“In recognition that relations between the United States and Turkey have been badly strained, especially by the Iraq war, President Obama’s first trip to Europe included a major speech to the Turkish parliament. American Image in Turkey is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand Turkish public disaffection with the United States. Moreover, Giray Sadik’s careful analysis of the links between Turkish public opinion and aspects of American policy—military assistance, economic assistance, foreign direct investments, and bilateral trade—provides useful guidelines for future policy.”

—Ole R. Holsti, Duke University

“Dr. Giray Sadik has brought together in this interesting volume useful data and analysis on the state of U.S.-Turkish relations in recent years. His insights into this subject help us understand the successes and the failures that have occurred as America attempts to improve its diplomatic ties with one of the most important nations in the world.”

—Loch K. Johnson, University of Georgia

Most recognize the importance of public opinion in foreign policy decisions in democracies. However, despite its importance to American security, the question of how American foreign policy has affected the views of foreign publics about the United States is seldom asked. Throughout American Image in Turkey: U.S. Foreign Policy Dimensions, Giray Sadik explores the relationship between American foreign policy and Turkish public opinion about the United States since 9/11. In the post-9/11 era, Turkey was one of the first states to join the global coalition against terrorism, but American and Turkish cooperation in Afghanistan contrasts with their differences about Iraq, which destabilizes their strategic partnership. Sadik examines the effects of American military and economic aid and foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey, on Turkish public opinion about the United States, addressing how these tools can increase levels of favorable public opinion toward the United States. Sadik explains how different trends of U.S. military and economic policies toward Turkey translate into significantly different levels of influence on post-9/11 Turkish public opinion toward the United States. The implications of new geopolitical realities make explorations of the effects of foreign policy on public opinion all the more urgent.

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American Image in Turkey
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Chapter 1

Introduction

No ruler can afford to be contemptuous of public opinion.
—John Zogby (Quoted in The Washington File 2001, 3)

The salience of public opinion in democracies has been generally recognized. Pioneering works such as Congress and Foreign Policy (Dahl 1950), and The American People and Foreign Policy (Almond 1967) call attention to the importance of American public opinion in U.S. foreign policymaking. Nevertheless, the effects of American foreign policy on the views of foreign publics about the United States have been rarely investigated, and even the existing research on the interaction between domestic politics and international relations remains inconclusive. Robert Putnam observes this discrepancy in the literature by noting that “domestic politics and international relations are often somehow entangled, but our theories have not yet sorted out the puzzling tangle” (Putnam 1993, 324).

Putnam notes the fact that “it is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly ‘Both, sometimes’. The more interesting questions are When? and How?” (Putnam 1993, 324). This study concentrates on these intriguing questions in the context of Turkish–American relations in the post-9/11 era that is, since terrorists attack the United States on September 11, 2001. To be more specific, this study explores the relationship between American foreign policy and Turkish public opinion about the United States since 9/11. Hence, in Putnam’s terminology this study can be mainly considered as a response to “How?” type question: how American foreign policy affects Turkish public opinion about the United States. In addition to this question, understanding the reasons behind the volatility in relations
between the two nations is essential. For this reason, there is also a need to ask “Why?” type questions. Hence, the flow of the research in this book will be as follows:

1) *The Puzzle:* How has American foreign policy affected Turkish public opinion toward the United States, and why is this relationship important?
2) *The Research Design and Methodology:* How do economic aid, military assistance, foreign direct investment (hereinafter FDI), and bilateral trade relate to Turkish public opinion towards the United States?
3) *The Literature Review:* Why does investigating the effects of foreign policy on public opinion important?
4) *The Overview of Turkish–American Relations:* Why is exploring the effects of foreign policy on public opinion especially important in the context of Turkish–American relations?

**WHY IS IT PUZZLING TO STUDY THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN U.S.–TURKISH RELATIONS?**

People are not sitting around waiting eagerly to hear from America anymore. Today we are competing for audiences in a very crowded communications environment.

—Karen P. Hughes (Hughes 2007, 18)

Considering the remoteness of many foreign policy issues from the life of the general public, one might suppose there would be a lack of public interest in foreign policy. Yet, according to a study by Foyle, “a close analysis of public attitudes on foreign policy suggests that the public, though not always prioritizing foreign policy issues, has consistently held policy preferences” (Foyle 2004, 57).

The fact that public opinion matters in foreign policy decisions has been a matter of general consensus. From earlier works on Putnam’s “two-level games” (Putnam 1993, 324)—that is diplomacy and domestic politics—to more recent declarations by the U.S. Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy Karen P. Hughes, the role of public opinion in foreign policy has been acknowledged. Yet, in most cases such emphasis did not go beyond stating that America’s image abroad is important for U.S. foreign policy.

More importantly, the means by which the United States can influence the view of foreign publics have been rarely investigated. Especially, in the post–Cold War era where threats are no longer emanating from the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers, and when the streets of developing countries have the potential
of breeding future terrorists, the perception of the United States abroad has become an element of American security more important than ever before.

Yet, neither does this mean that the United States has no choice nor any resources to deal with the worldwide rise of anti-Americanism. Although the nature of threat to America’s share has changed since the Cold War from a superpower standoff to terrorist attacks, the lessons of Cold War foreign policy successes can be adapted to the realities of a new age of terrorism. One of them is the use of American aid to promote U.S. values and interests, such as democracy and liberal economy. In the past, the United States created aid programs with varying goals ranging from the post–World War II reconstruction (for example, the Marshall Plan) to economic and military assistance to countries such as Greece and Turkey that were in danger of Communist incursion (the Truman Doctrine). Furthermore, the United States institutionalized its foreign assistance programs by establishing the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to implement its foreign aid policies worldwide. USAID not only endured during the Cold War, but also in a way contributed to America’s policy of “containment” (Kennan 1951, 46) by supporting American allies, friendly governments and nascent democracies in their resistance against the pressures of Communism.

Is there any reason why the United States should not use this already successful instrument to restore its image in the eyes of today’s world public opinion? After all, what is the added value of foreign aid, FDI, and bilateral trade, if they do not contribute to a more favorable perception of the donor state by the people of the recipient country? I will untangle this puzzle within the context of Turkish–American relations. To be more specific, the key research question here is: to what extent does U.S. foreign aid and FDI to Turkey, along with bilateral trade, contribute to increasing levels of favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States?

**RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

There is a growing consensus among social scientists that research programs advance more effectively through the iterative or collaborative use of different research methods than through the use of any method alone.

—Andrew Bennett (Bennett 2005, 51)

In general, it is expected that increasing levels of foreign aid, FDI, and bilateral trade (BiT) should contribute toward a sympathetic view of the donor country by the public of the recipient country. Thus, the overarching hypothesis of this study is:
Increasing levels of U.S. aid, FDI, and bilateral trade with Turkey are associated with an increasingly favorable Turkish public opinion towards the United States.

Accordingly, U.S. aid, FDI, and bilateral trade with Turkey are the independent variables, while Turkish public opinion (TPO) towards the United States is the dependent variable. Although the U.S. aid to Turkey is the principal independent variable, its measurement requires refinement. U.S. aid to Turkey can be categorized under two main groups: military assistance (MA) and economic assistance (EA). Therefore, U.S. aid to Turkey becomes the combination of these categories. Accordingly, Turkish public opinion is expected to be a function of U.S. economic and military aid, the U.S. FDI to Turkey, and bilateral trade between the two countries, as a result:

\[ MA + EA + FDI + BiT \propto TPO \]

To operationalize the main hypothesis, there is a need to establish links between the independent variables and the dependent variable. Hence, the separate hypotheses are:

1. The more U.S. military aid to Turkey, the more favorable TPO towards the U.S.
2. The more U.S. economic aid to Turkey, the more favorable TPO towards the U.S.
3. The more U.S. FDI to Turkey, the more favorable TPO towards the United States.
4. The more the bilateral trade between Turkey and the United States, the more favorable TPO towards the United States.

In this book, each of these hypotheses will be the subject of a separate chapter. As a result, I will be able to explore individual effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable. Each hypothesis-testing chapter will consist of sections that are designed to answer the following questions:

1. What is the definition of the independent variable to be tested?
2. What is the role of the independent variable in influencing Turkish public opinion towards the United States, and why is it important?
3. What are the findings and their ramifications?

Following these four hypothesis-testing chapters, I will present an overview of the findings altogether in order to explore the combined effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable. In light of the findings, I will present the policy recommendations and conclusions of this study.
In order to explore the relationship between these contours of American foreign policy and Turkish public opinion, I will use a case-study methodology as the principle means of investigation. More specifically, within the framework of case study methods, I will use congruence testing, in which “the researcher tests whether the predicted value of the dependent variable, in view of the values of the case’s independent variables, is congruent with the actual outcome of the case” (Bennett 2004, 24). Thus, differences in the dependent variable are attributed to incongruency on the independent. Simply put, congruence testing measures the degree of correlation between the different values of dependent variable based on changes in the values of independent variables. For this reason, “where there are a large number of cases, it may be possible to replace congruence testing with statistical methods of correlation and control.”

For example, to study large number of samples across many years a regression analysis can be used. Yet, considering the data limitations (i.e. scarcity of public opinion polls on foreign policy issues in many countries), and the exploratory nature of this book congruence testing remains the most suitable means within the framework of case study methods.

The idea of congruence testing derives from the word congruous which is defined as “conforming to the circumstances or requirements of a situation.” Accordingly, throughout the book, each hypothesis-testing chapter will explore the degree of congruence (i.e., conformity) between each independent variable and the dependent variable. For example, the chapter on military aid will explore to what extent the changes in Turkish public opinion towards the United States are conforming with (i.e., are congruent with) changes in U.S. military aid to Turkey, in order to measure the effect of U.S. military aid on Turkish public opinion.

Before elaborating on the reasons for choosing this case-study methodology, it is important to note that “there is no uniform answer to the question “which method is best?” (Van Evera 1997, 55). Nevertheless, in the literature on social science methodology, there has been a growing consensus on the principal strengths of case studies. As Stephen Van Evera observes:

The case method has two strengths . . . First, tests performed with case studies are often strong because the predictions tested are quite unique. . . . Second, inferring and testing explanations that define how the independent causes the dependent variable are often easier with case study than large-n methods. [Emphasis in original] (Van Evera 1997, 54)

In view of that, exploring the effects of American aid, FDI, and bilateral trade on Turkish public opinion presents a unique context that can be most probed by in-depth examination of Turkish–American relations in the
post-9/11 era. The case study method also enables a researcher with limited data to conduct in-depth analysis by using alternative and secondary sources when necessary. Accordingly, “case studies can be best if we want to infer or test explanatory hypotheses or if cases have been unevenly recorded—a few are recorded in great detail, many in scant detail” (Van Evera 1997, 55). To be more specific, data on Turkish public opinion about the United States for the pre-2000 period are much more limited as compare to the post-2000 period. This is clearly a limitation for this research. Yet, this does not mean that I will not consider the effects of the background of Turkish–American relations on contemporary situation. For example, as Çağaptay observed in *The Wall Street Journal* in 2007: “Before the party [AKP] took office, Turkey ranked first in pro-American sentiment among Muslim majority countries.”

As can be seen from the above example, a case study is suited for methodological synergy. Within the framework of this synergy, quantitative and qualitative methods are not necessarily competing, but rather complementing to each other. Hence, I will use both in tandem: quantitative sources will serve as the “skeleton” and qualitative sources as the “flesh,” of the research body.

I will employ quantitative measures as a primary source of basic data on U.S.–Turkish relations, such as the results of public opinion surveys, foreign military and economic aid, and FDI and bilateral trade data. Principally, such data help answer “if” type questions, such as: if there is a correlation between Turkish public opinion about the United States and American military aid to Turkey. Before addressing more complex “How?” and “Why?” type questions, it is essential to know the direction and the magnitude of correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variable. For this reason, quantitative data will constitute the backbone of my analysis, while qualitative sources will be used to explain reasons of why such correlation takes place (or not), and how it may affect Turkish–American relations.

Qualitative sources can be both of primary and secondary nature. Primary sources, such as the U.S. National Security Strategy documents (2000–2006), pertinent hearings before the U.S. Congress committees, public and private sector reports (e.g., 9/11 Commission report, reports of Turkish–American business associations) and speeches of political and military elites of both states, as well as secondary sources such as academic articles and journalist commentaries in major newspapers. In this respect, qualitative sources are functional in answering “why” and “how” type questions that aim to explain the reasons behind the statistical results (see Figure – 1.1).

Case study methods, “because of their emphasis on specific historical events, have the advantage of focusing researchers’ attention on the historical
and empirical reality that they are interested in understanding and explaining” (Kacowicz 2004, 121). Accordingly, the synergy of quantitative and qualitative methods can best be accommodated using case study methodology, since it enables a researcher to look beyond the numbers and thus encourages in-depth analysis of Turkish–American relations in the post-9/11 period. This does not mean that case study methodology is flawless and is perfectly designated to provide the precise tests of the hypotheses. Yet, when one considers its potential drawbacks, it is necessary to consider the reasons for these shortcomings as well. For example, “practitioners of case studies have produced neither a comprehensive catalog of possible case-study research designs nor a comprehensive list of case-selection methods” (Yin 1994, 18). Why? Because, “social science case studies will seldom be so decisive, but this problem stems from the messy nature of social science data and the complexity of social phenomena, not the inherent weakness of the case method” (Van Evera 1997, 67). In order to reduce this inherent ambiguity, I will now present the definitions of the dependent variable and the independent variables that will be used throughout the book, along with the principal methods measurement.

**Public Opinion**: Since Turkish public opinion towards the United States is the dependent variable, I will start first with its definition. Public opinion is defined as “an aggregate of the individual views, attitudes, and beliefs about a particular topic, expressed by a significant proportion of a community.”

Public opinion can be measured by analyzing political participation, interest
group activity and opinion polls based on the issue, scope, and timing of the research. In this study, to measure Turkish public opinion about the United States I will use public opinion polls of the *Pew Global Attitudes Project*. The PEW polls are consistently available (with the exception of 2001) in the post-9/11 period on the topic of “favorable opinions of the United States” in Turkey9 (See Figure – 1.1).

**Foreign Assistance:** In the official report of the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), there are five major categories of foreign assistance: “bilateral development aid, economic assistance supporting U.S. political and security goals, humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions, and military aid” (CRS 2004, 1). For analytical simplicity, I categorized U.S. foreign assistance under two major groups according to military and economic assistance: based on the scope and source (i.e., administering U.S. agency) of foreign aid, which overlap with my categorization of foreign assistance under economic and military aid.

*Military Aid:* “Most military assistance is administered by the Department of Defense (DOD) in conjunction with the Office of Politico-Military Affairs in the State Department The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the primary DOD body responsible for foreign military financing and training programs” (CRS 2004, 10).

*Economic Aid:* “The bulk of the U.S. bilateral economic aid program has been administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) created by executive branch reorganization in 1961; USAID became an independent agency in 1999, although its Administrator reports to and serves under the ‘direct authority and foreign policy guidance’ of the Secretary of State” (CRS 2004, 7).

Simply put, economic aid is administered mainly by the State Department, while military aid is mainly administered by the Department of Defense. As the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress Explains: “How and in what form assistance reaches an aid recipient can vary widely, depending on the type of aid program, the objective of the assistance, and the agency responsible for providing the aid” (CRS 2004, 5). Yet, since the allocation funds come from the U.S. treasury, military and economic aid can be both measured by using the report for the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (aka “Greenbook”).

**Foreign Direct Investment (FDI):** The definition of FDI implies that a business enterprise in one country has a lasting interest in and a degree of influence over, the management of a business enterprise in another country. Throughout the study I will use this definition narrowed by the U.S. criterion, since I am interested in measuring the effects of the American FDI: “the criterion used in the US as set forth in the International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act, sets ownership or control of ten per cent or more of an
enterprise’s voting securities as a considered evidence of a lasting interest in or a degree of influence over management.”

**Bilateral Trade:** According to Merriam-Webster’s dictionary *bilateral* means “affecting reciprocally two nations or parties.” Thus, in this study, bilateral trade refers to trade between the United States and Turkey that affects both nations. In this respect, I will consider both American exports to and imports from Turkey. Therefore, an increase in each is expected to signal increasing levels of favorable Turkish public opinion towards the United States. On the one hand, increasing American imports from Turkey will present Turkish businesspeople opportunities to enter the lucrative U.S. market, and thus provide new jobs for many Turks. In turn this chain of events is apt to positively affect their views about the United States.

On the other hand, increasing consumption of American goods can be interpreted as a sign of increasingly more favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Since both the United States and Turkey are the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), I will obtain their bilateral trade data from OECD database.

**INTERVENING FACTORS**

Abovementioned independent variables’ effect on Turkish public opinion toward the United States does not occur in vacuum. In fact, it is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the influence of the ongoing world developments on U.S.–Turkish relations. The United States as the remaining superpower and Turkey as a key regional actor at the junction of Europe, the Caucasus, and the Middle East are susceptible to the influences from these regions. As a result, it is expected that the policies of one of the countries towards these regions to influence the perception of that actor by its counterpart. For example, American failure to take effective measures against PKK terrorists’ use of Iraq as a safe haven has contributed to Turkish view of the United States as “tacit support for the PKK” (Larrabee 2007, 106), and thus has fueled anti-Americanism in Turkey.

Recently, American presence in Iraq and its ramifications for Turkey have had the most immediate effect on Turkish public opinion. Yet, American presence in Iraq has not been the only intervening factor that needs to be taken into account. The United States and Turkey have growing interests in all regions surrounding Turkey.

Therefore, it is expected that U.S. and Turkish policies in all of these regions to influence bilateral relations, and thus perceptions of each other. The following regions are of particular importance for the bilateral relations due to the factors outlined in parentheses:
(1) U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan (U.S.–Turkish counterterrorism cooperation)
(2) Transatlantic relations (U.S. support for Turkey’s EU accession)

Evidently, American and Turkish policies in these regions with respect to the above issues particularly have been influential on how the United States has been perceived by Turkish public opinion. Yet, none of them are the independent variables in this study. Because each of the above subjects is a combination of variables, throughout the book I will refer them as intervening factors, instead of conventional “intervening variables” usage. Accordingly, the above issues will be factored in the analysis in each chapter, where pertinent, and their overall influence on the process will be discussed after presenting the findings in the conclusion chapter of the book. Simply put, these factors can be considered and used as analytical filters when independent variables’ effects on the dependent variable are examined (See Table – 1.1).

**United States in Iraq and Afghanistan**

On September 11, 2001, the United States was subject to an unprecedented terrorist attack. This attack has ongoing implications for the U.S. foreign policy, and hence for world politics. After the attack, the U.S. President George W. Bush declared that “this is not the war of the United States only” and called all other nations that believe in democracy to be with the United States in its war

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**Table 1.1  Research Design Overview**

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<th>Choice of Research Objective</th>
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against terrorism. \textsuperscript{13} Immediately after the call of the President G.W. Bush, for the first time in its history and less than twenty-four hours after the attacks, NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Treaty—its collective defense clause—declaring the attack against the United States to be an attack against all NATO members. \textsuperscript{14} Turkey was one of the first countries that joined the global coalition formed to fight against terrorism (\textit{Hurriyet} 2001). In this respect, Ankara gave permission to all American and coalition member countries’ planes to use the Turkish air space in frame of the “Operation Enduring Freedom” against the Taliban forces in Afghanistan. In addition, it has sent military personnel to CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] headquarters, where this operation was directed, provided troops to Afghanistan, later Turkey took the commandship of ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] (\textit{Radikal} 2001).

Still, the head of the current civilian authority responsible for post-war Afghan reconstruction is former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hikmet Cetin. Although Afghanistan, in itself, has never been a national security threat to Turkey, Turkish political and military elites have long been emphasizing the need for international cooperation against terrorism. Only time will tell the ultimate effects of this cooperation for Afghanistan, but in terms of post 9/11 Turkish–American cooperation in international military operations Afghanistan is an ongoing success. As a result, Afghanistan experience has demonstrated that Turkey and the United States can effectively work together against global terrorism. In that respect, it is important to note that by success I mean the success of cooperation on the ground between the United States and Turkey. Whether this successful cooperation on the ground will translate into ultimate success of the NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan remains to be seen.

Although the success of Turkish–American collaboration in Afghanistan remains in the memories of political and military elites of both countries, all of these developments took place under the shadow of U.S.–Turkish differences with respect to Iraq. Increasing number of analysts observe that “no development has poisoned U.S.–Turkish relations more than Iraq” (Menon and Wimbush 2007, 137). Before elaborating on the principle bones of contention, it is important to note that unlike Afghanistan, and like most of the world, including many in America’s other major NATO allies, “Turks solidly opposed the war. They did not believe the invasion was necessary to defend the American people” (Menon and Wimbush 2007, 137). The underlying reason of Turkish opposition was the perception that the U.S.-led war in Iraq has created a dire threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity and national interests. American invasion of Iraq presented three major concerns for Turkish national security and interests in the region:
(1) Increasing PKK terrorist attacks staged by the safe havens in Northern Iraq;
(2) Turkmens’ rights in northern Iraq; and
(3) Status of Kirkuk.

(1) Increasing PKK terrorist attacks: Although there has been a consensus between the United States and Turkey on identifying PKK as “a terrorist organization” for more than a decade, U.S.–Turkish divergence over how to neutralize PKK training camps in northern Iraq has remained since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. It is important to note that “PKK terrorism has always been declared by both Turkey and the U.S. as a ‘destabilizing factor’ for the region and Turkey’s fight against it has generally been considered as a self-defense” (Ertem 2006, 63). Thus, the divergence does not stem from the disagreement over the need to counter the terrorist attacks, but rather on the different Turkish and American approaches on how to counter them.

Turkish concerns that “the PKK has acquired an even more reliable bastion for launching attacks and a deep reservoir of popular support among Iraq’s Kurds partly explains Turkey’s apparent special-forces operations in northern Iraq, as well as the continued presence of its military contingent” (Menon and Wimbush 2007, 134). According to analysts such as Nicholas Birch, such counter-measures can themselves make U.S.–Turkish relations even worse. For example, when Turkish special-forces operatives were arrested and detained by American troops in July 2003, there has been a public outcry against the United States in Turkey. In addition to leading diplomatic crisis between the United States and Turkey, this incident “received considerable play in the Turkish media and political circles, where it was portrayed as a humiliation, evidence of American ill-will, and payback for the Turkish parliament refusal to allow US forces to attack Saddam’s army from the north” (Menon and Wimbush 2007, 137).

America’s inability to fight with terrorists in northern Iraqi mountains due to its overstretched troops throughout the rest of Iraq is one thing, trying to actively prevent Turkish special-forces from countering terrorists is another. Especially when U.S. calls for dialogue between Turkish and Iraqi authorities proved futile, and “in an atmosphere very much hostile to the policies of the Bush administration, it became more difficult for Ankara to make Turkish people believe in the good will of their ‘strategic partner’ without seeing any concrete steps” (Ertem 2006, 62). Considering the increased terrorist attacks threatening Turkish security and national interest in the region, by the beginning of 2006, Turkey began deploying thousands of its troops at its border region with Iraq. Though there is no major Turkish cross-border operation as the end of 2007 is approaching, Turkish troop mass remains as a precaution...
against terrorist incursions, and as a demonstration of immediate preparedness of Turkish forces to defend Turkish national interests inside and abroad.

(2) Turkmens’ rights: Concentrated in Erbil, Mosul and Kirkuk, the Turkmen are “Iraq’s third-largest ethnic group after Arabs and Kurds” (Menon and Wimbush 2007, 137). Turkmens—as their name hints—have kinship ties with Turks.17 Although Turkmens come after Arabs and Kurds in terms of population, they are the most educated and urbanized group in Iraq, hence they live in major cities of northern Iraq, Mosul and Kirkuk.

(3) Status of Kirkuk: Turkish historical interests over Kirkuk are closely related with considerable Turkmen population of the city. Following the 1991 Gulf War, “in an effort to cement Baghdad’s control over the city and its environs Saddam’s regime flooded Kirkuk and its surrounding areas with Arabs (mainly Shi’ites from the south), while expelling some 100,000 Kurds, Turkmen and Christians” (Menon and Wimbush 2007, 135). Once Saddam was deposed, the Kurds were quick to claim ownership of Kirkuk, but so did the Iraqi Turkmen Front (Iraq Turkmen Cephesi, ITC).18 Although, it is estimated that the total number of Kurds, Turkmen, and Christians expelled from Kirkuk is around 100,000, “an inflow of some 350,000 Kurds to Kirkuk, many with no ties to the city, with encouragement and material assistance from the Kurdistan Regional Government, has been paralleled by the departure of the city’s Arab and Turkmen population” (Menon and Wimbush 2007, 141). As a result of Turkey’s declared position supporting to postpone the referendum in Kirkuk, until the population balance is restored, the referendum that was planned to be held by the end of 2007 remains to be conducted.19 A confrontation between Kurds and Turkmen over the ownership of Kirkuk could provoke Turkish military intervention.

Hence, “the status of oil-rich Kirkuk, capital of al-Tamim province, is a problem with the potential to create even greater acrimony between Ankara and Washington” (Menon and Wimbush 2007, 139). Regarding its concerns over the Kurdish domination in northern Iraq, Turkey is not alone in the region. All neighbors of northern Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria share similar concerns over the emergence of a Kurdish state in the region. It is likely that

The rise of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq would provide a stimulus to Kurdish nationalism in all three countries, particularly Iran, where the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyan Azad a Kurdistané, PJAK), led by Haji Ahmadi, has been battling Iranian security forces with greater intensity, while using Iraqi Kurdish territory as a sanctuary.20

In order to counter possible fait accompli, the three states are now aligned against the PKK and have even attacked its positions in the mountainous northern Iraq. As a result, Turkey improved its relations with both Iran and
Syria. Thus, U.S.–Turkish divergence in Iraq has a potential of triggering other differences in policies of both countries with respect to regions of increasing American concern.

U.S. Support for Turkey’s EU Accession

Turkey’s souring relations with the United States is accompanied by anger directed at the EU, flowing mainly from frustration over the delay in admitting Turkey to the Union. While the United States can only influence EU decisions relating to Turkey at the margins, and “has in fact pressed for Turkey’s admission, increasing animus toward Europe among Turks seems to be strengthening their already strong anti-Americanism” (Menon and Wimbush 2007, 141). The underlying reason of this rising anti-Western Turkish sentiment can be attributed to the disappointment of Turkish public from the American and European policies’ disregard of Turkish national security concerns. With respect to the EU, Turks are increasingly convinced that Turkey’s application to the EU seems less and less likely to succeed. The recent offer of a “privileged partnership” in the Union is viewed as a sop, an act of bad faith and confirmation of the growing suspicion that Europe rejects Turks because of who they are. As a result, while “two-thirds of Turks supported EU membership as late as 2004; only a third does so now” (Taspinar 2007, 124).

All in all, the two sources of resentment (against the United States and the EU) in Turkish society reinforce one another. Hence, “instead of Turkish ire at the EU strengthening U.S.–Turkish ties, it paradoxically feeds Turkish animus toward Washington and prompts discussions among Turkish elites about mapping new directions and strategies in foreign policy” (Menon and Wimbush 2007, 142).

Therefore, although the traditional Cold War “West” notion is no longer a valid umbrella classification for the United States and its Western European allies, Turkey’s relations with the EU still need to be considered when analyzing Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT FOREIGN POLICY AND PUBLIC OPINION INTERACTION, SO FAR?

Politicians have always been sensitive to public opinion; it is only during the era of scientific polling that the linkage between the views of citizens and foreign policy may be readily investigated.

—Robert M. Eisinger (Quoted in Geer 2004, 59)

This section aims to present what we know and what we do not know about the relationship between foreign policy and public opinion, while explain-
ing why it is more vital to explore this interaction now than ever before. As Eisinger notes on the previous page, the ability of social scientists to explore this foreign policy/public opinion linkage is a result of advances in “scientific polling.” Other reasons, such as the changing structure of international political system in the post Cold War era and transformations in communications technologies, are not only essential for our understanding of public opinion in contemporary foreign policymaking in democracies, but also in assessing the breadth of the existing literature in the aftermath of these transformations.

During the nearly five decades of the Cold War, the containment of Soviet power was the guiding light of American and allied (e.g., Western European, Turkish) foreign policy. Shapiro observes the effects of the bipolar system on foreign policymaking of Western democracies by noting that “the Cold War provided a powerful national-interest frame of reference for political leaders, the press, and public opinion in the United States and Western Europe” (Shapiro et al. 2000, 184). As one of the two front line NATO states, the other one being Norway, bordering the Soviet Union, this was the case for Turkey as well. The effects of this overwhelmingly powerful national-interest frame of the Cold War years have been felt in both the practice and the research of foreign policymaking. As a result,

Much of what we know about the predominant patterns in news reporting about foreign affairs, the nature and formation of public opinion, and the intricate relationships involving the mass media, public attitudes, and foreign policymaking is based on research conducted during the Cold War era. (Shapiro et al. 2000, 176)

In the aftermath of the Cold War, where agreement on major foreign-affairs issues was no longer as common among the longtime Western allies as it was during the post–World War II years, the relevancy of the existing literature is open to discussion. Recently Shapiro noted that in the era since the end of the Cold War “we have limited, if any, systematic knowledge about the causal linkage process that connects public opinion and foreign policy” (Shapiro et al. 2000).

Another more subtle, yet salient reason for exploring the linkage between foreign policy and public opinion is the transformations in communications technology. A recent U.S. Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, Karen Hughes, observed: “people are not sitting around waiting eagerly to hear from America anymore. Today we are competing for audiences in a very crowded communications environment” (Hughes 2007, 21). For example,

The “CNN effect” pointed to the ability of the first truly global television network to inform the public instantly and continuously of news from anywhere in the world and thereby force national decision makers to deal with the reported problems and issues quickly often without sufficient time to deliberate, and with
the advent of the “Internet syndrome” the Internet as a global medium denies authoritarian and democratic governments alike control over the flow of information. (Shapiro et al. 2000, 57)

In light of the new geopolitical realities (e.g., the end of the Cold War, 9/11) and their implications (such as global terrorism and ongoing transformations in international communications), the effects of foreign policy on public opinion need to be explored. In this respect, the extant research unfortunately remains behind the transforming realities on the ground. For instance, Hughes notes that “under President Bush’s direction, foreign aid has taken on greater importance as both a humanitarian matter and a security matter” (Hughes 2007, 23). Yet, scholarly research indicates that “the extent to which public perceptions of Muslim states influence U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey has not been adequately investigated” (Sampson 2004, 12). Today, “the percentage of Turks who hate the U.S. is higher than among Palestinians” (Çağaptay 2007, 1). A lack of timely research on aid and public opinion can lead to a lack of understanding and to poorly informed policymakers, leading further to detrimental consequences in practice. Overlooking these outcomes may be too costly to afford. For that reason, this study explores the links between various economic instruments (e.g., foreign aid, FDI, bilateral trade) of American foreign policy and their effect on Turkish public opinion about the United States, in order to examine whether these economic measures are still effective tools as assumed by the extant literature.

OVERVIEW OF TURKISH–AMERICAN RELATIONS

Strategic relations between Turkey and the United States date back to the early years of the Cold War. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and Turkish participation in the Korean War all contributed to Turkey’s invitation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. Since then, the transatlantic alliance has become the basis for Turkish–American strategic relations. Considering the Cold War dynamics, and the American policy of the “containment” against the Communist threat, “Turkey’s strategic position was its main asset and was the major reason for the Turkish–American alignment during the Cold War period” (Guney 2005, 79). As a result, structural and strategic realities of time (i.e., Cold War bipolarity) trumped all other identity-based concerns (i.e., which countries are considered European) and Turkey has been anchored within the Western alliance during the Cold War.
After the Cold War, with a waning Communist threat and the NATO’s existence becoming a source of heated debate on the both sides of the Atlantic, coupled with declining American military aid, Turkish elites started to question the value of the Turkish–American alliance. Yet, soon after, the erupting conflicts in the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo) and the Middle East (the First Gulf War) once again confirmed Turkey’s critical position for NATO in general and for the United States in particular. Structural dynamics has changed (i.e., end of the Cold War bipolarity), but the need for strategic cooperation remains, indeed has increased, in the new era. Therefore, a new security arrangement needed to be introduced to counter the emerging challenges.

Accordingly, “Washington and Ankara have begun to characterize the bilateral relationship between the United States and Turkey as a strategic partnership” (Kay 2000, 24) [emphasis in original]. Initially, the phrase was invoked to broaden the existing alliance relations under NATO, so that the two countries can cooperate over an increased number of issues in a more enhanced manner without the need to involve the remaining members of the Alliance. To be more specific, a strategic partnership, “stresses a range of shared long-term interests: the promotion of stability in the Caucasus and Central Asia, better mutual economic and trade relations, cooperation on global issues like terrorism and anti-narcotics efforts, and monitoring of Iraqi and Kurdish activities in northern Iraq” (Kay 2000, 26). Today, these critical strategic objectives continue to occupy their critical positions in the agendas of Turkish elites.

Despite more than a decade of ongoing transformation in Turkish–American relations, the strategic relations have tended to be anything but stable. Substantively, this strategic partnership “expanded bilateral security cooperation, particularly for Ankara’s most immediate concern: military modernization” (Kay 2000, 31). The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 (without a UN Security Council Resolution), along with Turkish parliament’s denial of American troops to use Turkish soil to attack Iraq from the north, revealed cracks in the strategic relations between the two nations. Since then, the efforts to mend fences have been present on both sides. Yet, American reluctance to take concrete steps against PKK terrorists, who are using northern Iraq as a safe haven to attack Turkey, continues to poison the relations. Inevitably, these strains in bilateral relations are reflected in the Turkish media, and thus further contribute to growing anti-Americanism within Turkish society. These and other challenges mean neither that both nations are no longer cooperating nor that all the venues of further cooperation have been exhausted. In view of the existing challenges, the United States and Turkey can further their alliance ties based on the already functioning relations of military and
economic cooperation. Yet, the effects of these American-led policies, such as economic and military assistance, are still unclear. The following chapters of this study aim to explore the effects of these policies, alongside the influence of American FDI and bilateral trade on Turkish public opinion towards the United States. Table – 1.1 illustrates an overview of the research design along with the variables of the study. Identifying the roles of the independent variables, presenting the pertinent findings, and analyzing their effects on the dependent variable will be the focus of each substantive chapter of this book.

NOTES


5. In this study Turkish public opinion is measured by The Pew Global Attitudes Project, which is a series of worldwide public opinion surveys that encompasses a broad array of subjects. The Pew Global Attitudes Project “is co-chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, currently Principal, the Albright Group LLC in Washington, DC, and former Senator John C. Danforth, currently Partner, Bryan Cave LLP in St. Louis, MO. The project is directed by Andrew Kohut, president of the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan ‘fact tank’ in Washington, DC, that provides information on the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world.” Available at: http://pewglobal.org/about.

6. U.S. foreign aid (both economic and military) is recorded by U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook). “The Greenbook shows a complete historical record of United States’ (U.S.) foreign aid to the rest of the world by reporting all loans and grants authorized by the U.S. Government for each fiscal year.” Available at: http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html.

7. Both FDI and bilateral trade are types of international transactions. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) records the international transactions between its member states. Both Turkey and the United States are the members of OECD. “SourceOECD was designed [by OECD] to meet the needs of institutions like universities, government departments, inter-governmental agencies,
non-governmental organizations, companies, think-tanks, research groups, etc., by offering the OECD’s publications catalogue, online in full text, in a flexible manner.” Available at: http://titania.sourceoecd.org/upload/brief_introduction.pdf.


13. This call of the U.S. President G. W. Bush received immediate global support, and hence the counter-terrorism operations in this vein have been referred as Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). For further details see, “Terrorism: Threat Assessment, Countermeasures and Policy,” Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, Vol. 6 (3), November 2001.

14. The full text of the declaration can be accessed from the official NATO website at: http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/index.html.

15. The organization’s [Kurdistan Workers’ Party—Partiya Karkarên Kurdistan, PKK] terrorist nature has been emphasized by the annual report of the U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism.” In the “Patterns of Global Terrorism Report for 1992,” published in April 1993, the PKK was described as “a Marxist Leninist terrorist group, composed of Turkish Kurds seeking to set up a Marxist state in south eastern Turkey,” p. 40. (Find “Patterns of Global Terrorism Reports” through: http://www.mipt.org/Patterns-of-Global-Terrorism.asp).


17. The Iraqi Turkmen are Oghuz Turks (descendents of the Seljuks, who created an empire that spread west from Central Asia in the eleventh century), as are the Turks of modern-day Turkey.

18. The ITF comprises the Iraqi National Turkmen Party, the Turkmenli Party, the Adalet Party, the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Turkmen, the Provincial Turkmen Party and the Movement of Independent Iraqi Turkmen. The ITF website can be found at http://www.kerkuk.net/eng/index.asp.

19. For a statement of the Turkish position, see “An Inhouse [sic] Debate on the Future of Iraq,” Foreign Policy Institute, 6 March 2007. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr


22. PKK is in the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations of the U.S. Department of State (http://te.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm).
The U.S. approach to Turkey is often characterized as “strategic” [ . . . ] strategic in terms of the primacy of security matters.

—Philip Robins, (Robins 2003, 84)

The strategic nature of Turkish–American relationship entails a critical role for U.S. military assistance to Turkey. Given the importance of Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in Turkish politics as the guardian of the Republic,¹ U.S. military assistance to Turkey is expected to have multi-faceted ramifications for Turkey beyond maintaining a modern military in a volatile region. One implication that is critical for Turkish–American relations is how U.S. military assistance affects the view of Turkish public opinion about the United States. Considering the rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey after 9/11, analyzing the potential of U.S. military assistance to garner favorable views towards the United States among Turkish society becomes ever more important. Especially, considering the wide variety of American foreign policy actions ranging from the “the axis of evil” and “crusade” speeches of the President George W. Bush to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, one needs to keep in mind the very context of U.S.–Turkish relations while assessing the effects of U.S. military assistance to Turkey on Turkish public opinion toward the United States in the post-9/11 era.

In order to place this analysis in the context of post-9/11 Turkish–American relations, this chapter will start by defining the role of military assistance by identifying the components of military assistance and its projected effects on Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Next, I present the findings for post-9/11 era, and, finally, I examine to what extent and direction U.S. military assistance influences Turkish public opinion toward the United States.
DEFINING THE ROLE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Before presenting the findings, it is essential to be able to identify the nature of U.S. military assistance to Turkey. It is also important to grasp the role of U.S. military assistance in Turkish–American relations, so that one can be able to examine its potential effects on Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Accordingly, this first part of the chapter addresses the following questions:

1. What is military assistance?
2. Why does the United States provide Turkey military assistance?
3. What is the importance of the U.S. military assistance for Turkey?
4. What is the role of military assistance in Turkish–American relations?
5. What are the effects of post-9/11 U.S. military assistance to Turkey on Turkish public opinion toward the United States (one of the key hypotheses introduced in Chapter 1), and how can this effect be measured?

(1) What is military assistance?

Military assistance and security assistance are both used interchangeably in the literature to refer to U.S. provision of military equipment, training, and service to allied and friendly governments around the world. Since, the nature of business is military, I prefer to use military assistance as a term referring to all U.S. security related equipment, training, and services provided on a grant, transfer, or purchase basis to the governments concerned.

To begin with the official designation, security assistance is defined in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) dictionary of military and associated terms as:

Groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act [AECA] of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.2

In this definition it is important to note that the purpose of U.S. military assistance is to serve America’s national interests by supporting allied and friendly militaries with U.S. defense articles and military training. Thus, U.S. military assistance is expected to enhance America’s influence abroad.

The principal components of the U.S. military assistance program in Turkey are:
a. Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
b. Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
c. International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs
d. Excess Defense Articles (EDA) transfers (Robey and Vordermark 2004, 1)

The close relationship established between the United States and its NATO allies—Turkey has been a NATO ally since 1952 with the largest standing army after the United States—has had a corresponding effect on subsequent security assistance management programs to include (Robey and Vordermark 2004, 4):

- The provision of arms on a preferential basis
- Delivery and cost, to NATO member countries
- Certain exclusions for NATO members for arms control legislative provisions
- International cooperation armaments projects with NATO countries, the F-16 and Joint Strike Fighter as cases in point.

The specific goals of the U.S. security assistance training programs are to:

- Promote self-sufficiency;
- Encourage the training of future leaders;
- Support enhanced relations between the United States and foreign countries;
- Expand foreign understanding of the United States, and its culture and values.

Accordingly, the United States expects its military assistance programs to contribute to further understanding and appreciation of American values and interests. In this respect, it is expected that the increasing U.S. military assistance will be associated with increasingly favorable Turkish public opinion towards the United States. Thus, the hypothesis of this chapter is: The greater the U.S. military assistance, the more favorable Turkish public opinion will be towards the United States.

(2) Why does the United States provide Turkey military assistance?

The strategic objectives of the United States are articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, a report prepared annually and presented to Congress by the president. Its three core objectives are:
• To enhance U.S. security
• To bolster America’s economic prosperity
• To promote American democracy abroad

During the both terms of the former George W. Bush administration (2000–2008), promoting the favorable view of the U.S. democracy worldwide was among top U.S. national security objectives. Although, the foreign policy dynamics of the current Obama Administration remain to be seen, his choice of Turkey as one of the first countries to visit right after his inauguration as the U.S. President signals that in terms of promoting the American image abroad we can expect a considerable degree of continuity in upcoming American foreign policy decision making process. In this respect, “foreign policy, plans, programs, and capabilities designed to achieve national objectives are developed by various government departments” (Robey and Vordermark 2004, 6). Military assistance programs are also designed specifically with national security objectives in mind. To be more specific, one of the primary methods used to carry out U.S. foreign and national security have been “the transfer of U.S. defense articles, defense services, and military training” (Robey and Vordermark 2004, 7).

In order to assure these key U.S. national security considerations, it has been stated that “any assistance furnished by the United States under the program must, by law, strengthen U.S. national security and promote world peace” (Security Assistance Management Manual—hereafter cited as SAMM,—151). For this reason, “countries designated eligible to purchase defense articles and services under the Arms Export Control Act, Section 3, are identified in the DoDD 5105.38-M, (SAMM, Table 600-1).

Alongside the U.S. national security objectives, U.S. military assistance is also essential in the build-up and maintenance of NATO capabilities. Since “NATO is all about collective security and the ability for allied militaries to operate together for a common purpose, this concept holds true even in today’s modern world to include the global war on terrorism” (Robey and Vordermark 2004, 12).

Regarding the particular importance of the U.S. military assistance to Turkey, one can immediately observe its geostrategic location as a key element in the U.S. strategy during the Cold War, as well as in the ongoing global war on terrorism. “The geostrategic position of the Republic of Turkey, at the heart of the most unstable triangle in the world, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, makes it imperative that the United States help maintain a strong and allied modern Turkish military” [italics
mine] (Robey and Vordermark 2004, 11). In this respect, it is important to note that the function of U.S. military assistance is not only to keep Turkish military strong, but also, if not more critically, allied. For that reason, the political and societal effects of the U.S. military assistance of Turkish public opinion about the United States are also important to consider, since in a democracy like Turkey, it is the Turkish public that would ultimately decide the alignment of the Turkish Republic and, hence, its military partnership.

Considering the American and NATO rationales, as well as the reasons peculiar to Turkey, it can be misleading to view the U.S. military assistance to Turkey as a one-way street of U.S. military aid flowing to Turkey. Such a view would depict Turkish–American relations without the benefit of a full understanding of strategic considerations and could lead to strategic miscalculations far costlier for the United States than the U.S. military assistance to Turkey.

In view of the above strategic considerations, U.S. military assistance started in Turkey in 1947 (the Truman Doctrine) and has developed over the years to be an integral part of the U.S. peacetime engagement strategy and now significantly contributes to American national security and foreign policy objectives.

(3) What is the importance of the U.S. military assistance for Turkey?

Turkey, as the bulwark of NATO’s southern flank, also has common borders with some Eastern European countries (Greece, Bulgaria), plus former Soviet client states such as Syria and Iraq. Today, this region still remains a dangerous and unstable area of the world. Turkey’s former deputy chief of staff and former commander of the coalition forces in Somalia, General Cevik Bir, captured the Turkish perspective on the link between strategy, location, and modernization by noting that “Turkey is surrounded by the Bermuda Triangle of the Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East. Given such threats, we must modernize Turkish Armed Forces [TAF]. If we can protect ourselves, then we can contribute to regional peace and stability, and thus, to the world peace” (Quoted in Robey and Vordermark 2004, 14). For almost six decades, the United States has been the top supplier of TAF with modern weaponry and military training. Thus, American military assistance has been essential in realizing TAF modernization goals.

Along with the modernization needs of the Turkish military, politically the U.S. military assistance also has been playing an important role in the
maintenance of Turkey’s defense strategy. Akin to U.S. national security strategy, Turkey’s defense strategy is based on the following principles:

- Deterrence and crisis response reflect the overlap between Turkey’s NATO missions and self-defense requirements
- Forward defense refers to the forward protection of NATO and the intent to defend Turkey at its borders
- High mobility enables a powerful reserve force to be placed centrally and deployed expeditiously to areas under threat (Turkish Defense White Paper 2000, 34)

Accordingly, all of the above outlined components of the U.S. military assistance program have enabled Turkey over the last 55 years to acquire U.S. equipment, services, and training for legitimate self-defense and for participation in multilateral security efforts.

In order to meet their domestic and alliance needs, “the Turkish military continues to try to expand its national defense industry to support its armed forces and develop a viable defense industrial base at a time when Turkey is required to bring its overall level of spending under control to enact necessary economic reforms for European Union (EU) accession” (Robey and Vordermark 2004, 16). As Turkey’s ally, the United States has been consistently supporting Turkish accession into the EU. Accordingly, in support of Turkish EU accession and America’s foreign policy goals, U.S. military assistance is essential in maintaining modern Turkish military without overstretching the budget of the country, so the Turkish economy can keep up with the EU’s standards of accession for a functioning liberal market economy.

(4) What is the role of military assistance in Turkish–American relations?

The primary reason the United States pursues foreign military sales is to achieve the goal of collective security. In general, it is far too expensive for most foreign and developing nations to build up national-level defensive weapons and military security systems. As Robey and Vordermark observe, “this has certainly been true for Turkey, more so because of her strategic location dictated this involvement by the United States. Turkey’s military has strengthened NATO’s southern flank and supported Western Europe’s defense in this volatile region, and it continues to be a moderating influence in the Middle East region” (Robey and Vordermark 2004, 7). Therefore, it remains in the United States’ interest to provide defense articles and military
services to foreign governments like Turkey. The key benefits of the U.S. military assistance program—for both the United States and Turkey—can be summarized as follows:

- Lowered unit production costs and shared research and development costs;
- Progress toward standardization and interoperability of equipment between the United States and friendly foreign nations;
- Use of the U.S. Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangements (CLSSA) by selected countries to include Turkey, which permits support of the foreign nation’s equipment from U.S. stocks on an equal basis with comparable U.S. forces having a similar mission.

**(5) What are the effects of post-9/11 U.S. military assistance to Turkey on Turkish public opinion toward the United States, and how can this effect be measured?**

Theoretically, the U.S. military assistance programs enable the United States to affect changes in host countries across a broad spectrum of issues: ranging from training in small unit tactics to encouraging concern for human rights, and from the provision of technical support for sophisticated weapons to the host military’s role in national politics. Thus, U.S. military assistance is expected to be influential beyond military modernization. Ideally, U.S. military assistance is not only supposed to upgrade the allied militaries’ technology, but also, more critically, the mindset of those militaries and their respective societies. After all, if the U.S. military assistance is not going to help to foster more favorable Turkish public opinion towards the United States, then it risks being counterproductive for the U.S. national security objectives.

The assumption is that U.S. training, advice, and assistance advances the following U.S. policy goals (Robey and Vordermark 2004, 6):

- Providing political influence in recipient countries;
- Encouraging attitudinal changes in host nation militaries and the development of democratic institutions;
- Promoting greater internal, regional, and international stability.

Therefore, the United States foreign policy holds that training, advice, and assistance to developing countries’ militaries are critical instruments of the United States’ national security policy. Along with the U.S. national security objectives, it is important to note that the last two of the above American objectives can also be assumed as benefiting the recipient country, in this case, Turkey. If in fact the U.S. influence contributes to the development of
democratic institutions, and promotes greater internal and regional stability for Turkey, then increasing American military assistance to Turkey should be expected to be associated with a more favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

In order to measure to what extent this projected relationship holds in the post-9/11 era, I will use the report of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations. This report is commonly known as “The Greenbook.” The Greenbook “shows a complete historical record of United States’ foreign aid to the rest of the world by reporting all loans and grants authorized by the U.S. Government for each fiscal year.”

With the aim of retaining consistency in measuring the dependent variable, Turkish public opinion of the United States, I will continue to use the PEW Global Attitudes Project survey data presented in Figure – 1.1.

**FINDINGS**

Key findings are presented in the figure below (Figure – 2.1). U.S. military assistance to Turkey and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States are expected to be positively associated with each other. Yet, this does not mean that one should expect changes in the independent variable to always cause changes of proportionate magnitude in the dependent variable. Instead, the attention should be paid to parallel (or contradictory) trends, to estimate the direction of the projected influence.

![Figure 2.1. U.S. Military Assistance and Turkish Public Opinion.](image-url)
Considering the general trends in both of the variables, certain parallels can be observed. For example, the sharp decline in the U.S. military assistance to Turkey from 2002 to 2003 coincides with the drop of favorable Turkish public opinion towards the United States by half. Thus, on the one hand, decline in the U.S. military assistance is associated with the decline in the overall favorable public opinion of the United States among Turks.

On the other hand, one can also observe that increasing U.S. military assistance to Turkey is associated with the rise of more favorable views of the United States by Turkish society. For instance, from 2003 to 2004 U.S. military assistance to Turkey almost doubled. In the same period, a very similar doubling occurred in the favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Therefore, based of the above findings, increase in the U.S. military assistance is associated with the rise of the favorable public opinion of the United States among Turks.

After 2004, both the U.S. military assistance and the favorable Turkish public opinion have been in a downward slope. These parallel trends in the above figures are significant, and thus they support the hypothesis of this chapter that the U.S. military assistance to Turkey is positively associated with the favorable view of the United States by Turkish public.

Although Turkish public opinion has been in parallel trend with respect to increases and decreases in U.S. military assistance to Turkey since 2002, one can also observe an anomaly during 2000–2002 period in this relationship. For example, even though U.S. military assistance increased almost by eight times, favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States decreased from over 50 percent in 2000 to under 30 percent in 2002. Therefore, although the data confirms the hypothesis with respect to positive relationship between U.S. military assistance to Turkey and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States for most of the post-9/11 era, it falls short in supporting the same relationship for the very beginning of the period.

The reasons for the existence (and absence) of these parallel trends are manifold, ranging from the place of military in Turkish society to the strategic nature of Turkish–American relations. The following section analyzes the reasons and potential repercussions of these findings in light of the key developments in Turkish–American relations in the post-9/11 era.

**ANALYSIS**

Traditionally, the military has been among the top institutions in retaining and maintaining political power—domestic and international—in Turkish states. Albeit a democracy, the primacy of military among the political institutions
is retained in the 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey as the guardian of the Republic: its regime, people, and territory. Philip Robins observes this role by noting that “in Turkey’s strategic culture the issue of security is a core component of just about every facet of public policy in Turkey” (Robins 2004, 161). Considering its profile, in Turkey “the rationale of security is used to justify a large army, the second biggest in NATO; the state has sought to develop an extensive domestic arms production sector; security is invoked as the justification for an array of measures” (Robins 2004, 163).

The underlying reason for employing security as the justification for an array of state policies does not only stem from the primacy of security as an issue in itself. More critically, in terms of the scope of this chapter, such justification is rooted in the conviction that Turkish society regards the military as the prominent institution of the Republic. That is why the Turkish military has been consistently among the top political institutions that Turkish people trust, whereas politicians usually among the ones with the lowest level of trust. Thus, the role of Turkish military in politics—domestic and international—has been, in a sense, endorsed by Turkish public, and this position of Turkish military has been recognized by many American analysts such as Philip Robins, who argues that:

The result of this fixation with security has been to give an important, and at times a pivotal, place to the military within the Turkish system. The Turkish armed forces, as the guardians of Ataturk’s ideological legacy, see themselves as the ultimate guarantors of the state and its orientation; the repeated nature of external and internal security challenges necessitates that the military remain strong, vigilant and prepared to step in directly whenever required. (Robins 2004, 162)

Given the importance of the military in Turkish society and politics, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that anyone interested in winning the hearts and minds of Turks ought to first influence their “guardians,” that is, the Turkish military. Hence, the very nature of Turkish politics, and the key role of Turkish military, leads one to expect that the U.S. military assistance to Turkey will be positively associated with the favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

The U.S. view of Turkey is in parallel with Turkish military’s prominent place in Turkish society as the ultimate guarantor of the Republic. Hence, “the U.S. approach to Turkey is often characterized as strategic in contrast to Europe’s more political and often more critical approach to relations with Ankara” (Lesser 2003, 83). Indeed, the relationship continues to be strategic in several senses: “strategic in terms of the primacy of security matters; strategic in terms of enduring and broad-based cooperation; and strategic in
Military Assistance

terms of Turkey’s role in the broader geopolitical equation” (Lesser 2003, 84). Accordingly, the United States views Turkey, and measures Turkish cooperation, through the lens of a global power, and, in this context, Turkey’s transregional position is significant because of Turkey’s proximity to American areas of interest (conflict zones as well), such as the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. Many Turkish and American analysts and officials, often make this point “location, location, location” (see Khalilzad; Lesser; Larrabee) in referring to Turkey’s strategic significance. Though, this point remains valid in terms of Turkey’s geographical location, it is critical to note that Turkey’s transregional quality goes beyond the country’s geographic position adjacent to areas of interest. More importantly, Turkey’s role in addressing new transregional challenges that cut across national and regional borders in the post-9/11 era need to be analyzed. These challenges are also among the most sensitive issues in the post-9/11 security agenda, especially for Turkey and the United States, and include “missile proliferation and defense, refugee movements, transnational crime and terrorism, and energy security in an era of new transport routes” (Lesser 2003, 84).

All in all, the strategic nature of Turkish–American relations remains today, and is likely to remain, at the heart of Turkish–American strategic partnership. For this reason, the very—strategic—nature of Turkish–American relations presents military cooperation, and thus U.S. military assistance to Turkey, to be the essential element in this relationship.

Key developments in Turkish–American relations in the post-9/11 era confirm the ongoing strategic essence of the relationship. The most notorious one is Turkish Parliament’s rejection of a motion allowing U.S. troops to use Turkish soil to attack Saddam’s Iraq from the north in 2003. The rejection of the motion can be explained by several factors, ranging from the fact that most within the Turkish establishment resisted an American attack without international legitimization to unfulfilled American promises to compensate Turkey for its losses from the First Gulf War (1990–1991).

More importantly, it is critical to note the resistance of Turkish public to this motion allowing U.S. troops to pass through Turkish soil. Despite the tragedy of 9/11, and Turkey’s immediate alignment with the United States in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), “Turkish public opinion strongly opposed the war [i.e., U.S.-led war against Iraq in 2003]” (Emerson and Tocci 2004, 25). Undoubtedly, this had an effect on Turkish members of parliament (MP) in casting their votes in favor of rejecting the U.S. use of Turkish soil to attack Iraq. Individual stories of many Turkish MPs about how their relatives, friends and constituencies personally asked them to prevent such action were widespread in Turkish media. For instance, Turkish Minister of Culture, Huseyin Celik, in an interview with Turkish daily Milliyet on March 5, 2003
explained his no-vote for the resolution based on his father’s call a night before voting advising not to vote in favor of allowing U.S. troops to pass through Turkish soil (*Milliyet* 2003). Such an example from the top cadre of the government reveals how effective role can public pressure play in critical Turkish foreign policy decisions. Under such public pressure, it would have been a surprise (albeit a good one for the United States), if the Turkish Parliament had passed a resolution in favor of the passage of U.S. troops. Although the Parliament was led by an overwhelming majority of the ruling party (AKP) that presented the resolution to the Parliament in 2003, the motion was rejected. In 2003, the U.S. military assistance to Turkey had declined sharply as compared to 2002, while favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States also declined by half (see Figure – 2.1). Thus, the resistance of Turkish public to American demands was in a sense expected. What was not expected, then? The real surprise (for some Turks and Americans) was the effectiveness of such resistance in shaping Turkish foreign policy. As a result, the main lesson to be taken from this rejection is to never underestimate the role of public opinion in democracies.

The shockwaves of this momentous decision were felt immediately in Washington and Ankara. Yet, even the interpretation of the decision by media in both countries was significantly different. Headlines in the United States negatively portrayed the refusal as a “snub,” whereas in Turkey the headlines focused on the democratically reached decision, which accurately reflected Turkish popular opposition. On March 2, 2003, U.S. headlines from the *Boston Globe* and *Chicago Tribune* were “Turkey Snubs U.S., Rejects Troops” and “In Blow to U.S., Turks Deny Bases,” respectively. In Turkey, the headline from the *Yeni Safak* read “Demokrasinin Zaferi” (Victory for Democracy).

In the aftermath of the rejection of the motion to allow U.S. troop movement through Turkey, tensions rose as the U.S. administration strongly warned Turkey not to intervene in Northern Iraq independently of American command. In July 2003 matters worsened further, “when US troops arrested a Turkish military unit in Suleymaniye in Northern Iraq” (Emerson and Tocci 2004, 26). This incident further increased the suspicious Turkish views of the American strategy in Iraq and, thus, contributed to the sharp decline of favorable Turkish public opinion towards the United States beginning in 2004 (see Figure – 2.1).

Ensuing events, however, helped to stabilize the bilateral relationship. In the context of the Iraqi crisis, “the Turkish government strengthened its relations with the Arab world and Iran, without straining its relations with Israel or hinting at a reversal in its Western orientation. Turkey respected its pledge not to unilaterally send additional troops to Northern Iraq” (Emerson and Tocci
2004, 25). All of these political moves can be considered as a balancing act on the Turkish side. This balancing is not necessarily against the United States, but rather an adaptation to the new world, where it has become ever more challenging to draw a clear line between a friend and a foe. Despite declining popularity of the United States among Turks, the Turkish government “offered to send Turkish troops to Iraq as part of the Anglo-American forces in October 2003” (Emerson and Tocci 2004, 26). By taking the risk of alienating their domestic constituency, the Turkish government lent a hand to the United States at a time when American allies were scarce. At this strategic juncture where the unpopularity of the U.S. foreign policy was record high worldwide, the U.S. Secretary of Defense at the time Donald Rumsfeld, preferred to use the term “coalitions of the willing” (Rumsfeld 2003) instead of “allies,” since allies were so difficult to be found and even more so to maintain.

What was the U.S. reaction to the Turkish offer? The United States, “persuaded by the strong Iraqi Kurdish resistance decided that it was best not to involve Turkish troops” (Emerson and Tocci 2004, 26). Hence, the U.S. government refrained from deploying Turkish troops in Iraq. This was a surprise neither for anti-Americans in Turkey nor for those who were skeptical of the U.S. policies. According to Turkish opinion polls, we know that this anti-Americanism or at least skepticism were the considerable majority of opinions in Turkish society at the time. Only less than 20 percent of Turks had favorable feelings towards the United States in 2003 (Pew 2006). In the following years, American policy in Northern Iraq has continued to haunt Turkish–American relations, breeding further skepticism among Turks about the underlying U.S. motives in Iraq. Undoubtedly, this ongoing unease about the Turkish role in Northern Iraq hampered Turkish–American military cooperation, as it can be observed in the sharp decline of the U.S. military assistance to Turkey in Figure – 2.1. These developments contributed to the further decline of American popularity in the eyes of Turkish public.

Yet, different views and their repercussions did not prevent the maintenance of bilateral cooperation. As a global power, the United States has wanted Turkey to contribute to U.S. freedom of action, diplomatically and militarily. Despite the failure to reach agreement on a concerted approach to Iraq, Turkey still plays an important logistical, commercial, and political role in the reconstruction of Iraq. As the Turkish domestic debate on foreign and security policy has become more active and far-reaching, the measurement of the Turkish interest in promoting U.S. freedom of action has become more transparent, and sometimes more difficult. Increasingly, as many observe, “public opinion now has an important role in this process” (see, for example, Lesser 2004, 85). The effects of Turkish public opinion
may not always be in the form of rubber stamping of the U.S. agenda; yet this option must be considered as an element of Turkish politics, if the relations are going to flourish based on the realities on the ground rather than false expectations.

The incidents discussed above, “while not leading to a permanent Turkish–American rift, may have led to a subtle re-evaluation of relations between the Turkish military and the Pentagon” (Barkey 2003, 27). The push for the war in Iraq was predominantly driven by the U.S. Department of Defense, which had traditionally emphasized Turkey’s strategic significance and enjoyed extremely close relations with the Turkish military. Also important, the Department of Defense is the principle American agency administering the U.S. military assistance to Turkey. For this reason, cracks in the bilateral military cooperation can also be used as an opportunity to bring about “an increased civilianization of Turkish–American relations” (Lesser 2004, 84).

Lesser uses the “civilianization” term to refer to a need to improve Turkish–American relations in areas other than military cooperation. In this vein, the need to diversify bilateral relations beyond mere military cooperation is evident. In the end, even the U.S. military planners emphasize the need to go beyond security, since

Turkey is now and will remain an important partner for the United States. The question is not, “How important is Turkey?” but “How is Turkey important?” The United States must address this question and develop a strong diverse relationship with Turkey based on the two countries’ convergent interests, and not solely on security (Gillis 2004, 16).

Such a diversified relationship is also likely to serve alike other supporting policies of the United States vis-à-vis Turkey and its surrounding regions (Europe, the Middle East). For instance, as Emerson and Tocci observe, “greater American focus on Turkey’s political and economic reform may prove far more fruitful to Turkey’s accession process than U.S. pressure on EU member states” (Emerson and Tocci 2004, 26).

All in all, the United States is facing a more democratic and developed Turkey than during the Cold War years, when NATO was established. Although, the fruits of Turkey’s nascent democracy may have not been always as expected, the United States needs to recognize the underlying driving force in democracies: the role of the public opinion. In the case of Turkish–American relations, the views of Turkish public opinion about the United States particularly important. As one of the American authorities on Turkey, Graham E. Fuller8 notes recently, “we [Americans] had better get used to the fact that Turkey, strengthened by its popular democracy, is going to pursue its own national interests, regardless of Washington’s pressure.
Few Turks want it any other way” (“Our Fraying Alliance with Turkey” 2007). Hence, now the question becomes how to win the hearts and minds of the Turks. In this process, the U.S. military assistance has been playing an important role. This neither means that U.S. military assistance is the only factor in shaping Turkish public opinion toward the United States nor that U.S. military assistance influences Turkish public opinion in isolation. Evidently, American policies affecting Turkey has also influenced Turkish public opinion, perhaps more than U.S. military assistance itself at times. American ineffectiveness over controlling Northern Iraq is an example that remains relevant today.

U.S.–Turkish divergence on Iraq influenced both U.S. military assistance to Turkey and Turkish public opinion toward the United States. The United States increased its military assistance to Turkey right after September 11, 2001. In retrospect, because this increase was in the eve of U.S.-led war against Iraq, many Turks perceived it as an American attempt to ‘buy’ Turkish support for U.S. invasion of Iraq. Hence, the adverse effect of an overwhelming increase (see Figure – 2.1) of U.S. military assistance to Turkey was counter-productive in garnering any Turkish sympathy toward the United States. Although this seems like an early (2000–2002) anomaly for hypothesizing positive relationship between U.S. military assistance and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States, in fact, it reveals how critical the perception of U.S. military assistance by Turkish public is. After 2002, however, favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States generally had a parallel trend with U.S. military assistance to Turkey, which means confirming the hypothesized relationship between the two.

The fact that the parallel trends of U.S. military assistance and favorable Turkish public opinion confirmed the hypothesized positive relationship for most of the post-9/11 era does neither mean that U.S. military assistance to Turkey is the only determinant in shaping Turkish public opinion toward the United States nor that such effect occurs in isolation of other international developments. For that reason, the diverse nature of U.S. Turkish relations needs to be kept in mind when analyzing the effects of independent variables on the dependent variable. As the foreign ministers of both countries declared in their “shared vision and structured dialogue” document in 2006, “our consultation and cooperation will also include enhanced bilateral relations with particular emphasis on economic and commercial relations and investments; defense/military cooperation; science and technology; and public diplomacy efforts and exchanges.” Whether such diversification in the form of U.S. economic assistance, FDI, or bilateral trade actually contributes to the favorable view of the United States by Turkish public opinion is examined in the following chapters.
ENDNOTES


5. For details of the Truman Doctrine, see President Harry S. Truman’s address to a joint session of Congress, March 12, 1947.


8. Graham E. Fuller is a former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the Office of the Director of the National Intelligence.

Chapter 3

Economic Assistance

Even in a time of terrorism and war, no successful foreign policy can neglect the global economy.

—C. Fred Bergsten (Foreign Affairs, 2004)

The global economy has always been one of the most important factors in shaping U.S. foreign policy. This situation stems not only from the fact that the United States as a global actor has to consider the realities of global economy, but from America’s ability to use economic assistance to advance its national security and interests. Although after the end of the Cold War U.S. foreign aid declined dramatically, after 9/11 the Bush administration has placed a strong emphasis on aid as a means to support allied and friendly governments in the war against terror. Steven Radelet notes this reversal by observing that “one of the greatest surprises of George W. Bush’s presidency so far has been his call to dramatically increase U.S. foreign aid. In March 2002, Bush proposed an increase of 50 percent over the next three years” (Radelet 2003, 27).

As outlined in Chapter 2, U.S. foreign aid involves military and economic assistance. In this chapter, I will analyze the effects of U.S. economic assistance on Turkish public opinion towards the United States in the post-9/11 era. In order to maintain consistency in the flow of analysis throughout the book, I will maintain the chapter outline used previously. Accordingly, this chapter is comprised of the following major sections:

(1) – Defining the Role of Economic Assistance;
(2) – Findings; and
(3) – Analysis.
DEFINING THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Before presenting the findings, it is essential to define the role of U.S. economic assistance with respect to Turkish–American relations in general and vis-à-vis its effects on Turkish public opinion toward the United States in particular. For that reason, first of all it is important to identify what economic assistance is, then why the United States provides such assistance to Turkey, and its importance for Turkey and Turkish–American relations. After that, I will present the hypothesis about the projected relationship between U.S. economic assistance to Turkey and its potential effects on the view of Turkish public opinion towards the United States in the post-9/11 era. Accordingly, in order to define the role of U.S. economic assistance, this section will consist of the following parts, each addressing the questions below:

(1) What is economic assistance?
(2) Why the United States does provide Turkey economic assistance?
(3) What is the importance of the U.S. economic assistance for Turkey?
(4) What is the role of economic assistance in Turkish–American relations?
(5) What are the effects of post-9/11 U.S. economic assistance on Turkish public opinion toward the United States (one of the key hypotheses introduced in Chapter 1), and how can this effect be measured?

(1) What is economic assistance?

Among five major categories of U.S. foreign assistance—“bilateral development aid, economic assistance supporting U.S. political and security goals, humanitarian aid, multilateral economic contributions, and military aid” (CRS 2004, 1)—I refer to the combined value of the first four of them as U.S. economic assistance. This functional categorization—as military and economic assistance—of U.S. foreign aid facilitates analysis by allowing the researcher to focus on the role of U.S. foreign aid. Recently, “bilateral development assistance has become the largest category of U.S. aid” (CRS 2004, 1). While Turkey is not among the countries on the USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) humanitarian aid list, bilateral development aid can be regarded as the main bulwark of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey. “USAID manages the bulk of bilateral economic assistance; [while] the Treasury Department handles most multilateral aid” (CRS 2004, 15). In order to represent the complete profile of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey, the values in the findings section represent the total amount of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey (Figure – 3.1).
(2) Why the United States does provide Turkey economic assistance?

Andrew Natsios, former administrator of USAID, in a 2005 speech observes that:

“Pure” development, that is, development abstracted from foreign policy concerns in the real world and the challenges it presents, is not likely sustainable over the long term, I fear. The history of over a half century of foreign assistance in the United States demonstrates this. (Natsios, 2005)

Accordingly, since it is not analytically sensible to isolate international development from the foreign policy objectives of a donor nation, it does not seem logical to abstract the economic assistance for development from foreign policy priorities of a donor nation.

The United States, as the largest donor of economic assistance (in dollar terms) for years, has been no different. Thus, American economic assistance has been an important instrument in foreign policy statecraft to advance U.S. national interests. The reports on the allocation of U.S. aid by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) explicitly underline this political motivation for U.S. economic assistance. For example, “the bulk of the [economic assistance] funds are provided through the Economic Support Fund (ESF), an aid category designed to advance American strategic goals with economic assistance” (CRS 2004, 23).

One can observe the sensitivity of U.S. economic assistance to the changes in international politics, and thus adjustments in American priorities. For instance, until 9/11 most of the ESF has gone to support the Middle East Peace Process, ongoing since the 1979 Camp David accords and especially gaining momentum since the end of the Cold War. After 9/11, “much ESF has targeted countries of importance in the war on terrorism. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan, and Indonesia are key partners in the war on terrorism” (CRS 2004, 37). Therefore, the impact of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent use of foreign aid to support the war on terrorism are clearly seen in the country-aid allocations for post-9/11 period. Such changes in country-aid allocations in line with the American foreign policy priorities, such as global war on terrorism, support the widespread belief in the literature that U.S. economic assistance has been employed to advance American foreign policy interests.

In addition to the global war on terrorism, several other interrelated global issues that are considered threats to U.S. security and well-being, such as narcotics, crime, and weapons proliferation, have received special attention when distributing U.S. economic assistance worldwide, especially since the war on terror began after September 11, 2001.
As a truly global actor with worldwide involvement, it is important to note that the “United States is providing some form of foreign assistance to about 150 countries. Assistance, although provided to many nations, is concentrated heavily in certain countries, reflecting the priorities and interests of United States foreign policy at the time” (CRS 2004, 8). Especially after 9/11, Turkey’s importance gained unprecedented attention. This was due not only to its strategic location, but also, more critically, due its ability to demonstrate that a Western style democracy is viable in a predominantly Muslim society.

(3) What is the importance of the U.S. economic assistance for Turkey?

The end of the Cold War was in essence the beginning of an era of opportunity for Turkey, a NATO member used to living with the Soviet threat at its borders. After the Cold War, that major threat evaporated (the dissolution of the Soviet Union), and new opportunities emerged for Turkish businessmen in the newly independent energy rich Turkic republics: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Yet, as a result of a series of unstable coalition governments, Turkey wasted most of these opportunities. Domestic instability, coupled with high inflation rates and a corrupt bureaucracy, alienated foreign investment, and in 2001 Turkey faced an economic crisis.

With its EU prospects unclear, if not dim, at a time Turkey was in need of any kind of economic assistance in 2001, it was only natural for Turkish elites to expect American aid in a time of an economic crisis. After all, what are the allies for, if not for bad times? Turkey has aimed to benefit from U.S. economic assistance directly and indirectly.

First of all, having U.S. economic assistance benefits Turkey by providing a cash flow via U.S. loans and grants to the Turkish economy. Thus, in the short term U.S. economic assistance has the potential of having a very direct and immediate effect on the economy by keeping businesses at work, and hence preventing unemployment and maintaining economic growth.

The relationship between foreign assistance and economic growth is controversially debated in economic and policy circles alike. Recently, this discussion has been influenced by an important paper written by Burnside and Dollar (2000). They find a positive influence between economic development and foreign aid, but only in good policy environments. The robustness of this result and its policy conclusions are questioned by Easterly (2003). Thus, although U.S. economic assistance has been useful for the Turkish economy, it is difficult to say that post-9/11 Turkish economic growth is as a result of
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U.S. economic assistance to Turkey. As a matter of fact, these contributions neglect the question of causality: is foreign assistance really a causal force in economic development, or is there only a correlation between foreign assistance and economic development? U.S. economic assistance could be a causal force if it eliminates barriers for economic growth. Chenery and Strout (1966) argue that “growth in developing countries is restricted by one limiting factor in every period. Such a gap, e.g., national savings, foreign exchange, human capital, or technological knowledge, can be removed by foreign assistance, which thereby fosters economic growth.” During this period a lack of consistency of U.S. military assistance to Turkey prevents one from attributing the elimination of any of the above gaps solely on American aid. Thus, U.S. economic assistance to Turkey has been important and useful, but its inconsistency prevents it from having any direct long term effect on the Turkish economy.

Along with the immediate effects of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey, American aid also has some more intangible and, therefore, more difficult to measure indirect effects on the Turkish economy, and hence on Turkish society. As the world’s largest economy, the United States is also the largest contributor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). There has been a consensus in the literature that IMF loans react to economic conditions but are also sensitive to political-economy variables. To be more specific, “[IMF] loans tend to be larger and more frequent [. . . ] when a country is more connected politically and economically to the United States” (Barro and Lee 2005, 1). Therefore, the side effects of the U.S. economic assistance to Turkey vis-à-vis international monetary institutions—IMF, World Bank—are also potentially beneficial, in terms of demonstrating that Turkey is credit-worthy for U.S. loans.

(4) What is the role of economic assistance in Turkish–American relations?

From an American perspective, “foreign assistance is a fundamental component of the international affairs budget and is viewed by many as an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy” (Tarnoff 2005, 1). In this respect, Turkish perspective is no different from America’s. Thus, in times when U.S. foreign policy needs Turkey, one can expect to observe increasing U.S. economic assistance to Turkey.

From the Turkish perspective, although the United States and Turkey experienced serious tensions over Iraq, the United States is Turkey’s most critical international ally. One analyst observed that “when Turkish diplomats discussed foreign policy matters it was almost as if the Americans were in the
room with them’’ (Wood 2004, 5). The degree of the overlap is, of course, open to debate. Yet, the essence of observation is the fact that Turkish elites do take into account American positions on key international issues.

Especially after 9/11, the United States has demonstrated an increasing understanding of Turkey’s importance. The Bush administration has been almost flawless in appreciating Turkey’s importance in its speeches. For example, as the President has said:

[Turkey] has always been important for its geography—here at the meeting place of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Now Turkey has assumed even greater historical importance, because of your character as a nation. Turkey is a strong, secular democracy, a majority Muslim society, and a close ally of free nations . . . Your success is vital to a future of progress and peace in Europe and in the broader Middle East—and the Republic of Turkey can depend on the support and friendship of the United States (Bush 2003).

Whether the actions of the Bush administration followed its generous rhetoric, and to what extent Turkish public have been convinced, need to be examined further.

(5) What are the effects of post-9/11 U.S. economic assistance on Turkish public opinion toward the United States, and how can this effect be measured?

Theoretically, U.S. economic assistance is expected to serve in a similar fashion to U.S. military assistance—that is, to advance American national interests and help to bring the recipient country’s foreign policies closer to the U.S. stance in world politics. Thus, in essence, U.S. military and economic assistance can be considered as mutually reinforcing pillars of U.S. foreign aid.

While military assistance is more specific in its main objective such as supporting strong allied militaries, U.S. economic assistance can have a wide range of concentrations ranging from supporting sustainable economic development to improving health and education facilities of the recipient country.

As a matter of fact the very multifaceted nature of U.S. economic assistance makes it particularly important for any long term partnership with the United States. Robert E. Hunter, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, underlines the significance nonmilitary aspects of cooperation for U.S. partnerships in the Middle East. According to Hunter, “the partnership should cooperate on addressing not only the challenges of political reform in the Middle East, but also the nonmilitary aspects of counterterrorism and counterproliferation, economic and social development, education, and health there and elsewhere” (Hunter 2004, 3).
Given its potential broad implications, U.S. economic assistance to Turkey is evidently expected to have a positive influence on Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Furthermore, if managed efficiently, one can expect U.S. economic assistance to be even more influential on Turkish public opinion than U.S. military assistance. While people tend to prioritize the importance of military force—and hence military assistance—during the time of war, in general most people are normally concerned with their socio-economic well-being and factors affecting it, such as economic assistance. As a result, the main hypothesis on the relationship between U.S. economic assistance to Turkey and Turkish public opinion toward the United States can be formulated as follows:

*The more the U.S. economic assistance, the more favorable Turkish public opinion will be toward the United States.*

Since USAID manages the bulk of U.S. economic assistance (bilateral development aid), its data constitutes the original source in this respect. All data on U.S. economic assistance to Turkey in Figure – 3.1 below depict the combined value of the total amount of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey in a given year. The Greenbook “shows a complete historical record of United States’ foreign aid to the rest of the world by reporting all loans and grants authorized by the U.S. Government for each fiscal year.”

**FINDINGS**

Key findings are presented in the figure below (Figure – 3.1). U.S. economic assistance to Turkey and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States are expected to be positively associated with each other. Yet, this does not mean that one should expect changes in the independent variable to always cause changes of proportionate magnitude in the dependent variable. Instead, the attention should be paid to parallel (or contradictory) trends, to estimate the direction of the projected influence.

The figure on the next page depicts the inconsistency of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey (represented by the solid line in Figure – 3.1). This inconsistency hampers one’s ability to draw parallels between U.S. economic assistance to Turkey and Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Yet, some conclusions can still be drawn. There are three major trends in Figure – 3.1 that are important in displaying the nature of the relationship between the U.S. economic assistance to Turkey and Turkish public opinion toward the United States.
Chapter 3

Considering the values for 2000 in Figure – 3.1, where U.S. economic assistance to Turkey is almost nonexistent, favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States is more than 50 percent. For 2001, despite a slight increase in U.S. economic assistance to Turkey, there is no data for Turkish public opinion (missing value for 2001 in Figure – 3.1). After September 11, 2001, from 2001 to 2002 one can observe the big spike in the solid line in Figure – 3.1. This can be principally attributed to the fact that Turkey was among the first countries to declare its support to the United States in the global war against terror. Although the 9/11 attacks triggered a wave of sympathy toward the United States in Turkey, favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States considerably declined to about 30 percent in 2002, almost half the figure of over 50 percent in 2000. Thus, for the period 2000–2002, U.S. economic assistance to Turkey and Turkish public opinion were inversely related. Certainly, this period does not confirm the main hypothesis of this chapter (H–2). Yet, does this mean that U.S. economic assistance is counterproductive in garnering favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States?

The downturn in favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States manifested itself in widespread public opposition to U.S.-led war against Iraq, and the infamous disapproval of the passage of American troops through Turkish soil by the Turkish parliament. Perhaps because of this rejection,

Figure 3.1. U.S. Economic Assistance and Turkish Public Opinion.
U.S. economic assistance to Turkey fell sharply from 2002 to 2003. Not surprisingly, America’s reaction to Turkey by sharply reducing U.S. economic assistance was not welcomed by Turkish public. Consequently, favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States fell sharply from about 30 percent in 2002 to 12 percent in 2003. Thus, for the 2002–2003 period, one can observe parallel trends, albeit downwards.

As a result, both U.S. economic assistance to Turkey and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States declined sharply. This period can be regarded as confirming the hypothesis (H-2). If one expects a rise in U.S. economic assistance to Turkey to lead increasing favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States, one can also expect the decrease in U.S. economic assistance to lead the opposite.

From 2003 to 2006, U.S. economic assistance to Turkey remained low, below 10 million U.S. Dollars. From 2003 to 2004 U.S. economic assistance slightly increased, and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States increased considerably, returning to 30 percent levels. From 2004 to 2005, U.S. economic assistance continued to increase, while Turkish public opinion declined. From 2005 to 2006, both U.S. economic assistance to Turkey and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States decreased considerably. In this period (2003–2006), while favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States fluctuated considerably, U.S. economic assistance to Turkey demonstrated only slight changes (see the solid line between 2003–2006 in Figure 3.1). Thus, even if there are some parallels observed, it is difficult to attribute them to the fluctuations in U.S. economic assistance to Turkey, since there were simply no substantial changes in the U.S. economic assistance to Turkey in this period. As a result, it is difficult to evaluate the effect of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey on Turkish opinion about the United States. Hence, for 2003–2006 period the data neither confirms nor disproves the hypothesis (H-2). Given the contradictory outcomes for the first two periods, it is difficult to state that the data either confirm or reject the hypothesis. Considering the varying trends of U.S. economic assistance and Turkish public opinion in less than a decade, one can state that there is no consistent relationship between U.S. economic assistance to Turkey and Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

**ANALYSIS**

Does this lack of consistent relationship between U.S. economic assistance to Turkey and Turkish public opinion toward the United States mean that U.S. economic assistance has no potential effect on Turkish public opinion?
Is U.S. economic assistance a wrong instrument to begin with, or had it been misused in influencing Turkish public? Hence, if U.S. economic assistance to Turkey is not useful in garnering favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States, then through what other ways can it help to improve U.S.–Turkish relations?

Throughout the post-9/11 period, one can observe that U.S. economic assistance to Turkey (see Figure – 3.1) remained considerably low with the exception of a spike from 2001 to 2002. President George W. Bush pledged an unprecedented increase in U.S. economic assistance in the aftermath of 9/11 in part of the global war on terrorism. At Monterrey, “in 2002, President Bush pledged to increase U.S. development assistance. In 2004, U.S. assistance totaled more than $19 billion, up from $10 billion in 2000. It now accounts for a quarter of the OECD total, the highest share in 20 years” (Natsios 2005).\(^3\) Despite the fact that Turkey has been considered one of the key U.S. allies in the global war on terrorism, and despite the fact that U.S. economic assistance budget has been at its peak in last 20 years, Turkey has not been granted consistent U.S. economic assistance in proportion with its increasing strategic importance for the United States.

Recovering from 2001 economic crisis, Turkey was already in need of economic assistance. After 9/11, Turkey declared its support for the U.S. global war on terror and participated in coalition operations against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and so far commanded ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) twice. Thus, at high politics level, U.S.–Turkish relations in fact flourished in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. One can observe that from the sharp increase in U.S. military assistance in the same period as well (Figure – 2.1). However, in the aftermath of the economic crisis, domestic political volatility prior to the 2002 general parliamentary elections hampered Turkish economy’s ability to fully exploit opportunities of increasing U.S. economic assistance to Turkey. As a result, the Turkish people’s ability to benefit from any economic development had been crippled. Unemployment and inflation remained high during 2002, while economic growth was barely recovering from the damage of the 2001 crisis. Thus, U.S. economic assistance was not channeled effectively to the Turkish people; hence, the Turkish people did not notice the benefits of the increasing U.S. economic assistance in their day-to-day lives.

During 2002–2003 period, the United States tried to convince Turkish decision-makers to support the U.S.-led war against Iraq, and to allow U.S. troops to use Turkish soil to stage an attack against Iraq from the north (to open a Northern Front). Although, the Turkish public was strongly against such action, the newly elected (November 2002) AKP government was in the process of negotiating U.S. economic aid in return for providing U.S. troops a pass through Turkish soil on their way to Iraq.
At the end of intense negotiations in the U.S. capital, “the Bush administration offered to expand aid package, including about $6 billion in grants and up to $20 billion in loan guarantees, to secure Ankara’s support for a possible invasion of Iraq” (Güney 2005, 349). These numbers demonstrate just how significant Turkish basing was to American war-planners.

Nevertheless, the widespread depiction of negotiations as horse-trading in the Turkish media, along with nationalist, left-wing, and Islamist critiques of the negotiations, did not contribute to a favorable view of American intentions by the Turkish public. Especially in an atmosphere where Turkish losses from the First Gulf War (1990–1991) were fresh in the memories of Turkish public, it was not difficult to find reasons to be suspicious about the underlying American motives. Since the First Gulf War, in an effort to support U.S.-imposed embargoes on Saddam, Turkey had numerous economic losses due to restrictions imposed on one of its most lucrative export markets: Iraq. It also lost its revenue from pipeline fees carrying Kirkuk oil to world markets via Turkish Mediterranean port of Yumurtalık.

To make the situation worse, after the First Gulf War Iraqi refugees escaping from Saddam flooded the Turkish–Iraqi border, further destabilizing the region where Turkey was fighting against PKK terrorists. Neither Turkish elites nor the Turkish public ever felt adequately compensated by the United States for the losses of the First Gulf War. As a result, when the generous U.S. economic aid package was proposed American commitment was questioned by the Turkish public at first.

Moreover, the Turkish public was wary of the potential unintended consequences of the U.S. invasion of Iraq for Turkey, such as destabilizing northern Iraq with concomitant potential increases in terrorist attacks on the Turkish–Iraqi border. Turkish analysts observed this American economic aid package as “money for blood” (Güney 2005, 349). Thus, the timing was wrong, the discourse (i.e., buying Turkish support) was wrong, and as a result an unprecedented U.S. economic aid offer to Turkey received an unprecedented defeat in Turkish parliament. Yet, does this mean that U.S. economic assistance to Turkey is ineffectual?

The absence of strong economic relations between the United States and Turkey may be the very reason for these uncertainties in the Turkish public toward the United States. Soner Çağaptay, in his testimony to the 9/11 Commission notes that “when the U.S.–Turkish relations faced a crisis in 2003, the deterioration in the relationship was compounded by the fact that bilateral military and political ties were not supported by strong economic relations” ( Çağaptay 2004, 21). With Turkey, the strategic relationship is longstanding, but the economic and cultural dimension remains underdeveloped. This prevailing security-heavy framework can be considered as the problematic
Chapter 3

legacy of the Cold War in U.S.–Turkish relations. The quality of the bilateral relationship continues to be measured, overwhelmingly, “by the quality of interaction at the high political level, with too little in the way of an underlying society-to-society relationship” (Turkish–U.S. Business Council 2006).

In this respect, it is important to note that having a high level strategic relationship with the United States is not the reason for the problem, but rather the problem is not having corresponding economic relations with the United States. This problem especially becomes ever more challenging in the diverse security environment of the post-9/11 era, when states can have different priorities while strategically continuing to share common agendas. The 2003 crisis in U.S.–Turkish relations has demonstrated that a strategic relationship without strong economic and social components can become potentially fragile at the moment immediate state preferences fail to overlap. As a result, “over the last decade, Washington has been remarkably unsuccessful in reassuring Turkish policymakers and opinion shapers about America’s commitment” (Turkish–U.S. Business Council 2006).

This analysis leads one to answer the key question in the beginning of the analysis section, America’s economic assistance is not an inappropriate tool to garner favorable public opinion toward the United States, but it is a tool that has not been used effectively to this end. U.S. economic assistance can be used to foster society-to-society relation between the United States and Turkey, as well as to support business-to-business relations for stronger economic relations. As most Turkish businessmen wish “if, in a few years’ time, there is less attention to the use of Incirlik air base and more attention to economic and cultural engagement, the relationship will benefit” (Turkish–U.S. Business Council 2006). In this respect, U.S. economic assistance to Turkey can provide the very conduit necessary to bolster U.S.–Turkish economic relations. Undoubtedly, this type of U.S. economic assistance would be much more grassroots oriented. Therefore U.S. aid would be much more noticeable by Turkish public, rather than government to government grants and/or loan transfers with uncertain futures of public access. Only after this kind of outreach measures are taken by using U.S. economic assistance to Turkey, one can expect it to garner increasing favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

ENDNOTES

1. USAID is an independent federal government agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. It supports long-term and equitable economic growth and advances U.S. foreign policy objectives. For details, see the official website at: http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/.

3. Andrew S. Natsios was Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development until January 2006. He is now serving as Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.
Chapter 4

Foreign Direct Investment

FDI combines aspects of both international trade in goods and international financial flows, and it is a phenomenon more complex than either of these.

—Robert C. Feenstra (Quoted by Modanli 2007)

In a globalizing world economy foreign direct investment (FDI) has become more than a mere venue for investment abroad. While principal economic motivations such as the drive for low cost and high profit remain, political factors in the determination and allocation of foreign investment are maintaining their importance.

Given the evident financial motivations, such as low labor costs and taxes, as well as, proximity to world markets and energy resources, what makes FDI a complex phenomenon is the fact that FDI has become a tool of foreign policy statecraft. Yet, despite the contemporary rising political relevance of FDI, “in contrast to the 19th and early 20th centuries, the effects of security factors on foreign direct investment (FDI) have received limited interest in the post-Cold War era” (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007, 835).

Unfortunately, this “limited interest” in the effects of security factors on FDI has also been the case for U.S.–Turkish relations. To address this gap in the literature, in this chapter I will analyze the effects of U.S. FDI in Turkey on Turkish public opinion toward the United States in the post-9/11 era. In order to maintain consistency within the book, I will continue to use the core three-step structure that I have used in the previous chapters. Accordingly, this chapter is organized as follows:
DEFINING THE ROLE OF FDI IN U.S.–TURKISH RELATIONS

It is important to identify what FDI means before beginning the analysis and presenting the findings. Internationally acceptable FDI definitions can be found through OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) and UNCTAD (United Nations Commission for Trade and Development).¹ Yet, for the purpose of this study, one also needs to understand the role of FDI in Turkish–American relations. This can be done by underlining economic and political reasons for direct investment by the United States, while explaining the importance of U.S. FDI for Turkey and, hence, for U.S.–Turkish relations. Only after these questions are addressed, can one proceed to the main hypothesis of this chapter that outlines the projected relationship between U.S. FDI in Turkey and Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Accordingly, with the aim of defining the role of FDI in U.S.–Turkish relations, I will address the following questions:

(1) What is FDI?
(2) Why does the United States invest in Turkey?
(3) What is the importance of the U.S. FDI for Turkey?
(4) What is the role of FDI in Turkish–American relations?
(5) What are the effects of U.S. FDI on Turkish public opinion toward the United States?

(1) What is FDI?

The very definition of direct investment implies that a person in one country has a lasting interest in and a degree of influence over, a business enterprise in another country. Simply put, FDI is a direct investment from one country in another country. For example, U.S. FDI in Turkey is a direct investment from the United States to Turkey. Since the focus of this study is on U.S.–Turkish relations, and more specifically in this chapter on the effects of American FDI in Turkey, it is necessary to narrow down this definition by introducing the U.S. criterion for FDI. The criterion used in the United States is set forth in the International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act, which “sets ownership or control of ten per cent or more of an enterprise’s voting
securities as a considered evidence of a lasting interest in or a degree of influence over management” (USBEA 2007).²

Other nongovernmental sources such as the research institutes of universities also rely on the similar definitions with added specifications, such as:

Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. (GLOBALIS 2007)

In line with these overlapping definitions, I will use the definition of FDI that has been narrowed down by the above-mentioned U.S. provisions, and detailed in the above paragraph.

(2) Why does the United States invest in Turkey?

Turkey has been an increasingly attractive location for Western foreign investment because of its emerging role as a springboard for foreign companies to access the newly emerging markets of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the broader Middle East by entering into joint ventures with Turkish partners. Hence, Turkey’s geopolitical position is not only a strategic political asset, but also an economic one. This has become particularly evident in the aftermath of 2002, with the steady annual growth of Turkish economy at more than 6 percent annually. According to OECD’s Direct Investment Trends Report, “Turkey has been among top 7 countries that most attracted foreign direct investment among OECD members in the last ten years” (Quoted by Aksam 2007). Another reason for Turkey’s attractiveness for investors is the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which enhanced the importance of Turkey’s strategic position not only geographically, but also culturally owing to Turkey’s close ties with newly independent energy-rich Turkic republics: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. As a result, since the beginning of the 1990s, “Istanbul has become the hub of a vast hinterland extending from the Balkans to the Caucuses and represents a prime focus for foreign investment” (Berköz 2005, 143).

At this juncture, Turkey has important political and economic benefits that the United States needs to consider when coordinating its direct investment policies abroad. Economically, with its young, well-educated population, sustainable GDP growth, and unique cultural and historic ties with the newly emerging countries of the Caucasus and central Asia, Turkey has been a rising star among OECD economies. There is no reason of why it will not
remain attractive. Accordingly, the United States can benefit from Turkey’s position vis-à-vis these countries, while enhancing U.S.–Turkish relations at another strategic, yet nonmilitary, level through the use of FDI in Turkey.

Politically, foreign investment has become an increasing source of global influence, and this is true for the United States as well. In addition, U.S. FDI in Turkey is likely to contribute to the economic stability of Turkish economy; thus, it is expected to contribute to the overall domestic political stability of Turkey, which is also in the interest of the United States. In this respect, Turkey’s own emerging potential and its market attractiveness for an incremental share of world foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have also been confirmed by the U.S. government, designating the country as one of the ten Big Emerging Markets along with China, India, Russia and Brazil, which are expected to offer the greatest commercial growth opportunities in the 21st century due to their high economic growth and rapidly growing population (Glaister and Tatoglu 2004).³

As the above authors observed, Turkey’s FDI potential has been officially recognized by the United States. In a sense, this is not only a recognition of the growing economic value of Turkey, but it can be interpreted also as an American recognition of Turkey as an essential partner beyond the military strategy domain, and, hence, a recognition that Turkey is an important partner in America’s global grand strategy.

(3) What is the importance of the U.S. FDI for Turkey?

FDI has multidimensional effects on the economy of a host country, in this study: Turkey. In this regard, FDI influences “the production, employment, income, prices, exports, imports, economic growth, balance of payments, and general welfare of the recipient country” (Erdal and Tatoglu 2002). In addition, FDI is also probably one of the most significant factors leading to the globalization of the international economy, and, hence, FDI is essential in establishing global connections for developing economies like Turkey.

In contrast with investments that enter and leave countries easily when at risk, “FDI contributes to economical growth, employment, technological development and exportation-centered production of the host country (where investments are made) by also developing relationships even among distant countries” (Modanli 2007), such as between the United States and Turkey.

In view of the advantages for their economy, host countries wish to attract and provide legal safeguards for this kind of investment. Accordingly, international treaties and national investment regulations in general are entered into as a means to protect and encourage FDI. In line with this idea,
Foreign Direct Investment Law No. 4875 (FDI Law), which emphasizes the opening of the investment environment in Turkey, was enacted. This law was enacted with a view to eliminate a variety of problems relating to the foreign investors concerned about their ownership rights in host countries and to the worries of host countries’ public with regard to the probable decrease in employment and loss of independence and ineffectiveness of the former existing Foreign Investment Promotion Law No. 6224 (the Old Law). The FDI Law also appropriately deals with foreign investors’ rights by current international standards (Modanli 2007).

Simply put, the main purpose of the new Turkish FDI Law is to reduce the bureaucratic barriers that foreign investors face. This is an indication that Turkish government policy is designed to encourage FDI by easing provisions that may hamper foreign investment in Turkey. In this vein, almost all areas open to investment by the Turkish private sector are fully open to foreign participation; thus, foreign investors can compete on an equal basis with their Turkish counterparts. All of these reforms to further attract foreign investment in Turkey demonstrate Turkey’s willingness to receive FDI in general. Within this generality, however, it is important to note that Turkey’s preference is to attract industrialized countries. Particularly, developed EU countries such as Germany, France, and the Netherlands represent the lion’s share of FDI in Turkey, while the United States trails behind them. The strategic depth of U.S.-Turkish relations has not been reflected in U.S. FDI to Turkey. This does not mean American FDI is not as important as European FDI for Turkey. As a matter of fact, it can be argued that perhaps it is just the opposite. The underlying reason is that the degree of American industrial strength, especially in defense, communications, energy transportation and production technologies, can be of critical importance for developing Turkey in the 21st century.

(4) What is the role of FDI in Turkish–American relations?

In general, it is believed that FDI flows do contribute significantly to build strong economic links between industrialized countries and developing countries (USTR 2007). That is why “the amount of FDI flowing to developing countries increased remarkably in the 1990s and now accounts for about 40 per cent of global FDI” (USTR 2007).4 This substantial surge in FDI flows to developing countries from developed countries has been largely a result of a rapid pace of liberalization movements in these countries. Similar liberalization trends have also been observed in Turkey, particularly because of the reforms introduced to harmonize Turkish economy with EU standards. The Turkish Government initiated a series of reforms aiming to accomplish the following objectives:
(a) Minimizing state intervention;
(b) Establishing a free market economy;
(c) Integrating the economy with the global economic system (Modanli 2007).

In addition to these legal and political adjustments with the EU, Turkey also signed a bilateral investment treaty with the United States: “The United States–Turkey Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), entered into force in May 1990” (USTR 2007). All of these domestic political and legal reforms clearly demonstrate that Turkey’s primary political, economic, and security ties are with the West. In this respect, the strategic ties with the United States are of paramount importance for Turkey (Barkey 2005). Yet, this does not mean that U.S.–Turkish relations do not need the support of strong economic ties as well. Through increasing American FDI in Turkey, the United States has the potential of nurturing strong grass roots economic and societal support for its policies among the Turkish public.

(5) What are the effects of post-9/11 U.S. FDI on Turkish public opinion toward the United States, and how can this effect be measured?

Given the importance of American FDI for U.S.–Turkish relations, it can be expected that U.S. FDI would play an important role in influencing Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Although, “in spite of important investments from the U.S. in the top 20 Turkish FDI companies (motor vehicles, rubber and glass), the relative share of US investment is not significantly different in Turkey than in the CEECs [Central and East European Countries]” (Dutz, Us, and Yilmaz 2004, 3), even though the latter are much smaller economies than Turkey. Thus, American FDI potential has not been fully exploited, considering the size of the Turkish economy. One question is: can this result be attributed to 9/11?

Studies indicate that “time-series intervention analysis shows that 9/11 generally had little lasting influence on U.S. FDI flows. Only a few countries that experienced subsequent terrorist attacks displayed a post-9/11 drop in U.S. FDI flows, which, except for Turkey, was not long-lived” (Enders, Schsida, and Sandler 2006, 523).

Under these circumstances one needs to ask about what kind of effects to expect from already limited American FDI. Theoretically, it is expected that higher levels of FDI will be associated with increasingly favorable public opinion toward the investing country.
The more the U.S. FDI to Turkey, the more favorable Turkish public opinion will be toward the United States.

In order to test this hypothesis, I will use the FDI data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, which is the combined data of American investment in Turkey.

FINDINGS

The findings with regard to the relationship between U.S. FDI in Turkey and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States are illustrated in the below figure (Figure – 4.1). U.S. FDI values represent the combined values of all American investment across various major sectors of Turkish economy, from machinery and automobiles to mining and services. In order to maintain consistency Turkish public opinion data that has been used throughout the book is retained.

When interpreting these findings, it is important to focus on the presence (or absence) of parallel trends, to estimate the effects of U.S. FDI in Turkey on Turkish public opinion toward the United States in the post-9/11 era. While U.S. FDI is not the only factor influencing Turkish public opinion toward the United States, it is necessary to note that “[FDI] findings have important policy implications given that developing democratic countries are trying to attract more FDI in order to achieve their economic growth and development targets” (Choi and Samy 2008, 83).

![Figure 4.1. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment and Turkish Public Opinion.](image-url)
The observation of these authors in the recent issue of *Foreign Policy Analysis* underlines the fact that FDI is expected to have positive, multifaceted repercussions for the host and investing economies, as well as for their respective domestic and international policies.

In Figure – 4.1, it is important to note that the values on the left (primary axis) represent the amount of U.S. FDI in Turkey in million of U.S. Dollars, which are the values for the solid line depicting the variations in the independent variable (U.S. FDI). The values on the right represent the percentage of favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States illustrating the variation in the dependent variable (Turkish public opinion toward the United States), which are the values for the dotted line.

From 2001 to 2003, U.S. FDI in Turkey increased steadily and reached its highest level for the period analyzed. Yet, this increase failed to generate a corresponding increase in favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Thus, the hypothesis projecting that an increase in FDI is associated with more favorable public opinion toward the investing country, in this case the United States, did not hold from 2001 to 2003. In fact, to the contrary, despite the steady increase in U.S. FDI in Turkey, there was a consistent decrease in Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

From 2003 to 2004, U.S. FDI in Turkey slightly declined while favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States almost doubled. Thus, once again the hypothesis of positive association between the U.S. FDI in Turkey and Turkish public opinion toward the United States is disproved.

From 2004 to 2005, U.S. FDI in Turkey continued to decline, and this time it was accompanied by the decline in favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States. As a result, the hypothesis is confirmed for 2004–2005 period. Such confirmation, though, was not as predicted, with an increase in FDI associated with an increase in favorable public opinion, but rather the other way around: a decrease in U.S. FDI to Turkey was paralleled by the decline in favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

From 2005 to 2006, despite a slight increase in U.S. FDI in Turkey, favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States declined sharply. Hence, the hypothesis is disproved once again for 2005–2006 period. Considering the varying fluctuations and the absence of parallel trends between U.S. FDI in Turkey and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States, one can conclude that U.S. FDI alone fails to explain fluctuations in Turkish public opinion toward the United States. As a result, the hypothesized positive association between the U.S. FDI in Turkey and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States does not exist in the post-9/11 era. Evidently, the U.S. FDI in Turkey failed to influence Turkish public opinion
toward the United States in a desirable direction, whether such failure has to do more with economics or politics needs to be further analyzed.

ANALYSIS

The very limited influence of American FDI in Turkey on Turkish public opinion toward the United States needs to be carefully analyzed to weigh the underlying economic and political reasons. Does this limited influence imply that American FDI is not important for Turkey? If not, what are the other intervening factors that interact with U.S. FDI and Turkish public opinion simultaneously?

To begin with economic reasons, American FDI in Turkey has been inadequate when compared with the FDI from developed European countries. According to Turkey’s largest businessmen organization, TUSIAD, “the EU accounts for 67% of foreign capital companies operating in Turkey. Netherlands is by far the leader investing country and the followers are Germany, United Kingdom and the United States” (TUSIAD 2007). It is important to note that each of these European countries is smaller than California, and hence they have much smaller economies, when compared with the United States. Still, the American FDI in Turkey has been trailing behind those countries. Thus, American FDI in Turkey was even smaller in relative terms, when the sheer size of the U.S. economy is considered. As a result, from an economic perspective, the smaller the FDI, the more limited its influence is on Turkish public.

One way of assessing the impact of FDI on Turkish public opinion is to view the FDI and Turkish public opinion from comparative perspective. Considering the fact that all countries preceding the United States in terms FDI to Turkey are the members of the European Union comparing Turkish public opinion toward the EU and the United States is intuitive. Accordingly, since the EU originated FDI to Turkey has been consistently higher than that of the United States, both in absolute and relative terms, one can expect that Turkish public opinion is likely to be more favorable toward the EU than toward the United States in the post-9/11 era. Recent study conducted by The German Marshall Fund of the United States demonstrates such translation of FDI to increasing levels of favorable views of the EU than that of the United States by Turkish public. In the most recent Transatlantic Trends “Thermometer Readings of Turkish Feelings toward Others” Turks’ warmth, representing a favorable view, toward the EU was measured as 33-degrees with a 7-degrees increase from 2007, while in the same study Turks’ warmth toward the United States was measured 14-degrees with only 3-degrees increase from 2007 (Transatlantic Trends 2008). This trend in Turkish public opinion can be further
observed when Turks are asked about with whom “Turkey should cooperate on international matters” (Transatlantic Trends 2008). According to the most recent study, 20% of Turks have supported Turkey acting with the EU on international matters, while only 3% of Turks voiced support for acting with the United States in response to the same question (Transatlantic Trends 2008). In light of the emerging research findings, comparative analysis of FDI and Turkish public opinion data with respect to favorable views upholds the FDI hypothesis of this study that increasing levels of FDI to Turkey are expected to be associated with increasing levels of favorable Turkish public opinion toward the FDI originating country. In addition, finding parallels between Turkish public perception and foreign policy preferences of Turkish public further supports the core foundation of this study that increasing Turkish public opinion matters considerably more in Turkish foreign policymaking, so as it needs to be taken into account accordingly.

Especially in a political climate where Turkey was undertaking a series of economic and political reforms to accelerate its EU accession, the influence of relatively smaller American FDI (compared to some EU countries) was prone to have a very limited, if any, effect on Turkish public opinion. In December 1999, Turkey became a candidate for EU membership. On December 17, 2004, the EU decided to begin formal accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. Therefore, at the very least until 2006, Turkish politics were predominantly preoccupied with the EU accession process.

During this period (2001–2003), U.S.–Turkish relations became high on the agenda of Turkish politics on in the eve of U.S. invasion of Iraq. This was the time of the infamous rejection by the Turkish parliament of the passage of American troops through Turkish soil to open a front against Saddam Hussein from the north of Iraq.

Although during the period 2001–2003, American FDI in Turkey increased steadily, Turkish public opinion toward the United States sharply declined. In this period it is important to note that Turkey aligned its foreign policy not with that of the United States, but instead with major European states, such as Germany and France (Guney 2005).

In such an alignment, evidently foreign policy considerations played a critical role; but it is also necessary to remember that Germany has been consistently the top foreign direct investor in Turkey. Thus, many Turks did not view increasing German investment as an attempt to buy favorable Turkish public opinion. Yet, this does not mean that German FDI has not this had potential side effect.

Economically and politically, the EU, more specifically Turkey’s EU accession process, has clearly been an intervening factor vis-à-vis U.S.–Turkish relations in general, and in explaining the effects of American FDI in Turkey in particular. Nevertheless, this does not mean that European influence on
U.S.–Turkish relations has always been detrimental. For example, Turkey and the EU formed a customs union beginning on January 1, 1996. In accordance with its EU accession process, Turkey’s existing customs union agreement with the EU helped to harmonize its laws and regulations with EU standards. Turkey adopted “the EU’s Common External Tariff regime, effectively lowering Turkey’s tariffs for third countries, including the United States” (U.S. Department of State 2007). Thus, in fact the United States has been among the top non-European beneficiaries of Turkey’s EU reforms of harmonizing its economic and political provisions to facilitate increasing foreign trade and investment. The underlying reason is the fact that the United States has been Turkey’s largest non-European investor and trade partner.

Turkey’s movement toward Europe can have a multiplier effect on trade and investment links with the United States. As noted recently in the report of the Turkish–U.S. Business Council, “if Turkey’s candidacy proceeds apace and the process of Europeanization continues, this could encourage a useful diversification and deepening of Turkish–US ties, especially on the economic front” (Turkish–U.S. Business Council 2006). The underlying logic behind this scenario is based on the fact that if Turkey improves its domestic environment through administrative streamlining and EU reforms to facilitate foreign investment, this will present an opportunity for American investors along with Europeans. Veteran American Turkey analyst Ian O. Lesser notes the importance of the investment climate for American investors and its possible repercussions in the long term:

Over the longer term, the American business community is more likely to be impressed by improvements in the soft infrastructure for direct investment—effective rule of law, transparency and a predictable regulatory climate—that would come with steady adherence to European practices. Continued integration with Europe could contribute to an aura of attractiveness and familiarity, with transatlantic consequences (Lesser 2006, 87)

The opportunities presented by a liberalized Turkish economy have not been fully explored as of yet by American investors. Whether those opportunities can actually enable the formation of a stable and growing direct investment flow from the United States to Turkey remains to be seen. So far, it has become evident that the effects of limited American FDI in Turkey have had minimal, almost negligible, influence over Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Certainly this does not mean that American FDI is not important for Turkey. On the contrary, American FDI in Turkey is vital to Turkey and the United States, and hence for Turkish–American relations. More likely, “deeper economic ties with Europe and the United States will facilitate, but not assure, closer ties at the strategic level” between Turkey and
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the United States (Lesser 2006, 92). In fact, how the Turkish public views the United States will undoubtedly contribute to the extent it supports (or hinders) Turkey’s strategic alignment with the United States.

ENDNOTES

1. OECD brings together the governments of countries committed to democracy and the market economy from around the world to support sustainable economic growth. For details, see the official website at: http://www.oecd.org. UNCTAD promotes the development-friendly integration of developing countries into the world economy. For details, see the official website at: http://www.unctad.org.


3. Glaister and Tatoglu provide an empirical analysis of the core dimensions of FDI activity based on primary data collected from Western multinationals engaged in either wholly-owned subsidiaries or joint ventures and from local Turkish firms which are the partners in joint ventures in Turkey.


5. Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD). Available at: http://www.tusiad.us.

Chapter 5
Bilateral Trade

Trade is an issue of growing importance that lies at the intersection of two of the biggest concerns facing the American people: the economy and foreign policy.


International trade has always been essential for the prosperity and strength of modern states. Hence, international trade has become a key factor in the domestic economies of trading countries, as well as in their foreign policy formulations. Drezner observes this increasingly important trend by noting that “today, trade policy affects more issues on the U.S. political agenda than ever before; at the same time, the decisions Washington makes have a great impact on the United States and the world” (Drezner 2006).

Undoubtedly, trade becomes a key factor to consider in U.S.–Turkish relations, given the global importance of international trade in foreign policymaking. Since the scope of this book is on U.S.–Turkish relations, I will concentrate on trade between the United States and Turkey (aka bilateral trade) when analyzing domestic and international implications of trade. Bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey is expected to have influence over the view of Turkish public opinion toward the United States. In order to maintain consistency throughout the book, while analyzing the effects of bilateral trade on Turkish public opinion toward the United States, I will follow the three-step structure below:

(1) – Defining the Role of Bilateral Trade in Turkish–American Relations;
(2) – Findings; and
(3) – Analysis.
DEFINING THE ROLE OF BILATERAL TRADE IN TURKISH–AMERICAN RELATIONS

The original basis of contemporary U.S.–Turkish relations dates back to the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and Turkey’s NATO membership in 1952. Thus, the Cold War has left a security-heavy framework for U.S.–Turkish relations. Yet, this does not mean that economic factors such as bilateral trade and investment are unimportant. In fact, today they may be more important than ever before for a sustainable U.S.–Turkish strategic partnership. Business circles and economy bureaucracies of both countries seem to increasingly realize this fact. In the most recent meeting of the Turkish–American Economic Partnership Commission (EPC), both sides declared their common position that “expanding economic ties is part and parcel of the strong and lasting friendship and strategic partnership that the peoples of the United States and Turkey enjoy” (EPC Action Plan 2007).

Economic relations between the United States and Turkey are important for both countries. Bilateral trade has been at the heart of economic relations between the United States and Turkey, and thus is expected to have influence on Turkish public opinion toward the United States. In order to define the role of bilateral trade, I will first define what bilateral trade means, then identify its role in Turkish–American relations, and finally present the hypothesis spells out the projected relationship between bilateral trade and Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Accordingly, I will address the following questions:

1) What is bilateral trade?
2) What is the role of bilateral trade in Turkish–American relations?
3) What are the effects of post 9/11 bilateral trade on Turkish public opinion toward the United States, and how can this effect be measured?

(1) What is bilateral trade?

Bilateral trade can be defined as a branch of international trade that takes place between two countries; in this case, between the United States and Turkey. Thus, throughout the book when I use the term bilateral trade, it does not refer to bilateral trade between any two countries, but it refers specifically to the trade between the United States and Turkey.

International trade and its utilities are identified in the Encyclopedia Britannica as “international trade and the accompanying financial transactions are generally conducted for the purpose of providing a nation with commodities it lacks in exchange for those that it produces in abundance; such transactions,
Bilateral trade refers to trade between the two countries considering all of the above mentioned factors of international trade. As a result, by definition the United States and Turkey are expected to have the above mentioned economic benefits from trading with each other. Yet, this does not mean that bilateral trade does not have important political repercussions.

(2) What is the role of bilateral trade in Turkish–American relations?

The United States and Turkey have a long standing trade relationship. Yet, only recently both countries have begun to realize its untapped potential. The recent report of Izmir Chamber of Commerce noted that “the two nations have been under a general trade and tariff agreement since 1985 and trading levels between the two have increased significantly since then” (Kolkind 2007, 3). Bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey has been institutionalized, and since then significantly increased. Thus, institutionalization of trade by way of agreements has contributed to an increase in bilateral trade.

Turkey’s 2001 economic crisis adversely affected the bilateral trade with the United States, yet “after a trade decline in 2001, the bilateral trade flow has consistently increased. In 2001, the bilateral flow value was $6.16 billion USD. In 2006, this amount had increased to $11.1 billion USD” (Kolkind 2007, 3). Therefore, during the analysis period of this study bilateral trade has been consistently increasing. In fact, bilateral trade has been the only variable studied here that increased consistently in the post-9/11 era. This consistent increase in itself demonstrates the high level that the bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey has achieved. As a result, the United States has become the largest trade partner of Turkey outside the EU.

Bilateral trade with the United States is, for obvious reasons, more important for Turkey than vice versa. A consideration of the size of the economies is sufficient to understand the relative importance of trade with the United States for Turkey. For that reason, increasing bilateral trade with the United States can be attributed to certain American policies with respect to Turkey. Those include for example, the fact that

The United States has included Turkey as a country that can benefit from its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. This program is designed to promote economic growth that provides duty-free entry for more than 4,650 products from 143 designated beneficiary countries and territories. Of these products under GSP; leather, jewelry, and automotive parts all qualify for these duty-free benefits. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, jewelry and
auto parts are also among the top imports under the GSP program accounting for 17.2% and 7.7% of the $26 trillion total imports the United States sees under GSP, respectively (Kolkind 2007, 3).

Including Turkey in the GSP demonstrates American awareness of Turkey’s importance and the importance of bilateral trade in U.S.–Turkish relations. Throughout the history of bilateral relations, there have been good times and bad times between the countries, but these fluctuations have only moderately affected trade. A key question is: To what extent does bilateral trade affect U.S.–Turkish relations in general, and Turkish public opinion toward the United States in particular?

When analyzing the effects of bilateral trade, one needs to keep in mind that that trade is a two-way process. To be more specific, when I mention from the bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey, I mean both Turkish exports to the United States and Turkish imports from the United States. In order to have a profile of bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey, it is important to know what are the major commodities traded between the two countries.

As it can be determined from the rich variety of commodities traded between the two countries, these industries employ many workers in different sectors of the respective economies, ranging from agriculture to mining, and from high-technology to chemistry. These workers cross-cut various segments of society, from rural life (such as cotton) to urbanized university graduate (such as the engineers working in the factories that manufacture aircraft and machinery parts). Such an extensive diversification of trade makes its place in U.S.–Turkish relations even more important, particularly with respect to the effect of bilateral trade on Turkish public opinion toward the United States. For example, in case of diminishing trade with the United States, it is likely that these industries will have to institute labor reduction. In turn, frustrated by their unemployment, those workers and families are likely to blame the United States. Clearly, a decline in Turkish exports to the United States will diminish favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

The importance for bilateral trade has been increasingly recognized by countries. In the most recent U.S.–Turkish Economic Partnership Commission, delegates from both countries agreed to “work together to remove bilateral trade barriers and expand U.S.–Turkish trade and investment” (EPC Action Plan 2007). Today, both the United States and Turkey realize the important potential of working together. Especially in the post–Cold War era, both countries’ interests in joint ventures to explore energy opportunities in the Caucasus and Central Asia have the potential to produce key economic and political benefits.
In the 1990s Turkey initiated the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone (BSECZ) as a new and elaborate model of multinational economic cooperation. The BSECZ created a powerful regional market of 400 million people from countries bordering or near the Black Sea. This region, rich in untapped natural resources and vital industries, is ready for economic and commercial growth and, hence, ready for joint U.S.—Turkish collaboration in order to open these untapped resources to world markets. In this vein,

The delegations noted the achievement of U.S.—Turkish cooperation in realization of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline. Building on this successful cooperation, they agreed to work together to promote regional efforts, that will bolster energy security, peace, and prosperity (EPC Action Plan 2007).

(3) What are the effects of post-9/11 bilateral trade on Turkish public opinion toward the United States, and how can this effect be measured?

Given the importance bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey on U.S.—Turkish relations, it is expected that bilateral trade will influence Turkish public opinion toward the United States. In general, it is expected that an increasing trade volume between the United States and Turkey will be associated with increasing favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Thus, the main hypothesis with respect to bilateral trade and Turkish public opinion toward the United States is:

The more the bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey, the more favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

Table 5.1. Main Turkish Exports to and Imports from the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Export Items (from Turkey to USA)</th>
<th>Main Import Items (from USA to Turkey)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Articles of Apparel and Clothing</td>
<td>Aircraft Spacecraft and Parts Thereof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessories</td>
<td>Electrical Machinery and Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery and Mechanical Appliances</td>
<td>Optical and Photographic Instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and Steel</td>
<td>Pharmaceutical Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles of Stone Plaster, Cement</td>
<td>Organic Chemicals, Vegetable Fats,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearls and Precious Stones</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral Fuels and Oils</td>
<td>Machinery and Mechanical Appliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton and Tobacco</td>
<td>Iron and Steel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkish Embassy to the United States of America (USA).
Chapter 5

Bilateral trade volume is the combination of exports and imports between the trading countries, in this case the United States and Turkey.

Bilateral Trade Volume = Exports + Imports

Based on the composition of bilateral trade, the above hypothesis can be broken down into two workable hypotheses. Since high bilateral trade volume requires high volume of exports as well as imports, the hypotheses project a positive relationship between both exports and imports, and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

H – 1: The more the Turkish exports to the United States, the more favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States.
H – 2: The more the Turkish imports from the United States, the more favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

The data for Turkish exports to and imports from the United States are obtained from OECD international trade database available at: http://www.sourceoecd.org.

FINDINGS

In Figure 5.1 the findings pertinent to the relationship between Turkish exports to the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States in the post-9/11 era are presented. While I used OECD international trade data for Turkish exports, I retained the PEW Global Attitudes

![Figure 5.1. Turkish Exports to the United States and Turkish Public Opinion.](image-url)
Project data in measuring favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States, in order to maintain consistency in the measurement of the dependent variable. Since Figure 5.1 illustrates the relationship between Turkish exports and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States, it tests the relationship projected by the first hypothesis (H – 1). As Figure 5.2 illustrates, there is no consistent parallel between Turkish exports to the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Does this mean that Turkish exports to the United States have no influence at all on Turkish public opinion toward the United States?

In 2000–2003 period, favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States declined from more than 50 percent to less than 15 percent, while Turkish exports to the United States increased slowly, but steadily. Thus, for this period, consistent marginal increases in Turkish exports to the United States play no significant role in increasing American favorability among Turkish public. As a result, the hypothesis (H – 1) did not hold between years 2001–2003; hence, the relationship between Turkish exports to the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States ranges from nonexistent to negative during this period.

In 2003–2004 period, Figure 5.2 depicts rising trends both in Turkish exports to the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Thus, during this period economic and societal relations between the two countries were improving. Considering the parallel trend, one can say that Turkish exports were associated with more favorable feeling toward the United States.

Figure 5.2. Turkish Imports from the United States and Turkish Public Opinion.
States among Turkish public. As a result, the hypothesis \((H - 1)\) supported for 2003–2004 period.

In 2004–2005 period, despite the fact that Turkish exports to the United States score a record high increase, favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States declines. Thus, during this period, the hypothesis \((H - 1)\) is disproved, since the relationship between Turkish exports to the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States was negative during this period.

In 2005–2006 period, both Turkish exports to the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States continued to decline. For that reason, the hypothesis \((H - 1)\) is confirmed for this period. Yet, for the years between 2000 and 2006 the hypothesis fails to consistently project the relationship between Turkish exports to the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Hence, Turkish exports to the United States did not demonstrate any consistently positive influence on Turkish public opinion toward the United States in the post-9/11 era.

As the above figure (Figure 5.2) illustrates the values of Turkish imports from the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States, its data can be used to assess the second hypothesis \((H - 2)\) of this chapter. In order to estimate the influence of Turkish imports from the United States on favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States, one needs to consider parallel (or divergent) trends between Turkish imports and favorable Turkish public opinion.

In the 2000–2002 period, Turkish imports from the United States declined slightly, while Turkish public opinion dropped sharply from over 50 percent to less than 30 percent. This parallel, albeit a negative one, demonstrates that the hypotheses hold for the period; hence, both the Turkish imports and favorable Turkish public opinion declined together, though the magnitudes of declines were quite different. Thus, although there are some parallels, it is difficult to argue for a considerable influence of Turkish imports on favorable Turkish public opinion for this period, given these differences in magnitude.

In the 2002–2003 period, favorable Turkish public opinion continued to decline to as low as 12 percent, while Turkish imports from the United States increased. Thus, for this period the relationship between the Turkish imports from the United States and favorable Turkish opinion toward the United States was negative; hence, the hypothesis \((H - 2)\) did not hold.

In the 2003–2004 period, similar to the parallel in Turkish exports, both Turkish imports from the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States increased. Thus, this period confirmed the second hypothesis \((H - 2)\). Overall, in this period economic and societal relations were mutually reinforcing.
In the 2004–2006 period, as Figure 5.2 illustrates, the Turkish imports to the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States went on divergent paths. While Turkish imports from the United States increased consistently, favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States declined considerably. Thus, during this period, the relationship between the Turkish imports and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States was negative. Considering the inconsistency of trends between the Turkish imports from the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States, the second hypothesis (H – 2) did not hold in the post-9/11 era. As a result, since both of the subhypotheses (H – 1 and H – 2) did not hold, I can conclude that bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey has had no consistent influence on Turkish public opinion toward the United States in the post-9/11 era. Does this mean that Turkish people do not view trade with the United States as important? If so, why has the United States been consistently the largest non-EU trading partner of Turkey? What is the role of bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey in U.S.–Turkish relations in general, and in Turkish public opinion toward the United States in particular? None of these questions have simple, straightforward answers, but thoughtful responses to these questions demand careful analysis.

**ANALYSIS**

President Bush has raised our economic relations with Turkey to a strategic level; we are pursuing every effort to increase our trade and investment from a base that is admittedly too low.

—Paul Wolfowitz (Speech at Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation 2002)

As the former Deputy U.S. Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz admitted, bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey has been “too low.” Especially considering the depth of strategic partnership between the two countries, the economic side of the relationship is definitely lagging behind the military side. Undoubtedly, this negligence limits any potential influence that bilateral trade and investment might have had, if their potential had been fully explored.

To better illustrate the inadequacy of U.S–Turkish bilateral trade, it is useful to compare U.S. trade with other European economies of similar size with Turkey. For example, David Levey observes that “in 2006, U.S. trade with Turkey was less than a third of that with Belgium, a country with about the...
same gross domestic product as Turkey but with only 15 percent of its population” (Levey 2007). Thus, there is definitely room for bilateral trade growth between the United States and Turkey. Especially considering Turkey’s more than 70 million population, the economic relationship has much more potential to grow.

This potential has not been fully explored so far. Expanding economic cooperation by increasing bilateral trade and investment was reiterated in the Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish–American Strategic Partnership document that was concluded by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul on July 5, 2006. Recently, the U.S.–Turkish joint Economic Partnership Commission (EPC) has underlined that “expanding economic ties is part and parcel of the strong and lasting friendship and strategic partnership that the peoples of the United States and Turkey enjoy” (EPC Action Plan 2007). Despite these high-level recognitions, in practice U.S.–Turkish economic cooperation still has long way to go. Toward this objective, Turkish and American delegations agreed to series of measures to improve U.S.–Turkish bilateral economic ties. Some of the most important ones are:

- The U.S. Department of Commerce, the Turkish Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade, and the Treasury will identify specific impediments to greater bilateral trade and investment, including but not limited to intellectual property rights, transparency, and anti-dumping procedures.
- The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) and the Department of State will cooperate with the Turkish Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade to encourage Turkish companies to compete for regional reconstruction and development projects sponsored by the United States.
- The U.S. Department of State and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will explore the idea of joint production opportunities in the region, working to encourage the Turkish and American private sectors to promote economic growth, opportunity and development in strategic regions, such as Iraq, Georgia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and the West Bank and Gaza.
- The relevant U.S. and Turkish authorities will encourage their energy companies to explore areas for cooperation in Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Central Asia in oil and gas exploration and development projects.
- The two countries will work together to improve the climate for bilateral investment, remove bilateral trade barriers, and expand U.S.–Turkish trade and investment (EPC Action Plan 2007).

It is important to note that the potential for U.S.–Turkish economic cooperation, in fact, goes far beyond the mere boundaries of these two countries. Thus,
Bilateral Trade

when analyzing the role of bilateral trade in U.S.–Turkish relations, it is not only the amount of imports and exports flowing between the two countries one needs to consider, but also the untapped potential of joint cooperation between Turkish and American firms. This kind of genuine cooperation is likely to contribute more to an increasingly favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Even if such arrangements may take awhile to gain grassroots appeal, at the very least there will a plethora of Turkish and American businesspeople to ameliorate the effects of political crises like the one in 2003 and provide some damage control in relations over the long term. In his testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, Çağaptay recommended that

When the U.S.–Turkish relations faced a crisis in 2003, the deterioration in the relationship was compounded by the fact that bilateral military and political ties were not supported by strong economic relations. The two countries now need to focus on legislation to bolster economic ties, including steps such as revisiting the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) issue as well as increasing U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey to ensure that the next time the relationship faces a crisis, a powerful business lobby will step in for damage control, something that did not happen in 2003. (Çagaptay 2005)

If U.S.–Turkish relations are to endure crises, the need for strong U.S.–Turkish economic ties is essential in the long term. The very people (i.e. Turkish–American businesspeople and their workers) involved in joint ventures are the ones who can be the driving force for keeping U.S.–Turkish ties strong, despite future political uncertainties. In the end, there is no bilateral relationship without problems; then the key is how partners overcome the crises they face, and how they forge a stronger strategic partnership. In this process, businesses play important roles; yet there are also certain steps that need to be taken by foreign policymakers. For example, according to a recent study “using a recent cross-section of data covering 22 large exporters and 200 import destinations: bilateral exports rise by approximately six to ten per cent for each additional consulate abroad” (Rose 2007, 36). Thus, economic relations tend to follow foreign policy priorities as well. Diplomats and businesspeople must work hand-in-hand.

Given this interaction between international economics and foreign policy, it is important to consider the role of economics in foreign policy as well, and the well-being of the populations of countries, since it is this very population that is entitled to vote for its government in democracies. For example, Gresser illustrates Turkey’s socio-economic conditions during its recovery from 2001 economic crisis by noting that “while growth has returned since last year’s deep recession, Turkey’s economy remains fragile: inflation is high, international investor confidence is uncertain, and the Turkish public is anxious”
(Gresser 2002). Since domestic economy is directly related to societal cohesion in Turkey, foreign inflows into the Turkish economy in forms of foreign investment and trade are also important for society in general. Under such circumstances, a well-established U.S.–Turkish economic cooperation in terms of a rising bilateral trade volume and investment is likely to be more influential on Turkish public opinion toward the United States in the long term.

ENDNOTES

1. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense in the administration of President George W. Bush, he was widely seen as one of the most hawkish of the so-called neo-conservatives in the Republican Party. A forceful advocate of U.S. military action, he was one of the main architects of the invasion in Iraq in 2003 (Source: BBC News Profile: Paul Wolfowitz).

Chapter 6

Findings and Conclusions

When unreservedly positive Turkish public attitudes toward the United States are confined to single digits, bilateral relations face a serious challenge—a challenge given further meaning by the heightened international debate about American power and purpose.

—Ian O. Lesser (Survival 2006)¹

In democracies, governments come to power with a public vote. Hence, public opinion is expected to be important in domestic as well as international policymaking in democracies. Turkey and the United States have been allied democracies since 1952. After the Cold War and especially after 9/11, both countries have realized that common values such as commitment to the world of democracy free from terrorism is a major common denominator on the basis of the joint efforts they have been undertaking from the Cold War years to the present day global war on terrorism.

It is essential how the Turkish public weighs the pros and cons of U.S.-Turkish relations, if bilateral relations are going to flourish in the long term. In recent years, Turkish public attitude toward the United States has been increasingly characterized by anti-Americanism. Given that both countries are committed to democracy; this is critical problem for both countries, and above all for U.S.–Turkish relations. Taking into account that this worldwide wave of anti-Americanism has grown after post-9/11 American policies, especially since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, I focused my analysis on the effects of American foreign policy on Turkish public opinion toward the United States in the post-9/11 era. In order to measure the effects of American foreign policy on Turkish public opinion, I used the indicators of American military and economic policies toward Turkey, such as U.S. military and economic
assistance to Turkey, U.S. FDI to Turkey, and bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey. These indicators are the independent variables that are expected to be positively associated with the dependent variable: Turkish public opinion toward the United States. To measure the dependent variable, I used the Pew Global Attitudes Project data, which was the most comprehensive, up-to-date, and foreign policy relevant survey, as compared to other public opinion research conducted by the German Marshall Fund and Gallup Polling. Still, the data for Turkish public opinion toward the United States for 2001 were missing in all the sources I searched. To compensate missing data, I started my analysis from 2000 for which Turkish public opinion data were available. I analyzed the effects of American foreign policy on Turkish public opinion toward the United States between 2000 and 2006.

In this chapter, I will first present the findings of this book, and discuss the broader historical and theoretical questions they raise. After that, I will discuss the policy implications of my findings for both the United States and Turkey. Finally, I will present my suggestions for further research. Accordingly, this chapter consists of the following sections:

(1) – Findings
(2) – Policy Implications

**FINDINGS**

Public opinion now counts in Turkish foreign policymaking, and as polling results suggest, this opinion has turned distinctly anti-American in recent years.

—Ian O. Lesser (*Survival* 2006)

Above all, this study is based on the belief that Turkish public opinion matters in Turkish foreign policymaking. Recently, this supposition has been important more than ever before owing to various changes in the structure of the international system and in the dynamics of Turkish domestic politics. After the Cold War the world has entered into a stage where threats are less existential and, therefore, strategic calculations do not necessarily trump public concerns as readily as had been the case during the Cold War. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and similar terrorist bombings in London, Madrid and Istanbul in the following years demonstrated that states’ foreign policies can have a direct effect on the domestic front more than ever before. Turkey was undertaking a remarkable political reform process to improve its democracy based on the EU standards (i.e., the Copenhagen Criteria).²
The combination of these domestic and international developments has elevated the role of public opinion to an unprecedented level in Turkish foreign policymaking. This means that Turkish public opinion now has become a key ingredient of Turkish foreign policy. It is expected that this key ingredient will play an increasingly important role in Turkey’s relations with its key ally: the United States. This is especially true, considering the fact that favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States has significantly declined since the beginning of the millennium.

As a result of the increasing importance that Turkish public has in the foreign policy of the country and, at the same time, to increasing anti-Americanism, I selected Turkish public opinion toward the United States as the dependent variable. Explaining Turkish public opinion is a multidimensional process, which involves various domestic and international factors. In order to study this process, I needed to analytically narrow down how American foreign policy can influence Turkish public opinion toward the United States. What American policies may contribute to the rise or fall of anti-Americanism in Turkey?

In this book, I undertake to explain Turkish public opinion toward the United States by using variables pertinent to American foreign policy. While there are various ways to assess American foreign policy, for any systematic inquiry there is a need for independent variables that can be measured for the analyzed period. To this end, I selected U.S. military and economic assistance, U.S. FDI, and bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey as the independent variables. These variables can be measured by using USAID and OECD data for the period between 2000 and 2006.

In the following section, I will summarize the findings on the effects of these independent variables on Turkish public opinion toward the United States. When presenting the findings, I will follow this order, based on the chapter sequence of the book:

(1) Findings on the effects of U.S. military assistance to Turkey
(2) Findings on the effects of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey
(3) Findings on the effects of U.S. foreign direct investment to Turkey
(4) Findings on the effects of bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey

(1) Findings on the effects of U.S. military assistance to Turkey

The contemporary U.S.–Turkish partnership is rooted in the military collaboration of both countries under NATO umbrella since 1952 when Turkey joined the organization. Recently, the strong military dimension of the bilateral
relations led many analysts and policy elites in both countries to describe the bilateral relations as the U.S.–Turkish “strategic partnership.” There has been a consensus in the literature that “for many decades, military relations formed the bedrock of the U.S.–Turkish alliance” (Çağaptay 2003).

Considering the major role of military collaboration in bilateral relations, as well as the significance of military in Turkish society, it is expected that U.S. military assistance to Turkey would have an important effect on Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Since the Turkish public closely follows the domestic and international developments pertinent to its security, and thus to its military, it is expected that increasing American military assistance to Turkey will be associated with an increasingly favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

This hypothesis is confirmed for almost all of the period analyzed. From 2002 to 2006, U.S. military assistance to Turkey and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States were positively associated. Thus, either increasing U.S. military assistance to Turkey contributed to the rise of favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States as from 2003 to 2004, or a decline in U.S. military assistance triggered declining levels of favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States in the remaining years analyzed. Two important notes: public opinion data were missing for 2001; and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States has been declining from over 50 percent in 2000 to less than 30 percent in 2002, while U.S. military assistance to Turkey sharply increased from 2001 to 2002 (See Figure – 2.1).

(2) Findings on the effects of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey

When analyzing the effects of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey, it is important to remember that Turkey is a developing economy. Turkey was undertaking a series of legal, political, and economic measures to harmonize its economy with the EU—that has been in customs union with Turkey since 1996—while trying to develop a viable domestic economy. These efforts were shattered by a 2001 economic crisis owing to political instability that came about as a result of series of shifting coalition governments ruling the country during 1990s and until 2002.

After 2001, Turkey was in need of economic assistance to recover from the crisis. Under these circumstances, one would expect U.S. economic assistance to play an important role in Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Especially if this assistance contributes to the revival of Turkey’s crisis-hit production and generates new job, then the U.S. economic assistance to Turkey can be expected to contribute to an increase in favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Thus, the hypothesis projects a
positive association between U.S. economic assistance and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

Although from 2001 to 2002, the United States increased its economic assistance right after the Turkish economic crisis, the U.S. economic assistance to Turkey was inconsistent. From 2002 to 2003, U.S. economic assistance to Turkey sharply declined even below its already low level. This decline was accompanied by a sharp decline in favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States. While the parallel declining trend in both of the variables can be observed from 2002 to 2003, from 2003 onward the effect of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey on Turkish public opinion toward the United States was negligible at best, and characterized inconsistency.

(3) Findings on the effects of U.S. foreign direct investment to Turkey

Recovering from the 2001 economic crisis, Turkey needed foreign direct investment (FDI) as source of capital to revitalize its sagging economy, restore its industry and production sector, and, most critically, to generate new jobs for the millions unemployed as a result of the crisis. Thus, at this critical juncture, American FDI might be expected to have an important positive effect on Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Put another way, if American FDI is associated with more new jobs for Turks, then it is expected to increase favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Thus, the hypothesis posits a positive association between American FDI and Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

Although American FDI to Turkey steadily increased right after the crisis from 2001 to 2003, favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States, nonetheless, sharply declined from 2002 to 2003. In the following years, the American FDI to Turkey and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States continued to follow inconsistent trends, with the exception of the 2004–2005 period, when they both decreased. As a result, the hypothesis has been neither confirmed nor denied, owing to the absence of any consistent effect of American FDI in Turkey on Turkish public opinion toward the United States (See Figure – 4.1). Considering how limited and inconsistent American FDI to Turkey was, it is not surprising that its influence on Turkish public opinion was to be inconsistent and limited. Does this mean that American FDI is not important for Turkish public? American FDI has been so limited and inconsistent that this question cannot be answered, The Turkish public did not have a chance to discover the potential importance of American FDI for Turkey, and hence for U.S.-Turkish relations.
(4) Findings on the effects of bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey

When analyzing the effects of the U.S.–Turkish bilateral trade on Turkish public opinion toward the United States, it is important to take into account both Turkish exports to the United States and Turkish imports from the United States. Accordingly, I categorized the export and import data separately to facilitate the analysis and to check to what extent Turkish exports to, and imports from, the United States have reinforcing (or diverging) effects on Turkish public opinion toward the United States. The core hypothesis about their projected relationship with Turkish public opinion toward the United States remained the same, that both increasing exports and imports are expected to be positively associated with increasing favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

Turkish exports to the United States increased slowly, but steadily, while favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States declined from more than 50 per cent to less than 15 percent from 2000 to 2003. As a result, the hypothesis did not hold between years 2001–2003; hence, the relationship between Turkish exports to the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States ranges from nonexistent to negative during this period (See Figure – 5.1). From 2003 to 2004, both Turkish exports to the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States increased. From 2004 to 2005, despite the fact that Turkish exports to the United States scored a record high increase, favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States declined. From 2005 to 2006, both Turkish exports to the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States declined. As a result, although some parallel trends are observed, there is no consistent relationship between Turkish exports to the United States and Turkish public opinion toward the United States.

From 2000 to 2002, Turkish imports from the United States declined, while Turkish public opinion dropped sharply from over 50 per cent to less than 30 per cent. This parallel trend, though a negative one, would have been confirming the hypothesized positive relationship between Turkish imports from the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States, if it had been consistent. However, in the following periods such consistency is simply absent. For example, from 2002 to 2003 favorable Turkish public opinion declined to about 12 per cent, while Turkish imports from the United States increased. While from 2003 to 2004, both Turkish imports from the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States increased (similar to the parallel in Turkish exports), from 2004 to 2006 the Turkish imports to the United States and favorable Turkish
public opinion toward the United States went on divergent paths again. As a result, there is no consistent trend between Turkish imports from the United States and favorable Turkish public opinion.

All in all, the lack of consistent effect of Turkish exports to, and imports from, the United States on Turkish public opinion demonstrates that bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey has not been an influential factor on Turks’ view of the United States. Does this mean than Turkish public finds bilateral trade with the United States unimportant? On the contrary, the Turkish public has increasingly recognized the importance of bilateral trade with the United States. That is why the United States has consistently been the largest non-EU trading partner of Turkey. The effects of the recent increases in the bilateral trade remain to be seen in the years to come.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Regarding resentment in Turkey toward the United States, the bad news is that it is widespread. The good news is that it is not deep-rooted. So that means it is reversible and if the right policy steps are taken, it wouldn’t be very surprising to see Turkish public opinion swayed in favor of the United States very fast, in a short amount of time.

—Soner Çağaptay (Çağaptay 2005)

It is important to note that Turkish public is not inherently hateful toward the United States. Thus, as Çağaptay observes, increasingly widespread anti-Americanism in Turkey is not an accumulation of entrenched antipathy toward the United States for long years, but rather a resentment of Turkish public over recent American policies. In fact, Turkish public opinion has been known for harboring generally favorable views toward the United States until 9/11 (Lesser 2006; Çağaptay 2005). In 2000, more than half (52 percent) of Turkish people viewed the United States favorably. Hence, it is essential to make it clear that the underlying reason for increasingly unfavorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States is American foreign policy. Since the core reason for the increasing anti-Americanism in Turkey is political, this study has important policy implications for the United States, Turkey, and, hence, for U.S.—Turkish relations. Accordingly, I will discuss the policy implications for each country, and how these country specific implications can affect the bilateral relations in the long term:

(1) Policy implications for the United States
(2) Policy implications for Turkey
(1) Policy implications for the United States

Few relationships over the past century have been as critical and at the same time mutually beneficial as our relationship with Turkey.

—Elton Gallegly (Gallegly 2005)

Turkey’s critical importance for the United States has been generally recognized by American foreign policy elites (Gallegly 2005; Wolfowitz 2002). This recognition is based on various strategic characteristics of Turkey that have become ever more important after 9/11. In his statement to the House Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats, Çağaptay explains why Turkey is still important for the United States: “Turkey straddles two regions of chief importance to the U.S. The Middle East to the south, and Central Eurasia—an energy rich area with a large Muslim population, stretching from the Black Sea to the Caucasus and Central Asia—to the north. Given its location and because of post-September 11 U.S. priorities towards these regions, Turkey bears utmost importance for U.S. policymakers” (Çağaptay 2005).

Çağaptay succinctly outlines the very tangible elements of Turkey’s importance for the post-9/11 American global strategy. His remarks are based on the existing U.S.–Turkish relations, in which strategic cooperation means military collaboration in practice. As a matter of fact, Turkey has been credited for this cooperation in a U.S. Senate resolution on “Expressing the importance of friendship and cooperation between the United States and Turkey” (Senate Resolution 358). The resolution was introduced to U.S. Senate by Senators Gordon Smith (R-OR) and Robert Byrd (D-WV) on December 16, 2005.

Given the fact that the resolution was introduced by the senators from both the Republican and the Democratic parties demonstrated that Turkey’s importance had bipartisan recognition. In this resolution, the importance of U.S.–Turkish strategic cooperation was outlined by concrete examples from various joint international missions, such as:

The Government of Turkey has made its base in Incirlik available for United States missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas Secretary of Defense Robert Gates credits United States air bases in Turkey with handling 70 percent of all air cargo deployed into Iraq; whereas 95 percent of the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protective vehicles (MRAPs) deployed into Iraq transit through air bases in Turkey. (Senate Resolution 358)

Turkey’s strategic importance for the United States has been recognized by U.S. policymakers and analysts alike (Fuller 2007; Lesser 2006; Gallegly 2005; Wolfowitz 2002). Yet, one needs to question whether this explains all
of why Turkey matters. More specifically, is it Turkey’s geopolitical location that makes Turkey strategically important for the United States? Although the importance of Turkey’s geographical position is undeniable, is this only feature that makes Turkey strategically important? If so, why are both the United States and Turkey dissatisfied with the current level of bilateral relations, based on a fairly well-functioning military cooperation? If not, then it is time to realize that “this real estate agent’s view of strategy—‘location, location, location’—has not served either side well in a post-containment era of diffuse regional problems, less-than-existential threats, and new debates about national power and purpose on both sides of the Atlantic” (Lesser 2006).

As a result, the United States needs to realize that this security-heavy framework of the Cold War years is no longer sufficient to address the diverse—economic and political, not just military—requirements of the post-9/11 era.

Alongside the changes in the international system, Turkey has been transforming as well. Turkey became a democracy by EU-standards by fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria and beginning the accession negotiations in 2005. Here it is important to note that the emphasis is on “by the EU-standards,” since as I have explained earlier the Copenhagen Criteria of the EU demands very specific legal and political reforms, so as to assure that democratic institutions are functioning “by the EU standards.” As a result of a series of legal and political reforms the role of Turkish government and parliament in Turkish foreign policy were enhanced. Accordingly, Turkish public opinion has become more influential in Turkish foreign policy. This transformation had important effects on U.S.–Turkish relations. Skeptics may rush to recall the Turkish parliament’s rejection of the resolution to allow U.S. troops to pass through Turkish soil to open a northern front against Iraq in 2003. Many tend to forget, however, that it was a democratic decision and Turkish “Prime Minister Erdogan respects and must answer to his public opinion, as does our President and Congress” (Barkey 2005). It is important to note that although Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) had a parliamentary majority, it failed to pass the resolution owing to the pressure from Turkish public, which was overwhelmingly against the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Therefore, in present-day Turkey the United States needs to take into account the importance of the Turkish public in the shaping of Turkish foreign policymaking. This is the most important policy implication of this study for the United States.

As a matter of fact, if the importance of Turkish public opinion in Turkish foreign policy is weighed carefully, Turkey’s democracy is an important strategic asset for the United States. In an era of American-proclaimed democracy-promotion in the greater Middle East, “Turkey is a strong example of a predominantly Muslim country with a true representative democratic
government” (Senate Resolution 358). Thus, not only its location but the fact that Turkey is a stable Western-style democracy makes a closer relationship between Turkey and the United States attractive for both sides.

This conclusion is difficult to convey effectively to the United States, given the remaining high levels of anti-Americanism in Turkish society. Thus, the increasingly unfavorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States not only hampers U.S.–Turkish relations, but it also diminishes the value of Turkish democracy for the United States. As a result, the American image abroad becomes damaged, especially among countries with predominantly Muslim populations. Around the world, “dislike of the U.S. is accentuated in Muslim countries, [but] most disturbing is a decline in favorable ratings in countries like Turkey and Pakistan, countries key to the war on terrorism or to any war with Iraq,” says Andrew Kohut, director of The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (quoted by La Franchi 2002). Therefore, it is evident that failing to stop the rise of unfavorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States carries with it much greater risks than just losing Turkey. Accordingly, unless the United States takes some steps to improve its image among Turkish public, it is likely that American global policies such as the global war on terrorism and democracy promotion may suffer a serious credibility crisis, notably among the one billion Muslims of the world.

Throughout the book, I have analyzed the effects of the established contours of U.S.–Turkish relations with respect to Turkish public opinion toward the United States. While U.S. military assistance to Turkey proved to be positively associated with favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States for almost the entire period, economy related variables such as U.S. economic assistance and U.S. FDI to Turkey, as well as bilateral trade, displayed inconsistent effects on Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Thus, traditional American overemphasis on the effectiveness of using economic incentives, such as U.S. grants, loans, credit guarantees, trade advantages, is demystified with respect to Turkey. Especially, widespread portrayals of U.S.-Turkish negotiations prior to the Iraq war, as Turkish policymakers’ bargained for more U.S. economic aid, was far from being representative of the true nature of the negotiations. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs of the time, Abdullah Gul, clearly denied these portrayals by noting that “intentionally or not, Turkey has in recent months been portrayed as a nation that bargains over what economic benefits it can get for its stance on Iraq, which is inaccurate” (Gul 2003). These allegations were not only inaccurate, but also, more critically, they were counter-productive in influencing Turkish public opinion toward the United States. Therefore, the United States needs to understand that Turkish public opinion is not for sale. Hence, trying to influence Turkish public opinion by using economic instruments can alienate
the Turkish public, especially when the security of its country is at stake, as in the case of the U.S. invasion of Iraq because of the potential of northern Iraq becoming a safe haven for terrorists attacking Turkey, as a result of the instability caused by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Accordingly, unless the United States becomes more careful in the use and public framing (portrayal) of its economic instruments, these instruments are likely to consistently backfire and, thus, be counter-productive in advancing American image and foreign policy.

The fact that the American image abroad and U.S. foreign policy go hand in hand was acknowledged in the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Its report states that “International public opinion is influential in the success of public policy objectives” (9/11 Commission Report 2004).

All in all, advancing America’s image abroad is an essential part of protecting American national security and protecting American interests abroad. To this end, “the trend toward strongly negative attitudes about the United States might be reversed, or at least offset, by new policy initiatives seen as favorable to Turkish interests” (Lesser 2006).

A U.S. Senate resolution outlines some of the most critical issues in which the United States needs to take initiative:

Whereas the Secretary of State has listed the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which has taken up arms against Turkey since its founding, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Senate

(1) reiterates its strong support for the strategic alliance between the United States and Turkey;
(2) urges Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey to communicate the continuing support of the Senate and of the people of the United States to the people of Turkey;
(3) condemns the violent attacks conducted by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party over the last 2 decades;
(4) urges Kurdish leaders in Iraq to deny safe harbor for terrorists and to recognize bilateral agreements between Iraq and Turkey for cooperation against terrorism;
(5) encourages the Government of Turkey and the Government of Iraq to continue to work together to end the threat of terrorism. (Senate Resolution 358)

This U.S. Senate resolution demonstrated an acknowledgement of the most critical problems in U.S.–Turkish relations in recent years. Thus, this is an important step forward for U.S.–Turkish relations. Still, unless this
acknowledgement is substantiated by American support to Turkish counter-terrorism efforts, the Turkish public is unlikely to be convinced that the United States is a true ally of Turkey. However, “if the United States showed its commitment to Turkey in the fight against the PKK, Turkish majority would quickly be swayed in favor of America” (Çağaptay 2005). Observing increases in favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States when casualties from terrorism decline in Turkey will be the ultimate success for U.S.–Turkish counter-terrorism cooperation, and hence for Turkish–American relations.

(2) Policy implications for Turkey

Turkey’s bonds with the United States will thrive because they are based on common values like democracy, freedom, and a market economy.

—President of the Republic of Turkey, Abdullah Gül (Gul 2003)

Despite the severe decline of American favorability among Turks, Turkish elites generally harbored positive views toward the United States. Even at difficult times, Turkish elites emphasize the common values and interests both countries share along with the importance of Turkish–American cooperation for Turkish foreign policy and for stability and peace in the regions surrounding Turkey. Nevertheless, “in Turkey, domestic and regional factors have driven policymakers and the public toward a more wary and ambivalent approach to relations with the United States. Some of these elements may be transitory, but others are likely to prove durable” (Lesser 2006). In this vein, it is important to remember that in the end it is the Turkish public that elects the elites to office, as is the case in any democracy. Therefore, elected policymakers have to take into account public opinion, if they aim for the continuation of their professional and political careers. Considering that recent surveys indicate that “Turkish public attitudes toward the United States are now the most negative in Europe” (Lesser 2006), Turkish policymakers have to convey the public pressure they are faced to their American counterparts. As a result, the mutual understanding between the policy elites of the two countries can be improved and bilateral relations can better address Turkish public concerns.

While the United States can do more to improve ties, there are also ways that Ankara can contribute to improve U.S.–Turkish relations. For example, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has come forth with a much needed clear vision on U.S.–Turkish relationship. On April 27, 2005, he said: “the Turkish nation is aware of the fact that the two countries need each other today and tomorrow.” Refuting the claims of Turkish opposition to the United States he added: “On the contrary, Turkish people appreciate U.S. support for the EU,
and against terrorism. Continued friendly efforts from the U.S. will contribute to the development of U.S.–Turkish relations” (Quoted in Çağaptay 2005). Thus, the Turkish Prime Minister has tried to court favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States and, when that was not enough, to frame ongoing U.S.-Turkish relations in a favorable manner. Also, it is important to note that Erdogan hinted to the United States the way it might improve its image in the eye of the Turkish public. In his last sentence, he used the phrase “Turkish people appreciate” American support for the EU and in counter-terrorism.

One way of improving relations is to know and clearly state what needs to be done, as discussed in Erdogan’s statements above. Another way is to be able to look forward. In this respect, Erdogan also stressed that “Turkey–U.S. cooperation should continue with regard to Iraq, solution of Arab–Israeli conflict, the Caucasus, stability in Central Asia, reform efforts in the Middle East, reconstruction of Afghanistan, fight with terrorism and energy security” (Quoted in Çağaptay 2005). Therefore, the Turkish Prime Minister believes that there are a range of issues that Turkey and the United States can cooperate together on over the short term.

In the long term, in order to have a more crisis-resistant and viable strategic partnership, Turkey needs more established economic ties with the United States. To this end, Turkey must further improve its economy and laws, so as to attract more American FDI. Coupled with growing bilateral trade, increasing American FDI in Turkey can become a clearinghouse for a powerful Turkish–American business lobby that can support bilateral cooperation both in Washington and in Ankara.

When the U.S.–Turkish relations faced a crisis in 2003, the deterioration in the relationship was compounded by the fact that bilateral military and political ties were not supported by strong economic relations. The two countries now need to focus on legislation to bolster economic ties, including steps such as revisiting the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) issue as well as increasing U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Turkey to ensure that the next time the relationship faces a crisis, a powerful business lobby will step in for damage control, something that did not happen in 2003. (Çağaptay 2005).

In addition, increasing American FDI would mean more jobs for Turks working for American firms. As a result, Turkish public is likely to start viewing U.S.–Turkish relations as more productive and well-established, and, as a result, the United States as a true ally of Turkey. In the end, “what joins us as allies is far greater than what separates us” (Barkey 2005). Nurturing a strong Turkish–American business lobby will not only improve economic relationships, but will likely to encourage both sides to protect and promote relational ties across the board.
CONCLUSION

Today, America’s image abroad does not only refer to how foreign policy elites view the United States, but also the perception of foreign publics. During the George W. Bush administration, American foreign policy have encountered with the costs of overlooking international public opinion. Considerable declines of support for American foreign policy among most of the NATO allies and countries with Muslim populations are clear indicators of this trend, which its consequences remain unclear and dangerous. In this regard, the importance of public opinion as a foreign policy ingredient appears to be more predominant than ever before. Thus, anyone who cares about the prospects and challenges to American foreign policy needs to ask: What can American foreign policy do to influence international public opinion toward the United States?

To address this question, I explored various U.S. foreign policy options in case of Turkey in the post-9/11 era. Throughout the book, I compared the effects of U.S. military and economic assistance, American FDI to Turkey, and bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey on Turkish public opinion toward the United States. While military assistance has a strong positive effect throughout the analyzed period, the economic instruments had a limited and inconsistent effect on Turkish public opinion. These key findings can be attributed to the existing security-based framework of U.S.–Turkish relations, and to the very limited capacity of economic instruments. The analysis of these contours suggests some significant policy implications, as outlined above.

Still, since U.S.–Turkish relations tend to be a result of multiple domestic and international factors, no discussion of policy implications will be exhaustive. Those domestic and international factors that the United States and Turkey jointly influence (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan) and are influenced by (e.g., EU enlargement and Central Asia energy transit projects) constitute major areas for further research.

ENDNOTES

1. Ian O. Lesser is Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, and President, Mediterranean Advisors, LLC. He is a former member of the Policy Planning Staff in the U.S. Department of State.

2. The Copenhagen Criteria of the European Union (EU) is a membership criteria requiring that the candidate country must have achieved: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. For further details, see the official enlargement website of the EU at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm.

3. Elton Gallegly (R) served as a representative in Congress from the State of California. His above remarks are from his statement to the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats, which he chairs.
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