UN trusteeship. Of particular concern were Okinawa and the former Japanese mandated islands. His move was necessary in order to comply with the Atlantic

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16 Eichelberger to Truman, 30 October 1945, OF 200, Folder: Invitations New York 1945, Harry S. Truman Papers, HSTL.
17 *ibid.*, Connelly to Eichelberger, 5 November 1945, OF 200, Folder: Invitations New York 1945, Harry S. Truman Papers, HSTL.
18 Eichelberger et al. to Truman, 29 November 1945, OF 85-a., Harry S. Truman Papers, HSTL.
Charter, which had promised to avoid US ‘aggrandisement’. The report argued that annexation would ‘subvert our moral influence in world affairs’, and that the US needed to display its full support for the UN trusteeship system. Anything less would smack of imperialism.20

However, with no movement on the issue from Washington, Eichelberger felt obliged to contact the White House. He argued that discussion of the atomic bomb had overshadowed the issue of trusteeship, an issue ‘almost as important to the success of the United Nations’. With the US occupying Pacific islands, the impression was left that the war had not ended colonial imperialism, and the US was then in no position to force other nations to withdraw from their imperial possessions. Eichelberger made a strong case for US leadership in this area, again demanding that the US place the Pacific islands under UN trusteeship, even while retaining strategic bases. The official response came from Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who took a very defensive stance in his reply. In addition to pointing out that the subject was under consideration in the State Department, Acheson highlighted the support of the US Government for both the trusteeship system and for independent self-governing nations.21

Eichelberger hoped to release his telegram to the public, but Acheson’s response was slow enough for an impatient Eichelberger to contact the State Department again after a week for an update. Again he argued that the Government must take a strong line on this issue to arrest ‘postwar imperialism’, and he hoped that the delay meant that a strong policy statement on the issue was being prepared. However, Acheson replied that he had nothing to add to his previous response.22

The issue of trusteeship was again raised at an all-day conference sponsored by the AA UN to highlight the imminent meeting of the UN General Assembly. The conference and subsequent dinner at the Hotel Astor in New York were attended by over one thousand people from over thirty private business, labour and other civic organisations. Although press attention focused on discussion of atomic energy, a significant portion of the final statement strongly emphasised trusteeship, in similar language to Eichelberger’s telegram to Truman. It was clear that Eichelberger was uncharacteristically losing patience with the Truman administration.23

His patience ran out before Christmas. For the first time since Pearl Harbor, Eichelberger openly spoke out against the Government. With no further word from Washington, Eichelberger sent a letter to all AA UN branches highlighting three policy areas for the US to address before the meeting of the General Assembly in

20 New York Times, 17 September 1945, p. 3.
21 Eichelberger to Truman, 2 December 1945, 890.0146/12-445, Decimal file, RG 59, NA CP; Acheson to Eichelberger, 7 December 1945, 890.0146/12-445, Decimal file, RG 59, NA CP.
22 Eichelberger to Acheson, 9 December 1945, 501.Be/12-945, Decimal file, RG 59, NA CP; Acheson to Eichelberger, 14 December 1945, 501.Be/12-945, Decimal file, RG 59.
January. On the first two – international control of atomic energy and economic cooperation with other members of the United Nations – Eichelberger praised the forward-looking policies of the Government. However, on the issue of trusteeship, he argued that the Government had been ‘strangely silent’. He argued that placing the Pacific bases under UN trusteeship would uphold an anti-colonial principle that the US had been particularly responsible for adding to the Charter. A strong statement on this issue would alleviate growing resentment in the Pacific towards western colonial powers.\(^\text{24}\)

The statement was similar in content to the telegram that Eichelberger had sent to Truman at the beginning of the month, but with the added criticism of the Government. The letter was reported in the *New York Times* under the bold headline ‘US is Criticized on Trusteeship’. To make the criticism even more obvious, and to direct it clearly at the Truman administration, Eichelberger recalled his conversation on trusteeship with Roosevelt, stating that ‘trusteeship was a favourite word of his’ and that he had supported the idea of trusteeships in the Pacific. To minimise any damage, but also to ensure the State Department got the message, Eichelberger sent a copy to Dean Acheson. He argued that the US was missing a great opportunity by not making its position clear. Acheson again responded that the US was doing all it could to strengthen that aspect of the UN.\(^\text{25}\)

Yet the fact that Eichelberger was willing to publicly speak out against the US Government was extremely significant. Throughout the war years, Eichelberger had kept his criticism of the Government to himself, due to his involvement in postwar planning, his support for the proposed UN, the constraints of wartime, and his relationship with Roosevelt. Yet now, with Roosevelt gone and the UN created, he saw a greater need than ever for international organisation; however, the US Government was reluctant to use it. In Eichelberger’s eyes, the Truman administration was moving away from the Roosevelt administration’s wartime vision of the United Nations. While he still hoped to influence the Truman Administration, Eichelberger was no longer prepared to keep quiet.

Moving into 1946, Eichelberger boldly outlined the importance of the next ninety days to the AAUN membership. With the first meetings of the General Assembly, the memberships of the Security and the Economic and Social Councils, and the Secretary General were to be chosen. Following these organisational steps, more practical discussions could immediately take place, on issues such as atomic energy, international trade and human rights.\(^\text{26}\)

Eichelberger used the opportunity to confront opposition within both the internationalist movement and the Government. Against the former, he argued

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\(^\text{25}\) Ibid., Eichelberger to Acheson, 27 December 1945, 890.0146/12-445, Decimal file, RG 59, NA CP; Acheson to Eichelberger, 10 January 1946, 890.0146/12-445, Decimal file, RG 59, NA CP.

\(^\text{26}\) *Changing World*, January 1946, p. 2.
that public opinion should be concentrated on the practical establishment of the General Assembly, rather than ‘nebulous theories’ of world government. The UN was the beginning of the new world system, and its Charter was flexible enough to be workable without immediate amendments. Against the Truman Administration, he reiterated yet again the need for a policy on trusteeship to check ‘postwar imperialism’. The threat from world government supporters and the resistance of the Truman administration to the UN proved to be the main challenges through 1946, as Eichelberger attempted to steer the UN between the two.27

The effort to provide strong support for the existing UN Charter began with a policy statement outlining nine key issues for promotion. These included the immediate physical construction of the UN, the establishment of international rule of law, establishing the supremacy of the General Assembly, creating an international air force (long a pet project for Eichelberger), the creation of an international Bill of Rights and an international trade organisation, development of a concept of world citizenship, expansion of the autonomous agencies of the UN, and full acceptance of the trusteeship system.28

The issue of trusteeship continued to be a point of contention for Eichelberger, and he refused to let it pass. Continued correspondence with acheson in the State Department achieved little, with Eichelberger reiterating his arguments and Acheson responding that the issue was still under consideration. To maximise the pressure on the administration, further statements in support of a strong trusteeship policy were sent to Truman, Secretary of State James Byrnes, US delegate to the UN Edward Stettinius, and US representative on the UN Trusteeship Committee John Foster Dulles. A statement from the Cso P in mid-February shifted the emphasis to the retention of strategic bases but still urged that this take place under a UN trusteeship. The shift achieved nothing, as US military and strategic interests dominated US policy, but the pressure from the AAUN continued.29

The issue of atomic energy also saw continued pressure on the Truman Administration from the AAUN, but again, little significant progress was made. Eichelberger began the year by arguing for a position against the stockpiling of nuclear weapons, stating that the US should use nuclear power for peaceful uses only. In March, he applauded Truman for postponing atomic energy experiments for six weeks, although he asked why they were not stopped altogether if nations were to eliminate their ‘weapons of mass destruction’. Acknowledging the rapidly deteriorating relations between the US and the USSR, he went on to enquire why all members of the atomic energy Commission could not be invited to witness

27 ibid.


29 New York Times, 2 January 1946, p. 20; acheson to eichelberger, 10 January 1946, Box 62, CEP; Eichelberger to Acheson, 22 January 1946, Box 62, CEP; New York Times, 21 January 1946, p. 3.
such experiments, in a display of openness that might change the worsening ‘international atmosphere’ within the Un.  

Eichelberger’s proposals were of course largely ignored, and it seemed that now, just nine months after the successful interaction at the San Francisco conference, it was almost impossible for Eichelberger to have any impact in Washington. Requests for appointments to see the President had been turned down in October and again in January, due to the pressure of official duties. It was little consolation when Eichelberger was asked by Truman to serve as a member of the national famine emergency Council, whose aim was to promote understanding of starvation in war zones overseas and conservation of food at home.  

It was equally difficult making significant contact with the State Department. Although the AAUN was still in regular contact with the Division of Public Liaison in the Office of Public Affairs, there was little in the way of dialogue between the two. The AAUN sent statements and reports to the Division, but they were used by the State Department primarily to keep an eye on public opinion. For its part, the Division sent background material on key foreign policy matters to the AAUN and, on rare occasions, sent State Department speakers to the AAUN’s new offices in New York at 45 East 65th street for discussions. However, there was no influence at the policy-making level, and no promotional involvement like that over Dumbarton Oaks or San Francisco. The promise of a two-way relationship failed to materialise.  

Despite the increasingly unilateral outlook emanating from Washington, Eichelberger was still concerned with the issue of world government. By the beginning of 1946, supporters of world government were beginning to organise in earnest. In February, the remaining elements of a mericans United for world organisation renamed themselves a mericans United for world Government. In terms of policy, they promoted major Charter revision and the abolition of the security Council veto. In response, the AAUN went as far as commissioning a study of world government: what it implied, and the difficulties it would face. In the end, the report expressed sympathy with the world government supporters, but dismissed the concept as unrealistic. The US and USSR, for example, were unlikely to relinquish any further sovereignty in the current political climate.

30 Eichelberger to AAUN Executive Committee, 12 January 1946, 63166, CEA; Eichelberger to Truman, 23 March 1946, of 692-a, folder misc. January–April 46, Harry S. Truman Papers, HSTL.  
31 Connelly to Eichelberger, 17 October 1945, of 421, Harry S. Truman Papers, HSTL; Connelly to Eichelberger, 23 January 1946, of 421, Harry S. Truman Papers, HSTL; Truman to Eichelberger, 12 March 1946, Box 62, CEP.  
32 See reports on opinion and activities of American Private organisations and Groups, Office of Public Opinion Studies, 1943–1965, RG 59, NACP; Russell to Eichelberger, 19 October 1945, Box 60, CEP; Eichelberger to Benton, 15 February 1946, 111.12 Benton, William/2-1546, Decimal file, RG 59, NA CP.
instead, immediate action on numerous issues was necessary, for which the Un was still the best and most effective option.³³

Broad support for the Un as the basis for Us foreign policy was reiterated in a march statement that offered a three-point programme. Firstly, all efforts for the achievement of international security, such as in Iran, were to be undertaken by the UN Security Council, as the way to make the UN stronger was ‘to use it for all political problems’. Secondly, and more significantly, it was urged that every effort be made to reach an understanding with the Ussr in an attempt to reduce international tension. This was the most open acknowledgement yet by the AAUN of the growing international antagonism between the two superpowers, and the Us was urged to examine its own behaviour to find what had led to Soviet suspicion. It was suggested that secretive American atomic diplomacy was the main cause of distrust between the two, and that the new Un atomic energy Commission should be allowed greater access to US atomic tests and experiments (a suggestion Eichelberger had made personally to Truman). More broadly, it was noted that ‘there is a line where plain speaking ends and red baiting begins. We are in danger of crossing that line’.³⁴

As international tensions rose, it seemed that the aa Un still believed that relations between the Us and Ussr could be resolved peacefully, and that a greater understanding between the two could develop. Yet the third point in the AAUN statement suggested a recognition that the Un might not be able to save itself from great power conflict, and that support for the Charter might have to come from the Us. It argued that the Us should support the Un Charter against aggression. If all other efforts fail, the Us must be willing to use the ‘full force of its economic and military power’ against the aggressor to defend peace and the Un Charter. This would, in effect, be unilateral action to defend a multilateral institution. In a line clearly referring to the Ussr, it was argued that the Us should declare the ‘obligations of the Charter’ as being ‘above any right of technical veto’.³⁵

By the spring of 1946, with the Cold war setting in, it became increasingly apparent that the growing hostility between the two superpowers was not only affecting the operation of the new Un, but it had the potential to render the organisation worthless. As a result, the AAUN had to walk a fine line. It continued to promote better relations between the Us and the Ussr and the principles of the Charter, even if the two were not always compatible. For example, over the question of removal of Soviet troops from Iran in early 1946, the AAUN supported the US approach of raising the issue in the Security Council and keeping the matter on the agenda until the troops were withdrawn. Unfortunately, the broader effect

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³⁴ New York Times, 17 March 1946, p. 7; Eichelberger to Welles, 15 March 1946, Box 117, Sumner Welles Papers, f Drl.

³⁵ ibid.
of this was to fill the first meetings of the Security Council with bitter exchanges between its most powerful members, souring relations further and leading to heated debates over security Council procedures.  

Eichelberger increasingly realised that the UN needed to be developed and utilised not simply for its own sake, but to heal the growing divisions between the superpowers. In May, he outlined a nine point plan to ‘bridge the chasm’. His included the immediate establishment of international controls over atomic energy, full use of both the economic and social Council and the trusteeship system, and the creation of both an international police force and an international bill of rights. However, his continued calls for acquired Pacific bases to be placed under UN trusteeship fell on deaf ears.

The issue of atomic energy was an equally disappointing area for the AAUN and CSOP, who had been putting forward detailed proposals to the State Department regarding international controls. In June, Bernard Baruch announced the US plan for atomic energy to the UN atomic energy Commission. He proposed that an international atomic Development authority be entrusted with all development and use of atomic energy. Unfortunately, he also strongly emphasised the need for sanctions and punishment relating to any national interference with the new authority. He also called for the removal of the security Council veto on issues of atomic energy. Under the plan, the US was to remain the only nation in possession of atomic weapons, and there was no timetable for their destruction, which would only follow the establishment of the Authority. The plan did little to impress the USSR or make it feel any more secure. The Soviets responded with broad criticism of the Baruch Plan, especially its suggested elimination of the Soviet veto over inspections.

While the AAUN publicly supported the Baruch plan, Eichelberger warned against the US developing a ‘fixation on the veto’. Privately, however, there was considerable frustration with Baruch’s inflexibility and a belief that he had gone too far in trying to secure US interests. The result was a proposal that the Soviets were highly unlikely to accept. James Shotwell thought raising the veto issue was ‘a major diplomatic blunder’. Although he agreed with much of Baruch’s plan, Eichelberger later conceded that the Soviets could not accept a US monopoly on atomic weapons. ‘Russia’s growing pride demanded that she, too, must make bombs before agreeing to their renunciation’. He also conceded the legitimacy of Soviet fears that the new authority would be ‘dominated by western nations’.

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36 State Department opinion survey #32, 26 April 1946, opinion and activities of American Private Organisations and Groups, Office of Public Opinion Studies, 1943–1965, RG 59, NA CP.


and that the plan should have been modified ‘to suit the susceptibilities of other nations’.  

It has been suggested that the differences between the AAUN’s public and private responses over the Baruch plan reflected the dilemma facing internationalists like Eichelberger and Shotwell. While they strongly desired the creation of an international atomic Development authority, they believed that Baruch had gone too far. Yet having spent most of the previous year calling for such an International Authority, they still believed that it could work, and to criticise the Baruch proposals would undermine the broad current of public opinion backing them. There was still faith that it was not too late to overcome difficulties with the Soviets, but that faith slowly eroded as the year progressed.

In addition to deteriorating international relations, the lack of UN support from Washington was dampening internationalist spirits. In fact, the only positive response to the AAUN from the White House in mid-1946 was a telegram from Truman in support of UN Week. The AAUN, in cooperation with the National Broadcasting Company and the National Educational Association, organised the celebration of UN Week to coincide with the first meeting of the General Assembly in New York. In his telegram, Truman claimed that ‘only through an increased understanding of the United Nations and a resulting support of its purposes and principles can we establish the solid foundations of peace upon which we must all place our hope for the preservation of our civilisation’. While Eichelberger was clearly happy to see the words on paper, he clearly wanted the ideas to be put more effectively into practice.

This became clear as the AAUN reassessed its aims and objectives going into the summer of 1946. Eichelberger took the opportunity to look back over the first six months of the year and assess the progression of the AAUN’s programme. In the first area – that of educating the public about the UN – it was deemed that the distribution of one and a half million pieces of literature and extensive plans for UN Week were just the main elements of a successful programme to reach the widest possible audience. In the area of studying how the UN should be strengthened, Eichelberger referred to the nine-point plan issued in May as a means to improve the Charter without revision. With regard to the assistance of UN staff, Eichelberger referred to the daily contact between the AAUN and UN officials.


Yet the most space was taken up by the issue of urging the US Government to make its membership of the UN as effective as possible.\footnote{Eichelberger to member of Executive Committee, 10 July 1946, Folder 13, Box 25, hmfc C.}

Eichelberger argued that the AAUN had a consistent influence on Government policy, ‘because of the excellence of its policy suggestions and because of the public opinion brought to bear on these issues’, yet the two examples he gave were atomic energy and trusteeship. The former could only be classed a success if the Baruch plan offered a workable blueprint for an International Atomic Development Authority, and the latter had been a continued source of frustration and disappointment. Nevertheless, to his members, Eichelberger appeared more concerned with getting more office space and support staff than with making a bigger impact in Washington.\footnote{ibid.}

An assessment of the workings of the AAUN revealed that while the world had changed, very little had altered at the Association: Clark Eichelberger was still very much in charge. Suggestions that Eichelberger give up control of staff matters to focus entirely on policy were dismissed out of hand, despite concerns from other members of the executive committee. Long-time associate Hugh Moore was led to comment that Eichelberger needed a General manager to get through the daily workload, but that he would have a problem delegating authority: ‘He has run a one ring show so long that he will find it hard to take command of the Greatest show on earth’. Moore also admitted that Eichelberger was very touchy on the subject, and was apt to feel that ‘one is trying to build around him, whereas, of course, the purpose is merely to support him’.\footnote{Eichelberger to La Roche, 12 May 1946 Folder 13, Box 25, HMFC; Moore to La Roche, 13 May 1946, Folder 13, Box 25, HMFC.}

With Eichelberger still very much in charge of the AAUN, those who were disaffected with his leadership style had no real alternative, and his personal style led to at least one resignation. Ralph Carson resigned as an AAUN director in April due to disillusionment with the ‘rather emotional and evangelistic leadership which is provided by Clark’. As Carson saw it, the AAUN had entered a new phase where it could no longer simply promote the UN. Rather, the duty of the AAUN was now ‘in the field of applied foreign policy’. The work of the CSOP and the limited success of the AAUN to influence policy in Washington were no longer good enough for Carson. Eichelberger countered that the AAUN was in the service of selling ideas and of making a success of the UN.\footnote{Carson to AAUN, 3 April 1946, Box 58, CEP; Eichelberger to Cullman, 19 June 1946, Folder 13, Box 25, HMFC.}

With respect to selling ideas, the AAUN continued to press the trusteeship issue over the summer. A letter to Secretary of State Byrnes expressed the CSOP’s disappointment with US policy over Pacific bases, but also over the general trusteeship agreements being negotiated, which were seen as little better than the...
League of Nations mandate system. However, it was argued yet again that the US had no claim to the moral high ground as long as there was ‘one rule for our allies and another for ourselves’.  

However, despite Eichelberger’s continued frustration on this issue, he asked the State Department if it had any objections to the letter being made public. He knew there was no reason other than to show the Department the courtesy of asking first, but he chose to do so anyway. This request to clear a CSOP letter harked back to the more deferential days before the end of the war, and suggested that Eichelberger was looking to gain greater influence with the State Department. Yet the fact he was potentially willing to let the State Department censor the letter was a bizarre move after eight months of limited relations and even open criticism. In the end, the State Department line was that no interjection should be made, and the letter was reported in the press. The response from Byrnes was more encouraging, as he stood by Truman’s January statement that the former Japanese mandates were indeed to be placed under UN trusteeship. This response, however, was kept private.

The only other encouraging aspect of the summer for the AAUN was the setting up of the World Federation of United Nations Associations and the press coverage that came with it. Eichelberger’s two week August trip to Luxembourg was widely reported and his leading role was celebrated in editorials in both the New York Times and Washington Post. The Post noted that US support for the UN was partly a result of organisations such as the AAUN who deserved ‘a large share of the credit for swinging this country away from its outmoded isolationism’. It was only right therefore that Eichelberger, ‘long a prominent figure in the movement in this country for world peace’, should be responsible for developing similar views throughout the world. The Times praised Eichelberger’s efforts at nurturing ‘mass grass roots support’ for the UN in the hope that it would lead to a grass roots demand for ‘conciliation and understanding, for patience and – above all – common sense’.

The reassessments of the summer culminated in a new AAUN policy statement in September. It noted the heightened tension between the US and the USSR, and that some predicted a tragic conflict between the two lay ahead. It was ‘the highest duty of statesmen in all countries to change this state of opinion’. The preamble also noted that one of the greatest dangers facing the world was that acts of the two great powers were misunderstood by the other, and that both sides were at fault in this respect. In order to halt the growing rivalries, the AAUN recommended seven policies for the US to adopt in an effort to ease tensions.

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46 Holcombe to Byrnes, 17 July 1946, 501.Be/7-1746, Decimal file, RG 59, NACP.
48 Editorials reprinted in Changing World, October 1946, p. 3.
49 Changing World, October 1946, pp. 4, 11; New York Times, 30 September 1946, p. 3; AAUN draft policy statement, 14 September 1946, 63327, CEA.
Firstly, the US Government needed to make it clear that its foreign policy was based on the obligations of the UN Charter. It also needed to remain strong in order to support the principles of the UN, rather than acting in a unilateral manner. Thirdly, the US must remain at the service of the Security Council in securing peace; at the same time preventing regional arrangements from hindering the UN. The US was to avoid using Germany as a pawn in its rivalry with the USSR; and to contribute to the strengthening of the global economy. Finally, US foreign policy needed to display a bipartisan front.50

For the press, the most significant point was in the finer details of point three, in which it was suggested that the US disregard a Security Council veto if a majority of the Security Council vote in favour of armed action in self-defence of a UN member nation. This was covered by Article 51 of the UN Charter, which empowered nations to act in self-defence until the Security Council could act. This interpretation saw the veto as a delay in action, rather than a final decision against it. This was certainly a concession to increasingly hardline attitudes in the US, but it was ingenious to work within the boundaries, if not necessarily the spirit, of the Charter.51

There were however criticisms of US policy within the statement. The detail of point one urged the US to support the ‘freest and most open discussion’ in the Security Council, suggesting it should ‘lean over backwards to agree to commission of investigation even when the necessity is not obvious’. This remark was aimed at a recent US decision in the Security Council to vote against a Soviet resolution to discuss British and American troop placements in non-enemy countries. There was also clear criticism in the detail of point two of US policy on atomic energy, on the continuing problem of trusteeship policy, on the need for a reduction in armaments, and on the need for UN military contingents.52

The policy statement revealed the difficult situation Eichelberger and the AAUN found themselves in. At the same time as doing everything possible to promote the ideals of international organisation and the practical uses of the UN, they increasingly found themselves facing a polarised world. The hazy interpretation of the veto in the statement would have been unthinkable just months before, but it reflected the changing international situation. Yet they still held out hope for a peaceful future, one with great power cooperation and understanding rather than mistrust and suspicion.

Unfortunately, the AAUN’s voice in Washington had all but disappeared by this point. Eichelberger attempted to meet with President Truman again in September, and yet again his request was refused. He was particularly concerned at the repeated postponement of the first meeting of the General Assembly in New York. Eichelberger feared that important issues involving reconstruction and refugees were being unnecessarily delayed. In addition, the AAUN had already postponed its planned UN Week twice. However, although his telegrams

50 Changing World, October 1946, pp. 4, 11.
51 New York Times, 30 September 1946, p. 3.
were politely received, his requests for a meeting came to nothing. In the end, UN Week was rescheduled for 20–26 October, climaxing with a dinner at the Waldorf-Astoria hotel, featuring chairman of the US delegation to the General Assembly Warren Austin, President of the General Assembly Paul-Henri Spaak, and Secretary-General Trygve Lie.53

The UN Week celebrations could not mask continued concerns over the future of the UN, but they did highlight the potential usefulness of the UN General Assembly. In October, the UN supported the Soviet proposal in the General Assembly for information on foreign troops in non-enemy nations. The proposal had originally been voted down by Western powers in the Security Council, but the UN supported its discussion at the General Assembly, as part of its support for the ‘freest and most open discussion’ of international issues.54

However, the trusteeship issue refused to go away. A firm US policy had yet to be announced, but the UN was increasingly concerned about the attitudes of other nations to trusteeship. In response to draft trusteeship agreements from the UK, Belgium, and Australia, a CSOP report expressed concern that none of the agreements provided adequate protection for native inhabitants against exploitation, and nor did they explicitly address the supervising role of the UN Trusteeship Council. It was hoped that strong US leadership on the issue could make the system effective. Yet the report also noted that the CSOP had requested confirmation from the State Department in July as to its policy on the Japanese mandates. ‘No reply’, the report states, ‘by the Department of State to this inquiry has ever been published.’55

Of course, a reply from James Byrnes did exist; it had simply never been made public. Given that Byrnes had claimed the former Japanese mandates were to be placed under UN trusteeship, publication of the letter would have been extremely controversial, as at this point the official US position was still uncertain. Searching for confirmation of the original position, Eichelberger contacted the State Department asking if he could go public with the Byrnes letter. After a conversation with State Department officials, Eichelberger was convinced not to go public with the letter at the time, given the ongoing nature of discussions in Washington. Not wanting to alienate the State Department, Eichelberger held on to letter, despite the pressure that publication could place on the administration. Yet he remained hopeful of a positive outcome.56

Although Eichelberger and the UN grudgingly accepted the Truman administration’s reluctance to fully utilise the UN, both the world body and

54 *New York Times*, 14 October 1946, p. 3.
56 Eichelberger to Byrnes, 27 October 1946, 501.Be/10-2746; Decimal file, RG 59, na CP; State Dept memo, 5 November 1946; 501.Be/10-2746; Decimal file, RG 59, na CP.
the US Government continued to come under attack from supporters of a world government, including organisations such as Americans United for World Government and World Federalists. From the end of September, World Federalists undertook an advertising campaign to support their cause, undermining the UN in the process. Eichelberger reacted with a furious editorial highlighting numerous flaws in the plans for world government.57

He argued that the international situation required far more than a constitutional solution. Understanding between the USSR and the west was no more likely with world government than it was at present. Indeed, it was far less likely, as there was no chance of constitutional revision in the ever-deteriorating climate. Any Charter revision would almost certainly lead to a weaker organisation, not a stronger one. Finally, supporters of world government argued that it could function without the USSR, a suggestion that Eichelberger argued would split the world into two distinct and opposing sides.58

Eichelberger never really believed that world government had a chance, but he was genuinely concerned about the impact of statements such as ‘the United Nations is dying’ on public opinion. If public opinion turned against the UN then the Truman administration would do the same. Over the following months, Eichelberger and the AAUN went on a public relations offensive to show the depth of national support for the UN. In December, he presented UN Secretary General Trygve Lie with one hundred thousand messages of goodwill and support from the American people. In early 1947, he began a monthly poll on current issues in order ‘to make the voice of the people count in solving United Nations problems’.59

However, the continued dissatisfaction from the far end of the internationalist spectrum culminated in the creation of United World Federalists in February 1947. The new organisation, which merged Americans United for World Government, World Federalists, and four other smaller groups, promoted a federal world government (even though the six merging organisations could not yet agree how this was to be achieved). United World Federalists included individuals who had worked with Eichelberger and his organisations during the war, such as Raymond Gram Swing, Norman Cousins, Thomas Finletter, and Edgar Ansel Mowrer, and early polls suggested that a small but growing minority of the population supported their ideas.60

Again, Eichelberger felt compelled to respond. He argued that the UN had far more pressing issues to deal with than Charter amendments. He also claimed that any revisions were almost certain to disadvantage the USSR, which would only serve to ‘widen the breach between certain members of the United Nations which

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58 Ibid.
happily has been lessening’. it was notable that eichelberger still believed in the possibility of great power cooperation and the ability of Un to bring the powers together. Yet despite his calls for understanding, the two nations were drifting further and further apart.61

Eichelberger continued to highlight the positive aspects of the UN in the first weeks of 1947. In a New Year’s message, he optimistically suggested comparing the condition of the world at the first day of 1946 and the first day of 1947 ‘to see how much progress has been made toward the establishment of permanent peace’, largely thanks to the UN. The only obstacles in the way of greater success in 1947 were ‘cynicism and reaction, inertia, false economy and escapist-perfectionism’. He could not have foreseen the events that would make great power cooperation more difficult than ever.62

in the eighteen months following the creation of the Un, the pattern of Us internationalism had not gone according to eichelberger’s and the aa Un’s plan. The reality of great power tension failed to match 1945’s triumphant expectation of a peaceful multilateral world, led by an internationally minded Us. t he aa Un’s definition of internationalism was coming under attack from both sides. Even though a majority of public opinion still supported the Un against the alternatives of unilateralism and world government, the volume of criticism had clearly increased.

against the challenge of world government supporters, the aa Un continued to promote the existing UN as the best and only option for world peace and international cooperation. while support for some form of world government increased slightly through 1946, it was not yet a viable alternative to the UN. Yet the biggest threat world government offered was the damage it could do to the existing UN in the eyes of US opinion. Eichelberger kept defending the UN against attacks from world government supporters, but he was also defending it from the minority of the public that supported a more unilateral policy. This other extreme, who were still referred to as isolationists, were a small but significant minority who would happily have had the Us withdraw from a world organisation altogether.

Between these two extremes of old fashioned isolationism and world government lay both the aa Un and the t ruman a dministration. Both clearly supported the Un, but where the aa Un wanted the Un to be the main tool of Us diplomacy, the t ruman a dministration increasingly saw it as just one method of diplomacy. a gain, since the triumphant creation of the Un, relations between the AAUN and the Government had cooled. Eichelberger had failed to strike up a personal relationship with t ruman, and connections to the s tate Department were primarily in the realm of information exchange, rather than policy dialogue. With the Un up and running, it appeared that the t ruman a dministration had far less

use for the eichelberger and the aa Un than before, and there was little that the internationalists could do to get their influence back.

Yet despite open criticisms of the Truman Administration in the early postwar years, the aa Un, and eichelberger in particular, had not yet given up hope. He still supported the Government on most key issues, and he still believed that great power cooperation was possible. In early 1947, the issue of Un trusteeships was finally settled, with the US finally agreeing to place the former Japanese mandated islands under Un supervision, although the Us would be the administering authority. Eichelberger still felt that the proposed agreement left a great deal to be desired in terms of detail, but it was certainly a step forward. Eichelberger's criticism was constructive, as he recognised that Us support for the Un was essential to its success.63

By the spring of 1947, broad aa Un policy was to provide full support to the Un, and to encourage the Us to utilise the Un as its main tool of international diplomacy. Within that broad strategy, they continued to push the Us Government on smaller issues to further strengthen the Un. Unfortunately for the internationalists, 1947 saw much larger international issues threaten the viability and future of the UN. These issues led to difficult decisions, ones that would seriously affect the definition of Eichelberger’s internationalist worldview.

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In early 1947, Clark Eichelberger still believed that the UN could live up to his wartime expectations. Despite the events of the past eighteen months, he still felt that the international organisation was the best hope for securing international cooperation and understanding. Despite hesitancy and scepticism from Washington, he still believed that the Truman administration would use the UN as its primary tool of diplomacy.

Over the following year, his optimism faded. As Cold War tensions heated up, and the Truman administration utilised the UN occasionally, rather than consistently, Eichelberger and the AA UN were faced with a dilemma. They could have criticised Truman, or even supported the case for world government, but they chose not to. Instead, they chose to support the administration, with occasional but generally constructive criticism. They reluctantly recognised that the UN was merely one tool of US diplomacy, rather than the primary one, but Cold War issues meant that there was no real alternative.

Eichelberger found it difficult to maintain a consistent line of argument during 1947. He truly wanted the aid package to Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan to have been executed under UN auspices. Yet he nevertheless believed that they were the right policies to support in order to check the advance of communism and help restore Europe’s economic powers. He justified supporting aid to Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan on the grounds that they were not actions aimed specifically at the Soviet Union, and he insisted on downplaying anti-communist rhetoric at all times. However, both were policy measures bound to cause great power suspicion and distrust, something he had strongly argued against in the past. His most contradictory position was on the Marshall Plan. As the head of the AAUN, he was initially critical of its by-passing of the UN. Yet at the same time, he gave the Plan his full support as the instigator of the Committee for the Marshall Plan.

By early 1948, a pattern was in place that would remain for years to come. As the international climate worsened still, with the fall of Czechoslovakia in February and the passing of the Marshall Plan, Eichelberger increasingly fell behind the official Government line. In addition, the anti-communist sentiment increasingly pervading domestic politics made it difficult for anyone to promote a policy of accommodation with the USSR. In the final analysis, Eichelberger believed that
the Us stood for the values of the Un far more closely than the Ussr did. Freedom and democracy, international free trade and open systems: these were the ideals to be supported and promoted, if not by the Un then by the Us.

This is not to say that Eichelberger supported the Truman administration to the extent he had supported Roosevelt. His continued efforts to create a personal connection between the two were rebuffed, and his influence in the State Department was extremely limited, with the exception of the Committee for the Marshall Plan. Also, there were issues on which Eichelberger and the aa Un continued to constructively criticise Truman, such as Palestine. He continued to argue for all measures short of appeasement to end hostilities with the soviet Union, and he fought against excessive anti-communism. Finally, Eichelberger never gave up promoting the Un as a tool of Us diplomacy and the belief that it offered the best mechanism for a just and peaceful world.

Yet on the big issue of conflict between the great powers, Eichelberger, like many Americans, was convinced by 1948 that the US was standing for international, if not universal values. While he continued to support his multilateral internationalist vision, he pragmatically recognised its limits. If the Us could not utilise the multilateral mechanisms of the Un in the face of soviet obstructionism and intransigence, it was still better that the Us was active in international affairs unilaterally than not involved at all.

At the end of February 1947, British officials informed the State Department that they could no longer afford to provide military and economic support to Greece and Turkey. The Truman Administration seized the opportunity to move against the soviet Union by not only moving to provide that support, but by justifying it in forceful political and ideological terms. In the 12 March speech that outlined the Truman Doctrine, the President stated the world must ‘choose between alternative ways of life’, and that the Us must support ‘free peoples’ against ‘totalitarian regimes’. There was no third way. In an open-ended commitment, the Us vowed to halt the march of communism across the globe.1

The Truman Doctrine offered little hope of compromise and cooperation with the soviet bloc even though there was no evidence that they had any role in the ongoing Greek civil war. Indeed, it seemed like one of the many foreign policy initiatives criticised by the aa Un for raising suspicion and distrust. Bearing this in mind, it might have been expected that the AAUN response to the Truman Doctrine was negative. Instead, in public at least, it was extremely supportive. Eichelberger drafted a statement that supported ‘full participation wherever American influence may be effective’, because if ‘British withdrawal from Greece means the creation of a power vacuum, the United states must in some way or other take the responsibility for filling it’. However, he added that bold US leadership in this area ‘should be exercised to whatever possible extent through the United

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Nations’. Eichelberger reiterated this strong supportive line when speaking in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27 March.\(^2\)

Eichelberger did, however, have real reservations about the support for Greece and Turkey, especially the way that the plan circumvented the UN, but he passed them on to the State Department in private. As with his response to the Baruch plan, the official AAUN stance was supportive, and constructive criticisms were passed on behind closed doors. In a lengthy letter to Dean Acheson, Eichelberger suggested three ways in which the Government could convince public opinion that the UN was not being ignored. In addition to arguing for a UN mission on the Greek border to ensure it was not violated, and for UN Military Staff Committee contingents to police the area, Eichelberger urged at least some of the loan money for Greece and Turkey to be spent through the UN and its specialised agencies. Acheson’s response was noncommittal, but he assured Eichelberger that the UN was a significant part of US planning at this time.\(^3\)

In the end, an amendment from Senator Arthur Vandenberg that made ‘a symbolic nod’ to the United Nations helped to placate Eichelberger and AAUN supporters who feared that the US was completely bypassing the UN. A pro-UN address from Warren Austin, head of the US mission at the UN, also helped to alleviate internationalist fears. The UN went on to issue a statement in support of US policy in Greece and Turkey. As so much had been done to criticise US policy, Eichelberger felt it was now necessary to highlight the attitudes of UN supporters who saw that ‘American policy, if properly coordinated with the United Nations, supports and strengthens the United Nations in the fulfilment of its mission’.\(^4\)

The AAUN’s support for the Truman Doctrine reminded the State Department how useful the association was in mobilising public opinion, so the Department had no hesitation in supporting the AAUN’s new ‘People’s section’. The new People’s section aimed to promote discussion of the UN and foreign policy issues among the general public across the nation. The new section was bound to strengthen the UN because, as Secretary of State George Marshall argued, ‘the basic aims of the American people are essentially those of the United Nations Charter’. However, the AAUN was now just one of the many national organisations being courted by the Department of State’s Division of Public Liaison. In early June, Eichelberger

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\(^3\) Eichelberger to Acheson, 15 March 1947, 868.00/3-1547, internal affairs of Greece, 1945–49, (National Archives Microfilm Publication LM98, Reel 8), RG 59, NACP.

was one of two hundred and forty representatives of national organisations to attend a three-day conference on US foreign policy in Washington.\(^5\)

Nevertheless, Eichelberger kept up his personal attempts to gain closer access to the Truman administration. A visit to the State Department in June led to a meeting with Dean Rusk of the Office of Special Political Affairs; subsequently, Eichelberger kept Rusk informed of AAUN activities for the remainder of the summer. A telephone call to a assistant secretary of state Armour attempted to establish further contact with the state Department and assure the Government of ‘the full cooperation of his organisation’. However, eichelberger’s attempts to see the President were again unsuccessful. Despite letters in May and July of 1947, Truman was again too busy to see eichelberger, even though he highlighted the fact that he saw the President twice after the conclusion of the san francisco conference but had not seen him since.\(^6\)

While eichelberger may have offered the aa Un’s full cooperation to the Government, the Association’s response to the Truman Administration’s next major policy announcement suggested otherwise. The European Recovery Programme, or marshall Plan, announced by the secretary of state at the beginning of June, promised to provide economic support to assist European reconstruction. It was seen by many as the economic counterpart to the Truman Doctrine. It was equally likely to cause great power conflict, as the USSR would never allow the opening of Eastern Europe to US economic influence.\(^7\)

The aa Un’s initial public response to the marshall Plan was one of clear disappointment and frustration, and it made no effort to hide it. Eichelberger argued that the money must go through the United Nations rather than by-passing it ‘through unilateral action’. If the Us contributed the money alone, a ‘danger of resentment’ could arise, so it was far better to work with other nations, even if the Us was the ‘very biggest partner’ involved. A further statement argued that there was no risk going through the UN, as there was no possibility of a veto on economic matters. If all European nations, including the USSR, could assist in the programme there would ‘be less likelihood of a European misunderstanding of our Government’s sincere efforts for economic reconstruction widening the tragic

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\(^5\) marshall to eichelberger, 4 June 1947, 501/5-2647, Decimal file, RG 59, na CPP; Department of State press release, 30 April 1947, Folder: PA: Francis Russell, Box 3 Office symbol files, records of the assistant secretary of state for Public Affairs, 1945–50, RG 59, na CP.

\(^6\) eichelberger to armour, 18 June 1947, 501/6-1847, Decimal file, RG 59, na CP; Armour memo, 9 July 1947, 501/6-1847, Decimal file, RG 59, na CP; Eichelberger to Connelly, 14 May 1947, of 421, Harry S. Truman Papers, hstl; Connelly to eichelberger, 3 June 1947, of 421, harry s. t ruman Papers, hstl; Connelly to eichelberger, 15 July 1947, of 421, harry s. t ruman Papers, hstl. For eichelberger–Rusk, correspondence, see 9 and 24 July 1947, Box 64, CEP.

breach between East and West’. It was hoped that for the sake of both the UN and efficiency that the UN Economic Commission for Europe would serve as the machinery for the proposed marshall Plan aid.\(^8\)

Over the following month it became clear that the USSR would not participate in the marshall Plan, partly because it was set up to undermine their economic system. For Eichelberger this had potentially ‘tragic consequences’, as it widened the breach that he hoped the UN machinery would narrow. In increasingly dramatic rhetoric, he warned that ‘there is still time to retrieve the situation through the United Nations if the statesmen will use it’. Of course, the American statesmen had no desire to use it, as they had no desire to include the USSR in the marshall Plan. This was partly because of the heightened anti-communist feeling since the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, and partly because of the prohibitive effect it would have had on the cost of the plan. Either way, it was increasingly clear that the marshall Plan would by-pass the UN. As H.W. Brands has noted, ‘the hardening of positions on either side of the Cold War increasingly indicated a marginal future for the United Nations and the internationalist spirit it represented’.\(^9\)

This only made Eichelberger even more frustrated. An AA UN press release at the end of July argued somewhat tenuously that Truman and successive secretaries of state have stated time and again that the UN is ‘the very foundation’ of US foreign policy. It claimed that the UN kept being by-passed as it was not yet strong enough, yet how could the organisation grow if it was continually ignored? A further editorial in AA UN magazine Changing World reiterated Eichelberger’s frustration yet again that the marshall Plan was being pursued outside of the UN.\(^10\)

This reaction made it all the more extraordinary that at the same time as he disagreed with US policy through the AA UN, Eichelberger was creating another private organisation to mobilise public support behind the marshall Plan. Responding to comments in Congress suggesting that Europe was ‘finished’, Eichelberger urged the need for US popular opinion behind ‘the assistance the United States must give to implement the marshall proposals for European reconstruction’. He specifically suggested the creation of a new representative committee to ‘stimulate a solid body of support’. Eichelberger’s enthusiasm for the idea was reinforced by comments from Arthur Vandenberg. Writing to Eichelberger in June, Vandenberg argued that US public opinion would not be ready for the ‘burdens’ of such a plan until it was demonstrated to the American people that it was ‘within the latitudes

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of their own available resources’ and ‘serves their own intelligent self-interest’. The need for a new committee appeared obvious. The AAUN Board discussed the idea at their next meeting, but with Eichelberger away in Europe for much of August, the idea was not raised again until the beginning of September.\(^\text{11}\)

From 14–20 September, the AAUN celebrated UN week, where Eichelberger again urged that the US use the UN as the foundation of its foreign policy, supported by speakers including Secretary of State Marshall. Yet at the same time, Eichelberger was arranging an ad hoc committee to promote Marshall’s plan for European reconstruction that bypassed the UN. Given Eichelberger’s dominant position in the AAUN, there was no possibility that he had simply been outvoted on this issue by his fellow AAUN directors and committee members. He had spoken out on the issue of working through the UN too many times in a personal capacity. It appeared, and indeed was, highly contradictory.\(^\text{12}\)

So why was Eichelberger prepared to organise support for a policy that circumvented the UN? Firstly, there was the issue of relations with the Government. Even if it contradicted AAUN policy, the proposed Committee for Marshall Plan certainly created closer links with the Truman Administration. For the first time since the war, Eichelberger was working closely with the Government again, and he knew that the proposed Committee had Government approval. In fact, the State Department had been considering the need to develop public opinion since August, not long after Eichelberger had raised the issue with his colleagues at the AAUN. It had even considered developing a citizens committee of its own, although, understandably, the idea was dismissed due to ‘internal uncertainties, legal barriers, and accusations of using propaganda’. It was essential that any such organisation was not a front, nor that it could be perceived to be one. Yet when the idea came to them from outside, from Eichelberger, they were all too keen to encourage such a committee. Once again the lines between state and private blurred.\(^\text{13}\)

Eichelberger discussed the idea further with Carnegie Endowment President Alger Hiss, who had received positive feedback on the idea from State Department officials, and the two men then approached former Secretary of War Robert Patterson about chairing the Executive Committee. Patterson also conferred with the State Department’s Robert Lovett and Secretary of Commerce Averell Harriman before agreeing, but the feedback was again positive – the Truman Administration clearly supported the creation of a Committee for the Marshall Plan.\(^\text{14}\)

In addition to the direct connections to the Government, Eichelberger was encouraged by the words of another former Secretary of War, Henry Stimson. In a


\(^{14}\) Ibid.
The AAUN and the Committee for the Marshall Plan

The recent *Foreign Affairs* article, ‘the Challenge to Americans’, Stimson had argued that excessive anti-communist rhetoric only heightened international tensions; such inflammatory language only served to drive the Soviets further away, encouraging suspicion and distrust. These were exactly the kind of arguments that Eichelberger had been making for months. Having read the article, Eichelberger decided that the Committee for the Marshall Plan must focus on the economic and humanitarian advantages of the Marshall Plan. The affinity Eichelberger felt with Stimson’s words led to him and Hiss asking Patterson to secure Stimson as national chairman.\(^{15}\)

Eichelberger was also clearly concerned about the spectre of an old-fashioned form of isolationism rearing its head. The initial stimulus for Eichelberger’s thoughts had been isolationist comments in Congress from the America First Committee founder Robert E. Wood. Eichelberger responded by arguing that to talk about Europe being ‘through’ and to play on fears about vast numbers of European migrants was ‘utter nonsense and typical of America First escapist philosophy’.\(^{16}\)

There was no doubt that Eichelberger hoped that Marshall Plan aid would be distributed through the UN. Yet when it became clear that the Government had no intention of working through the UN, and that public opinion was very much behind the plan, Eichelberger conceded defeat, at least in part. He accepted that there was ‘no choice but to support adequate appropriations to provide the aid to Western Europe that the Marshall Plan proposes’. The AAUN then took on a ‘dual objective’: to reconstruct Europe through the Marshall Plan and to reopen dialogue with the USSR through the UN. It has been argued by Michael Wala that the successful implementation of the Marshall Plan, even without UN involvement, would allow the US to become ‘a full member of the community of nations and would prevent a future retreat into political isolationism’. In this respect, the Marshall Plan was ‘an expression of a newly awakening internationalism developed during the war years’.\(^{17}\)

However, this was clearly a different form of internationalism to the one Eichelberger fought for through the AAUN. His was only ‘internationalism’ when compared to pre-war isolationism. Yes, the US was involved internationally, but it was in a unilateral manner. It was not the multilateral internationalism, requiring maximum use of the UN whenever possible, that Eichelberger had spent the last two years, if not his entire adult life, fighting for. Nevertheless, the need to aid Western Europe broadly matched the ideals of international support and cooperation promoted by the UN Charter. Eichelberger also recognised that

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\(^{15}\) ibid., eichelberger to patterson, 3 october 1947, 0458-0460, reel 118, henny Stimson Papers (microfilm edition), Cambridge University Library.


a rejuvenated western europe was necessary for us and world trade. finally, eichelberger was a pragmatist, at least when compared to the more idealistic members of the internationalist movement. if internationalism through the un was impossible, then unilateral internationalism was more acceptable than no internationalism at all.

once the committee for the marshall plan was announced in november, eichelberger had to justify his support for the marshall plan because of its avoidance of the un. he claimed that the us should give full support to the plan and integrate it with the un wherever possible. he then used some rhetorical sleight of hand to argue how the marshall plan would actually support the un: ‘the marshall plan must not be considered as disassociated from the united nations. its success means stability for the nations of europe; and the united nations must derive its strength from stable members’. the marshall plan, however, was just the beginning. the european nations could then advance economically using the machinery of the un, such as the international trade organisation.

eichelberger’s argument and those of the committee for the marshall plan were boosted in february 1948 by a soviet coup in czechoslovakia that helped to convince many of the necessity of a strong non-communist europe (and the threatening nature of the ussr). the marshall plan, or european recovery programme, comfortably passed the us senate 69–17 and the house 329–74, before being signed into law on 3 april 1948. in the end, some fifty two national organisations supported the committee for the marshall plan, and even though robert patterson conceded that the marshall plan’s approval was ‘due to the behaviour of the moscow gang’ more than any other factor, the committee was certainly effective in mobilising public support for it. dean acheson called it the most successful citizens’ committee since the committee to defend america by aiding the allies.

despite the success of the committee for the marshall plan, eichelberger was still clearly distressed about events in czechoslovakia. it affected him broadly insofar as it concerned world peace, but it also hit a nerve on a personal level. the death of czech foreign minister jan masaryk was particularly troubling, as eichelberger had met with him many times. the most recent occasion had been the previous august at the meeting of the world federation of united nations associations, and he considered him a personal friend. in one of eichelberger’s most emotional editorials, he argued that czechoslovakia’s liberty had been

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destroyed from within by a new form of ideological aggression which must be met in a new way. Indeed, Czechoslovakia is the symbol of the tragedy of a great part of the world: enslavement, liberation and now again enslavement. What was the answer? The only way forward was to build ‘a sense of collective responsibility and political security’.20

For the first time, Eichelberger appeared to be outlining a role for the UN in checking Soviet aggression. True, Eichelberger was also critical of the US Government for its selective use of the UN: ‘the United nations is not an instrument of policy to be used only when expedient’. He also singled out US policy on specific issues, arguing that the growing problems in Palestine represented the most pressing issue for both the US and the UN. Yet he came back to the tension between the US and the USSR, arguing ‘the purpose of the United States through the United Nations must be to avoid war, not by appeasement, but by a combination of strength to resist aggression from any quarter plus conciliation without any sacrifice of principle’. He claimed that if the US used the UN as the basis for its foreign policy ‘the United States would be in a position eventually to offer the Soviet Union solutions to outstanding problems’. He was unable to provide details, or suggest why the Soviets would go along with a US-dominated UN. But the message was clear. The US, through the UN, could check Soviet aggression without further escalation of violence. Indeed, the UN could be utilised to support containment.21

Even with a qualified show of support for containment, it was increasingly clear where Eichelberger’s – and therefore the AAUN’s – sympathies lay in the hardening Cold War atmosphere. This was in part due to the increasing difficulty in bridging the gap between the US and USSR. Yet as international and domestic tensions served to heighten the Cold War, it became clear that Eichelberger had not fully grasped the ideological nature of the conflict, or was simply unsuccessful in his brave attempts to ignore it. His belief that the Committee for the Marshall Plan could somehow focus on the economic and social aspects of the plan without stimulating suspicion in Moscow either severely misunderstood or underestimated the increasingly ideological nature of the Cold War. It was no longer possible to separate out the economic and social from the political. Eichelberger was not the only internationalist leader who struggled in his continued efforts to seek a degree of accommodation with the Soviets. James Shotwell had a similar difficulty in reconciling ‘his intellectual commitment to continued economic expansion guided by the Open Door policy and his support for a concert of power to deal with the new circumstances …. He refused to admit that the type of accommodation with the Soviet Union which he proposed demanded limitations upon a merican

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21 Ibid.
expectations and actions’. As both men struggled to realise, the internationalist values they championed were not as universal as they thought.\textsuperscript{22}

in the aftermath of the marshall Plan, eichelberger and the aa Un increasingly supported the broad thrust of Us foreign policy towards the USSR. the unfolding events of the Cold War left Eichelberger and his AAUN providing qualified support for a policy of containment in the name of world peace and security. there was no doubt that eichelberger continued to be frustrated by the truman a dministration’s habit of using the UN when it suited its needs, and otherwise ignoring it. Yet he conceded that aa Un policy must face the realities before it, ‘to assist the United Nations to meet the overwhelming tasks before it and to demand of our Government that it give consistent leadership in helping to meet these problems’. The question of Us policy in Palestine was one such problem area, and although eichelberger argued strongly for Un involvement and partition, in the end he threw his support behind truman’s decision to recognise israel.\textsuperscript{23}

he continued his broad support for the truman a dministration in spite of his growing frustration at his lack of access to Truman. Attempts to arrange meetings with truman in may and July of 1947 and february and november of 1948 were all turned down, to his increased frustration. By the end of 1948, eichelberger even felt it necessary to reply to Truman’s Secretary, Matthew Connelly, to express his disappointment at the President’s inability to meet with him. the same frustration applied to the state Department. as early as June 1946, eichelberger stated that he had less contact with the state Department than ‘at any time in ten years’. there were clearly numerous issues on which he wanted to influence Government policy, and to mould it into a more multilateral internationalist framework.\textsuperscript{24}

However, despite his criticisms, eichelberger believed that Us foreign policy offered the closest approximation to the ideals of the UN Charter: human rights and justice, progress and freedom, peace and security. his priority was a multilateral internationalism, defined by working through the UN at all times and using it as ‘the very moral foundation’ of US foreign policy. Yet if this could not be achieved through influence in Washington, or the development of public opinion, then eichelberger was reluctantly prepared to accept a unilateral a merican internationalism. Given the state of world affairs, this was not ideal, yet it was


\textsuperscript{23} Changing World, may 1948, pp. 2, 3, 16; eichelberger to truman, 15 may 1948, of 421, harry s. truman Papers, hstl .

\textsuperscript{24} matthew Connelly to eichelberger, 3 June 1947, of 421, harry s. truman Papers, hstl ; Connelly to eichelberger, 15 July 1947, of 421, harry s. truman Papers, hstl ; Connelly to eichelberger, 4 february 1948, of 421, harry s. truman Papers, hstl ; Connelly to eichelberger, 29 november 1948, of 421, harry s. truman Papers, hstl ; eichelberger to Connelly, 2 December 1948, of 421, harry s. truman Papers, hstl ; Eichelberger to Welles, 28 June 1946, Box 117, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
preferable to a world where the US refused to exert its moral influence, such as the world of the 1920s and 1930s. This did not mean that the battle for a more multilateral foreign policy outlook was over, and Eichelberger would continue to fight it. It merely meant that the triumph of internationalism was, in the end, only a limited victory for the internationalists who had worked so hard to create an international organisation.25

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in June 1946, peace activist John Pearmain wrote to former Secretary of State and Honorary President of the AAUN Sumner Welles. He asked Welles if Clark Eichelberger was on the payroll of the State Department. Welles politely replied that Eichelberger had worked with the State Department for roughly a year during 1942 and 1943, when he served on a committee that Welles himself had formed within the State Department. However, he had not worked for, or received money from the State Department for over two and half years.¹

Despite this seemingly conclusive reply, Pearmain repeated his question to Welles, making further accusations in the process. He claimed that the AAUN, under Eichelberger’s leadership, was not ‘a free agent’ and was merely a ‘front’ for the State Department. Pearmain argued that there was no chance for the liberal movements in the United States if they were being fed the State Department line through supposedly independent organisations such as the AAUN. He developed this view after speaking to numerous colleagues who had felt the same way about Eichelberger for a number of years – that he was a State Department stooge. In addition, he claimed that Congressman Christian Herter had informed him that the State Department used such organisations as fronts.²

Welles, who was Honorary President of the AAUN, felt compelled to reply. He described the suggestion that the AAUN was a State Department front as ‘frankly nonsensical’, and claimed that the organisation was ‘wholly free from even the slightest vestige of Government influence’. With regard to Herter’s comments, Welles argued that they had ‘not a shred of foundation’ and that he would be asking Herter to withdraw his remarks as soon as possible. He highlighted the association’s opposition to recent US policies on issues such as trusteeship as proof that the organisation was more than capable of criticising the Truman administration. Welles was clearly disappointed that such unsubstantiated charges were being spread, with absolutely no evidence to back them up. Eichelberger, too, was ‘astonished’ that such questions were being asked, unless ‘some of the extreme world government people would like to make it appear that I am a State Department stooge because I support the United Nations’.³

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¹ Pearmain to Welles, 19 June 1946, Box 120, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL; Welles to Pearmain, 1 July 1946, Box 120, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
² Pearmain to Welles, 4 October 1948, Box 135, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL; Pearmain to Welles, 9 October 1948, Box 135, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
³ Welles to Pearmain, 30 October 1948, Box 135, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL; Eichelberger to Welles, 28 June 1946, Box 117, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL.
it is clear that neither the aa Un nor any of eichelberger’s other organisations were ‘fronts’; nor had eichelberger ‘sold out’, in Pearmain’s words, to the state Department. However, eichelberger and the aa Un certainly acted in a way that made such allegations plausible, even if they were a surprise to eichelberger himself. Pearmain was not alone in asking such questions. Even Ernest Hopkins, the chairman of a mericans United, referred to eichelberger as ‘a professional propagandist’. eichelberger continually sought close personal and organisational links to both the White House and the State Department. He supported official policy on the majority of issues, and often refused to move ahead of Government policy, especially at Franklin Roosevelt’s request. Even when he was disappointed with the speed or direction of US policy, he invariably kept his criticisms to himself, or he took them to the Government behind closed doors. Only after the end of World War II did Eichelberger openly criticise the Government. Yet even then, eichelberger later commented that ‘the administration could feel that the weight of the association was in its support’.

When it came to defining his relationship with the state, and that of his organisations, Eichelberger and his colleagues always chose to take a cooperative stance rather than an oppositional one. They could have challenged the Truman Administration by the end of 1945, as Americans United did; or taken an even stronger stand against the Government in early 1947, like United World Federalists. Yet they did neither, choosing to remain as close to the Government as possible. While this left them open to allegations of being an acolyte of the state Department, or a Government stooge, eichelberger ensured that while his relationship with the state was cooperative, he was never co-opted. Even when he was promoting Government policies, such as the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, he always did so out of choice, as his views genuinely coincided with those of the Government.

His continued support came despite the fact that the opportunity to redefine US internationalism had passed. US internationalism had been redefined, but not in the way eichelberger had hoped. The opportunity to create a more just and peaceful world through a multilateral international organisation had been lost, as the course of world events and the dominant role of the state revealed the limits on the influence of private organisations such as the AAUN. Instead, Eichelberger and the aa Un gave their support to the more unilateral internationalism of the postwar years. His views were seen as far more politically viable, if not necessarily superior alternative to concepts of world government. The support was often qualified, as the internationalists attempted to pressure the US Government over issues such as Palestine, where great power divisions did not rule out the possibility that the Un could still make a difference. Use of the UN was promoted whenever possible. Yet

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4 Pearmain to Welles, 4 October 1948, Box 135, Sumner Welles Papers, FDRL; Fosdick to Hopkins, 8 December 1944, Folder 18, Box 4, HMFC; Robert Accinelli, ‘Pro-Un internationalists and the early Cold war: the american association for the United nations and Us foreign Policy’, *Diplomatic History*, 9 (1985), p. 352.
Conclusion

on issues regarding the USSR, the UN joined the Cold War consensus, albeit on its liberal wing.

How much more could Eichelberger have done? True, the creation of state Department bureaucracy to deal with private organisations and the UN’s dominance of the internationalist field opened a space for negotiation in 1944 and 1945, but the narrowed conception of US internationalism by 1947 and 1948 meant there was little left to discuss. However, by opting for cooperation rather than opposition, Eichelberger kept the door open to the Truman Administration. He succeeded in getting into a position where he could negotiate with the US Government over its utilisation of the UN.

In this respect, the actions of Clark Eichelberger moved beyond a concept of state spirit. Yes, Eichelberger worked with the US Government during World War II because he believed that their shared aims were promoting a grand design: an international organisation that would lead to a more just and peaceful world. Yet this was not a simple choice between support and opposition. Even when he was working directly with the State Department, and when his full support was behind the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, the relationship between Eichelberger and the Government was always under negotiation. The internationalist leader held the weaker hand, and only ever made limited gains but, through a policy of cooperation and collaboration, he retained a position of influence.

The negotiation was necessary because Eichelberger displayed an international spirit, one that went beyond the narrow boundaries of the state. He promoted a multilateral definition of international relations based on negotiation and compromise, rather than limited concepts of national interest. Unfortunately, the early years of the Cold War revealed the limitations of the United Nations and the dominant position of sovereign nations. In an attempt to find a path between an increasingly unpopular multilateral internationalism and a narrow, interest-based nationalism, Eichelberger reconciled his support for international organisations with support for the state. Yet he did this not simply because it was his own Government, but because of its particularly American values.

Indeed, Eichelberger was able to join the Cold War consensus and support the Truman Administration because he also embodied an American spirit that was built on American values and transcended individual US administrations. The fact that Eichelberger was able to reconcile his international and American spirit suggests two things. Firstly, for all of his genuine belief in internationalism, Eichelberger never fully stood outside of a national American framework, even during the war years. Even his conception of internationalism was inextricably tied up in American values and beliefs: ideals of freedom and democracy, peace and justice, progress and human rights, and free economic markets.

More importantly, Eichelberger truly believed that those American values were international or even universal values. In his eyes, what was good for the US was good for the world. As Eichelberger saw it, the United States needed to provide moral leadership to the world. While this leadership was not necessarily in the name of narrow national interests, it was still a distinctly American view, based on
a belief that the Us maintained ‘a certain moral position’ in international affairs that merited international respect. Indeed, in eichelberger’s eyes, the Us set the moral tone for the Un.\textsuperscript{5}

It has been suggested that political internationalism was fundamentally a form of Pax Americana. However, neither eichelberger nor s hotwell consciously promoted a nationalistic form of US global dominance, let alone a role for the US as world policeman. Yet as long as American superiority went hand in hand with a merican ideals, they generally accepted the more unilateral elements of US foreign policy, even at the expense of diminishing the power of the United Nations. Rather naively, neither man seemed fully aware of the contradictions involved. This remained the case up to the Vietnam war, after which eichelberger was disappointed by a Government emphasising ‘national defence above everything else’. By 1970, the US was no longer living up to its own high moral standards. in the words of a UN diplomat, ‘the American dream is fading’. Yet this was a failure of the state to live up to a merican ideals and those of the UN Charter, not a failure of the ideals themselves.\textsuperscript{6}

Eichelberger continued to keep the pressure on the US Government to provide moral leadership for the world, because, as he understood it, the United Nations was no more than the sum of its parts, and for better or worse, he always believed that the part best equipped to provide moral leadership was the United States. From the vantage point of 1977, three years before his death, Eichelberger looked to the future: ‘a mericans hope that once again we may see the United s tates occupy a position of moral leadership in the United n ations’. Three decades later, many a mericans are still hoping.\textsuperscript{7}


\textsuperscript{7} ibid., p. 300.
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